Labour, Mobility and Temporary Migration: A Comparative Study of Polish Migration to Wales

Labour, Mobility and Temporary Migration

LABOUR, MOBILITY AND TEMPORARY MIGRATION

A Comparitive Study of Polish Migration to Wales

JULIE KNIGHT, JOHN LEVER AND ANDREW THOMPSON

© Julie Knight, John Lever and Andrew Thompson, 2017

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any material form (including photocopying or storing it in any medium by electronic means and whether or not transiently or incidentally to some other use of this publication) without the written permission of the copyright owner. Applications for the copyright owner’s written permission to reproduce any part of this publication should be addressed to the University of Wales Press, 10 Columbus Walk, Brigantine Place, Cardiff CF10 4UP.

www.uwp.co.uk

British Library CIP Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN: 978-1-78683-080-7

eISBN: 978-1-78683-082-1

The right of Julie Knight, John Lever and Andrew Thompson to be identified as authors of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 79 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

The publisher has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for any external or third-party internet websites referred to in this book, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

Cover image: Welsh/Polish flag montage by Clifford Hayes / www.hayesdesign.co.uk

Contents

List of Abbreviations

PART I

CHAPTER 1: EU Enlargement, Migration and the UK

CHAPTER 2: Theorising Migration – Understanding Motivations, Networks and Mobility

CHAPTER 3: Locations and Research Methodology

PART II

CHAPTER 4: Why Migrate? Motivations and Migrant Decision-Making

CHAPTER 5: Polish Migrants in Cardiff: Changing Motivations in a Diverse City Environment

CHAPTER 6: Polish Workers in Merthyr Tydfil: Happily Resigned to Life in the Valleys?

CHAPTER 7: Polish Migrants in Llanelli: What Happens after the Initial Migration Period?

PART III

CHAPTER 8: ‘Migratory Drift’ (or Why Migrants Nearly Always Stay Longer than Planned)

CHAPTER 9: Polish Migrant Integration

CHAPTER 10: Policy Implications

Notes

References

List of Abbreviations

PART I

1

EU Enlargement, Migration and the UK

Introduction

In 2004, the European Union (EU) expanded to include ten new member states from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). The new member states to join at this time were: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.¹ While Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU in 2007 and Croatia in 2013, the 2004 EU enlargement was one of the most contentious, not least because the strengths of the economies of the existing fifteen member states were juxtaposed with the weaknesses of the economies of the ten new members.² As a result, the 2004 enlargement was met with a variety of responses within the national governments in Europe. Many of the old member states used restrictive policies to curb or completely stop the flow of migrants from CEE countries on a temporary basis. Interestingly, not all of the CEE countries were viewed as a threat to the old member states’ labour markets. Eight of the ten countries posed a concern for old member states. These eight countries became known as the ‘Accession 8’, or ‘A8’, and included all of the aforementioned CEE countries with the exception of Malta and Cyprus.

In the period immediately following accession, thousands of CEE migrants entered the UK, the majority coming from Poland. Academics, policy-makers and the media classified these Polish migrants as young, well-educated and economically motivated individuals who were planning to migrate to the UK for the short term and return home. However, it is only in hindsight, a decade after this enlargement, that academics are beginning to understand how these Polish migrants have influenced the labour market of Britain and how their motivations and characteristics have evolved over time. This is where the book begins: looking back over the past ten years to understand how the Polish migrants have changed in the UK, including their changing labour market mobility, their social network formation and their plans to stay in the UK. The last point is of particular importance as the vast majority of these migrants originally intended to stay in the UK for less than a year. However, ten years after enlargement, many have remained in the UK with no immediate plan to remigrate making their migration marked by temporariness and migratory drift.

Labour, Mobility and Temporary Migration draws on a substantial body of qualitative data derived from interviews with Polish migrants living and working in three localities across the South Wales region – in Cardiff, Llanelli and Merthyr Tydfil – to explore the forces and stories behind one of the largest population movements in recent European history. It will fill a significant gap in the literature on labour migration in the EU in three distinct ways.

