FM 7-100.

OPFOR
Opposing Force
Tactics

Final Draft

September 2004

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Further dissemination requires TRADOC DCSINT approval.

 FM 7-100.2
FM 7-100.2

OPFOR

Opposing Force:

Tactics

FM 7-100.2
 STATUS OF DRAFT

Note that the current update of FM 7-100.2 (September 04) is a Final Draft. It is
provided here in for any last comments from the field before we publish it.

Please address any questions or comments to Jon Cleaves at

[email protected].
 FOREWORD
In todays complicated and uncertain world, it is impossible to predict the exact nature of
future conflict that might involve the U.S. Army. So the Army must be ready to meet the
challenges of any type of conflict, in all kinds of places, and against all kinds of threats. This is
the nature of the contemporary operational environment (COE), and training for such an
environment requires a different type of Opposing Force (OPFOR) than that of the past.
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT) of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC) is the Executive Agent for the development, management,
administration, integration, and approval functions of the OPFOR Program across the Army.
Thus, the TRADOC DCSINT is responsible for documenting the doctrine, organization, and
capabilities of a contemporary OPFOR that is appropriate for training the Armys leaders,
soldiers, and units for the COE.
In the FM 7-100 series, the TRADOC Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence
(ODCSINT) has created a flexible baseline for an OPFOR that can be adapted to meet a
variety of different training requirements in a number of different scenarios that reflect the
COE. The OPFOR tactical doctrine outlined in FM 7-100.2 represents a realistic composite of
potential adversaries the Army might encounter in the real-world situations of the foreseeable
future. However, the world is continually changing, as are the threats and challenges for which
the Army must be prepared. The Army must remain flexible, as must the OPFOR designed to
serve as a challenging sparring partner in the training environment.
This manual is approved for use in all Army training venues. However, as the contemporary
OPFOR and other aspects of the COE are integrated into Army training, the TRADOC
ODCSINT and the intelligence community will continue research and analysis of real-world
developments and trends. The goal of this continued effort is to keep our OPFOR and our
understanding of the COE truly contemporary and relevant as the world around us
changes. Thus, this manual is intended to be a living document, and the ODCSINT will
modify and change it as often as necessary in order to ensure its continued relevance in
light of changes and developments in the COE. In anticipation of such changes, this manual
will be published primarily in electronic format with only limited distribution of hard-copy,
printed manuals. The electronic version is available on the Army Knowledge Online (AKO) at
http://www.us.army.mil and the General Dennis J. Reimer Training and Doctrine Digital
Library (ADTDL) at http://www.adtdl.army.mil. Users also need to monitor the TRADOC
ADCSINT-Threats Knowledge Center on AKO for information regarding periodic updates.

MAXIE L. MCFARLAND
Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
 Preface
This manual is one of a series that describes a contemporary Opposing Force
(OPFOR) for training U.S. Army commanders, staffs, and units. See the Refer-
ence section for a list of the manuals in this series. Together, these manuals out-
line an OPFOR than can cover the entire spectrum of military capabilities
against which the Army must train to ensure success in any future conflict.
Applications for this series of manuals include field training, training simula-
tions, and classroom instruction throughout the Army. All Army training venues
should use an OPFOR based on these manuals, except when mission rehearsal or
contingency training requires maximum fidelity to a specific country-based
threat. Even in the latter case, trainers should use appropriate parts of the
OPFOR manuals to fill information gaps in a manner consistent with what they
do know about a specific threat.
The proponent for this publication is HQ TRADOC. Send comments and recom-
mendations on DA Form 2028 directly to the OPFOR and Threat Integration Di-
rectorate of the TRADOC Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence at the
following address: Director, OPFOR and Threat Integration Directorate, ATTN:
ATIN-T (Bldg 53), 700 Scott Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1323.
This publication is available at Army Knowledge Online (AKO) at
http://www.us.army.mil and on the General Dennis J. Reimer Training and
Doctrine Digital Library (ADTDL) at http://www.adtdl.army.mil. Readers should
monitor those sites and also the TRADOC ADCSINT-Threats Knowledge Center
on AKO for the status of this manual and information regarding updates.
Periodic updates, subject to the normal approval process, will occur as a result of
the normal production cycle in accordance with TRADOC regulation 25-36,
paragraphs 2-17 and 4-7. The date on the cover and title page of the electronic
version will reflect the latest update.
Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns or pronouns do not re-
fer exclusively to men.

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FM 7-100.2 ________________________________________________________________________________

Introduction
This manual is part of the FM 7-100 series, which describes a contemporary
Opposing Force (OPFOR) that exists for the purpose of training U.S. forces
for potential combat operations. This OPFOR reflects the characteristics of
military and paramilitary forces that may be present in the contemporary
operational environment (COE). Like those real-world threats, the OPFOR
will continue to present new and different challenges for U.S. forces. The COE is
constantly changing, and it is important for U.S. Army training environments
to keep pace with real-world developments.

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

The DOD officially defines an operational
environment (OE) as a composite of the Contemporary Operational
conditions, circumstances, and influences Environment (COE)
that affect the employment of military forces
and bear on the decisions of the unit The operational environment
commander (JP 1-02). The contemporary that exists today and for the
operational environment (COE) is the clearly foreseeable future.
operational environment that exists today
and for the clearly foreseeable future. There are some constants or common
threads that define the general nature of this COE:
The United States in not likely to have a peer competitor until 2020 or be-
yond.
However, nations will continue to field armed forces and use these forces
as a tool to pursue national interests.
As nations use their armed forces (or other instruments of national power)
in pursuit of national interests, their actions may cause U.S. intervention,
either unilaterally or as a coalition partner, with or without United Na-
tions mandate.
Nations that believe the United States may act to counter their national
interests will develop diplomatic, informational, economic, and military
plans for managing U.S. intervention.
Nations will continue to modernize their armed forces within the con-
straints of their economies, but in ways that may negate U.S. overmatch.
Advanced technology will be available on the world market for a wide va-
riety of nation-state and non-state actors.
Non-state actors will play an important role in any regional conflictas
combatants or noncombatants.
All combat operations will be significantly affected by a number of vari-
ables in the environment beyond simple military forces.
Thus, one of the constants is that there are variables. Those variables in the
COE result in a number of different OEs that can occur in specific circumstances
or scenarios.

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______________________________________________________________________________ Introduction

CRITICAL VARIABLES
Any OE, in the real world or in the
training environment, can be defined Critical Variables of COE
in terms of eleven critical variables. Nature and Stability of the State.
While these variables can be useful in Regional and Global Relation-
describing the overall (strategic) ships.
environment, they are most useful in Economics.
defining the nature of specific OEs. Sociological Demographics.
Each of these conditions, Information.
circumstances, and influences and Physical Environment.
their possible combinations will vary Technology.
according to the specific situation. In External Organizations.
this sense, they are variables. These National Will.
variables are interrelated and
Time.
sometimes overlap. Different variables
will be more or less important in
different situations. Each OE is different, because the content of the variables is
different. Only by studying and understanding these variablesand incorporat-
ing them into its trainingwill the U.S. Army be able to keep adversaries from
using them against it or to find ways to use them to its own advantage.

Nature and Stability of the State

It is important to understand the nature and stability of the state (or states) with
which or in which the conflict takes place. Study of this variable measures how
strong or weak a country is and determines where the real strength of the state
lies; it may be in the political leadership, the military, the police, or some other
element of the population. Understanding this variable will allow U.S. forces to
better understand the nature of the military campaign and the true aims of an
enemy campaign, operation, or action. It also helps determine what kinds of
threats may be present in a particular country. The real threat to U.S. forces
may come from elements other than the military.

Regional and Global Relationships

Nation-states and/or non-state actors often enter into relationships, which can be
regional or global. These partnerships support common objectives, which can be
political, economic, military, or cultural. An actors membership or allegiance to
such a relationship can determine its actions of support and motivation. Virtu-
ally all conflict will occur with alliances and coalitions, some involving the
United States and some involving its adversaries. When actors create regional or
global alliances, it can add to their collective capability and broaden the scale of
operations and actions.
As the world moves away from the traditional long-term, fixed alliances of the
past, regional and global relationships are much more fluid and unpredictable.
The choice of a state to be nonaligned does not mean that it will not become in-
volved in a conflict or crisis. It simply means that the state does not make a
commitment to another state, alliance, or cause before a situation arises. This
lack of precommitment makes it difficult to predict how actors and forces may
align when a situation does arise. Alliances can form or change rapidly, even dur-
ing the course of an operation or campaign.

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FM 7-100.2 ________________________________________________________________________________

Economics
The economic variable establishes the boundaries between the haves and the
have-nots. This gap of economic differences among nation-states and other ac-
tors can cause conflict. Economic superiority, rather than military superiority,
may be the key to power or dominance within a region. However, economic posi-
tion often represents a nation or non-state actors ability to buy military technol-
ogy or to conduct prolonged operations.
Economics help define the relationship between a nation or non-state actor and
other actors at the regional or global level. These regional or global economic re-
lationships could result in military or political assistance.

Sociological Demographics
The demographics variable includes the cultural, religious, and ethnic makeup of
a given region, nation, or non-state actor. Extreme devotion to a particular cause
or significant hatred of a particular group may provide an enemy with an un-
shakable will and a willingness to die for the cause. U.S. forces may also find
that large segments of the population around them are sympathetic to the same
cause as the enemy force. The needs of the local population can create heavy de-
mands on U.S. military units, particularly their supply and medical systems.
Refugees and internally displaced persons may increase the complexity of the
environment. The enemy may use civilians as shields or obstacles or as cover for
hostile intelligence services.

Information
Media and other information means can make combat operations transparent to
the world, visible to all who have access to data. Various actors seek to use per-
ception management to control and manipulate how the public sees things. They
will exploit U.S. mistakes and failures and use propaganda to sway the local
population to support their cause. Media coverage can impact on U.S. political
decision making, international opinion, or the sensitivities of coalition members.
Even without sophisticated sensors and information systems, actors native to the
area or region often have greater situational awareness than U.S. forces. Various
actors are able to access commercial systems (such as satellite communications
and imagery) for the larger picture. For a more detailed view, they can use hu-
man networks operating over normal telephone lines or with cellular telephones
to maintain situational awareness.

Physical Environment
The main elements in the physical environment are terrain and weather. Poten-
tial enemies clearly understand that less complex and open environments favor a
U.S. force with its long-range, precision-guided weapons and sophisticated re-
connaissance capability. So they will try to avoid the types of operations and en-
vironments for which such U.S. forces are optimized. They will try to operate in
urban areas and other complex terrain and in weather conditions that may ad-
versely affect U.S. military operations and mitigate technological advantages.

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______________________________________________________________________________ Introduction

Technology
The technology that nations or non-state actors can bring to the OE includes
what they can develop and produce, as well as what they could import. Access to
technological advances available on the global market is slowly eating away at
the technological advantage the United States has enjoyed in the past.
It is likely that some high-end forces in a particular region of the world could
field a few systems that are more advanced than those of the U.S. force deployed
there. Easy access to new technology allows potential adversaries to achieve
equality or even overmatch U.S. systems in selected niche areas. Many countries
are trying to acquire relatively low-cost, high-payoff, new technologies. In addi-
tion, upgrades and hybridization allow older systems to compete with more mod-
ern capabilities, thus neutralizing the technical advantage of many modern
forces. In urban areas or other complex terrain, less advanced systems may still
find effective uses. Various actors may find adaptive and innovative ways of us-
ing systems for other than their originally intended applications.

External Organizations
When the U.S. Army goes into a failed state or into areas torn by conflict, it is
likely to find international humanitarian relief organizations at work there.
These external organizations continue to grow in influence and power, as well as
in willingness to become involved in crisis situations that were previously purely
military operations. These external organizations can have both stated and hidden
interests and objectives that can either assist or hinder U.S. mission accomplish-
ment. The presence of transnational corporations operating in a country or region
can also place added pressure on U.S. forces to avoid collateral damage to civilian
life and property. U.S. forces may have to divert troops and resources from their as-
signed missions to conduct rescues or provide security for various external organiza-
tions.

National Will
The variable of national will reflects how much each countrys people and gov-
ernment are behind what the military or paramilitary forces are doing. This can
influence the objectives of a conflict, its duration, and the conditions for ending it.
A country will try to attack its opponents national will and still preserve its own.
Clearly, most foreign countries view U.S. national will as a point of vulnerability.
Thus, a potential adversary may perceive the collective will of his people as a
comparative advantage against the United States.
History has proven that battlefield victory does not always go to the best-trained,
best-equipped, and most technologically advanced force. Victory often goes to the
side that most wants to win, needs to win, and is willing to sacrifice to do so.

Time
In most cases, potential opponents of the United States view time as being in
their advantage. When U.S. forces have to deploy into the area over long time
and distance, the opponent can use this time to adjust the nature of the conflict
to something for which the U.S. forces are not prepared.

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FM 7-100.2 ________________________________________________________________________________

First, the opponent will try to control the entry of U.S. forces into the area. If ac-
cess control fails, the enemy still has the opportunity to oppose lightly equipped
U.S. early-entry units and try to prevent full deployment of the rest of the force.
The opponent will try to speed up the tempo, to rapidly defeat its local or re-
gional enemy or to defeat U.S. early-entry forces before the United States can
deploy overwhelming military power. If that fails, the opponent will try to pro-
long the conflict and to outlast the U.S. will to continue.

Military Capabilities
Military capabilities of a nation-state or non-state actor are measured in relative
terms, in comparison to the capabilities of other actors against which they might
be applied. Most of the military forces in the world continue to operate in conven-
tional ways, which remain sufficient against other local and regional actors.
However, once the United States becomes involved, these same military forces
may have to use adaptive or asymmetric approaches. Various nations and other
foreign entities around the world study the United States and its military forces.
They generally view the United States as a major powerthe worlds only super-
powerwith an overall advantage in technology and warfighting capability. De-
spite these strengths, other actors see some weaknesses that they may be able to
exploit. They can use these perceptions as a guide to optimizing the effectiveness
of their own forces and to find ways to negate current U.S. advantages.
Military capabilities may be the most critical and the most complex variable that
affects military operations. However, the military variable does not exist in isola-
tion from the other variables that help determine the overall OE. It interacts
with the other variables, and all the other variables can affect military capabilities.
Potential enemies can use any or all of these factors against the Army as it tries to
accomplish its missions in various parts of the world or in various training environ-
ments.

REAL WORLD
In the real world, the COE is the entire set of conditions, circumstances, and influ-
ences that U.S. Armed Forces can expect to face when conducting military opera-
tions to further the national interests of the United States, its friends, and allies.
The COE is contemporary in the sense that it does not represent conditions that
existed only in the past or that might exist only in the remote future, but rather
those conditions that exist today and in the clearly foreseeable, near future. This
COE consists not only of the military and/or paramilitary capabilities of potential
real-world adversaries, but also of the manifestations of the ten other variables that
help define any OE.

TRAINING
In training environments, the COE is the OE created to approximate the de-
mands of the real-world COE and to set the conditions for desired training out-
comes. This involves the appropriate combination of an OPFOR (with military
and/or paramilitary capabilities representing a composite of a number of potential
adversaries) and other OE variables in a realistic, feasible, and plausible manner.

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______________________________________________________________________________ Introduction

The purpose of the COE in training simulations is to produce the necessary training
outcomes. 1
Even in the COE for training, it is possible to speak of an overall COE that ad-
dresses the qualities of virtually any OE in which the units or individuals being
trained might be called upon to operate. In this sense, there are the same con-
stants as in the real-world COE.

INTERACTION AND LINKAGE OF VARIABLES

The variables of the COE do not exist in isolation from one another. The linkages
of the variables cause the complex and often simultaneous dilemmas that a military
force might face. In order to provide realistic training, training scenarios must try to
simulate this synergistic effect to the maximum degree that is feasible.
The COE is not just about the OPFOR. The COE variables and their interaction
provide the robust environment and context for OPFOR operations. The complex-
ity of the specific OE in training can be adjusted to keep it appropriate for the
required training objectives and the training state of various U.S. Army units.

ADAPTIVE AND CHANGING

The nature of the COE is adaptive and constantly changing. As the United States
and its military forces interact with the COE in a real-world sense, the OE
changes. As the Army applies the lessons learned from training in a COE setting,
the OPFOR and potential real-world adversaries will also learn and adapt.
The development of the COE for training started with research to develop an un-
derstanding of the real-world COE and trends that affect military operations. Then,
taking into consideration the desired training outcomes and leader development
goals, the authors of the FM 7-100 series proceeded to document an OPFOR doctrine
and structure that reflect the real-world COE, and the Army began integrating this
OPFOR and other COE variables into training scenarios. Meanwhile, the authors of
the FM 7-100 series are continuing to research the real-world COE and to mature
the OPFOR and the COE in training in order to provide a richer, appropriately chal-
lenging training environment and keep the OPFOR and the COE truly contempo-
rary.

ENEMY, THREAT, AND OPFOR

Before going further into the COE, the contemporary OPFOR, and the intended
uses of this manual, it may be useful to define some key terms and the distinc-
tions among them. It is important to distinguish among the terms enemy, threat,
and OPFOR and to use them correctly.

ENEMY
The U.S. Army defines enemy as the individual, group of individuals (organized
or not organized), paramilitary or military force, national entity, or national alli-
ance that is in opposition to the United States, its allies, or multinational partners.

1
The same type of COE conditions can be created to support some combat development activities that do not re-
quire simulation of a specific real-world potential adversary. However, some combat development activities may
require portrayal of an OE that extends further into the future than is typical for the COE.

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In other words, the enemy is whoever is actually opposing the United States in a
particular conflict. 2 Thus, this term is synonymous with adversary or opponent.

THREAT
A potential adversary is sometimes designated as a threat. In this sense, the
Army defines threat as any specific foreign nation or organization with inten-
tions and military capabilities that suggest it could become an adversary or chal-
lenge the national security interests of the United States or its allies. Once hos-
tilities actually begin, the threat becomes the enemy.

OPPOSING FORCE
An Opposing Force (OPFOR) is a training tool that should allow the U.S. Army to
train against a challenging and plausible sparring partner that represents the wide
range of possible opponents the Army could face in actual conflict. It enables train-
ing of all arms of the Army and prepares the Army for potential combat operations. 3
During the road to war leading up to events in a training scenario, the OPFOR
may play the role of a threat (potential enemy) that is on the verge of becoming
an enemy. However, the actual training event usually deals with a state of hos-
tilities. Thus, once hostilities begin in the training event, the OPFOR acts as the
enemy of the U.S. force in the training environment. 4
During the Cold War period, the Army employed OPFORs based on specific real-
world threats. However, the Army needs a different type of OPFOR to meet its
training requirements for the COE.

Cold War OPFOR

When the Army established its OPFOR program in 1976 with Army Regulation
350-2, it could hardly have envisioned todays computerized constructive and vir-
tual simulations, or even the evolving requirements of live simulations. It de-
fined an OPFOR simply as an organized force created by and from U.S. Army
units to portray a unit of a potential adversary armed force. Thus, all OPFORs
were originally threat-based, in the sense that they replicated the forces, capa-
bilities, and doctrine of a particular country officially recognized as a threat or
potential adversary. In the midst of the Cold War, the 1976 regulation identified
only one potential adversary against which to train: the Soviet Union; by 1983, a
revision of the regulation added North Korea as a second threat for replication by
an OPFOR. Over time, the Army developed other OPFORs to replicate other
threats emerging in places ranging from Latin America and Southwest Asia.

2
This definition of enemy is from the U.S. point of view. After this Introduction, the chapters of this manual address
their topics from the OPFOR point of view. So, friendly refers to the OPFOR and its allies, and enemy refers to the
enemy of the OPFOR, which may be an opponent within its own country or region or an extraregional opponent
(normally the United States or a U.S.-led coalition).
3
Although the OPFOR is primarily a training tool, it may be used for other purposes. For example, some combat de-
velopment activities that do not require simulation of a specific real-world potential adversary may use an OPFOR to
portray the threat or enemy.

4
From the OPFOR point of view, its leadership plans and develops forces and methods to deal with one or more
threats to its own interests, goals, or survival.

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______________________________________________________________________________ Introduction

In its time, the threat-based OPFOR served the Army very well, particularly for
units targeted against specific threats. The benefits of this training were borne out,
for example, in Operation Desert Storm. Techniques and doctrine, including deep at-
tack and the intelligence preparation of the battlefield, developed to cope with spe-
cific threats and honed against the OPFOR, enabled the Army to achieve decisive
results on the battlefield. However, the OE is dynamic, and the pace of that dynamism
has increased with the end of the Cold War and the rapid advancement of informa-
tion technology.

Contemporary OPFOR
Training U.S. forces for the COE re- Contemporary OPFOR
quires a different kind of OPFOR from
that of the past. The contemporary A plausible, flexible military and/or
OPFOR must be less predictable and paramilitary force representing a
not based on the armed forces of a par- composite of varying capabilities of
ticular country. In todays world, the actual worldwide forces, used in
U.S. Army must be prepared to go into lieu of a specific threat force, for
any OE and perform its full range of training and developing U.S. forces.
missions. It must be ready to do so in
the face of a wide variety of possible threats and at the same time be prepared to
deal with third-party actors that may have other interests. Not all threats are
purely military in nature. Therefore, the U.S. Army now defines an OPFOR as a
plausible, flexible military and/or paramilitary force representing a composite of
varying capabilities of actual worldwide forces, used in lieu of a specific threat
force, for training and developing U.S. forces.
Thus, in some training environments, a military force alone may be the OPFOR.
In other cases, military forces may have paramilitary forces acting in loose af-
filiation with them, or acting separately from them within the same training en-
vironment. These relationships depend on the scenario, which is driven by train-
ing requirements.
Various agencies and experts have different lists of real-world threats the United
States might have to face. If the U.S. Army were to pick any one of these threats
as the threat against which to train, that threat would almost certainly not be
the one it would actually fight. What is needed is a composite that is representa-
tive of the full range and variety of possible threats and OEs. It must have a bit
of everythingit could be virtually anybody, anywhere. Therefore, this manual
defines this representative composite in a way that is flexible enough to fit the
most demanding U.S. Army training requirements and provides a framework for
training that creates the leaders, soldiers, and unit skills necessary for success
on the next battlefield.

CONTEMPORARY THREATS AND OTHER ACTORS

There are many types of actors or participants in todays complex world envi-
ronment. Some of the actors are countries (also called nation-states) and some
are not. Nation-states are still dominant actors. However, some power is shifting
to nontraditional actors and transnational concerns. There are many potential
challenges to traditional concepts like balance of power, sovereignty, national in-
terest, and roles of nation-state and non-state actors.

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FM 7-100.2 ________________________________________________________________________________

Of course, not all actors are threats. To be a threat, a nation or organization must
have both the capabilities and the intention to challenge the United States. The
capabilities in question are not necessarily purely military, but encompass all the
elements of power available to the nation or organization.

NATION-STATE ACTORS
Nation-states fall into four basic categories according to their roles in the inter-
national community. The categories are core states, transition states, rogue
states, and failed or failing states.
The category of core states includes more than half of the nearly 200 countries in
the world today. These are basically democratic (although to varying degrees)
and share common values and interests. Within this larger group, there is an
inner core of major powers. These are the advanced countries, including the
United States, that generally dominate world politics. Most conflict with global
consequences will involve the core states in some fashion or another.
Transition states are other larger, industrial-based countriesmostly emerging
regional powersthat are striving to become major powers. High-end transition
states are moving from an industrial-based society to an information-based soci-
ety. Low-end transition states are seeking to move from an agricultural-based so-
ciety to an industrial base. As states try to make this transition, there are cycles
of political stability and instability, and the outcome of the transition is uncer-
tain. Some transition states may successfully join the ranks of core states and
even become major powers within that context; others may become competitors.
Rogue states are those that are hostile to their neighbors or to core states inter-
ests. These countries can sponsor international terrorism or even confront U.S.
military forces operating in the region. Failed or failing states are fragmented in
such a way that a rule of law is absent; their instability is a threat to their neigh-
bors and the core states.
Countries can move from one category to another, as conditions change. Some-
times countries join together in multinational alliances and coalitions. Together,
they have more strength and can become a power to be reckoned with.

NON-STATE ACTORS
Non-state actors are those that do not represent the forces of a particular nation-
state. Such non-state elements include rogue actors as well as third-party actors.
Like rogue states, rogue actors are hostile to other actors; however, they may be
present in one country or extend across several countries. Examples include in-
surgents, guerrillas, mercenaries, and transnational or subnational political
movements. Particular sources of danger are terrorists and drug-trafficking or
criminal organizations, since they may have the best technology, equipment, and
weapons available, simply because they have the money to buy them. These non-
state rogue actors may use terror tactics and militarily unconventional methods
to achieve their goals.
Third-party actors may not be hostile to other actors. However, their presence,
activities, and interests can affect the ability of military forces to accomplish
their mission when operating in a foreign country. These third-party actors can
be refugees, internally displaced persons, and other civilians on the battlefield,

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______________________________________________________________________________ Introduction

including international humanitarian relief agencies, transnational corporations,

and the news media. These individuals and groups bring multiple sources of mo-
tivation, ideology, interests, beliefs, or political affiliations into consideration.
They may be sources of civil unrest. Their presence may require military forces to
consider the potential impacts of traffic congestion, demonstrations, sabotage,
and information manipulation.

REAL-WORLD AND TRAINING CONSIDERATIONS

When U.S. forces become involved in a particular country or region, they must
take into account the presence and influence of these various types of threats and
other actors. In a training environment, an OPFOR can represent a composite of
those nation-state or non-state actors that constitute military and/or paramili-
tary forces that could present a threat to the United States, its friends, or its allies.
Other, non-state actors that fall in the category of nonmilitary forces or elements are
not part of the OPFOR, but could be part of the COE used in the training environ-
ment.

CONTEMPORARY OPFOR
This manual introduces the baseline tactical doctrine of a flexible, thinking,
adaptive, contemporary OPFOR that applies its doctrine with considerable ini-
tiative. (See the definition of contemporary OPFOR above.) It is applicable to the
entire training community, including the OPFORs at all of the combat training
centers (CTCs), the TRADOC schools, and units in the field. It provides an
OPFOR that believes that, through adaptive use of all available forces and capa-
bilities, it can create opportunities that, properly leveraged, can allow it to fight
and win, even against a technologically superior opponent such as the United
States.

BASELINE
As a baseline for developing specific OPFORs for specific training environments,
this manual describes an OPFOR that is representative of the forces of contem-
porary nation-states. This composite of the characteristics of real-world military
and paramilitary forces provides a framework for the realistic and relevant por-
trayal of capabilities and actions that U.S. armed forces might face in the COE.
For this composite of real-world threats, the manual refers to the country in
question as the State. 5 As the baseline for the contemporary OPFOR that is
representative of real-world forces, the State is not a peer competitor of the
United States. However, it is a dominant power in its region of the world and is
capable of challenging U.S. interests there. The general characteristics of the
State could fit a number of different types of potential adversaries in a number of
different scenarios.
Like most countries in the world, the State does not design its forces just to fight
the United States. It designs them principally to deal with regional threats and
to take advantage of regional opportunities. Therefore, the States national secu-
rity strategy (including its doctrine, force design, and investment strategy) fo-

5
In specific U.S. Army training environments, the generic name of the State may give way to other (fictitious)
country names such as Atlantis, Upper Flambokia, or Westland.

xv
FM 7-100.2 ________________________________________________________________________________

cuses primarily on maintaining and expanding its position as a regional power. It

develops its military forces in a way that ensures conventional power superiority
over any of its regional neighbors. These forces, together with the States other
instruments of power, make it a dominant force in its region.
At the same time, the State is aware that aggressive pursuit of its regional goals
might lead to intervention by a major power, such as the United States, from out-
side the region. To the extent possible, therefore, it invests in technologies and
capabilities that have utility against both regional and extraregional opponents.
The basic force structure of the OPFOR is the same for either type of threat. The
State must go to waror continue the war after extraregional interven-
tionwith whatever it had going into the war.
When an extraregional power intervenes with sufficient force to overmatch the
States, the State has to adapt its patterns of operation. It realizes that the forces
and technology that allow it to dominate its neighbors may not be a match for the
modern, high-technology forces of a wealthy extraregional power like the United
Statesat least not in a head-to-head conventional confrontation. However, it
can use those means in creative and adaptive ways. To the maximum extent pos-
sible, the State plans and trains for adaptive operations and how it will make the
transition to them. It is the combination of the States capabilities and its adap-
tive strategy, operations, and tactics that make it believe it can take on such an
extraregional force and win.
At the strategic level, the States ability to challenge U.S. interests includes not
only the military and paramilitary forces of the State, but also the States dip-
lomatic-political, informational, and economic instruments of power. Rarely
would any country engage the United States or a U.S.-led coalition with purely
military means. It is also possible that the State could be part of an alliance or
coalition, in which case the OPFOR could include allied forces. These nation-
state forces may also operate in conjunction with non-state actors such as insur-
gents, terrorists, and drug or criminal organizations.
The FM 7-100 series, as a whole, covers not only the military and paramilitary
forces of the State, but also other, non-state paramilitary and nonmilitary or-
ganizations present in the States region of the world. An extraregional power be-
coming involved in that region may have to deal with any or all of these types of
military, paramilitary, and nonmilitary elements. It might encounter these ele-
ments individually or, more likely, in combination with other such elements.
Whether these elements operate in concert or independently, they are an important
part of the COE.
Trainers need to consider the total OE and all instruments of power at the dis-
posal of the State and the OPFORnot just the military element, but also dip-
lomatic-political, informational, and economic means. For a nation-state, these
are instruments of national power. For non-state actors whose forces are para-
military in nature, the other three instruments of power are generally present to
one degree or another. Together, these instruments represent the power that ac-
tors can bring to bear against the United States.

xvi
______________________________________________________________________________ Introduction

FLEXIBILITY
As a training tool, the OPFOR must be a challenging, uncooperative sparring
partner, capable of stressing any or all battlefield operating systems of the U.S.
force. However, it also must be tailored to meet training requirements.
In the OPFOR baseline presented in this manual, the FM authors often say that
the State or the OPFOR may be able to do something or might or could do
something. They often use the progressive forms of verbs to say that the State
has a growing economy or is developing a capability or is continually mod-
ernizing. The State participates in the global market, which can allow it to ac-
quire things it cannot produce domestically. Such descriptions give scenario
writers considerable flexibility in determining what the State or the OPFOR ac-
tually has at a given point in time or a given place on the battlefieldin a particu-
lar scenario.
The composite example of this baseline may meet the OPFOR requirements for
many U.S. Army training environments. For cases that require an OPFOR based
on a type of nation-state with characteristics different from those of the State de-
scribed in this manual, this baseline provides a framework from which trainers
can develop an OPFOR appropriate for their particular training requirements.
The OPFOR must be flexible enough to fit various training requirements. It must
be scalable and tunable. Depending on the training requirement, the OPFOR
may be a large, medium, or small force. Its technology may be state-of-the-art,
relatively modern, obsolescent, obsolete, or an uneven combination of those cate-
gories. Its ability to sustain operations may be limited or robust.

THINKING
This manual describes how the OPFOR thinks, especially how it thinks about
fighting its regional neighbors and/or the United States. This thinking deter-
mines basic OPFOR tacticsas well as strategy and operations, which are the
subjects of other manuals in this series. It drives OPFOR organizational struc-
tures and equipment acquisition or adaptation. It also determines how the na-
tion-state OPFOR that represents the armed forces of the State would interact
with other, non-state actors that may be present in the COE.
Just because the U.S. force knows something about how the OPFOR has fought
in the past does not mean that the OPFOR will always continue to fight that
way. A thinking OPFOR will learn from its own successes and failures, as well as
those of its potential enemies. It will adapt its thinking, its makeup, and its way
of fighting to accommodate these lessons learned. It will continuously look for in-
novative ways to deal with the United States and its armed forces.

ADAPTABILITY
Like all military forces, the OPFOR has a basic, conventional design for dealing
with forces with capabilities equal to or inferior to its own. Prior to a U.S. force
becoming involved, therefore, the OPFOR can use the application or threat of ap-
plication of that conventional design to dominate or influence its regional
neighbors. The OPFOR plans these operations well in advance and tries to exe-
cute them as rapidly as possible, in order to preclude regional alliances or outside
intervention.

xvii
FM 7-100.2 ________________________________________________________________________________

The OPFOR has developed its doctrine, force structure, and capabilities with an
eye toward employing them against both regional and extraregional opponents, if
necessary. It has thought about and trained for how to adapt once an extrare-
gional force becomes engaged. It has included this adaptability in its doctrine in
the form of general principles, based on its perceptions of the United States and
other threats to its goals and aspirations. It will seek to avoid types of operations
and environments for which U.S. forces are optimized. During the course of con-
flict, it will make further adaptations, based on experience and opportunity.
When a U.S. force or a U.S.-led coalition first begins to deploy into theater, the
OPFOR will seek to disrupt the deployment and thus create opportunity. In such
cases, the conventional design the OPFOR used in regionally-focused operations
may still provide the framework for military operations against an advanced ex-
traregional force. The OPFOR will not shy away from the use of military means
against such an opponent, so long as the risk is commensurate with potential
gains. As a U.S. or coalition force builds up power in the region, the OPFOR must
rely on adaptive applications of its basic design in order to mitigate its disadvan-
tages and exploit its advantages compared to this new opponent.
In general, the contemporary OPFOR will be less predictable than OPFORs in
the past. It will be difficult to template as it adapts and attempts to create oppor-
tunity. Its patterns of operation will change as it achieves success or experiences
failure. OPFOR doctrine might not change, but its way of operating will.

INITIATIVE
Like U.S. Army doctrine, OPFOR doctrine must allow sufficient freedom for bold,
creative initiative in any situation. OPFOR doctrine is descriptive, but not pre-
scriptive; authoritative, but not authoritarian; definitive, but not dogmatic. The
OPFOR that U.S. units encounter in various training venues will not apply this
doctrine blindly or unthinkingly, but will use its experience and assessments to
interpolate from this baseline in light of specific situations. Thus, U.S. units can
no longer say that the OPFOR has to do certain things and cannot do anything
that is not expressly prescribed in established OPFOR doctrine. Doctrine guides
OPFOR actions in support of the States objectives; OPFOR leaders apply it with
judgment and initiative.

KEEPING THE COE AND THE OPFOR CONTEMPORARY

The COE is extremely fluid, with rapidly changing regional and global relation-
ships. New actorsboth nations and non-state actorsare constantly appearing
and disappearing from the scene. The OPFOR tactical doctrine provided in this
manual should meet most of the U.S. Armys training needs for the foreseeable
future. During the period covered by the COE, almost anyone who fights the
United States would probably have to use the same kinds of adaptive action as
outlined in this doctrine. As the geopolitical situation, forces, or capabilities
change over time, OPFOR doctrine and its applications will evolve along with
them, to continue to provide the Army a contemporary OPFOR. Thus, the
OPFOR will remain capable of presenting a challenge that is appropriate to meet
evolving training requirements at any given point in time.

xviii
 Chapter 1

Strategic and Operational Framework

This chapter describes the States national security strategy and how the
State designs campaigns and operations to achieve strategic goals out-
lined in that strategy. This provides the general framework within which the
OPFOR plans and executes military actions at the tactical level, which are
the focus of the remainder of this manual. The nature of the State and its na-
tional security strategy are explained in greater detail in FM 7-100. See FM
7-100.1 for more detail on OPFOR operations.

NATIONAL-LEVEL ORGANIZATION
1-1. The State intends to achieve its strategic goals and objectives through
the integrated use of four instruments of national power, which are interre-
lated and complementary:
Diplomatic-political.
Informational.
Economic.
Military.
A clear-cut line of demarcation between military, economic, and political mat-
ters does not exist. The informational element cuts across the other three.
Thus, the State believes that its national security strategy must include all
the instruments of national power, not just the military. Power is a combina-
tion of many elements, and the State can use them in varying combinations
as components of its overall national security strategy. See FM 7-100 for
more detail on these instruments of power and the State ministries associ-
ated with each.

NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITY

1-2. The National Command Authority (NCA) exercises overall control of the
application of all instruments of national power in planning and carrying out
the national security strategy. Thus, the NCA includes the cabinet ministers
responsible for those instruments of power: the Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Minister of Public Information, Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs,
Minister of the Interior, and Minister of Defense, along with other members
selected by the States President, who chairs the NCA. (See Figure 1-1.)
1-3. The President also appoints a Minister of National Security, who heads
the Strategic Integration Department (SID) within the NCA. The SID is the
overarching agency responsible for integrating all the instruments of national
power under one cohesive national security strategy. The SID coordinates the
plans and actions of all State ministries, but particularly those associated
with the instruments of power.

1-1
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITY

PRESIDENT

MINISTER OF
NATIONAL
SECURITY

MINISTER MINISTER OF MINISTER OF MINISTER MINISTER

OF FOREIGN PUBLIC FINANCE AND OF THE OF
AFFAIRS INFORMATION ECONOMIC AFFAIRS INTERIOR DEFENSE

STRATEGIC
INTEGRATION
DEPARTMENT

MINISTRY MINISTRY OF MINISTRY OF MINISTRY MINISTRY

FINANCE AND OF THE OTHER
OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OF
ECONOMIC AFFAIRS INTERIOR MINISTRIES
AFFAIRS INFORMATION DEFENSE

GENERAL
STAFF

SUPREME
HIGH COMMAND

Figure 1-1. National Command Authority

NATIONAL
COMMAND
AUTHORITY

MINISTRY OF
DEFENSE
SUPREME
HIGH COMMAND
GENERAL
STAFF

STRATEGIC SPF INTERNAL

ARMY NAVY AIR FORCE SECURITY
FORCES COMMAND
FORCES

AIR
DEFENSE
FORCES

Figure 1-2. The States Armed Forces

ARMED FORCES
1-4. The NCA exercises command and control of the States Armed Forces
via the Supreme High Command (SHC), which includes the Ministry of De-
fense (MOD) and a General Staff drawn from all the service components. (See
Figure 1-2.) In peacetime, the MOD and General Staff operate closely but

1-2
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 1

separately. The MOD is responsible for policy, acquisitions, and financing the
Armed Forces. The General Staff promulgates policy and supervises the ser-
vice components; its functional directorates are responsible for key aspects of
defense planning. During wartime, the MOD and General Staff merge to form
the SHC, which functions as a unified headquarters.
1-5. The State organizes its Armed Forces into six service components. The
Army is the largest of the six services, although it relies on mobilization of
reserve and militia forces to conduct sustained operations. These ground
forces, along with a relatively large Navy and Air Force, are sufficient to
dominate the States regional neighbors militarily. The Internal Security
Forces are subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior in peacetime, but are
resubordinated to the SHC as a sixth service in time of war.

ADMINISTRATIVE FORCE STRUCTURE

1-6. The OPFOR has an administrative force structure that manages its mili-
tary forces in peacetime. This administrative force structure is the aggregate
of various military headquarters, facilities, and installations designed to
man, train, and equip the forces. In peacetime, forces are commonly grouped
into corps, armies, or army groups for administrative purposes. An army
group can consist of several armies, corps, or separate divisions and brigades.
In some cases, forces may be grouped administratively under geographical
commands designated as military regions or military districts. If the SHC
elects to create more than one theater headquarters, it may allocate parts of
the administrative force structure to each of the theaters, normally along geo-
graphic lines. Normally, these administrative groupings differ from the
OPFORs go-to-war (fighting) force structure. Other parts of the administra-
tive force structure consist of assets centrally controlled at the national level.
1-7. In wartime, the normal role of administrative commands is to serve as
force providers during the creation of operational- and tactical-level fighting
commands. After transferring control of its major fighting forces to one or
more task-organized fighting commands, an administrative headquarters, fa-
cility, or installation continues to provide depot- and area support-level ad-
ministrative, supply, and maintenance functions. A geographically-based
administrative command also provides a framework for the continuing mobi-
lization of reserves to complement or supplement regular forces. In rare
cases, an administrative command could function as a fighting command.

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

1-8. The national security strategy is the States vision for itself as a nation
and the underlying rationale for building and employing its instruments of
national power. It outlines how the State plans to use its diplomatic-political,
informational, economic, and military instruments of power to achieve its
strategic goals. Despite the term security, this strategy defines not just what
the State wants to protect or defend, but what it wants to achieve.

NATIONAL STRATEGIC GOALS

1-9. The NCA determines the States strategic goals. The States overall goals
are to continually expand its influence within its region and eventually

1-3
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

change its position within the global community. These are the long-term
aims of the State. Supporting the overall, long-term, strategic goals, there may
be one or more specific goals, each based on a particular threat or opportunity.

Peace War

STRATEGIC OPERATIONS
Against Enemy Strategic Centers of Gravity

REGIONAL
OPERATIONS
TRANSITION
OPERATIONS
ADAPTIVE
OPERATIONS

Against Opponents Against Opponents

the State that Overmatch
Overmatches the State

Figure 1-3. Conceptual Framework for Implementing the States National Security Strategy

FRAMEWORK FOR IMPLEMENTING NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

1-10. In pursuit of its national security strategy, the State is prepared to
conduct four basic types of strategic-level courses of action. (See Figure 1-3.)
Each course of action involves the use of all four instruments of national
power, but to different degrees and in different ways. The State gives the four
types the following names:
Strategic operationsstrategic-level course of action that uses all
instruments of power in peace and war to achieve the goals of the
States national security strategy by attacking the enemys strategic
centers of gravity.
Regional operationsstrategic-level course of action (including con-
ventional, force-on-force military operations) against opponents the
State overmatches, including regional adversaries and internal threats.
Transition operationsstrategic-level course of action that bridges
the gap between regional and adaptive operations and contains some
elements of both, continuing to pursue the States regional goals while
dealing with the development of outside intervention with the potential
for overmatching the State.
Adaptive operationsstrategic-level course of action to preserve the
States power and apply it in adaptive ways against opponents that
overmatch the State.

1-4
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 1

Although the State refers to them as operations, each of these courses of

action is actually a subcategory of strategy. Each of these types of opera-
tions is actually the aggregation of the effects of tactical, operational, and
strategic actions, in conjunction with the other three instruments of national
power, that contribute to the accomplishment of strategic goals. The type(s) of
operations the State employs at a given time will depend on the types of
threats and opportunities present and other conditions in the operational en-
vironment.
1-11. Strategic operations are a continuous process not limited to wartime or
preparation for war. Once war begins, they continue during regional, transi-
tion, and adaptive operations and complement those operations. Each of the
latter three types of operations occurs only during war and only under certain
conditions. Transition operations can overlap regional and adaptive operations.

Strategic Operations
1-12. What the State calls strategic operations is actually a universal stra-
tegic course of action the State would use to deal with all situationsin
peacetime and war, against all kinds of opponents, potential opponents, or
neutral parties. The nature of strategic operations at any particular time cor-
responds to the conditions perceived by the NCA. Depending on the situation,
the State may first try to achieve its ends through strategic operations alone,
without having to resort to armed conflict. It may be able to achieve the desired
goal through pressure applied by other-than-military instruments of power, per-
haps with the mere threat of using its superior military power against a regional
opponent. These actions would fall under the general framework of strategic op-
erations.
1-13. Once war begins, the State will employ all means available against the
enemys strategic centers of gravity: diplomatic initiatives, information war-
fare (IW), economic pressure, terrorist attacks, State-sponsored insurgency,
direct action by SPF, long-range precision fires, and even weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) against selected targets. These efforts allow the enemy no
sanctuary and often place noncombatants at risk.

Regional Operations
1-14. When nonmilitary means are not sufficient or expedient, the State may
resort to armed conflict as a means of creating conditions that lead to the de-
sired end state. However, strategic operations continue even if a particular
regional threat or opportunity causes the State to undertake regional opera-
tions that include military means.
1-15. Prior to initiating armed conflict and throughout the course of armed
conflict with its regional opponent, the State would continue to use strate-
gic operations to preclude intervention by outside playersby other re-
gional neighbors or by an extraregional power that could overmatch the
States forces. However, the overall strategy always includes branches and
sequels for dealing with the possibility of intervention by an extraregional
power.
1-16. At the military level, regional operations are combined arms, joint, in-
teragency, and/or multinational operations. They are conducted in the States

1-5
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

region and, at least at the outset, against a weaker regional opponent. The
States doctrine, organization, capabilities, and national security strategy al-
low the OPFOR to deal with regional threats and opportunities primarily
through offensive action.
1-17. Regionally-focused operations typically involve conventional patterns
of operation. However, the term conventional does not mean that the OPFOR
will use only conventional forces and conventional weapons in such a conflict,
nor does it mean that the OPFOR will not use some adaptive approaches.

Transition Operations
1-18. When unable to limit the conflict to regional operations, the State is
prepared to engage extraregional forces through a series of transition and
adaptive operations. Usually, the State does not shift directly from regional
to adaptive operations. Thus, a period of transition operations overlaps both
regional and adaptive operations. The transition can begin concurrently with
regional operations. Transition operations allow the State to shift gradually
to adaptive operations or back to regional operations. At some point, the
State either seizes an opportunity to return to regional operations, or it
reaches a point where it must complete the shift to adaptive operations. Even
after shifting to adaptive operations, the State tries to set conditions for tran-
sitioning back to regional operations.
1-19. When an extraregional force starts to deploy into the region, the bal-
ance of power begins to shift away from the State. Although the State may
not yet be overmatched, it faces a developing threat it will not be able to han-
dle with normal, conventional patterns of operation designed for regional
conflict. Therefore, the State must begin to adapt its operations to the chang-
ing threat.
1-20. While the State and the OPFOR as a whole are in the condition of transi-
tion operations, an operational- or tactical-level commander will still receive a
mission statement in plans and orders from higher headquarters stating the
purpose of his actions. To accomplish that purpose and mission, he will use as
much as he can of the conventional patterns of operation that were available to
him during regional operations and as much as he has to of the more adaptive-
type approaches dictated by the presence of an extraregional force. Transition
operations serve as a means for the State to retain the initiative and still
pursue its overall strategic goal of regional expansion despite its diminishing
advantage in the balance of power.
1-21. There are two possible outcomes to transition operations. If the ex-
traregional force suffers sufficient losses or for other reasons must withdraw
from the region, the OPFORs operations may begin to transition back to re-
gional operations, again becoming primarily offensive. If the extraregional
force is not compelled to withdraw and continues to build up power in the re-
gion, the OPFORs transition operations may begin to gravitate in the other di-
rection, toward adaptive operations.

Adaptive Operations
1-22. Once an extraregional force intervenes with sufficient power to over-
match the State, the full conventional design used in regionally-focused op-

1-6
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 1

erations is no longer sufficient to deal with this threat. The State has devel-
oped its doctrine, organization, capabilities, and strategy with an eye toward
dealing with both regional and extraregional opponents. It has already
planned how it will adapt to this new and changing threat and has included
this adaptability in its doctrine.
1-23. The OPFOR still has the same forces and technology that were avail-
able to it for regional operations, but must use them in creative and adaptive
ways. It has already thought through how it will adapt to this new or
changing threat in general terms. (See Principles of Operation versus an
Extraregional Power below.) It has already developed appropriate branches
and sequels to its basic SCP and does not have to rely on improvisation. Dur-
ing the course of combat, it will make further adaptations, based on experi-
ence and opportunity.
1-24. Even with the intervention of an advanced extraregional power, the State
will not cede the initiative. It will employ military means so long as this does not
either place the regime at risk or risk depriving it of sufficient force to remain a
regional power after the extraregional intervention is over. The primary objec-
tives are to preserve combat power, to degrade the enemys will and capability to
fight, and to gain time for aggressive strategic operations to succeed.
1-25. The types of adaptive actions that characterize adaptive operations at
the strategic level can also serve the OPFOR well in regional or transition
operationsat least at the tactical and operational levels. However, once an
extraregional force becomes fully involved in the conflict, the OPFOR will
conduct adaptive actions more frequently and on a larger scale.
1-26. The State believes that adaptive operations can lead to several possible
outcomes. If the results do not completely resolve the conflict in the States
favor, they may at least allow the State to return to regional operations. Even
a stalemate may be a victory for the State, as long as it preserves enough of
its instruments of power to preserve the regime and lives to fight another
day.

