Insurgency: Strategies of Rebellion and Counterterrorism

Chapter 1: Insurgency

An insurgency is a brutal, armed uprising led by tiny, weakly armed groups who mainly operate in rural areas and engage in guerrilla warfare against a more powerful authority.

Counter-insurgency warfare and other political, economic, and social measures of many kinds can be used to put an end to an insurgency. versus various insurgency factions. Other historical uprisings have been multipolar rather than a simple model made up of two sides, such as the Russian Civil War. There were two primary factions in the Angolan Civil War: MPLA and UNITA. Another separatist campaign for the Cabinda region's independence existed at the same time, led by FLEC. In situations where there is no recognized authority, such as the Somali Civil War, particularly the period from 1998 to 2006, when it devolved into tiny, essentially autonomous nations engaged in shifting coalitions with one another, multipolarity broadens the concept of insurgency.

The Geneva-based NGO Center on Armed Groups is committed to comprehending and interacting with armed groups more effectively.

Insurgency is described as a technology of military conflict typified by tiny, weakly armed bands practicing guerrilla warfare from rural base areas by James Fearon and David Laitin.

James D. Fearon claims that there is a rationalist explanation for why leaders choose to risk in battles rather than negotiate peacefully. Furthermore, Walter argues that a civil war between the government and the insurgents may result in the establishment of a new government that is answerable to a wider spectrum of citizens and who must make political concessions. According to Walter, the existence of powerful institutions can help to prevent the recurrence of civil wars, but autocratic governments are less inclined to allow the creation of powerful institutions because of their associated restrictions on official privileges and corruption.

Elisabeth Jean Wood argues in her book, Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in Salvador, that those who engage in high-risk activism are acutely aware of the advantages and disadvantages of fighting in civil wars.

The strategies and procedures used by various insurgencies vary. Robert R. Tomes described four components that usually encompass an insurrection in a 2004 study:

cell networks that protect confidentiality

Terrorism has bred public unrest and led people to turn to insurgents for safety in the past.

various strategies to win the public's favor, frequently by weakening the incoming government

assaults on the government

A definition like Tomes' is an illustration of one that excludes some insurgencies. For instance, there was no cell system in place during the French Revolution, and little to no effort was made to intimidate civilians during the American Revolution. In Pakistan's two coups that followed one other in 1977 and 1999, the early activities were directed at the government's internal affairs rather than at gaining widespread support. Although Tomes' concept is appropriate for Mao's Phase I, it does not adequately address more extensive civil wars. Although Mao believes that terrorism is typically prevalent in the early stages of revolutionary insurrection, it is not always the case.

With reference to Trinquier's definition of counterinsurgency, Tomes provides an indirect definition of insurgency: an interlocking system of actions—political, economic, psychological, and military—that aim at the [insurgents' intended] overthrow of the established authority in a country and its replacement by another regime. argues that modern insurgency does not exactly fit earlier notions of insurgency because recent incidents are much more likely to be international or transnational in nature. Numerous insurgencies may be a part of more complicated conflicts that involve third forces (armed groups that have an impact on the outcome, like militias), fourth forces (unarmed groups that have an impact on the outcome, like the international media), and other parties that may not be the main insurgents or the legitimate government. Transnational organizations are more frequently sponsored while overt governmental sponsorship is becoming less usual. Insurgency nesting within complex conflicts linked to state fragility or collapse... (See below for a discussion on failed states.) According to Metz, modern insurgencies have much more intricate and fluid involvement than traditional wars, in which distinct belligerents fight for a definite strategic triumph.

Terrorism is a common component of insurgencies. While there is no agreed-upon definition of terrorism in international law, there are working definitions that are supported by the UN, including one that was created for the Policy Working Group on the UN and Terrorism by Alex P. Schmid. In its 2002 report to the Secretary-General, the Working Group made the following claims::

It would be helpful to outline some basic aspects of the phenomenon without trying to provide a detailed definition of terrorism. Most of the time, terrorism is a political act. It is usually done for political or ideological (whether secular or religious) reasons and is intended to cause dramatic and fatal harm to civilians as well as to instill terror. Although terrorism is a criminal act, it goes beyond simple crime. Understanding terrorism's political nature as well as its fundamental crime and psychology is crucial to combat the problem. Both sides of this problem must be addressed by the UN.

