Java Deserialization Vulnerabilities - The Forgotten Bug Class (RuhrSec Edition)

Java Deserialization Vulnerabilities
– The Forgotten Bug Class
Matthias Kaiser
(@matthias_kaiser)

About me
 Head of Vulnerability Research at Code White in Ulm, Germany
 Specialized on (server-side) Java
 Found bugs in products of Oracle, VMware, IBM, SAP, Symantec, Apache, Adobe, etc.
 Recently looking more into the Windows world and client-side stuff
28.04.2016
@matthias_kaiser

Agenda
 Introduction
 Java’s Object Serialization
 What’s the problem with it
 A history of bugs
 Finding and exploiting
 Code White’s bug parade + a RuhrSec special
 More to come?
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Should you care?
 If your client is running server products of
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you SHOULD!

Some facts
 The bug class exists for more than 10 years
 Most ignored bug class in the server-side Java world until 2015
 A easy way to get reliable RCE on a server
 Architecture independent exploitation
 With Java deserialization vulnerabilities you can pwn a corp easily!
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Where is it used
 Several J2EE/JEE core technologies rely on serialization
 Remote Method Invocation (RMI)
 Java Management Extension (JMX)
 Java Message Service (JMS)
 Java Server Faces implementations (ViewState)
 Communication between JVMs in general (because devs are lazy :-)
 Custom application protocols running on top of http, etc.
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What is serialization?
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Object
File
Network
Database
ObjectStream of bytes Stream of bytes
Serialization Deserialization

Overview of Java’s Object Serialization Protocol
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Magic
class name
field type
class field
Class description info
TC_OBJECT
TC_CLASSDESC
classdata[]

There is protocol spec and a grammar
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https://docs.oracle.com/javase/8/docs/platform/serialization/spec/protocol.html

Deserializing an object
What could possibly go wrong here?
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What’s the problem
 ObjectInputStream doesn’t include validation features in its API
 All serializable classes that the current classloader can locate and load can get deserialized
 Although a class cast exception might occur in the end, the object will be created!
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What’s the problem #2
 A developer can customize the (de)-serialization of a serializable class
 Implement methods writeObject(), writeReplace(), readObject() and readResolve()
 ObjectInputStream invokes readObject() and readResolve()
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Under our control!

 Further methods can be triggered by using certain classes as a "trampoline"
 Object.toString() using e.g. javax.management.BadAttributeValueExpException
 Object.hashCode() using e.g. java.util.HashMap
 Comparator.compare() using e.g. java.util.PriorityQueue
 etc.
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Trampoline
class
Target
class

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javax.management.BadAttributeValueExpException
1. Reading the field "val"
2. Calling "toString()" on "val"