STRATEGIC CAMPAIGN
1-27. To achieve one or more specific strategic goals, the NCA would develop
and implement a specific national strategic campaign. Such a campaign is the
aggregate of actions of all the States instruments of power to achieve a spe-
cific set of the States strategic goals against internal, regional, and/or ex-
traregional opponents. There would normally be a diplomatic-political cam-
paign, an information campaign, and an economic campaign, as well as a
military campaign. All of these must fit into a single, integrated national
strategic campaign.
1-28. The campaign could include more than one specific strategic goal. For
instance, any strategic campaign designed to deal with an insurgency would
include contingencies for dealing with reactions from regional neighbors or an
extraregional power that could adversely affect the State and its ability to
achieve the selected goal. Likewise, any strategic campaign focused on a goal
that involves the States invasion of a regional neighbor would have to take
into consideration possible adverse actions by other regional neighbors, the

1-7
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

possibility that insurgents might use this opportunity to take action against
the State, and the distinct possibility that the original or expanded regional
conflict might lead to extraregional intervention. Figure 1-4 shows an exam-
ple of a single strategic campaign that includes three strategic goals. (The
map in this diagram is for illustrative purposes only and does not necessarily
reflect the actual size, shape, or physical environment of the State or its
neighbors.)

Neutral Allied
Country Country Sea
t
res
f Un
ao
Are
al:
Hostile ic Go ency
g r g
ate nsu
Country Str nteri
u Strategic Goal:
Co
Defense Against Invasion
THE STATE

Strategic Goal:
Annexation of Territory

Sea

Sea

Figure 1-4. Example of a Strategic Campaign

NATIONAL STRATEGIC CAMPAIGN PLAN

1-29. The State would need a specific national strategic campaign plan (na-
tional SCP) to integrate all the instruments of national power under a single
plan. The national SCP is the end result of the SIDs planning effort. Based
on input from all State ministries, this is the plan for integrating the actions
of all instruments of power to set conditions favorable for achieving the cen-
tral goal identified in the national security strategy. The MOD is only one of
several ministries that provide input and are then responsible for carrying out
their respective parts of the consolidated national plan. State ministries respon-
sible for each of the four instruments of power will develop their own cam-
paign plans as part of the unified national SCP.
1-30. A national SCP defines the relationships among all State organizations,
military and nonmilitary, for the purposes of executing that SCP. The SCP
describes the intended integration, if any, of multinational forces in those in-
stances where the State is acting as part of a coalition.

1-8
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 1

MILITARY STRATEGIC CAMPAIGN PLAN

1-31. Within the context of the national strategic campaign, the MOD and
General Staff develop and implement a military strategic campaign. During
peacetime, the Operations Directorate of the General Staff is responsible for
developing, staffing, promulgation, and continuing review of the military
strategic campaign plan. It must ensure that the military plan would end in
achieving military conditions that would fit with the conditions created by
the diplomatic-political, informational, and economic portions of the national
plan that are prepared by other State ministries. Therefore, the Operations
Directorate assigns liaison officers to other important government ministries.
1-32. Although the States Armed Forces (the OPFOR) may play a role in
strategic operations, the focus of their planning and effort is on the military
aspects of regional, transition, and adaptive operations. A military strategic
campaign may include several combined arms, joint, and/or interagency op-
erations. If the State succeeds in forming a regional alliance or coalition,
these operations may also be multinational.
1-33. The General Staff acts as the executive agency for the NCA, and all
military forces report through it to the NCA. The Chief of the General Staff
(CGS), with NCA approval, defines the theater in which the Armed Forces
will conduct the military campaign and its subordinate operations. He de-
termines the task organization of forces to accomplish the operational-level
missions that support the overall campaign plan. He also determines whether
it will be necessary to form more than one theater headquarters. For most
campaigns, there will be only one theater, and the CGS will serve as thea-
ter commander, thus eliminating one echelon of command at the strategic
level.
1-34. In wartime, the MOD and the General Staff combine to form the SHC.
The Operations Directorate continues to review the military SCP and modify
it or develop new plans based on guidance from the CGS, who commands the
SHC. It generates options and contingency plans for various situations that
may arise. Once the CGS approves a particular plan for a particular strategic
goal, he issues it to the appropriate operational-level commanders.
1-35. The military SCP directs operational-level military forces, and each
command identified in the SCP prepares an operation plan that supports the
execution of its role in that SCP. The SCP assigns forces to operational-level
commands and designates areas of responsibility (AORs) for those com-
mands.
1-36. From the General Staff down through the operational and tactical lev-
els, the staff of each military headquarters has an operations directorate or
section that is responsible for planning. The plan at each level specifies the
AOR and task organization of forces allocated to that level of command, in
order to best accomplish the mission assigned by a higher headquarters. Once
the commander at a particular level approves the plan, he issues it to the
subordinate commanders who will execute it. Figure 1-5 illustrates the
framework for planning from the national level down through military chan-
nels to the operational and tactical levels. (See Chapter 2 for more detail on
the tactical-level planning process.)

1-9
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

Decision-Making Staff
Executing
(Plan-Approval) Planning Plan
Organizations
Authority Organization

Strategic Level

National
National Strategic
Strategic All State
Command Integration
Campaign Ministries
Authority Department
Plan

Military
Chief of Operations Strategic Armed
General Staff Directorate Campaign Forces
Plan

Theater Forces
Theater Operations
Campaign Allocated to
Commander Directorate
Plan Theater

Operational Level

Forces
Field Group Operations Operation
Allocated to
Commander Section Plan
Field Group

Forces
OSC Operations Operation
Allocated to
Commander Section Plan
OSC

Tactical Level

Forces
Tactical-Level Operations Allocated to
Battle Plan
Commander Section Tactical-Level
Command

Figure 1-5. State and OPFOR Planning Framework

1-10
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 1

PRINCIPLES OF OPERATION VERSUS AN EXTRAREGIONAL POWER

1-37. The State assumes the distinct possibility of intervention by a major
extraregional power in any regional conflict. Consequently, it has devised the
following principles for applying its various instruments of diplomatic-
political, informational, economic, and military power against this type of threat.

CONTROL ACCESS INTO REGION

1-38. Extraregional enemies capable of achieving overmatch against the
State must first enter the region using power-projection capabilities. There-
fore, the States force design and investment strategy is focused on access
controlto selectively deny, delay, and disrupt entry of extraregional forces
into the region and to force them to keep their operating bases beyond con-
tinuous operational reach. This is the easiest manner of preventing the ac-
cumulation of enemy combat power in the region and thus defeating a techno-
logically superior enemy.
1-39. Access-control operations are continuous throughout a strategic cam-
paign and can reach beyond the theater as defined by the States NCA. They
begin even before the extraregional power declares its intent to come into the re-
gion, and continue regardless of whether the State is conducting regional, transi-
tion, or adaptive operations. Access-control operations come in three basic forms:
strategic preclusion, operational exclusion, and access limitation.

Strategic Preclusion
1-40. Strategic preclusion seeks to completely deter extraregional involve-
ment or severely limit its scope and intensity. The State would attempt to
achieve strategic preclusion in order to reduce the influence of the extrare-
gional power or to improve its own regional or international standing. It
would employ all its instruments of power to preclude direct involvement by
the extraregional power. Actions can take many forms and often contain sev-
eral lines of operation working simultaneously.
1-41. The primary target of strategic preclusion is the extraregional powers
national will. First, the State would conduct diplomatic and perception man-
agement activities aimed at influencing regional, transnational, and world
opinion. This could either break apart ad hoc coalitions or allow the State to
establish a coalition of its own or at least gain sympathy. For example, the
State might use a disinformation campaign to discredit the legitimacy of dip-
lomatic and economic sanctions imposed upon it. The extraregional powers
economy and military would be secondary targets, with both practical and
symbolic goals. This might include using global markets and international fi-
nancial systems to disrupt the economy of the extraregional power, or con-
ducting physical and information attacks against critical economic centers.
Similarly, the military could be attacked indirectly by disrupting its power
projection, mobilization, and training capacity. Preclusive actions are likely
to increase in intensity and scope as the extraregional power moves closer to
military action. If strategic preclusion fails, the State will turn to operational
methods that attempt to limit the scope of extraregional involvement or cause
it to terminate quickly.

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

Operational Exclusion
1-42. Operational exclusion seeks to selectively deny an extraregional force
the use of or access to forward bases of operation within the region or even
outside the theater defined by the NCA. For example, through diplomacy,
economic or political connections, information campaigns, and/or hostile ac-
tions, the State might seek to deny the enemy the use of bases in other foreign
nations. It might also attack population and economic centers for the intimida-
tion effect, using long-range surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs), WMD, or SPF.
1-43. Forces originating in the enemys homeland must negotiate long and
difficult air and surface lines of communication (LOCs) merely to reach the
region. Therefore, the State will use any means at its disposal to also strike
the enemy forces along routes to the region, at transfer points en route, at ae-
rial and sea ports of embarkation (APOEs and SPOEs), and even at their
home stations. These are fragile and convenient targets in support of transi-
tion and adaptive operations.

Access Limitation
1-44. Access limitation seeks to affect an extraregional enemys ability to in-
troduce forces into the theater. Access-control operations do not necessarily
have to deny the enemy access entirely. A more realistic goal is to limit or in-
terrupt access into the theater in such a way that the States forces are capa-
ble of dealing with them. By controlling the amount of force or limiting the
options for force introduction, the State can create conditions that place its
conventional capabilities on a par with those of an extraregional force. Capa-
bility is measured in terms of what the enemy can bring to bear in the thea-
ter, rather than what the enemy possesses.
1-45. The States goal is to limit the enemy accumulation of applicable com-
bat power to a level and to locations that do not threaten the accomplishment
of a strategic campaign. This may occur through many methods. For example,
the State may be able to limit or interrupt the enemys deployment through
actions against his aerial and sea ports of debarkation (APODs and SPODs)
in the region. Hitting such targets also has political and psychological value.
The State will try to disrupt and isolate enemy forces that are in the region or
coming into it, so that it can destroy them piecemeal. It might exploit and
manipulate international media to paint foreign intervention in a poor light,
decrease international resolve, and affect the force mix and rules of engage-
ment (ROE) of the deploying extraregional forces.

EMPLOY OPERATIONAL SHIELDING

1-46. The State will use any means necessary to protect key elements of its
combat power from destruction by an extraregional forceparticularly by air
and missile forces. This protection may come from use of any or all of the
following:
Complex terrain.
Noncombatants.
Risk of unacceptable collateral damage.
Countermeasure systems.

1-12
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 1

Dispersion.
Fortifications.
IW.

1-47. Operational shielding generally cannot protect the entire force for an
extended time period. Rather, the State will seek to protect selected elements
of its forces for enough time to gain the freedom of action necessary to prose-
cute important elements of a strategic campaign.

CONTROL TEMPO
1-48. The OPFOR initially employs rapid tempo to conclude regional opera-
tions before an extraregional force can be introduced. It will also use rapid
tempo to set conditions for access-control operations before the extraregional
force can establish a foothold in the region. Once it has done that, it needs to
be able to control the tempoto ratchet it up or down, as is advantageous to
its own operational or tactical plans.
1-49. During the initial phases of an extraregional enemys entry into the re-
gion, the OPFOR may employ a high operational tempo. Taking advantage of
the weaknesses inherent in enemy power projection, it seeks to terminate the
conflict quickly before main enemy forces can be brought to bear. If the
OPFOR cannot end the conflict quickly, it may take steps to slow the tempo and
prolong the conflict, taking advantage of enemy lack of commitment over time.

CAUSE POLITICALLY UNACCEPTABLE CASUALTIES

1-50. The OPFOR will try to inflict highly visible and embarrassing losses on
enemy forces to weaken the enemys domestic resolve and national will to
sustain the deployment or conflict. Modern wealthy nations have shown an
apparent lack of commitment over time, and sensitivity to domestic and
world opinion in relation to conflict and seemingly needless casualties.
1-51. The OPFOR also has the advantage of disproportionate interests: the
extraregional power may have limited objectives and only casual interest in
the conflict, while the State approaches it from the perspective of total war
and a threat to its aspirations or even to its national survival. The State is
willing to commit all means necessary, for as long as necessary, to achieve its
strategic goals. Compared to the extraregional enemy, the State stands more
willing to absorb higher military and civilian casualties in order to achieve
victory. It will try to influence public opinion in the enemys homeland to the
effect that the goal of intervention is not worth the cost.

NEUTRALIZE TECHNOLOGICAL OVERMATCH

1-52. Against an extraregional force, the OPFOR will forego massed forma-
tions, patterned echelonment, and linear operations that would present easy
targets for such an enemy. It will hide and disperse its forces in areas where
complex terrain limits the enemys ability to apply his full range of techno-
logical capabilities. However, the OPFOR can rapidly mass forces and fires
from these dispersed locations for decisive combat at the time and place of its
own choosing.

1-13
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

1-53. Another way to operate on the margins of enemy technology is to ma-

neuver during periods of reduced exposure. The OPFOR trains its forces to
operate in adverse weather, limited visibility, rugged terrain, and urban envi-
ronments that shield them from the effects of the enemys high-technology weap-
ons and deny the enemy the full benefits of his advanced reconnaissance, intelli-
gence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA) systems.
1-54. Modern militaries rely upon information and information systems to
plan and conduct operations. For this reason, the OPFOR will conduct exten-
sive information attacks and other offensive IW actions. It can also use the
enemys robust array of RISTA systems against him. A sophisticated enemys
large numbers of sensors can overwhelm subordinate units ability to receive,
process, and analyze raw intelligence data and to provide timely and accurate
intelligence analysis. The OPFOR can add to this saturation problem by us-
ing deception to flood enemy sensors with masses of conflicting information.
Conflicting data from different sensors at different levels (such as satellite
imagery conflicting with data from unmanned aerial vehicles) can confuse the
enemy and degrade his situational awareness.
1-55. The OPFOR will concentrate its own RISTA, maneuver, and fire sup-
port means on the destruction of high-visibility (flagship) enemy systems.
This offers exponential value in terms of increasing the relative combat
power of the OPFOR and also maximizes effects in the information and psy-
chological arenas. Losses among these premier systems may not only degrade
operational capability, but also undermine enemy morale. Thus, attacks
against such targets are not always linked to military objectives.

CHANGE THE NATURE OF CONFLICT

1-56. The OPFOR will try to change the nature of conflict to exploit the dif-
ferences between friendly and enemy capabilities. Following an initial period
of regionally-focused conventional operations and utilizing the opportunity af-
forded by phased enemy deployment, the OPFOR will change its operations
to focus on preserving combat power and exploiting enemy ROE. This shift in
the focus of operations will present the fewest targets possible to the rapidly
growing combat power of the enemy. Also, the OPFOR or affiliated forces can
use terror tactics against enemy civilians or soldiers not directly connected to
the intervention as a device to change the fundamental nature of the conflict.
1-57. Against early-entry forces, the OPFOR may still be able to use the de-
sign it employed in previous operations against regional opponents, particu-
larly if access-control operations have been successful. However, as the ex-
traregional force builds up to the point where it threatens to overmatch the
OPFOR, the OPFOR is prepared to disperse its forces and employ them in
patternless operations that present a battlefield that is difficult for the enemy to
analyze and predict.
1-58. The OPFOR may hide and disperse its forces in areas of sanctuary. The
sanctuary may be physical, often located in urban areas or other complex ter-
rain that limits or degrades the capabilities of enemy systems. However, the
OPFOR may also use moral sanctuary by placing its forces in areas shielded
by civilians or close to sites that are culturally, politically, economically, or
ecologically sensitive. It will defend in sanctuaries when necessary. However,

1-14
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 1

elements of the OPFOR will move out of sanctuaries and attack when they
can create a window of opportunity or when opportunity is presented by
physical or natural conditions that limit or degrade the enemys systems.
1-59. The OPFOR elements do not avoid contact; rather, they often seek con-
tact, but on their own terms. Their preferred tactics under these conditions
would be the ambush and raid as a means of avoiding decisive combat with
superior forces. They will also try to mass fires from dispersed locations to
destroy key enemy systems or formations. However, when an opportunity
presents itself, the OPFOR can rapidly mass forces and execute decisive com-
bat at the time and place of its choosing.

ALLOW NO SANCTUARY
1-60. Along with dispersion, decoys, and deception, the OPFOR uses urban
areas and other complex terrain as sanctuary from the effects of enemy
forces. Meanwhile, its intent is to deny enemy forces the use of such terrain.
This forces the enemy to operate in areas where the OPFORs long-range fires
and strikes can be more effective.
1-61. The OPFOR seeks to deny enemy forces safe haven during every phase
of a deployment and as long as they are in the region. It is prepared to attack
enemy forces anywhere on the battlefield, as well as to his strategic depth.
The resultant drain on manpower and resources to provide adequate force-
protection measures can reduce the enemys strategic, operational, and tacti-
cal means to conduct war and erode his national will to sustain conflict. The
goal is to present the enemy with a nonlinear, simultaneous battlefield. Such
actions will not only deny the enemy sanctuary, but also weaken his national
will, particularly if the OPFOR or affiliated forces can strike targets in the
enemys homeland.

OPERATIONAL-LEVEL ORGANIZATION
1-62. In peacetime, tactical-level commands belong to parent organizations in
the administrative force structure. In wartime, they typically serve as part of
a field group (FG) or an OSC. In rare cases, they might also fight as part of
their original parent units from the administrative force structure.

FIELD GROUP
1-63. A field group is the largest operational-level organization, since it has
one or more smaller operational-level commands subordinate to it. An FG is a
grouping of subordinate organizations with a common headquarters, a com-
mon AOR, and a common operation plan. FGs are always joint and inter-
agency organizations and are often multinational. However, this level of
command may or may not be necessary in a particular SCP. An FG may be
organized when the span of control at theater level exceeds four or five sub-
ordinate commands. This can facilitate the theater commanders remaining
focused on the theater-strategic level of war and enable him to coordinate ef-
fectively the joint forces allocated for his use.
1-64. The General Staff does not normally form standing FG headquarters,
but may organize one or more during full mobilization, if necessary An FG
can be assigned responsibilities in controlling forces in the field during adap-

1-15
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

tive operations in the homeland, or forward-focused functionally (an FG may

be assigned an access-control mission). However, FGs may exist merely to ac-
commodate the number of forces in the theater.
1-65. FGs are typically formed for one or more of the following reasons:
An SCP may require a large number of OSCs and/or operational-level
commands from the administrative force structure. When the number
of major military efforts in a theater exceeds the theater commanders de-
sired or achievable span of control, he may form one or more FGs.
In the rare cases when multiple operational-level commands from the
administrative force structure become fighting commands, they could
come under the command of an FG headquarters.
Due to modifications to the SCP, a standing operational-level head-
quarters that was originally designated as an OSC headquarters may
receive one or more additional major operational-level commands from
the administrative force structure as fighting commands. Then the
OSC headquarters would evolve into an FG headquarters.
In the first two cases, a standing FG staff would be formed and identified as
having control over two or more OSCs (or operational-level headquarters
from the administrative force structure) as part of the same SCP. In the third
case, the original OSC headquarters would be redesignated as an FG head-
quarters. In any case, the FG command group and staff would be structured
in the same manner as those of an OSC.
OPERATIONAL-STRATEGIC COMMAND
1-66. The OPFORs primary operational organization is the OSC, which is
described in detail in FM 7-100.1. Once the General Staff writes a particular
SCP, it forms one or more standing OSC headquarters. Each OSC headquar-
ters is capable of controlling whatever combined arms, joint, interagency, or
multinational operations are necessary to execute that OSCs part of the
SCP. However, the OSC headquarters does not have forces permanently as-
signed to it.
1-67. When the NCA decides to execute a particular SCP, each OSC partici-
pating in that plan receives appropriate units from the OPFORs administra-
tive force structure, as well as interagency and/or multinational forces. The
allocation of organizations to an OSC depends on what is available in the
States administrative force structure and the requirements of other OSCs.
Forces subordinated to an OSC may continue to depend on the administra-
tive force structure for support.
1-68. If a particular OSC has contingency plans for participating in more
than one SCP, it could receive a different set of forces under each plan. In
each case, the forces would be task organized according to its mission re-
quirements in the given plan. Thus, each OSC consists of those division-,
brigade-, and battalion-size organizations allocated to it by the SCP currently
in effect. These forces also may be allocated to the OSC for the purpose of
training for a particular SCP. When an OSC is neither executing tasks as
part of an SCP nor conducting exercises with its identified subordinate forces,
it exists as a planning headquarters.

1-16
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 1

OPERATION PLAN
1-69. Operational-level commands prepare operation plans to control execu-
tion of their portion of an SCP. The operation plan must
Optimally allocate forces and resources to each mission.
Provide concrete methods to coordinate the actions of maneuver, fire
support, and logistics support.
Provide for a specific sequence and methods for conducting each sub-
task required to assure mission success.
From the completed operation plan, the operational-level staff creates opera-
tional directives or combat orders to inform subordinates of their missions,
roles, and time requirements for executing the plan. Tactical-level subordi-
nates create their own battle plans and combat orders for their missions
within the operation plan.

1-70. The operation plan details the commanders thinking and reflects the
input of various subordinates and staff elements according to their functional
responsibilities. It normally includes the following specific areas:
Assessment of the enemy situation and probable intentions.
Scope, aim, and concept of operations.
Organization of forces.
Organization of the battlefield.
Results of force analysis.
Plan for commitment of reserves.
Missions of subordinate units.
Missions of supporting and adjacent units.
Plan for logistics support.
Locations of command posts.

TYPES OF OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE ACTION

1-71. The types of offensive action in
OPFOR doctrine are both tactical Types of Offensive Action
methods and guides to the design of Attack:
operational courses of action. An OSC Integrated Attack.
offensive operation plan may include Dispersed Attack.
subordinate units that are executing
different offensive and defensive Limited-Objective Attack:
courses of action within the overall of- Sophisticated Ambush.
fensive mission framework. The OPFOR Raid.
recognizes three basic types of offensive Spoiling Attack.
Counterattack.
action: attack, limited-objective attack,
and strike. (See Chapter 3 for discus- Strike.
sion of the same types of action at the
tactical level.)

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

1-72. The types of defensive action in

OPFOR doctrine are both tactical Types of Defensive Action
methods and guides to the design of Maneuver Defense.
operational courses of action. The two Area Defense.
basic types are maneuver defense and
area defense. As with offensive operations, the defense can also be character-
ized as integrated or decentralized. An OSC defensive operation plan may in-
clude subordinate units that are executing various combinations of maneuver
and area defenses, along with some offensive courses of action, within the
overall defensive mission framework. (See Chapter 4 for discussion of the
same types of action at the tactical level.)

BATTLEFIELD GEOMETRY
1-73. The OPFOR organizes the battlefield in such a way that it can rapidly
transition between offensive and defensive operations and between linear
and nonlinear operations. This flexibility can help the OPFOR adapt and
change the nature of the conflict to something for which the enemy is not
prepared.
1-74. The OPFOR recognizes the complexity of the modern battlefield. This
will often lead to situations where part of the OPFOR may be able to effec-
tively operate in a linear fashion, while other parts may be able to (or need
to) conduct nonlinear operations. The OPFORs understanding of what makes
a battlefield linear or nonlinear is based on general military theory accepted
by the armed forces of many countries. Battlefield geometry can be described
in two dimensions: the relationship of units to each other, the enemy, and
their support base; and the expected effects of that relationship.

LINEAR OPERATIONS
1-75. Some military operations that develop along a secure line from a base
toward a geographically-based objective. These linear operations are charac-
terized by an easily definable front and rear across the entire force. Orienta-
tion of the bulk of the force is in one general direction, defined as the front,
normally facing the enemy and/or the objective. (See Figure 1-6.) During lin-
ear operations, the flanks of units are normally protected by other units,
natural terrain features, or manmade obstacles.

1-18
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 1

Rear Front

X
Base
Objective
X

Enemy

Figure 1-6. Linear Operations

Objective X

Enemy

Base Enemy

Objective

Figure 1-7. Nonlinear Operations

NONLINEAR OPERATIONS
1-76. Military operations that seek to complete a force- or systems-based
mission, with no secure connection to a base and no easily defined front and
rear across the force, are nonlinear. Orientation of the force is determined by
the location of the immediate threat or the objective. (See Figure 1-7.) In
most cases, units in a nonlinear environment rely on movement, deception,
cover, and concealment to provide protection for potentially exposed ele-
ments.

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

EXPECTED EFFECTS
1-77. The OPFOR considers the difference between linear and nonlinear op-
erations less in terms of geography and more in terms of effects desired. Lin-
ear operations normally produce small effects from small actions and large ef-
fects from large actions (or perhaps large effects from an aggregation of small
actions)a linear relationship. Linear operations are proportional and addi-
tive, and produce and typically produce a predictable, measurable effect. In
contrast, this relationship may not always be present in nonlinear operations,
which can produce large effects from small actions. In some cases, small ac-
tions produce small effects or no effects at all. Thus, nonlinear operations
produce disproportionate, often unpredicted effects.

SYSTEMS WARFARE
1-78. The OPFOR defines a system as a set of different elements so connected
or related as to perform a unique function not performable by the elements or
components alone. The essential ingredients of a system include the compo-
nents, the synergy among components and other systems, and some type of
functional boundary separating it from other systems. Therefore, a system of
systems is a set of different systems so connected or related as to produce re-
sults unachievable by the individual systems alone. The OPFOR views the
operational environment, the battlefield, the States own instruments of
power, and an opponents instruments of power as a collection of complex,
dynamic, and integrated systems composed of subsystems and components.
1-79. Systems warfare serves as a conceptual and analytical tool to assist in
the planning, preparation, and execution of warfare. With the systems ap-
proach, the intent is to identify critical system components and attack them
in a way that will degrade or destroy the use or importance of the overall sys-
tem.

PRINCIPLE
1-80. The primary principle of systems warfare is the identification and iso-
lation of the critical subsystems or components that give the opponent the
capability and cohesion to achieve his aims. The focus is on the disaggrega-
tion of the system by rendering its subsystems and components ineffective.
While the aggregation of these subsystems or components is what makes the
overall system work, the interdependence of these subsystems is also a poten-
tial vulnerability. Systems warfare has applicability or impact at all three
levels of warfare.

APPLICATION AT THE STRATEGIC LEVEL

1-81. At the strategic level, the instruments of power and their application
are the focus of analysis. National power is a system of systems in which the
instruments of national power work together to create a synergistic effect.
Each instrument of power (diplomatic-political, informational, economic, and
military) is also a collection of complex and interrelated systems.
1-82. The State clearly understands how to analyze and locate the critical
components of its own instruments of power and will aggressively aim to pro-
tect its own systems from attack or vulnerabilities. It also understands that

1-20
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 1

an adversarys instruments of power are similar to the States. Thus, at the

strategic level, the State can use the OPFOR and its other instruments of
power to counter or target the systems and subsystems that make up an op-
ponents instruments of power. The primary purpose is to subdue, control, or
change the opponents behavior.
1-83. If an opponents strength lies in his military power, the State and the
OPFOR can attack the other instruments of power as a means of disaggre-
gating or disrupting the enemys system of national power. Thus, it is possi-
ble to render the overall system ineffective without necessarily having to de-
feat the opponent militarily.

APPLICATION AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL

1-84. At the operational level, the application of systems warfare pertains
only to the use of armed forces to achieve a result. Therefore, the system of
systems in question at this level is the combat system of the OPFOR and/or
the enemy.

COMBAT LOGISTICS
FORCES FORCES

Examples: Examples:
Tanks, Transportation,
IFVs/APCs, Ammunition,
Infantry Fuel,
Rations,
Maintenance,
COMBAT Medical
SYSTEM

COMBAT C2 AND
SUPPORT
FORCES RISTA

Examples: Examples:
Artillery, Headquarters,
SSMs, Signal Nodes,
Air Defense, Satellite Downlinks,
Engineers, Reconnaissance Sensors
Direct Air Support

Figure 1-8. Combat System

Combat System
1-85. A combat system (see Figure 1-8) is the system of systems that results
from the synergistic combination of four basic subsystems that are integrated
to achieve a military function. The subsystems are as follows:
Combat forces (such as main battle tanks, IFVs and/or APCs, or infantry).

1-21
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

Combat support forces (such as artillery, surface-to-surface missiles

(SSMs), air defense, engineers, and direct air support).
Logistics forces (such as transportation, ammunition, fuel, rations, main-
tenance, and medical).
C2 and RISTA (such as headquarters, signal nodes, satellite downlink
sites, and reconnaissance sensors).

1-86. The combat system is characterized by interaction and interdependence

among its subsystems. Therefore, the OPFOR will seek to identify key sub-
systems of an enemy combat system and target them and destroy them indi-
vidually. Against a technologically superior extraregional force, the OPFOR
will often use any or all subcomponents of its own combat system to attack
the most vulnerable parts of the enemys combat system rather than the en-
emys strengths. For example, attacking the enemys logistics, C2, and RISTA
can undermine the overall effectiveness of the enemys combat system with-
out having to directly engage his superior combat and combat support forces.
Aside from the physical effect, the removal of one or more key subsystems can
have a devastating psychological effect, particularly if it occurs in a short
span of time.

Planning and Execution

1-87. The systems warfare approach to combat is a means to assist the com-
mander in the decision-making process and the planning and execution of his
mission. The OPFOR believes that a qualitatively and/or quantitatively weaker
force can defeat a superior foe, if the lesser force can dictate the terms of combat.
It believes that the systems warfare approach allows it to move away from
the traditional attrition-based approach to combat. It is no longer necessary
to match an opponent system-for-system or capability-for-capability. Command-
ers and staffs will locate the critical component(s) of the enemy combat system,
patterns of interaction, and opportunities to exploit this connectivity. Systems
warfare has applications in both offensive and defensive contexts.
1-88. The essential step after the identification of the critical subsystems and
components of a combat system is the destruction or degradation of the syn-
ergy of the system. This may take the form of total destruction of a subsystem
or component, degradation of the synergy of components, or the simple denial
of access to critical links between systems or components. The destruction of
a critical component or link can create windows of opportunity that can be
exploited, set the conditions for offensive action, or support a concept of op-
eration that calls for exhausting the enemy on the battlefield. Once the
OPFOR has identified and isolated a critical element of the enemy combat sys-
tem that is vulnerable to attack, it will select the appropriate method of attack.
1-89. Todays state-of-the-art combat and combat support systems are im-
pressive in their ability to deliver precise attacks at long standoff distances.
However, the growing reliance of some extraregional forces on these systems
offers opportunity. For example, attacking critical ground-based C2 and RISTA
nodes or logistics systems and LOCs may have a very large payoff for relatively
low investment and low risk. Modern logistics systems assume secure LOCs and
voice or digital communications. These characteristics make such systems vul-

1-22
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 1

nerable. Therefore, the OPFOR can greatly reduce a military forces combat
power by attacking a logistics system that depends on just-in-time delivery.
1-90. For the operational commander, the systems warfare approach to com-
bat is not an end in itself. It is a key component in his planning and sequenc-
ing of tactical battles and engagements aimed toward achieving assigned
strategic goals. Systems warfare supports his concept; it is not the concept.
The ultimate aim is to destroy the enemys will and ability to fight.

APPLICATION AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL

1-91. It is at the tactical level that systems warfare is executed in attacking
the enemys combat system. While the tactical commander may use systems
warfare in the smaller sense to accomplish assigned missions, his attack on
systems will be in response to missions assigned him by the operational
commander.
APPLICATION ACROSS ALL TYPES OF STRATEGIC-LEVEL ACTIONS
1-92. Systems warfare is applicable against all types of opponents in all stra-
tegic-level courses of action. In regional operations, the OPFOR will seek to
render a regional opponents systems ineffective to support his overall con-
cept of operation. However, this approach is especially conducive to the con-
duct of transition and adaptive operations. The very nature of this approach
lends itself to adaptive and creative options against an adversarys techno-
logical overmatch.

RELATIONSHIP TO THE C2 PROCESS

1-93. The systems warfare approach to combat is an important part of
OPFOR planning. It serves as a means to analyze the OPFORs own combat
system and how it can use the combined effects of this system to degrade the
enemys combat system. The OPFOR believes that the approach allows its
decision makers to be anticipatory rather than reactive.

THE ROLE OF PARAMILITARY FORCES IN OPERATIONS

1-94. Paramilitary forces are those organizations that are distinct from the
regular armed forces but resemble them in organization, equipment, training,
or purpose. Basically, any organization that accomplishes its purpose, even
partially, through the force of arms is considered a paramilitary organization.
These organizations can be part of the government infrastructure or operate
outside of the government or any institutionalized controlling authority.
1-95. In consonance with the concept of all means necessary, the OPFOR
views these organizations as assets that can be used to its advantage in time
of war. Within its own structure, the OPFOR has formally established this
concept by assigning the Internal Security Forces, part of the Ministry of the
Interior in peacetime, to the SHC during wartime. Additionally, the OPFOR
cultivates relationships with and covertly supports nongovernment paramili-
tary organizations to achieve common goals while at peace and to have a high
degree of influence on them when at war.
1-96. The primary paramilitary organizations are the Internal Security
Forces, insurgents, terrorists, and drug and criminal organizations. The de-

1-23
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

gree of control the OPFOR has over these organizations varies from absolute,
in the case of the Internal Security Forces, to tenuous when dealing with ter-
rorist and drug and criminal organizations. In the case of those organizations
not formally tied to the OPFOR structure, control can be enhanced through
the exploitation of common interests and ensuring that these organizations
see personal gain in supporting OPFOR goals.
1-97. The OPFOR views the creative use of these organizations as a means of
providing depth and continuity to its operations. A single attack by a terrorist
group will not in itself win the war. However, the use of paramilitary organi-
zations to carry out a large number of planned actions, in support of strategy
and operations, can play an important part in assisting the OPFOR in achiev-
ing its goals. These actions, taken in conjunction with other adaptive actions,
can also supplement a capability degraded due to enemy superiority.

1-24
 Chapter 2

Tactical Command and Control

This chapter examines the OPFOR system and process of command and con-
trol (C2). It explains how the OPFOR expects to direct the forces and actions
described in other chapters of this manual. It provides insights into the
OPFOR theory and practice of controlling combined arms, interagency, and
multinational forces in war. Most important, it shows how OPFOR com-
manders and staffs think and work.

In modern war, victory is likely to go to the side that acts most quickly.
The overriding need for speedy decisions to seize fleeting opportunities
drastically reduces the time available for decision making and for issuing
and implementing orders. The need to seize opportunities on the battle-
field, coupled with dispersion to avoid the threat of precision weapons,
dictates the replacement of concentration in terms of space by concentra-
tion in terms of time and effects. Moreover, the tactical situation is sub-
ject to sudden and radical changes, and the results of combat are more
likely to be decisive than in the past. OPFOR C2 participants, processes,
and systems are designed to operate effectively and efficiently in this new
environment. The successful execution of an information warfare (IW)
plan is critical to victory.

This chapter focuses on tactical command and control. All OPFOR levels
of command share a common decision-making and planning process. They
also share a parallel staff organization and command post (CP) structure,
tailored to match the differences in scope and span of control.

CONCEPT
2-1. The OPFORs Tactical C2 concept is based on the following key princi-
ples.
2-2. Mission tactics. OPFOR tactical units focus on the purpose of their
tactical missions and continue to act on that purpose even when the details of
an original plan have become irrelevant through enemy action or unforeseen
events.
2-3. Flexibility through battle drill. The OPFOR does not see battle drill Formatted: Bullets and Numbering
as a restrictive methodology. Rather, it believes that true flexibility comes
from soldiers in tactical units understanding basic battlefield functions to
such a degree that they are second nature. Only when common battlefield
functions can be performed rapidly without further guidance or orders do tac-
tical commanders achieve the flexibility to modify the plan on the move.

2-1
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

2-4. Accounting for mission dynamics. The OPFOR recognizes that en-
emy action and battlefield conditions may make the originally selected mis-
sion irrelevant and require an entirely new mission be acted upon without an
intermediate planning session. An example would be an OPFOR fixing force
that finds itself the target of an enemy fixing action. To continue solely as a
fixing force would actually assist the enemy in achieving its mission. In this
case, the OPFOR unit might choose to re-task organize on the move and allo-
cate a part of the fixing force to the exploitation force and use a smaller
amount of combat power to keep the enemy fixing force from being able to in-
fluence the fight. OPFOR tactical headquarters constantly evaluate the
situation to determine if the mission being executed is still relevant, and if
not, to advise the commander on how best to shift to a relevant course of ac-
tion. It requires the commander at each level of command to act flexibly, ex-
ercising his judgment as to what best meets and sustains the aim of his supe-
rior.

COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURES

2-5. C2 at the tactical level of command is designed with emphasis on surviv- Formatted: Bullets and Numbering
ability through mobility, redundancy, and security. CPs and procedures are
streamlined compared to such at the operational level and great reliance is
placed on use of common procedures for important recurring tactical tasks.
2-6. OPFOR Brigade and Brigade Tactical Group headquarters and CPs are
similar to those found in Divisions and DTGs in most respects, but lack an
IFC and IFCCP. BTGs have a Fire Support Coordination Center in their op-
erations section, but are not expected to integrate fires from all systems and
services without augmentation.
2-7. OPFOR battalions are characterized by headquarters composed of a
command section including the commander and deputy commander and a
small staff element and a staff section including the chief of staff and the re-
mainder of the battalion staff. The commander and deputy commander will
each have their own command vehicles in mounted units. The battalion staff
consists of the operations officer (who also serves as the deputy COS), the as-
sistant operations officer, the intelligence officer, and the resources officer.
The signal platoon leader also serves as the battalion communications officer,
the reconnaissance platoon leader acts as the chief of reconnaissance while
the materiel support platoon leader serves as the battalion resources officer.
2-8. OPFOR companies are characterized by headquarters composed of a
command team consisting of the commander and a small staff element and a
support team consisting of the deputy commander and the rest of the com-
pany staff.

COMMAND AND SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS

2-9. OPFOR units are organized using four command and support relation-
ships, summarized in Figure 2-1 and described in the following paragraphs.
These relationships may shift during the course of an operation in order to
best align the force with the tasks required. The general category of subordi-
nate units includes both constituent and dedicated relationships; it can also
include interagency and multinational (allied) subordinates.

2-2
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2

Relationship Commanded by Logistics from Positioned by Priorities from

Constituent Gaining Gaining Gaining Gaining

Dedicated Gaining Parent Gaining Gaining

Supporting Parent Parent Supported Supported

Affiliated Self Self or Parent Self Mutual Agreement

Figure 2-1. Command and Support Relationships

Constituent
2-10. Constituent units are those forces assigned directly to a unit and form-
ing an integral part of it. They may be organic to the table of organization
and equipment of the administrative structure forming the basis of a given unit,
assigned at the time the unit was created, or attached to it after its formation.

Dedicated
2-11. Dedicated is a command relationship identical to constituent with the
exception that a dedicated unit still receives logistics support from a parent
headquarters of similar type. An example of a dedicated unit would be the
case where a specialized unit, such as an attack helicopter company, is allo-
cated to a BTG. The base brigade does not otherwise possess the technical
experts or repair facilities for the aviation units equipment, the dedicated re-
lationship permits the company to execute missions exclusively for the BTG
while still receiving its logistics support from its parent organization. In
OPFOR plans and orders, the dedicated command and support relationship is
indicated by (DED) next to a unit title or symbol.

Supporting
2-12. Supporting units retain a command and logistics relationship with
their parent headquarters, but are positioned and given mission priorities by
their supported headquarters. This relationship permits supported units the
freedom to establish priorities and position supporting units while allowing
higher headquarters to rapidly shift support in dynamic situations. An ex-
ample of a supporting unit would be an MRL battalion supporting a BTG for
a particular phase of an operation but ready to rapidly transition to a differ-
ent support relationship when the BTG becomes the DTG reserve in a later
phase. In OPFOR plans and orders, the supporting command and support re-
lationship is indicated by (SPT) next to a unit title or symbol.

Affiliated
2-13. Affiliated organizations are those operating in a units AOR that the
unit may be able to sufficiently influence to act in concert with it for a limited
time. No command relationship exists between an affiliated organization
and the unit in whose AOR it operates. Affiliated organizations are typically
nonmilitary or paramilitary groups such as criminal cartels, insurgencies,

2-3
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

terrorist cells, or mercenaries. In some cases, affiliated forces may receive

support from the DTG or BTG as part of the agreement under which they co-
operate. Although there will typically be no formal indication of this relation-
ship in OPFOR plans and orders, in rare cases (AFL) is used next to unit ti-
tles or symbols.

TACTICAL-LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS
2-14. OPFOR tactical organizations fight battles and engagements. They exe-
cute the combat actions described in the remainder of this manual.

Divisions
2-15. In the OPFORs administrative force structure, the largest tactical for-
mation is the division. Divisions are designed to be able to
Sustain independent combat operations over a period of several days.
Exert control over an important geographic area or medium-size urban
area (population 20,000 to 100,000).
Integrate interagency forces up to brigade or group size.
Accept constituent flame weapons, artillery (cannon and rocket), engi-
neer, air defense, chemical defense, antitank, medical, logistics, signal,
and electronic warfare (EW) units.
Accept dedicated and supporting surface-to-surface missile (SSM), Spe-
cial-Purpose Forces (SPF), aviation (combat helicopter, transport heli-
copter) and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) units. A division may ac-
cept these type units as constituent if it is also allocated their essential
logistics support.
Execute all of the actions discussed in this manual.
Serve as the basis for forming a division tactical group (DTG), if neces-
sary. (See discussion of Tactical Groups below.)
Fight as part of an OSC or an organization in the administrative force
structure (such as army or military region) or as a separate unit in an
FG.
Maneuver Brigades
2-16. The OPFORs basic combined arms unit is the maneuver brigade. In
the administrative force structure, maneuver brigades are typically constitu-
ent to divisions, but some are organized as separate brigades with a greater
ability to accomplish independent missions without further allocation of
forces. Maneuver brigades are designed to be able to
Sustain independent combat operations over a period of 1 to 3 days.
Exert control over a small geographic area or small urban area (popu-
lation 1,000 to 20,000).
Integrate interagency forces up to battalion size.
Accept constituent flame weapons, artillery (cannon and rocket), engi-
neer, air defense, antitank, logistics, and signal units.

2-4
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2

Accept dedicated and supporting chemical defense, medical, EW, SSM,

SPF, aviation (combat helicopter, transport helicopter) and UAV units.
A brigade may accept these type units as constituent if it is also allo-
cated their essential logistics support.
Execute all of the actions discussed in this manual (except strikes).
Serve as the basis for forming a brigade tactical group (BTG), if neces-
sary.
Fight as part of a division or DTG.
Fight as a separate unit in an OSC, an organization of the administra-
tive force structure (such as army, corps, or military district), or an FG.
Tactical Groups
2-17. A tactical group is a task-organized division or brigade that has received
an allocation of additional land forces in order to accomplish its mission. These
forces may come from within the Ministry of Defense, from the Ministry of the
Interior, or from affiliated forces. Typically, these assets are initially allocated to
an OSC or FG, which further allocates them to its tactical subordinates. The
purpose of a tactical group is to ensure unity of command for all land forces in a
given AOR. Tactical groups formed from divisions are division tactical groups
(DTGs) and those from brigades are brigade tactical groups (BTGs). 1 A DTG
may fight as part of an OSC or as a separate unit in an FG. A BTG may fight as
part of a division or DTG or as a separate unit in an OSC or FG. Figures 2-2
through 2-3 give examples of possible DTG and BTG organizations.
2-18. In addition to augmentation received from a higher command, a DTG
or BTG normally retains the assets that were originally subordinate to the
division or brigade that served as the basis for the tactical group. However, it
is also possible that the higher command could use units from one division or
brigade as part of a tactical group that is based on another division or brigade.

1
Any division or brigade receiving additional assets from a higher command becomes a DTG or BTG. Therefore,
2
references to C of a DTG or BTG throughout the remainder of this chapter may also apply to division or brigade,
respectively, unless specifically stated otherwise.

2-5
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

DTG

BTGs BRIGADES DETACHMENTS BATTALIONS

INTERAGENCY
COMPANIES UNITS IFC ISC

AFFILIATED
FORCES

Figure 2-2. Possible DTG Organization (Example)

BTG

DETACHMENTS BATTALIONS COMPANIES PLATOONS

INTERAGENCY AFFILIATED
UNITS FORCES

Figure 2-3. Possible BTG Organization (Example)

2-6
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2

2-19. The division that serves as the basis for a DTG may have some of its
brigades task organized as BTGs. However, just the fact that a division be-
comes a DTG does not necessarily mean that it forms BTGs. A DTG could
augment all of its brigades, or one or two brigades, or none of them as BTGs.
A division could augment one or more brigades into BTGs, using the divi-
sions own constituent assets, without becoming a DTG. If a division receives
additional assets and uses them all to create one or more BTGs, it is still des-
ignated as a DTG.

Battalions
2-20. In the OPFORs force structure, the basic unit of action is the battalion.
Battalions are designed to be able to
Execute basic combat missions as part of a larger tactical force.
Exert control over a small geographic area or village-sized urban area
(population 100 to 1000).
Execute all of the tactical actions discussed in this manual.
Plan for operations expected to occur 6-24 hours in the future.
Serve as the basis for forming a detachment (DET), if necessary. (See
discussion of detachments below.)
Fight as part of an BTG or DTG.

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

MECHANIZED
INFANTRY
BN (IFV)

BATTALION MECHANIZED SP MORTAR/ RECON

INFANTRY COMBO GUN PLATOON
HQ CO (IFV) BTRY (120-mm) (Tracked)

WEAPONS MANPAD SIGNAL MATERIEL

SUPPORT
PLATOON PLATOON PLATOON PLATOON

Fig 2-4 Battalion Example

Companies
2-21. In the OPFORs force structure, the largest unit without a staff is the
company. Companies are designed to be able to
Execute tactical tasks. A company will not normally be asked to per-
form two or more tactical tasks simultaneously. OPFOR tactical tasks
are listed in Appendix A.
Exert control over a very small geographic area or small village-sized
urban area (population 1-300).
Serve as the basis for forming a detachment (DET), if necessary. (See
discussion of detachments below.)
Fight as part of a battalion, or BTG.

2-8
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2

ANTITANK
GUN
BATTERY

MOTOR
BATTERY CONTROL FIRING
TRANSPORT
HQ SECTION PLATOON SECTION

Fig 2-5 Company Example

Platoons
2-22. In the OPFORs force structure, the smallest unit typically expected to
conduct independent fire and maneuver is the platoon. Platoons are de-
signed to be able to
Execute tactical tasks. A platoon will not be asked to perform two or
more tactical tasks simultaneously. OPFOR tactical tasks are listed in
Appendix A.
Exert control over a small riot/crowd/demonstration.
Serve as the basis for forming a reconnaissance or fighting patrol.
Fight as part of a company, battalion, or detachment.

Historical Designations
2-23. The terms regiment, squadron, troop, and battery are historical desig-
nations without any further implied meaning. In this manual, the use of the
common term for a unit type will include any historical designations for a
unit of the same size. (See Figure 2-4.)

Historical Designation Common Term

Regiment Brigade

Squadron Battalion

Troop, Battery Company

Figure 2-6. Historical Designations and Common Terms

2-9
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

Single-Arms Brigades and Regiments

2-24. The OPFOR force structure contains brigade-size units of single arms
such as surface-to-air missile (SAM), artillery, SSM, antitank, combat heli-
copter, signal, and EW. These units almost always operate in support of a
larger formation and only rarely as tactical groups or detachments, or on in-
dependent missions.

