Epistemology in the 21st Century: Five Works

Epistemology in the 21st Century

Five Works

John-Michael Kuczynski

Table of Contents

The Basic Principles of Knowledge Management

Epistemology in an Hour: An Interactive Course

A Crash Course in Epistemology

Epistemology

Empiricism and Its Limits

The Basic Principles of Knowledge Management

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What follows is a brief statement of the most basic principles of the discipline of Knowledge Management (KM).

Without knowledge, nothing can be accomplished. But it is not enough to have knowledge: knowledge must also be organized. And there are two quite different ways in which knowledge must be organized. First, it must be organized within a given individual’s mind. If Smith is to accomplish what he wants to accomplish, or if he is to know what it is worth his while to try to accomplish, it is not enough that he have various bits of knowledge: he must also know how those bits of knowledge bear on one another. If his desire is to eat, it is not enough that Smith know there to be wild boar nearby: Smith must also know that, if he kills and then appropriately prepares the flesh of those boars, he can gratify his desire to eat.

Second, bits of knowledge that are had by different people must be organized. Suppose that Smith and Jones are both hungry. Also suppose that Smith knows the location of some nearby boar but does not know how to hunt and kill them, and that Jones knows how to hunt but doesn’t know the whereabouts of any boars. In that case, each of Smith and Jones is powerless to gratify his desire for boar-meat; but if they share information with each other, they can both gratify their respective desires for boar-meat. In general, bits of information had by different people must often be shared if those various people are to achieve their respective objectives.

Knowledge Management (KM) is the discipline that studies how knowledge is to be acquired and then organized if individuals and pluralities thereof are to achieve their goals. KM is concerned with the acquisition of knowledge by individuals and with the subsequent organization of knowledge within the minds of individuals; and KM is also concerned with the acquisition of knowledge by organizations and with the subsequent organization of knowledge within organizations. KM is also concerned with exchanges of information between individuals, between individuals and organizations, and between organizations.

Let us now state some of the basic principles of KM. We will begin by stating some obvious but important truths.

Individuals have knowledge. (I know that 1+1=2. I know how to tie my shoes.)

Individuals can share knowledge. (I can apprise you of the fact that 1+1=2; I can teach you how to tie your shoes.)

An institution is an organized, goal-oriented plurality of individuals.

In order for an institution to function, its members must share knowledge with one another.

Let us state some important but non-obvious truths.

There appears to be such a thing as collective knowledge. Here is an example. Consider the computer (or electronic reading device) on which you are reading this very document. There isn’t necessarily any one human being who knows how to build that device. And even if there happens to be some one individual who does happen to know exactly how to assemble that device, he personally almost certainly was not responsible for building it, and his having that knowledge very possibly was not to any degree at all responsible for the construction of that device. What was responsible for the construction of that device was the fact that various different people at Microsoft, along with various other corporations, each had little bits of knowledge that, when appropriately integrated with one another through various channels of communication, guided various manufacturing processes and company-decisions in such a way that, in due course, a reading-tablet came into existence.

There thus seems to be a sense in which the Microsoft Corporation knows more than any given one of the people composing it.  Thus, Microsoft as an institution is more knowledgeable, in at least some respects, than any given person composing it, and there is thus such a thing as institutional knowledge. Moreover, institutional knowledge, though obviously in some way or other derivative of various instances of individually had knowledge, cannot in any straightforward way be identified with individual knowledge.

Knowledge-sharing of the just-described sort is a form of Adam Smith’s division of labor. Indeed, wherever there is division of labor, there is institutional knowledge. (No single one of the workers on the Ford Assembly line necessarily knows how to build a Ford. But collectively they have the requisite knowledge, and that collective knowledge, by virtue of being embodied in the appropriate institutional protocols, leads to the production of Ford cars.) And it also seems likely that institutional knowledge exists wherever there is a division of labor.

But even though there is a sense in which an institution tends to know more than its members, there is also a sense in which an institution tends to know less than its members. Suppose that Smith is some brilliant medical researcher at Company X who has discovered a cure for cancer. Given only that Smith knows how to cure cancer, it doesn’t follow that anyone else at Company X knows how to do so. Smith may not have told anyone. Or he may have told some people, but they didn’t believe him or they didn’t understand what he was saying. But even if Smith did tell other people at X and those other people did both understand and believe Smith, it still doesn’t follow that X as an institution has knowledge of how to cure cancer. In order for there to be a significant sense in which X, as a corporation, knows how to cure cancer, it isn’t enough that some, or even all, of the people within X know how to cure cancer. Unless that knowledge has led to the appropriate manufacturing protocols and, more generally, to the appropriate organization-internal protocols, there is no significant sense in which X has institution-level of knowledge of how to cure cancer.

By the same token, echoing what we said a moment ago, even if no one person at X knows how to cure cancer, it may still be that X-internal protocols organize the various bits of knowledge that the individuals at X do have in such a way that X is able to manufacture a cancer-cure. So it may be that if X suitably organize the various bits of knowledge had by X-employees, then knowledge of how to cure cancer may be embodied in X-practices, even if no single person at X knows how to cure cancer.

So in order for X to function properly, information needs to be exchange between X-members, on the one hand, and X-itself, on the other. X must be so organized that the various bits of knowledge had by individual X-associates conduce to X’s corporate objectives.

In general, if an organization is to function properly, it must be possible for the individuals within that organization to exchange information with that organization as a whole.

