INSTINCTS OF THE HERD IN PEACE AND WAR: Exploring the Dynamics of Collective Behavior in Times of Stability and Conflict (2024 Guide for Beginners)

Iris Knight

Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War (Wilfred Trotter)

Copyright © 2024 by Iris Knight

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, scanning, or otherwise without written permission from the publisher. It is illegal to copy this book, post it to a website, or distribute it by any other means without permission.

First edition

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Contents

1. Preface

2. Preface to the Second Edition

3. Herd Instinct and Its Bearing on the Psychology of Civilized Man

4. Sociological Applications of the Psychology of Herd Instinct

5. Gregariousness and the Future of Man

6. Man’s Place in Nature and Nature’s Place in Man

7. Comments on an Objective System of Human Psychology

8. Some Principles of a Biological Psychology

9. The Biology of Gregariousness

10. Characters of the Gregarious Animal Displayed by Man

11. Some Peculiarities of the Social Habit in Man

12. Imperfections of the Social Habit in Man

13. Gregarious Species at War

14. England Against Germany—Germany

15. England Against Germany—England

16. Prejudice in Time of War

17. Psychological Anticipations

18. After the War

19. The Instability of Civilization

20. Some Characters of a Rational Statecraft

1

Preface

Written almost 10 years ago, the first two pieces in this book were published in the Sociological Review in 1908 and 1909. Although they had created a single document, it was decided to publish it in two installments at an interval of six months, and to significantly reduce the overall mass.

Recently, I received a suggestion that because the two pieces’ original review numbers were no longer in print, a reprint could be warranted given the topic’s continued relevance. This could not be accomplished without attempting to represent the potential rewards of 10 years of more speculation and some attempt to apply to current situations the principles which had been sketched out.

With the exception of a small number of pages, the new comment quickly outweighed the original text in terms of volume and makes up the majority of this book. This relatively brief record is made here not out of personal interest but particularly to emphasize that I have been working to adapt ideas that emerged 10 years ago to current circumstances. I bring this up not to claim some kind of prophetic insight in having proposed such long-ago explanations for thinking that civilization’s stability was surprisingly weak, but more because it is well known that the environment of a major conflict is not conducive to free thought. Even if the ideas I’m basing my case on are credible, the reader would have had further cause to doubt their validity if they hadn’t developed in the modern era appear in the refracting national emergency atmosphere.

The main goal of this book is to dispel the notion that psychology is a body of dull, ambiguous generalizations that it sometimes seems to be made up of. Instead, it suggests that psychology, especially when studied in conjunction with other biological fields, can serve as a useful guide in everyday life and provide insight into the workings of the human mind that may help us predict some aspects of the future. The current condition of circumstances is a great opportunity to test the veracity of this proposal, and the experiment is made much more interesting by the compelling motivation of an urgent national danger.

If the nature of this war is turning into a contest of moral forces on a daily basis, as it clearly is, then a profound comprehension of the origins and nature of national morale must be at least as important as the technical expertise of the military engineer and cannon manufacturer. It is reasonable to assume that keeping a high level of bravery and resolve through the highs and lows of combat is the major purpose of a strong morale. Without these attributes, a country whose true independence and survival are in jeopardy may be taken for granted and may remain even in cases when the overall moral order is severely disturbed. An

Achieving an acceptable morale leads to something even more challenging. It provides the nation’s machinery with energy, initiative, and a peaceful working environment. On the individual level, it guarantees the maximum output of effort with the least amount of interference from egoistic feelings like impatience, worry, and discontent. These roles would be described by a practical psychologist along with the methods that should be used to activate them.

Every act of power has implications in two different sectors, which become more apparent the more we think about how governments behave themselves during wartime: first, in the more direct and immediate manner that its core function is oriented against the adversary and the impact it has on the country’s morale as a result. The first of these two components is unpredictable, like all military endeavours, and neither success nor failure can be predicted; on the other hand, the second component’s influence can be defined and anticipated, and it need never be completely unclear to anyone save the naive or the uninterested.