Detachment

2-25. A detachment is a battalion or company designated to perform a spe-

cific mission and allocated the forces necessary to do so. Detachments are the
smallest combined arms formations and are, by definition, task organized. To
further differentiate, detachments built from battalions can be termed
BDETs and those from companies CDETs. The forces allocated to a detach-
ment suit the mission expected of it. They may include
Artillery or mortar units.
Air defense units.
Engineer units (with obstacle, survivability, or mobility assets).
Heavy weapons units (including heavy machineguns, automatic gre-
nade launchers, and antitank guided missiles),
Units with specialty equipment such as flame weapons, specialized re-
connaissance assets, or helicopters.
Interagency forces up to company. (Platoon for CDETs)
Chemical defense, antitank, medical, logistics, signal, and electronic
warfare (EW) units.
BDETs can accept dedicated and supporting Special-Purpose Forces
(SPF), aviation (combat helicopter, transport helicopter) and un-
manned aerial vehicle (UAV) units.
2-26. The basic type of OPFOR detachment is the independent mission de-
tachment (IMD). IMDs are formed to execute missions that are separated in
space and/or time from those being conducted by the remainder of the form-
ing unit. IMDs can be used for a variety of missions, some of which are listed
here as examples:
Seizing key terrain.
Linking up with airborne or heliborne forces.
Conducting tactical movement on secondary axes.
Pursuing or enveloping an enemy force.
Conducting a raid or ambush.

2-10
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2

DET

BATTALION ADDITIONAL ADDITIONAL INTERAGENCY

(BASE) COMPANIES PLATOONS UNITS

Fig 2-7 Battalion-sized Detachment (BDET) Example

DET

COMPANY ADDITIONAL ADDITIONAL INTERAGENCY

(BASE) PLATOONS SQDS/SECTIONS UNITS

Fig 2-8 Company-sized Detachment (CDET) Example

Element

2-27. An element is a company or platoon sized component of a detachment

given a specific tactical task in support of the detachments mission.

Patrol

2-11
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

2-28. A patrol is a platoon- or squad-sized force task organized to accomplish

a specific reconnaissance and/or security mission. There are two basic types
of patrol, fighting patrol and reconnaissance patrol. Both are described in
chapter 8.

INTEGRATED FIRES COMMAND

2-29. The integrated fires command (IFC) is a combination of a standing C2
structure and task organization of constituent and dedicated fire support
units. All division-level and above OPFOR organizations possess an IFC C2
structurestaff, CP, communications and intelligence architecture, and
automated fire control system (AFCS). The IFC exercises command of all con-
stituent and dedicated fire support assets retained by its level of command.
This includes army aviation, artillery, and missile units. It also exercises
command over all reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target ac-
quisition (RISTA) assets allocated to it. 2
2-30. As the balance of units discussed in the manual do not possess an IFC,
the full discussion of its structure and capabilities is left to FM 7-100.1

INTEGRATED SUPPORT COMMAND

2-31. The integrated support command (ISC) is the aggregate of combat ser-
vice support units (and perhaps some combat support units) organic to a divi-
sion and additional assets allocated from the administrative force structure
to a DTG. It contains such units that the division or DTG does not sub-
allocate to lower levels of command in a constituent or dedicated relation-
ship. The DTG further allocates part of its ISC units as an integrated support
group (ISG) to support its IFC, and the remainder supports the rest of the
DTG, as a second ISG. For organizational efficiency, other combat service
support units may be grouped in this ISC and its ISGs, although they may
support only one of the major units of the DTG or IFC. Sometimes, an ISC or
ISG might also include units performing combat support tasks (such as
chemical warfare, IW, or law enforcement) that support the DTG and its IFC.
(See Chapter 14 for more detail on the ISC and ISG.)

ORGANIZING THE TACTICAL BATTLEFIELD

2-32. The OPFOR organizes the battlefield in such a way that it can rapidly
transition between offensive and defensive actions and between linear and
nonlinear dispositions. This flexibility can help the OPFOR adapt and change
the nature of conflict to something for which the enemy is not prepared.
2-33. In his combat order, the commander specifies the organization of the
battlefield from the perspective of his level of command. Within his units
area of responsibility (AOR), as defined by the next-higher commander, he
designates AORs for his subordinates, along with zones, objectives, and axes
related to his own overall mission.

2
Based on mission requirements, the commander may also allocate maneuver forces to the IFC. This is most often
2
done when he chooses to use the IFC CP to provide C for a strike, but can also be done for the execution of other
missions.

2-12
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2

2-34. A combat order normally defines AORs and zones by specifying bound-
ary lines in terms of distinct local terrain features through which a line
passes, specifying whether each terrain feature is included or excluded from
the units AOR or zones within it. Normally, a specified terrain feature is in-
cluded unless the order identifies it as excluded. For example, the left
boundary of a units AOR could run from hill 108, to hill 250 (excluded), to
junction of roads 52 and 98.

Areas of Responsibility
2-35. OPFOR organizations are given a specific area of responsibility. An
OPFOR AOR is the geographical area and associated airspace within which a
commander has the authority to plan and conduct combat operations.
2-36. An AOR is bounded by a limit of responsibility (LOR) beyond which the
organization may not operate or fire without coordination through the next-
higher headquarters. AORs may be linear or nonlinear in nature. Linear
AORs may contain subordinate nonlinear AORs and vice versa.
2-37. A higher commander may retain control of airspace over a lower com-
manders AOR. This is done through the use of standard airspace control
measures.

Zones
2-38. AORs typically consist of three basic zones: battle, disruption, and sup-
port. An AOR may also contain one or more attack and/or kill zones. The
various zones in an AOR have the same basic purposes within each type of of-
fensive and defensive action (see Chapters 3 and 4). Zones may be linear or
nonlinear in nature. The size of these zones depends on the size of the
OPFOR elements involved, engagement ranges of weapon systems, the ter-
rain, and the nature of the enemys operation. Within the LOR, the OPFOR
normally refers to two types of control lines. The support line separates the
support zone from the battle zone. The battle line separates the battle zone
from the disruption zone.
2-39. An AOR is not required to have any or all of these zones in any particu-
lar situation. A command might have a battle zone and no disruption zone. It
might not have a battle zone, if it is the disruption force of a higher com-
mand. If it is able to forage, it might not have a support zone. The intent of
this method of organizing the battlefield is to preserve as much flexibility as
possible for subordinate units within the parameters that define the aim of
the senior commander. An important feature of the basic zones in an AOR is
the variations in actions that can occur within them in the course of a specific
battle.

2-13
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

BTG

BTG AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

Support Battle Disruption
Zone Zone Zone

LOR

Attack Zone

Axis Objective
Kill
Zone

Battalion
AOR

BTG

Support Line Battle Line

Figure 2-9. Linear AOR Example

2-14
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2

BTG AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

BTG
LOR
BTG
Disruption
BTG
Zone L OR

BTG Battalion
Battle Line Attack
Zone Objective

BTG
Support Line
BTG
Objective BTG
Battle Zone
Disruption
Axis Zone
Support
Zone

Battalion
AOR

BTG
Zo l
ne
Kil

Disruption
Zone

BTG
Disruption
Zone

BTG
LOR

Figure 2-10. Nonlinear AOR Example

2-40. Disruption Zone. The disruption zone is the AOR of the disruption
force. The disruption zone is that geographical area and airspace in which
the units disruption force will conduct disruption operations. It is where the
OPFOR will set the conditions for successful combat actions by fixing enemy
forces and placing long-range fires on them. Units in this zone begin the at-
tack on specific components of the enemy combat system, to begin the disag-
gregation of that system. Successful actions in the disruption zone will create
a window of opportunity that is exploitable in the battle zone. For example,
attacking enemy engineer elements can leave his maneuver force unable to
continue effective operations in complex terrainexposing them to destruc-
tion by forces in the battle zone. The disruption force also strips away the en-
emys reconnaissance assets while denying him the ability to acquire and en-
gage OPFOR targets with deep fires. This includes an air defense effort to
deny aerial attack and reconnaissance platforms from targeting OPFOR
forces. Disruption zones may be contiguous, noncontiguous, or layered.
2-41. Battalions and below do not typically have their own disruption zones,
but may be conducting operations within the disruption zone of a higher
command.
2-42. Disruption operations are the deliberate conduct of missions in support
of the overall tactical task: disrupt. Disruption operations are comprised of
five key actions:
Initiating systems attack
Destroying enemy reconnaissance.

2-15
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

Forcing the enemy to deploy early or disrupting his offensive prepara-

tions.
Gaining and maintaining reconnaissance contact with key enemy ele-
ments.
Deceiving the enemy as to the disposition of OPFOR units.

2-43. The disruption zone is bounded by the battle line and the LOR of the
overall AOR. In linear offensive combat, the higher headquarters may move
this LOR forward as the force continues successful offensive actions. Thus,
the boundaries of the disruption zone will also move forward during the
course of a battle. The higher commander can push the disruption zone for-
ward or outward as forces adopt a defensive posture while consolidating
gains at the end of a successful offensive battle and/or prepare for a subse-
quent offensive battle.
2-44. Battle Zone. The battle zone is the portion of the AOR where the
OPFOR expects to conduct decisive operations. Using all elements of combat
power, the OPFOR will engage the enemy and defeat him in this zone. The
battle zone is where the OPFOR will engage the enemy in close combat to
achieve tactical decision. Forces in the battle zone will exploit opportunities
created by actions in the disruption zone. The linkage of these tactical suc-
cesses to the operation plan allows the accomplishment of operational and/or
strategic objectives.
2-45. In the battle zone, the OPFOR is typically trying to accomplish one or
more of the following:
Create a penetration in the enemy defense through which exploitation
forces can pass.
Draw enemy attention and resources to the action.
Seize terrain.
Inflict casualties on a vulnerable enemy unit.
Prevent the enemy from moving a part of his force to impact OPFOR
actions elsewhere on the battlefield.

2-46. A DTG does not always form a DTG-level battle zone per sethat zone
may be the aggregate of the battle zones of its subordinate units. In nonlin-
ear situations, there may be multiple, noncontiguous brigade or BTG battle
zones, and within each the DTG would assign a certain task to the unit
charged to operate in that space. The brigade or BTG battle zone provides
each of those subordinate unit commanders the battlespace in which to frame
his actions.

2-47. The battle zone is separated from the disruption zone by the battle line
and from the support zone by the support line. The commander may adjust
the location of these lines in order to accommodate successful offensive ac-
tion. In a linear situation, those lines can shift forward during the course of a
successful attack. Thus, the battle zone would also shift forward.

2-16
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2

2-48. Battalion and below units often have AORs that are almost entirely
battle zones with a small support zone contained within.

2-49. Support Zone. The support zone is that area of the battlespace de-
signed to be free of significant enemy action and to permit the effective logis-
tics and administrative support of forces. Security forces will operate in the
support zone in a combat role to defeat enemy special operations forces. Cam-
ouflage, concealment, cover, and deception (C3D) measures will occur
throughout the support zone to protect the force from standoff RISTA and
precision attack. A DTG support zone may be dispersed within the support
zones of subordinate brigades or BTGs, or the DTG may have its own support
zone that is separate from subordinate AORs. If the battle zone moves during
the course of a battle, the support zone would move accordingly. The support
zone may be in a sanctuary that is noncontiguous with other zones of the
AOR.
2-50. Attack Zone. An attack zone is given to a subordinate unit with an of-
fensive mission, to delineate clearly where forces will be conducting offensive
maneuver. Attack zones are often used to control offensive action by a subor-
dinate unit inside a larger defensive battle or operation.
2-51. Kill Zone. A kill zone is a designated area on the battlefield where the
OPFOR plans to destroy a key enemy target. A kill zone may be within the
disruption zone or the battle zone. In the defense, it could also be in the sup-
port zone.

DTG OR DIVISION COMMAND GROUP AND STAFF

2-52. A DTG or division headquarters includes the command group and the
staff. (See Figure 2-12.) These elements perform the functions required to
control the activities of forces preparing for and conducting combat.
2-53. The primary functions of headquarters are to
Make decisions.
Plan combat actions that accomplish those decisions.
Acquire and process the information needed to make and execute effec-
tive decisions.
Support the missions of subordinates.
The commander exercises C2 functions through his command group, staff,
and subordinate commanders.

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

COMMANDER

Command Group

Deputy
Commander

Commanders of
Chief Subordinate
of Forces
Staff

Primary Staff

Intelligence Operations Resources

Officer Officer Officer

Secondary Staff

Chief of Chief of Chief of

Current
Reconnaissance Operations Logistics

Chief of Chief of Chief of

Information Future
Warfare Operations Administration

Chief of Chief of
Airspace
Communications Operations

Functional Staff

Chief of Chief of Chief of

Integrated Special Population
Fires Operations Management

Chief of Chief of Chief of

Force WMD Infrastructure
Protection Management

Figure 2-11. DTG or Division Command Group and Staff

2-18
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2

Command Group
2-54. The command group consists of the commander, deputy commander
(DC), and chief of staff. Together, they direct and coordinate the activities of
the staff and of subordinate forces.
2-55. Commander. The commander directs subordinate commanders and,
through his staff and liaison officers, controls any supporting elements.
OPFOR commanders have complete authority over their subordinates and
overall responsibility for those subordinates actions. This centralized author-
ity enables the commander to maintain troop discipline and unity and to act
decisively. Under the fluid conditions of modern warfare, even in the course
of carefully planned actions, the commander must accomplish assigned mis-
sions on his own initiative without constant guidance from above.
2-56. The commander is responsible for the combat capability of subordinate
units, the organization of combat actions, the maintenance of uninterrupted
C2, and the successful conduct of combat missions. He examines and analyzes
the mission he receives (that is, he determines his forces place in the senior
commanders concept of the battle or operation). He may do this alone or
jointly with the chief of staff. He then gives instructions to the chief of staff
on preparing his forces and staff for combat. He also provides instructions
about the timing of preparations. The commander makes his own assessment
of intelligence data supplied by the chief of reconnaissance. Then, with advice
from the primary staff officers, he makes an assessment of his own forces. Af-
ter discussing his deductions and proposals with the operations officer and
his staff, the commander reaches a decision, issues combat missions to sub-
ordinates, and gives instructions about planning the battle. He then directs
coordination within his organization and with adjacent forces and other ele-
ments operating in his AOR.
2-57. During the course of combat, the commander must constantly evaluate
the changing situation, predict likely developments, and issue new combat
missions in accordance with his vision of the battlefield. He also keeps his
superiors informed as to the situation and character of friendly and enemy
actions and his current decisions.
2-58. Deputy Commander. In the event the commander is killed or inca-
pacitated, the DC would assume command. Barring that eventuality, the
primary responsibility of the DC of a DTG or division is to command the IFC.
As IFC commander, he is responsible for executing tactical-level fire support
in a manner consistent with the commanders intent.
2-59. Chief of Staff. Preeminent among OPFOR staff officers is the chief of
staff position (found at every level from the General Staff down to battalion).
He exercises direct control over the primary staff. During combat, he is in
charge of the main CP when the commander moves to the forward CP. He
has the power to speak in the name of the commander and DC, and he nor-
mally countersigns all written orders and combat documents originating from
the commanders authority. He alone has the authority to sign orders for the
commander or DC and to issue instructions in the commanders name to sub-
ordinate units. In emergency situations, he can make changes in the tasks
given to subordinate commanders. Thus, it is vital that he understands not
merely the commanders specific instructions but also his general concept

2-19
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

and train of thought. He controls the battle during the commanders ab-
sences.
2-60. The chief of staff is a vital figure in the C2 structure. His role is to serve
as the director of staff planning and as coordinator of all staff inputs that as-
sist the commanders decision making. He is the commanders and DCs focal
point for knowledge about the friendly and enemy situation. He has overall
responsibility for providing the necessary information for the commander to
make decisions. Thus, he plays a key role in structuring the overall recon-
naissance effort, which is a combined arms task, to meet the commanders in-
formation requirements.

Staff
2-61. A staff provides rapid, responsive planning for combat activity, and
then coordinates and monitors the execution of the resulting plans on behalf
of the commander. Proper use of this staff allows the commander to focus on
the most critical issues in a timely manner and to preserve his energies.
2-62. The staff releases the commander from having to solve administrative
and technical problems, thereby allowing him to concentrate on the battle.
The primary function of the staff is to plan and prepare for combat. Evalua-
tion and knowledge of the situational elements of combat is fundamental to
the decision-making process and the direction of troops. After the commander
makes the decision, the staff must organize, coordinate, disseminate, and
support the missions of subordinates. Additionally, it is their responsibility to
train and prepare troops for combat, and to monitor the pre-combat and com-
bat situations.
2-63. In the decision-making and planning process, the staff
Prepares the data and estimates the commander uses to make a deci-
sion.
Plans and implements the basic measures for comprehensive support
of a combat action.
Organizes communications with subordinate and adjacent headquar-
ters and the next-higher staff.
Monitors the activities of subordinate staffs.
Coordinates ongoing activity with higher-level and adjacent staffs dur-
ing a battle or operation.

2-64. The staff consists of three elements: the primary staff, the secondary
staff, and the functional staff. Figure 2-12 depicts the primary, secondary,
and functional staff officers of a DTG or division headquarters; it does not show
the liaison teams, which support the primary, secondary, and functional staff.

Primary and Secondary Staff

2-65. Each member of the primary staff heads a staff section. Within each
section are two or three secondary staff officers heading subsections subordi-
nate to that primary staff officer.

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_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2

2-66. Operations Officer. The operations officer heads the operations sec-
tion, and conducts planning and prepares plans and orders. Thus, the opera-
tions section is the principal staff section. It includes current operations, fu-
ture operations, and aerospace operations subsections, as well as the functional
staff.
2-67. The operations officer also serves as deputy chief of staff. He is respon-
sible for training and the formulating of plans and orders. He monitors the
work of all other staff sections, remains knowledgeable of the current situa-
tion, and is ready to present information and recommendations concerning
the situation. He writes combat orders and important combat reports. In co-
ordination with the information section, the operations officer keeps the
commander informed on the progress of the battle and the overall operation.
Specific duties of the operations section include
Assisting the commander in the making and execution of combat deci-
sions.
Collecting information concerning the situation of friendly forces.
Preparing and disseminating orders, plans and reports, summaries,
and situation overlays.
Providing liaison for the exchange of information within the headquar-
ters and with higher, subordinate, and adjacent units.
Organizing the main CP.
Organizing troop movement and traffic control.
Coordinating the organization of reconnaissance with the information
section.

2-68. The chief of current operations is a secondary staff officer who proac-
tively monitors the course of current operations and coordinates the actions
of forces to ensure execution of the commanders intent. He serves as the rep-
resentative of the commander, chief of staff, and operations officer in their
absence and has the authority to control forces in accordance with the battle plan.
2-69. The chief of future operations is a secondary staff officer who heads the
planning staff and ensures continuous development of future plans and pos-
sible branches, sequels, and contingencies. While the commander and the
chief of current operations focus on the current battle, the chief of future op-
erations and his subsection monitor the friendly and enemy situations and
their implications for future battles. They try to identify any developing
situations that require command decisions and/or adaptive measures. They
advise the commander on how and when to make adjustments to the battle
plan during the fight. Planning for various contingencies and anticipated opportu-
nities can facilitate immediate and flexible response to changes in the situation.
2-70. The chief of airspace operations (CAO) is a secondary staff officer who
is responsible for the control of the DTGs airspace. See Chapters 9 and 10 for
further information on his duties.
2-71. Intelligence Officer. The intelligence officer heads the intelligence
and information section, which consists of the reconnaissance subsection, the
IW subsection, and the communications subsection. The intelligence officer is

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

responsible for the acquisition, synthesis, analysis, dissemination, and pro-

tection of all information and intelligence related to and required by the
DTGs combat actions. He ensures the commanders intelligence require-
ments are met. He provides not only intelligence on the current and future
operational environment, but insight on opportunities for adaptive and crea-
tive responses to ongoing operations. The intelligence officer works in close
coordination with the chief of future operations to establish feedback and in-
put for future operations and the identification of possible windows of oppor-
tunity.
2-72. The intelligence officer also formulates the DTGs IW plan and must ef-
fectively task organize his staff resources to conduct and execute IW in a
manner that supports the strategic IW plan. He is responsible for the coordi-
nation of all necessary national or theater-level assets in support of the IW
plan and executes staff supervision over the IW and communications plans.
He is supported by three secondary staff officers: the chief of reconnaissance,
the chief of IW, and the chief of communications.
2-73. The chief of reconnaissance develops reconnaissance plans, gathers in-
formation, and evaluates data on the battlefield situation. During combat, he
supervises the efforts of subordinate reconnaissance units and reconnais-
sance staff subsections of subordinate units. Specific responsibilities of the
reconnaissance subsection include
Collecting, analyzing and disseminating information on the enemy, ter-
rain, and weather to the commander and subordinate, higher, and ad-
jacent units.
Organizing reconnaissance missions, including requests for aerial re-
connaissance, in coordination with the operations section and in sup-
port of the IW plan.
Preparing the reconnaissance plan, in coordination with the operations
section.
Preparing the reconnaissance portion of battle plans and combat or-
ders.
Preparing intelligence reports.
Supervising the exploitation of captured enemy documents and mate-
riel.
Supervising interrogation and debriefing activities throughout the
command.
Providing targeting data for long-range fires.
2-74. The chief of information warfare is responsible supervising the execu-
tion of the DTGs IW plan. (Chapter 6 details the components of the IW plan.)
These responsibilities include
Coordinating the employment of IW assets, both those constituent to
the DTG and those available at higher levels.
Planning for and supervising all information protection and security
measures.
Supervising the implementation of the deception and perception man-
agement plans.

2-22
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2

Working with the operations staff to ensure that targets scheduled for
destruction support the IW plan, and if not, resolving conflicts between
IW needs and operational needs.
Recommending to the intelligence officer any necessary actions re-
quired to implement the IW plan.
2-75. The chief of communications develops a communications plan for the
command that is approved by the intelligence officer and chief of staff. He or-
ganizes communications with subordinate, adjacent, and higher headquar-
ters. The communications subsection plans the use of all forms of communi-
cations, to include satellite communications (SATCOM), wire, radio, digital,
cellular, and couriers, to ensure that the commander has continuous and un-
interrupted control. Specific responsibilities of the communications subsec-
tion include
Establishing SATCOM and radio nets.
Establishing call signs and radio procedures.
Organizing courier and mail service.
Operating the commands message center.
Supervising the supply, issue, and maintenance of signal equipment.

2-76. An additional and extremely important role of the communications offi-

cer is to ensure the thorough integration of interagency and allied forces into
the DTGs C2 structure. The DTG headquarters is permanently equipped
with a full range of C2 systems compatible with each of the services of the
States Armed Forces as well as with other government agencies commonly
operating as part of DTGs. Other government agencies and allied partners
are also the responsibility of the communications officer, and he plans and
provides for their C2 integration.
2-77. Resources Officer. The resources officer is responsible for the requisi-
tion, acquisition, distribution, and care of all of the DTGs resources, both
human and materiel. He ensures the commanders logistics and administra-
tive requirements are met and executes staff supervision over the commands
logistics and administrative procedures. (Logistics procedures are detailed in
Chapter 13.) He is supported by two secondary staff officers: the chief of lo-
gistics and the chief of administration. One additional major task of the re-
sources officer is to free the commander from the need to bring his influence
to bear on priority logistics and administrative functions. He is also the offi-
cer in charge of the sustainment CP.
2-78. The chief of logistics heads the logistics system. He is responsible for
managing the order, receipt, and distribution of supplies to sustain the com-
mand. He is responsible for the condition and combat readiness of arma-
ments and related combat equipment and instruments. He is also responsible
for their supply, proper utilization, repair, and evacuation. He oversees the
supply and maintenance of the DTGs combat and technical equipment.
These responsibilities encompass the essential wartime tasks of organizing
and controlling the DTGs recovery, repair, and replacement system. During
combat, he keeps the commander informed on the status of the DTGs equip-
ment.

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

2-79. The chief of administration supervises all personnel actions and trans-
actions in the DTG. His subsection maintains daily strength reports; records
changes in table of organization and equipment of units in the administrative
force structure; assigns personnel; requests replacements; records losses; admin-
isters awards and decorations; and collects, records, and disposes of war booty.

Functional Staff
2-80. The functional staff consists of experts in a particular type of military
operation or function. (See Figure 2-13.) These experts advise the command
group and the primary and secondary staff on issues pertaining to their indi-
vidual areas of expertise. The functional staff consists of the following ele-
ments:
Integrated fires.
Force protection.
Special operations.
Weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
Population management.
Infrastructure management.

2-81. In peacetime, the functional staff is a cadre with personnel assigned

from appropriate branches. It has enough personnel to allow continuous 24-
hour capability and the communications and information management tools
to allow them to support the commanders decision-making process and exer-
cise staff supervision over their functional areas throughout the AOR. In
wartime, the functional staff receives liaison teams from subordinate, sup-
porting, allied, and affiliated units that perform tasks in support of those func-
tional areas.

2-24
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2

Operations
Officer

Chief of Chief of Chief of Chief of

Integrated Force Special
Fires Protection Operations WMD

Chief of Chief of
Population Infrastructure
Management Management

Figure 2-12. DTG or Division Functional Staff

2-82. Chief of Integrated Fires. The chief of integrated fires is responsible

for integrating C2 and RISTA means with fires and maneuver. He works
closely with the DTG chief of reconnaissance and the IFC staff. He also coor-
dinates with the chief of IW to ensure that deception and protection and se-
curity measures contribute to the success of fire support of offensive and de-
fensive actions.
2-83. Chief of Force Protection. The chief of force protection is responsible
for coordinating activities to prevent or mitigate the effects of hostile actions
against OPFOR personnel, resources, facilities, and critical information. This
protection includes air, space, and missile defense; NBC defense; defensive
IW; anti-terrorism measures; counterreconnaissance; and engineer surviv-
ability measures. This subsection works closely with those of the chief of
WMD and the chief of IW. Liaison teams from internal security, air defense,
chemical defense, and engineer forces provide advice within their respective
areas of protection.
2-84. Chief of Special-Purpose Operations. The chief of special-purpose
operations is responsible for planning and coordinating the actions of SPF
units allocated to a DTG or supporting it from OSC level. When possible, this
subsection receives liaison teams from any affiliated forces that act in concert
with the SPF.
2-85. Chief of Weapons of Mass Destruction. The chief of WMD is re-
sponsible for planning the offensive use of WMD. This functional staff ele-
ment receives liaison teams from any subordinate or supporting units that
contain WMD delivery means.
2-86. Chief of Population Management. The chief of population manage-
ment is responsible for coordinating the actions of Internal Security Forces,

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

as well as psychological warfare, perception management, civil affairs, and

counterintelligence activities. There is always a representative of the Minis-
try of the Interior, and frequently one from the Ministry of Public Informa-
tion. This subsection works closely with the chief of IW and receives liaison
teams from psychological warfare, civil affairs, counterintelligence, and Internal
Security Forces units allocated to the DTG or operating within the DTGs AOR.
2-87. Chief of Infrastructure Management. The chief of infrastructure
management is responsible for establishing and maintaining roads, airfields,
railroads, hardened structures (warehouses and storage facilities), inland
waterways, ports, and pipelines. He coordinates with the DTG resources offi-
cer regarding improvement and maintenance of supply and evacuation
routes. He exercises staff supervision or cognizance over the route construc-
tion and maintenance functions of both civil and combat engineers operating
in the DTGs AOR. He coordinates with civilian agencies and the DTG chief
of communications to ensure adequate telecommunications support.

Liaison Teams
2-88. Liaison teams support brigade and division staffs (as well as those of
tactical groups and detachments) with detailed expertise in the mission areas
of their particular branch or service and provide direct communications to
subordinate and supporting units executing missions in those areas. Liaison
team leaders speak for the commanders of their respective units. Liaison
teams to DTGs and divisions are organized with a liaison team leader, two
current operations officers or senior NCOs, and two plans officers or senior
NCOs. This gives liaison teams the ability to conduct continuous operations
and simultaneously execute current plans and develop future plans. The staff
will also receive liaison teams from multinational and interagency subordi-
nates and from affiliated forces.

BTG AND BRIGADE COMMAND GROUP AND STAFF

2-89. Generally speaking, the command group and staff of a BTG or brigade
are smaller versions of those previously described for DTG or division level.
The following paragraphs highlight the differences other than size.

Command Group
2-90. The BTG or brigade command group consists of the commander, DC,
and chief of staff. The primary difference is that the DC does not serve as IFC
commander, since there is no IFC at this level of command.
2-91. Commander. Brigade commanders typically spend more of the fight-
ing at the forward CP or with subordinate units than division commanders.
Much more of the brigade commanders fight is the direct fire battle.
2-92. Deputy Commander. At the brigade (and below) the DC is not also
the commander of the IFC, as IFCs do not exist at those levels.
2-93. Chief of Staff. At brigade level, the chief of staff position retains all
the characteristics of the division CofS position.

2-26
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2

Staff
2-94. BTG and brigade staffs are naturally smaller and less capable than
DTG and division staffs. In particular, the sections responsible for planning
are much reduced, providing the BTG or brigade with the ability to plan com-
bat actions only 24 to 48 hours into the future.
2-95. Another key difference from the DTG or division staff is that the func-
tional staff is organized differently. A BTG or brigade functional staff con-
sists of the following elements:
Fire support.
Force protection.
WMD.
Population management.
Infrastructure management.
There is no chief of integrated fires or functional staff element for integrated
fires at the BTG or brigade level, since this level of command has no IFC.
However, the staff at brigade level does include a chief of fire support. Fire
support is controlled by the FSCC.

2-96. Brigades do not prepare IW plans of their own, per se. The brigade
performs limited deception tasks of its own but primarily it executes its por-
tion of an overall IW plan prepared by its parent division or OSC. The intel-
ligence officer, through his IW chief, must effectively task organize his staff
resources to conduct and execute IW in a manner that supports the overall
IW plan. He is responsible for the coordination of all necessary national or
theater-level assets in support of the IW plan that are under the control of
his brigade.

BATTALION COMMAND GROUP AND STAFF

2-97. Battalion staffs are highly streamlined and do not contain the robust
planning and control capabilities of higher staffs.

Command Group
2-98. The battalion command group consists of the commander, the deputy
commander, their vehicle drivers and RTOs. In maneuver units where the
battalion command group employ combat vehicles, the command group may
include vehicle gunners as well. Often a staff officer or NCO from the opera-
tions and/or intelligence section accompanies the battalion command group
on the battlefield.
2-99. The battalion commander positions himself where he can best influence
the critical action on the battlefield. The deputy commander is typically su-
pervising the execution of the battalions second most critical operation and
separate from the BC so that both are not killed by the same engagement.

Staff

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

2-100. At battalion level, the staff consists of two elements: the primary staff
and the secondary staff. There is no functional staff below BTG level. Fig-
ure 2-13 depicts the staff of a combat battalion headquarters and the liaison
teams which support it.
2-101. At battalion, typically each member of the primary staff heads a small
staff section consisting of themselves and two other soldiers of the correct
specialty. Two staff NCOs serve as day and night shift leaders in the main
command post. The leaders of the battalions specialty platoons serve in a
staff command role to coordinate key battlefield functions. Liaison teams
from other units are attached to the operation section.
The battalion staff has the mission to coordinate battlefield functions and to
anticipate the battalions needs 6-12 hours into the future. It supports the
commander in the completion of combat orders and ensures his intent is be-
ing executed. It is not capable of executing long-range planning or support-
ing complex, joint or interagency operations without augmentation.

Staff Command
2-102. At brigade level and above, the OPFOR does not use the concept of
commanders of combat support units acting as senior staff officers. But at
battalion, in order to streamline staff functions, the OPFOR relies on com-
manders of supporting arms units to exercise staff supervision over their ar-
eas.
2-103. At battalion level, the reconnaissance platoon leader serves as the
chief of reconnaissance, the signal platoon leader serves as the chief of com-
munications and the material support platoon leader as the chief of logistics.
The chiefs of reconnaissance and communications coordinate with the main
and forward command posts and the chief of logistics operates the battalion
trains.
2-104. The OPFOR will only employ staff command functions :
In secondary staff areas (admin, logistics, recon, communications,
aerospace ops)
With commanders who have sufficient control over the area that the
additional staff supervision functions are not a serious burden to
their command responsibilities

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_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2

COMMANDER

Command Group
Deputy
Commander

Commanders of
Chief Subordinate
of Forces
Staff

Primary Staff

Information Operations Resources

Officer Officer/DCofS Officer

Secondary Staff

Recon Platoon Assistant Ops MSP Platoon

Leader Officer Leader

Signal Platoon Fires Liaison

Leader Officer

Aviation Liaison
Officer

Figure 2-13 Battalion Command Group and Staff

COMMAND POSTS
2-105. The OPFOR plans to exercise tactical control over its wartime forces
from an integrated system of CPs. It has designed this system to ensure un-
interrupted control of forces.
2-106. CPs are typically formed in three parts: a control group, a support
group, and a communications group. The control group includes members of
the command group and staff. The support group consists of the transport
and logistics elements. Whenever possible, the communications group is re-
moted from the control and support groups, because of its large number of

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

signal vans, generators, and other special vehicles that would provide a
unique signature.
2-107. Because the OPFOR expects its C2 to come under heavy attack in war-
time, its military planners have created a CP structure that emphasizes sur-
vivability through dispersal, stringent security measures, redundancy, and
mobility. They have constructed a CP system that can sustain damage with
minimum disruption to the actual C2 process. In the event of disruption, they
can quickly reestablish control. This extensive system of CPs extends from
the hardened command facilities of the National Command Authority to the
specially designed command vehicles from which OPFOR tactical command-
ers control their units. Tactical CPs and most operational-level CPs have
been designed to be very mobile and smaller than comparable enemy CPs.
The number, size, and types of CPs depend on the level of command.

COMMAND POST TYPES

2-108. OPFOR ground forces use five basic and three special types of CPs.
Not all levels of command use all types at all times. (See Figure 2-14, where
parentheses indicate that a type of CP may or may not be employed at a cer-
tain level.) The redundancy provided by multiple CPs helps to ensure that
the C2 process remains survivable.

2-30
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2

Basic Special

Sustainment CP

Deception CP
Alternate CP

Auxiliary CP
Airborne CP
Forward CP
Main CP

IFC CP

Trains
Level of
Command

DTG/Division X X X X - (X) (X) (X) (X)

BTG/Brigade X - X X - (X) (X) (X) (X)

BDET/Battalion X - X X X - (X) - (X)

CDET/ - - X X (X) - - - (X)

Company

Figure 2-14. Command Post System

2-109. For brevity, OPFOR plans and orders may use acronyms for the vari-
ous types of CP. Thus, main CP may appear as MCP, integrated fires com-
mand CP as IFC CP, forward CP as FCP, sustainment CP as SUSCP, trains
as TR, airborne CP as AIRCP, alternate CP as ALTCP, auxiliary CP as
AUXCP, and deception CP as DCP.

Main Command Post

2-110. The main CP generally is located in a battle zone or in a key sanctu-
ary area or fortified position. It contains the bulk of the staff. The chief of
staff directs its operation. Its primary purpose is to simultaneously coordi-
nate the activities of subordinate units not yet engaged in combat and plan
for subsequent missions. The particular emphasis on planning in the main
CP is on the details of transitioning between current and future operations.
The main CP is the focus of control. It is less mobile and much larger than
the forward CP. It makes use of hardened sites when possible.
2-111. The chief of staff directs the staff in translating the commanders deci-
sions into plans and orders. He also coordinates the movement and deploy-
ment of all subordinate units not yet in combat and monitors their progress
and combat readiness. In addition to the chief of staff, personnel present at
the main CP include the liaison teams from subordinate, supporting, allied,
and affiliated units, unless their presence is required in another CP.

IFC Command Post

2-112. The DC of a DTG or division directs the IFC from the IFC CP. The
IFC CP possesses the communications, airspace control, and automated fire

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control systems required to integrate RISTA means and execute long-range

fires. Each secondary staff subsection and some functional staff subsections
have an element dedicated to the IFC CP. The IFC CP includes liaison teams
from fire support, army aviation, and long-range reconnaissance elements.
The IFC CP is typically separated from the main CP. Also for survivability,
the various sections of the IFC headquarters that make up the IFC CP do not
necessarily have to be located in one place.

Forward Command Post

2-113. A commander often establishes a forward CP with a small group of se-
lected staff members. Its purpose is to provide the commander with informa-
tion and communications that facilitate his decisions. The forward CP is de-
ployed at a point from which he can more effectively and personally observe
and influence the battle.
2-114. The personnel at the forward CP are not permanent. The assignment
of officers to accompany the commander is dependent on the mission, situa-
tion, availability of officers, communications, and transport means. Officers
who may accompany the commander include the operations officer and the
chief of reconnaissance. Other primary and or secondary staff officers may
also deploy with the forward CP, depending on the needs of the situation.
The secondary staff contains enough personnel to man the forward CP with-
out degrading its ability to man the main or IFC CPs.
2-115. When formed, and when the commander is present, the forward CP is
the main focus of command, though the chief of staff (remaining in the main
CP) has the authority to issue directives in the commanders absence.

Sustainment Command Post

2-116. The resources officer establishes and controls the sustainment CP.
This CP is deployed in a position to permit the supervision of execution of
sustainment procedures and the movement of support troops, typically in the
support zone. It contains staff officers for fuel supply, medical support, com-
bat equipment repair, ammunition supply, clothing supply, food supply, pris-
oner-of-war, and other services. It interacts closely with the subordinate
units to ensure sustained combat capabilities. In nonlinear situations, multi-
ple sustainment CPs may be formed.

Trains
2-117. The battalions material support platoon leader creates the battalion
trains from his platoon HQ and other assets constituent to his unit. The
trains is the focal point of the battalions logistic effort. Companies that are
executing logistic operations away from the battalion may also form trains
for a limited time from their own logistics assets.

Airborne Command Post

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_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2

2-118. To maintain control in very fluid situations, when subordinates are

spread over a wide area, or when the other CPs are moving, a commander
may use an airborne CP. This is very common in division-level commands,
typically aboard helicopters.

Alternate Command Post

2-119. The alternate CP provides for the assumption of command should the
CP containing the commander be incapacitated. The alternate CP is a desig-
nation given to an existing CP and is not a separately established element.
The commander will establish which CP will act as an alternate CP to take
command if the main (or forward) CP is destroyed or disabled. For example,
the commander might designate the IFC CP as the alternate CP during a
battle where long-range fires are critical to mission success. For situations
that require reconstituting, he might designate the sustainment CP instead. Al-
ternate CPs are also formed when fighting in complex terrain, or if the organiza-
tion is dispersed over a wider area than usual and lateral communication is dif-
ficult.

Auxiliary Command Post

2-120.The commander may create an auxiliary CP to provide C2 over subor-
dinate units fighting on isolated or remote axes. He may also use it in the
event of disrupted control or when he cannot adequately maintain control from
the main CP. An officer appointed at the discretion of the commander mans it.

Deception Command Post

2-121. As part of the overall IW plan, the OPFOR very often employs decep-
tion CPs. These are complex, multi-sensor-affecting sites integrated into the
overall deception plan to assist in achieving battlefield opportunity by forcing
the enemy to expend command and control warfare (C2W) effort against
meaningless positions.

COMMAND POST MOVEMENT

2-122. Plans for relocating the CPs are prepared by the operations section.
The CPs are deployed and prepared in order to ensure that they are reliably
covered from enemy ground and aerial reconnaissance, or from attack by en-
emy raiding forces.
2-123. Commanders deploy CPs in depth to facilitate control of their AORs.
During lengthy moves, CPs may bound forward along parallel routes, pre-
ceded by reconnaissance parties that select the new locations. Normally, the
main and forward CPs do not move at the same time, with one moving while
the other is set up and controlling the battle. During an administrative
movement, when there is little or no likelihood of contact with the enemy, a
CP may move into a site previously occupied by another CP. However, during
a tactical movement (see Chapter 5) or when contact is likely, the OPFOR
will not occupy a site twice, because to do so would increase the chances of an
enemy locating a CP. While on the move, CPs maintain continuous contact
with subordinates, higher headquarters, and flanking organizations. During
movement halts, the practice is to disperse the post in a concealed area, cam-
ouflaging it if necessary and locating radio stations and special vehicles some

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

distance from the control and support groups. Because of dispersion in a mo-
bile environment, CPs are often responsible for their own local ground de-
fenses.
2-124. During the movement of a main CP, the OPFOR maintains continuity
of control by handing over control to either the forward or airborne CP or,
more rarely, to the alternate CP. Key staff members often move to the new
location by helicopter to reduce the time spent away from their posts. Before
any move, headquarters troops carefully reconnoiter and mark the new loca-
tion. Engineer preparation provides protection and concealment.

COMMAND POST LOCATION

2-125. The OPFOR locates CPs in areas affording good concealment, with
good road net access being a secondary consideration. It situates CPs so that
no single weapon can eliminate more than one. Remoting communications fa-
cilities lessens the chance of the enemys locating the actual command ele-
ment by radio direction finding.
2-126. During some particularly difficult phases of a battle, where close co-
operation between units is essential, the forward CP of one element may be
collocated with the forward or main CP of another. Examples are the com-
mitment of an exploitation force, the execution of a strike, or the passing of
one organization through another.

COMMAND POST SECURITY

2-127. Security of CPs is important, and the OPFOR takes a number of
measures to ensure it. CPs are a high priority for air defense protection. Ide-
ally, main CPs also locate near reserve elements to gain protection from
ground attack. Nevertheless, circumstances often dictate that they provide
for their own local defense. Engineers normally dig in and camouflage key
elements.
2-128. Good camouflage, the remoting of communications facilities, and the
deployment of alternate CPs make most of the C2 structure fairly survivable.
Nevertheless, one of the most important elements, the forward CP, often re-
mains vulnerable. It forms a distinctive, if small, grouping, well within en-
emy artillery range. The OPFOR will therefore typically provide key CPs
with sufficient engineer and combat arms support to protect them from en-
emy artillery or special operations raids.

COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS

2-129. The OPFOR commanders C2 requirements are dictated generally by
the doctrine, tactics, procedures, and operational responsibilities applicable
to commanders at higher echelons. Battlefield dispersion, mobility, and in-
creasing firepower under conventional or WMD conditions require reliable,
flexible, and secure command and control.
2-130. Expanding C2 requirements include the need for
High mobility of combat headquarters and subordinate elements.
Rapid collection, analysis, and dissemination of information as the ba-
sis for planning and decision making.

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_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2

Maintaining effective control of forces operating in a hostile IW envi-

ronment.
Supporting communications systems, which are the principal means of C2,
must have a degree of mobility, reliability, flexibility, security, and surviv-
ability comparable to the C2 elements being supported.
2-131. Modern warfare has resulted in a shift away from large formations ar-
rayed against one another in a linear fashion, to maneuver warfare con-
ducted across large areas with more lethal, yet smaller, combat forces. C2
must provide the reliable, long-range communications links necessary to con-
trol forces deployed over greater distances. In order to move with the maneu-
ver forces, the communications systems must be highly mobile.

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

COMMUNICATIONS
2-132. The chief characteristics of communications supporting the C2 struc-
ture are security, survivability, and flexibility. In the OPFOR view, centrali-
zation of operational planning is a prerequisite to achieving the flexibility re-
quired to ensure timely concentration of forces and fires. Redundancy in
equipment, as well as communications links and CPs, is the primary means
of ensuring the control structures security and survivability.
2-133. The organization of communications to meet operational and tactical
requirements is the responsibility of the commander at each level. Prior to
combat, the chief of communications, under the personal direction of the in-
telligence officer, prepares the communications plan. After approval by the
chief of staff, it becomes an annex to the combat order for implementation by
subordinate signal units. OPFOR communications reflect the concern of
commanders to maintain uninterrupted C2, flexibility, and security.

Signal Assets
2-134. Communication systems employed include
Manportable high-frequency (HF) and very-high-frequency (VHF) ra-
dios.
HF radio stations.
VHF and ultra-high-frequency (UHF) multichannel radio relay.
Super-high-frequency (SHF) troposcatter systems.
Satellite communications (SATCOM).
Wire and cable (landline as far forward as possible).
Commercial communications networks (including cellular, microwave,
radio, wire, digital, and satellite)
Local area networks (LANs) and wide area networks (WANs).
Internet and Intranet.
Encrypted communications are common from brigade upward, but may ex-
tend to the lowest levels in modernized OPFOR units.

2-135. Headquarters normally task organize their signal assets to support

the formation of forward, main, IFC, and sustainment CPs. The numbers and
types of signal units can vary greatly depending on the size and makeup of
the force grouping under a particular headquarters.
2-136. It is possible to extend mobile communications through the integra-
tion of wire and wireless systems and by connecting with fixed military and
civil communications facilities.
2-137. Signal communications are organized through the signal centers that
are established to provide communications for the CPs. All available commu-
nications methods are used to integrate the control and support groups of the
CPs with the communications centers.
2-138. The OPFOR also stresses the use of non-electronic means of communi-
cations. While radio must be the principal means of communication in a fluid,
mobile battle, the OPFOR is aware of the threat from enemy signals intelli-

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_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2

gence, direction finding, and communications jamming. Also, wire and cable
are often not practical in fast-moving situations.
2-139. During periods of radio silence or disruption of radio communications,
the OPFOR employs messengers, liaison officers, and visual and sound sig-
nals. Messengers are the preferred method for delivering combat orders at
any time. Representatives from the staff may observe and supervise the exe-
cution of orders. Whenever possible, the OPFOR prefers personal contact be-
tween commanders (or their representatives) and subordinates.

Communications Nets
2-140. C2 of OPFOR organizations relies on extensive and redundant com-
munications. The OPFOR primarily uses UHF/SHF SATCOM, radio relay
multichannel, HF radio stations, HF and VHF single-channel radios, and
wire or cable.
2-141. Tactical commands operate two command nets. The commander nor-
mally controls the primary command net from the forward CP, while the
chief of staff maintains control of the alternate net from the main CP. De-
pending on the distances involved, the primary net may be either HF or
VHF. All of the commands constituent and dedicated units monitor the
command nets. The DTG or division IFC CP also monitors the command
nets.
2-142. The operations officer maintains an operations net monitored by the
commander, subordinate and supporting units, and any alternate or auxil-
iary CP created. The resources officer also monitors this net from the sustain-
ment CP.
2-143. The DTG or division DC, as IFC commander, maintains the integrated
fires net. This net is monitored by the elements of the IFC.
2-144. The resources officer maintains the support net. Materiel support,
maintenance, and medical units monitor this net. Subordinate combat arms
units may also use this net when requiring additional, immediate assistance
that constituent support assets are unable to provide.
2-145. The chief of reconnaissance maintains an intelligence net, monitored
by reconnaissance units, maneuver units, the commander, DC, chief of staff,
and resources officer.
2-146. The CAO maintains the airspace control net for the purpose of control-
ling the commands airspace. Elements on this net include aviation units, air
defense assets, and army aviation liaison teams.
2-147. When required, the commander will create a special mission net,
monitored by the chief of staff, that is employed to control the activities of
units conducting a special mission, such as a reconnaissance detachment or
an airborne or heliborne landing force deployed behind enemy lines. Specific
communications systems employed are dependent on the depth and type of
mission.
2-148. The command maintains an air defense and NBC warning communi-
cations net, monitored by all constituent, dedicated, and supporting units.
This net is used for passing tactical alerts, NBC, and air warning notices.

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

The chief of staff maintains a watch on the division-level warning nets at the
main CP; he then disseminates warning where appropriate.
2-149. The command establishes multichannel links between the main and
sustainment CPs and the CPs of subordinate units. These links are used for
high-capacity voice and data transmissions. The DTG also establishes mul-
tichannel links between the main and sustainment CPs.
2-150. The primary responsibility for maintaining communications of a tacti-
cal command with its parent headquarters rests with the main CP. With the
larger staffs and greater communications capabilities of the main CP, the
commander is allowed to focus more on the actual conduct of the battle from
the forward CP. Obviously, when staff members, such as the CAO or chief of
reconnaissance, accompany the commander, they will establish control over
their respective nets as required.
2-151. The chief of IW may also control one or more deception nets designed
to mislead enemy signals intelligence analysis. Integrated into the IW plan
are a description of these nets and procedures for their use.