History of Java deserialization vulnerabilities
JRE vulnerabilities
(DoS)
Mark Schönefeld
2006
JSF Viewstate
XSS/DoS
Sun Java Web Console
Luca Carretoni
2008
CVE-2011-2894
Spring Framework RCE
Wouter Coekaerts
CVE-2012-4858
IBM Cognos Business
Intelligence RCE
Pierre Ernst
2011 2012
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History of Java deserialization vulnerabilities
CVE-2013-1768 Apache OpenJPA RCE
CVE-2013-1777 Apache Geronimo 3 RCE
CVE-2013-2186 Apache commons-fileupload RCE
Pierre Ernst
CVE-2015-3253 Groovy RCE
CVE-2015-7501 Commons-Collection RCE
Gabriel Lawrence and Chris Frohoff
CVE-2013-2165 JBoss RichFaces RCE
Takeshi Terada
2013 2015
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Finding is trivial
 Do the "grep" thing on "readObject()"
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Finding is trivial
 Use an IDE like Intellij or Eclipse and trace the call paths to ObjectInputStream.readObject()
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Exploitation
 Exploitation requires a chain of serialized objects triggering interesting functionality e.g.
 writing files
 dynamic method calls using Java’s Reflection API
 etc.
 For such a chain the term "gadget" got established
 Chris Frohoff and others found several gadgets in standard libs
 Let’s look at an example gadget
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Javassist/Weld Gadget
 Gadget utilizes JBoss’ Javassist and Weld framework
 Reported to Oracle with the Weblogic T3 vulnerability
 Works in Oracle Weblogic and JBoss EAP
 Allows us to call a method on a deserialized object
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InterceptorMethodHandler
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Javassist/Weld Gadget summary
 During deserialization a "POST_ACTIVATE" interception will be executed
 We can create an "interceptorHandlerInstances" that defines our deserialized target object as
a handler for a "POST_ACTIVATE" interception
 We can create an "interceptionModel" that defines a method to be executed on our handler for
a "POST_ACTIVATE" interception
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Javassist/Weld Gadget call chain
InterceptorMethodHandler.readObject(ObjectInputStream)
InterceptorMethodHandler.executeInterception(Object, Method, Method, …)
SimpleInterceptionChain.invokeNextInterceptor(InvocationContext)
SimpleMethodInvocation<T>.invoke(InvocationContext)
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SimpleMethodInvocation
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"Return of the Rhino"-Gadget
 Gadget utilizes Rhino Script Engine of Mozilla
 Works with latest Rhino in the classpath
 Oracle applied some hardening to its Rhino version
 So only works Oracle JRE <= jre7u13 
 Works with latest openjdk7-JRE (e.g. on Debian, Ubuntu) 
 Allows us to call a method on a deserialized object
 Will be released on our blog soon
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What to look for?
 Look for methods in serializable classes
 working on files
 triggering reflection (invoking methods, getting/setting properties on beans)
 doing native calls
 etc.
AND being called from
 readObject()
 readResolve()
 toString()
 hashCode()
 finalize()
 any other method being called from a "Trampoline" class
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What to look for?
 Look at serializable classes used in Java reflection proxies
 java.lang.reflect.InvocationHandler implementations
 javassist.util.proxy.MethodHandler implementations
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InvocationHandlerInterface
Proxy
toString() invoke (…) // do smth
invoke (target, toString, args)

What to look for?
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Prints out method being called

What to look for?
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What if InvocationHandler.invoke()
does "scary" things using values from
the serialized object input stream?
Proxy

Making gadget search easier
 Chris Frohoff released a tool for finding gadgets using a graph database
 Using object graph queries for gadget search
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Exploitation tricks
 Adam Gowdiak’s TemplatesImpl
 com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl is serializable
 Allows to define new classes from your byte[ ][ ]
 Calling TemplatesImpl.newTransformer() on deserialized object  Code Execution
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Exploitation tricks
 InitialContext.lookup()
 @zerothoughts published a gadget in Spring’s JtaTransactionManager recently
 Triggers InitialContext.lookup(jndiName)
 Uses "rmi://yourFakeRmiServer/…" as jndiName
 Loads classes from your fake RMI server
 Calling JdbcRowSetImpl.execute() on a deserialized object will do the same 
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Payload generation
 Chris Frohoff released the great tool "ysoserial"
 Makes creation of payloads easy
 Includes gadgets for
 Commons Collection 3 & 4
 Spring
 Groovy
 JRE7 (<= jre7u21)
 Commons BeanUtils
 and even more!
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Custom payloads
 I wouldn’t go for Runtime.getRuntime().exec(cmd) for several reasons
 Most of the gadgets don’t touch the disk 
 With scripting languages your life gets even easier
 Use what’s in the classpath
 Javascript (Rhino, Nashorn)
 Groovy
 Beanshell
 etc.
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Code White’s Bug Parade
 CVE-2015-6554 - Symantec Endpoint Protection Manager RCE
 CVE-2015-6576 - Atlassian Bamboo RCE
 CVE-2015-7253 - Commvault Edge Server RCE
 CVE-2015-7253 - Apache ActiveMQ RCE
 CVE-2015-4582 - Oracle Weblogic RCE
 CVE-2016-1998 - HP Service Manager RCE
 CVE-2016-2173 - Spring AMQP
 NO-CVE-YET - Oracle Hyperion RCE
 NO-CVE-YET - SAP NW AS Java
 Others I can’t talk about (now)
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Oracle Weblogic
 Oracle’s Application Server (acquired from BEA)
 Middleware for core products of Oracle
 Oracle Enterprise Manager
 Oracle VM Manager
 Oracle ESB
 Oracle Hyperion
 Oracle Peoplesoft
 And many more
28.04.2016

