Unlikely Ally: How the Military Fights Climate Change and Protects the Environment

PREFACE

PLAYING POWER GAMES WITH A THREAT MULTIPLIER

September 8, 2011, dawned warm across the American Southwest—nothing new for the region—but by 1:57 p.m. it was 115 degrees in California’s Imperial Valley, much hotter than normal for that time of year. Utility companies in these parts consider September a shoulder season, when customer demands for energy are lower than in peak summer months, and often schedule transmission-maintenance outages. Several important transmission lines were down for repair that particular September day. When a crush of air conditioners powered up across the Imperial Valley and electricity demand spiked, the region’s chief grid and transmission operator for the territory, Arizona Public Service, saw the danger signs in real time. At its North Gila substation, a critical and automatic safety measure kicked in for devices called series capacitors, which were bypassed in order to optimize the voltage on the utility’s transmission line.

An experienced substation technician was dispatched to the North Gila site to perform what’s called switching to isolate the capacitors. He was to execute eleven crucial steps that had to be done in exact order. It was high stress, and he was both on the phone with the APS system operator (required company protocol for switching) and distracted by a maintenance crew he was trying to give instructions to. He missed two steps.

At 3:27 p.m. the massive transmission line that runs through the North Gila substation and carries electricity from Arizona to the Imperial Valley; Northern Baja, Mexico; and San Diego went down. About ten minutes later, residents in Yuma, Arizona, began to lose power. From there the blackout cascaded south and west, affecting more than five million people, some for up to twelve hours. All of the San Diego area lost power. According to a report by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission: The blackout happened near rush hour, on a business day, snarling traffic for hours. Schools and businesses closed, some flights and public transportation were disrupted, water and sewage pumping stations lost power. Marine Corps Air Station Miramar went down. So did Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton in northern San Diego County.

The day it happened, Major General Anthony (Tony) Jackson was just two months shy of retirement after serving thirtysix years in the Marine Corps. As commanding general of Marine Corps Installations West, based at Camp Pendleton, he was the man in charge when the power went out. His command center was equipped with emergency power, and when the blackout rolled over Camp Pendleton some of his diesel generators kicked on for base headquarters. That was the one good thing that happened that day, Jackson said.

Jackson immediately put his base on high alert. My HQ never lost communications within my command, but power was cut to our housing and the other facilities. We had ramifications for water supply. Power was not fully restored to the base until 4:30 a.m.

When the electrical grid goes down—whether compromised by human error, antiquated infrastructure, natural disaster, or cyberattack—the cascading negative consequences can be profound, as those who experienced the 2011 blackout discovered. To put the need for grid security starkly, as did the authors of a 2017 paper for the Truman Center, a nationwide membership organization of veterans, policy analysts, and political advisors created in the aftermath of 9/11 to reconceptualize national security in the twenty-first century, the failure of the electrical grid can be seen as the single point of failure to the American way of life.

Jackson understood the broader implications of being dependent on a power grid he had no control over. If you lose communication with your satellites, if you don’t have the Internet, you’re in trouble and it’s all interrelated with energy policy, he said. We need to be self-sufficient so we can do the business of national security.

Diesel generators kept Jackson’s HQ lit and connected during the massive electricity-system failure. But he didn’t want to depend on fossil fuels for backup going forward. He wanted the US military—the world’s largest single petroleum buyer—to wean itself from its dependence on fossil fuels. This was by no means a radical idea: The federal law that set the Defense Department goal to procure or produce no less than 25 percent renewable energy for its facilities by 2025 was signed by President George W. Bush in 2007. After leading the initial campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq in the early days of those wars, General James Mattis—now Donald Trump’s secretary of defense—called on the Defense Department to unleash us from the tether of fuel. The Marine Corps alone was consuming in excess of 200,000 gallons of fuel per day in Afghanistan during the height of that war. Mattis’s comments came as the army was losing an average of two soldiers for every fifty fuel-supply convoys.

It was during the war in Afghanistan that there was a very clear recognition that the fuel-supply lines were leading to a huge number of deaths and injuries, and that the nexus between security and energy was very real, a former Pentagon official working on energy initiatives told me.

In a speech to the Society of American Military Engineers a few months before the blackout, Jackson—a decorated two-star general and one of the highest-ranking African Americans in the Marine Corps—challenged his audience to think bigger and do better when it came to their role in supporting the military’s mission. He called for a focus on renewable-energy development that would make the nation’s need to do battle in oil-producing countries a thing of the past.

Jackson had been a young major in 1990, and was only two weeks into his new post at the National Military Command Center’s Europe, Middle East, and Africa desk in the Pentagon when he got the call, he said. At first he could not understand the thick accent on the other end of the line, so Jackson asked the man to slow down and repeat himself. ‘The Iraqis. The Iraqis. They are here. This is the American Embassy in Kuwait City. Listen!’ Jackson said he could imagine the frightened man putting the phone to the embassy window. And then I hear the rat a tat tat of machine gun fire.