Procedures
2-152. Before making contact with the enemy, most radio and radio-relay
systems maintain a listening watch with transmission forbidden or strictly
controlled. OPFOR units usually observe radio silence when defending or de-
parting assembly areas. During radio silence, wire and courier are the pri-
mary communications means. While moving toward the enemy, units nor-
mally limit radio transmissions to various code words informing commanders
they have accomplished assigned tasks or have encountered unexpected diffi-
culties. The OPFOR also uses visual signals, such as flags and flares, to a
great extent during movement. Usually only the commander and reconnais-
sance elements have permission to transmit.
2-153. In the offense, OPFOR units maintain radio silence until the outbreak
of battle, when those authorized to transmit may do so without restriction.
When contact with the enemy occurs, units initiate normal radio procedures.
Subordinate commanders inform the commanderusually by code
wordwhen they reach objectives, encounter NBC contamination, make con-
tact with the enemy, or have important information to report.

COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS SURVIVABILITY

2-154. Survivability of C2 systems is of great concern, since the C2 elements
are typically located within range of enemy standoff systems, with increased
potential for disruption or destruction. The OPFOR stresses the need to
maintain continuous, reliable control of its forces and has undertaken a num-
ber of measures to prevent disruption and enhance survivability, while re-
maining flexible enough to retain control of units in combat. These include
High mobility of C2 systems and facilities.
Redundancy of the C2 elements and networks.
Adherence to operations- and information-security measures.
Deception.

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_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2

2-155. IW activities contribute to C2 survivability. So does the principle of

centralized control and decentralized execution. The survivability of the
headquarters command group is facilitated by the fact that the commander,
DC, and chief of staff can be in separate CPs (forward, IFC, and main CPs,
respectively).

Mobility
2-156. C2 elements must be highly mobile, due to the emphasis on maintain-
ing combat at a rapid tempo. Because of their proximity to the enemy, CPs
and supporting communications must frequently relocate to avoid detection
and subsequent destruction.
2-157. CPs are usually mobile (that is, in vehicles) but may also be fixed. By
emphasizing the use of multiple, mobile CPs, planners minimize the disrup-
tion of C2 that would occur with the enemys destruction of this element of
the C2 structure. Highly mobile signal units employing transportable com-
munications equipment support mobile CPs. This gives OPFOR commanders
great flexibility in organizing and deploying their C2 elements. Thus, they
are able to provide effective control in varied situations.

Redundancy
2-158. The OPFOR has built extensive redundancy into the C2 structure.
Multiple CPs are fielded as low as possible. For communications between lev-
els of command, multiple communications types are employed. Providing a
variety of single- and multichannel links, these systems operate over a wide
frequency spectrum.

Operations and Information Security

2-159. The consistent adherence to operations- and information-security
measures is especially critical, given the increased capabilities of enemy re-
connaissance, the increased role of surprise, and the proliferation of precision
weapons. Given the high priority the enemy places on C2 elements as targets,
maintaining operations security is an important requirement for C2 nodes.
This is achieved by the stringent adherence to information-security proce-
dures and extensive use of C3D.

2-39
 Chapter 3

Offense
The offense carries the fight to the enemy. The OPFOR sees this as the de-
cisive form of combat and the ultimate means of imposing its will on the en-
emy. While conditions at a particular time or place may require the OPFOR
to defend, defeating an enemy force ultimately requires shifting to the of-
fense. Even within the context of defense, victory normally requires some
sort of offensive action. Therefore, OPFOR commanders at all levels seek to
create and exploit opportunities to take offensive action, whenever possible.

The aim of offense at the tactical level is to achieve tactical missions in

support of an operational plan. A tactical command ensures that its sub-
ordinate commands thoroughly understand both the overall goals of the
operation plan and the specific purpose of a particular mission they are
about to execute. In this way, subordinate commands may continue to exe-
cute the mission without direct control by a higher headquarters, if neces-
sary.

PURPOSE OF THE OFFENSE

3-1. All tactical offensive actions are designed to achieve the goals of an op-
erational plan through active measures. However, the purpose of any given
offensive mission varies with the situation, as determined through the deci-
sion-making process. The primary distinction among types of offensive mis-
sions is their purpose. Thus, the OPFOR recognizes five general types of tac-
tical offensive missions according to their purpose: gain freedom of move-
ment, restrict freedom of movement, gain control of key ter-
rain/personnel/equipment, gain information and dislocate. These general
purposes serve as a guide to understanding the design of an offensive mission
and not as a limit placed on a commander as to how he makes his intent and
aim clear.

ATTACK TO GAIN FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

3-2. An attack to gain freedom of movement creates a situation in an impor-
tant part of the battlespace where other friendly forces can maneuver in a
method of their own choosing with little or no opposition. Such an attack can
take many forms here are some examples:
seizing an important mobility corridor to prevent a counterattack into
the flank of another moving force
destroying an air defense unit so that a combat helicopter may use an
air avenue of approach at lower risk
breaching a complex obstacle to pass through a follow-on force.

3-1
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

Security operations such as screen, guard and cover may have one or more
attacks to gain freedom of movement as a component of their scheme of ma-
neuver.

ATTACK TO RESTRICT FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

3-3. An attack to restrict freedom of movement prevents the enemy from ma-
neuvering as he chooses. Restricting attacks can deny key terrain, ambush
moving forces, dominate airspace or fix an enemy formation. Tactical tasks
often associated with restricting attacks are ambush, block, canalize, contain,
fix, interdict, and isolate.

ATTACK TO GAIN CONTROL OF KEY TERRAIN/PERSONNEL/EQUIPMENT

An attack to gain control of key terrain/personnel/equipment is not necessar-
ily terrain focused a raid with the objective of taking prisoners is an attack
to gain control. Besides the classic seizure of key terrain that dominates a
battlefield, an attack to control may also target facilities such as economic
targets, ports or airfields. Tactical tasks associated with an attack to control
are raid, clear, occupy, retain, secure and seize.

ATTACK TO GAIN INFORMATION

3-4. An attack to gain information, commonly known as a reconnaissance at-
tack, is used to answer important questions about the enemys dispositions
and capabilities. The OPFOR recognizes that an enemy will take significant
measures to prevent the OPFOR from gaining critical intelligence. This
means that quite often the OPFOR will have to fight for information, using
an offensive operation to penetrate or circumvent the enemys security forces.

ATTACK TO DISLOCATE
An attack to dislocate is used to prevent the enemy from being able to execute
an optimal course of action. Attacks to dislocate often have a strong informa-
tion warfare (IW) component. Dislocation attacks typically focus on a key en-
emy capability or vulnerability. Tactical tasks associated with dislocation are
ambush, disrupt, interdict and neutralize.

PLANNING THE OFFENSE

3-5. For the OPFOR, the key elements of planning offensive missions are
Determining the level of planning possible (planned versus situational
offense).
Organizing the battlefield.
Organizing forces.
Organizing IW activities in support of the offense (see Chapter 6).
Determining the objective of the offensive action.

3-6. Offensive actions during transition and adaptive operations will not be
able to rely simply on massing combat power at a decisive point. Such actions
will typically include
Increased use of infiltration.

3-2
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 3

Increased role of perception management (see Chapter 6) in support of

the offense.
Increased use of affiliated forces in support of offensive action.
PLANNED OFFENSE
3-7. A planned offense is an offensive mission or action undertaken when
there is sufficient time and knowledge of the situation to prepare and re-
hearse forces for specific tasks. Typically, the enemy is in a defensive position
and in a known location. The OPFOR plans an offense using the method de-
scribed in Chapter 2. Key considerations in offensive planning are
Selecting a clear and appropriate objective.
Determining which enemy forces (security, reaction, or reserve) must be fixed.
Developing a reconnaissance plan that locates and tracks all key en-
emy targets and elements.
Creating or taking advantage of a window of opportunity to free
friendly forces from any enemy advantages in precision standoff and
situational awareness.
Determine which component or components of an enemys combat sys-
tem to attack.
SITUATIONAL OFFENSE
3-8. The OPFOR may also conduct a situational (hasty) offense. It recognizes
that the modern battlefield is chaotic. Fleeting opportunities to strike at an
enemy weakness will continually present themselves and just as quickly dis-
appear. Although detailed planning and preparation greatly mitigate risk,
they are often not achievable if a window of opportunity is to be exploited.
3-9. The following are examples of conditions that might lead to a situational
offense:
A key enemy unit, system, or capability is exposed.
The OPFOR has an opportunity to conduct a spoiling attack to disrupt
enemy defensive preparations.
An OPFOR unit makes contact on favorable terms for subsequent of-
fensive action.

3-10. In a situational offense, the commander develops his assessment of the

conditions rapidly and without a great deal of staff involvement. He provides
a basic course of action to the staff who then quickly turn that course of ac-
tion into an executable combat order. Even more than other types of OPFOR
offensive action, the situational offense relies on implementation of battle
drills by subordinate tactical units (see Chapter 5).
3-11. Organization of the battlefield in a situational offense will normally be
limited to minor changes to existing control measures. Organization of forces
in a situational offense will typically require the use of detachments of vari-
ous types. The nature of situational offense is such that it often involves
smaller, independent forces accomplishing discrete missions.

3-3
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

ORGANIZING FORCES FOR THE OFFENSE

3-12. In planning and executing offensive actions, the OPFOR organizes and
designates various forces according to their function. This provides a common
language for how the OPFOR fights functionally, rather than geometrically.
The functions do not change, regardless of where the force might happen to
be located on the battlefield. Thus, functional forces that perform the com-
mon operational and tactical tasks of disrupting, fixing, assaulting, exploit-
ing, providing security, and deceiving are logically designated as disruption,
fixing, assault, exploitation, security, and deception forces, respectively. A
force held in reserve is designated as a reserve, until it receives a mission to
perform a specific function.
3-13. In his combat order, the tactical commander also specifies the organi-
zation of the forces within his level of command. Thus, subordinate forces
understand their roles within the overall operation or battle. However, the
organization of forces can shift dramatically during the course of a battle or
operation, if part of the plan does not work or works better than anticipated.
For example, a unit that started out being part of a fixing force might split off
and become an exploitation force, if the opportunity presents itself. Assault
forces may not even make contact with the enemy, but instead conduct a dem-
onstration. Fixing forces could consist entirely of irregular forces, while exploita-
tion forces could engage the ultimate objective with fires only.
3-14. Each of the separate functional forces has an identified commander.
This is often the senior commander of the largest subordinate unit assigned
to that force. For example, if two BTGs are acting as the DTGs fixing force,
the senior of the two BTG commanders is the fixing force commander. Since,
in this option, each force commander is also a subordinate unit commander,
he controls the force from his units command post (CP). Another option is to
have one of the DTGs CPs be in charge of a functional force. For example,
the forward CP could control a disruption force or a fixing force. Another pos-
sibility would be for the IFC CP to command the disruption force or the ex-
ploitation force or any other force whose actions must be closely coordinated
with fires delivered by the IFC.
3-15. In any case, the force commander is responsible to the tactical group
commander to ensure that combat preparations are made properly and to
take charge of the force during the battle. This frees the tactical group com-
mander from decisions specific to the forces mission. Even when tactical
group subordinates have responsibility for parts of the disruption zone, there
is still an overall tactical group disruption force commander.
3-16. A battalion or below organization will only ever be a part (or all) of a
single higher commands functional force (assault, exploitation, fixing, re-
serve, etc.) at any given time. If, for example, a BTG needed one part of one
of its battalions to serve as the assault force, but needed another part to join
the exploitation force, one of the two battalion subunits would be re-task or-
ganized.

Disruption Force
3-17. In the offense, the disruption force would typically include the disrup-
tion force that already existed in a preceding defensive situation (see Chapter

3-4
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 3

4). It is possible that forces assigned for actions in the disruption zone in the
defense might not have sufficient mobility to do the same in the offense or
that targets may change and require different or additional assets. Thus, the
disruption force might require augmentation. A DTG disruption force is typi-
cally a BTG, while a BTG disruption force is typically an independent mis-
sion detachment (IMD).
3-18. Battalions and below often serve as disruption forces for BTGs. Typi-
cally, this mission is complex enough for them to be task organized as de-
tachments.

Fixing Force
3-19. OPFOR offensive operations are founded on the concept of fixing enemy
forces so that they are not free to maneuver. The OPFOR recognizes that
units and soldiers can be fixed in a variety of ways. For example
They find themselves without effective communication with higher
command.
Their picture of the battlefield is unclear.
They are (or believe they are) decisively engaged in combat.
They have lost mobility to complex terrain, obstacles, or weapons of
mass destruction (WMD).

3-20. In the offense, planners will identify which enemy forces need to be
fixed and the method by which they will be fixed. They will then assign this
responsibility to a force that has the capability to fix the required enemy
forces with the correct method. The fixing force may consist of a number of
units separated from each other in time and space, particularly if the enemy
forces required to be fixed are likewise separated. A fixing force could consist
entirely of affiliated irregular forces. It is possible that a discrete attack on
logistics or C2 (or other systems) could fix an enemy without resorting to de-
ploying large fixing forces.
3-21. Battalions and below often serve as fixing forces for BTGs and are also
often capable of performing this mission without significant task organiza-
tion. This is particularly true in those cases where simple suppressive fires
are sufficient to fix enemy forces.

Assault Force
3-22. The assault force is charged with creating the conditions that allow the
exploitation force the freedom to operate. In order to create a window of op-
portunity for the exploitation force to succeed, the assault force may be re-
quired to operate at a high degree of risk and may sustain substantial casu-
alties. However, an assault force may not even make contact with the enemy,
but instead conduct a demonstration.
3-23. Battalions and below serving as an assault force are often required to
breaching or obstacle clearing operations, but it is important to remember
that the requirements laid on the assault force are tied directly to the type
and mission of the exploitation force.

3-5
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

3-24. Within a detachment, the force that seizes an enemy position is often
termed an assault element. This is not precisely the same as the concept
behind assault force. An assault element has the mission of seizing an en-
emy held position.

Exploitation Force
3-25. The exploitation force is assigned the task of achieving the objective of
the mission. It typically exploits a window of opportunity created by the as-
sault force. However, effective IW, a mismatch in system capabilities, or even
the enemys own dispositions may create a situation in which the exploitation
force is able to achieve the objective without a formal assault force.

Security Force
3-26. The security force conducts activities to prevent or mitigate the effects
of hostile actions against the overall tactical-level command and/or its key
components. If the commander chooses, he may charge this security force
with providing force protection for the entire AOR, including the rest of the
functional forces; logistics and administrative elements in the support zone;
and other key installations, facilities, and resources. The security force may
include various types of unitssuch as infantry, SPF, counter-
reconnaissance, and signals reconnaissance assetsto focus on enemy spe-
cial operations and long-range reconnaissance forces operating throughout
the AOR. It can also include internal security forces units allocated to the
tactical-level command, with the mission of protecting the overall command
from attack by hostile insurgents, terrorists, and special operations forces.
The security force may also be charged with mitigating the effects of WMD.

Deception Force
3-27. When the IW plan requires combat forces to take some action (such as
a demonstration or feint), these forces will be designated as deception forces
in close-hold executive summaries of the plan. Wide-distribution copies of the
plan will refer to these forces according to the designation given them in the
deception story.

Reserves
3-28. At the commanders discretion, forces may be held out of initial action
so that he may influence unforeseen events or take advantage of developing
opportunities. OPFOR offensive reserve formations will be given priorities in
terms of whether the staff thinks it most likely that they will act as a fixing,
assault, or exploitation force. The size and composition of an offensive reserve
is entirely situation-dependent.

ORGANIZING BATTALIONS AND DETACHMENTS FOR THE OFFENSE

3-29. Battalions and detachments employ a different scheme for organizing

forces than the fixing-assault-exploitation force methodology used by bri-
gades and above. This is because the OPFOR tends to use detachments to
accomplish a single tactical task rather than a multi-task mission.

3-6
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 3

3-30. The standard battlefield organization of a detachment is into three

parts: the security element, the support element and the action element (also
known in specific situations as the firing or assault element).
3-31. The security element of a detachment provides local tactical security for
the detachment and prevents the enemy from influencing mission accom-
plishment. The action element accomplishes the detachments tactical task.
The support element provides combat and combat service support and C2 for
the detachment. Due to such considerations as multiple avenues of ap-
proach, a detachment may organize one or more of each of these elements in
specific cases.
3-32. In certain situations, a detachment may organize one or more specialist
elements. Specialist elements are typically formed around a unit with a spe-
cific capability such as an obstacle clearing element, reconnaissance element
or deception element.

PREPARING FOR THE OFFENSE

3-33. In the preparation phase, the OPFOR focuses on ways of applying all
available resources and the full range of actions to place the enemy in the
weakest condition and position possible. Commanders prepare their forces for
all subsequent phases of the offense. They organize their forces and the bat-
tlefield with an eye toward capitalizing on conditions created by successful
attacks.

ESTABLISH CONTACT
3-34. The number one priority for all offensive actions is to gain and main-
tain contact with key enemy forces. As part of the decision-making process,
the commander and staff identify which forces must be kept under watch at
all times. The OPFOR will employ whatever technical sensors it has at its
disposal to locate and track enemy forces, but the method of choice is ground
reconnaissance. It may also receive information on the enemy from the civil-
ian populace, local police, or affiliated irregular forces.

MAKE THOROUGH LOGISTICS ARRANGEMENTS

3-35. The OPFOR understands that there is as much chance of an offense be-
ing brought to culmination by a lack of sufficient logistics support as by en-
emy action. Careful consideration will be given to carried days of supply and
advanced caches to obviate the need for easily disrupted LOCs.

MODIFY THE PLAN WHEN NECESSARY

3-36. The OPFOR takes into account that, while it might consider itself to be
in the preparation phase for one battle, it is continuously in the execution phase.
Plans are never considered final. Plans are checked throughout the course of
their development to ensure they are still valid in light of battlefield events.

3-7
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

REHEARSE CRITICAL ACTIONS IN PRIORITY

3-37. The commander establishes the priority for the critical actions expected
to take place during the battle. The force rehearses those actions in as realis-
tic a manner as possible for the remainder of the preparation time.

EXECUTING THE OFFENSE

3-38. The degree of preparation often determines the nature of the attack in
the execution phase. Successful execution depends on forces that understand
their roles in the operation or battle and can swiftly follow preparatory ac-
tions with the maximum possible shock and violence and deny the enemy any
opportunity to recover. A successful execution phase often ends with transition
to the defense in order to consolidate gains, defeat enemy counterattacks, or
avoid culmination. In some cases, the execution phase is followed by continued
offensive action to exploit opportunities created by the battle just completed.

MAINTAIN CONTACT
3-39. The OPFOR will go to great lengths to ensure that its forces maintain
contact with key elements of the enemy force throughout the battle. This in-
cludes rapid reconstitution of reconnaissance assets and units and the use of
whatever combat power is necessary to ensure success.

IMPLEMENT BATTLE DRILLS

3-40. The OPFOR derives great flexibility from battle drill. (See Chapter 5
for more detail.) Contrary to the U.S. view that battle drill, especially at
higher levels, reduces flexibility, the OPFOR uses minor, simple, and clear
modifications to thoroughly understood and practiced battle drill to adapt to
ever-shifting conditions. It does not write standard procedures into its com-
bat orders and does not write new orders when a simple shift from current
formations and organization will do.
3-41. OPFOR offensive battle drills will include, but not be limited to the fol-
lowing:
React to all seven forms of contactdirect fire; indirect fire; visual; ob-
stacle; nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC); electronic warfare
(EW); and air attack.
Fire and Maneuver.
Fixing enemy forces.
Situational Breaching.
MODIFY THE PLAN WHEN NECESSARY
3-42. The OPFOR is sensitive to the effects of mission dynamics and realizes
that the enemys actions may well make an OPFOR units original mission
achievable, but completely irrelevant. As an example, a unit of the fixing
force in an attack may be keeping its portion of the enemy force tied down
while another portion of the enemy force is maneuvering nearby to stop the
exploitation force. In this case, the OPFOR unit in question must be ready to
transition to a new mission quickly and break contact to fix the maneuvering
enemy force.

3-8
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 3

SEIZE OPPORTUNITIES
3-43. The OPFOR places maximum emphasis on decentralized execution, ini-
tiative, and adaptation. Subordinate units are expected to take advantage of
fleeting opportunities so long as their actions are in concert with the purpose
of the combat order or operational directive.

DOMINATE THE TEMPO OF COMBAT

3-44. Through all actions possible, the OPFOR plans to control the tempo of
combat. It will use continuous attack, IW, and shifting targets, objectives,
and axes to ensure that tactical events are taking place at the pace it desires.

TYPES OF OFFENSIVE ACTION TACTICAL GROUPS

3-45. The types of offensive action in OPFOR doctrine are both tactical meth-
ods and guides to the design of operational courses of action. An offensive
mission may include subordinate units that are executing different offensive
and defensive courses of action within the overall offensive mission framework.

ATTACK
3-46. An attack seeks to achieve tactical decision through primarily military
means by defeating the enemys military power. This defeat does not come
through the destruction of armored weapons systems but through the disrup-
tion, dislocation, and subsequent paralyzation that occurs when combat
forces are rendered irrelevant by the loss of the capability or will to continue
the fight. Attack is the method of choice for OPFOR offensive action. There
are two types of attack: integrated attack and dispersed attack.
3-47. The OPFOR does not have a separate design for exploitation as a dis-
tinct offensive course of action. Exploitation is considered a central part of all
integrated and dispersed attacks.
3-48. The OPFOR does not have a separate design for pursuit as a distinct
offensive course of action. A pursuit is conducted using the same basic
course-of-action framework as any other integrated or dispersed attack. The
fixing force gains contact with the fleeing enemy force and slows it or forces it
to stop while the assault and exploitation forces create the conditions for and
complete the destruction of the enemys C2 and logistics structure or other
systems.
3-49. The OPFOR recognizes that moving forces that make contact must rap-
idly choose and implement an offensive or defensive course of action. The
OPFOR methodology for accomplishing this is discussed in Chapter 5.

Integrated Attack
3-50. Integrated attack is an offensive action where the OPFOR seeks mili-
tary decision by destroying the enemys will and/or ability to continue fight-
ing through the application of combined arms effects. Integrated attack is of-
ten employed when the OPFOR enjoys overmatch with respect to its oppo-
nent and is able to bring all elements of offensive combat power to bear. It
may also be employed against a more sophisticated and capable opponent, if

3-9
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

the appropriate window of opportunity is created or available. See Figures 3-

3 through 3-5 for examples of integrated attacks.

I BTG

II
II
I
II

Exploitation Force
X
Assault Force

I
I

Fixing Force
Fixing Force I

Enemy
Reserve

I I (+)

Fixing Force
Disruption
Zone
Battle
Zone

BTG

Figure 3-1. Example of an Integrated Attack #1

3-51. The primary objective of an integrated attack is destroying the enemys

will and ability to fight. The OPFOR recognizes that modern militaries can-
not continue without adequate logistics support and no military, modern or
otherwise, can function without effective command and control.
3-52. Integrated attacks are characterized by
Not being focused solely on destruction of ground combat power but of-
ten on C2 and logistics.
Fixing the majority of the enemys force in place with the minimum
force necessary.
Isolating the targeted subcomponent(s) of the enemys combat system
from his main combat power.
Using complex terrain to force the enemy to fight at a disadvantage.
Using deception and other components of IW to degrade the enemys
situational understanding and ability to target OPFOR formations.

3-10
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 3

Using flank attack and envelopment, particularly of enemy forces that

have been fixed.

II I
Fixing
Force

II I
Fixing
Force
Road

I
II

II
X
II I

R Enemy
oa
d Reserve I

Fixing BSA
Force

X
II Assault I
Force

II I
I Exploitation
I Force

Fixing
Force

Figure 3-2. Example of an Integrated Attack #2

3-53. The OPFOR prefers to conduct integrated attacks when most or all of
the following conditions exist:
The OPFOR possesses significant overmatch in combat power over en-
emy forces.
It possesses at least air parity over the critical portions of the battle-
field.
It is sufficiently free of enemy standoff reconnaissance and attack sys-
tems to be able to operate without accepting high levels of risk.

3-11
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

I
Exploitation
Force
Fixing
Assault Force
I I Force
II

Forest

II
Fixing
Force

Forest

Figure 3-3. Example of an Integrated Attack #3

Organizing Forces for an Integrated Attack

3-54. An integrated attack employs fixing, assault, and exploitation forces. A
disruption force exists, but is not created specifically for this type of offensive
action.
3-55. Fixing Force. The fixing force in an integrated attack is required to
prevent enemy defending forces, reserves, and quick-response forces (QRF)
from interfering with the actions of the assault and exploitation forces. The
battle will develop rapidly and enemy forces not in the attack zone cannot be
allowed to reposition to influence the assault and exploitation forces. Maneu-
ver forces, precision fires, air defense units, long-range antiarmor systems,
situational obstacles, chemical weapons, and electronic warfare (EW) are
well suited to fix defending forces.
3-56. Assault Force. The assault force in an integrated attack is charged
with creating conditions that allow the exploitation force to rapidly penetrate
enemy defenses. Since the exploitation force is principally required to act
within the window of opportunity, the assault force may successfully employ
infiltration of infantry to carefully pre-selected points to assist the exploita-
tion force in its penetration. Smoke and suppressive artillery and rocket
fires, combat engineer units, and air-delivered weapons are also suited to this
mission.

3-12
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 3

3-57. Exploitation Force. The exploitation force in an integrated attack

must be capable of penetrating or avoiding enemy defensive forces and at-
tacking and destroying the enemys support infrastructure before he has time
to react. An armored or attack helicopter unit is often best suited to be the
core of an exploitation force in an integrated attack due to the combination of
mobility, protection and killing power possessed by such forces.

Dispersed Attack
3-58. Dispersed attack (also known as decentralized attack) is the primary
manner in which the OPFOR conducts offensive action when threatened by a
superior enemy and/or when unable to mass or provide integrated C2 to an
attack. This is not to say that the dispersed attack cannot or should not be
used against peer forces, but as a rule integrated attack will more completely
attain objectives in such situations. Dispersed attack relies on IW and dis-
persion of forces to permit the OPFOR to conduct tactical offensive actions
while overmatched by precision standoff weapons and imagery and signals
sensors. The dispersed attack is continuous and comes from multiple direc-
tions. It employs multiple means working together in a very interdependent
way. The attack can be dispersed in time as well as space. See Figures 3-6
through 3-8 for examples of dispersed attacks.
3-59. The primary objective of dispersed attack is to take advantage of a win-
dow of opportunity to bring enough combined arms force to bear to destroy
the enemys will and/or capability to continue fighting. To achieve this, the
OPFOR does not necessary have to destroy the entire enemy force, but often
just a key portion of that force.
3-60. Selecting the appropriate portion of the enemy to destroy is the first
step in planning the dispersed attack. This element is chosen because of its
importance to the enemy and varies depending on the force involved and the
current military situation. For example, an enemy force dependent on one
geographical point for all of his logistics support and reinforcement would be
most vulnerable at that point. Disrupting this activity at the right time and
to the right extent may bring about tactical or operational decision on the
current battlefield or it may open further windows of opportunity to attack
the enemys weakened forces at little cost to the OPFOR. In another example,
an enemy force preparing to attack may be disrupted by an OPFOR attack
whose purpose is to destroy long-range missile artillery, creating the oppor-
tunity for the OPFOR to achieve standoff with its own missile systems. In a
final example, the key system chosen may be the personnel of the enemy
force. Attacking and causing mass casualties among infantrymen may delay
an enemy offensive in complex terrain while also being politically unaccept-
able for the enemy command structure.
3-61. Dispersed attacks are characterized by
Not being focused on complete destruction of ground combat power but
rather on destroying a key portion of the enemy force (often targeting
enemy C2 and logistics).
Fixing and isolating enemy combat power.
Using smaller, independent subordinate elements.
Conducting rapid moves from dispersed locations.

3-13
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

Massing at the last possible moment.

Conducting simultaneous attack at multiple, dispersed locations.
Using deception and other components of IW to degrade the enemys
situational understanding and ability to target OPFOR formations.

LZ Fixing
Exploitation Force
Force I Exploitation
Assault Force
Force

Fixing
Force
Exploitation
Force

Assault
Force
I

Fixing
Force

Exploitation
Force

Bn
Reserve
Fixing
Force

I Assault
Force

Figure 3-4. Dispersed Attack Example #1

3-62. The window of opportunity needed to establish conditions favorable to

the execution of a dispersed attack may be one created by the OPFOR or one
that develops due to external factors in the operational environment. When
this window must be created, the OPFOR keys on several tasks that must be
accomplished:
Destroy enemy ground reconnaissance.
Deceive enemy imagery and signals sensors.
Create an uncertain air defense environment.
Selectively deny situational awareness.
Maximize use of complex terrain.

3-14
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 3

II Exploitation Mountains
Force

II LZ
LZ
Prep
II
X
Exploitation
Force
Exploitation I I
Force LZ

LZ LZ
Prep

LZ Brigade
Prep Reserve
I

Road

II

Fixing
I Force
II
II
II II
Assault
Force I
Assault Assault
I I
Force Force
Fixing II
Force I I
I I
I
Fixing
Force

Figure 3-5. Dispersed Attack Example #2

Organizing Forces for a Dispersed Attack

3-63. A dispersed attack employs fixing, assault, and exploitation forces. A
disruption force exists, but is not created specifically for this type of offensive
action. Deception forces can also play an important role in a dispersed attack.
3-64. Fixing Force. The fixing force in a dispersed attack is primarily fo-
cused on fixing enemy response forces. Enemy reserves, quick response
forces, and precision fire systems that can reorient rapidly will be those ele-
ments most capable of disrupting a dispersed attack. Maneuver forces, preci-
sion fires, air defense and antiarmor ambushes, situational obstacles, chemi-
cal weapons, and EW are well suited to fix these kinds of units and systems.
3-65. Assault Force. The assault force in a dispersed attack is charged with
creating favorable conditions for the exploitation force to rapidly move from
dispersed locations and penetrate or infiltrate enemy defenses. Since it is the
exploitation force that is principally required to act within the window of op-
portunity, the assault force may successfully employ infiltration of infantry
to carefully pre-selected points to assist the exploitation force in its penetra-
tion. Smoke and suppressive artillery and rocket fires, combat engineer units

3-15
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

and air-delivered weapons are also suited to this mission. Dispersed attacks
often make use of multiple assault forces separated in time and/or space.
3-66. Exploitation Force. The exploitation force in a dispersed attack must
be capable, through inherent capabilities or positioning relative to the en-
emy, of destroying the target of the attack. A tank brigade may be the
weapon of choice to maneuver throughout the battlefield as single platoons in
order to have one company reach a vulnerable troop concentration or soft C2
node. Alternatively, the exploitation force may be a widely dispersed group of
SPF teams set to strike simultaneously at exposed logistics targets. Dis-
persed attacks often make use of multiple exploitation forces separated in
time and/or space, but often oriented on the same objective or objectives.

Disruption
Zone

IMDR
LO D

LO
Enemy
R
IM

Enemy
Base Camp Base Camp
Fixing
Force

MSR 1 Fix by
MSR 2 Fire
ttle
Ba one
Z
Enemy
Support Area
& APOD

Fixing
Force

Laser Target
Exploitation Designator
Force MSR 3 Team

Assault
Battle Force
Zone

Enemy
Base Camp

Exploitation
Fixing Force
Force

Disruption
Zone
IMD
LOR

Figure 3-6. Dispersed Attack Example #3

3-16
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 3

LIMITED-OBJECTIVE ATTACK
3-67. A limited-objective attack seeks to achieve results critical to the opera-
tion plan or even the strategic campaign plan (SCP) by destroying or denying
the enemy key capabilities through primarily military means. The results of
a limited-objective attack typically fall short of tactical or operational deci-
sion on the day of battle, but may be vital to the overall success of the opera-
tion or campaign. Limited-objective attacks are common during adaptive
operations in which the objective is to preserve forces and wear down the
enemy, rather than achieving decision.
3-68. The primary objective of a limited-objective attack is a particular en-
emy capability. This may or may not be a particular man-made system or
group of systems, but may also be the capability to take action at the enemys
chosen tempo.
3-69. Limited-objective attacks are characterized by
Not being focused solely on destruction of ground combat power but of-
ten on C2 and logistics.
Denying the enemy the capability he most needs to execute his plans.
Maximal use of the systems warfare approach to combat (see Chapter
1).
Significant reliance on a planned or seized window of opportunity.

3-70. There are two types of tactical limited-objective attack: spoiling attack,
and counterattack.

Spoiling Attack
3-71. A spoiling attack is designed to control the tempo of combat by disrupt-
ing the timing of enemy operations. This is accomplished by attacking during
the planning and preparation for the enemys own offensive operations. Spoil-
ing attacks do not have to accomplish a great deal to be successful. Con-
versely, planners must focus carefully on what effect the attack is trying to
achieve and how the attack will achieve that effect. In some cases, the pur-
pose of the attack will be to remove a key component of the enemys force ar-
ray or combat system so it is unavailable for the planned attack and there-
fore reduces his overall chances of success. More typically, the attack is de-
signed to slow the development of conditions favorable to the enemys
planned attack. See Figure 3-7 for an example of a spoiling attack.
3-72. Quite often, the spoiling attack develops as a situational attack (see
above). This occurs when an unclear picture of enemy dispositions suddenly
clarifies to some extent and the commander wishes to take advantage of the
knowledge he has gained to disrupt enemy timing. This means that spoiling
attacks are often conducted by reserve or response forces that can rapidly
shift from their current posture to strike at the enemy.

3-17
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

I I
I

I
I
I
Spoiling I
Attack I
I
I

I
I

II XX
Main
Defense
MSB
X Force

KILL
I ZONE

Spoiling
Attack I
I
I I

I I
I I
Marsh KILL
I ZONE

I I

Forest
I

Figure 3-7. Spoiling Attack Example

3-73. Spoiling attacks are characterized by

A requirement to have a clear picture of enemy preparations and dis-
positions.
Independent, small unit action.
Highly focused objectives.
The possibility that a spoiling attack may open a window of opportu-
nity for other combat actions.

3-74. The OPFOR seeks to have the following conditions met in order to con-
duct a spoiling attack:
RISTA establishes a picture of enemy attack preparations.
Enemy security, reserve, and response forces are located and tracked.
Enemy ground reconnaissance in the attack zone is destroyed or ren-
dered ineffective.

3-75. Spoiling attacks are actually executed using one of the other types of
offensive action as the base method: integrated attack, dispersed attack, so-
phisticated ambush, or raid. Thus, the forces engaged in a spoiling attack

3-18
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 3

would be organized accordingly. The primary difference between a spoiling

attack and the other types of limited-objective attack is the purpose of the at-
tack.

Counterattack
3-76. A counterattack is designed to cause an enemy offensive operation to
culminate and allow the OPFOR to return to the offense. A counterattack is
designed to control the tempo of combat by returning the initiative to the
OPFOR. See Figure 3-8 for an example of a counterattack.

DTG
DTG BTG BTG DTG
Disruption Disruption Battle Zone II
Support Zone
Zone Zone
Fixing X
II Force
KIL E
ZO

KI NE
L

ZO
N

LL

II
XX
Enemy Main Attack XX
II BTG DTG
Battle Zone
KIL E
ZO
L
N

II
II X
Assault
Force LL
KI NE II II
II
ZO Exploitation
II Force
II
X
ZO L

DTG
NE
KIL

Antilanding
Reserve
DTG (Former DTG
Counterattack Reserve)
II
II

BTG
Battle Zone
DTG

Figure 3-8. Counterattack Example

3-77. Quite often, the counterattack develops as a situational attack (see

above). This occurs when an unclear picture of enemy dispositions suddenly
clarifies to some extent and the commander wishes to take advantage of the
knowledge he has gained to disrupt enemy timing. This means that counter-
attacks are often conducted by reserve or response forces that can rapidly
shift from their current posture to strike at the enemy.

3-19
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

3-78. Counterattacks are characterized by

A shifting in command and support relationships to assume an offen-
sive posture for the counterattacking force.
A proper identification that the enemy is at or near culmination.
The planned rapid transition of the remainder of the force to the of-
fense.
The possibility that a counterattack may open a window of opportunity
for other combat actions.

3-79. The OPFOR seeks to set the following conditions for a counterattack:
Locate and track enemy reserve forces and cause them to be commit-
ted.
Destroy enemy reconnaissance forces that could observe counterattack
preparations.
Organizing Forces for a Counterattack
3-80. A counterattack employs fixing, assault, and exploitation forces. The
disruption force was generally part of a previous OPFOR defensive posture.
3-81. Fixing Force. The fixing force in a counterattack is that part of the
force engaged in defensive action with the enemy. These forces continue to
fight from their current positions and seek to account for the key parts of the
enemy array and sure they are not able to break contact and reposition. Ad-
ditionally, the fixing force has the mission of making contact with and de-
stroying enemy reconnaissance forces and any combat forces that may have
penetrated the OPFOR defense.
3-82. Assault Force. In a counterattack, the assault force (if one is used) is
assigned the mission of forcing the enemy to commit his reserve so that the
enemy commander has no further mobile forces with which to react. If the
fixing force has already forced this commitment, the counterattack design
may forego the creation of an assault force.
3-83. Exploitation Force. The exploitation force in a counterattack maneu-
vers through or bypasses engaged enemy forces to attack and destroy the en-
emys support infrastructure before he has time or freedom to react. An ar-
mored or attack helicopter unit is often best suited to be the core of an exploi-
tation force in a counterattack due to the combination of mobility, protection,
and firepower possessed by such forces.

TACTICAL OFFENSIVE ACTIONS - DETACHMENTS

3-84. OPFOR commanders select the offensive action they deem, with the as-
sistance of their staffs, to be best suited to accomplishing their mission.
OPFOR battalions and below are typically called upon to execute one combat
mission at a time, so it will be rare that such a unit will be employing more
than one of these methods simultaneously.

3-20
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 3

ASSAULT
3-85. An assault is the basic form of OPFOR tactical offensive combat. An
assault is an attack that destroys an enemy force through firepower and the
physical occupation and/or destruction of his position.
3-86. Assaults at any level of command and with any type forces have the
same basic characteristics:
Suppression of the enemy force to permit the action element to move
against the enemy position without receiving destructive fire.
Use of surprise, limited visibility, complex terrain and C3D by the as-
sault element to attain the enemy position while remaining combat ef-
fective.
Isolation of the enemy position so that it cannot be reinforced during
the battle.

3-87. The OPFOR does not have a separate design for mounted and dis-
mounted assaults as the same basic principles apply to any assault action.
A situational assault may have to make use of whatever forces can take ad-
vantage of a window of opportunity, but the OPFOR views all assaults as
combined arms actions.

Organizing Forces for an Assault

3-88. Security Element. The security element provides early warning of ap-
proaching enemy forces and prevents them from reinforcing the assaulted
unit. Security elements often make use of terrain chokepoints, obstacles,
ambushes and other techniques to resist larger forces for the duration of the
assault. The commander may (or may be forced to) accept risk and employ a
security element that can only provide early warning but is not strong
enough to halt or repel enemy reinforcements. This decision is based on
METT-T.

3-89. Action Element. The action element of an assault (also called the as-
sault element) maneuvers to and seizes the enemy position, destroying any
forces there.

3-90. Support Element. The support element provides the assaulting de-
tachment with one or more of the following:

CSS
C2
Supporting direct fire (HMG, ATGM, recoilless rifle, AGL, etc.)
Supporting indirect fire (mortar, artillery, etc.)
Mobility Support

3-21
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

Air Avenue of Approach

Ground Avenue of Approach

Security Element

Security Element

Support Element
Assault Element

Support Element

Figure 3-9. Example of an Assault #1

3-22
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 3

Security Element

Assault Element

Support Element
Support Element

Security Element

Figure 3-10. Example of an Assault #2

Organizing The Battlefield For An Assault

3-91. The detachment conducting an assault is given an AOR which to oper-
ate. The deciding factor will be whether or not a higher HQ is controlling the
airspace associated with the operation.

3-92. The AOR will often identify the enemy position being assaulted as the
primary objective, with associated attack routes and/or axes. Support by fire
positions will typically be assigned for use by the support element. The se-
curity element will have battle positions that over watch key enemy air and
ground avenues of approach with covered and concealed routes to and from
those positions.

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

Support Element
Sniper

Observer

Action Element

Rioting Crowd

Gate

Security Element

Guard House

Sniper

Support Element
Observer

Figure 3-11. Example of an Assault #3

Executing the Assault

3-93. An assault is the most violent course of action a military force can un-
dertake. The nature of an assault demands an integrated combined-arms
approach. Indeed, a simple direct assault has a very low success chance
without some significant mitigating factors. Decisive OPFOR assaults are
characterized by:
Isolation of the objective
Effective tactical security
Effective suppression
Violent fire and maneuver against the enemy

3-94. Tasks of the Security Element. The security element is typically
the first element to act in an assault. The security element moves to a posi-
tion (or positions) where it can deny the enemy freedom of movement along
any ground or air avenues of approach that can reinforce the objective or in-
terfere with the mission of the assault element. The security element is
equipped and organized such that it can detect enemy forces and prevent
them from contacting the rest of the detachment. The security element nor-

3-24
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 3

mally gets a screen, guard or cover overall mission, but may also be called
upon to perform other tactical tasks in support of its purpose:
Ambush
Block
Canalize
Contain
Delay
Disrupt
Fix
Interdict
Isolate

3-95. Tasks of the Support Element. The support element can have a
wide range of functions in an assault. Typically the detachment commander
exercises C2 from within a part of the support element, unless his analysis
deems success requires he leads the assault element personally. The support
element controls all combat support and CSS functions as well as any sup-
porting fires. The support element typically does not become decisively en-
gaged but parts of it may employ direct suppressive fires. Tasks typically ex-
pected of support elements in the assault are:
Attack by Fire
Disrupt
Fix
Neutralize
Support by Fire

3-96. Tasks of the Assault Element. The assault element must be able to
maneuver from its assault position to the objective and destroy the enemy lo-
cated there. It can conduct attack by fire, but this is not an optimal method-
ology and should only be used when necessary. Tactical tasks expected of
the assault element are:
Clear
Occupy
Secure
Seize

3-97. Speed of execution is critical to an assault. At a minimum, the assault

element must move with all practical speed once it has left its attack posi-
tion. However, the OPFOR goal in an assault is for all the elements to exe-
cute their tasks with as much speed as can be achieved. For example, the
longer the security element takes to move to its positions and isolate the ob-
jective, the more time the enemy has to react even before the assault element

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

has begun maneuvering. Therefore, the OPFOR prefers as much of the ac-
tion of the three elements of an assault to be simultaneous as possible.
OPFOR small units practice the assault continually and have clear battle
drills for all of the key tasks required in an assault.

Command and Control of an Assault

3-98. Typically, the commander positions himself with the support element
and the deputy moves with the assault element, although this may be re-
versed. The primary function of control of the assault is to arrange units and
tasks in time and space so that the assault element begins movement with all
elements of the support element brought to bear, the security element provid-
ing the detachments freedom to operate and the objective isolated.

Reconnaissance in the Assault

3-99. Reconnaissance units in support of an assault are typically given the
following missions:
Determine and observe enemy reinforcement and counterattack routes
Determine composition and disposition of the forces on the objective
Locate and mark enemy counter mobility and survivability effort
Locate and track enemy response forces
Defeat enemy C3D effort
3-100. Reconnaissance effort is support of an assault can begin long before
the assault is executed. A level of command above the detachment typically
controls this effort. Situational assaults may be executed with relatively lit-
tle known about the enemy but where a window of opportunity exists that
will close if not taken advantage of in the near term.

3-101. Detachments relying on their own reconnaissance effort to a large de-

gree and/or taking advantage of a window of opportunity to execute an as-
sault often form reconnaissance elements to support the assault.

Armor Support to an Assault

3-102. IFVs typically operate in the support element, providing direct sup-
pressive fires. The use of IFVs in the assault element is possible, but the
risk must be weighed against the number and type of AT weapon systems on
or covering the objective and the need for the infantry in the assault element
to move at IFV speed during its approach. The weapons, light armor and im-
aging systems of IFVs can be useful in the security element, but must be bal-
ance against any stealth requirements of the security elements scehme of
maneuver.
3-103. AFVs support an assault in the same manner as IFVs. They are more
likely to be useful in the assault element if the enemy does not have signifi-
cant AT killing power available on the objective. AFVs can be used as the
primary element of the assault element on open ground, but to do so where
any stay behind or infiltrating force can employ effective AT fires carries
great risk. Most likely, AFVs will be used in the assault element when it has

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_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 3

to cross some distance at speed over open ground and AT systems along the
attack axis have been destroyed or suppressed.

Fire Support to an Assault

3-104. The primary mission of fire support in an assault is to suppress the
objective and protect the advance of the assault element. Precision muni-
tions may be used to destroy key systems that threaten the assault force.
Obscurants may be used to reduce the effectiveness of enemy weapons and
RISTA. Special munitions may be used to prevent effective reinforcement of
the objective.
3-105. Fire support assets committed to the assault are typically part of the
support element.

Air Defense Support of an Assault

3-106. The typical purpose of air defense support to an assault is to prevent
enemy air power from influencing the action of the assault element. This can
be accomplished in numerous ways and is tied to METT-T. It is possible to
find air defense systems and measures in all three elements of an assault.
3-107. Air defense systems in the security element provide early warning and
defeat enemy aerial response to the assault. Such systems also target enemy
aerial reconnaissance such as UAVs to prevent the enemy from having a
clear picture of the assault action.
3-108. Air defense systems in the support element provide overwatch of the
assault element and the objective.
3-109. Air defense systems are least likely to be found in the action element
of an assault. However, such situations as long attack axes, which require
the assault force to operate out of the range of systems in the support ele-
ment for any length of time, may dictate this disposition of air defense sys-
tems.

Engineer Support to an Assault

3-110. Engineer units and missions primarily support the assault by ensur-
ing the assault element gets to the objective in an expeditious manner. En-
gineer units and systems may be part of the assault element or may be or-
ganized as a separate specialist element.

3-111. Engineers assigned to a security element may conduct countermobilty

tasks along expected enemy reinforcement routes. They also support the se-
curity element by ensuring it retains freedom to maneuver while executing
its tasks.

Logistics Support to an Assault

3-112. Logistics support units, when present, are almost always in the sup-
port element. The OPFOR prefers that assaults are of short enough duration

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

that significant resupply does not have to occur within the detachment prior
to the completion of the mission.

Information Warfare Support to an Assault

3-113. Information Warfare supports the assault primarily by helping isolate
the objective. This is often done by:
deceiving forces at the objective as to the timing of the assault
conducting deception operations to fix response forces
isolating the objective with electronic warfare
Assaults in Close Terrain
3-114. Close terrain has both advantages and disadvantages for assaulting
troops. It reduces engagement ranges, thereby easing the task of keeping the
assault element protected during its approach to the objective. However, it
also provides the enemy cover and concealment on the objective as well as
natural obstacles to movement and good ambush positions along that same
approach.

Assaults in Urban Terrain

3-115. Assaults in urban terrain face all the challenges of those in close ter-
rain and many more.
3-116. Assaults in close, mixed or open terrain always face the possibility of
obstacles restricting movement to the objective. It urban terrain obstacles
man-made or not are virtually a certainty. Typically then, assaulting de-
tachments include a specialist element made up of sappers and other sup-
porting arms, known as a clearing element, designed to execute mobility
tasks in support of the assault element.

AMBUSH
3-117. An ambush is a surprise attack from concealed positions on a moving
or temporarily halted enemy.