Any action or endeavour has varying degrees of priority given to the military and moral considerations, however it may be argued that although moral considerations are occasionally far more significant than military considerations, they are never entirely not present. This consistent and unquestionably important element in all governmental actions typically receives attention that is so blatantly incompetent and superficial as to validate the perception that the widespread conviction in its significance is merely a traditional expression.

The approach I have taken is blatantly conjectural, and I do not regret it because the facts are accessible for everyone to observe and verify or refute. I’ve attempted to suggest a route; I’ve attempted not to urge or convince to utilize it—these are issues that are not within my purview.

2

Preface to the Second Edition

A few typographical errors have been fixed in the First Edition text, and a sentence that was unclear has been removed. Nothing else has changed. A postscript has been included to highlight Some of the paths taken by psychology research during the war provided a useful prediction that was subsequently validated, and they looked at the extraordinary circumstances that society is currently facing.

I took the risk of speculating that a country at war may benefit from some effective mental understanding in the Preface to the First Edition; I now use this chance to argue that such information would not be less valuable to a weary country looking for harmony. Simultaneously, it may be noteworthy to mention that this book solely focuses on examining concepts, admits to using speculative techniques and findings, and makes no pretence of offering advice on how to run affairs.

3

Herd Instinct and Its Bearing on the Psychology of Civilized Man

I. Introduction

Few topics have sparked as much spirited and protracted debate as the definition of sociology as a science. Because it is believed that this article may have social implications, it is imperative that the author need to clarify the meaning of the phrase when he uses it. The idea that sociology is a collection of knowledge organized to be helpful in projecting and, if possible, guiding the future behaviour of its material is, of course, implied by the term science, which refers to the discipline’s experience with its subject matter. This content represents man in related man’s culture. Therefore, it follows that sociology is simply another term for psychology in its broadest sense—that is, a psychology that can encompass all mental occurrences, including the most complicated ones.

It is fundamentally more practical than any orthodox psychology that has yet to be published. Naturally, sociology has been referred to as social psychology and is thought to be distinct from ordinary psychology in that it focuses on the mental activities that people exhibit in their social interactions. This is based on the idea that society highlights a unique set of mental skills that ordinary psychology, which primarily deals with the individual, is not primarily concerned with.

It can be said right away that the main argument of this article is that this mindset is false and is to blame for the relative sterility of the sociological psychology approach. The individual and social domains are seen as completely interconnected in this context. It is argued that since we do not know what it is like to be an isolated animal, all human psychology must be the psychology of associated man, and each individual must exhibit the traits of the social animal, if any. The sole distinction between the two scientific disciplines is that traditional psychology does not purport to be practical in the sense of giving valuable insight; in contrast, sociology claims to address the intricate, multifaceted issues of everyday life, which is always social due to biological factors. Therefore, rather than calling it social psychology, it would be more appropriate to refer to sociology as practical or applied psychology if it is to be characterized as psychology.

The first result of accepting this point of view completely is to highlight the magnitude and complexity of the mission of sociology; in fact, it is occasionally argued that such a discipline is not even possible. As an illustration, Professor Karl Pearson stated at an early Sociological Society conference that the field of sociology could not emerge until the obstetrical brilliance of a man of the calibre of Pasteur or Darwin. Mr. H. G. Wells went farther at a subsequent conference, arguing that sociology cannot exist as a science and does not exist at all.

This kind of skepticism seems to be predicated on the notion that practical psychology in the previously established meaning is unachievable. Some claim that this is because human will brings an aspect into behaviour.Another and more deterministic school holds that human conduct is so complex that it cannot be reduced to a comprehensive system of generalizations until science as a whole has advanced significantly beyond its current state. This is because human behaviour is inherently incommensurable, which means that it will always expose human behaviour to the occurrence of true variety and beyond the reach of scientific generalization. In actuality, both points of view result in equally negative sentiments about sociology.

