Night Fighter Aces of the Luftwaffe 1940–43

Origins of the Luftwaffe Night Fighter Arm

During the Great War, aerial combat also took place at night, mainly in the face of Zeppelin and heavy German bomber (Gotha or Halberstadt) attacks on London and Paris. Some successes were achieved but, despite these efforts, night-fighting remained very limited and was little appreciated after 1918. While the creation of an offensive air arm took place covertly in the interwar period, the nascent Luftwaffe was largely geared towards tactical and offensive actions in support of fast-moving ground forces (Blitzkrieg). Nachtjagd—night-fighting—was not a priority.

Of course, the Generalstab der Luftwaffe was not blind—the Condor Legion in Spain flew many nighttime bombing raids with Ju 52s. At least two of these trimotors were intercepted by Republican fighters and shot down. However, it failed to understand that the RAF had laid the foundations for a strategic bomber force long before the start of World War II. Following the failure of the Geneva disarmament conference in July 1934—Hitler had already withdrawn Germany from the League of Nations and de facto revised the terms of the Treaty of Versailles—Germany was recognized as a potential major threat. The only possibility for the British of striking at Germany was likely to be through aerial bombardment by bomber aircraft in accordance with the theories of General Giulio Douhet, an early advocate of strategic bombing. Back in the 1920s the first Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Hugh Trenchard, was a proponent—he firmly believed that the future belonged to large fleets of bombers, albeit operating by day.

The first strategic RAF bombing raids on Germany took place as a response to the German invasion of the Low Countries and France—during the night of May 15/16, 1940, 81 bombers unloaded their cargoes over the Ruhr. On the night of June 4/5 some 50 RAF bombers, either operating alone or in small groups, again bombed several targets in Germany. Berlin was bombed for the first time by the RAF on the night of August 25/26, 1940.

While the night defense of Germany was neglected, it did exist to a limited extent. On May 1, 1939, at Döberitz, outdated Arado Ar 68s and a few Bf 109 Ds were brought together to form a 10.(N)/JG 2 under the command of an Oblt. Müller. The Staffel soon moved to Brandenburg-Briest and then to Jever. A 10.(N)/JG 72 also existed for a short period. Following the invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, another night-fighting Staffel, 10. (N)/JG 26, was formed at Bonn-Hangelar with the same equipment. Commanded by Oblt. Johannes Steinhoff, it soon moved to Stade and Jever. Assigned to defend the strategic Bay of Germany, the Bf 109s (having replaced the obsolescent Arados) initially operated mainly by day, with 10.(N)/JG 26 being credited with no fewer than six Wellington bombers during the famous air battle of December 18, 1939 flown against north German ports. These increasingly heavy losses during daylight missions forced RAF Bomber Command to give priority to night bombing. In February 1940, to counter this change in tactics, 10.(N)/JG 26 was redesignated 11.(N)/JG 2, with a 12. Staffel added to form V.(N)/JG 2 commanded by Hptm. Albert Blumensaat. On February 23, 1940, Ofw. Hermann Förster (11.) was credited with a Wellington near Nordeney, but this was also during the day.

On April 9, 1940, Operation Weserübung was launched, indirectly laying the foundations for the Nachtjagd. 11 Staffel of JG 2 flew into Aalborg and, on the night of April 25/26, Förster scored his second victory over a Hampden of 49 Sqn, the first night victory by a German fighter unit in the war.

The RAF was very active over Scandinavia, regularly attacking airfields at night. This particularly irritated Hptm. Wolfgang Falck, who had made his mark in ZG 76 during the fighting over the Bay of Germany but who was now in charge of I./ZG 1. As the British raids were only countered by very inaccurate Flak fire, Falck selected a few experienced pilots to test out his idea of using his Bf 110s as night fighters. As he recalled in his memoir:

We had an excellent time in Aalborg. But after a while, RAF bombers were overhead more and more often, flying into Germany on night raids and returning overhead again at dawn. When they had bombs left over, they would jettison them on us or shoot at us with their weapons. Far too seldom one of them would be shot down by the antiaircraft defenses. Something had to be done. There was a radar monitoring position [eine Funkmess-Stellung] on the coast not far from the airbase. The Freya device, which was operated here under the command of a Leutnant named Werner Bode, was able to measure the direction and speed of the approaching and departing RAF bombers so we knew to the minute when they would appear overhead. This gave us the time we needed to evacuate the buildings before we were possibly attacked … I started to get annoyed with the British. If they could fly at night—why couldn’t we? After all, we were also equipped with twin-engine aeroplanes and most of my pilots had been trained to fly on instruments [Blindflugausbildung].

During World War I, German Zeppelins and heavy bombers were often sent out on night raids, as in this drawing showing biplanes defending Paris under bombardment.