The debate over the definitions of insurgency and terrorism is yet another. A pure terrorist cell may pursue political, even revolutionary, goals, but their brutality substitutes rather than complements a political agenda, according to Michael F. Morris' winning essay in the 24th Annual United States Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Essay Contest. Morris argued that the use of terrorism, or lack thereof, did not characterize insurgency However, organizational characteristics have historically offered another way to distinguish between the two. Typically, fighting forces used by insurgencies are orders of magnitude more powerful than those used by terrorist groups. Insurgencies may offer social services, have an overt, even legal, political wing, and have a political goal. Their covert branch engages in terror activities like attacks that intentionally harm civilians, as well as attacks on military targets using strategies like raids and ambushes.

Terrorism was a crucial component in Mao's first of the three phases of revolutionary warfare, according to him. Mao believed that establishing a guerilla movement involved engaging in terrorism.

While not all insurgencies use fear, the majority do use subversion, a less well-defined tactic. A nation that is being overthrown is not outfought; rather, it is outmanaged. Administration with a minus sign in front is what subversion is. Insurgencies without subversion that are uncommon are those in which there is no recognized government that is delivering administrative services.

Although U.S. spokespeople now use the word subversion less frequently, this may be because it was once overused in an explicitly anticommunist context. When he stated that immediate action was necessary before the enemy's subversive politico-military teams find fruitful spawning sites for their fish eggs, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk did so in April 1962. Rarely can subversion alone overthrow a regime; it is arguable that this occurred during Eastern Europe's liberalization. Solidarity was perceived by Poland's communist authorities as subversive but nonviolent.

Francis Fukuyama said that the United States was not battling terrorism in general, as it did in Chechnya or Palestine, in his argument against the term Global War on Terror. He claimed that the war on terror is actually a campaign against radical Islamism, a movement that uses culture for political ends. Although it might go beyond the Cold War's ideological rivalry, he said that it is not the same as Samuel Huntington's clash of civilizations. Fukuyama emphasized, in response to Huntington's theory, that the US and its allies should concentrate on specific extreme organizations rather than engage in combat with global Islam.

Political strategies, not overt military action, according to Fukuyama, are the best ways to put an end to that insurgency.

Trust and shared values can serve as the foundation for cooperation; one person's terrorist is another person's freedom warrior.

There's a definition of terrorism that everyone can agree on.

Information can be freely exchanged.

Other states can be trusted to protect information and use it for their mutual benefit.

International organizations are reliable and secure.

Issues with internal unrest and national security do not call for compartmentation and concealment.

There are shared priorities and demands for action because of the war against terrorism..

International action's natural foundation is global and regional cooperation.

The compatibility of legal systems allows for cooperation.

Rule of law and human rights Cooperation is not hindered by disagreements.

most requirements are similar.

Financial requirements and resources can be dissociated from cooperation.

If one starts with Mao, social scientists, warriors, and agents of change have been simulating insurrection for nearly a century. Counterinsurgency models come from Kilcullen, McCormick, Barnett, and Eizenstat, and they are not mutually exclusive from one another. While Eizenstat discusses the gaps that cause societal stability to crack, Kilcullen analyzes the pillars of a stable society. The interaction between the actors—the rebels, the government, the populace, and outside organizations—is depicted in McCormick's model. Barnett talks about how the nation interacts with the outside world, while Cordesman concentrates on how to provide security in particular.

Recent research has attempted to use computational and mathematical modeling to represent the conceptual framework of insurgent warfare. Using statistical data from more than 50,000 insurgent attacks, a recent study by Juan Camilo Bohorquez, Sean Gourley, Alexander R. Dixon, Michael Spagat, and Neil F. Johnson titled Common Ecology Quantifies Human Insurgency proposes a common framework for 9 modern insurgency battles.

Kilcullen outlines a counterinsurgency framework. He provides a visual picture of the participants in his conflict model, which he depicts as a box containing a ecology with traits related to geography, ethnicity, economics, society, culture, and religion. Governments, counterinsurgent forces, insurgent leaders, insurgent forces, and the general populace, which consists of three categories, are among the entities contained within the box:

people who support the rebels; people who support the counterinsurgents; They just want to go on with their lives.

States or organizations that support one side or the other are frequently, but not always, outside the box. Intervention that is unconventional has its own characteristics.

The counterinsurgency approach can be summed up as efforts to put an end to the insurgency by a campaign balanced along three pillars: political, economic, and security.