The general did not even glance at the notes he’d carried to the podium. With his Marine Corps camouflage rolled into wide cuffs over his biceps, he was all business as he leaned closer to the microphone. Two weeks into my Pentagon tour we were at war in the Middle East and we haven’t stopped. A generation has been born since then, and graduated college, and we’re still there. We didn’t get the [lines at gas stations] of the 1970s. We didn’t get the threat when Iraq invaded Kuwait. We seem to be continually willing to spill American blood. Our scientists, our engineers, have not devoted the same effort to conserving and producing energy as was expended on the Manhattan Project for the atom bomb.

In his way, Jackson was just trying to get help following orders: The commandant of the Marine Corps had identified energy as a top priority, setting a goal of increasing renewableenergy consumption by 2020 and echoing others in Pentagon leadership who had announced that energy independence was a priority both at home and abroad. Jackson was also in sync with the state of California. Since 2002, California has had one of the most ambitious renewable-energy policies in the nation. The Renewables Portfolio Standard, passed in Sacramento with bipartisan support, required electric utilities to increase their procurement of renewable-energy resources to 20 percent by 2017. Governor Jerry Brown upped that already impressive ante in his 2015 inaugural address when he called for California to increase its renewables portfolio to 50 percent by 2030.

Since coming to Camp Pendleton in 2009, Jackson had led the charge for all seven of the Marine Corps bases under his command in the western region to ramp up their ability to produce renewable energy. For him, on-site renewable-energy generation was a win-win and a no-brainer: In an emergency that knocked out power to the electricity grid his bases could island and produce their own power independently; renewable-energy generation would also reduce the need for oil from places that didn’t much care for the United States.

Yet even with the winds of change at Jackson’s back, and pushes of support from his military higher-ups and the California legislature, at every critical juncture in his quest to expand on-base renewable-power generation he was met with insurmountable obstacles to success.

WHILE I WAS REPORTING FOR THIS BOOK, current commanding generals and directors of public works at Southern California installations I visited expressed a contemporaneous version of General Jackson’s early frustrations: They’d get a few small renewable-energy projects green-lighted and built but then hit a wall of restrictions. Captain Rich Wiley, the commander of Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, was among the first to voice a complaint, telling me that, Even though we have the capacity to generate more power, we can’t. [We have] limits on our ability to produce renewable energy and provide for the base. He mentioned something called Rule 21 when talking about the limit, but he could not explain what it was.

To be honest, Wiley’s protestations initially struck me as a snow job: a military leader with a crisp khaki flight suit and Robert Redford looks saying that though he wanted to generate more renewable power on base, he couldn’t? Really? Since when had the military started channeling the Sierra Club?

Yet, on a tour of a small solar array near the fence line at China Lake the next day, the base’s Utilities and Energy Management branch head Robert Campos complained about the mysterious restriction as well, saying, It’s a California thing, so all the bases in the state are going to have to deal with it.

Variations on this theme were repeated at Twentynine Palms and at Fort Irwin, where the chief for Master Planning said the base could easily be energy independent but for laws that keep us from generating that much power. One engineer also mentioned an obscure piece of legislation, California Senate Bill (SB) 83, as a culprit but couldn’t tell me how or why.

If the military leadership and engineers at these installations had the will, the know-how, and, in some cases, the environmental permits, why in the world would they be unable to build out renewables capacity? Especially those bases in the Mojave Desert that had thousands of acres of already disturbed land (which could make environmental permitting easier, and opposition from conservation groups less intense) and almost perfectly constant supplies of daytime solar power? It didn’t make sense.

I asked several California energy experts who stated confidently that there were no explicit numerical limits on renewableenergy generation. One in particular noted that in a hard-fought battle in Sacramento between California’s progressive legislature and the state’s investor-owned utilities, renewable-energy advocates had prevailed: Passed in 2013, California Assembly Bill (AB) 327 is landmark energy legislation that lifts the 1-megawatt cap on customer-sited renewable generation that had bedeviled the Marine Corps’ Tony Jackson. The common term for this kind of generation is net energy metering or net metering; it allows customers with solar arrays to export excess energy during the day and get the same number of kilowatt-hours back over the course of the year. With the 2013 passage of AB 327, net metering was allowed for larger systems—with the details, including any cap on system size, to be worked out by regulators at the California Public Utilities Commission. I was told that this victory means that these systems could potentially produce up to 100 percent of their on-site power needs with renewable energy. There is no carve-out military cap in AB 327, they told me. However, the law left it to the regulators to set a cap if the PUC felt it was necessary. If one took her eyes off the ball at AB 327, she’d think the military guys didn’t know what they were talking about.