First, it is unique in reviewing the topic of Polish migration to the UK over time to understand the continuing evolution of migrants’ motivations and characteristics. This is of particular importance for policy-makers, who have only recently begun to understand the major impact that these migrants have on the British labour market. Migrants almost always plan to come only for a relatively short stay abroad, but the majority stay considerably longer, often years after they had expected to return. Understanding why this ‘migratory drift’ occurs is critical for policy knowledge, especially in learning more about how migrants’ analyses of comparative economic conditions in their home and destination countries influence how far they stretch their stay abroad. This book will contribute to this knowledge because the early studies on which it is based were undertaken as the financial crisis and subsequent recession in the UK were breaking, while the later research was undertaken when the recession was peaking. Our research enables us to show that for as long as migrants are able to secure work, the quality of life in the UK, especially for those with children, has an important bearing on the decision of many to ride out the economic downturn.

Second, the book will fill a gap in the literature on migration to Wales. Historians of Wales have skilfully dissected previous migrations from Ireland and, later, from Italy. However, more contemporary migration patterns to Wales, particularly those from further afield, such as Poland, have not received a significant amount of attention. This book brings together the single largest body of data on Polish migration to Wales which, significantly, was undertaken as it was unfolding after EU enlargement in 2004. It thus provides a unique snapshot of social change in Wales at an important moment when the UK was experiencing and adjusting to an unexpectedly large wave of migration from CEE countries. The experience of Wales, and the lessons of the book, will nevertheless be of wider significance. A striking feature of A8 migration was the movement of migrants to all parts of the UK, and across urban and rural localities alike. Staffing agencies played a key role in shuttling workers to all four corners of the UK, and in the cases of Llanelli and Merthyr Tydfil we are able to report on just how important these commercial middlemen are for labour migration.

Third, the book is unique in its ability to capture the migrants’ story across different localities. As mentioned, many of the studies completed on post-2004 Polish migrants in England and other parts of the UK are largely city-based. It has only been in the recent past that a handful of journal articles have begun to approach the subject of Polish migration from a more spatial dimension focusing on non-city regions; however, these articles focus on specific areas outside of Wales and are not comparable. This comparative study aims to highlight the evolution of post-2004 Poles throughout three distinct regions in the South Wales area, making the implications for its use considerably more widespread.

This last point regarding the comparative spatial considerations is a major theme of this book, which was born out of three independently conducted studies coming together in this monograph. Despite the methodological commonalities across these studies, their findings were considerably different. These variations in the findings make this book essential reading for those interested in understanding the evolution of post-2004 Polish migrants’ characteristics and motivations in the South Wales region. The findings from each study will contribute to three locality chapters – urban, semi-urban and rural – using specific cross-cutting themes to shape each chapter. These cross-cutting themes include, but are not limited to, the following: labour market experiences, human capital development, social network construction and usage, and future plans.

This Introduction will set the stage for the rest of the book by outlining three distinct points. First, the role of history in shaping both EU and UK government policy in relation to migration will be explored to understand why migrants chose to migrate to the UK. Second, the number of CEE migrants, particularly Poles, that have entered the UK since 2004 will be reviewed. Owing to the number of sources that collect information on migrant numbers, as well as the limitations of each of these sources, the number of Poles that actually entered and stayed in the UK is highly contentious. Third, this chapter will review the economic, social and political landscape of Wales to provide the reader with a better understanding of the attractiveness of this country to a new migrant group.

By arranging this chapter in this way, the government hierarchy is subtly presented, highlighting how the EU policy on migration informs UK policy, and how UK policy, with the exception of certain social issues like housing and education, informs Wales policy. This was an intentional effort by the authors to explain how individual countries such as Wales are engaged in a complex political system in regard to migration. The authors also acknowledge that there are significant political, social and economic changes occurring across the EU and the UK at the time of writing. These changes can have an impact on both UK and EU migration policy and the role of devolved governments like the Welsh Assembly Government in future.

