The Evolution Of The Armored Force, 1920-1940

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Text originally published in 1993 under the same title.

© Pickle Partners Publishing 2014, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted by any means, electrical, mechanical or otherwise without the written permission of the copyright holder.

Publisher’s Note

Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.

We have also made every effort to include all maps and illustrations of the original edition the limitations of formatting do not allow of including larger maps, we will upload as many of these maps as possible.

The Evolution of the Armored Force, 1920-1940

By

Edward J. O’Shaughnessy, Jr., LTC, USA

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS 4

ABSTRACT 5

Introduction 6

The Demise of the Tank Corps 8

Infantry-Tanks 9

An External Catalyst 14

The Experimental Mechanized Force 15

A New and Permanent Mechanized Force 18

The Mechanized Force Becomes Cavalry 27

The Fate of Infantry-Tanks 30

The Second External Catalyst 33

The Armored Force 34

Conclusion 36

REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 37

Bibliography 38

ABSTRACT

In armored force circles the inter-war years are sometimes referred to as the lean years. The abolishment of the separate Tank Corps in 1920, the Depression Era budget constraints and a lack of national strategic vision have caused a mistaken belief that little attention was paid to the development of armored force structure and doctrine in this critical time period. In fact the evidence points to the contrary. Rather than development by a kick start in 1940, the evidence illustrates an evolution of armored doctrine and force structure. The process started immediately upon return from World War I by a core of tank visionaries and advocates. The fruits of their labors were realized in 1940 when war demanded the rapid fielding of armored divisions. The fact that fourteen divisions were fielded in four years, when none had existed previously, is testimony to their efforts. This paper is told from their perspective. In the face of significant institutional obstacles these tank advocates responded to a higher calling. The inter-war period has parallels for us today. Once again we have declared victory, are downsizing our force structure and slashing our defense budget. Will we retain and encourage within our ranks visionaries and advocates to prepare our military for future conflict as we enter a new lean years era?

INTRODUCTION

Conventional wisdom among Army officers today has it that little effort was applied in the interwar years towards the development of what today we call the heavy division, the armored combined arms team, highly mobile and balanced for decisive action. The common understanding is that the Depression budget, branch rivalries, but most importantly (and incorrectly) a lack of professional foresight and attention were the characteristics of the lean years, as the period is sometimes called.

When one superficially explores the subject of armored development during the interwar years, the contemporary branch literature leads one to believe that origin of the Armored Force of 1940 was almost exclusively the result of the Cavalry branch’s evolution. Most of the contemporary credit goes to Adna Chaffee, the Father of the Armored Force, and the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized) at Fort Knox.

But is this the complete story? Is there not more to it? The rapid organization of armored divisions from early 1940, when there existed none, to 1944 when there existed fourteen, begs several questions. How was it that armored force structure and doctrine seemingly grew to maturity so rapidly? Was there not any foundation laid between the wars? Was there not any continuity from the World War I Tank Corps experience and lessons learned that was carried over to the armored units that came of age in World War II?

Surprisingly, the answers to these questions are easily discovered and rich in detail. Contrary to the common perception, it simply was not the case that everyone was asleep at the switch. In fact the case can be made that the creation of the Armored Force in 1940 was nothing more than another incremental step in the evolution of force structure that had been nonstop since the tank became a US weapon system.

The story told here is one of constant and progressive work by a number of visionaries and armored force advocates against significant institutional barriers. While these historical figures were represented in several branches they were predominantly grouped around infantry-tank units. These armored force advocates, of whom the corporate Armored Force knows so little today, served continuously with tanks from the end of World War I and provided a test bed for ideas and experimentation until the infantry-tank units,