And in order for that to be possible, the members of the organization must exchange knowledge with one another. It is also necessary, however, that when information is exchanged between organization-members, it be exchanged in a way that allows it to be operationalized in a way that advances that organization’s objectives.

Epistemology in an Hour: An Interactive Course

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Lecture 1 Two kinds of Beliefs

We have beliefs about the world. For example, I believe that it is raining.

We also have beliefs about our beliefs. For example, I believe that I know that it is raining.

Epistemology is concerned with beliefs of the second kind, and its job is to determine what legitimate grounds a given such belief could possibly have.

Epistemology does not ask: Is it raining? Rather, it asks: What legitimate reasons could there be for believing that it is raining?

In general, epistemology is the branch of philosophy that asks: What legitimate reasons can there be for having the beliefs that we have?

Quiz

Which of the following is an example of a belief about a belief?

My belief that 1+2=3.

My belief that it is currently warm outside.

My belief that my computer is working.

My belief that I know that my computer is working.

None of the above

Answer: d

Explanation: Any beliefs on a person’s part as to what he knows are beliefs about beliefs. Beliefs about the weather are not beliefs about beliefs. Nor are beliefs about numbers or computers. 

Lecture 2 An example of what epistemology does

I believe that if I were to drop the vase, it would shatter.

In fact, I believe that I know this.

But how could I possibly have such knowledge? How can one have knowledge of what might have happened but didn't? In other words, how can one have counterfactual knowledge?

Here is how.

The world is governed by causal mechanisms. You kick the ball; the ball moves. The flip the switch; the light turns on. You drop the vase; the vase shatters.

To know that the ball would move if kicked is simply to know of the corresponding causal mechanisms.

Counterfactual knowledge is causal knowledge.

It is knowledge not of non-existent happenings but of existent causal mechanisms.

To know that the vase would have shattered if it had been dropped is simply to know that dropping such vases causes them to shatter.

Problem solved.

This is a textbook-example of what an epistemologists does.

Quiz

True or false? My knowledge that 1+1=2 is a case of counterfactual knowledge.

Answer: False

Explanation: Counterfactual knowledge is knowledge of a counterfactual truth, and 1+1=2 is not such a truth. A counterfactual truth is one that concerns what would have been but isn’t. An example is the proposition that Bill Clinton would not have been elected President had he died upon birth. 1+1=2 clearly does not fall into this category.

True or false? My knowledge that I would be hungry if I had not eaten today is a case of counterfactual knowledge.

Answer: True

Explanation: The proposition that I would be hungry if I had not eaten today is a counterfactual truth, and my knowledge of it is therefore counterfactual knowledge.

Lecture 3 The non-revisionist nature of epistemology

The analysis put forth in the last lecture is consistent with common sense.

According to common sense, we sometimes have counterfactual knowledge; and that analysis, supposing it correct, establishes that common sense is right about this.

In other words, our analysis was non-revisionist.

In epistemology, revisionist answers are usually attempts to cloak failure to find the answer.

For example, many epistemologists have claimed that we cannot possibly know that one event causes another. We can't know that stabbing people negatively affects their health, they say. And sometimes they will back up their position with a superficially plausible argument.

But we obviously do have such knowledge, and people who say otherwise are trying to cover up their failure to account for this fact.

Quiz

Which of the following positions is revisionist?

Knowledge of the past cannot possibly ever provide any rational basis for any beliefs concerning the future.

Knowledge of the past can sometimes provide a rational basis for beliefs concerning the future.

Answer: a

Explanation: We obviously believe a, and we obviously have no choice but to do so; and when people deny a, they are either being disingenuous or are projecting their own epistemic deficiencies onto others.

Lecture 4 Two kinds of skepticism

There are two kinds of skepticism.

There is context-specific skepticism. I am skeptical about Smith's integrity, or I am skeptical about some specific claim of his, for example, his contention that he paid his way through college by playing the stock market.

This kind of skepticism is often rational.

Then there is non-context-specific skepticism, this being skepticism about the very possibility of our having knowledge of a kind that we very much seem to have and that, for all practical purposes, we have to operate on the assumption that we have. The contention that we cannot possibly have knowledge of causal ties falls into this category, as does the contention that knowledge of the present cannot possibly provide a rational basis for any beliefs concerning the future.

This kind of skepticism is about hiding one's failure to find the answer by claiming that there isn't one.

Quiz

Which of the following is a case of context-specific skepticism?

David Hume's contention that we cannot know anything about the future.

Your skepticism about the accuracy of the homeless man's claim that he has an IQ of 180.

Answer: b

Explanation: Whereas Hume’s contention is global in scope, your belief about the homeless man concerns a specific context and is therefore context specific. 

Lecture 5 Knowledge of Truths vs. Awareness of Objects

Pains and tickles are instances of awareness, but they are not knowledge.

Knowledge is knowledge of truths.

Sensory-experiences, such as your visual perceptions of the screen in front of you, serve as the basis of much knowledge. But they are not themselves instances of knowledge. In seeing a rock or a tree, you are aware of something, and that awareness in its turn is likely to lead to knowledge.

But that awareness is not in and of itself knowledge. This is because the object of knowledge is always a truth, and no rock is a truth.

Quiz

True or false? When you have a stomachache, the feeling you are having is knowledge.

Answer: False

Explanation: You can obviously have knowledge