The EU referendum on 23 June 2016, with a vote in favour of the UK leaving the EU, has sparked the resignation of a Prime Minister, the appointment of a new Prime Minister with a new Cabinet, and the strong possibility of the UK starting the process to leave the EU.³, ⁴ These changes have all occurred in the course of the last three months, making the topic of migration, particularly from the EU member states into the UK, both a pivotal point of discussion and also an option that may not exist in the near future. As the large-scale migration of EU migrants to Britain formed a significant argument in the Leave campaign in these times of uncertainty, it is of the utmost importance to understand the impact of migration to the UK, and more specifically, Wales.⁵

EU History and the 2004 Enlargement

Over the last fifty years, since the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 which established the EU, the number of EU member states has grown from the six founding members to twenty-eight.⁶ The original aim of the EU was to prevent future conflict among the member states. To meet this aim, the principles of free movement of goods, finance and labour within the EU area were the core tenets to increase cohesion among the member states.⁷, ⁸ The free movement of finance and goods was widely accepted from the outset, particularly with the creation of the Eurozone in 1999; however, the free movement of labour has traditionally been less accepted. For new member states, the right to free movement of labour is traditionally received last, on the date of accession, with the barriers to trade and capital flows being lifted in advance.⁹ The rationale for the free movement of labour is that it would allow supplies of labour to move where a demand for labour exists as well as creating social cohesion among the EU member states.¹⁰ In addition, there are economic benefits associated with the free movement of labour such as a boost in economic productivity and migrants are less likely to claim benefits.¹¹

While the free movement of labour was intended to support both cultural and economic development between the new and the old member states, initially limitations existed for those interested in migrating within the EU for labour purposes. For example, from 1990 to 1993 the EU migrant was expected to be at least in part-time employment in the settlement location, which then allowed a five-year right of abode that was renewable.¹² In 1993 with the Treaty of Maastricht, this limitation was removed, which allowed a truly free movement of labour within the EU member states. This also included European Free Trade Association (EFTA) immigrants, as they were no longer required to register for a visa. In 1997 the Schengen Agreement (1985) which allowed completely free movement, with no passport checks, between thirteen of the fifteen EU member states (excluding Ireland and the UK) was adopted in the Amsterdam Treaty. This treaty made the Schengen Agreement a part of EU law which new EU members would have to adopt. More recently, in 2004, the Free Movement Directive, the core legislation on free movement of labour in the EU, was constructed. This allows the free movement of labour, but, if the ‘EU citizen’ in question does not have a job or a means of financial support in the destination country, then the migrant must return home after three months. If migrants intend to stay beyond the three months, they could be required to register with the host member state. Under this scheme, it is difficult to track intra-EU migrants and for the destination country to have them removed after the three-month period.

This brief review of EU doctrine relating to the free movement of labour highlights two points. First, there is a changing emphasis on labour movement among the member states. Second, with the Free Movement Directive, ‘free movement’ is still not actually possible in the EU among existing members. However, the most severe limitations to labour movement within the EU are established for new member states through transition arrangements which the fifth enlargement of the EU, starting in 2004, clearly demonstrates. The transition arrangements allow a buffer between EU accession and labour movement to reduce the impact of mass migration on the labour markets of the existing EU countries. These arrangements are on a country-to-country basis, subject to a periodic review, and can vary from one accession to another. These restrictions do not traditionally apply to students or self-employed migrants. The transition arrangements for the 2004 accession were set out in the Accession Treaty of 2003.¹³ In the 2004 enlargement of the EU, ‘the provisional arrangements for the transition policy combine a two-phase transition period of five years with a review after two years. There is the possibility of a prolongation for individual member states, if requested, of a period of two years.’¹⁴ In total, with the prolongation of the transition policy by the member state, the transition period is potentially seven years.