Of course, you cannot command something which you do not possess. Because of this, unity of command (across organizations or between government and non-government players) is ineffective in this situation. One of the fundamentals of military doctrine is unity of command.

In Kilcullen's opinion, unity of effort is similar to swarming depends more on a common issue diagnosis (i.e., the distributed knowledge of swarms), platforms for cooperation, information exchange, and deconfliction than it does on a common command and control structure. Inter-agency teams need to be formed for versatility (the capacity to execute a wide variety of activities) and agility (the ability to transition quickly and smoothly between jobs). Each player must understand the others' strengths, weaknesses, skills, and aims.

According to Stuart Eizenstat, insurgencies arise from gaps. A state needs to be able to close three gaps, the first of which is the most crucial, in order to be successful:

Security: defense ... while maintaining territorial sovereignty and protecting against internal and foreign dangers. Rebellious armed groups or criminal nonstate actors may resort to violence to exploit this security gap if a government is unable to provide it, as was the case in Haiti, Nepal, and Somalia.

Water, electricity, food, and public health are essential for survival, followed by communications, education, and a functioning economy.

Legitimacy: bridging the legitimacy gap requires more than chanting democracy and elections, but rather a government that the people believe has their consent, has little corruption, and has a functioning legal system that upholds human rights.

Keep in mind how Kilcullen's three pillars and Eizenstat's gaps are comparable. Do not assume that a struggling state on the table below cannot help less developed states while bridging its own gaps.

Although McCormick's model is intended to be a counterinsurgency (COIN) tool, it also provides a symmetrical understanding of the necessary behaviors for both insurgent and COIN forces to succeed. The counterinsurgency model may show how both insurgent and COIN forces succeed or fail in this manner. The model's tactics and principles are applicable to both forces, therefore the extent to which they adhere to it should directly affect the success or failure of either the insurgent or COIN force.

The model features four important actors or aspects:

Insurgent force

Force fighting insurrection (i.e., the government)

Population

International community

The various components must weigh their best possibilities in a series of activities because they all interact with one another:

gaining the public's backing

sabotage the opponent's population control strategy

direct combat with the opposition

sabotage the adversary's interactions with the international community

Establish connections with the world community

According to Thomas Barnett's paradigm, the globe is divided into connected core of states that have highly developed internal and external communications, and disconnected periphery of nations. He describes a system administrator force, frequently multinational, operating in a generally calm environment. This force ties the nation to its core and gives the locals the ability to communicate, which is comparable to swarm coordination. Another paradigm enters the picture in the event of occupation or civil war: the leviathan, a first-world military power that destroys the regular troops of the enemy. Rather than small-scale insurgencies, Leviathan is designed to combat powerful armies. At the tactical level, Leviathan may engage in massive swarming, but the decision to dispatch it is determined at the strategic level and can be done either autonomously or by an established core group like NATO or ASEAN.

Other than quick Leviathan takedowns, security building seems to need to be regional, with alliances and more developed nations providing logistical and other technical support (e.g., ASEAN, NATO). Military training, occasionally in specialized fields like intelligence, is the first step in noncombat military support in bridging the security gap. Intelligence, planning, logistics, and communications are examples of more direct but still non-combat support.

Anthony Cordesman points out that there are regional and state-specific variations in security needs. He highlighted various security requirements for various regions in his writings on the Middle East, as well as the US interest in security in those regions.

The US should concentrate its efforts in North Africa on security cooperation to achieve regional stability and counterterrorism.

The US must mainly separate its security collaboration with Israel from its security cooperation with friendly Arab nations like Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon, but it may strengthen security cooperation with all of these nations in the Levant.

The US must deal with the strategic significance of the Persian Gulf, a region whose oil and expanding gas exports power crucial components of the global economy.

It is important to realize that counterterrorism, as defined by Cordesman, encompasses a wide range of measures, both violent and nonviolent, aimed at destabilizing a rival terrorist group. As a colonial administrator in 1898, the French officer Joseph Gallieni made the following observation:, When a military operation decimates a nation's population and causes everyone to cower in fear, the nation is not conquered and pacified; instead, the seeds of insurrection will begin to sprout among the populace, and the rancor built up by the harsh use of force will cause them to flourish once again.

Compared to Cordesman, Kilcullen and Eizenstat both articulate a purpose that is more abstract. The security pillar of Kilcullen is basically equal to the security gap of Eizenstat:

military protection (securing the population from attack or intimidation by guerrillas, bandits, terrorists or other armed groups)

police protection (community policing, police intelligence or Special Branch activities, and paramilitary police field forces).