Organizing Forces for an Ambush

3-118. Similar to an assault, a detachment conducting an ambush is organ-
ized into three elements: the assault element, the support element, and the
security element.
3-119. The action element (firing element, assault element) of an ambush has
the mission of attacking and destroying enemy elements in the kill zone(s).
3-120. The security element of an ambush has the mission to prevent enemy
elements from responding to the ambush before the main action is concluded.
Failing that, it prevents the assault element from becoming decisively en-
gaged. This is often accomplished simply by providing early warning.
3-121. The support element of an ambush has the same basic functions as
that of an assault. It is quite often involved in supporting the assault ele-
ment with direct fire as well as indirect.

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_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 3

Organizing the Battlefield for an Ambush

3-122. A detachment is typically given a combat zone in which to execute an
ambush as such attacks typically do not require control of airspace at the de-
tachment level.
3-123. The area where the enemy force is to be destroyed is delineated by one
or more kill zones.

Executing an Ambush
3-124. There are three types of OPFOR ambushannihilation, harassment,
or containmentbased on the desired effects and the resources available.
Ambushes are frequently employed because they have a great chance of suc-
cess and provide force protection. The OPFOR conducts ambushes to kill or
capture personnel, destroy or capture equipment, restrict enemy freedom of
movement, and collect information and supplies.

3-125. Annihilation Ambush. The purpose of an annihilation ambush is to

destroy the enemy force. Generally, this type of ambush employs mines and
other obstacles to halt the enemy in the kill zone. The goal of the obstacles is
to keep the enemy in the kill zone throughout the action. Through direct fire
systems, the support element destroys or suppresses all enemy forces in the
kill zone. It remains in a concealed location and may have special weapons,
such as antitank weapons. The support and assault elements kill enemy per-
sonnel and destroy equipment within the kill zone by concentrated fires. The
assault element remains in covered and concealed positions until enemy ac-
tivity ceases within the kill zone. Once the enemy ceases his activity, the as-
sault element secures the kill zone and eliminates any remaining enemy per-
sonnel that pose a threat. The assault element remains in the kill zone to
thoroughly search for any usable information and equipment, which it takes
or destroys. The security element positions itself to ensure early warning and
to prevent the enemy from escaping the kill zone. Following the initiation of
the ambush, the security element seals the kill zone and does not allow any
enemy forces in or out. The ambush force withdraws in sequence; the assault
element withdraws first, then the support element, and lastly the security
element. The entire ambush force reassembles at a predetermined location
and time.

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

Action Element engages and maneuvers to halt enemy

Figure 3-12a. Annihilation Ambush (Example)

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_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 3

Support Element

Action Element

Security Element

Support Element moves from hide positions to suppress enemy

Security Element prevents withdrawal and isolates kill zone

Figure 3-12b. Annihilation Ambush (Example)

3-31
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

Kill Zone

X
X
X
X Enemy
X
X

xxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxx xxx

S
E l up p Security
Security em or
Element en t Action Element
t
Element

Security
Element
Mines
XXX Obstacles
Withdrawal Routes

Figure 3-13. Annihilation Ambush (Example)

3-126. Harassment Ambush. A harassment ambush interferes with routine

enemy activities, impedes the enemys freedom of movement, and has a psy-
chological impact on enemy personnel. The OPFOR may choose to conduct a
harassment ambush if the enemy has superior combat power. This type of
ambush does not require the use of obstacles to keep the enemy in the kill
zone. A detachment conducts the harassment ambush at a greater distance
from the enemy, up to the maximum effective range of its weapons.

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_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 3

Action Element

Improvised Explosive Devices

Support Element
(disabled bus)
Enemy Convoy

Security Element

Observer

Figure 3-14. Harassment Ambush (Example)

3-127. Many times, the assault and support elements are combined to pro-
vide better control of fires throughout the kill zone, which may be quite wide.
The assault element does not normally perform the role of assaulting the kill
zone, but may if conditions permit. The assault and support elements concen-
trate massive direct and indirect fires in the kill zone. The security element
provides early warning.
3-128. Harassment ambushes may be accomplished with very little in the
way of resources. The action and security elements may be as little as two-
four personnel combined. In cases where the primary weapon system is one
or more explosive devices, the ambush may be conducted by one-two person-
nel or even by a time delayed fusing system.
3-129. While the assault and support elements withdraw, the security ele-
ment may remain to provide warning and to delay enemy forces if necessary.
As in all ambushes, the detachment may emplace mines and plan for indirect
fires to cover withdrawal routes.
3-130. Containment Ambush. A containment ambush is a security meas-
ure that is usually part of a larger action. It is used to prevent the enemy
from using an avenue of approach or interdicting another action, such as a
raid. The assault element may assault to secure the kill zone, as described in

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

the annihilation ambush, although this is not required for success. The sup-
port and security elements perform the same functions as those described in
the annihilation ambush.

3-131. Obstacles are an integral part of a successful containment ambush.

They serve two functions: to prevent the enemy from using the avenue of ap-
proach and to hold the enemy in the kill zone. Within time constraints, the
ambushing force may erect multiple, mutually supporting obstacles covered
by direct and indirect fires.

Action
Element

Security Element

Security Element
QRF
Security Element

Containment
Ambush on QRF

Enemy
Base Camp

Attack on Enemy
Base Camp

Action
Element
I

Figure 3-15. Containment Ambush (Example)

Command and Control of an Ambush

3-132. Typically, the commander positions himself with the support element
and the deputy moves with the action element, although this may be re-
versed. The primary function of control of the ambush is to arrange units
and tasks in time and space so that the action element initiates the ambush
when the target is most vulnerable while ensuring the detachment is able to
break contact when the action is complete.

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_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 3

Reconnaissance Support to an Ambush

3-133. Reconnaissance is critical to a successful ambush. Reconnaissance es-
tablishes the time the enemy unit will be in the kill zone, determines the best
terrain on which to attack and locates response forces and provides early
warning.

Armor Support to an Ambush

3-134. Armor units are typically in the support element, directing fire into
the kill zone. They also have the speed to withdraw rapidly at the conclusion
of the ambush or reposition to block response forces.

Fire Support to an Ambush

3-135. Fire support units are almost always in the support element, provid-
ing fires into the kill zone, illumination over it or smoke to permit with-
drawal.

Air Defense Support to an Ambush

3-136. In the event of an aerial ambush target, air defense units may make
up the balance of the action element.

3-137. When the ambush target is a ground unit, air defense is most likely
found in the security element(s) where it can provide early warning and fires
against aerial response forces.

Engineer Support to an Ambush

3-138. The primary task of engineers in an ambush is countermobility both
in support of the security elements mission of isolating the ambush area and
to hinder enemy exiting the kill zone.

Logistics Support to an Ambush

3-139. Ambushes are typically not multi-day battles. The detachment will
move from a secured location with everything it needs to complete the mis-
sion. In those rare instances where the situation supports a multi-day hide
prior to executing the ambush, the detachment will be required to move with
its own extra life support. Resupply of an ambushing detachment would sig-
nificantly increase the chances of its detection and defeat its purpose.

IW Support to an Ambush
3-140. IW primarily supports ambushes by concealing the action through de-
ception and information protection. Successful ambushes may be used by an
IW campaign as tools to show the failure of enemy force protection efforts.

Ambushes in Close Terrain

3-141. Ambushes require that the action element remain concealed until the
initiation of the attack. Close terrain is highly favorable for ambushes due to
the cover and concealment it provides.

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

Ambushes in Urban Terrain

3-142. Urban terrain is ideal for ambushes. It provides cover and conceal-
ment to the ambushing detachment, canalizes enemy forces into the kill
zone(s) and permits easy withdrawal.

RAID
3-143. A raid is an attack against a stationary target for the purposes of its
capture or destruction that culminates in the withdrawal of the raiding de-
tachment to friendly territory.

3-144. Raids are characterized by

Destroying key systems or facilities, providing or denying critical in-
formation, or securing hostages or prisoners.
OPFOR sensor(s) with capability and mission to find and track the tar-
get. Sensors are often ground reconnaissance, but may include UAVs
or satellites.
A C2 method to link raiding detachment and sensors.
Supporting operation(s)usually primarily IWto create window of
opportunity for raiding force to operate.
Organizing Forces for a Raid
3-145. Detachments assigned a raid mission are organized into an action (or
raiding) element, a support element, and one or more security elements.
3-146. Action Element. The action element in a raid is charged with the ac-
tual destruction or seizure of the target. This element must be capable,
through inherent capabilities or positioning relative to the enemy, of destroy-
ing or seizing the target of the raid. SPF, airmobile light artillery, and infan-
try trained in night infiltration techniques are all examples of potential com-
ponents of the action element for a raid. The action element in a raid may
also be required to expose the target to attack, if necessary. It may be, how-
ever, that effective IW, a mismatch in system capabilities, or even the en-
emys own dispositions create a situation wherein the target is already suffi-
ciently exposed.
3-147. Support Element. The support element provides fire support, com-
bat support, and combat service support to the assault and security elements.
The IMD commander normally controls the raid from within the support ele-
ment.
3-148. Security Element(s). The primary threat to raiding elements is being
discovered and defeated by security forces prior to execution of the raid. The
security element in a raid is primarily focused on fixing enemy security and
response forces. The security element is equipped and organized such that it
can detect enemy forces and prevent them from contacting the rest of the de-
tachment.

Organizing the Battlefield for a Raid

3-36
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 3

3-149. The target of a raid is normally indicated by an objective.

Executing a Raid
3-150. The task of a security element in a raid is to occupy enemy security
and response forces and force the enemy to focus on parts of the battlefield
away from the raid. Security elements deploy to locations where they can
deny the enemy freedom of movement along any ground or air avenues of ap-
proach that can reinforce the objective or interfere with the mission of the ac-
tion element. The security element normally gets a screen, guard or cover
overall mission, but may also be called upon to perform other tactical tasks in
support of its purpose:
Ambush
Block
Canalize
Contain
Delay
Disrupt
Fix
Interdict
Isolate

Command and Control of a Raid

3-151. A raid is conducted by forces autonomous on the battlefield, but linked
by C2 and purpose. Although supported with operational assets, raids are
primarily conducted by tactical-level forces. They can often involve affiliated
forces, particularly when conducted as part of adaptive operations. A raid is
not necessarily tied to scheme of maneuver, in that the larger part of the
force may be involved in an operation not directly related to the raid.

Reconnaissance Support to a Raid

3-152. The primary task of reconnaissance in a raid is to locate the target of
the raid and track it accurately until the action element is in contact.

Armor Support to a Raid

3-153. Armored forces, with their advantages of speed and firepower, can be
used quite effectively in raids. The challenge in their use is concealing both
their movement to the attack and their withdrawal upon completion of the
raid.

Fire Support to a Raid

3-154. Fire support units support raids in a number of ways:
SEAD to support raiding aviation elements

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

Suppression of response forces

Smoke to permit withdrawal.

3-155. Fire support units (and combat helicopters acting in this role) may be
the action element of a raid with or without additional ground forces.

Air Defense Support to a Raid

3-156. In a raid, air defense is most likely found in the security element(s)
where it can provide early warning and fires against aerial response forces.

Engineer Support to a Raid

3-157. Raiding elements are supported primarily by engineers executing mo-
bility tasks to permit access to the objective and to facilitate withdrawal of
the raiding detachment.

Logistics Support to a Raid

3-158. Raids are typically not multi-day battles. The detachment will move
from a secured location with everything it needs to complete the mission.

IW Support to a Raid
3-159. IW primarily supports raids by concealing the action through decep-
tion and information protection. Successful raids may be used by an IW cam-
paign as tools to show the failure of enemy force protection efforts.

Raids in Close Terrain

3-160. Raiding detachments made up of aviation or aviation-borne forces or
of highly mobile ground elements may not require close terrain to execute
their mission. Speed of the attack, probably along with low visibility condi-
tions, may permit a raiding detachment to be successful against an objective
in mixed or open terrain.

Raids in Urban Terrain

3-161. Raids in urban terrain often have the objective of seizing one or more
enemy personnel. As these are extremely mobile targets and easy to conceal,
effective intelligence on the target is an absolute prerequisite for such a mis-
sion.

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_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 3

RIVER
Assault
Element

Power Plant
II
Objective

Exfiltration
I LZ

RO

I
AD
Security
Element
I ROAD

Security
Element
Support
Element
R
VE
RI

Not to Scale

Figure 3-16. Raid (Example)

SEARCH AND ATTACK

3-162. A search and attack is a tactical offensive action that locates and ei-
ther fixes or destroys dispersed enemy elements.

Organizing Forces for a Search and Attack

3-163. Search and Attacks are typically characterized by a large number of
security elements and possibly more than one action element. Reconnais-
sance elements are the most likely specialist element to be required.
3-164. There may or may not be one action element for each security ele-
ment.

Organizing the Battlefield for a Search and Attack

3-165. Multiple attack routes, objective rally points and orientation objec-
tives often characterize search and attacks.
Executing a Search and Attack
3-166. A Search and Attack is initiated by multiple security elements moving
through and to likely points of contact with enemy forces that need to be de-
stroyed or fixed.

3-39
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

Security Element
?

?
Action Element

Security Element

I Security Element
I
?

Support Element
Action Element

Figure 3-16 Search and Attack (Example)

Command and Control of an Search and Attack

3-167. Conducting a search and attack requires a great deal of reliance on
the ability of the security (and reconnaissance, if separate) elements to oper-
ate independently.

Reconnaissance Support to an Search and Attack

3-168. There are two basic methods for conducting reconnaissance in a
search and attack. The first is for each security element to act as its own re-
connaissance element, therefore being responsible for both finding an enemy
force and fixing it.
3-169. The second method is for the detachment to organize reconnaissance
elements that have the mission to find the enemy forces in the detachment
AOR or combat zone and use security elements solely for the task of fixing
them.

Armor Support to an Search and Attack

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_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 3

3-170. Depending on the situation, armor may be used in any of the elements
of a search and attack. In the reconnaissance element, armor system ther-
mal imagers and other EO aids assist in the detection and identification of
enemy forces.
3-171. Armor forces could provide the security element in a search and at-
tack with a combination of firepower and protection that significantly en-
hances the mission of fixing the enemy.
3-172. Armor forces mobility and speed permit them to serve in the action
element of a search and attack, rapidly orienting on fixed enemy forces and
moving to a position of advantage to destroy them.

Fire Support to an Search and Attack

3-173. Fire support in a search and attack focuses on:
Responsive fires in support of security elements in contact
Support of the maneuver of the action element(s)
Destruction of fixed enemy using precision munitions
3-174. Attack aviation may be allocated to reconnaissance and/or security
elements, using armed reconnaissance techniques. It may also be a compo-
nent (or the entirely of) a highly mobile action element.
3-175. Assault aviation is used to transport infantry and commandos to LZs
where they can attack forces fixed by the security element(s).

Air Defense Support to a Search and Attack

3-176. Air defense in a search and attack prevent response forces and rein-
forcements from influencing the location, fixing and destruction of enemy
forces in the AOR or zone.

Engineer Support to a Search and Attack

3-177. Engineer support to a search and attack focuses on mobility, permit-
ting security and action elements freedom of maneuver.
3-178. Engineer elements also conduct counter-mobility tasks to fix located
enemy forces.

Logistics Support to a Search and Attack

3-179. A Search and Attack can be marked by widely dispersed elements op-
erating over extended time periods and distances. Elements will attempt to
carry sufficient resupply with them. The OPFOR will also make use of
caches, resupply on the move, dedicated logistics elements and other tech-
niques to sustain the battle without a drop in tempo or loss of contact.

IW Support to a Search and Attack

3-180. IW activities in a search and attack are primarily executed to:
protect elements of the detachment from being detected

3-41
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

encourage enemy elements to reveal themselves or even surrender

fix enemy forces

Search and Attack in Close Terrain

3-181. A search and attack will often be executed on close terrain as enemy
forces will not typically require location on open terrain. Reconnaissance and
security elements will require equipment and sensors that permit them to
operate in this terrain and detect and track enemy forces operating in a close
terrain environment. Action elements will require sufficient mobility to rap-
idly gain contact with and destroy fixed enemy forces.

Search and Attack in Urban Terrain

3-182. A search and attack on urban terrain makes extensive use of IW.
Population management and affiliated forces to locate and track enemy ele-
ments. Paramilitary forces may also act as security elements for a search
and attack.

3-42
 Chapter 4

Tactical Defense
While the OPFOR sees the offense as the decisive form of military action,
it recognizes defense as the stronger form of military action, particularly
when faced with a superior, extraregional foe. Defensive operations can
lead to strategic victory if the extraregional enemy abandons his mission.
It may be sufficient for the OPFOR simply not to lose. Even when an op-
erational-level commandsuch as a field group (FG) or operational-
strategic command (OSC)as a whole is conducting an offensive opera-
tion, it is likely that one or more subordinate units may be executing de-
fensive missions to preserve offensive combat power in other areas, to
protect an important formation or resource, or to deny access to key facili-
ties or geographic areas. The same is true of subordinate units within a
tactical group.

A tactical command ensures that its subordinate commands thoroughly

understand both the overall goals of the operation plan and the specific
purpose of a particular battle they are about to fight. In this way, subor-
dinate commands can continue to fight the battle without direct control by
a higher headquarters.

OPFOR defenses can be characterized as a shield of blows. Each force

and zone of the defense plays an important role in the attack of the en-
emys combat system. A tactical-level defense is structured around the
concept that disaggregating and destroying the synergy of the enemys
combat system will make enemy forces vulnerable to attack and destruction.

Commanders and staffs do not approach the defense with preconceived

templates. The tactical situation may cause the commander to vary his
defensive methods and techniques. Nevertheless, there are basic charac-
teristics of defensive battles (purposes and types of action) that have ap-
plications in all situations.

PURPOSE OF THE DEFENSE

4-1. Defensive battles are designed to achieve the goals of the battle or op-
eration plan through active measures while preserving combat power. How-
ever, the purpose of any given defensive battle depends on the situation, as
determined through the decision-making process.

DEFENSE TO PROTECT PERSONNEL/EQUIPMENT

4-2. A defense to protect key personnel/equipment creates one or more loca-
tions in the battlespace where forces critical to the OPFOR effort are pro-

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

tected from enemy reconnaissance acquisition and destructive action. This

can be because these elements are important to the OPFOR effort at an op-
erational or even strategic scale or because the OPFOR needs time to recon-
stitute these elements for future offensive operations.
4-3. Such a defense typically, but not always relies heavily on C3D and IW
measures. However, enemy ROE, limited access areas such as non-
belligerent countries, adverse weather conditions and other such factors may
be may be employed to provide protection to OPFOR forces.

DEFENSE TO RESTRICT FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

4-4. A defense to restrict freedom of movement prevents the enemy from ma-
neuvering as he chooses. Restricting defenses can deny key terrain, ambush
moving forces, dominate airspace or fix an enemy formation. Tactical tasks
often associated with restricting attacks are ambush, block, canalize, contain,
fix, interdict, and isolate.

DEFENSE TO CONTROL KEY TERRAIN

4-5. A defense to control prevents enemy seizure of geographic features or fa-
cilities. Besides the classic seizure of key terrain that dominates a battle-
field, an attack to control may also target facilities such as economic targets,
ports or airfields.

DEFENSE TO GAIN TIME

4-6. A defense to gain time prevents the enemy from successfully concluding
his scheme of maneuver before a certain point in time or prior to a given
event taking place. A defense to gain time is not oriented on either a pro-
tected force or a geographic location it is oriented on the enemys perceived
scheme of maneuver. Security operations, delays, ambushes and spoiling at-
tacks are often all parts of a defense to gain time.

PLANNING THE DEFENSE

4-7. For the OPFOR, the key elements of planning defensive missions are
Determining the objective of the defensive action
Determining the level of planning possible (planned versus situational
defense).
Organizing the battlefield.
Organizing forces.
Organizing IW activities in support of the defense (see Chapter 7).

4-8. Defensive actions during transition and adaptive operations will not be
able to rely simply on attrition-based tactics in layered engagement areas.
Such actions will typically include increased use of
Infiltration to conduct spoiling attacks and ambushes.
Perception management (see Chapter 7) in support of defensive opera-
tions.

4-2
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 4

Affiliated forces for reconnaissance, counter-reconnaissance, security,

and attacks against key enemy systems.
PLANNED DEFENSE
4-9. A planned (deliberate) defense is a defensive mission or action under-
taken when there is sufficient time and knowledge of the situation to prepare
and rehearse forces for specific tasks. Typically, the enemy is in a staging or
assembly area and in a known location and status. Key considerations in defen-
sive planning are
Selecting a clear and appropriate objective.
Determining which enemy forces must be defeated.
Determine which component or components of an enemys combat sys-
tem to attack.
Selecting key positions in complex terrain from which to dominate sur-
rounding avenues of approach.
Determining the method that will deny the enemy his tactical objectives.
Developing a plan for reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and tar-
get acquisition (RISTA) that locates and tracks major enemy formations,
and determines enemy patterns of operations and probable objectives.
Creating or taking advantage of a window of opportunity that frees
friendly forces from any enemy advantages in precision standoff and
situational awareness.

SITUATIONAL DEFENSE
4-10. The OPFOR may also conduct a situational (hasty) defense. It recog-
nizes that the modern battlefield is chaotic. Circumstances will often change
so that the OPFOR is not afforded the opportunity to conduct offensive ac-
tion, thus forcing the OPFOR over to a defensive posture. If the OPFOR de-
termines that a situational window of opportunity is closing, it may assume a
situational (or hasty) defense. Although detailed planning and preparation
greatly mitigate risk, they are often not achievable if enemy action has taken
away the initiative.
4-11. The following are examples of conditions that might lead to a situ-
ational defense:
The enemy is unexpectedly striking an exposed key OPFOR unit, sys-
tem, or capability.
The enemy is conducting a spoiling attack to disrupt OPFOR offensive
preparations.
An OPFOR unit makes contact on unfavorable terms for subsequent of-
fensive action.
The enemy gains or regains air superiority sooner than anticipated.
An enemy counterattack was not effectively fixed

4-12. In a situational defense, the commander develops his assessment of the

conditions rapidly and without a great deal of staff involvement. He provides

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

a basic course of action to the staff, which then quickly turns that course of
action into an executable combat order. Even more than other types of
OPFOR defensive action, the situational defense relies on implementation of
battle drills by subordinate tactical units
4-13. Organization of the battlefield in a situational defense will normally be
limited to minor changes to existing control measures. Organizing forces in a
situational defense will typically rely on minor modifications to existing struc-
ture.

ORGANIZING FORCES FOR THE DEFENSE

4-14. In his battle plan, the tactical-level commander also specifies the or-
ganization of the forces within his level of command. However, the organiza-
tion of forces can shift dramatically during the course of a battle or operation.
For example, a unit that initially was part of a disruption force may eventu-
ally occupy a battle position within the battle zone and become part of the
main defense force or act as a reserve.
4-15. Each of the separate functional forces has an identified commander.
This is often the senior commander of the largest subordinate unit assigned
to that force. For example, if two BTGs and an independent mission detach-
ment (IMD) are acting as the DTGs main defense force, the senior of the two
BTG commanders is the main defense force commander. During dispersed and
decentralized operations, even when the force consists of like units of the same
command level, control can be delegated to the senior commander of that
forces like units. Since, in this option, each force commander is also a subor-
dinate unit commander, he controls the force from his units command post
(CP).
4-16. Another option is to have one of the higher units CPs command and
control a functional force. Particularly during dispersed defensive operations,
functional forces that contain units of the same command level might be con-
trolled from the forward, auxiliary, or airborne CP of the tactical group. For
example, the forward CP could control a disruption force. Another possibility
would be for the IFC CP to command the disruption force or any other force
whose actions must be closely coordinated with fires delivered by the IFC.
4-17. The force commander is responsible to the tactical group commander to
ensure that combat preparations are made properly and to take charge of the
force during the operation. This frees the higher-level commander from deci-
sions specific to the forces mission. Even when subordinates of a tactical
group have responsibility for parts of the tactical group disruption zone, there
is still an overall tactical group disruption force commander.

Disruption Force
4-18. The size and composition of forces in the disruption zone depends on
the level of command involved, the commanders concept of the battle, and
the circumstances in which the unit adopts the defense. A tactical com-
mander will always make maximum use of stay-behind forces and affiliated

4-4
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 4

forces existing within his AOR. Subordinate commanders can employ forces
in the higher disruption zone with tactical group approval.
4-19. A DTG disruption force is typically a BTG, while a BTG disruption
force is typically an IMD. However, a disruption force has no set order of bat-
tle. It may contain
Ambush teams (ground and air defense).
Long-range reconnaissance patrols and/or SPF teams.
RISTA assets and forces.
Counterreconnaissance detachments.
Artillery systems.
Target designation teams.
Elements of affiliated forces (such as terrorists, insurgents, or crimi-
nals).
Anti-landing reserves.

4-20. The purpose of the disruption force is to prevent the enemy from con-
ducting an effective attack. The disruption force does this by initiating the at-
tack on components of the enemys combat system. Successful attack of des-
ignated components or subsystems begins the disaggregation of the enemys
combat system and creates vulnerabilities for exploitation in the battle zone.
Skillfully conducted disruption operations will effectively deny the enemy the
synergy of effects of his combat system.
4-21. For example, the tactical group commander may determine that de-
struction of the enemys mobility assets will create an opportunity to destroy
maneuver units in the battle zone. The disruption force would be given the
mission of seeking out and destroying enemy mobility assets while avoiding
engagement with maneuver forces.
4-22. The disruption force may also have a counter-reconnaissance mission
(see Chapter 6). It may selectively destroy or render irrelevant the enemys
RISTA forces and deny him the ability to acquire and engage OPFOR targets
with deep fires. It employs RISTA assets to locate and track enemy RISTA
forces and then directs killing systems to destroy them. For this purpose, the
disruption force may include OSC-level RISTA assets, SPF, and helicopters.
There will be times, however, when the OPFOR wants enemy reconnaissance
to detect something that is part of the deception plan. In those cases, the dis-
ruption force will not seek to destroy all of the enemys RISTA assets.
4-23. The disruption force may deceive the enemy as to the location and con-
figuration of the main defense in the battle zone, while forcing him to show
his intent and deploy early. Some other results of actions in the disruption
zone can include delaying the enemy to allow time for preparation of the de-
fense or a counterattack, canalizing the enemy onto unfavorable axes, or am-
bushing key systems and vulnerable troop concentrations.

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

Main Defense Force

4-24. The main defense force is the functional force charged with execution of
the defensive mission. It operates in the battle zone to accomplish the pur-
pose of the defense.

Protected Force
4-25. The protected force is the force being kept from harm by covering or de-
laying forces. It may be in the battle zone or the support zone.

Security Force
4-26. The security force conducts activities to prevent or mitigate the effects
of hostile actions against the overall command and/or its key components. If
the commander chooses, he may charge this security force with providing
force protection for the entire AOR, including the rest of the functional forces;
logistics and administrative elements in the support zone; and other key in-
stallations, facilities, and resources. The security force may include various
types of unitssuch as infantry, SPF, counter-reconnaissance, and signals
reconnaissance assetsto focus on enemy special operations and long-range
reconnaissance forces operating throughout the AOR. It can also include in-
ternal security forces with the mission of protecting the overall command
from attack by hostile insurgents, terrorists, and special operations forces.
The security force may also be charged with mitigating the effects of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD). The security force commander can be given con-
trol over one or more reserve formations, such as the anti-landing reserve.
(See also Tactical Security in Chapter 6.)

Counterattack Forces
4-27. A defensive battle may include a planned counterattack scheme. This is
typical of a maneuver defense, but could also take place within an area de-
fense. In these cases, the tactical commander will designate one or more
counterattack forces. He will also shift his task organization to create a coun-
terattack force when a window of opportunity opens that leaves the enemy
vulnerable to such an action. The counterattack force can have within it fix-
ing, assault, and exploitation forces (as outlined in Chapter 3). It will have
the mission of causing the enemys offensive operation to culminate. The tac-
tical group commander uses counterattack forces to complete the defensive
mission and regain the initiative for the offense.

Types of Reserves
4-28. At the commanders discretion, forces may be held out of initial action
so that he may influence unforeseen events or take advantage of developing
opportunities. He may employ a number of different types of reserve forces of
varying strengths, depending on the situation.
4-29. Maneuver Reserve. The size and composition of a reserve force is en-
tirely situation-dependent. However, the reserve is normally a force strong
enough to respond to unforeseen opportunities and contingencies at the tacti-
cal level. A reserve may assume the role of counterattack force to deliver the

4-6
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 4

final blow that ensures the enemy can no longer conduct his preferred course
of action. Reserves are almost always combined arms forces.
4-30. A reserve force will be given a list of possible missions for rehearsal and
planning purposes. The staff assigns to each of these missions a priority,
based on likelihood that the reserve will be called upon to execute that mis-
sion. Some missions given to the reserve may include
Conducting a counterattack. (The counterattack goal is not limited to
destroying enemy forces, but may also include recovering lost positions
or capturing positions advantageous for subsequent combat actions.)
Conducting counterpenetration (blocking or destroying enemy penetra-
tions).
Conducting antilanding missions (eliminating vertical envelopments).
Assisting forces heavily engaged on a defended line to break contact
and withdraw.
Act as a deception force.

4-31. Antitank Reserve. OPFOR commanders faced with significant ar-

mored threats may keep an antitank reserve (ATR). It is generally an anti-
tank unit and often operates in conjunction with an obstacle detachment
(OD). Based on the availability of antitank and engineer assets, a division- or
brigade-size unit may form more than one ATR.
4-32. Anti-landing Reserve. Because of the potential threat from enemy
airborne or heliborne troops, a unit may designate an antilanding reserve
(ALR). ALRs will be resourced for rapid movement to potential drop zones
(DZs) and landing zones (LZs). The ALR commander will have immediate ac-
cess to the operational and tactical intelligence system for early warning of
potential enemy landing operations. ALRs typically include maneuver, air de-
fense, and engineer units, but may be allocated any unit capable of disrupting
or defeating an airborne or heliborne landing, such as smoke or electronic
warfare (EW). While other reserves can perform this mission, the commander
may create a dedicated ALR to prevent destabilization of the defense by ver-
tical envelopment of OPFOR units or seizure of key terrain. ALRs assume po-
sitions prepared to engage the enemy primary DZ or LZ as a kill zone. They
rehearse and plan for rapid redeployment to other suspected DZs or LZs.
4-33. Special Reserves. In addition to their ODs, units may form an engi-
neer reserve of earthmoving and obstacle-creating equipment. A commander
can deploy this reserve to strengthen defenses on a particularly threatened
axis during the course of the battle. A unit threatened by enemy use of WMD
may also form a chemical defense reserve.

Deception Force
4-34. When the IW plan requires the creation of nonexistent or partially ex-
isting formations, these forces will be designated deception forces in close-
hold executive summaries of the battle plan. Wide-distribution copies of the
plan will make reference to these forces according to the designation given
them in the deception story. The deception force in the defense is typically
given its own command structure both to replicate the organization(s) neces-

4-7
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

sary to the deception story and to execute the multidiscipline deception re-
quired to replicate an actual military organization. Tactical group command-
ers can use deception subordinate tactical group and detachment command
structures to deny enemy forces information on operation plans for the de-
fense.

Organizing Detachments for the Defense

4-35. Detachments employ a different scheme for organizing forces than the
force methodology used by tactical groups. This is because the OPFOR tends
to use detachments to accomplish a single tactical task rather than a multi-
task mission.
4-36. The standard battlefield organization of a detachment is into four
parts: the disruption element, the main defense element, the reserve element,
and the support element.
4-37. The disruption element of a detachment provides local tactical security
for the detachment, prevents the enemy from influencing mission accom-
plishment, and prevents the enemy from conducting an effective attack by
targeting key systems and sub-components of systems in the disruption zone.
The main defense element accomplishes the detachments tactical task. The
reserve element provides the defender with the tactical flexibility to influence
unforeseen events or to take advantage of developing opportunities. The sup-
port element provides combat and combat service support and C2 for the de-
tachment. Due to such considerations as multiple avenues of approach, a de-
tachment may organize one or more of each of these elements in specific
cases.
4-38. In certain situations, a detachment may organize one or more specialist
elements. Specialist elements are typically formed around a unit with a spe-
cific capability such as an obstacle clearing element, reconnaissance element
or deception element.
4-39. At any given time, a detachment will only be associated with a single
higher commands functional force (disruption, main defense, security, coun-
terattack, reserve, etc.). If a higher command needs to divide a detachment
to accomplish other tasks, it will be re-task organized. For example, if a BTG
needed one part of one of its battalions to serve as the main defense force, but
needed another part to join the reserve, one of the two battalion subunits
would be re-task organized.
4-40. Detachments may be assigned one of several tasks while conducting a
defense:
Defend a Simple Battle Position
Defend a Complex Battle Position
Act as Counterattack force
Act as Reserve
Act as Deception Force
Act as Security Force
Act as Counter-reconnaissance Detachment

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_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 4

PREPARING FOR THE DEFENSE

4-41. In the preparation phase, the OPFOR focuses on ways of applying all
available resources and the full range of actions to conduct the defense in the
strongest condition and strongest positions possible. Commanders organize
their forces and the battlefield with an eye toward capitalizing on conditions
created by successful defensive actions, and seizing opportunities for offen-
sive actions wherever possible.
4-42. The defensive dispositions are based on the application of the systems
warfare approach to combat, as described in Chapter 1. OPFOR defensive ac-
tions focus on attacking components or subsystems to of the enemys combat
system to disaggregate the system of systems. By denying the enemy the
synergy created by an integrated, aggregated system, vulnerabilities are cre-
ated that defensive forces can exploit.

DENY ENEMY INFORMATION

4-43. Tactical commanders realize that enemy operations hinge on an appre-
ciation of the situation. Defensive preparations will focus on destruction and
deception of enemy sensors in order limit the ability of enemy forces to un-
derstand the OPFOR defensive plan. A high priority for all defensive prepa-
rations is to deny the enemy the ability to maintain reconnaissance contact
on the ground. The OPFOR recognizes that, when conducting operations
against an extraregional power, it will often be impossible to destroy the abil-
ity of the enemys standoff RISTA means to observe its defensive prepara-
tions. However, the OPFOR also recognizes the reluctance of enemy military
commanders to operate without human confirmation of intelligence, as well
as the relative ease with which imagery and signals sensors may be deceived.
OPFOR tactical commanders consider ground reconnaissance by enemy Spe-
cial Operations Forces as a significant threat in the enemy RISTA suite and
will focus significant effort to ensure its removal. While the OPFOR will exe-
cute missions to destroy standoff RISTA means, C3D will be the method of
choice for degrading the capability of such systems.

MAKE THOROUGH COUNTERMOBILITY AND SURVIVABILITY PREPARATIONS

4-44. The more time available, the greater the preparation of a position,
zone, or AOR. This is a reflection of engineer effort and time to devote to that
effort. The OPFOR employs every method to maximize the time available to
prepare for the defense. This includes preparation of the State during peace-
time and highly detailed plans for transition from regional to adaptive opera-
tions to take full advantage of any operational lull as the enemy builds com-
bat power. This might involve an offense with limited objectives that transi-
tions to the defense by design.
4-45. Tactical commanders realize that engineer works are vital to the stabil-
ity of the defense. They will use engineer assets to improve the advantages of
complex terrain in protecting friendly forces and exposing enemy forces to
engagement. Engineer efforts can contribute to creating windows of opportu-
nity by degrading the ability of the enemys combat system to integrate the

4-9
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

effects of its subsystems. Of course, such work is not just an engineer respon-
sibility; it is a combined arms task.
4-46. Engineer units specializing in rapid obstacle construction and minelay-
ing form mission-specific units known as ODs. These ODs normally deploy in
conjunction with reserves to block enemy penetrations or to protect the flanks
of counterattack forces. In the initial stages of the defense, engineer assets
concentrate on creating obstacles in the disruption zone, in gaps in the com-
bat formation, and to the flanks, and preparing lines for counterpenetration
and counterattack and routes to such lines. The obstacle plan ensures that
the effort is coordinated with fires and maneuver to produce the desired ef-
fects. In conjunction with other tasks, engineers support the IW plan through
activities such as constructing false defensive positions and preparing false
routes. See Chapter 12 for more information on countermobility and surviv-
ability planning.

MAKE USE OF COMPLEX TERRAIN

4-47. The OPFOR will make maximum use of complex terrain in all defensive
actions. Complex terrain provides cover from fires, concealment from standoff
RISTA assets, and intelligence and logistics support from the population of
urban areas. It plays into the strength of OPFOR resolve to win through any
means and through protracted conflict if necessary.

MAKE THOROUGH LOGISTICS ARRANGEMENTS

4-48. The overwhelming ability of extraregional forces to strike exposed lo-
gistics elements makes it difficult to resupply forces. The OPFOR under-
stands that there is as much chance of a defensive action being brought to
culmination by a lack of sufficient logistics support as there is by enemy ac-
tion. Careful consideration will be given to carried days of supply and ad-
vanced caches to obviate the need for easily disrupted lines of communication
(LOCs).

MODIFY THE PLAN WHEN NECESSARY

4-49. The OPFOR takes into account that, while it might consider itself to be
in the preparation phase for one battle, it is continuously in the execution
phase. Plans are never considered final. Plans are checked throughout the
course of their development to ensure they are still valid in light of battlefield
events.

REHEARSE EVERYTHING POSSIBLE, IN PRIORITY

4-50. The commander establishes the priority for critical parts of the battle,
and rehearses those actions with his subordinates in as realistic a manner as
possible for the remainder of the preparation time. Typical actions to be re-
hearsed in preparation for a defense include
Commitment of reserve.
Initiation of a counterattack.
Execution of the fire support plan.

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_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 4

EXECUTING THE DEFENSE

4-51. Successful execution depends on forces that understand their roles in
the operation or battle and can swiftly follow preparatory actions with im-
plementation of the battle plan or rapid modifications to the plan, as the
situation requires. A successful execution phase results in the culmination of
the enemys offensive action. It ideally ends with transition to the offense in
order to keep the enemy under pressure and destroy him completely. During
adaptive operations against superior enemy force, however, a successful de-
fense may end in a stalemate.
4-52. A successful defense sets the military conditions for a return to the of-
fense or a favorable political resolution of the conflict. The OPFOR may have
to surrender territory to preserve forces. Territory can always be recaptured,
but the destruction of OPFOR major combat formations threatens the sur-
vival of the State. Destruction of the protected force is unacceptable.
4-53. Success criteria for a tactical commander conducting an area or ma-
neuver defense may include
Major combat formations remain intact.
The enemy is forced to withdraw or, at a minimum, forego offensive op-
erations due to losses.
A stalemate allows operational-, theater-, and national-level assets
time to conduct attacks against enemy strategic centers of gravity.
MAINTAIN CONTACT
4-54. OPFOR commanders will go to great lengths to maintain contact with
key elements of the enemy force throughout the battle. This includes rapid
reconstitution of reconnaissance assets and units and the use of whatever
combat power is necessary to ensure success.

IMPLEMENT BATTLE DRILLS

4-55. The OPFOR derives great flexibility from battle drill. Contrary to the
U.S. view that battle drill, especially at higher levels, reduces flexibility, the
OPFOR uses minor, simple, and clear modifications to thoroughly understood
and practiced battle drills to adapt to ever-shifting conditions. It does not
write standard procedures into its combat orders and does not write new or-
ders when a simple shift from current formations and organization will do.
4-56. Battle drills are slightly less important in defensive situations, but the
standardized battle drills for reacting to all seven forms of contact (direct fire,
indirect fire, visual, obstacle, NBC, EW, and air attack) will have defensive
counterparts.

MODIFY THE PLAN WHEN NECESSARY

4-57. The OPFOR is sensitive to the effects of mission dynamics and realizes
that the enemys actions may well make the original mission of an OPFOR
unit achievable, but completely irrelevant. As an example, a delaying force
may be capable of fixing a key element of the enemys attack because the en-
emy is using a small force to fix the OPFOR in one area while attacking
strongly in another. In this case, the OPFOR unit in question must be ready

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

to transition to a new mission quickly and break contact with sufficient com-
bat power to fix the maneuvering enemy force.

SEIZE OPPORTUNITIES
4-58. The OPFOR places maximum emphasis on decentralized execution, ini-
tiative, and adaptation. Subordinate units are expected to take advantage of
fleeting opportunities so long as their actions are in concert with the purpose
of the combat order or operational directive.

INTEGRATED AND DECENTRALIZED DEFENSES

4-59. The OPFOR recognizes two general forms of defense: integrated and
decentralized. The distinction between the two rests on the ability of the
OPFOR to operate freely in the battlespace with full combined arms synchro-
nization and adequate C2 and logistics support.

INTEGRATED DEFENSE
4-60. A tactical defensive action is integrated if the OPFOR has the ability to
achieve full combined arms synchronization through all levels of command
and throughout the battlespace. This requires a modernized C2 system, a ro-
bust logistics capability, and the ability to operate relatively free of enemy in-
fluence in the support zone and battle zones prior to the commencement of
full-fledged enemy offensive action. The OPFOR force structure possesses the
first two of these characteristics, at least in relation to regional opponents.
Thus, during regional operations and perhaps transition operations, it would
often be operating in an integrated fashion unless the enemy is able to
achieve a sufficient level of overmatch in RISTA and standoff attack capabil-
ity to deny the OPFOR freedom of action.
4-61. Integrated defenses are able to
Act, at least partially, without the requirement for windows of oppor-
tunity.
Maximize the effects of destructive fire and maneuver.
Achieve tactical decision through primarily military means.
DECENTRALIZED DEFENSE
4-62. A defensive action is decentralized if the OPFORs C2 and/or logistics
capability has been significantly degraded or it does not have the ability to
operate freely in the battlespace. This typically occurs when the enemy enjoys
significant technological overmatch, particularly in technical RISTA means
and standoff precision attack. Decentralized defenses do not achieve decision
in and of themselves. Rather, they focus on preserving combat power while
buying time for the execution of strategic operations (see Chapter 1).
4-63. In some cases, a tactical commander may chose to adopt a decentralized
defense to preserve his C2 and logistics, understanding that his ability to syn-
chronize operations will be degraded. Tactical commanders are constantly es-
timating the situation to determine risk versus reward for active measures. A
decentralized defense relies on initiative of subordinate commanders and the

4-12
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 4

discrete targeting of elements of the enemys combat system to reduce combat

capability and expose enemy forces to destruction.
4-64. To be successful, decentralized defenses must
Operate primarily in complex terrain.
Maximize the effects of countermobility and survivability measures.
Rely heavily on IW.
Make the best possible use of reconnaissance fires (see Chapter 8).

TYPES OF DEFENSIVE ACTION

4-65. The types of defensive action in OPFOR doctrine are both tactical
methods and guides to the design of operational courses of action. The two
basic types are maneuver and area defense. A tactical commander may use
both forms of defense simultaneously across his AOR. A defensive battle plan
may include subordinate units that are executing various combinations of
maneuver and area defenses, along with some offensive courses of action,
within the overall defensive mission framework.

MANEUVER DEFENSE
4-66. In situations where the OPFOR is not completely overmatched, it may
conduct a tactical maneuver defense. This type of defense is designed to
achieve tactical decision by skillfully using fires and maneuver to destroy key
elements of the enemys combat system and deny enemy forces their objec-
tive, while preserving the friendly force. Maneuver defenses cause the enemy
to continually lose effectiveness until he can no longer achieve his objectives.
They can also economize force in less important areas while the OPFOR
moves additional forces onto the most threatened axes.
4-67. Maneuver defenses are almost always integrated defenses. Decentral-
ized maneuver defenses typically occur as part of transition operations. As an
extraregional enemy builds combat power to overmatch levels, but before the
OPFOR is completely overmatched, maneuver defense can buy time for other
forces to move into sanctuary areas and prepare for adaptive operations.
4-68. Even within a maneuver defense, the tactical group commander may
use area defense on some enemy attack axes, especially on those where he
can least afford to lose ground. Conversely, he may employ maneuver defense
techniques to conduct actions in the disruption zone if it enhances the attack
on the enemys combat system and an area defense in the battle zone.

Method
4-69. Maneuver defense inflicts losses on the enemy, gains time, and protects
friendly forces. It allows the defender to choose the place and time for en-
gagements. Each portion of a maneuver defense allows a continuing attack on
the enemys combat system. As the system begins to disaggregate, more ele-
ments are vulnerable to destruction. The maneuver defense accomplishes this
through a succession of defensive battles in conjunction with short, violent
counterattacks and fires. It allows abandoning some areas of terrain when
responding to an unexpected enemy attack or when conducting the battle in
the disruption zone. In the course of a maneuver defense, the tactical com-

4-13
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

mander tries to force the enemy into a situation that exposes enemy forma-
tions to destruction. See Figures 4-4 and 4-5 for examples of maneuver de-
fense.

Disruption
Force

I
Enemy

KILL
ZONE Contact
Force

Disruption
Force Shielding
Force

KILL
Enemy
ZONE

Contact
Force

Contact
Force Forest

Shielding
Disruption Force
Force
KILL
ZONE
KILL
Enemy ZONE

Figure 4-1. Maneuver Defense Example 1

4-70. A maneuver defense trades terrain for the opportunity to destroy por-
tions of the enemy formation and render the enemys combat system ineffec-
tive. The OPFOR might use a maneuver defense when
It can afford to surrender territory.
It possesses a mobility advantage over enemy forces.
Conditions are suitable for canalizing the enemy into areas where the
OPFOR can destroy him by fire or deliver decisive counterattacks.

4-71. Compared to area defense, the maneuver defense involves a higher de-
gree of risk for the OPFOR, because it does not rely heavily on the inherent
advantages of complex battle positions. Units conducting a maneuver defense
typically place smaller elements forward in defensive positions and retain
much larger reserves than in an area defense.

4-14
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 4

Defensive Lines
4-72. The basis of maneuver defense is for units to conduct maneuver from
position to position on a succession of defensive lines. In this case, the line
defended on is not a continuous line of defenses, but rather a notional line on
which one or more units have orders to defend for a certain time at a certain
depth within a units AOR. The OPFOR can accept large intervals between
defensive positions on such a line. Part of the line may consist of natural or
manmade obstacles or of deception defensive positions.
4-73. These lines are not necessarily linear, in the sense of forming a
straight line. Nor are they necessarily at regular intervals from one another.
A particular units position on a subsequent line may not be directly behind
its previous position. In the spaces between the lines, the defenders can or-
ganize reconnaissance fire, raids, and counterattacks. Thus, it is difficult for
the enemy to predict where he will encounter resistance.
4-74. The number of lines and duration of defense on each line depend on the
nature of the enemys actions, the terrain, and the condition of the defending
units. Lines are selected based on the availability of natural obstacles and
shielding terrain, with consideration of being able to leave the lines without
being observed.

Defensive Maneuver
4-75. Defensive maneuver consists of movement by bounds and the mainte-
nance of continuous fires on enemy forces. A disruption force and/or a main
defense force (or part of it) can perform defensive maneuver. In either case,
the force must divide its combat power into two smaller elements: a contact
force and a shielding force. The contact force is the element occupying the
forward-most defensive line at any point in time. The shielding force is the
element occupying the next line immediately to the rear.
4-76. At each line, the contact force ideally forces the enemy to deploy his
maneuver units and perhaps begin his artillery preparation for the attack.
Then, before the contact force becomes decisively engaged, it maneuvers to its
next preplanned line, behind the line occupied by the shielding force. While
the original contact force is moving, the shielding force is able to keep the enemy
under continuous attack. When the original contact force passes to the rear of
the original shielding force, the latter force becomes the new contact force. When
the original contact force occupies its next line, it becomes the shielding force for
the new contact force. In this manner, units continue to move by bounds to
successive lines, preserving their own forces while delaying and destroying
the enemy.
4-77. Subsequent lines are far enough apart to permit defensive maneuver by
friendly units. The distance should also preclude the enemy from engaging
one line and then the other without displacing his indirect fire weapons. This
means that the enemy, having seized one line, must change the majority of
his firing positions and organize his attack all over again in order to get to
the next line. However, the lines are close enough to allow the defending
units to maintain coordinated, continuous attack on the enemy while moving
from one to the other.