For the 2004 enlargement, the individual member states’ transition arrangements were carried out in phases starting on the day of accession on 1 May 2004 and ending, at the latest, on 30 April 2011. To protect their labour markets from the anticipated mass migration of A8 migrants, the existing EU member countries invoked their right to a transition arrangement requiring visas, and visa-like access or a complete delay to access their labour markets. The majority of existing EU members imposed a two- to four-year transition policy to protect their labour markets, while the A8 countries’ economies had time to adjust and potentially provide employment for the would-be labour migrants. However, other countries went to extremes with their policies, either enforcing the maximum transition time of seven years, as was the case with Austria and Germany, or allowing immediate access to the labour markets, as was done by the UK, Ireland and Sweden.

For the maximum-transition policy enforcers, the reason for the extreme limitation had to do with their proximity to the A8 countries, the strength of their economies in comparison, and the historic migration from the A8 countries across their borders. Alternatively, those countries that did not impose a transition policy on the A8 countries refrained because they estimated a low number of inward migrants from the A8 countries owing to the lack of the similar language, the distance between the sending and receiving countries (which influences social networks) and the potential devaluation of qualifications.¹⁵ These reasons for predicting small numbers of migrants were reinforced by EU labour migration history. In 2002, it was found that only 1.5 per cent of EU workers lived in different member states, which was a statistic that had not changed in thirty years.¹⁶ When creating the transition arrangements, the UK government expected to receive inflows of 5,000–13,000 A8 migrants.¹⁷

Although the UK constructed an open transition arrangement, the A8 migrants who were entering the UK were expected to register with the Worker Registration Scheme (WRS). The WRS was similar to the Free Movement Directive. Registration for A8 migrants on the WRS ended in April 2011, but during the course of the 2004–11 period, when the scheme was active, it was used for: gathering statistics on the inflows of A8 migrants and understanding the location within the UK of major migration inflows, the economic impact of these migrant inflows and the type of work the migrants were doing.¹⁸ While there was little incentive for the migrants in signing up for the WRS, they were able to claim certain benefits, if working, only when signed up to the WRS. Claiming benefits, such as job seeker’s allowance, could only occur after the migrant had worked in the UK for twelve consecutive months, with no more than a thirty-day break.¹⁹

The exact number of migrants entering the UK from the date of enlargement onwards varies by data source, and the data on CEE migrants leaving the UK are even more varied.

There are several limitations to WRS data which highlight that, while it is a well-cited source, the WRS may not have accurately captured the number of CEE migrants entering the UK from 2004 to 2011 for the following reasons:

•The registration fee was high for migrants, making them unwilling to register.

•The migrants who were self-employed or students were not counted through the WRS.

•The statistics did not take into account return migration.

•The statistics were cumulative, which made the accurate counting of migrants who re-enter and reapply problematic.

•The regional count did not reflect the actual number of migrants in the area owing to intra-UK migration.

•The scheme was not easily enforced for migrants, or for employers, who were supposed to have the WRS registration before employing the migrant. ²⁰

Despite these limitations, the authors will use the data where possible when discussing the number of Poles in their regions from 2004 to 2011 as this is one of the few data sources that can be narrowed down to local authority level. During this period of time, from 2004 to 2011, the number of Poles entering the UK changed, and the perception of Poles in the UK also changed. With many Poles staying in the UK longer than they and others, expected, the original set of characteristics outlined in the first section of this chapter were no longer relevant. While we can only understand this in hindsight, the implications of a large group of migrants residing in the long term has a significant impact on the social, political and economic environment in the UK.

Polish Migration in the UK: Ten Years after Enlargement

Over ten years since enlargement, Polish migrants continue to arrive in the UK, and many of those who migrated since 2004 continue to thrive in the UK. According to the WRS, from May 2004 to April 2011, over 1 million A8 migrants (1,133, 950) entered the UK.²¹, ²² Throughout this period, 62 per cent, or 703,049, of the A8 migrants entering the UK were from Poland, producing the largest single inflow of migrants to the UK in its history.²³, ²⁴ Comparing National Insurance Number (NINo) with WRS data, Harris, Moran and Bryson highlight the conservative nature of the WRS-produced figures.²⁵ The study found that the NINo allocations for Poles from 2004 to 2009 were 27 per cent higher (with 821,000) than the WRS registrations (597,000) during the same period.²⁶ In view of limitations of the WRS figures, it is interesting that they could be conservative, given their cumulative nature as well as the inability to subtract the number of Poles who left the UK.²⁷ Nonetheless, the 2011 census has 579,000 Poles living in the UK, making this migrant group the second largest (after migrants from India) in the UK at that time.²⁸, ²⁹ The demographic change resulting from this migrant flow is the largest in Europe since the end of WW2.³⁰ With a larger number of Poles entering the UK than originally planned, did any of the other original conceptions of Poles change over time as well?

