Mind Games: Setting Conditions for Successful Counterinsurgency Military Information Support Operations

This edition is published by PICKLE PARTNERS PUBLISHING—www.picklepartnerspublishing.com

To join our mailing list for new titles or for issues with our books – [email protected]

Or on Facebook

Text originally published in 2010 under the same title.

© Pickle Partners Publishing 2014, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted by any means, electrical, mechanical or otherwise without the written permission of the copyright holder.

Publisher’s Note

Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.

We have also made every effort to include all maps and illustrations of the original edition the limitations of formatting do not allow of including larger maps, we will upload as many of these maps as possible.

MIND GAMES: SETTING CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL COUNTERINSURGENCY MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Henry B. Davis IV Major, United States Army

B.A., University of New Mexico, 2000

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS 4

ABSTRACT 5

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 6

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 7

I. INTRODUCTION 8

A. RESEARCH QUESTION 8

B. PURPOSE 9

C. CASE STUDY SELECTION 9

D. HYPOTHESES 10

E. METHODOLOGY 12

F. LITERATURE REVIEW 14

G. CHAPTER REVIEW 15

II. THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY (1948–1960) 16

A. AN OVERVIEW OF THE EMERGENCY 16

B. BRITISH PSYOP ORGANIZATION AND CAPABILITIES 17

C. BRITISH PSYOP EFFORTS 20

D. HYPOTHESIS TESTING 21

III. THE VIETNAM WAR (1950–1975) 24

A. AN OVERVIEW OF THE WAR 24

B. AMERICAN PSYOP ORGANIZATION AND CAPABILITIES 25

C. AMERICAN PSYOP EFFORTS 28

D. HYPOTHESIS TESTING 31

IV. THE KENYAN EMERGENCY (1952–1960) 34

A. AN OVERVIEW OF THE EMERGENCY 34

B. BRITISH PSYOP ORGANIZATION AND CAPABILITIES 37

C. BRITISH PSYOP EFFORTS 38

D. HYPOTHESIS TESTING 40

V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 42

A. REVIEW OF CASE STUDY FINDINGS 42

B. CONCLUSIONS 44

C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 45

APPENDIX A: POST-WORLD WAR II INSURGENCIES 46

APPENDIX B: SELECTED MAPS 49

APPENDIX C: SAMPLE PSYOP PRODUCTS 52

SAMPLE U.K. PSYOP PRODUCTS DISSEMINATED IN MALAYA 52

SAFE CONDUCT PASS TO MCP PERSONNEL 53

B. SAMPLE U.S. PSYOP PRODUCTS DISSEMINATED IN VIETNAM 55

C. SAMPLE U.K. PSYOP PRODUCTS DISSEMINATED IN KENYA 58

Government promise 61

REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 62

LIST OF REFERENCES 63

MALAYAN EMERGENCY REFERENCES 63

Books 63

Journal Articles 63

Monographs 63

Websites 64

VIETNAM WAR REFERENCES 64

Books 64

Reports 65

Journal Articles 65

Theses 65

Websites 65

KENYAN EMERGENCY REFERENCES 66

Books 66

Theses 66

Websites 66

OTHER REFERENCES 67

Books 67

Blogs 68

Monographs 68

Theses 68

Journal Articles 68

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to determine what actions can be taken by American military forces to set conditions for conducting effective Military Information Support Operations (MISO) campaigns in counterinsurgency (COIN) conflicts. To find these actions, hypotheses built upon tenets found in American military Psychological Operations (PSYOP) doctrine were compared to empirical observations of PSYOP conducted in three COIN case studies from the 1950s and 1960s. Because COIN literature is ripe with assertions, such as Dr. Kalev I. Sepp’s, that effective, pervasive psychological operations (PSYOP) campaigns are inherent in successful COIN operations, it is ironic that few works discuss specific recommendations regarding the design and conduct of such campaigns. This study begins filling this literature gap by showing that MISO relationship to other operations holds greater significance in effective MISO campaign design than internal details such as the level of centralization. This finding supports contemporary calls for a more unified group of inform and influence practitioners within the United States military, as well as calls for the United States government to draft a National Information Strategy to better leverage this important element of national power.

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ARVN:—Army of the Republic of Vietnam

CMO:—Civil Military Operations

COIN:—Counterinsurgency

JUSPAO:—Joint United States Public Affairs Office

KAU:—Kenyan African Union

MACV: —Military Assistance Command - Vietnam

MCP: —Malayan Communist Party

MISO: —Military Information Support Operations (formerly known as PSYOP)

MPAJA: —Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army

MRLA: —Malayan Races Liberation Army

NVA:—North Vietnamese Army

POG:—Psychological Operations Group

PSYOP: —Psychological Operations (now known as MISO)

PSYWAR:—Psychological Warfare (later known as PSYOP and now MISO)

USAID—United States Agency for International Development

USIS:—United States Information Service

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author is deeply indebted to the two most important women in his life. Ever eager to hear how this thesis was progressing, the author’s mother, Mrs. Dora F. Davis, has always been an inspiration to him in many ways. The author’s lovely wife, Mrs. Youn-Hee M. Davis, has always actively supported his academic activities and, in particular, kept him fed while he was sequestered in the Naval Postgraduate School’s Dudley-Knox Library working on this paper. Also, many thanks go to the aforementioned library’s helpful and courteous staff, as well as the author’s peers whose encouragement and information he continues to find an invaluable resource. Finally, great thanks go to the author’s advisors in this endeavour, Drs. Hy S. Rothstein and Kalev I. Sepp, for the knowledge and wisdom they so freely shared with the author both inside and outside of the classroom.

I. INTRODUCTION

During the United States’ involvement in the Vietnam War from 1950 to 1975, many military resources were expended in the counterinsurgency (COIN) fight against the Viet Cong. One American resource in particular used in Vietnam has begun to receive renewed attention: Psychological Operations (PSYOP), which have recently been renamed Military Information Support Operations (MISO).{1} While most literature about American PSYOP in Vietnam seems to find more faults than strengths regarding its implementation, few authors have examined United States PSYOP efforts in a rigorous manner from which lessons could be derived for use in modern MISO.{2} While Dr. John A. Nagl has compared American COIN efforts in Vietnam to British COIN efforts in Malaya in his book Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, even this work only devotes three pages to