4-15
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

4-78. OPFOR commanders may require a unit holding a line to continue de-
fending, even if this means the unit becomes decisively engaged or enveloped.
This may be necessary in order to allow time for the construction of defenses
to the rear of the line this unit is defending. This may be the case when a unit
is conducting maneuver defense in the disruption zone while the main de-
fense force is preparing for an area defense in the battle zone. At some point,
a unit conducting maneuver defense as part of the main defense force may be
ordered to continue to defend on a line, if conditions are favorable for defeat-
ing the enemy or repelling the attack at that line.
4-79. The example in Figure 4-2 shows that the shielding force does not nec-
essarily have to remain in place to do its job. It can go out to meet the enemy
(perhaps in an ambush) and then fall back into another battle position. This
type of maneuver can force the enemy into a nonlinear fight.

II

Enemy

II

Contact Force

II
II II
II II

Shielding Force

En
em
y
y
em
En

Figure 4-2. Maneuver Defense Example 2

Disruption Force
4-80. The disruption force initiates the attack on the enemys combat system
by targeting and destroying subsystems that are critical to the enemy. If suc-
cessful, the disruption force can cause culmination of the enemy attack before
the enemy enters the battle zone. In the worst case, the enemy would enter
the battle zone unable to benefit from an integrated combat system and vul-
nerable to defeat by the main defense force.
4-81. In a maneuver defense, the disruption force often occupies battle posi-
tions in the disruption zone and seeks to force the enemy to fight on disad-
vantageous ground and at a tempo of the OPFORs choosing. A maneuver de-
fense disruption force also can set the conditions for a strike (see Chapter 3).

4-16
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 4

The disruption force mission includes disaggregating the enemy attack and, if
possible, destroying the enemy force.
4-82. Maneuver units conduct the defense from successive battle positions.
Intervals between these positions provide space for deployment of mobile at-
tack forces, precision fire systems, and reserves.
4-83. The distance between successive positions in the disruption zone is
such that the enemy is forced to displace the majority of his supporting weap-
ons to continue the attack on the subsequent positions. This aids the force in
breaking contact and permits time to occupy subsequent positions. Long-
range fires, ODs, and ambushes to delay pursuing enemy units can assist
units in breaking contact and withdrawing.
4-84. If the disruption force has not succeeded in destroying or halting the at-
tacking enemy, but is not under too great a pressure from a pursuing enemy,
it may occupy prepared battle positions in the battle zone and assist in the re-
mainder of the defensive mission as part of the main defense force. A disruption
force may have taken losses and might not be at full capability; a heavily dam-
aged disruption force may pass into hide positions. In that case, main defense or
reserve forces occupy positions to cover the disruption forces disengagement.

Main Defense Force

4-85. The mission of the main defense force is complete the defeat of the en-
emy by attack of those portions of the force exposed by actions of the disrup-
tion force and by enemy reactions to contact. This may involve resubordina-
tion of units and in some cases attacks by fire or maneuver forces across unit lim-
its of responsibility.
4-86. The main defense force in a maneuver defense divides its combat power
into contact and shielding forces. These forces move in bounds to successive
defensive lines. If maneuver defense in the disruption zone has provided suf-
ficient time, the defensive positions on these lines may take on more of the
characteristics of prepared battle positions.
4-87. The basic elements of the battle zone are battle positions, firing lines,
and repositioning routes. Battle positions use the terrain to protect forces
while providing advantage in engagements.
4-88. The commander may order a particular unit to stand and fight on a line
long enough to repel an attack. He may order this if circumstances are favor-
able for defeating the enemy at that line. The unit also might have to remain
on that line because the next line is still being prepared or a vertical envel-
opment threatens the next line or the route to it.

Reserves
4-89. A unit in the maneuver defense can employ a number of reserve forces
of varying strengths. The maneuver reserve is a force strong enough to defeat
the enemys exploiting force. The commander positions this reserve in an as-
sembly area using C3D to protect it from observation and attack. From this
position, it can transition to a situational defense or conduct a counterattack.
The reserve must have sufficient air defense coverage and mobility assets to
allow maneuver. If the commander does not commit the reserve from its

4-17
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

original assembly area, it maneuvers to another assembly area, possibly on a

different axis, where it prepares for other contingencies. (See the Reserves
section above for discussion of other types of reserves.)

AREA DEFENSE
4-90. In situations where the OPFOR must deny key areas (or the access to
them) or where it is overmatched, it may conduct a tactical area defense. Area
defense is designed to achieve a decision in one of two ways:
By forcing the enemys offensive operations to culminate before he can
achieve his objectives.
By denying the enemy his objectives while preserving combat power
until decision can be achieved through strategic operations or opera-
tional mission accomplishment.
4-91. The area defense does not surrender the initiative to the attacking
forces, but takes action to create windows of opportunity that permit forces to
attack key components of the enemy system and cause unacceptable casual-
ties. Area defense can set the conditions for destroying a key enemy force in a
strike. Extended windows of opportunity permit the action of maneuver
forces to prevent destruction of key positions and facilitate transition to a
larger offensive action. IW is particularly important to the execution of the
area defense in adaptive and transition operations. Deception is critical to the
creation of complex battle positions, and effective perception management is
vital to the creation of the windows of opportunity needed to execute maneu-
ver and fires.

Method
4-92. Area defense inflicts losses on the enemy, retains ground, and protects
friendly forces. It does so by occupying complex battle positions and dominat-
ing the surrounding battlespace with reconnaissance fire (see Chapter 9).
These fires attack designated elements of the enemys combat system to de-
stroy components and subsystems that create an advantage for the enemy.
The intent is to begin disaggregating the enemy combat system in the disrup-
tion zone. When enemy forces enter the battle zone, they should be incapable
of synchronizing combat operations. See Figures 4-6 through 4-8 for examples
of area defense.
4-93. Area defense creates windows of opportunity in which to conduct spoil-
ing attacks or counterattacks and destroy key enemy systems. In the course
of an area defense, the tactical commander uses terrain that exposes the en-
emy to continuing attack.
4-94. An area defense trades time for the opportunity to attack enemy forces
when and where they are vulnerable. The OPFOR might use an area defense
when
It is conducting access-control operations.
Enemy forces enjoy a significant RISTA and precision standoff advan-
tage.
Conditions are suitable for canalizing the enemy into areas where the
OPFOR can destroy him by fire and/or maneuver.

4-18
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 4

4-95. A skillfully conducted area defense can allow a significantly weaker

force to defeat a stronger enemy force. However, the area defense relies to a
significant degree on the availability of complex terrain and decentralized lo-
gistics. Units conducting an area defense typically place small ambush and
raiding forces in complex terrain throughout the AOR to force the enemy into
continuous operations and steadily drain his combat power and resolve.
4-96. Within an overall area defense, the OPFOR might use maneuver de-
fense on some portions of the AOR, especially on those where it can afford to
lose ground. This occurs most often during transition operations as forces ini-
tially occupy the complex terrain positions necessary for the execution of the
area defense.

Road

II
ne I
Li Bat
BTG ttle tle L
Ba ine
Disruption
Zone

I
II
II
I
I
BTG
Reserve

Road
II
ne
Li

I
ttle

Ba
ttle
Ba

L ine BTG
Battle
Zone

T 46A D f ( l #1) (12 A 01)

Figure 4-3. Area Defense Example 1

Disruption Force
4-97. In an area defense, the disruption zone is that battlespace surrounding
its battle zone(s) where the OPFOR may cause continuing harm to the enemy
without significantly exposing itself. For example, counterreconnaissance ac-
tivity may draw the attention of enemy forces and cause them to enter the

4-19
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

kill zone of a sophisticated ambush using long-range precision fires. RISTA

assets and counterreconnaissance forces occupy the disruption zone, along
with affiliated forces. Paramilitary forces may assist other disruption force
elements by providing force protection, controlling the civilian population,
and executing deception operations as directed.
4-98. The disruption zone of an area defense is designed to be an area of un-
interrupted battle. OPFOR RISTA elements contact with enemy forces, and
other parts of the disruption force attack them incessantly with ambush and
precision fires.
4-99. The disruption force has many missions. The most important mission
at the tactical level is destruction of appropriate elements of the enemys
combat system, to begin its disaggregation. The following list provides exam-
ples of other tasks that the disruption force may perform:
Detect the enemys main groupings.
Force the enemy to reveal his intentions.
Deceive the enemy as to the location and configuration of battle positions.
Delay the enemy, allowing time for preparation of defenses and coun-
terattacks.
Force the enemy into premature deployment.
Attack lucrative targets (key systems, vulnerable troops).
Canalize the enemy into situations unfavorable to him.
The disruption force mission also includes maintaining contact with the en-
emy and setting the conditions for successful reconnaissance fire and strikes.

4-20
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 4

II
I
II
I

Enemy
L
KIL
Z O LL

E
ZON
NE
KI

Enemy
II
I Forest

II
I

L
KIL E
N
ZO

Enemy

Figure 4-4. Area Defense Example 2

4-100. In an area defense, the disruption force often occupies and operates
out of battle positions in the disruption zone and seeks to inflict maximum
harm on selected enemy units and destroy key enemy systems operating
throughout the AOR. An area defense disruption force permits the enemy no
safe haven and continues to inflict damage at all hours and in all weather
conditions.
4-101. Disruption force units break contact after conducting ambushes and
return to battle positions for refit and resupply. Long-range fires, ODs, and
ambushes to delay pursuing enemy units can assist units in breaking contact
and withdrawing.

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

Actual Positions

Deception

X
X
II
II

Elite Mech Inf Div

Fortifying Position in
Complex Terrain
Deception
X

XX
Enemy II
X

Protected Force
on
pti
ce

II
X
De

LEGEND
II
Retain
X

Occupy

Contain

Figure 4-5. Area Defense Example 3

4-102. Even within the overall context of an operational area defense, the dis-
ruption force might employ a maneuver defense. In this case, the distance be-
tween positions in the disruption zone is such that the enemy will be forced to
displace the majority of his supporting weapons to continue the attack on the
subsequent positions. This aids the force in breaking contact and permits
time to occupy subsequent positions.
4-103. The disruption zone will often include a significant obstacle effort. En-
gineer effort in the disruption zone also provides mobility support to disrup-
tion force elements requiring maneuver to conduct attacks or ambushes. Non-
traditional obstacles such as booby traps and IEDs take on greater impor-
tance in an area defense during adaptive or transition operations.
4-104. Within the overall structure of the area defense, disruption force ele-
ments seek to conduct highly damaging local attacks. Units selected for mis-
sions in the disruption zone deploy on likely enemy avenues of approach.
They choose the best terrain to inflict maximum damage on the attacking en-
emy and use obstacles and barriers extensively. They defend aggressively by
fire and maneuver. When enemy pressure grows too strong, these forces can
conduct a maneuver defense, withdrawing from one position to another in or-
der to avoid envelopment or decisive engagement.

4-22
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 4

4-105. Since a part of the disruption force mission to attack the enemys com-
bat system, typical targets for attack by forces in the disruption zone are
C2 systems.
RISTA assets.
Precision fire systems.
Aviation assets in the air and on the groundat attack helicopter for-
ward arming and refueling points (FARPs) and airfields..
Logistics support areas.
LOCs.
Mobility and countermobility assets.
Casualty evacuation routes and means.

4-106. In some cases, the disruption force can have a single mission of detect-
ing and destroying a particular set of enemy capabilities. This does not mean
that no other targets will be engaged; it means that, given a choice between
targets, the disruption force will engage the targets that are the most damag-
ing to the enemy combat system.

Main Defense Force

4-107. The units of the main defense force conducting an area defense occupy
complex battle positions within the battle zone. The complex terrain is rein-
forced by engineer effort and C3D measures. These complex battle positions
are designed to prevent enemy forces from being able to employ precision
standoff attack means and force the enemy to choose costly methods in order
to affect forces in those positions. They are also arranged in such a manner as
to deny the enemy the ability to operate in covered and concealed areas himself.
4-108. The main defense force in an area defense conducts attacks and em-
ploys reconnaissance fire against enemy forces in the disruption zone. Dis-
ruption zone forces may also use the complex battle positions occupied by the
main defense force as refit and rearm points.

Reserves
4-109. A unit in the area defense can employ a number of reserve forces of
varying strengths. In addition to its other functions, the maneuver reserve in
an area defense may have the mission of winning time for the preparation of
positions. This reserve is a unit strong enough to defeat the enemys exploita-
tion force in a maneuver battle during a strike. The unit positions its reserve
in an assembly area within one or more of the battle positions, based on the
commanders concept for the battle. (See the Reserves section above for dis-
cussion of other types of reserves.)

TACTICAL DEFENSIVE ACTIONS

4-110. OPFOR commanders select the defensive action they deem, with the
assistance of their staffs, to be best suited to accomplishing their mission.
OPFOR battalions and below are typically called upon to execute one combat

4-23
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

mission at a time, so it will be rare that such a unit will be employing more
than one of these methods simultaneously.
4-111. The types of defensive action in OPFOR doctrine are both tactical
methods and guides to the design of operational courses of action. The two
basic types are maneuver and area defense. A tactical commander may use
both forms of defense simultaneously across his AOR, however OPFOR units
at the battalion level and below generally participate as a part of a maneuver
defense as opposed to conducting one independently. A defensive battle plan
may include subordinate units that are executing various combinations of
maneuver and area defenses, along with some offensive courses of action,
within the overall defensive mission framework.
4-112. OPFOR battalions and their subordinate units normally fight both
area and maneuver defense actions employing simple battle positions. Alter-
natively, an area defense may employ complex battle positions.

DEFENSE OF A SIMPLE BATTLE POSITION (SBP)

4-113. A simple battle position is a defensive location oriented on the most
likely enemy avenue of approach or objective area. Simple battle positions are
not necessarily tied to restrictive terrain but will employ as much engineer ef-
fort as possible to restrict enemy maneuver. Defenders of simple battle posi-
tions will take all actions necessary to prevent enemy penetration of their po-
sition, or defeat a penetration once it has occurred. Unlike a complex battle
position, which is typically independent, a SBP may form a larger integrated
defense with other SBPs.

ORGANIZING FORCES TO DEFEND A SIMPLE BATTLE POSITION

4-114. Disruption element SBP forces assigned to the disruption element
have the mission of defeating enemy reconnaissance efforts, determining the
location, disposition, and composition of attacking forces, and in some cases
they will also target designated subsystems of the attacking enemys combat
system. To accomplish these tasks, the disruption element may form Combat
Security Outposts (CSOPs) and ambush teams.
4-115. CSOPs prevent enemy reconnaissance or small groups from penetrat-
ing friendly positions and force the enemy to prematurely deploy and lose his
momentum in the attack. CSOPs are generally composed of task-organized
platoon or squad-size forces. The platoon or squad(s) forming the CSOP is
generally drawn from the battalion reserve or second echelon, although com-
panies may also form their own CSOPs. CSOPs are positioned forward of the
battle zone on key terrain or along key avenues of approach. They typically
will not be positioned directly astride avenues of approach into kill zones, but
may cover them with fire. If decisively overmatched by enemy combat power,
CSOPs may withdraw to the battle zone. An OPFOR battalion may employ
more than one CSOP. During the counter-reconnaissance battle, other forces
may augment CSOPs, covering those avenues of approach that the CSOPs do
not cover. CSOPs are typically assigned one or more of the following tactical
tasks:
Ambush
Attack by Fire

4-24
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 4

Delay
Disrupt
Fix

4-116. Ambush A CSOP with this task generally will avoid contact with su-
perior enemy forces and only engage key enemy targets. When assigning this
task, the OPFOR commander must also describe desired effects on the enemy
(destroy, fix, suppress, etc.)

4-117. Attack by fire A CSOP with this task is normally attempting to

shape the battlefield in some fashion, either by turning an attacking enemy
force into a kill zone or by denying the enemy a key piece of terrain. A CSOP
with this task may also be required to target a key element of the enemy
force.

4-118. Delay A CSOP with this task will attempt to buy time for the
OPFOR to accomplish some other task such as defensive preparations,
launch a counter-attack, complete a withdrawal, etc. Normally the CSOP
will withdraw (remaining in the disruption zone, or moving to the battle or
support zones) after engaging for a set amount of time.

4-119. Disrupt A CSOP with this task will attempt to weaken an enemy at-
tack by using fires to cause premature commitment of the enemy, break
apart his formation, and desynchronize his plan.

4-120. Fix A CSOP with this task will use fires to prevent a key element of
the enemy force from moving from a specific place or halt them for a specific
amount of time.

4-25
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

CSOP CSOP Example

(+) Supporting SBP

CSOP Kill Zone I (-)

CSOP Engagement Fan

BN Kill Zone

Enemy I (+)

CSOP Kill Zone

Road

Fig. 4-6 Combat Security Outpost Example

4-121. Ambush teams (independent from CSOPs) remain concealed forward

of the battle zone, and may allow some enemy forces to bypass their position.
Once they identify key enemy targets, they will engage them by employing
flanking or surprise close range fire.
4-122. Main Defense Element - The main defense element of a SBP is re-
sponsible for defeating an attacking force, and for maneuvering to defeat the
penetration or seizure of other SBPs.
4-123. Reserve Element The reserve element of a SBP exists to provide
the OPFOR commander with tactical flexibility. During the counter-
reconnaissance battle the reserve may augment forces in the disruption zone,
in order to provide additional security to the main defense element. During
this time, the reserve element will also rehearse potential counter-attack
routes, although to avoid detection it will rarely do so en masse. Once a sig-
nificant attacking force is detected, the reserve element will withdraw to a
covered and concealed position, conduct resupply, and prepare for additional
tasks. Some typical additional tasks given to the reserve may include-
Conducting a counter-attack.
Conducting counter-penetration (blocking or destroying enemy

4-26
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 4

penetration of the SBP).

Conducting anti-landing operations.
Assisting engaged forces in breaking contact.
Acting as a deception element.
4-124. Support Elements - The support element of a SBP has the mission of
providing one or more of the following to the defending force:
CSS
C2
Supporting direct fire (HMG, ATGM, recoilless rifle, AGL, etc.)
Supporting indirect fire (mortar, artillery, etc.)
Supporting non-lethal fires (Jamming, PSYOPS broadcasts, etc.)
Engineer Support

Simple Battle
II
Village
(-) Position
I (+)

Reserve

I
Road

Kill Zone

Road

Figure 4-7 CDET in Simple Battle Position Example 1

4-27
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

Company SBP
Forest

AT / AGL

Reserve
(+)

Kill Zone

e
Z on
ill
yK
ar
nd
co
Se

AT / AGL
Road

Figure 4-8 CDET in Simple Battle Position Example 2

ORGANIZING THE BATTLEFIELD FOR A SBP

4-125. Disruption Zone This is the area forward of the battle zone where
the defenders will seek to defeat enemy reconnaissance efforts, detect attack-
ing forces, disrupt and delay an attackers approach, and destroy key attack-
ing elements prior to engagement in the battle zone.
4-126. Battle Zone This is the area where the defending commander com-
mits the preponderance of his force to the task of defeating attacking enemy
forces. Generally, a SBP will have its battle zone fires integrated with any
adjacent SBPs. Fires will orient to form kill zones where the OPFOR plans to
destroy key enemy targets. When possible, kill zones will be placed on the re-
verse slope of intervisibility lines within the battle zone.
4-127. Reverse Slope Defense A reverse slope defense is positioned behind
an intervisibility line so that is masked from enemy observation and direct
fire. The defense is based upon employing the intervisibility line to protect
friendly forces and isolate portions of the attacking force as they cross the
crest. Although the OPFOR may not occupy the crest in strength, it will con-
trol it by fire. OPFOR commanders prefer a reverse slope defensive position
because it confers the following advantages:

4-28
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 4

It hinders or prevents enemy observation of the defensive position.

Attacking forces are not able to receive direct fire support from follow-
on forces.
It can negate an enemy stand-off fire advantage
Attacking enemy forces are silhouetted while crossing the crest of the
intervisibility line.
Engineers can conduct their work out of direct fire and observation
from the enemy.

4-128. In some cases, the adoption of a reverse slope defense can prevent the
defenders weapon systems from exploiting their maximum range. However,
skilful OPFOR commanders will select defensive terrain that allows them to
maximize their weapons stand-off range. They do so by emplacing their sys-
tems at their maximum effective range behind the crest of the intervisibility
line that supports their kill zone - this may mean placing a weapon system on
the counterslope behind the terrain forming the intervisibility line.
4-129. Maintaining observation of the enemy while on the forward slope of an
intervisibility line can be difficult. To alleviate this disadvantage, OPFOR
commanders will employ reconnaissance assets to observe forward of the re-
verse slope defensive position.
4-130. The OPFOR commander will seek a defensive position behind a ter-
rain feature(s) that in addition to providing an intervisibility line, canalizes
attackers into narrow attack frontages which lead into the kill zone.
4-131. Fire Planning Fire is the basic means of destroying the enemy in the
defense. To perform this task, the OPFOR will employ lethal and non-lethal
weaponry in a unified manner, often directed into a kill zone. The normal ba-
sis of a battalions system of fire is the AT fire of its companies and attach-
ments, and supporting artillery. In areas that are not accessible to vehicles,
the basis of fire will primarily be machinegun, grenade launcher, mortar and
artillery fires. In this case, where possible AT systems will be employed in an
anti-personnel role.
4-132. During the OPFOR fire planning process the commander and staff de-
lineate key enemy targets. The planners then appoint reconnaissance ele-
ments to identify targets and weapons systems to engage them. The OPFOR
battalions fire planning includes sectors of concentrated fire and barrier fire
lines of artillery and mortars in the disruption zone, on flanks, and through-
out the depth of the battle zone. Subordinate units and weapons are expected
to coordinate with each other as well as flanks units in the coverage of kill
zones.
4-133. Kill zones will be covered by frontal and flanking / cross fires of the
OPFOR battalions and other supporting weapons systems. The OPFOR will
employ obstacles and fire concentrations to halt and hold the enemy within
kill zones. Terrain considerations and available weaponry will dictate the size
of the kill zone and the width of the OPFOR defense.

4-29
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

4-134. Support zone The support zone may contain C2, CSS, indirect, and
direct support fire assets, the reserve, as well as other supporting assets. The
support zone will normally locate itself behind the SBP. Support zones are
not typically found below the company level.

EXECUTING A SBP
4-135. SBP defenders will conduct aggressive counter-reconnaissance
throughout their occupation of the battle position. Such counter-
reconnaissance will occur primarily in the disruption zone, but measures will
also be taken in the battle and support zones. OPFOR electronic warfare as-
sets will attempt to detect the presence and location of enemy recon elements.
The reserve element may act as a quick-response force to destroy any enemy
reconnaissance assets discovered in the battle or support zones. Once a sig-
nificant attacking force is detected, the OPFOR will employ fires (direct / in-
direct) to delay and attrit attackers in the disruption zone.
4-136. Defenders in the battle zone will attempt to defeat attacking forces.
Should the enemy penetrate the main defenses or capture a position, defend-
ers will take measures to defeat the penetration or recapture the position, to
include the commitment of reserves and repositioning forces from other areas
within the SBP.
4-137. Defenders in the support zone will provide support to defenders in the
disruption and battle zones as required. In the event of the defeat or penetra-
tion of the SBP, they will maneuver as needed to avoid destruction or to sup-
port counterattacks.
4-138. Deception To keep the enemy from discovering the nature of the
OPFOR defenses and to draw PGM fire away from actual units, defenders
will establish dummy firing positions. In addition to enhancing force protec-
tion, the OPFOR will employ deception positions as an economy of force
measure to portray strength. These measures will include the creation of
false entrenchments, heat signatures, and dummy vehicles.

Command and Control of a SBP

4-139. To maintain security during defensive preparations, defenders will
make all possible use of secure communications, such as couriers and wire.
However, once the main battle is joined, communications measures will tend
to be those that support maneuver, such as radio and cellular technology.

Reconnaissance in a SBP
4-140. SBP defenders will perform aggressive counter-reconnaissance activi-
ties to prevent the enemy from remaining in reconnaissance contact with the
SBP. The OPFOR will observe avenues of approach to provide early warning;
determine location, composition, and disposition of attackers; and direct fires
against key enemy systems or components of systems.

4-30
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 4

SWAMP
R&S in a SBP (-) Reserve

Woods

(+)
Enemy
CSOP Kill Zone
CSOP

With
dra wal
Rou Road
te
er
Riv

C
(-)
(-)

Kill Zone
C
e Village
ut
Ro
al
aw
dr
ith
I
Village W
C

Woods
Enemy

Disruption Zone Battle Zone Support Zone

Figure 4-9 Reconnaissance Example 1

Armor Support to a SBP

4-141. When employed within a SBP, armor will typically serve an anti-
armor role. Armored forces may also be massed as a counter-attack reserve.
Defending armored vehicles will be in two-tier (turret defilade) vehicle fight-
ing positions to provide maximum cover and concealment, or will fight above
ground to take maximum advantage of maneuver capabilities. Armor defend-
ing SBPs does not prefer single-tier (hull defilade) vehicle fighting positions
as they provide insufficient cover and concealment against PGM and restrict
vehicular mobility.

Fire Support to a SBP

4-142. SBPs may receive fire support both from organic assets and from
higher echelon supporting forces. Fire support is integrated with other adja-
cent units to ensure appropriate coverage. Defenders will employ fires to:
Attrit attackers along the avenues of approach and in LZs
Defeat attackers in the battle zone
Defeat penetrations of battle positions / support counter-attacking

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

forces

Air Defense Support of a SBP

4-143. SBPs employ both active and passive air defense measures to protect
the defender from air threats. AAA and shoulder-fired SAMs may be found
interspersed throughout the SBP including anti-LZ ambushes. Electronically
integrated air defense systems may be present when attached to the defend-
ing force from higher echelon supporting units.

Engineer Support to a SBP

4-144. Engineers support the SBP initially by preparing survivability posi-
tions and counter-mobility works that support the disruption and battle
zones. Once these preparations are complete, engineer support will shift to
mobility support for the reserve force to ensure that it maintains freedom of
maneuver.
4-145. Engineer tasks are a shared responsibility throughout the OPFOR. Al-
though engineers have the bulk of specialized equipment for constructing for-
tified positions, this work exceeds the capability of organic engineers and
even those likely attached as reinforcements. Therefore the OPFOR use all
available personnel and equipment.
4-146. Obstacle planning SBP obstacles are normally employed to shape
the battlefield by disrupting the enemys approach march, blocking avenues
of approach, turning the enemy into and fixing him in kill zones. Should the
OPFOR retain a FASCAM capability, it will be used to reinforce pre-existing
obstacles, block avenues of approach, or to re-seed breached obstacles.
4-147. Figure 4-10 shows tasks that are the first priority in the sequence of
position preparation. Combat arms unit personnel clear fields of fire and
view. Then they emplace barbed wire, mines, and other obstacles in front of
each fighting vehicle, crew-served weapon, and individual infantryman. Per-
sonnel use open slit trenches. Using covered slit trenches, engineers dig in
headquarters and medical points. Camouflage measures are also performed.
If the situation permits, engineers will employ excavating and earthmoving
equipment.

Tasks of Combat Troops and Engineers

Clear fields of observation and fire.

Emplace obstacles ahead of any CSOPs, then ahead of platoon strongpoint forward edge.
Dig one- or two-man foxholes for riflemen, machinegun crews, snipers, and operators of grenade launchers,
manpack ATGMs, and shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).
Connect foxholes into a squad trench (open slit trench).
Prepare a continuous trench in platoon and company strongpoints.
Prepare emplacements at primary firing positions for IFVs/APCs, tanks, ATGM launchers, and other weapons

4-32
 _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 4

in the platoon or company strongpoint.

Build basic positions (covered slit trenches) for platoon, company, and battalion command posts.
Build basic positions (covered slit trenches) for battalion or company medical points.
Dig and prepare covered slit trenches for each squad, crew, or team.
Camouflage positions, weapons, and vehicles against reconnaissance and for protection against enemy pre-
cision weapons.

Tasks of Engineers

Emplace additional obstacles on the most likely axes of enemy attack in front of the forward edge, in gaps
between units, on their flanks, and in the depth of the strongpoint.
Deepen sections of trenches and communication trenches, and provide covered shelters for equipment on
terrain that provides concealment from enemy observation and fire and permits the use of engineer mecha-
nized equipment.
Prepare lines of firing positions for reserve counterattack forces and prepare forward movement routes to
these lines and to lines of deployment for counterattacks.
Prepare routes for movement to the lines of deployment for the counterattack, lines of deployment of reserves,
and firing positions.
Set up water supply or distribution points.

Figure 4-10. First-priority preparation tasks for OPFOR BN defensive area.

Figure 4-11 shows tasks that are typically the second priority in the sequence of OPFOR position
preparation.

Tasks of Combat Troops and Engineers

Improve company and platoon strongpoints, adding overhead cover if possible.

Finish building or improve command posts and medical points.
Dig emplacements at alternate and temporary firing positions of IFVs/APCs, tanks, and other weapons.
Dig emplacements at firing lines and assembly areas for company or battalion armored groups.
Dig communication trenches to primary and alternate IFV/APC firing positions, to shelters, to command posts,
and to the rear.
Prepare dugouts on the basis of one per platoon and one for each company or battalion medical point.
When possible, make covered slit trenches or dugout shelters for each squad, weapon crew, or team.
Create and upgrade the system of trenches and communication trenches from a combat and housekeeping
standpoint. Housekeeping and sanitary preparation or trenches includes making niches for storing food, wa-
ter, and equipment and making latrines, sumps, soakage pits, and drainage ditches.

Tasks of Engineers

Connect individual emplacements into emplacements for squads with sections of trench dug with mechanized
equipment.
Prepare a continuous trench in the battalion defensive area.
Make bunkers for each company/battery and at battalion command posts.
Make shelters for vehicles, weapons, equipment, missiles, ammunition, and other supplies.
Improve or create additional obstacles ahead of the forward edge, on the flanks, and in gaps between adja-
cent strongpoints.
Prepare main dummy objects in the company strongpoint or battalion defensive area.
Prepare for demolition of roads, bridges, overpasses, and other important objectives in the depth of the
defense.
Prepare routes for maneuver, resupply, and evacuation.

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

Figure 4-11. Second-priority preparation tasks for OPFOR BN defensive area.

Figure 4-12 shows tasks that typically are the third priority in the sequence of position prepara-
tion. In addition to the addition and improvement of existing positions and obstacles, engineers
connect squad trenches until they run continuously across the entire platoon, company, and bat-
talion frontage.

Tasks of Combat Troops and Engineers

Finish building or improving communication trenches and preparing strongpoints.

Improve engineer preparation of company strongpoints and the battalion defensive area.
Improve the platoon strongpoints and squad and weapon positions in a tactical and housekeeping respect.
Connect squad trenches in the platoon and company strongpoints with one another, if this has not already
been done.
Build a system of engineer obstacles.
Develop a system of trenches and communication trenches in the company strongpoint or battalion defensive
area.
Establish shelters for personnel and continue building shelters for equipment and deepening trenches and
communication trenches.
Adapt the communication trenches for conducting fire.
Cover some parts of the trenches.
Prepare dugout shelters at platoon command posts.
Set up shelters (one per company and per battalion command post).
Dig communication trenches to the rear (first with a depth of 0.6 m and then 1.1 m).
Equip the trenches and communication trenches with alternate (lateral and forward) foxholes and emplace-
ments for firing machineguns and grenade launchers and with embrasures, overhead protection, and
niches/recesses for ammunition.
Prepare dummy positions, strongpoints, and defensive areas.

Tasks of Engineers

Develop or improve a network of routes for unit maneuver, supply, and evacuation.
Expand the system of obstacles.
Improve fighting positions, firing lines, lines of deployment for counterattack, lines of deployment of reserves,
command posts, assembly areas of reserves, and logistics elements.

Figure 4-12. Third-priority preparation tasks for OPFOR BN defensive area.

Logistics Support to a SBP

4-148. Logistics units, when present, will normally be found with the support
element, to the rear of the SBP. Units in the disruption zone and battle zone
will locally stockpile supplies, including multiple basic loads of ammunition,
to ensure that they remain self-sufficient during the battle.

Information Warfare Support to a SBP

4-149. Information Warfare supports the SBP primarily by deceiving the en-
emy as to the defenders actual location. The OPFOR will conduct deception
operations that portray inaccurate defender locations and strengths. Such

4-34
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 4

measures will attempt to convince the attacker to strike areas were he will
inflict minimal damage to the defenders, or maneuver himself to a position of
disadvantage, such as the center of a kill zone.

DEFENDING A COMPLEX BATTLE POSITION (CBP)

4-150. CBPs are designed to protect the units within them from detection
and attack while denying their seizure and occupation by the enemy. They
are not necessarily tied to an avenue of approach. CBPs protect forces while
providing sanctuary from which to launch local attacks.
4-151. CBPs are designed to protect the units within them from detection and
attack while denying their seizure and occupation by the enemy. Command-
ers occupying CBPs intend to preserve their combat power until conditions
permit offensive action. In the case of an attack, CBP defenders will engage
only as long as they perceive an ability to defeat aggressors. Should the de-
fending commander feel that his forces are decisively overmatched, he will at-
tempt a withdrawal in order to preserve combat power.
4-152. Complex Battle Positions have the following characteristics that dis-
tinguish it from Simple Battle Positions:
Limited avenues of approach
Avenues of approach are easily observable by the defender
360 degree fire coverage / protection from attack (this may be due to the
nature of surrounding terrain or engineer activity such as tunneling)
Engineer effort prioritizing cover and concealment measures; limited
counter-mobility effort which might reveal the CBP location.
Large logistic caches

4-153. C3D measures are critical to the success of a CBP as the defender
generally wants to avoid enemy contact. Additionally, forces within a CBP
will remain dispersed to negate the effects of precision ordinance strikes.
Generally, once the defense is established, non-combat vehicles will be moved
away from troop concentrations to reduce their signature on the battlefield.

ORGANIZING FORCES TO DEFEND A CBP

4-154. Disruption element The disruption element of a CBP is primarily

concerned detecting attackers and providing early warning to the defending
force. In addition to observation posts and ground ambushes, the security
force will establish anti-landing ambushes and anti-landing reserves. When
the CBP is attacked, security forces will remain in position to provide the
OPFOR commander with a reconnaissance capability. The security force may
also include indirect fire assets, such as mortars, to provide immediate, di-
rectly observed, harassing fires.

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

4-155. Main Defense Element The main defense element of a CBP is re-
sponsible for defeating an attacking force, and for covering the withdrawal of
the support force in the case of an evacuation of the CBP.
4-156. Reserve Element The reserve element of a CBP exists to provide
the OPFOR commander with tactical flexibility. During the counter-
reconnaissance battle the reserve may augment forces in the disruption zone,
in order to provide additional security to the main defense element. How-
ever, the reserve will rarely do so if such action would reveal the location of
the CBP to the enemy. Some typical additional tasks given to the CBP re-
serve may include-
Conducting a counter-attack.
Conducting counter-penetration (blocking or destroying enemy
penetration of the SBP).
Conducting anti-landing operations.
Assisting engaged forces in breaking contact.
Acting as a deception element.
4-157. Support Element The support element of a CBP has the mission of
providing one or more of the following to the defending force:
CSS
C2
Supporting direct fire (HMG, ATGM, recoilless rifle, AGL, etc.)
Supporting indirect fire (mortar, artillery, etc.)
Supporting non-lethal fires (Jamming, PSYOPS broadcasts, etc.)
Engineer Support

4-36
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 4

Complex Battle (+)

Position Anti-LZ

Anti-LZ (+)
Kill Zone

Mountains Exfiltration
Route Dismounted
Exfiltration Route Mountains

(+) II
I (+)

I
Reserve (+)

Alt. Exfiltration
(+) Kill Zone
Route (+)
Alt. Exfiltration
Route Anti-Armor
Village
Kill Zone

(+)
(+)

Anti-LZ / Infiltration Anti-LZ / Infiltration

Figure 4-13 CDET in Complex Battle Position

4-37
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

Platoon CBP Village

Squad Battle
ine Position

Exfiltration
yL

Route
ilit
isib
er v
I nt

Kill Zone

Squad Battle
Position

Cave

Enemy

Squad Battle
Machine
Position
Gun w/ Pack
Mule
Air Ambush
Mountain

Cave

Mortar w/
Exfiltration
Pack Mule Route

Anti-Infiltration
Ambush

Figure 4-14 CSOPs Supporting a Complex Battle Position

4-38
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 4

Enemy Enemy
Enemy CSOP Example
Supporting CBP

Village
(+)
Village

(+) CSOP

ne
Secondary
Ki

Zo
Road
ll
Zo CSOP

ll
Ki
ne

OPFOR BN
Battle and OPFOR BN
Support Zones Disruption Zone Primary Mountains
Road
ne
Zo

Enemy Secondary Village

ill

(+)
K

(+) Road
Village
CSOP
CSOP

ne
Zo
ll
Forest Ki

Enemy Enemy

Fig. 4-15 CSOPs Supporting a Complex Battle Position

ORGANIZING THE BATTLEFIELD FOR A CBP

4-158. Disruption Zone - The survival nature of a CPB does not encourage
having large amounts of combat power in the disruption zone as that could
draw attention to the defense. Unlike a SBP, in a CBP disruption zone it is
less likely that the OPFOR will employ large portions of the reserve as a cov-
ering force again as a measure to reduce the battlefield signature of the
CBP.
4-159. Battle Zone This is the area where the defending commander com-
mits the preponderance of his force to the task of defeating attacking enemy
forces, or delaying them while the defenders withdraw. In a CBP the battle
zone may be in a roughly circular perimeter around the support zone.
4-160. Support Zone The support zone may contain C2, CSS, indirect and
direct support fire assets, the reserve, and other supporting assets. The sup-
port zone will locate itself within the center of the CBP.

EXECUTING A CBP
4-161. Most security / counter-recon will be passive measures unless attack is
imminent. In the event of an attack, fires (direct / indirect) will delay and at-
trit attackers.

4-39
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

4-162. Defenders in the battle zone will attempt to defeat attacking forces.
Should the defending commander determine that he lacks the capacity to de-
feat attackers, defenders in the battle zone will cover the withdrawal of the
rest of the unit before retiring themselves. Should the enemy penetrate the
main defenses, it is likely the defensive commander will determine further
resistance to be useless. In this case, he may commit reserves to delay further
penetration while the remainder of the defending force withdraws.
4-163. Defenders in the support zone will provide support to defenders in the
disruption and battle zones as required. In the event of a withdrawal, they
will be some of the first elements to withdraw via exfiltration routes.

Command and Control of a CBP

4-164. C2 of a CBP is generally more difficult than that of a SBP because the
defenders may be more dispersed. To maintain security and avoid detection,
defenders will make all possible use of secure communications, such as couri-
ers and wire.

Reconnaissance Support to a CBP

4-165. OPFOR reconnaissance assets will observe avenues of approach key to

providing early warning and allow the commander to make fight or flee de-
termination. The OPFOR is less likely to engage in counter-reconnaissance
activities if such actions would reveal CBP location. In order to passively
gather information, personnel will imbed themselves within local popula-
tions.

4-40
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 4

Mountains

Ene
y m
Forest
Disruption Zone

Village

Dismounted
Exfiltration Route

CSOP (+)
d
oa
R

e
on
OPFOR BDET

lZ
Battle Position

Kil Exfiltration
Route

Alt. Exfiltration
Anti-LZ / Infiltration
Enemy

Route
Disruption Zone

Fig. 4-16 Recon Support to a CBP

Armor Support to a CBP

4-166. Due to the larger signature of armored forces (and its tendency to
draw PGM fire), forces defending a CBP are less likely to employ significant
armor assets. When armor is employed, it will generally remain concealed in
reserve and emerge only when needed to defeat attacking enemy forces or to
cover a withdrawal.

Fire Support to a CBP

4-167. As CBPs are generally independent and self-supporting in their na-

ture, all fire support will come from within the CBP itself. Defenders will em-
ploy fires to:
Attrit attackers along avenues of approach and in LZs
Defeat attackers in the battle zone
Cover the withdrawal of defenders from the CBP

4-41
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

Air Defense Support to a CBP

4-168. Unlike SBPs, passive air defense is most common to CBPs, and active
air defense will generally be of non-electromagnetic signature emitting na-
ture. AAA and shoulder-fired SAMs may be found interspersed throughout
the CBP including anti-LZ ambushes.

Engineer Support to a CBP

4-169. Engineer activity within the CBP will generally be of a non-signature,

or low signature producing variety. Engineers will conceal survivability posi-
tions (Entrenchments, fortifications, improved caves, tunnels, hardened
buildings, etc.). Counter-mobility efforts, such as AP / AT mines and booby-
traps will likewise be hidden from observation. Wire obstacles, AT ditches,
and vehicular survivability positions will be less common due to the difficulty
in concealing such works.

4-170. Obstacle planning While CBP obstacles may be used in the devel-
opment of kill zones, they are generally more protective in nature than those
in a SBP. For example, they may be employed to turn an attacker away from
a vulnerable flank, or to protect an exfiltration route by blocking an avenue of
approach into it.

4-171. Engineer preparation priorities will otherwise be of a similar nature to

those of the SBP. (See SBP figures 4-x, 4-x, 4-x).

Logistics Support to a CBP

4-172. Logistic operations within a CBP are generally of a self-sustaining na-

ture. Large supply caches will be common.

IW Support to a CBP

4-173. Elements from the CBP may attempt to integrate within any local
communities for the purpose of gathering and disseminating information.
Generally, the CBP will not have an easily detectable IW operation as it is at-
tempting to maintain a low profile. IW may focus on downplaying the exis-
tence or significance of the CBP itself. If the CBP cannot be hidden, IW may
attempt to convince enemy (extra-national) forces that the defenders are
friendly to them. In some cases, senior OPFOR leaders may conduct IW from
a CBP to convince followers in other locations that they are still alive and
leading their organizations in the struggle against the enemy.

4-174. Complex battle positions in urban environments may make special use
of sewer and subway systems. Sewers and subways will provide shelter as

4-42
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 4

well as covered and concealed avenues of approach and exfiltration routes. In

some cases, an entire CBP may be subterranean.

4-43
 Chapter 5

Battle Drill

The OPFOR derives great flexibility from battle drill. Contrary to the U.S.
view that battle drill, especially at higher levels, reduces flexibility, the
OPFOR uses minor, simple, and clear modifications to thoroughly
understood and practiced battle drill to adapt to ever-shifting conditions.
It does not write standard procedures into its combat orders and does not
write new orders when a simple shift from current formations and
organization will do.

The aim of battle drill is to achieve advantage in controlling the tempo of

combat by performing basic combat functions without hesitation or need
for further coordination, assistance or delay. Battle drill is intended to be
the baseline of tactical competence for the OPFOR. Once able to execute
all elements of battle drill, units can be directed to act with concise and
rapidly formulated combat orders.

APPLICATION OF BATTLE DRILL TO DIFFERENT FORCE TYPES

5-1. Battle drill is not tied to a particular type of unit or level of command. It
is described in terms of task-organized sub elements performing critical
tasks. The composition of a security element may be different in different
type forces operating on varied terrain, but the tasks the security element
will be called upon to perform a given battle drill will be the same for any
tactical unit. Similarly, a sub element may be called upon to fix an enemy
force in a given battle drill and the methodology used to fix that force may
vary between OPFOR organizations.

BATTLE DRILLS
5-2. OPFOR Battle drill is used to make the execution of basic tactical tasks
standard throughout the OPFOR. It is not meant to be specific to a type of
unit, but rather represents a common methodology for certain recurring
missions tactical units are routinely called upon to accomplish.
TASK ORGANIZATION AND BATTLE DRILL

5-3. Battle drill is primarily oriented toward offensive action and attacking, or
at least moving forces.
5-4. The standard battlefield organization of a detachment is into three parts:
the security element, the support element and the action element (also known
in specific situations as the firing or assault element).

5-1
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

5-5. The security element of a detachment provides local tactical security for
the detachment and prevents the enemy from influencing mission
accomplishment. The action element accomplishes the detachments tactical
task. The support element provides combat and combat service support and
C2 for the detachment. Due to such considerations as multiple avenues of
approach, a detachment may organize one or more of each of these elements
in specific cases.
5-6. In certain situations, a detachment may organize one or more specialist
elements. Specialist elements are typically formed around a unit with a
specific capability such as an obstacle clearing element, reconnaissance
element or deception element.
ACTIONS ON CONTACT
5-7. Despite constant advances in situational awareness technologies and
methods, it will be the rule rather than the exception that an OPFOR unit
makes contact under precisely predicted conditions and with exactly the
expected enemy. The actions on contact battle drill is designed to ensure
OPFOR units retain the initiative and fight under circumstances of their
choosing.
Forms of Contact
5-8. The OPFOR recognizes seven forms of contact:
Direct Fire
Indirect Fire
Obstacle
Air
NBC
EW
Sensor
5-9. The actions on contact battle drill is primarily for use by a combat force
making sensor and/or direct fire contact with an enemy force. When making
undesired contact (indirect fire, air, NBC, EW or ground contact made by a
non-combat unit), the Break Contact battle drill is employed instead. When
making contact with an isolated obstacle, Situational Breach may be selected.
Actions on Contact Conditions
5-10. The commander making contact must rapidly determine what type of
contact has been made:

Contact as expected in his course of action

Contact made at an unexpected time, but with the expected enemy
Contact made in an unexpected location, but with the expected enemy
Contact made at an unexpected time and location, but with the
expected enemy
Contact made with an unexpected enemy

5-2
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 5

5-11. The OPFOR considers it highly unlikely that contact will be made in
the expected location at the expected time with the expected enemy force.
Actions on contact are designed to provide the commander with the flexibility
to either continue with the planned course of action or rapidly adopt a new
course of action more suited to changed conditions.

5-12. This flexibility is achieved by:

ensuring that contact is made with one or more security elements

before the remainder of the force becomes engaged
providing the commander with the ability to make his own decisions if
communication with higher authority is impractical
using C3D to prevent unwanted engagements
Actions on Contact Execution
5-13. Fix. The SE making contact fixes the enemy. It continues to provide
early warning of approaching enemy forces and prevents them from gaining
further information on the rest of the OPFOR force. This SE is then known
as the fixing element. Fixing elements often make use of terrain chokepoints,
obstacles, ambushes and other techniques to fix a larger force.
5-14. Assess and Report. The commander must make an assessment of the
tactical situation that determines whether or not making contact in this
manner and with this enemy constitutes a change in his course of action.
This determination is the most vital step in successful execution of actions on
contact because if it is performed incorrectly, the unit will subsequently be
executing a course of action inappropriate to the mission and situation.
Concurrent with his assessment, the commander reports to the chain of
command the form of contact he has made, critical details of its composition
and his assessment.

5-15. Isolate. The unit making contact maneuvers and deploys security
elements to ensure additional enemy forces do not join the battle
unexpectedly.

5-16. Maintain freedom to maneuver. The commander of the contacting unit

ensures he makes contact with the minimum force necessary to fix the
enemy. He makes use of C3D and the break contact battle drill to prevent
his force from becoming decisively engaged. Security elements determine
safe maneuver avenues for him to employ. Freedom to maneuver is also
maintained by:

Dominating avenues of approach into the battle area

Determining location of enemy flanks or exposed areas of weakness

5-17. Execute course of action. The contacting unit either continues with its
original course of action if deemed appropriate or executes a new one that
suits the situation. A new course of action could be one given to the unit

5-3
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

based on the assessment it provide to its higher command or one chosen by

the commander in absence of time or guidance.