There is no denying that human behaviour is observably exceedingly complicated both fantastic and depressing. But there is a significant quirk to the challenge of extrapolating from it that is not immediately apparent. It is that, as observers, we are incessantly pursued by man’s own narrative of his behaviour; that is,concerning a particular act, our observation is invariably mingled with a knowledge, drawn from our own emotions, of how it appears to the act’s author, and it is far more challenging than is commonly believed to separate and account for the influence of this factor. Every one of us is adamant that his actions and convictions are essentially unique, rational, and not influenced by outside forces and everyone is prepared to provide a number of justifications for his actions that adhere to these values. Furthermore, these are the reasons that will come to the observer on their own as they see how his peers behave.

Here, it is proposed that direct observation is not the primary source of the impression of the unfathomable complexity and variety of human activities, but rather this second aspect of introspectual interpretation that may be classified as anthropomorphic in nature. In human psychology, a response to this is therefore just as important as it was in comparative psychology, where the names of Bethe, Beer, Uexküll, and Nuel are linked to analogous movements and their more severe manifestations. It is argued that this anthropomorphism in psychologists’ general attitudes conceals the obvious similarities in human behaviour, has made the development of a really practical psychology extremely delayed. Though not much has been investigated from the perspective of a comprehensive objectivism, certain generalizations summarizing some of the ranges of human belief and behaviour may already have been developed. This essay does not aim to conduct such an investigation, though, and these points have been made first to imply that theory suggests the sociological problem is not as insurmountably hard as it first seems, and second to provide support for a closer look at specific areas of human behaviour. The author would argue that although such approach has a unique range of applications, it is undoubtedly risky when utilized in place of a study that minimizes the use of deductive reasoning when the importance of previously gathered information has been misunderstood, or when more specific approaches have not worked because the researcher was not given clear guidance on which facts were most likely to be useful for measurement. Consequently, the goal of this essay is to provide some assistance for the use of such techniques by using a logical analysis of the coordination and measurement of facts serve as the foundation for all legitimate science.

It is evident from a cursory examination of the conduct problem that the key lies in the area of emotion, to use the term as broadly as possible. Feeling and instinct are related in a clear and as essential as the comparisons between cerebral processes and reflexive behaviour are, instinct must now be taken into consideration in this work.

II. Psychological Aspects of Instinct

Many years ago, William James examined and determined with a very ultimate delicacy and accuracy how instinct looks to introspection in a well-known chapter of his Text Book of Psychology. He demonstrated that an instinct’s urge presents itself as an axiomatically apparent notion, something that is so obviously sense that it would be illogical or evil to explain its foundation.

As soon as we realize that instinctual decisions have a distinct and recognizable form in our minds, we are prompted to consider if all decisions that take this form have to be viewed as fundamentally originating from instinct. However, investigation demonstrates that the majority of opinion is founded on assumptions that have these introspectual characteristics. As a result, any answer other than negative would appear completely inconsistent with how we now understand the nature of human mind.

There have been several efforts to explain human action as being driven by instinct. In actuality, he is sufficiently influenced by the cues of such basic drives as self-preservation, nourishment, and sex to render the ambitious project and its alluring early rewards. These three impulses allow for so much generalization that it was impossible to resist the urge to say that all human action could be reverted to them. But soon, uncertainty started to cast a shadow over these early successes of materialism. Despite his clear obligation to the contrary, man would continue to fail so frequently to support himself, nourish himself, and show resistance to the accoutrements of sex that any attempt to fit his actions into these it was once again discovered that man escaped and must always escape any complete generalization by science. Three categories involved an increasingly evident and ultimately intolerable amount of pushing and pulling, as well as so much pretence that he was altogether in, when, quite plainly, so large a part of him remained out. As a result, the enterprise had to be abandoned.