CVE-2015-4852 - Oracle Weblogic
 Reported on 21st of July 2015 to Oracle as "Oracle Weblogic T3 Deserialization Remote Code
Execution Vulnerability"
 Detailed advisory with POCs
 Using Chris Frohoff’s Commons Collection Gadget
 Using my Javassist/Weld Gadget
 I recommended to implement "Look-ahead Deserialization" by Pierre Ernst
 Yeah, the one @foxglovesec dropped …
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 Weblogic uses multi-protocol listener architecture
 Channels can be defined listening for several protocols
 The "interesting" protocols are t3 and t3s
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CVE-2015-4852 - T3 Protocol
 Weblogic has its own RMI protocol called T3
 Exists since the early days of Weblogic
 Used for JEE remoting (e.g. Session Beans)
 Used for JMX (e.g. by Weblogic Scripting Tool)
 Can also be tunneled over HTTP (if enabled)
 Check http://target:port/bea_wls_internal/HTTPClntLogin/a.tun
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CVE-2015-4852 - How I found the bug
 Found during my daughter’s midday nap ;-)
 Remembered the time when I was Dev and writing software for NATO systems
 We used to deploy software on Weblogic using T3
 Just wrote some lines to create a T3 connection
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CVE-2015-4852 - How I found the bug
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I haven’t specified any user, right?

T3Client
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1. Checking the protocol
2. Create "RJVM" object
4. Call a RMI method on
on the stub
3. Create a RMI stub

BootServicesStub
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Method id 2
Serializing a UserInfo object

CVE-2015-4852 - Triggering the bug
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Stacktrace of the Weblogic Server while triggering the bug

CVE-2015-4852 - I’m in your UserInfo
BootServicesImpl
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Method id 2

CVE-2015-4852 - I’m in your UserInfo
BootServicesStubImpl
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calls
readObject()

CVE-2015-4852 - POC
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Oracle Weblogic
"Patch" #1:
CPU January 2016
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CVE-2015-4852 - "Patch" #1
 Fixing this doesn’t look easy, serialization is used in the core protocol
 You can find a lot of gadgets in the classpath of Weblogic
 Oracle "patched" it by implementing "Look-ahead" deserialization (by Pierre Ernst)
 But they check against a blacklist in "resolveClass()":
28.04.2016

CVE-2015-4852 - Bypassing "Patch" #1
 Alvaro Muñoz and Christian Schneider released "SerialKiller" at RSA 2016
 collection of gadgets to bypass "Look-ahead" deserialization
 triggering additional call to "readObject()" on an unfilterted "ObjectInputStream" instance
 allows to bypass the "patch" using gadget e.g. "Weblogic1"
 Jacob Baines found another bypass gadget
 utilizes JMS classes from package "weblogic.jms.common"
 e.g. "TextMessageImpl", "XMLMessageImpl", "ObjectMessageImpl", etc.
 I also found it and wanted to drop it here 
 btw. JMS is another external entry point for deserialization 
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Oracle Weblogic
"Patch" #2:
CPU April 2016
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CVE-2015-4852 - "Patch" #2
 Blacklist unchanged, although new gadgets were available!
 The JMS bypass gadgets/entry points were fixed.
 Couple of other changes I need to look at …
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 Alvaro‘s / Christian‘s bypass gadget still works, but I want to show you something new 
 So I started to
 look at "patch" #1
 look for bypass gadgets
 You can imagine what’s coming 
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 com.oracle.sender.provider.standard.Conversation
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 Blacklist implemented in "ClassFilter" blocks classes from package "javassist"
 The only class from "javassist" which is used by gadget is the interface "MethodHandler"
 Interfaces are not checked by the "Look-ahead" deserialization technique
 Javassist/Weld gadget still works, but the "TemplatesImpl" technique is blocked
 As you have seen before you can also use the "JdbcRowSetImpl" technique
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Oracle Weblogic 12.2.1 (fully patched)
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DEMO

More to come?
 Sure! Bugs & Gadgets
 I already mentioned that Java Messaging is using Serialization heavily
 Currently I’m working on the Java Messaging Exploitation Tool (JMET)
 Integrates Chris Frohoff’s ysoserial
 Pwns your queues/topics like a boss!
 Planned to be released around summer ‘16
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Conclusion
 Java Deserialization is no rocket science
 Finding bugs is trivial, exploitation takes more
 So many products affected by it
 Research has started, again …
 This will never end!
28.04.2016

Java Deserialization Vulnerabilities
– The forgotten bug class
Matthias Kaiser

Java Deserialization Vulnerabilities - The Forgotten Bug Class (RuhrSec Edition)

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