Polwar: The Politicization of Military Forces; History, Theory, and Practice

© 2019 . All rights reserved.

No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted by any means without the written permission of the author.

Published by AuthorHouse  06/24/2019

ISBN: 978-1-7283-1351-1 (sc)

ISBN: 978-1-7283-1352-8 (e)

Library of Congress Control Number: 2019906744

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Contents

Acknowledgements

Glossary of Terms

Introduction

PART I Genesis

The Red Army and Birth of Polwar

The Chinese Connection

The Latter Day Chinese Nationalist Polwar System

PART II Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Polwar

Introduction

The Mission

The Organization

The General Political Warfare Department

Political Warfare in Military Units and Organizations

Conclusion

PART III The Relevance Of Polwar Today

Introduction

Egypt’s Central Security Forces Rampage

The U.S. Role: Civil-Military Models and Control

Conclusion

Appendix A Command Relations between the Polwar and General Staffs in the Chinese (Nationalist) Armed Forces

Appendix Functions of the Chinese Nationalist Polwar Staff

Appendix C Chinese Nationalist Polwar Supporting Units

Appendix D Development Of Political Warfare

Appendix E RVNAF Political Warfare Insignia

Selected Bibliography

Notes

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Political Warfare Structure of the PLA

Command and Organization of Polwar Units in the Chinese (Nationalist) Armed Forces

Organizational Chart of the General Political Warfare Department, Ministry of National Defense, (GPWD) (MND) Republic of China

Comparison between CHINAT Polwar Staffs and US General and Special Staffs

RVNAF GPWD Organization

RVNAF Political Indoctrination and Training Department

RVNAF Psywar Department Organization

RVNAF Social Services Department Organization

Social Service Department Morale and Welfare Packets

RVNAF Polwar College

RVNAF Polwar Battalion Organization

RVNAF Polwar Company Organization

RVNAF Polwar Staff Organization - Corps; Divisions

RVNAF Polwar Staff Organization - Regiment; Battalions

RVNAF Polwar Staff Organization - Sector; Sub-Sector

RVNAF Company Level Polwar Organization

AUTHOR’S NOTE

This work originally was presented, successfully, as a thesis to the Graduate School of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst in 1987. Despite its publication as a book in 2019, its message still is as valid and maintains that validity in its application to the armed forces of developing nations today. The reader may reflect upon the fact that the situation in Egypt, used here as an example of the application of the Polwar concept, though under different governance today remains as suitable an exemplar as it was thirty years ago. The more recent Arab Spring demonstrations in Egypt, following the uprising in Tunisia, was a less violent expression of what occurred in 1986. As I’ve said elsewhere, this merely is another case of plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose—the more it changes, the more it stays the same.

This book is dedicated to

three men who knew what real soldiering was all about—Sergeants Aubin, McMurren, and Reavey.

There are some militarists who say: We are not interested in politics but only in the profession of arms. It is vital these simple-minded militarists be made to realize the relationship that exists between politics and military affairs. Military action is a method used to attain a political goal. While military affairs and political affairs are not identical, it is impossible to isolate one from the other.

Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, 1937

The mode of being the new intellectual can no longer consist in eloquence, … but in active participation in practical life, as constructor, organizer, and permanent persuader.

(Gramsci)

The author with Admiral (then Captain) Than, Commandant, Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Political Warfare College

(Dalat, 1969)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In the preparation of this work I am indebted mainly to circumstances; had the road of my life taken a different way then most probably I would not have had the interest and certainly not the experience to deal with the subject I have chosen to write about. I am grateful for the opportunity provided by my assignment as Senior US Advisor to the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Political Warfare College during the first six months of 1969, which led me to discover polwar; but a special acknowledgement is due to my subsequent assignment, as senior instructor and program director for the subject while at the US Institute for Military Assistance at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, where I was enabled to conduct extensive research in the history, theory and practice of modern (since 1917) polwar.

Special thanks are due also to the colleagues with whom I served at the College in Vietnam—Vietnamese, Nationalist Chinese and those from the Republic of Korea—and to those among whom I wrote, taught and learned while at the Institute, especially those of the teaching triangle of the Universities of Duke, North Carolina and North Carolina State.