A more apparent conclusion would have been that there was another instinct—perhaps an impulse—that had not been considered and that would not have had a very clear purpose in relation to the person, but would mostly manifest as altering the other instincts and creating novel combinations where the original instinctual drive was no longer distinguishable from other instincts. It is rather clear that a system like this would result in a sequence of events where uniformity would be impossible to detect by direct observation, but would be readily apparent if the features of this unknown x were known. It is a startling truth that certain animals’ behaviour can be easily categorized into three areas: sex, nourishment, and self-preservation, but the behaviour of other species cannot be this described. The tiger and the cat exhibit straightforward conduct and readily understandable, exhibiting no incomprehensible anomalies; in contrast, the experiences of the dog, with his conscience, his humour, his fear of being alone, his ability to devote himself to a cruel master, or the bee, with her selfless devotion to the hive, provide phenomena that no sophistry can comprehend without the assistance of a fourth instinct. However, a cursory investigation would reveal that gregarious animals are those whose behaviour defies easy categorization into the three categories of primal instinct. If it is then able to be displayed since gregariousness has a biological significance that is comparable to the other instincts’ importance, we can expect to find the source of these behavioural anomalies in it. Additionally, if we can demonstrate that man is gregarious, we can use it to define the x that may be responsible for the complexity of human behaviour.

III. Biological Significance of Gregariousness

There are two extremely noticeable and abrupt improvements in the complexity and size of the unit on which natural selection operates unaltered in the animal kingdom. These developments are comprised of the compilation of the transition from a single to a multicellular organism and from a solitary to a social unit, which were before independent and subjected to the full typical activity of natural selection.

It is evident that in a multicellular organism, individual cells lose part of their ability to function as unicellular organisms did. For example, reproduction is restricted and regulated, nutrients cannot be obtained in the same straightforward manner, and only specific channels can respond to stimuli. We may figuratively state that the commune no longer experiences the effects of natural selection in exchange for these sacrifices. Unsuitability of a certain cell or set of only by affecting the entire organism can cells be eradicated.In contrast to the organism in which the single cell constitutes the entirety, the latter is less susceptible to the whims of a single cell. Consequently, it appears that a wider range of variability for individual cells is now permitted, which may lead to a higher level of diversity in the material that may be chosen. Furthermore, variations that were not initially advantageous would now have a possibility of survival. When considering multicellularity in this light, it appears as a method to get away from the harshness of natural selection, which for unicellular organisms reduced competition to such a fierce battle that any variation outside the narrowest bounds were deadly because, in a kingdom this tiny, gains in one area would always mean losses in another. Therefore, the only possibility for more favourable elaboration to happen was if the rival unit grew. It’s possible that different multicellular creature species will eventually surpass their maximum potential. There would be intense competition, and ever-tinier deviations might yield significant outcomes. In the species in which these circumstances are met, an expansion of the unit is imminent if progress is to occur. Increases in physical complexity make it impossible, and the development of greediness seems to be the inevitable next step. The need for and certainty of the change are demonstrated by its dispersed growth in extremely dispersed locations (such in mammals and insects) around the same time when, we may guess, multicellularity emerged.

It appears that gregariousness is usually seen as a very superficial trait, hardly qualifying, in a sense, of the designation of an instinct; useful, maybe, but neither fundamentally significant nor likely to be profoundly embedded in the species’ genetic makeup. This mindset could arise from the fact that, among animals, gregariousness has not been followed by any noticeable physical changes that are clearly connected with it.

Whatever the reason, the present writer believes that this approach to the social habit is not supported by the evidence and hinders the development of conclusions that may be very beneficial.

An examination of ants and bees demonstrates how fundamentally important gregariousness may become. In these kinds of communities, the individual is physically and/or mentally incapable of existing outside of the group, which raises the possibility that, even in communities that are not as tightly knit as those of ants and bees, the individual may actually be more reliant on group life than first appears.

The