5-18. The unit making contact ensures follow-on units are aware of the
contact and de-conflict positioning, typically through the use of a standard
marking system.

Isolate

Fix

Security Element

Maneuver Security Element

Figure 5-1. Example of Actions on Contact #1

5-4
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 5

MANEUVER Enemy
ISOLATE

FIX

Security Element

CONTACT

Security Element

ASL

Action Element

Support Element
SL

Call for Fire

Figure 5-2. Example of Actions on Contact #2

SITUATIONAL BREACH
5-19. The OPFOR is prepared to overcome obstacles during all phases of
combat. A situational breach is the reduction of and passage through an
obstacle encountered in the due course of executing another tactical task.
The unit conducting a situational breach may have expected an obstacle or
not, but in either case conducts a situational breach with the resources at
hand and does not wait for specialized equipment and other support.
5-20. Isolate. The security element takes action to ensure enemy
elements cannot reinforce those defending the obstacle. It might
accomplish this through C3D measures, counter-mobility tasks, direct
or indirect fire engagements or a variety of other means.
5-21. Secure. The security element takes action to ensure enemy
defending the obstacle are neutralized. This is typically accomplished
by direct or indirect fire or the use of obscurants. This task may also
be assigned to the support element alone or in combination with the
security element.
5-22. Penetrate. The clearing element neutralizes the obstacle such
that the action element and/or a follow-on force can complete its

5-5
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

mission. All OPFOR organizations carry sufficient equipment,

whether field expedient or constituent, to penetrate basic enemy
obstacle systems and urban construction and debris. Precise
descriptions of OPFOR obstacle reduction techniques can be found in
Chapter 12.
5-23. Execute Course of Action. Once the obstacle has been penetrated
and the lanes isolated and secured, the action element and/or a follow
on force executes the basic course of action.

ISOLATE

PENETRATE

Security Element
ISOLATE

Action (Breach) Element

SECURE

Security Element
WPNS

Support Element
HQ

Fig 5-3 Situational Breach

BREAK CONTACT

5-24. The primary consideration in breaking contact is to remove the enemys

ability to place destructive or suppressive fires on the greater portion of the
OPFOR force. This is accomplished by fixing the enemy, regaining freedom
to maneuver and employing fires, C3D and counter-mobility.

5-6
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 5

5-25. Fix. The SE fixes the enemy. It prevents the enemy force from
maneuvering to remain in contact with the rest of the OPFOR force. It may
employ IW to appear to be larger than it is or even to appear to be the entire
OPFOR detachment.
5-26. Regain Freedom to Maneuver. The commander reduces his elements in
contact to only security element(s). He selects one or more routes from his
current location that enable his detachment to remain out of contact while
permitting him to maneuver in support of his mission.
5-27. Employ C3D, Fires, and Counter-mobility. The commander employs a
variety of means to protect his force while it maneuvers to a position out of
contact. Cover, camouflage, concealment and deception are employed to limit
or remove the enemys ability to maintain situational awareness of the
OPFOR force. This may be as simple as placing obscuring smoke between
the enemy and the OPFOR force or as complex as a sophisticated deception
plan making use of decoys and mock-ups. The OPFOR commander employs
fires as part of the break contact battle drill to suppress the enemy and
prevent him from returning fire effectively and to fix him and restrict his
maneuver. Counter-mobility actions, such as the emplacement of dynamic
obstacles or the destruction of man-made structures also restrict the enemys
ability to maneuver and maintain contact with the OPFOR force.
5-28. Execute Course of Action. Once freedom to maneuver has been
regained, the OPFOR force executes the basic course of action.
5-29. Fixing Element Rejoins. An important consideration within the break
contact battle drill is that it is likely one or more security elements were
given the task to fix the enemy force while the drill was executed. These
elements must be accounted for in the action to break contact. Typically, the
employment of C3D, fires and counter-mobility is focused on separating the
fixing elements from the enemy while the fixing elements permit the rest of
the force to break contact first.

5-7
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

Smoke

Fix

Security Element C3D

Smoke

Rejoin

Maneuver Security Element

Fig 5-4, Break Contact

FIRE AND MANEUVER

5-30. The most basic of all OPFOR battle drills is fire and maneuver. Fire
and maneuver is the way in which OPFOR small units move while in contact
with the enemy.
5-31. When required to move while in contact with the enemy, the OPFOR
commander selects a part of his force to be the support (or firing) element and
part to be the action (or moving) element. The support element then directs
suppressing fire against any enemy that has the ability to influence the
movement of the action element. The action element then moves to either a
firing line or to the objective and once its new position is reached it becomes
the new support element and the former support element becomes the new
moving element.
5-32. The critical aspect of executing fire and maneuver is the commanders
selection of the right amount of combat power and resources to assign to each
of the elements of his force. If the support element does not have the ability
to significantly reduce the effectiveness of the enemy, the action element will

5-8
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 5

be destroyed. If the action element does not have the combat power to take
the objective or assume its new role as support element, the mission will fail.

Fix 1

Security Element

Fix 2
Maneuver 2
Maneuver 1

Security Element

Fig 5-5 Fire and Maneuver

FIX
5-33. One of the most critical battle drills OPFOR units execute is to fix the
enemy. The ability to fix the enemy at crucial points is the fundamental way
units maintain the freedom to maneuver and retain the initiative.

5-34. An enemy becomes fixed in one of three basic ways: he cannot

physically move, he does not want to move, he does not think he can move.

5-35. An enemy that cannot physically move is constrained in some real way.
A soldier wounded in the legs, a tank with a track blown off and a platoon
surrounded by scatterable mines are examples of this from of fixed. However,
even this state can be temporary a buddy can carry the soldier, the tank
repaired, the minefield breached. Fixing an enemy by physically preventing
him from moving is the most difficult and resource intensive method.

5-9
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

5-36. An enemy does not want to move when he feels that in doing so he
takes great risk to life and material. Suppressive fires are the primary
method by which an enemy is fixed in this way. Suppressive fires are simple
to employ and are the least difficult and resource intensive means, but are
also the means that places the OPFOR at the greatest risk the soldiers and
systems providing the suppressive fires are vulnerable to detection and
return fire.

5-37. Fires. Fires fix the enemy by killing him or wounding him enough to
prevent relocation (destructive) or by making it too dangerous for him to
reposition (suppressive).
5-38. IW. Information Warfare fixes the enemy by convincing the enemy he
does not want to move or by making him think he cannot move. Some
examples of IW used to fix the enemy are:
Propaganda claiming the enemy will be destroyed if he moves in the
open.
Information attack that simulates the enemy higher commander
ordering the enemy unit to remain in place.
Deception that makes the enemy think the fixing force is stronger than
it is or at least capable of destroying the enemy force if it relocates.

5-39. Counter-mobility. Counter-mobility actions fix the enemy primarily by
physically restraining his movement. In actuality, there is no obstacle that
cannot be breached with effort, so counter-mobility actions are typically time-
sensitive. The more time spent and resources gathered by the enemy, the
less effective counter-mobility actions would be at fixing him.

5-10
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 5

Security Element

Support Element (Crowd)

Security Element

Action Element

Support Element (Cars as hasty road blocks)

Fig 5-6 Fix

TACTICAL MOVEMENT
5-40. Tactical movement is the method by which OPFOR units move on the
battlefield. It is employed in any situation where enemy contact is possible. It
is most often used in offensive operations, to move from attack position to the
point of attack.
ORGANIZING THE BATTLEFIELD FOR TACTICAL MOVEMENT
5-41. Even on a defensive battlefield, tactical movement is essentially an
offensive action and, at least for the moving force, the battlefield will be
organized in a manner similar to other offensive actions.
Axis
5-42. The moving force will move along an axis. The axis will define the area
within which the greater part of the main body (defined below) will move.
Exact routes within and along an axis that the force will use are called attack
routes.
Attack Zone
5-43. The moving force typically operates inside its own attack zone to give it
more freedom with which to fire and maneuver. If the moving force does not

5-11
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

have its own attack zone, it must clear fires with the unit who owns the
terrain over which it is moving.
Firing Lines
5-44. Firing lines will be established on common graphics to facilitate
coordination of direct fire. Firing lines are positions from which to engage the
enemy that possess some inherent advantage (such as concealment or hull-
down).
ORGANIZING FORCES FOR TACTICAL MOVEMENT
5-45. Some of the task organizations associated with tactical movement also
play roles on other types of combined arms tactics. For example, SDs and SEs
provide security during tactical movement and in other situations. Fighting
patrols (FPs) perform reconnaissance missions during tactical movement and
in other situations in which the OPFOR is not in direct contact with the
enemy. The main body contains forces organized in the same manner as
during the offense. Figure 5-8 shows an example of the possible deployment
of various forces within a BTG during tactical movement.

FL1
wn
oute Bro
Attack R SE FL2
FP

FL3

Exploitation
Force AXIS FALCON FL4
II II II I

Attack Route Black

SE FP

FL5 FL6
II I I (-) I

Attack Route Red

Main Assault Force FP
SE SE
Body

AXIS FALCON FL8

FL7

Attack Route White FL9

SE FP

Figure 5-7. Tactical Movement Control Measures and Example Forces

5-12
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 5

Security Detachment
5-46. An SD is a task-organized battalion or company with the mission of
protecting the moving force from direct fire and other forms of contact and
from being fixed by enemy action. The SD is typically also the fixing force in
an offensive action. The SD will be further organized into security elements to
facilitate providing all-around security.
Security Element
5-47. An SE is a company- or platoon-size force that operates as part of an
SD. SEs are typically charged with providing the moving force with
protection from enemy action originating from a particular area along the
axis (thus, they may be designated as a front, flank, or rear security
element).
Fighting Patrols
5-48. Chapter 7 includes the complete discussion of FPs. However, a moving
force will use as many FPs as the commanders analysis deems necessary to
facilitate situational awareness and freedom of movement along each attack
route.
Main Body
5-49. The main body consists of the assault, exploitation and supporting
forces of the attacking unit. (See Chapter 3.)
PLANNING TACTICAL MOVEMENT
5-50. The focus of planning tactical movement is determining how to attack
according to the commanders intent with no or little interference from the
enemy. This is done by
Selecting attack routes the enemy cannot influence or could only do so
with extreme difficulty.
Properly allocating forces to the security detachment.
Planning and executing IW to disrupt the enemys ability to interfere
with the moving force.

5-51. The second consideration in planning tactical movement is ensuring the

moving force is ready to transition to an attack or defense as appropriate
should the force encounter moving enemy. Planning factors are used to
determine likely enemy movement routes and expected dispositions at
contact. Preplanned indirect fire targets and direct fire firing lines are
identified to support this transition.
EXECUTING TACTICAL MOVEMENT
5-52. Tactical movement is executed by moving as quickly as terrain and
mobility assets allow. This is made possible by RISTA assets gaining and
maintaining contact with enemy forces in the AOR and by the security
detachment ensuring complete freedom of movement.
5-53. FPs clear routes and provide reconnaissance information to the SD and
main body. When contact is made, FPs fix enemy forces and assist other FPs
and security elements in their destruction. Other FPs continue to identify
and clear alternate routes.

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

5-54. SEs fix and destroy enemy forces that might interfere with the progress
of the unit. They serve as a base of fire for maneuver by other parts of the
force.
Transition from Tactical Movement
5-55. Tactical movement is, in essence, an offensive action. Should the
moving unit make contact with enemy forces prior to reaching its objective or
initiating its attack, the commander is faced with the following basic choices:
Bypass the new enemy force.
Engage and destroy the new enemy force.
Assume a situational defense.
Enemy forces are typically bypassed if small enough to be fixed entirely by
one or more FPs or SEs. Figure 5-9 hows an example with a combination of
fixing and bypassing an enemy force.
5-56. The new enemy force is destroyed by the moving unit conducting an
integrated or dispersed attack from its movement formation. FPs and
elements of the SD become the fixing force and elements of the main body
provide the assault and exploitation forces. These may be the assault and
exploitation forces from the original mission or a new task organization.
5-57. Only if there is no other choice or if the terrain is very favorable to
defensive operations will the OPFOR transition a tactical movement to a
defense. The type of defensive action selected (maneuver or area) will depend
on the circumstances that brought about the transition.

5-14
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 5

te
FP Rou
New

ute
ed Ro
Plann II
I

FP
SE
I

SE

FP
Assault Force II
II
II

Exploitation
Force
II
I

SE

Figure 5-8. Transition from Tactical Movement

5-15
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

TACTICAL SECURITY
5-58. Tactical security is the collection of measures taken to protect a unit
from the effects of enemy action. Tactical security is a continuous combined
arms action performed in both offense and defense.
ORGANIZING THE BATTLEFIELD FOR TACTICAL SECURITY
5-59. Tactical security is performed throughout the AOR and uses the same
control measures that define the AOR. In addition, security forces may
receive their own attack zones in which to operate to allow them to better
control their forces.
ORGANIZING FORCES FOR TACTICAL SECURITY
5-60. The OPFOR employs various types of forces in tactical security roles.
The exact task organization depends on the situation and the force to be
protected.
Security Force
5-61. If the commander chooses to have one organization responsible for all
tactical security in his AOR, this is known as the security force. There is no
set organization for the security force, but its subelements will be security
detachments. A security force is typically formed when the types and number
and separation of anticipated security actions requires a single responsible
commander and planning staff. Some examples are
A DTG assigns an infantry-based BTG the security force role and
allocates counterintelligence assets and a signals reconnaissance unit
to it to focus on enemy special operations and long-range
reconnaissance forces operating throughout its AOR.
A DTG assigns an air defense-based BTG the security force role and
assigns the antilanding reserve to it to focus on the enemy air, missile
and air assault threat to the DTG AOR.
A BTG creates a CRD and assigns it the security force role as the
commander assesses the primary threat to the BTG is from enemy
reconnaissance.
A BTG creates a security detachment (SD) and assigns it the security
force role while it undertakes tactical movement (discussed in detail
later in this chapter).
Security Detachment
5-62. Detachments formed to undertake tactical security actions are SDs. An
SD may be formed for and given any security mission. Most commonly, they
are formed as part of a tactical movement. SDs designated to rapidly move
anywhere in the AOR to respond to a variety of enemy threats are called
quick response forces (QRFs).
Security Element
5-63. Security elements (SEs) are task-organized company- or platoon-size forces
operating as part of a detachment. They execute an independent tactical
security task, such as protecting the flank or rear of a moving force or
providing local security while the rest of the detachment executes the

5-16
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 5

mission. (See the Antiarmor Ambush and Artillery Raid portions of this
Chapter for examples.)
Combat Security Outpost
5-64. Combat security outposts (CSOPs) are task-organized platoon- or
squad-size forces that provide local security to forces in battle positions or
assembly areas. They prevent enemy reconnaissance or small groups from
penetrating friendly positions and force the enemy to deploy and lose his
momentum in the attack. They are typically assigned one or more of the
following tactical tasks:
Ambush.
Attack by fire.
Delay.
Disrupt.
Fix.
Counterreconnaissance Detachment
5-65. The CRD is discussed elsewhere in this chapter, but has a significant
tactical security function. The CRD is focused almost entirely on enemy
reconnaissance, while other security forces have the mission to protect from
other types of enemy units and action as well. The commander has great
flexibility in determining the size and composition of his CRD and its
relationship with the security force, if formed.
Fighting Patrol
5-66. Fighting patrols (FPs) have a security function as well as a
reconnaissance function. See Chapter 7 for information on FPs.
Reserves
5-67. Reserves will often be called upon to perform security missions. This is
particularly likely in the case of unanticipated enemy action.
PLANNING TACTICAL SECURITY
5-68. Tactical security is planned as any other mission and is a component of
all combat actions. The operations section coordinates tactical security
planning, but gets significant input from the reconnaissance, IW and force
protection subsections. The commander may assign some or all tactical
security planning tasks to the security force headquarters if that organization
has the resources to conduct effective C2 integration.
5-69. All units are expected to execute tactical security in their AORs or
zones. The mission is to protect key assets from enemy reconnaissance,
special operations, intelligence services, and small-scale infiltrations.
5-70. The key to planning tactical security is to identify the threats to the
unit and the accomplishment of the mission and to allocate the minimum
essential forces necessary to mitigate or eliminate those threats. Minimum
forces is an important consideration because the OPFOR does not want the
execution of tactical security to degrade the units ability to accomplish the
mission. Essential forces are those who by capability are best suited to deal
with the particular threats faced by the command. For example,
counterintelligence units may be a critical element of tactical security for a

5-17
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

DTG faced by enemy special operations forces or intelligence agents

operating in the AOR, but not necessary in the security force of a DTG not
faced by such threats.
EXECUTING TACTICAL SECURITY
5-71. Tactical security missions include
Cover.
Delay.
Tactical movement security.
Combat security.
Counterreconnaissance.
Quick response.
Area security.

5-72. Cover is a defensive tactical task that uses an area defense to protect a
force from direct and indirect fire. Cover is described further in Chapter 4.
Delay is a defensive tactical task that uses a maneuver defense to protect a
force from direct and indirect fire. Cover and delay are described further in
Chapter 4. The execution of tactical security for a force conducting tactical
movement is described later in this chapter.
5-73. Combat security (also called local security) is executed by establishing
outposts along enemy avenues of approach and conducting patrols to provide
early warning to the main body and time for the main body to complete its
current action and respond as needed to the new threat. Combat security
forces also destroy enemy reconnaissance. Forces that execute combat
security are CSOPs and SEs (see above). Figure 5-7 shows an example of
combat security actions.

5-18
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 5

II
II CSOP

Enemy AA

PATROL

Enemy AA

CSOP I

QRF
II
CSOP

Enemy AA

Figure 5-9. Combat Security Example

5-74. Counterreconnaissance is a tactical security task that protects the force

by consolidating and focusing efforts to systematically destroy enemy
reconnaissance elements. CR is described in detail elsewhere in this chapter.
5-75. Quick response is a tactical security task in which a force capable of
rapid tactical movement moves to and eliminates or neutralizes a threat. A
quick response force (QRF) is a detachment task organized to execute this
task.
5-76. Area security is a tactical security task that integrates combat security
and force protection subtasks into a single C2 structure within a single AOR.
Area security is designed to counter multiple threats by assigning two or
more of the following tasks to a single security force:
Combat security.
Counterreconnaissance.
Counterintelligence.
Air and missile defense.
Survivability.
Counter-mobility.

5-19
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

C3D.
Quick response.
Counterfire.
Antilanding actions.

5-20
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 6

Chapter 6

Combined Arms Tactics

Combined arms tactics are tactical actions that require the effective coor-
dination of multiple arms to be successful. The tactics described in this
Chapter are employed in combat actions that could be either offensive or
defensive in nature.

ACTIONS OF THE DISRUPTION FORCE

6-1. The purpose of the disruption force is to significantly degrade the en-
emys combat capability and to prevent the enemy from conducting an effec-
tive operation. The primary task of the disruption force is to initiate the at-
tack against the enemys combat system. (See Systems Approach to Warfare
in Chapter 1.) The disruption force does this by initiating the attack on com-
ponents of the enemys combat system. Successful attack of designated com-
ponents or subsystems begins the disaggregation of the enemys combat sys-
tem and creates vulnerabilities for exploitation in the battle zone. Skillfully
conducted disruption operations will effectively deny the enemy the synergy
of effects of his combat system. In addition, the disruption force
Destroys enemy reconnaissance.
Forces the enemy to deploy early or disrupts his offensive preparations.
Gains and maintains reconnaissance contact with key enemy elements.
Deceives the enemy as to the disposition of OPFOR units.

6-2. The disruption force may be given any offensive, defensive or security
mission that best suits the disruption of the particular enemy force in ques-
tion in the specific battlespace assigned. To accomplish these missions, the
disruption force executes a combination of tactical tasks designed to set the
conditions for OPFOR success. These tasks include one or more of the follow-
ing:
Cover.
Delay.
Disrupt.
Fix.
Ambush.
Contain.
Canalize.
Isolate.
Neutralize.

6-1
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04)_______________________________________________________________

Interdict.
ORGANIZING THE DISRUPTION ZONE
6-3. The disruption zone is essentially the area of responsibility (AOR) of the
disruption force. It may contain subordinate unit battle positions, kill zones,
axes, objectives and attack zones based on the disruption force commanders
intent.

ORGANIZING THE DISRUPTION FORCE

6-4. The size and composition of the disruption force depends on the level of
command involved, the commanders concept of the battle, and terrain and
enemy involved. A commander will also always make maximum use of stay-
behind forces and affiliated forces existing within his AOR. Subordinate
commanders can employ forces in a disruption zone role independent of the
battle plan only with division or division tactical group (DTG) approval. Typi-
cally, a DTG disruption force is a BTG, while a BTG disruption force is typi-
cally an independent mission detachment (IMD). However, a disruption force
has no set order of battle. It may contain
Ambush teams (ground and air defense).
Long-range reconnaissance patrols and/or Special-Purpose Forces
(SPF) teams.
Reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition
(RISTA) assets and forces.
Counterreconnaissance detachments.
Artillery systems.
Target designation teams.
Elements of affiliated forces (such as terrorists, insurgents, criminals,
or special police).
Antilanding reserves.

PLANNING THE DISRUPTION BATTLE

6-5. The disruption force headquarters plans the disruption battle. Key plan-
ning considerations for the disruption battle are:
Identifying components or subsystems of the enemys combat system
that are priority for attack.
Identifying priority intelligence tasks to be accomplished by the disrup-
tion force.
Determining the disruption force role in the overall information war-
fare (IW) plan.
Determining critical OPFOR elements that must be protected from en-
emy reconnaissance efforts.
EXECUTING THE DISRUPTION BATTLE
6-6. The disruption force fixes enemy forces and places long-range fire on key
enemy units. It also strips away the enemys reconnaissance assets while de-
nying him the ability to acquire and engage OPFOR targets with deep fires.

6-2
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 6

This includes an air defense effort to deny aerial attack and reconnaissance
platforms from targeting OPFOR elements. The disruption force seeks to
conduct highly damaging local attacks.
6-7. Typical systems, units, or facilities to be attacked by the disruption force
are
Command and control (C2) systems.
RISTA assets.
Attack helicopter forward arming and refueling points.
Airfields.
Precision fire systems.
Logistics support areas.
Lines of communication (LOCs).
Mobility and countermobility assets.
Casualty evacuation routes and means.

COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE
6-8. The OPFOR defines counterreconnaissance (CR) as a continuous com-
bined arms action to locate, track and destroy all enemy reconnaissance op-
erating in a given AOR. The OPFOR conducts CR at all times and during all
types of operations. The OPFOR understands the role of situational aware-
ness in battle and will spare no effort or resource to hunt down and eliminate
enemy reconnaissance troops and systems.

ORGANIZING THE BATTLEFIELD FOR COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE

6-9. The unit AOR will be divided into one or more CR zones (CRZs). There
are many ways to do this depending upon the situation. For example, a DTG
could fight the CR battle at its level and make the entire AOR the only CRZ.
It could instead give the disruption force the CR mission in the disruption
zone and each brigade or BTG responsibility for its CRZ. A CRZ is the AOR
for one counterreconnaissance detachment (CRD, see below). Control meas-
ures key to CR action are those that assist in locating, tracking and destroying
enemy reconnaissance elements. See Figure 5-1 for an example of a BTGs CRZ.

Reference Zones
6-10. Reference zones (RZs) are subdivisions of the CRZ that assist in rapid
orientation on the ground and direction of killing forces or systems to enemy
reconnaissance elements. RZs may take the form of a grid pattern with indi-
vidual grids given code names, letters or numbers. RZs may also include tar-
get reference points whether for orientation purposes only or also as artillery
targets.

Predicted Enemy Locations

6-11. Predicted enemy locations (PELs) are identified locations in the AOR
where enemy activity, troops or systems are projected. PELs are not solely
associated with CR, but the information section identifies a specific set for
those locations where enemy reconnaissance is forecast.

6-3
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04)_______________________________________________________________

Kill Zones
6-12. Kill zones are discussed in Chapter 2. However, the CRD commander
will often identify his own set of kill zones associated with where he intends
to kill enemy reconnaissance on the ground.

BTG Reference
Zones
RZ8
RZ9

PEL RZ7
1

II

RZ1

RZ6

II
PEL
2
II

RZ2

RZ3 PEL RZ5

3
RZ4
BTG

Figure 6-1. Counterreconnaissance Zone (Example)

ORGANIZING FORCES FOR COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE

6-13. Counterreconnaissance is a combined arms mission. Commanders will
select the units best suited to locate, track, and kill enemy reconnaissance
given the nature of the overall mission and the AOR.

Counterreconnaissance Detachment
6-14. A CRD is a detachment (see Chapter 2) task organized to be able to lo-
cate, track and destroy enemy reconnaissance throughout its CRZ. Each CRZ
is the responsibility of one CRD.
6-15. Command and Support Relationships. As a detachment, the CRD
is primarily composed of constituent and dedicated units. However, the sup-
porting command and support relationship may be necessary to bring special-
ized capabilities to bear for limited periods of time. For example, the CRD
may receive a precision-capable artillery unit in support in order to destroy
enemy mounted reconnaissance targets. In another case, the CRD may re-

6-4
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 6

ceive a night-capable helicopter unit for use during a period of limited visibil-
ity.
6-16. CRD and the Security Force. The security force is charged with the
force protection of the unit from all threats. A CRD is specifically designed to
enemy reconnaissance and intelligence collecting elements. The commander
has two basic options in designing their relationship. Typically, the CRD is a
component of the security force. Alternately, the commander may give the
CRD additional security responsibilities and resources and charge the CRD
with performing the security mission in its AOR leaving the security force to
execute missions in other parts of the higher AOR.

CRD Components
6-17. The CRD is a task organization created specifically for the CR mission.
It is a combined arms organization, with various combinations of the follow-
ing components. See Figure 6-2 for an example of a CRD organization.
6-18. Reconnaissance. Perhaps the most essential component of a CRD is
its reconnaissance elements. If the CRD cannot locate and track enemy re-
connaissance elements, it cannot perform its mission. CRD reconnaissance
elements take many forms: long range reconnaissance units, mounted and
dismounted (combat) reconnaissance units, signals reconnaissance, aerial re-
connaissance, or SPF.
6-19. Air Defense. Air defense systems in the CRD might be used defen-
sively to protect elements of the CRD. It might also be used offensively to de-
stroy enemy aerial reconnaissance systemsunmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs), reconnaissance aircraft, or reconnaissance helicopters.
6-20. Aviation. Aviation assets play a number of roles in a CRD. They
transport infantry rapidly to already located enemy reconnaissance targets.
They perform armed and unarmed reconnaissance to locate enemy reconnais-
sance. As the CRZ is generally a large area for the forces in the corresponding
CRD to cover, aviation assets may be used to resupply dispersed elements of
the CRD.
6-21. Artillery. Artillery and other indirect fire systems provide an excellent
means of killing enemy reconnaissance without involving direct fire engage-
ments. The challenge is to employ artillery against enemy targets within the
battle and support zones without endangering other OPFOR forces. Precision
systems are uniquely suited to the CR mission and the OPFOR considers the
expenditure of limited precision resources against enemy reconnaissance tar-
gets to be well worth it.
6-22. Infantry. Enemy reconnaissance units often seek concealment in com-
plex terrain. Infantry units in the CRD attack and destroy such targets.
Normally, other elements of the CRD locate these targets, but infantry may
also be called upon to conduct reconnaissance missions in complex terrain in
support of the CR effort.
6-23. Engineers. Typically a CRD does not have significant engineer re-
sources. When present, they execute standard engineer missions when and
where necessary. Combat engineer elements also accompany infantry in ac-
tions on complex terrain.

6-5
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04)_______________________________________________________________

6-24. Signal. CRDs often operate over relatively large geographic areas. The
CRD will be organized with appropriate signal assets to allow it to transmit
and manipulate information securely over large distances.
6-25. Electronic Warfare. CRDs may contain electronic warfare (EW) as-
sets to permit them to block enemy reconnaissance elements from communi-
cating their observations to their higher headquarters and other enemy units.
6-26. Armor. If the enemy has a strong mounted reconnaissance capability,
or when terrain conditions are favorable, the CRD may contain armor ele-
ments. The tank units can move rapidly to engage and destroy located recon-
naissance targets.

CRD

MECHANIZED TANK SP AA ATGM

INFANTRY
COMPANY PLATOON PLATOON PLATOON

SP HOWITZER
BATTERY
(122-mm)

Figure 6-2. Counterreconnaissance Detachment (Example)

PLANNING COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE
6-27. The CR plan is written by the staff of the unit forming the basis of the
CRD with guidance from the higher staff. CR is treated as an ongoing offen-
sive action no matter what type action is being undertaken by the higher
unit. The CR plan is the battle plan (see Chapter 2) of the CRD.

EXECUTING COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE
6-28. The CRD headquarters interacts with the reconnaissance section of the
DTG or BTG staff to maintain a clear picture of enemy locations with an em-
phasis on his reconnaissance systems. As enemy reconnaissance assets are
identified, they are tracked by the CRD headquarters and this information is
provided to the CRD elements given the mission to destroy those elements. If

6-6
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 6

other OPFOR combat elements in the AOR are closer and/or better suited to
find or destroy critical enemy reconnaissance elements, the CRD commander
will recommend this action to the higher commander and, if approved, coor-
dinate this effort. See Figure 6-3 for an example of CR execution within a
BTGs AOR.
6-29. The CRD commander determines which enemy reconnaissance assets
are to be destroyed in accordance with the higher commanders guidance. He
assigns missions to attack and destroy those assets to appropriate subordi-
nate elements. The CRD headquarters guides the attacking element in on the
enemy reconnaissance asset until contact is made.

BTG Reference
Zones
RZ8
RZ9

PEL RZ7
1
II

RZ1

RZ6
II
PEL
2 COLT

II

RZ2

LEGEND
RZ3 PEL RZ5
3 Observation
RZ4
BTG

Figure 6-3. Execution of Counterreconnaissance (Example)

ALL-ARMS AIR DEFENSE

6-30. The OPFOR recognizes that air defense operations and tactics against
a sophisticated enemy are problematic. Although there are adaptations that
can be made in the tactics employed by air defense units to improve their
chances of success; the OPFOR views the creative and adaptive use of other
arms to accomplish air defense objectives as part and parcel of the overall air
defense effort. They view this as a practical application of the combined arms
concept. This application calls for the simultaneous employment of several
arms, in some cases including air defense systems, to achieve an effect
against the enemy air threat that will render greater results than the use of

6-7
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04)_______________________________________________________________

air defense assets/systems alone. This air threat includes all aircraft capable
of attacking, conducting reconnaissance or moving troops on the battlefield.
The extent to which this can be applied is limited only by the commander and
staffs knowledge of the enemy air threat, capabilities of their own systems
and their ability to apply that knowledge to come up with innovative solu-
tions.
6-31. This section addresses a number of example tactics that can be em-
ployed against the enemy air threat. It will include a brief discussion of plan-
ning from national through tactical levels. This is necessary to demonstrate
that these tactics can be used to achieve strategic, operational and tactical
results and therefore applied at all levels. They are part of an overall cam-
paign to defeat or at least degrade enemy air capabilities.
6-32. The OPFOR organizes its forces and assets to assist in accomplishing
the three basic phases of air defense:
Actions taken to destroy enemy aircraft and control systems before
they are employed.
Actions taken to destroy enemy aircraft while in flight and before they
enter airspace over ground forces.
Actions to destroy aircraft that have penetrated airspace over ground
maneuver forces.
Although these phases occur sequentially as hostilities are initiated, they oc-
cur almost simultaneously and are conducted continuously.

ORGANIZING THE BATTLEFIELD FOR ALL-ARMS AIR DEFENSE

6-33. In organizing the battlefield, the OPFOR first roughly equates the
three phases above with where they will primarily occur on the ground. That
is, the effort to destroy aircraft before they are employed will occur primarily
in the enemy support area. This basically encompasses that area that ex-
tends from enemy home territory, allied basing, to and including in-theater
enemy rear areas down to enemy division level. It is the area in which air-
craft are based, refueled, maintained and resupplied. This area is the overall
responsibility of the OPFOR theater commander. A large part of it could be
given an OSC. Part of the area assigned could fall within the OSCs disrup-
tion zone. This area is referred to the basing area.
6-34. The area in which aircraft fly before they enter air space over ground
maneuver units extends from bases to the main battle areas of OPFOR units.
This flight area overlaps the basing zone. The disruption zone(s) are in-
cluded in this since one of the missions performed in this zone is to destroy
aerial platforms before they get to the main battle area. Finally, the target
area consists of the disruption, battle and support zones. The disruption
zone is included here since part of the air defense mission in them is to pro-
tect forces on the ground within the zone.
6-35. These areas are transparent to tactical organizations. They will operate
using the control measures discussed elsewhere in this manual. The purpose
of these areas is to assist planners in rationalizing, planning, and organizing
the overall effort.

6-8
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 6

ORGANIZING FORCES FOR ALL-ARMS AIR DEFENSE

6-36. The forces employed to execute these tactics consist almost exclusively
small units. They include but are not limited to SPF, engineers, artillery and
mortar, infantry, mobile and manportable air defense units or systems, and
affiliated forces. These organizations are often used in combination or par-
ticipate separately in attacking targets which, in effect, achieves a combined
result.

PLANNING ALL-ARMS AIR DEFENSE

6-37. Planning begins at the national level and before the threat of war. Each
contingency plan developed includes a detailed analysis of the area involved
to include the identification of key airfields, ports, LOCs, and infrastructure,
which could support an enemy force. In those areas controlled by the OPFOR,
preparations are made to support planned missions. These include the identi-
fication of complex terrain in the vicinity of identified targets, potential cache
sites, and forces to perform missions. Areas not in the direct control of the
OPFOR, but anticipated to be included in the contingency, are also analyzed.
Factors examined include all those mentioned above and the identification of
insurgent groups, groups with ethnic ties to the OPFOR, groups which sym-
pathize with the OPFOR for political reasons, individual sympathizers, ter-
rorist groups and even criminal organizations. Potential means and routes of
infiltration and potential sources of supply are also examined. Key targets
and missions are identified and units tasked to be prepared to perform them.
This information is shared with the OSCs assigned to the particular contin-
gency and the planning effort coordinated. What is developed is an integrated
plan consisting of a large number of tactical actions which support air de-
fense objective at all levels. This is the basic plan from the OPFOR operates
at the initiation of hostilities. It is modified, updated and new missions as-
signed as the contingency situation develops.
6-38. Plans are developed which, taken as a whole, may constitute a battle or
operation within the designated area. This is particularly true in the basing
area, since most of the forces operating there will be small units. Their ac-
tions are timed to occur simultaneously or sequentially to achieve a result
over time. For example, a series of actions against an airfield, set to occur
within certain timeframes, can have the net effect of not only destroying air-
craft and their support facilities but also degrading enemy air operations. An
additional payoff is the possible commitment of forces needed in other areas
to secure the facility.

EXECUTION OF ALL-ARMS AIR DEFENSE

6-39. Single-round rocket launchers, towed multiple rocket launchers
(MRLs), or (where suitable) higher-capacity MRL systems are placed in hide
positions as friendly forces withdraw from an area. The hides are situated in
complex terrain and previously determined firing data is set on the weapons.
System hides contain only one system, are loaded and ready to fire, and
highly camouflaged. These hide positions are dispersed over a wide area.
Crews manning the systems bivouac away from the system to keep it cold.
Crews have communication capability but are kept on radio silence. When
monitoring and acknowledging one-time orders to execute they do so away

6-9
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04)_______________________________________________________________

from the system. Once given the order to execute the firing systems work on a
predetermined firing schedule issued as part of an overall plan. Each MRL
may be may be assigned the mission of firing once. Firing occurs in a prede-
termined sequence separated by time. The net effect of this tactic is to de-
stroy or damage facilities/aircraft on the ground and degrade the operating
capability of support personnel. Munitions loads can be mixed dependent on
the desired effect. They can include scatterable mines, delayed-fuzed muni-
tions, high explosive (HE), and chemical.
6-40. This effort can be enhanced through the employment of mortars. Single
mortar crews operating from pre-selected hides can move to firing positions
where rounds with pre-set charges are cached. Once laid in the mortars can
fire rounds in rapid succession at targets on the airfield and then move back
to hides. Given range and terrain considerations larger caliber mortars (120-
mm) can be used in conjunction with laser target designators to place rounds
on point targets such as large aircraft, fuel storage and ammunition facilities
and hangers.
6-41. The use of small special-purpose forces (SPF) teams equipped with
man-portable non-line-of-sight ATGMs can target aircraft on the ground,
maintenance vehicles and facilities and even air traffic control and communi-
cations vans.
6-42. In filtrated or stay behind special-purpose forces and infantry can con-
duct on-order raids against airfields and ground support facilities away from
the airfields. These raids can be timed in conjunction with other methods so
that they assist in keeping the target under constant pressure. They can also
conduct small team ambushes along LOCs with the specific purpose of de-
stroying certain types of vehicle or equipment related to air operations.
6-43. Terrorist and other affiliated groups can intimidate host country civil-
ian contractors to force them to sabotage enemy operations they are support-
ing. Examples include contaminating fuel and lubricant supplies, placing
bombs on generators or ground support equipment. Insurgent groups can be
contacted, supplied and trained to perform missions that support the objec-
tive of the operation.
6-44. SPF teams can infiltrate man-portable, shoulder-fired surface-to-air
missiles (SAMs) close to airfields or along identified and potential flight
routes. These teams are best employed in pairs. Early warning can be
achieved to some extent through the use of a team overwatching airfields and
transmitting to SAM teams the departure of aircraft.
6-45. The planned combined use of antihelicopter mines, artillery and remote
sensors by OSCs and their constituent organizations can be an effective tactic
against attack helicopters using standoff firing techniques. Critical to this
tactic is the identification through analysis of likely helicopter firing posi-
tions. These will be located primarily in the disruption zone. Once identified
these areas are seeded with antihelicopter mines, remote sensors are placed
to overwatch the sites and the sites registered as preplanned artillery tar-
gets. Once the sensors pick up the incoming helicopters, the information is re-
layed to artillery units that take the sites under fire using variable time
fused munitions. This tactic can either destroy or damage the aircraft or
cause the area to be untenable. In lieu of remote sensors small teams can be

6-10
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 6

positioned to overwatch the most likely sites and relay information back to
the guns.
6-46. Antihelicopter mines can be placed on likely firing positions. This area
can be left unattended and the technique can be used at sights to economize
assets for use at the most likely sights. Another crude but potentially effec-
tive method employing engineers is the use of cables strung across avenues of
ingress.

ANTILANDING ACTIONS
6-47. The OPFOR prefers to prevent landings by airborne or heliborne troops
through the destruction of the troop transport aircraft in flight. Failing that,
it will take significant actions to destroy landing forces on the ground as soon
after landing as possible. Antilanding actions (ALA) can and will be executed
by any force with the capability to affect the aircraft or the landing forces, but
ALA is a combined arms action that primarily falls to the antilanding reserve
(ALR) for execution.

ORGANIZING THE BATTLEFIELD FOR ANTILANDING ACTIONS

6-48. Antilanding forces are given their own attack zone to control their ac-
tions against landing forces. Such an attack zone may only be activated for
the duration of an antilanding action or may be assigned to the ALR perma-
nently. Kill zones are used to control both ground and air defense engage-
ments. PELs are used to indicate anticipated enemy landing or drop zones
(LZs or DZs).

ORGANIZING FORCES FOR ANTILANDING ACTIONS

6-49. Commanders form one or more antilanding reserves to conduct ALA
during or after an enemy landing operation. ALRs can consist of any units
the commander and staffs force analysis determines necessary to destroy an
enemy airborne or heliborne landing. Typical ALRs include as subelements:
Gun and missile air defense units.
Infantry with AT weapons.
Armor.
Smoke units.
Engineers.
Aviation.
Artillery.
ALRs are typically detachments, but an ALR for an anticipated major enemy
landing operation may be a BTG or even a DTG should the situation warrant.

PLANNING ANTILANDING ACTIONS

6-50. The ALR plans actions to attack enemy transport aircraft en route to
and in the vicinity of the LZ or DZ. This may require the assistance of other
air defense units not in the ALR. The force protection subsection of the BTG
or DTG staff performs this coordination.

6-11
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04)_______________________________________________________________

6-51. The ALR plans and rehearses actions in the vicinity of the LZs or DZs
as well as movement between assembly areas, hide positions, attack positions
and between LZs or DZs.

EXECUTING ANTILANDING ACTIONS

6-52. Early warning is transmitted from the main command post to the ALR.
The ALR moves to positions in the attack zone from which it can engage
transport aircraft and destroy landing forces on the ground.

URBAN COMBAT
6-53. The OPFOR sees urban combat (UC) as a vital subcomponent of its tac-
tical actions. Complex urban terrain provides significant advantages to the
side that is ready to make use of them. OPFOR units train extensively in UC
and expect to make maximum use of complex urban terrain and to act to
deny such use to the enemy.

ORGANIZING THE BATTLEFIELD FOR URBAN COMBAT

6-54. Areas of responsibility in UC are constructed as they are in other ac-
tions. Urban detachments (UDs) are often given an attack zone in which to op-
erate. Support zones are often located in sanctuary areas inside battle positions.
6-55. In addition to normal control measures, the OPFOR will place great
emphasis in defining and using the third dimension that urban areas create.
(See Figure 5-12.) All zones will be defined both in terms of horizontal dimen-
sions as well as the vertical. It may well be for example, that the upper floors
of a building are a kill zone while the lower floors are still in the battle or dis-
ruption zone and contain friendly forces.

Disruption
Zone

Kill Zone

Battle
Zone

Rubble/debris

Fighting
Position Basement

Sewers/Drains Sewers/Drains
Underground Parking Garage

Tunnels/cache
Support Zone

6-12
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 6

Figure 6-x. Three-Dimensional Battlefield Organization

ORGANIZING FORCES FOR URBAN COMBAT

6-56. The primary organization used by the OPFOR for UC is the urban de-
tachment. A UD is a task-organized battalion or company given the mission
to attack and seize selected portions of an urban area. The composition of
UDs is mission dependent, but almost always includes, as a minimum, artil-
lery, engineers and flame weapons troops.
6-57. Urban detachments consist of the following elements:
Security element.
Clearing element.
Assault element.
Support element.

6-58. The security element of a UD provides local tactical security for the de-
tachment and prevents the enemy from influencing mission accomplishment.
The clearing element ensures the assault element has an avenue of approach
that is clear of obstacles, debris and rubble that would disrupt its movement.
The assault element moves from a covered and concealed position and accom-
plishes the UDs tactical task. The support element provides combat and com-
bat service support and C2 for the detachment.

PLANNING URBAN COMBAT

6-59. The OPFOR sees certain aspects of UC as critical to success and ad-
dresses them in the plan for every action on complex urban terrain.
6-60. The populace of a given urban area represents key terrain: the side that
manages it best has a distinct advantage. UC will see large segments of the
populace remain in place. The OPFOR will use the population to provide C3D
for their operations, enhancing their mobility in proximity to enemy posi-
tions. The OPFOR will take advantage of enemy moral responsibilities and
attempt to make the civil population a burden on enemy forces logistical and
force protection resources. They will herd refugees into enemy controlled sec-
tors, steal from local nationals and hide among civilians during enemy offen-
sive operations.
6-61. The civil population will also serve as a key intelligence source for the
OPFOR. Local hires serving among enemy soldiers, civilians with access to
base camp perimeters and refugees moving through enemy-controlled sectors
will all be manipulated by threat forces to provide information on enemy dis-
positions, readiness and intent. Also, OPFOR SPF and reconnaissance assets
will move among well-placed civilian groups.
6-62. The OPFOR will attempt to win the information war as much as they
will directly oppose enemy action. Portable video cameras, internet access,
commercial radios and cellular phones are all tools that permit the OPFOR to
tell its story and turn the national wills involved against enemy participation
in the operation. Enemy atrocities will be staged and broadcast. Electronic
mail will be transmitted to sympathetic groups to help undermine resolve.

6-13
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04)_______________________________________________________________

Hackers will gain access to enemy sites to manipulate information to the

threats advantage.
6-63. The OPFOR plan for UC will always address the need for continuous
combat. The plan includes a methodology for cycling soldiers out of positions
in contact to reduce the effects of combat stress.

EXECUTING URBAN COMBAT

6-64. The OPFOR will identify and quickly seize control of critical compo-
nents of the urban landscape to help them shape the battlespace to their own
ends. Phone exchanges provide simple and reliable communications that can
be easily secured with off-the-shelf technologies. Sewage treatment plants
and flood control machinery can be used to implement weapons of mass de-
struction (WMD) strategies or to make sections of the urban area uninhabit-
able. Media stations significantly improve the controlling forces information
ops position. Power generation and transmission sites provide means to con-
trol significant aspects of civilian society over a large area.
6-65. Upper floors and roofs provide the OPFOR excellent observation points
and battle positions above many weapons maximum elevations. Shots from
upper floors strike armored vehicles in vulnerable points. Basements also
provide firing points below many weapons minimum depressions and strike
at weaker armor. Sewers and subways provide covered and concealed access
throughout the area of operations. The OPFOR will think in terms of these
three dimensions. Conventional lateral unit boundaries will often not apply
as threat forces control some stories of the same building while enemy forces
control others. See Figure 5-12 for an example of UC in an enemy-controlled
building complex.

6-14
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 6

Enemy-held
Building Complex

Security Element
Security Element

Support Element

Assault Element

Clearing Element

Figure 6-x. Urban Detachment Attacking Enemy-Controlled Building Complex

6-66. Whether they are purpose-built or adapted, many weapons will have
greater then normal utility in an urban environment while others will have
significant disadvantages. The following are examples of weapons favored by
the OPFOR in urban operations:
Weapons with no minimum depression or maximum elevation.
Grenade launchers (automatic and rifle-mounted).
AT grenade launchers and shoulder-fired ATGMs.
Weapons with little or no backblast (such as gas metered or soft
launch).
Mortars.
Sniper rifles.
Machineguns.
Grenades.
Flame and incendiary weapons.
Riot control and tranquilizer gases.
Mines and boobytraps.
Artillery pieces used in direct fire mode.

6-67. The OPFOR will hug high-technology conventional enemy forces in an

urban environment to avoid the effects of high-firepower standoff weapon
systems. Additionally, it will attempt to keep all or significant portions of en-

6-15
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04)_______________________________________________________________

emy forces engaged in continuous operations to increase their susceptibility

to stress-induced illnesses. Urban operations, by their nature, produce an in-
ordinate amount of combat-stress casualties and continuous operations exac-
erbate this problem. The OPFOR will maintain a large reserve to minimize
the impact of this on its own forces.
6-68. The OPFOR will prey on soldiers untrained in basic infantry skills.
Ambushes will focus on these type soldiers conducting resupply operations or
moving in poorly guarded convoys. Urban combat is characterized by the iso-
lation of small groups and navigational challenges and the threat will use the
separation this creates to inflict maximum casualties even when there is no
other direct military benefit from the action.

6-16
 Chapter 7

Information Warfare
The OPFOR and forces of the States regional neighbors are rapidly in-
creasing the levels of technology used by military communications, auto-
mation, reconnaissance, and target acquisition systems employed at the
tactical level. Potential extra-regional adversaries rely heavily on such
systems. In order to ensure the successful use of its own information
technologies and to deny the enemy the advantage afforded by such sys-
tems, the OPFOR has continued to refine its doctrine and capabilities for
information warfare (IW).

The OPFOR defines information warfare as specifically planned and inte-

grated actions taken to achieve an information advantage at critical
points and times. The goal is to influence an enemys decision-making
through his collected and available information, information systems, and
information-based processes, while retaining the ability to employ
friendly information, information-based processes, and systems.