Pascal R. Politano

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

ARVN - Army of the Republic of Vietnam

CCP - Chinese Communist Party

CHEKA or Cheka - Cherezvychainyi komitet; Extraordinary commission (for fighting counterrevolution and sabotage)

CHICOM - Chinese Communist

CHINAT - Chinese Nationalist

CIA - (US) Central Intelligence Agency

COMUSMACV - Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

CSF - Central Security Force(s)

DAFIE - Directorate of Armed Forces Information and Education

FBI - (US) Federal Bureau of Investigation

GPWD - General Political Warfare Department

GVN - Government of (South) Vietnam

IG - Inspector General

Infitah - Anwar Sadat’s 1974 open door policy on foreign investment

JCS - Joint Chiefs of Staff

KCT - Kun chang tang (Share Production Party); Chinese Communist Party

KMT - Kuomintang; National People’s Party formed by Sun Yat-sen

MACV - (US) Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

MND - Ministry of National Defense

Mossad - Israeli Security Police

MPC - Military Police Command

NSA - (US) National Security Agency

NVA - North Vietnamese Army

PIO - Public Information Office or Officer

PLA - People’s Liberation Army (Chinese Communist)

Politcoms - Political commissars

Polwar - Political warfare; politicization of military forces

Psyop or PSYOP - Psychological operations

Psywar or PSYWAR - Psychological warfare

ROC - Republic of China

RVN - Republic of Vietnam

RVNAF - Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces

SAVAK - Iranian security, or secret, police

Shariah - The straight path or canon law of Islam (Islamic law)

Shi’ite, Shi’a - Literally, followers—of Ali, the fourth caliph after Mohammed—who reject the first three caliphs and consider Ali and his eleven decendents the only true successors of Mohammed.

TGC - Taiwan General Command

Ulama, Ulema - Religious teachers and scholars of Islam

USAIMA - US Army Institute for Military Assistance

USAJFKCMA - US Army John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance (now US Army Center for Special Warfare)

USARV - US Army, Vietnam

VC - Viet Cong; South Vietnamese Communists

Voenspets - Voenyi spetsialist; military specialists; leaders selected from the ranks of the old Czarist Imperial Army to serve in Russia’s revolutionary Red Army

INTRODUCTION

This book will consist of three major parts: an introduction to the history, concepts and practice of polwar from its inception in the Russian Red Army to its introduction to non-Communist military forces; a rather detailed description of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces General Political Warfare system; and finally, conclusions drawn from those two parts as to the applicability of a type of polwar system for the armed forces of a contemporary third world member (Egypt) of the free nations of the world.

In my introduction I will discuss briefly the genealogy of the term political warfare or polwar as it has come to be used by the US government in an esoteric sense, that is, in the politicization of military forces as an attempt to achieve certain fundamental goals (such as loyalty) within those forces.

The basic concept of polwar originated with the Russian commissar system, giving the political cadre absolute control over the communist revolutionary armed forces, thus making them a decisive tool for the preservation of the Communist Party’s power. In 1924, the concept was introduced in China by Russian advisors, and later was revised and has been used to the present time by both the Communist Chinese and the Nationalists in forms modified to conform to their respective ideologies. (See Appendix D.)

The polwar system introduced to the Republic of Vietnam in 1960 was adapted from the Nationalist Chinese system. Although the primary mission of the Vietnamese system was ensuring the loyalty of their own armed forces, two additional tasks were included in the charter: gaining and maintaining the support of the civilian populace in both friendly and enemy controlled areas and destroying the loyalty of the enemy. These latter missions were the responsibility of the psychological warfare element of the General Political Warfare Department. The Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army polwar organizations were tailored after the Communist Chinese system.

The South Vietnamese polwar system failed with its armed forces, but this failure does not invalidate the concept. The Nationalist Chinese system, the only formalized system outside the communist orbit (with the possible exception of Israel about whose internal military affairs little is known), still is in place and keeping its military house in order. The question remains therefore: Would such a system have