Building a foundation for human rights, civil institutions, individual protection, public safety (fire, ambulance, sanitation, civil defense), and population security are all important aspects of human security.

Although military means are used throughout the model, not just in the security domain, and civilian activity is crucially important in the security pillar as well, this pillar captures military commanders' attention the most. All three pillars must develop concurrently, maintain balance, and be firmly rooted in an effective information campaign.

While discussing the specific situation in Iraq, Anthony Cordesman makes several comments that apply to other troubled countries as well. Instead than believing that the civilizations must fight, however, it is possible to identify them as actors in a globalized world. Because the civilisation to which the problematic nation belongs will have cultural and linguistic background that Western culture cannot expect to duplicate, Cordesman notes that the Islamic civilization, not alone the West, bears the duty in the case of Iraq.

The real issue is the future of their civilization, and weak nations cannot be strengthened externally by tolerating religious, cultural, or separatist violence or terrorism when it targets unpopular targets or by trying to shift the blame for their own shortcomings onto other countries, religions, or cultures.

In their review, Berman and Matanock define asymmetric wars (also known as irregular conflicts) as insurgencies that are occurring in recent history and in which the government forces have a clear advantage over rebels in coercive power. The framework involves the government forces, the rebels, and the civilians. While people can anonymously communicate local information with government troops, which would enable government forces to efficiently use their asymmetric advantage to target rebels, government forces and rebels fight one another and may unintentionally hurt civilians. The government and rebels will allocate resources to give services to civilians in order to persuade them to provide information with the government by taking into account the role of civilians in this framework.

The framework is predicated on a number of presumptions:

Information sharing is a civilian response action.

Civilians can give information anonymously without putting themselves in danger, and it is anticipated that they will respond to rewards.

Neither the government forces nor the rebels would purposefully use coercion or intimidation to attack civilians.

Five significant consequences for counterinsurgency strategies are generated by this concept:

The value of the information supplied enhances the incentive for the government and rebels to deliver services to citizens.

Government service supply could lessen rebel violence.

Efforts to reduce rebel violence are more successful when they focus on the needs of local citizens and require information exchange from the community. In reality, these may be smaller initiatives created in collaboration with regional communities, which are likewise simpler to cancel when information is withheld.

The impact of programs that reduce violence will be enhanced by innovations that provide local citizens more value, like involving development experts in project design and implementation.

Government-provided security and service delivery (i.e., development investment) are complimentary endeavors.

In the event that civilians are killed by rebels or government troops, civilian support for that side will decline.

Technologies that provide anonymous government tips, which are frequently technical in nature, can lessen rebel violence.

Empirical evidence from the conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other subnational conflicts is used to test these implications. To better understand asymmetric conflicts and to make tactical, strategic, and public policy decisions that are based on better information, more research is required in the areas of governance, rule of law, attitudes, dynamics, and agency between allies.

Before fighting an insurrection, one must know what they are fighting. The British's Malay Emergency counterinsurgency and the Philippine government's suppression of the Huk Rebellion have historically been the most successful counterinsurgencies. By 1902, American soldiers had successfully put an end to the Philippine-American War, even though they had used methods that most people today would find abhorrent.

{End Chapter 1}

Chapter 2: Guerrilla warfare

Guerrilla warfare is a type of irregular warfare wherein small groups of combatants, such as paramilitary members, armed civilians, or irregulars, employ military techniques like ambushes, sabotage, raids, petty warfare, hit-and-run tactics, and mobility to battle a more powerful and immobile traditional military.

Although the phrase guerrilla warfare was first used in relation to the Peninsular War in the 19th century, the tactical strategies have been in use for a very long time. Sun Tzu suggested the employment of guerrilla-style tactics in The Art of War in the sixth century BC. Many guerilla warfare techniques are assigned to the Roman general Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus, who developed what is now known as the Fabian strategy. Throughout history, guerrilla warfare has been employed by a variety of groups. It is notably connected to revolutionary movements and public resistance to occupying or encroaching armies.

Due to often weaker weapons or forces, guerrilla tactics emphasize avoiding direct clashes with enemy armies in favor of small-scale battles intended to wear down foes and force them to withdraw. Guerrilla techniques are therefore typically only employed for defense. Organized guerrilla groups frequently rely on funding from the local populace or from supporters abroad who share their