Animism and the Origin of Religion According to Edward Burnett Tylor (1832-1917)

Chapter 1: Introduction to Edward Burnett Tylor

Edward Burnett Tylor, an English anthropologist, is often credited as the founder of the modern discipline of anthropology and a key figure in the development of the study of religion. Born in 1832, Tylor's intellectual journey unfolded during a period of profound transformation in both scientific and philosophical thought. His ideas shaped the trajectory of anthropology, especially in regard to the study of religion and its origins. Tylor's seminal work, Primitive Culture (1871), set the stage for many later studies of human belief systems, particularly his theory of animism as the foundation of religious thought.

Tylor’s background as a self-educated scholar plays a crucial role in understanding the way he approached his field. Having attended Balliol College, Oxford, Tylor found his early intellectual interests aligned with the emerging disciplines of geology and archaeology. His travels to places like Mexico, where he observed and engaged with indigenous peoples, helped shape his thinking about the cultural and religious lives of so-called primitive societies. It was through these experiences that Tylor developed an interest in animism—the belief that the world is animated by spiritual forces or beings—and sought to investigate its role in the formation of religious thought.

Tylor’s most influential contribution lies in his theory of the evolutionary development of religion. He proposed that religion progressed through a set series of stages, beginning with animism and progressing through polytheism and monotheism. Tylor's evolutionary framework was grounded in the broader 19th-century intellectual environment, which was shaped by the idea that human society evolved through distinct stages of cultural development. Influenced by thinkers like Charles Darwin, Tylor extended Darwinian ideas of natural selection into the realm of human culture and religion, positing that early religious beliefs were not mere superstition but rather rational attempts to explain natural phenomena.

The central concept in Primitive Culture is animism, which Tylor defined as the belief in spiritual beings or forces that animate the natural world. Tylor argued that animism was the earliest form of religion, stemming from humans' attempts to explain natural events such as death, dreams, and other experiences that seemed beyond their control. He suggested that early humans came to the conclusion that natural objects like trees, rocks, and animals possessed souls or spirits. In this framework, the soul was not an abstraction but a vital force that could act independently of the body. As Tylor put it, Animism is the belief in spiritual beings, and it was from this core belief that all other religious systems were derived.

Tylor's ideas were revolutionary in that they marked a departure from theological approaches to the study of religion, which had dominated Western thought for centuries. Instead of seeing religion as the product of divine revelation, Tylor viewed it as a product of human cognition—an attempt to make sense of the world. His scientific, almost secular approach, placed the study of religion within the broader context of human evolution and the development of intellectual faculties.

The anthropological landscape of Tylor’s time was also profoundly shaped by debates between those who advocated for cultural evolutionism and those who believed that human societies were static and diverse in their religious and social practices. The work of early anthropologists like Lewis Henry Morgan, who wrote Ancient Society (1877), aligned with Tylor’s views on cultural evolution. Morgan’s classification of societies into stages of savagery, barbarism, and civilization paralleled Tylor’s own ideas about the development of religion. Tylor, however, took a more focused approach to the study of religion as part of a broader framework of social evolution.

In Primitive Culture, Tylor's extensive use of ethnographic examples illustrates his theory of animism’s ubiquity across various cultures. He drew upon a wide range of primary sources, including reports from missionaries, explorers, and colonial administrators, to support his argument that animism was a universal stage in the development of human religious thought. One of his key examples was the belief in spirits among the indigenous peoples of South America. Tylor interpreted these beliefs as evidence of a common, human instinct to attribute agency to natural forces. He argued that the idea of spirits was an intellectual step forward from mere superstition, a way for early humans to begin categorizing their experiences and interactions with the world.

Although Tylor’s work was groundbreaking, it was not without its limitations. One of the most significant critiques of Tylor's evolutionary approach is his Eurocentric worldview. Tylor assumed that Western civilization represented the pinnacle of human cultural and intellectual development, which meant that he often framed non-Western religious systems as primitive or undeveloped. This approach was typical of many scholars of his time but has since been challenged by later anthropologists and critics who argue that such assumptions reinforce colonialist and imperialist ideologies.

The question of what constituted primitive belief systems also became a point of contention in the anthropological community. Tylor's framework of religious evolution suggested that all societies would inevitably progress through the stages of animism, polytheism, and monotheism, culminating in the rationalism of scientific thought. Critics, including scholars like Franz Boas, contested this notion, arguing that human cultures were not necessarily following a single, linear path of development. Instead, cultural practices and beliefs, including religious ones, were shaped by specific historical, social, and environmental contexts that could not be reduced to a universal formula.

Tylor’s work also sparked discussions about the nature of religion itself. Was religion merely a psychological or intellectual phenomenon, or did it have deeper, more existential roots? While Tylor focused on religion as a cognitive construct, others, such as Emile Durkheim, sought to emphasize the social and collective dimensions of religious life. Durkheim, in his The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1912), proposed that religion could not be understood solely through individual beliefs but must also be seen as a social institution that reinforced collective solidarity. In contrast to Tylor’s emphasis on individual cognition, Durkheim’s work focused on the social functions of religion and its role in maintaining group cohesion.

Tylor’s legacy is still felt today, particularly in the field of anthropology, where his evolutionary model of religious development continues to inform discussions about the origins of human belief systems. Despite criticisms of his Eurocentrism and reductionism, Tylor’s idea that religion had a rational, cognitive basis marked a significant departure from theological interpretations of religious phenomena. His emphasis on animism as the foundation of religion continues to resonate with scholars interested in the origins and development of religious thought across cultures.

As the 19th century came to a close, the intellectual environment in which Tylor worked was shifting. The advent of psychological and sociological theories of religion, along with the development of structuralism and functionalism, would eventually overshadow Tylor's work. However, his ideas about animism and the evolution of religion laid the groundwork for future anthropological inquiry into the nature of belief systems and their role in human societies.

Tylor’s reflections on the nature of belief, his theory of animism, and his influence on subsequent generations of anthropologists offer a valuable lens through which to view the early intellectual history of anthropology and the study of religion. By focusing on the cognitive roots of religious belief, Tylor challenged scholars to think critically about the origins of human religious thought, even as his work provoked controversies that would shape the field for years to come. Through his groundbreaking work, Edward Burnett Tylor made a profound contribution to the study of human culture and the religious systems that have shaped humanity's collective history.

Chapter 2: Defining Animism

Animism, the belief in spiritual beings or forces animating the natural world, lies at the heart of Edward Burnett Tylor's theory of religion and remains one of the most influential concepts in the study of religious anthropology. Tylor's treatment of animism was revolutionary for his time, offering a comprehensive framework for understanding the ways in which early human societies perceived and interacted with the world around them. Yet, to appreciate fully the significance of Tylor’s definition, one must first understand the historical and intellectual context in which it arose, and the myriad influences that shaped both his thought and the broader anthropological study of religion.

The word animism itself comes from the Latin anima, meaning soul or spirit. The concept of animism predates Tylor’s work, but his systematic theorization of it helped elevate the idea to central importance in anthropology. In Tylor's view, animism represented the most rudimentary form of religious belief, a primal attempt by early humans to explain natural phenomena by attributing them to invisible spiritual agents. His definition of animism was grounded in his broader evolutionary theory of religion, which suggested that human religious thought evolved from simpler forms of belief to more complex systems over time. Tylor was influenced by the scientific climate of the 19th century, where Darwinian ideas about biological evolution were reshaping understandings of human nature. Much like