An array of reports characterised the Polish migrants entering the UK post-enlargement as being young, highly educated, willing to take low-skilled jobs, highly mobile and planning to stay in the UK for the short term.³¹, ³², ³³ Some authors noted the ‘migrant paradox’ with high-skilled workers taking low-skilled jobs, others noted that the Polish migrants were starting to set up ethnic businesses, and yet others focused on the ‘dangers’ of having a supply of labour during a recession and ‘job-taking’.³⁴, ³⁵, ³⁶ Regardless of the positive or negative connotation that research on Polish migrants has taken, academics agree that the aforementioned characterisation of this migrant group has changed over time.³⁷

Many of these once considered ‘short-term’ migrants have remained in the UK and are thriving.³⁸ It is expected that anywhere from 50 to 70 per cent of the migrants that entered the UK from Poland since 2004 have stayed in the UK.³⁹, ⁴⁰ This range is supported by the aforementioned NINo figures in 2009, in contrast to the 2011 census figures. Research suggests that, like nomadic tribes in the Sudan or flocks of birds blown off course, these migrants are ‘drifting’ and have no definite plans to return to Poland or to settle in the UK.⁴¹ More recent research highlights that some Poles return-migrate to Poland only to return to the UK to settle.⁴²

These long-term migrants are making an impact in the UK – spatially, politically and culturally. The Poles’ geographic spread within the UK is of interest.⁴³, ⁴⁴ Unlike other historic migrant groups to enter the UK, through the use of their social networks and recruitment agencies, the Poles are spatially dispersed in rural, urban and semi-urban spaces.⁴⁵ In addition, owing to the academic, media and government interest in this migrant group, the inflow of Poles since 2004 has had an impact on British migration policy. The UK changed its policies towards EU migrants, enacting transition policies for the 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania) and 2013 (Croatia) enlargements.⁴⁶ The UK opened its doors to Bulgarian and Romanian labour migrants in January 2014 and the Croatian labour migrants will be able to enter the UK in 2020, depending on the EU migration policy post-Brexit.⁴⁷ More recently, in the run-up to the referendum, the Leave campaign used the free flow of EU migration as one of the reasons that UK should leave the EU.⁴⁸ In regard to the cultural impact, the British Future survey conducted in December 2013 highlighted that British workers perceive Polish migrants as ‘hard-working’ and ‘making a contribution to Britain’; however, the same survey also reported that British workers perceived Polish migrants as ‘not making an effort to integrate’.⁴⁹ In addition, Amnesty International reported (2016) that hate crimes in the UK against immigrants of all nationalities increased by over 60 per cent in the post-referendum period, highlighting some of the tensions experienced between migrants and the local population.⁵⁰

The fate of the EU migrants currently in the UK or planning to migrate to the UK is in flux. With the referendum results, as well as other events with the new Prime Minister and Cabinet, it is unclear what the situation at the present time is for EU citizens currently living in the UK or planning to enter the UK in the future.

Migrants in Wales 2004–2015

Given the overarching aim of this book in focusing on migration to Wales, the foregoing text sets the stage for the remainder of this chapter and this book. Specifically focusing on Wales, this section will explain the historic migrations to the country, as well as the social and economic attributes of Wales, to provide the reader with a better understanding of what attracted Polish migrants to come there in the post-2004 period.

According to the 2011 UK census, Wales is a country with a population of 3,063,000 people, including migrants and migrant communities.⁵¹ The Annual Population Survey noted that the number of migrants in Wales has increased over