A press conference was held immediately after the December 18 air battle. Obstlt. Carl Schumacher (JG 1) chats with Reichspressechef Otto Dietrich, State Secretary in the Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda while three of the successful pilots discuss tactics. From left: Oblt. Johannes Steinhoff of 11.(N)/JG 2, Oblt. Wolfgang Falck of I./ZG 76, and Oblt. Anton Pointner of 5./JG 77.

So, I contacted the commander of the searchlight and Flak battery on the airfield and approached Lt. Bode about my ideas. My proposal to both was to set up a coordinated network over North Jutland, the Skagerrak, the Kattegat, and the eastern North Sea, which from now on would be monitored by the Freya radar, searchlights, Flak, and I./ZG 1. If Bode’s Freya detected enemy flights encroaching on our grid, my Bf 110s would fly out to sea so that Flak and searchlights on site and in its vicinity would not have to take any notice of us. We would wait over the North Sea until the British bombers were close enough to us, according to Bode’s returns, and then try to make visual contact and shoot them down. If the British stuck to their routines, they had to come through our surveillance zone at dawn on their return flight from the Reich: there would be enough natural light to make visual contact with them. Moreover, the nights were rarely so dark that you couldn’t recognize an aircraft reasonably close by, even if it was only from its exhaust flames. So begannen wir mit der Nachtjagd … this was how we started night-fighting.

Falck continued:

I initially selected three crews to find out with me how suitable the 110 really was for such missions—the pilots were Oblt. Werner Streib, Hptm. Günther Radusch, and Ofw. Thier. I estimated that along with myself these three had the most blind-flying experience. We flew our first practice sorties during spring 1940 and although Streib thought the idea of night-fighting crazy, Radusch, Thier, and I considered that it was possible. Drei zu eins—three to one. Werner Streib stuck to the program, even if he wasn’t convinced, and we continued to work on our tactics. A few nights later—the night of April 30/May 1—the RAF once again hit our airfield, but the coordination between us and the other units involved didn’t work out. The British were over the aerodrome in no time, dropped a few small bombs, hit our planes with their onboard armament, and disappeared, while we crawled out of our shrapnel trenches and manholes, cursing. Driven by impotent rage, we jumped into our Bf 110s and followed the bombers. We were neither strapped in nor wearing our flight helmets—we just thundered off without any radio communication and it was pure luck that none of us rolled headlong into a bomb crater on take off. With a clear night sky and relatively good visibility, we headed westward and after a few minutes I actually spotted a low-flying enemy aircraft. I fired at it from a distance, but as soon as the enemy noticed the attack, it dived into the early morning haze over the North Sea and disappeared. Fips Radusch also made contact with the enemy [Feindberührung] and attacked, but his prey eluded him in the same way as mine. He had even come so close to the bomber that he received defensive fire. Ofw. Thier was also able to attack a bomber and flew three firing passes—albeit also unsuccessfully. Werner Streib had seen nothing at all. That made it three to one again. There was basically something to our experiments, but we were still doing too much wrong. Step by step, we improved what was proving to be inadequate. Our Bf 110s were fitted with flame dampers for the exhausts of their Daimler-Benz engines so that we were no longer irritated by the constant blue-red sizzling of the exhaust flames, which were completely invisible during the day but dazzled us considerably at night, and made it easier for an enemy to spot and fire at us. We experimented with ammunition that both reduced the muzzle flash and shone less brightly in the trajectory than the usual tracer rounds. We supplemented the blind-flying instrumentation of our aircraft and racked our brains with the people from the Flak, searchlight, and radar positions about how to optimize our cooperation. Finally, I wrote a report with our recommendations and sent it to the Reich Aviation Ministry (Reichsluftfahrtministerium) and while we hoped for a reply, we continued to work on our ideas.

At Aalborg, a 109 of 11.(N)/JG 2 displays the owl (Eule) badge of the Night Fighter Staffel.

A Bf 109 D of 10(N)./JG 26 tested single-engine nighttime flying as early as September 1939. Note the Eule (owl) emblem on the engine cowl of white 11. The folding section of the canopy was removed to cut down on reflections.

It was all very early days, but a great deal of experience was gained. Falck’s report reached the desk of Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring where it was well received.

On May 10, 1940, the Wehrmacht launched its assault on the West. One element of the West’s response was the dispatch of RAF Bomber Command heavy bombers (Wellington, Hampden, Whitley) at night over German industrial centers. These raids had only limited effect but exasperated the Germans who set out to create a credible night fighter force based on Falck’s blueprint. On June 22, as the Western Campaign ended, the recently promoted Maj. Falck, who had persisted with his night-fighting trials and was already considered to be a specialist, was appointed Kommodore of