The whole thing seemed like a wild-goose chase, but in a lastditch effort before turning to other things I contacted someone who works at the nexus between utilities and solar power companies on interconnection issues (and whose proximity to these power players led him to ask, for reasons that will soon become clear, that I not use his name). He is well versed in the subject and an expert on Rule 21 and net energy metering.

ELECTRIC RULE 21, as it’s formally known, has been around a long time, it turns out. First adopted by the California Public Utilities Commission in 1982—several decades before the state began incentivizing and actively promoting the wide deployment of rooftop solar and other types of renewable-energy generation—Rule 21 laid the groundwork for how non-utility-owned generating facilities interconnected their decentralized, or distributed, generation with the electrical grid. As the distributed generation of renewables mushroomed, the complexity of technical and policy issues increased as well. Rule 21 has morphed along the way to try and keep up. In 2013, AB 327 directed the Public Utilities Commission to revise its net metering and Rule 21 rules yet again; allowed that the commission could lift the 1-megawatt cap; and directed that the cost of interconnecting larger facilities under Rule 21 be passed along to the customer.

Very few producers of renewable power—solar, wind, biomass, or fuel cell—are truly off the grid, meaning completely disconnected and independent from their local electric-power provider. Renewable energy is intermittent, while most consumers want electricity on demand. Given that fact, how much should self-generating customers pay for interconnection, and for the operation and upkeep of the electrical grid upon which they continue to depend? Should there be some fixed charges they can’t avoid, so as to ensure that those who can’t afford to (or don’t want to) put solar panels on their roofs, et cetera, don’t get costs shifted onto them? How much should utilities pay for the customer-generated renewable power put onto the grid? Should it be the retail price, so that if customers use at home exactly as much power as they put on the grid, the net cost of their electricity would be $0? If they put more on than they use, how much credit should they receive? The Public Utilities Commission was given direction in AB 327 to answer such questions, then set up its rulemaking schedule and reached its final decisions on these quite complicated and fiercely contested matters in 2016.

The timing of these various rules and regulations is important, so please hang in there.

The Public Utilities Commission issued its new net energy metering rules in January 2016—the result of the process that started after the passage of AB 327. The new rules included the surprise that net metering would be capped only by the customer’s load, meaning that a customer could now generate as much electricity per year as he or she was expected to consume. California produces 44 percent of all the distributed solar power generated in the United States, so the rules of engagement set in motion by 2013’s AB 327 and codified in the commission’s establishment of new net energy metering rules matter a great deal. As California goes, so goes the nation.

But as the Public Utilities Commission was transparently going through its rulemaking and decision-making process, a powerful shadow group was deliberating over the net metering terms as well—a group powerful enough to handicap the military’s ability to fully participate in California’s renewableenergy revolution.

If not for the help of the net metering and Rule 21 expert, I would never have been able to figure this out.

OVER THE PHONE with this expert, I read transcripts from conversations I’d had with base commanders and public works directors. Did these military guys have a legitimate beef? I asked. He said he’d just completed an 8-megawatt interconnection deal with no problem, then added, The net energy metering rules allow considerably larger systems than that. I haven’t looked at the military base issue, but essentially you can do a system of unlimited size, to offset on-site load. He was confident that the military men had been mistaken. The PUC’s final decision was a good outcome, he said, since it streamlined the application process for distributed generation, provided a level playing field regardless of the size of the renewable power project, and made the rules uniform. Toward the end of the conversation, he apologized for not being able to help more but underscored that the new net energy metering rules were a friend and not a foe to renewable-energy producers.

Case closed, I thought. So, I was surprised when I heard from him a few days later. His curiosity piqued by the inquiry, he’d undertaken a deeper dive. His email began: Regarding the NEM [net energy metering] rules for military facilities, there’s a crazy sequence of events that I’ll try to explain.

The bottom line: California military installations do have a 12-megawatt cap on renewable-power generation, and the source of that one-size-fits-all restriction was indeed SB 83, just as one of the military’s engineers had told me. Virtually no other renewable-energy producer in the state has such a restriction, and it wasn’t accidental.

Senate Bill 83 was a seventy-three-page omnibus bill signed into law by Governor Jerry Brown in 2015—after the passage of the landmark AB 327 energy legislation but before the PUC’s decision-making process had been completed. There is no mention of the military or its energy-generation needs in seventytwo-plus pages, but then, plunked into exactly two paragraphs, the military’s renewable-energy generation is capped; its ability to export any excess power back onto the grid is effectively denied and, just to make sure, it’s stipulated that installations won’t be compensated if they do export power. In a final turn of the screw, it is mandated that installations will pay for