Knowing it cannot maintain continuous information dominance, particu-

larly against an extra-regional opponent, the OPFOR selects for disrup-
tion only those targets most critical to ensuring the successful achieve-
ment of its objectives. It attempts to gain an information advantage only
at critical times and places on the battlefield. This chapter focuses on IW
activities at the tactical level. 1

ELEMENTS OF IW

7-1. Integrated within IW doctrine are the following seven elements:

Electronic warfare (EW).
Deception.
Physical destruction.
Protection and security measures.
Perception management.
Computer Warfare
Information attack (IA).

1
Unless specifically stated otherwise, references to division and brigade in this chapter also apply to a division tacti-
cal group (DTG) or brigade tactical group (BTG). A tactical group is a task-organized unit organized around the
baseline, administrative structure of a division or brigade.

6-1
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

7-2. The seven elements of IW do not exist in isolation from one another and are not mutually
exclusive. The overlapping of functions, means, and targets makes it necessary that they all be
integrated into a single, integrated IW plan. However, effective execution of IW does not neces-
sary involve the use of all elements concurrently. In some cases, one element may be all that is
required to successfully execute a tactical IW action. Nevertheless, using one element or subele-
ment, such as camouflage, does not by itself necessarily constitute an application of IW.
7-3. The use of each element or a combination of elements is determined by the tactical situa-
tion and support to the overall operational objective. The size and sophistication of an enemy
force also determines the extent to which the OPFOR employs the various elements of IW. The
commander has the freedom to mix and match elements to best suit his tactical needs, within the
bounds of guidance from higher headquarters.

ELECTRONIC WARFARE
7-4. EW is activity conducted to control or deny the enemys use of the electromagnetic spec-
trum, while ensuring its use by the OPFOR. The OPFOR realizes that it cannot completely deny
the enemys use of the spectrum. Thus, the goal of OPFOR EW is to control (limit or disrupt) his
use or selectively deny it at specific locations and times on the battlefield, at the OPFORs choos-
ing. In this way, the OPFOR intends to challenge the enemys goal of information dominance.
7-5. The OPFOR employs both nonlethal and lethal means for EW. Nonlethal means range
from signals reconnaissance and electronic jamming to the deployment of corner reflectors, pro-
tective countermeasures, and deception jammers. The OPFOR can employ low-cost GPS jammers
to disrupt enemy precision munitions targeting, sensor-to-shooter links, and navigation. Lethal
EW activities include the physical destruction of high-priority targets supporting the enemys
decision-making processsuch as reconnaissance sensors, command posts (CPs), and communi-
cations systems. They also include activities such as lethal air defense suppression measures. If
available, precision munitions can degrade or eliminate high-technology command and control
(C2) assets and associated links.
7-6. EW activities especially focus on the enemys advanced C2 systems developed to provide
real-time force synchronization and shared situational awareness. The enemy relies on the
availability of friendly and enemy force composition and locations, digital mapping displays, and
automated targeting data. By targeting vulnerable communications links, the OPFOR can dis-
rupt the enemys ability to digitally transfer and share such information. The OPFOR enhances
its own survivability through disrupting the enemys ability to mass fires with dispersed forces,
while increasing enemy crew and staff workloads and disrupting his fratricide-prevention meas-
ures.
7-7. EW is a perfect example of the integrated nature of OPFOR IW elements. It overlaps
significantly with protection and security measures, deception, and physical destruction. Recon-
naissance, aviation, air defense, artillery, and engineer support may all contribute to successful
EW for IW purposes.

Signals Reconnaissance
7-8. Signals reconnaissance conducted in support of the tactical actions focuses on identifying
and disrupting the coordination of enemy forces. It includes both intercept and direction finding
(DF). Priorities for signals reconnaissance include
Maneuver unit CPs and nets.
Forward air controller (FAC) nets.
Control links of

7-2
 _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 7

Fire support and tactical aviation assets.

Maneuver reserves.
Antitank reserves.
Engineer elements.
Signals reconnaissance targets all forms of target acquisition systems and
sensors, especially those associated with enemy EW activities.

Electronic Jamming
7-9. Jamming also supports the disaggregation of enemy forces. Jamming targets include
Company and battalion command nets.
Brigade command nets.
Artillery battery and battalion fire direction center (FDC) and com-
mand nets.
Command links between brigade and division reserves and parent units.
7-10.

DECEPTION
7-11. The OPFOR integrates deception into every tactical military action; it does not plan de-
ception measures and activities in an ad hoc manner. A deception plan is always a major portion
of the overall IW plan. The OPFOR formulates its battle plan, overall IW plan, and deception
plan concurrently. It attempts to deceive the enemy concerning the exact strength and composi-
tion of its forces, their deployment and orientation, and their intended manner of employment.
When successfully conducted, deception activities ensure that the OPFOR achieves tactical sur-
prise, while enhancing force survivability. All deception measures and activities are continuously
coordinated with deception plans and operations at higher levels. Affiliated forces may assist in
executing deception activities.

Deception Activities
7-12. OPFOR deception activities seek to confuse the enemy to the extent that he is unable to
distinguish between legitimate and false targets, units, activities, and future intentions. Insert-
ing false or misleading information at any point in the enemy decision-making process can lead
to increased OPFOR survivability and the inability to respond appropriately to OPFOR tactical
actions. Manipulation of the electromagnetic spectrum is critical to successful deception activi-
ties, as the OPFOR responds to the challenge posed by advances in enemy C2 systems and sen-
sors.
7-13. Deception activities can include
Executing feints and demonstrations to provide a false picture of where
the main effort will be.
Creating the false picture of a major offensive effort.
Maximizing protection and security measures to conceal movement.
Creating false high-value assets such as surface-to-surface missile
(SSM) launchers, CPs, and armor concentrations with decoys or mockups.

7-14. The OPFOR employs all forms of deception, ranging from physical decoys and electronic
devices to tactical activities and behaviors. The key to all types of deception activities is that they

7-3
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

must be both realistic and fit the deception story. Due to the sophistication and variety of sensors
available to the enemy, successfully deceiving him requires a multispectral effort. The OPFOR
must provide false or misleading thermal, visual, acoustic, and electronic signatures.
7-15. Integral to the planning of deception activities is the OPFORs identification of the decep-
tion target. This target is that individual, organization, or group that has the necessary decision-
making authority to take action (or to neglect to do so), in line with the deceivers deception objec-
tive. On the tactical battlefield, this target is typically the enemy commander, although the OPFOR
recognizes the importance of focusing actions to affect specific staff elements.
7-16. Successful deception activities depend on the identification and exploitation of enemy
information systems and networks, as well as other conduits for introducing deceptive informa-
tion. Knowing how the conduits receive, process, analyze, and distribute information allows for
the provision of specific signatures that meet the conduits requirements. On the tactical battle-
field, the enemy reconnaissance system is the primary information conduit, and receives the
most attention from OPFOR deception planners. The international media and Internet sites may
also be a target for deceptive information at the tactical level, being fed false stories and video that
portray tactical-level actions with the goal of influencing operational or even strategic decisions.

Deception Forces
7-17. The battle plan and/or IW plan may call for the creation of one or more deception forces.
This means that nonexistent or partially existing formations attempt to present the illusion of
real or larger units. When the IW plan requires combat forces to take some action (such as a feint
or demonstration), these forces are designated as deception forces in close-hold executive sum-
maries of the plan. Wide-distribution copies of the plan make reference to these forces according
to the designation given them in the deception story.
7-18. The deception force is typically given its own command structure both to replicate the
organization(s) necessary to the deception story and to execute the multidiscipline deception re-
quired to replicate an actual or larger military organization. The headquarters of a unit that has
lost all of its original subordinates to the task organization of actual DTGs or BTGs is an excel-
lent candidate for use as a deception force. Operational-strategic command (OSC) or DTG com-
manders can use deception DTG or BTG (or division or brigade) command structures to mislead
the enemy and deny him information on the actual organization of forces in the operation plan or
battle plan.
7-19. Deception forces may use a series of feints or demonstrations, ruses or decoys. All activi-
ties must fit the overall deception story and provide a consistent, believable, and multidiscipline
representation. Basic tactical camouflage and cover techniques are used to support all types of
deception.
7-20. Feints. Feints are offensive in nature and require engagement with the enemy in order
to show the appearance of an attack. The goal is to support the mission and ultimately mislead
the enemy. Feints can be used to force the enemy to
Employ his forces improperly. A feint may cause these forces to move
away from the main attack toward the feint, or a feint may be used to
fix the enemys follow-on forces.
Shift his supporting fires from the main effort.
Reveal his defensive fires. A feint may cause premature firing, which
reveals enemy locations.

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 _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 7

7-21. Demonstrations. Demonstrations are a show of force on a portion of the battlefield

where no decision is sought. They are similar to feints, but contact with enemy is not required.
Demonstrations may be conducted for the purpose of deceiving the enemy by a show of force. Ad-
vantages of demonstrations include
Absence of contact with enemy.
Possibility of using simulation devices in place of real items to deceive
the enemys reconnaissance capabilities.
Use when a full force is not necessary because of no contact with the
enemy.

7-22. Ruses. Ruses are tricks designed to deceive the enemy in order to obtain a tactical ad-
vantage. They are characterized by deliberately exposing false information to enemy collection
means. IAs, perception management actions, and basic C3D all support this type of deception.
7-23. Decoys. Decoys represent physical imitations of OPFOR systems or deception positions
to enemy RISTA assets in order to confuse the enemy. The goal is to divert enemy resources into
reporting or engaging false targets. It is not necessary to have specially manufactured equipment
for this type of visual deception. Decoys are used to attract an enemys attention for a variety of
tactical purposes. Their main use is to draw enemy fire away from high-value targets. Decoys are
generally expendable, and they
Can be elaborate or simple. Their design depends on several factors,
such as the target to be decoyed, a units tactical situation, available
resources, and the time available.
Can be preconstructed or made from field-expedient materials. Except
for selected types, preconstructed decoys are not widely available. A
typical unit can construct effective, realistic decoys to replicate its key
equipment and features through imaginative planning and a working
knowledge of the electromagnetic signatures emitted by the unit.

7-24. The two most important factors regarding decoy employment are location, fidelity and
realism. Logically placing decoys can greatly enhance their plausibility. Decoys are usually
placed near enough to the real target to convince an enemy that it has found the target. How-
ever, a decoy must be far enough away to prevent collateral damage to the real target when the
decoy draws enemy fire. Proper spacing between a decoy and a target depends on the size of the
target, the expected enemy target acquisition sensors, and the type of munitions directed against
the target. Decoys must be constructed according to a friendly units SOP and must include tar-
get features that an enemy recognizes. The most effective decoys are those that closely resemble
the real target in terms of electromagnetic signatures. Completely replicating the signatures of
some targets, particularly large and complex targets, can be very difficult. Therefore, decoy construc-
tion should address the electromagnetic spectral region in which the real target is most vulnerable.

Electronic Deception
7-25. Electronic deception is used to manipulate, falsify, and distort enemy sensors. It must be
conducted in such a manner that realistic signatures are replicated. Electronic deception takes
the form of manipulative, simulative, or imitative deception. The OPFOR may use one or all
of these types of electronic deception.
7-26. Manipulative Electronic Deception. Manipulative electronic deception (MED) seeks
to counter enemy jamming, signals intelligence (SIGINT), and target acquisition efforts by alter-
ing the electromagnetic profile of friendly forces. Specialists modify the technical characteristics

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

and profiles of emitters that could provide an accurate picture of OPFOR intentions. The objec-
tive is to have enemy analysts accept the profile or information as valid and therefore arrive at
an erroneous conclusion concerning OPFOR activities and intentions.
7-27. MED uses communication or noncommunication signals to convey indicators that mis-
lead the enemy. For example, to indicate that an OPFOR unit is going to attack when it is actu-
ally going to withdraw, the unit might transmit false fire support plans and requests for ammu-
nition.
7-28. MED can cause the enemy to fragment his intelligence and EW efforts to the point that
they lose effectiveness. It can cause the enemy to misdirect his assets and therefore cause fewer
problems for OPFOR communications.
7-29. Simulative Electronic Deception. Simulative electronic deception (SED) seeks to mis-
lead the enemy as to the actual composition, deployment, and capabilities of the friendly force.
The OPFOR may use controlled breaches of security to add credence to its SED activities. There
are a number of techniques the OPFOR uses.
With unit simulation, the OPFOR establishes a network of radio and
radar emitters to emulate those emitters and activities found in the
specific type unit or activity. The OPFOR may reference the false unit
designator in communications traffic and may use false unit call signs.
With capability or system simulation, the OPFOR projects an elec-
tronic signature of new or differing equipment to mislead the enemy
into believing that a new capability is in use on the battlefield. To add
realism and improve the effectiveness of the deception, the OPFOR
may make references to new equipment designators on other or re-
lated communications nets.
To provide a false unit location, the OPFOR projects an electronic sig-
nature of a unit from a false location while suppressing the signature
from the actual location. Radio operators may make references to false
map locations near the false unit location, such as hill numbers, a road
junction, or a river. This would be in accordance with a script as part of
the deception.

7-30. Imitative Electronic Deception. Imitative electronic deception (IED) injects false or
misleading information into enemy communications and radar networks. The communications
imitator gains entry as a bona fide member of the enemy communications system and maintains
that role until he passes the desired false information to the enemy.
7-31. In IED, the enemys electromagnetic emissions are imitated to mislead the enemy. Ex-
amples include entering the enemy communication nets by using his call signs and radio proce-
dures, and then giving enemy commanders instructions to initiate actions. Targets for IED in-
clude any enemy receiver and can range from cryptographic systems to very simple, plain-
language tactical nets. IED can cause an enemy unit to be in the wrong place at the right time,
to place ordnance on the wrong target, or to delay attack plans. Imitative deception efforts are
intended to cause decisions based on false information that appears to the enemy to have come
from his own side.
7-32. Noncommunications Deception. The OPFOR is continuing the development and
fielding of dedicated tactical noncommunications means of electronic deception. It simulates
troop movements by such means as use of civilian vehicles to portray movement to radar, and
marching refugees to portray movement of troops in the rear. Simple, inexpensive radar corner

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reflectors provide masking by approximating the radar cross sections of military targets such as
bridges, tanks, aircraft, and even navigational reference points. Corner reflectors can be quite
effective when used in conjunction with other EW systems, such as ground-based air defense
jammers.

Deception Command Post

7-33. The IW plan may also call for employing deception CPs. These are complex, multi-sensor-
affecting sites integrated into the overall deception plan to assist in achieving battlefield oppor-
tunity by forcing the enemy to expend his command and control warfare (C2W) effort against
meaningless positions.

PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION
7-34. Another method for disrupting enemy control is physical destruction of the target. The
OPFOR integrates all types of conventional and precision weapon systems to conduct the de-
structive fires, to include fixed- and rotary-wing aviation, cannon artillery, multiple rocket
launchers (MRLs), and SSMs. It can also utilize other means of destruction, such as explosives
delivered by special-purpose forces (SPF), insurgents, terrorists, or other affiliated forces.
7-35. Physical destruction measures focus on destroying critical components of the enemy
force. C2 nodes and target acquisition sensors are a major part of the fire support plan during
physical destruction action. Priority targets include
Battalion, brigade, and division CPs.
Area distribution system communications centers and nodes.
Artillery FDCs.
FACs.
Weapon system-related target acquisition sensors.
Jammers and signals intelligence (SIGINT) systems.

7-36. The OPFOR may integrate all forms of destructive fires, especially artillery and aviation,
with other IW activities. Physical destruction activities are integrated with jamming to maximize
their effects. Specific missions are carefully timed and coordinated with the IW plan and the actions
of the supported units.
7-37. The accuracy of modern precision weapons allows the OPFOR to strike at specific IW-
related targets with deadly accuracy and timing. Due to the mobility and fleeting nature of many
IW targets, precision weapons deliver the munitions of choice against many high-priority targets.
7-38. The OPFOR continues to research and develop directed energy weapons, to include radio
frequency weapons and high-power lasers. While the OPFOR has fielded no dedicated weapon
systems, it may employ low-power laser rangefinders and laser target designators in a sensor-
blinding role.

PROTECTION AND SECURITY MEASURES

7-39. Protection and security measures encompass a wide range of activities, incorporating the
elements of deception and EW. Successfully conducted protection and security measures signifi-
cantly enhance tactical survivability and preserve combat power.
7-40. Protection and security measures conducted as part of IW include
Information collection, processing, and utilization.

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

Reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance.

Information and operations security.
Camouflage, concealment, cover, and deception (C3D).
Force protection.
Secure use of information-collection and -processing systems.
At the tactical level, the focus is primarily on counterreconnaissance, infor-
mation and operations security, and C3D measures.

Counterreconnaissance
7-41. The OPFOR tries to exploit the large number and apparently superior technology of the
enemys sensors. For example, it employs software at the tactical level that allows it to analyze
the enemys satellite intelligence collection capabilities and warn friendly forces of the risk of
detection. The use of signature-reducing and signature-altering devices, along with diligent ap-
plication of operations security measures, supports deception activities in addition to denying
information.

Information and Operations Security

7-42. Information and operations security can protect the physical and intellectual assets used
to facilitate command and control. Security must function continuously to be effective. It must
conceal not only operational intentions, current locations and configurations, and actions but also
the tactics, techniques, and procedures of information systems employment and operation.
7-43. The OPFOR clearly understands the importance of information security. Commanders
understand their vulnerabilities to being attacked through their own information systems and
develop means to protect these systems. In addition, the OPFOR must be capable of isolating
attacks on its information systems while maintaining the ability to execute. In order to reduce
the vulnerability, the OPFOR emphasizes strong communications, computer, and transmission
security. It uses all available assets of the State to support this process and supply the necessary
resources and intelligence.

Camouflage, Concealment, Cover, and Deception

7-44. The OPFOR gives particular attention to protective measures aimed at reducing the en-
emys ability to target and engage OPFOR systems with precision munitions. Knowing that the
enemy cannot attack what his RISTA systems do not find, the OPFOR employs a variety of C3D
techniques throughout the disruption, battle and support zones. These range from the most sim-
ple and inexpensive methods to hide from observation to the most modern multispectral signa-
ture-reducing technology.

PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT
7-45. Perception management involves measures aimed at creating a perception of truth that
best suits OPFOR objectives. It integrates a number of widely differing activities that use a com-
bination of true, false, misleading, or manipulated information. Targeted audiences range from
enemy forces to the States own citizens.
7-46. The various perception management activities include efforts conducted as part of
Psychological warfare (PSYWAR).
Public affairs.

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Media manipulation and censorship.

Statecraft.
Public diplomacy.

7-47. The last two components, while not conducted at the tactical level, certainly have a great
impact on how and where the OPFOR conducts tactical-level perception management activities.
Perception management activities conducted at the tactical level must be consistent with the
States operational and strategic goals.
7-48. PSYWAR is a major contributor to perception management during combat. Targeting the
military forces of the enemy, PSYWAR attempts to influence the attitudes, emotions, motiva-
tions, and reasoning of enemy personnel. Specialists plan PSYWAR activities at all command
levels down to DTG or BTG. In addition to the enemys military forces, the specialists also con-
centrate on manipulating the local population and international media in favor of the OPFOR,
turning opinion against the enemys objectives. Planners focus special emphasis on highlighting
enemy casualties and lack of success. The enemy nations population is a major target of these
activities, due to the importance of public support for enemy military activities.
7-49. Statecraft (the art of conducting state affairs) and diplomacy (the art and practice of con-
ducting negotiations with other states) are aspects of perception management conducted with
foreign governments, and include those countries populations as a target. The OPFOR skillfully
employs media and other neutral players, such as nongovernmental and private volunteer or-
ganizations, to influence further public and private perceptions. It exploits the international me-
dias willingness to report information without independent and timely confirmation.
7-50. The State employs public affairs and censorship to control its own populations access to
information and perception of reality. Successful preparation of the population significantly en-
hances public support for the OPFORs military actions. As part of this, the State prepares its
forces and population for enemy IW.

INFORMATION ATTACK
7-51. The OPFOR recognizes the increasing dependence of modern armies on tactical informa-
tion systems. The OPFOR attempts to preserve the advantages of such systems for its own use,
while exploiting the enemys reliance on such systems.
7-52. Information attack is a critical element of OPFOR IW. This type of action focuses on the
intentional disruption or distortion of information in a manner that supports accomplishment of
the mission. Unlike, computer warfare attacks that target the information systems, IAs target the
information itself. Attacks on the commercial Internet by civilian hackers have demonstrated the
vulnerability of cyber and information systems to innovative and flexible penetration, disruption, or
distortion techniques. OPFOR information attackers (cyber attackers) learn from and expand upon
these methods.
7-53. IA offers a powerful tool for the OPFOR. For example, an information attacker may tar-
get an information system for electronic sabotage or manipulate and exploit information. This
may involve altering data, stealing data, or forcing a system to perform a function for which it
was not intended, such as creating false information in a targeting or airspace control system.
7-54. Likely targets for an IA are information residing in the critical tactical systems of
an opponent: telecommunications links and switches, fire control, logistics automation, ISR
downlinks, situational awareness networks, command and control systems, etc.

COMPUTER WARFARE

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

7-55. Computer warfare consists of attacks that focus specifically on the computer systems,
networks, and/or nodes. This includes a wide variety of activities, ranging from unauthorized
access (hacking) of information systems for intelligence-collection purposes, to the insertion of
malicious software (viruses, worms, logic bombs, or Trojan horses). Such attacks concentrate on
the denial, disruption, or manipulation of the infrastructures integrity. The OPFOR may at-
tempt to accomplish these activities through the use of agents or third-party individuals with
direct access to enemy information systems. It can also continually access and attack systems at
great distances via communications links such as the Internet.
7-56. OPFOR computer warfare activities may be conducted prior to or during a military
action. For example, by damaging or destroying networks related to an enemys projected force
deployments and troop movements, the OPFOR can effectively disrupt planning and misdirect
movement, producing substantial confusion and delays. As modern armies increasingly rely on
just-in-time logistics support, targeting logistics-related computers and databases can produce
delays in the arrival of critical materiel such as ammunition, fuel, and spare parts during critical
phases of a conflict.
The OPFOR can successfully conduct invasive computer warfare activities from the safety of its own
territory, given the distributed ability to reach targeted computers anywhere in the world (as long as
they are connected to the Internet). The OPFOR can continuously exploit the highly integrated
information systems of an adversary.

TOOLS AND TARGETS

7-57. Tools for waging IW can include conventional physical and electronic destruction means,
malicious software, denial of service (DOS) attacks, the Internet, the media, and communication
networks, as well as various types of reconnaissance, espionage, and eavesdropping technologies.
The OPFOR can employ IW tools from both civilian and military sources and assets of third-
party sources.
7-58. The OPFOR sees the targets of IW as decision makers, weapons and hardware, an oppo-
nents critical information infrastructure, C2 system, information and telecommunications sys-
tems, and C2 centers and nodes. Information links, such as transmitters, communication devices,
and protocols, will be targeted. These targets may be more susceptible to precision fires and more
traditional forms of attack based on EW. However, the OPFOR is extremely adaptive and will
employ the best option available to degrade or destroy an information link.

STRATEGIC IW
7-59. Strategic information warfare (SIW) is the synergistic effort of the State to control or
manipulate information events in the strategic environment, be they political, economic, mili-
tary, or diplomatic in nature. Specifically, the State defines SIW as any attack (digital, physical,
or cognitive) against the information base of an adversarial nations critical infrastructures. The ul-
timate goal of SIW is strategic disruption and damage to the overall strength of the opponent. This
disruption also focuses on the shaping of foreign decision makers actions to support the States stra-
tegic objectives and goals.
7-60. The Strategic Information Warfare Planning Office (SIWPO) within the National Com-
mand Authority (NCA) is responsible for developing a strategic information warfare plan (SIWP)
and for reviewing and integrating information-related plans of all State ministries, both military
and civilian. However, the SIWPO works most closely with the Ministry of Defense, specifically
the General Staff, to ensure the development of the SIWP in concert with the military IW plan.

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7-61. In Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, the Chief of IW handles IW functions
that transcend service component boundaries. He reviews and approves the IW plans of all op-
erational-level commands as well as any separate theater headquarters that might be estab-
lished. He drafts the overall military IW plan that, upon approval by the Intelligence Officer, is
forwarded to the Operations Directorate of the General Staff for inclusion in the military strate-
gic campaign plan (SCP). Once approved by the Chief of the General Staff, the military IW plan
and the rest of the military SCP are forwarded to the SID for incorporation into the national-
level SIWP and the national SCP, respectively. During peacetime and preparation for war, the
Chief of IW continues to review and refine the military IW plan.

OPERATIONAL-LEVEL IW
7-62. The OPFOR conducts IW actions at the operational level to support strategic campaigns
or operational objectives or to deny its opponents the ability to conduct such operations. The fo-
cus at this level is on affecting an adversarys lines of communication (LOCs), logistics, C2, and
critical decision-making processes. The OPFOR targets information or information systems in
order to affect the information-based process, be it human or automated.
7-63. Just as there is a Chief of IW in the General Staff, there is a chief of IW under the intel-
ligence officer in operational-level staffs. The intelligence officer coordinates all necessary na-
tional- or theater-level assets for the IW plan. He and chief of IW are responsible for ensuring
that all IW actions undertaken at their level are in concert with the overall military IW plan and
the SIWP. As necessary, the Chief of IW in the General Staff can directly task each operational-
level chief of IW to support the SIW campaign.

TACTICAL-LEVEL IW
7-64. Information, its management, and its control have always been important to the success-
ful conduct of tactical missions. Given todays tremendous advancements in information and in-
formation systems technology, this importance is growing in scope, impact, and sophistication.
The OPFOR recognizes the unique opportunities that IW gives tactical commanders and con-
tinuously strives to incorporate IW activities in all tactical missions and battles.
7-65. IW may help degrade or deny effective enemy communications and blur or manipulate
the battlefield picture. In addition, IW helps the OPFOR achieve the goal of dominating the
tempo of combat. Using a combination of perception management activities, deception tech-
niques, and EW, the OPFOR can effectively slow the pace of battle. For example, the OPFOR
may select to destroy lucrative enemy targets or orchestrate and execute a perception manage-
ment activity that weakens the enemys international and domestic support, causing hesitation
or actual failure of the operation. It executes deception plans to confuse the enemy and conceal
true OPFOR intentions. More traditional EW activities can also contribute to the successful ap-
plication of IW at the tactical level by challenging or weakening the enemys quest for informa-
tion dominance.
7-66. IW also supports the critical mission of counter-reconnaissance at the tactical level. The
OPFOR constantly seeks ways to attack, degrade, or manipulate the enemys reconnaissance,
intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA) capabilities. All enemy target acquisi-
tion systems and sensors are potential targets. Long-range sensors in particular are a high prior-
ity for attack by fires or electronic jamming.
7-67. While the effects of IW can be multidimensional and at times hard to pinpoint, the OP-
FOR highlights the following tasks and associated effects as critical to the application of IW at
the tactical level:

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

Destroy. Destruction tasks physically render an enemys information

systems ineffective. Destruction is most effective when timed to occur
before the enemy executes a C2 function or when focused on a resource-
intensive target that is hard to reconstitute.
Degrade. Degradation attempts to reduce the effectiveness of the en-
emys information infrastructure, information systems, and informa-
tion collection means.
Disrupt. Disruption activities focus on the disruption of enemy obser-
vation and sensor capabilities at critical times and locations on the bat-
tlefield.
Deny. Denial activities attempt to limit the enemys ability to collect or
disseminate information on the OPFOR or deny his collection efforts.
Deceive. Deception activities strive to mislead the enemys decision
makers and manipulate his overall understanding of OPFOR activities.
Exploit. Exploitation activities attempt to use the enemys C2 or
RISTA capabilities to the advantage of the OPFOR or to exploit any
enemy vulnerability.
Influence. The goal of perception management activities is to affect an
enemys beliefs, motives, perspective, and reasoning capabilities, in or-
der to support OPFOR objectives.
SYSTEMS WARFARE
7-68. In the systems warfare approach to combat (see Chapter 1), the OPFOR often focuses on
attacking the C2 and/or RISTA elements that are critical components of the enemys combat sys-
tem. It is often more feasible to attack these types of targets, rather than directly engaging the
combat power of the enemys combat or combat support forces or even his logistics forces. Tacti-
cal-level IW can be a primary means of attacking C2 and RISTA assets, either on its own or in
conjunction with other elements of the OPFORs own combat system.

OFFENSIVE IW
7-69. Offensive IW involves the integrated use of subordinate and supporting capabilities and
activities, mutually supported by intelligence, to affect an adversarys decision makers or to in-
fluence others in order to achieve or promote specific OPFOR objectives. Using the elements of
IW offensively, the OPFOR can either prevent an adversary from exercising effective C2, chal-
lenge his quest for information dominance, or leverage enemy information systems to its own
advantage.

Purpose of Offensive IW
7-70. Simply put, offensive IW seeks to deny, degrade, destroy, disrupt, deceive, and exploit an
adversarys information systems and capabilities. Offensive IW helps the OPFOR seize and re-
tain the initiative by degrading the enemys information systems and forcing the enemy com-
mander to be reactive. This can result in slowing the enemys tempo, disrupting his decision cy-
cle, and impacting his overall ability to generate combat forces and execute and sustain opera-
tions.

Possible Offensive IW Actions

7-71. Possible OPFOR offensive IW activities and actions can include

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Denying the enemy the information necessary to conduct operations

(destroy, degrade, or distort).
Influencing the information (misinformation, manipulation, or spin-
ning).
Disrupting the enemys ability to observe and collect information and
obtain or maintain information dominance.
Degrading enemy information collection or destroying his collection
means.
Deceiving the decision makers by manipulating perception and causing
disorientation within the decision cycle.
Neutralizing or destroying the opponents information capability by
physical destruction of critical communications nodes and links.
DEFENSIVE IW
7-72. Defensive IW is the integration and coordination of policies and procedures, operations, per-
sonnel, and technology to protect and defend friendly information and information systems. Defen-
sive IW also seeks to conceal the physical locations of critical information systems. IW activities,
particularly defensive measures, play a significant role in ensuring the viability and survivabil-
ity of the OPFOR C2 process. IW defensive actions are planned at the strategic, operational, and
tactical levels. IW measures, combined with the mobility and redundancy of C2 systems, can pro-
vide a high degree of survivability, even if the enemy is successful in disrupting or destroying some
elements of the process.

Purpose of Defensive IW
7-73. The objectives of OPFOR defensive IW activities and actions are
Protecting the information environment.
Detecting attack.
Restoring capabilities.
Responding to attack.
Specific objectives of defensive IW include misleading the enemy concerning
the OPFORs force structure, location, and intent; protecting all critical in-
formation and communication links; and ensuring maximum survivability of
friendly high-value assets and combat power.

Possible Defensive IW Actions

7-74. To achieve these objectives, the OPFOR conducts a variety of activities and actions that
can
Provide for uninterrupted control of friendly forces.
Ensure survivability through extensive use of signature-reducing
measures.
Conceal the identities and locations of critical elements.
Portray false force dispositions and OPFOR unit strengths.
Portray false levels of preparation, readiness, and morale.
Portray false impressions of OPFOR operational intent.

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

IW IN THE OFFENSE
7-75. IW in the offense can include both offensive and defensive IW activities. IW in the offense
may be in the form of deception planning and execution, physical destruction of C2 systems,
jamming, and/or IA of critical communication nodes. However, all elements of IW are available
for use by the commander.
7-76. During transition and adaptive operations, many tactical offensive actions are intended
to contribute to a larger effort to get the extraregional force to leave the region. Attacks to expel
often have a strong IW component, with an increased role of perception management activities,
with the goal of causing the enemy to remove himself from the area.

WINDOWS OF OPPORTUNITY
7-77. In order to conduct successful offensive action against an extraregional force that enjoys
a technological overmatch, the OPFOR must exploit windows of opportunity. Sometimes these
windows occur naturally, as a result of favorable conditions in the operational environment, but
most often the OPFOR will have to create its own opportunities.
7-78. When the OPFOR must create a window of opportunity, IW activities can contribute to
this by
Destroying or disrupting enemy C2 and RISTA assets.
Deceiving enemy imagery and signals sensors.
Selectively denying situational awareness.
Slowing the tempo of enemy operations.
Isolating key elements of the enemy force.
IW can help create the necessary windows of opportunity for each type of
offensive action by executing effective deception techniques, EW, and physical
destruction.

IW ROLE IN FUNCTIONAL FORCES

7-79. The role of deception forces is discussed extensively earlier in this chapter. However, IW
also can play an important role in any of the other functional forces associated with the various
types of offensive action.

Disruption Force
7-80. IW supports the counterreconnissance mission of the disruption force. Units in the dis-
ruption zone attempt to strip away the enemys reconnaissance assets (to deceive him of the loca-
tion and configuration of the attack) while denying him the ability to acquire and engage OPFOR
targets with deep fires. Typical targets for attack by the disruption force include enemy C2 sys-
tems and RISTA assets.
7-81. In the disruption force, signals reconnaissance elements assist other OPFOR reconnais-
sance means in completing the identification of the type of forces deployed by the enemy. They
also identify enemy reconnaissance reporting links for exploitation during the course of the of-
fensive action. All fire support and tactical aviation nets are identified and monitored, as are C2
links to enemy reserves. Combat engineer units are a high priority, since their composition and
disposition on the battlefield are indicators of how and where the enemy expects to conduct his
main defensive effort. Of particular interest are all units with obstacle-creating assets, such as
minelayers.

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Fixing Force
7-82. A fixing force may achieve its mission by conducting a successful feint or demonstration.
In this case, the function of the fixing force could be achieved by means of a deception force. EW
assets may be part of a fixing force. A combination of deception, EW, and other IW activities can
fix defending forces and forces that might otherwise have been capable of disrupting or interfer-
ing with the actions of the assault and exploitation forces, or coming to the aid of the targeted
enemy force. Such enemy forces and systems include reserves, quick-response forces, and preci-
sion fire systems that can respond rapidly to OPFOR offensive actions.

Assault Force
7-83. The assault force typically creates a window of opportunity that exposes the target and
allows the exploitation force to achieve the objective. However, effective IW can assist in creating
a situation in which no other assault force is necessary, since the target is already sufficiently
exposed.
7-84. Jamming missions are critical for assault forces. The OPFOR heavily targets reconnais-
sance-reporting links, minimizing the enemy knowledge of the approaching forces composition
and intentions. It jams fire support nets, and in particular reporting links between forward ob-
servers and firing batteries, to limit the number of calls for fire and fire missions. Depending on
the amount of air activity conducted by both the enemy and the OPFOR, air defenses and FACs
are targeted.
7-85. Specific targets jammed by the assault force, or in support of it, can include
Artillery FDCs and command nets.
Ground-reconnaissance and forward observer reporting links.
EW command and reporting links.
Air defense target acquisition, command, and air warning nets.
FAC-associated nets controlling attack aircraft.
Exploitation Force
7-86. Once the window of opportunity has been created by IW and/or other means, IW can con-
tinue to keep that window open throughout the conduct of the exploitation. If the target happens
to be an enemy C2 or RISTA asset, its physical destruction can meet the objective of the IW plan
as well as the battle plan.
7-87. During exploitation activities, IW (specifically EW) focuses on disrupting enemy forces,
such as reserves and attack air assets, that are capable of halting the OPFORs movement and
exploitation. Both signals reconnaissance and electronic jamming are performed by the exploita-
tion force and in support of it.
7-88. As the OPFOR maneuvers, it monitors enemy reserves and follow-on forces for the re-
sponse to the penetration. It also continues to monitor bypassed forces, in order to identify those
enemy elements capable of reconstituting or reorganizing and counterattacking. The OPFOR
typically tasks signals reconnaissance assets of exploitation forces with this mission, relieving
the assault force assets of this responsibility.
7-89. Priority targets for signals reconnaissance include
Reserve and follow-on force command nets.
Fire support nets (especially those units that could employ precision
weapons)

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

Antitank nets.
Attack helicopter nets.
NBC-related nets.

7-90. Jamming activities during exploitation target those maneuver and fire support units
providing active resistance. The OPFOR heavily targets reporting links between reserve and fol-
low-on maneuver units and their reconnaissance patrols, as well as their command nets.
7-91. All enemy maneuver and fire support units that may influence the OPFORs exploitation
force are jammed. This includes jamming of enemy air defense units that could jeopardize the
use of OPFOR attack helicopters and fixed-wing attack aircraft.
7-92. Specific jamming priorities include
Command nets of units in contact with the OPFOR fixing or assault
forces.
Reserve and follow-on force command nets.
Artillery battery FDC and command nets.
Air defense target acquisition and command nets.
FAC links and attack air command nets.
Reserves
7-93. The OPFOR will use information security and C3D measures to conceal the location, size,
and composition of an offensive reserve. For reserves (or any other force that has not yet been
committed to battle), the OPFOR emphasizes rigid information security procedures. This in-
cludes limiting radio transmissions to the minimum required or using alternate communications
means. Assembly areas will rely heavily on C3D to protect the uncommitted force from observa-
tion and attack. In some cases, however, the reserve may act as a deception force, drawing atten-
tion away from the actual assault or exploitation force.

IW ROLE IN CERTAIN TYPES OF OFFENSIVE ACTION

7-94. IW can support all types of offensive action: attack (integrated or dispersed), limited-
objective attack (sophisticated ambush, raid, spoiling attack, or counterattack), or strike. How-
ever, it can play particularly significant roles in certain types of action.

Dispersed Attack
7-95. Besides dispersion of forces, dispersed attack relies on IW to permit the OPFOR to con-
duct tactical offensive actions while overmatched by precision standoff weapons and imagery and
signals sensors. Deception forces can also play an important role in a dispersed attack.

Sophisticated Ambush and Raid

7-96. Sophisticated ambushes and raids rely on supporting actionsusually primarily IWto
create a window of opportunity for the ambush element to operate. The IW plan is designed to
facilitate infiltration or positioning of the ambush or raiding element and expose the target. Al-
though sophisticated ambushes are executed by tactical-level forces, the OSC will be involved in
IW planning and coordination of operational-level assets needed to support the ambush or raid.
A sophisticated ambush or raid can destroy key C2 and RISTA systems or facilities, denying
critical information to the enemy. Quite often, the OPFOR may conduct a raid as a disrupting or
misleading component of an IW plan surrounding another, larger tactical action or operation.

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Strike
7-97. Strikes are characterized by significant reliance on deception and other IW measures.
The window of opportunity needed to establish conditions favorable to the execution of the strike
may be created by deceiving enemy imagery and signals sensors or selectively denying the en-
emy situational awareness. A combination of deception and EW can fix defending forces, and
prevent the targeted enemy force from reacting in time to avoid destruction by OPFOR maneu-
ver and/or fires.

IW IN THE DEFENSE
7-98. As in the offense, IW in the defense can include both offensive and defensive IW activi-
ties. Some defensive IW activities tend to be more important in the defense than in the offense.
However, all elements of IW are available for use by the commander, and all can play a signifi-
cant role. Offensive IW actions have important applications, since an overall OPFOR defensive
actioneven at the tactical leveltypically incorporates many smaller offensive actions, which
can involve IW as well as maneuver and fires.
7-99. Specific defensive objectives include: misleading the enemy concerning the OPFORs
force structure, defensive orientation, and intentions; delaying and fragmenting the enemy at-
tack; and ensuring maximum survivability of friendly high-value assets and combat power. To
achieve these objectives, the OPFOR conducts a variety of IW activities that can
Disrupt or destroy enemy C2 nodes and links.
Provide for uninterrupted control of friendly forces.
Ensure survivability through extensive use of signature-reducing
measures.
Conceal the identities and locations of critical assets such as reserves,
artillery assets, and CPs.
Portray false force dispositions and strengths.
Portray false levels of preparation, readiness, and morale.

IW ROLE IN FUNCTIONAL FORCES

7-100. The role of deception forces, discussed extensively earlier in this chapter, is extremely
important in the defense. However, IW also can play an important role in any of the other func-
tional forces associated with the various types of defensive action.

Disruption Force
7-101. The role of the disruption force and of IW supporting that force is much the same as in
the offense. Targets for attack in the disruption zone include enemy C2 systems and RISTA as-
sets. However, IW efforts in the disruption zone may seek to either destroy or manipulate enemy
reconnaissance assets.
7-102. The disruption force may selectively destroy or render irrelevant the enemys RISTA
forces and deny him the ability to acquire and engage OPFOR targets with deep fires. There will
be times, however, when the OPFOR wants enemy reconnaissance to detect something that is
part of the deception plan. In these cases, the disruption force will not seek to destroy all of the
enemys RISTA assets.

Main Defense Force

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7-103. In either maneuver or area defense, the main defense force operates in the battle zone.
The success of the main defense force in accomplishing the purpose of the defense (destroy, pre-
serve, or deny) often relies heavily on successful execution of IW, especially in a defense against
a technologically superior extraregional force.
7-104. Maneuver Defense. Part of a defensive line in a maneuver defense may consist of de-
ception defensive positions. When the contact and shielding forces conduct defensive maneuver
to positions on subsequent defensive lines, signals reconnaissance and jamming assets support
the movement, when possible. Because of their high value to the commander, these assets nor-
mally do not deploy in positions that expose them to capture or destruction. Rather, they deploy
to reasonably secure terrain available off the routes of defensive maneuver. Primary targets are
enemy reconnaissance reporting links and fire support nets, in order to prevent or minimize at-
tacks or fire strikes on the contact or shielding force. Operational-level signals reconnaissance
and jamming assets may support a divisions (or brigades) maneuver defense; less likely, but
possible, is support provided by flanking units.
7-105. Area Defense. IW is particularly important to the execution of the area defense in tran-
sition and adaptive operations. Deception is critical to the creation of complex battle positions,
and effective perception management is vital to the creation of the windows of opportunity
needed to execute maneuver and fires. Complex battle positions are defensive locations designed
to employ a combination of complex terrain, C3D, and engineer effort to protect combat forces
from engagement by precision standoff attack. They are designed to protect the units within
them from detection and attack. Engineers also support the IW plan through activities such as
constructing deception defensive positions and preparing false routes. Defensive actions during
transition and adaptive operations will typically include increased use of perception manage-
ment in support of defensive actions.

Counterattack Force
7-106. As the OPFOR element designated as a counterattack force maneuvers to counterattack,
early and accurate identification of any enemy recognition and response is critical. Enemy air-
borne and ground reconnaissance reporting links and sensors, and long-range fire assets are
high-priority targets, although the OPFOR must rely on operational-level support for much of
the targeting capabilities required.
7-107. Signals reconnaissance and jamming priorities are generally similar to those for the
main defense force, with a few exceptions. Of particular importance are identifying and disrupt-
ing those command, fire support, and reconnaissance nets that link the penetrating enemy force
with his main body. Artillery and aviation nets are jammed, in order to prevent attacks coordi-
nated with the penetrating force.

Reserves
7-108. The commander positions his maneuver reserve in an assembly area using C3D to protect
it from observation and attack. In some cases, however, the reserve may receive the mission of
acting as a deception force. Antilanding reserves may be allocated EW assets for the purpose of
disrupting or defeating an airborne or heliborne landing.

ROLE OF IW ELEMENTS IN THE DEFENSE

7-109. In all types of defensive action, all elements of IW tend to be involved, to varying degrees,
depending on the situation and windows of opportunity. The two basic types of defensive action
(maneuver and area defense) share much in common from the IW perspective. Therefore, rather
than discussing IW contributions to each of the types of OPFOR defensive action, this section

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will discuss specific applications of various IW element that apply to the OPFOR defense, in
which the paramount role of IW is to provide deception capabilities, protection and security, EW,
and physical destruction, as well as to assist in attack detection and capability restoration. This
discussion supplements the basic information found in the Elements of IW section earlier in this
chapter, but with defense-specific applications.

Deception
7-110. The OPFOR develops a deception plan as part of the overall IW plan. The extent and
complexity of the deception depends on the amount of time available for planning and prepara-
tion.
7-111. While creating the picture of the battlefield the OPFOR wants the enemy to perceive,
deception planners have two primary objectives. The first is to cause the enemy to commit his
forces and attack in a manner that favors the OPFORs defensive plan. Specifically, the intent is
to have the enemy attack and attempt to penetrate the defense at a location of the OPFORs
choosing, where the OPFOR has created a lethal antitank defense and can counterattack to de-
stroy the enemy main force.
7-112. The second objective, and the focus of deception activities when time is limited, is to
minimize friendly-force signatures. This limits detection and destruction by enemy attack.
7-113. False Deployment. The OPFOR attempts to deny the enemy the ability to accurately
identify its defensive force dispositions and intentions. Knowing it cannot totally hide its forces,
it tries to blur the boundaries and compositions of the defending forces, while providing indica-
tions of deception units and false targets.
7-114. Actions are also taken to hide the exact composition and deployment of forces. Specific
activities include
Establishing deception defensive positions and engineer obstacles, sup-
ported by decoy vehicles.
Establishing disruption zones to conceal the actual battle line of
friendly defensive positions.
Concealing unit movement and occupation of defensive positions.
Creating the perception of false units and their associated activity.
Creating false high-value assets such as artillery and rocket systems,
tanks, and CPs.

7-115. By providing the appearance of units in false locations, the OPFOR attempts to induce
the enemy to attack into areas most advantageous to the OPFOR. When the deception is success-
ful, the enemy attacks the defense where the OPFOR can take maximum advantage of terrain.
False thermal and acoustic signatures, decoy and actual vehicles, and corner reflectors, sup-
ported by false radio traffic, all contribute to the appearance of a defensive force where in fact
none exists. Depending on the terrain, deception units may be created forward of the actual de-
fense, causing the enemy to commit forces to the attack earlier than he should. Alternatively, the
actual units could be forward of the deception units, providing surprise and lethal fires before the
enemy is prepared.
7-116. Sufficient engineer support is critical to the success of any defensive deception activity.
Units in the main effort receive the priority, to include the allocation of additional assets from
operational-level engineer units.

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

7-117. Signature Reduction. Signature reduction of OPFOR units in the defense is critical to
the success of any deception plan. Minimizing the thermal, radar, acoustic, and electronic signa-
tures of combat vehicles and supporting systems is critical to ensuring deception of the enemy
and, of course, enhancing survivability. The OPFOR extensively uses a variety of signature-
reduction materials and procedures that provide protection from sensors and target acquisi-
tion systems operating across the electromagnetic spectrum.

Protection and Security Measures

7-118. At the tactical level, protection and security measures in the defense focus primarily on
counterreconnaissance, C3D, and information security. These and other protection and security
measures measures may overlap into the realms of EW or deception.
7-119. Counterreconnaissance. Winning the counterreconnaissance battle is very important,
since it can limit what information the enemy is able to collect and use in planning his attack.
Tactical commanders realize that enemy operations hinge on an intelligence appreciation of the
situation. Therefore, defensive preparations will focus on destruction and deception of enemy
sensors in order limit the ability of enemy forces to understand the OPFOR defensive plan. A
high priority for all defensive preparations is to deny the enemy the ability to maintain re-
connaissance contact on the ground.
7-120. The OPFOR recognizes that, when conducting operations against an extraregional
power, it will often be impossible to destroy the ability of the enemys standoff RISTA means to
observe its defensive preparations. However, the OPFOR also recognizes the reluctance of enemy
military commanders to operate without human confirmation of intelligence, as well as the rela-
tive ease with which imagery and signals sensors may be deceived. OPFOR tactical commanders
consider ground reconnaissance by enemy Special Operations Forces as a significant threat in
the enemy RISTA suite and will focus significant effort to ensure its removal. While the OPFOR
will execute missions to destroy standoff RISTA means, C3D will be the method of choice for de-
grading the capability of such systems.
7-121. Camouflage, Concealment, Cover, and Deception. The OPFOR dedicates extensive
effort to employing C3D to protect its defensive positions and high-value assets. All units are re-
sponsible for providing protective measures for themselves, with support from engineer units.
The OPFOR employs a variety of signature-reducing or -altering materials and systems, to in-
clude IR- and radar-absorbing camouflage nets and paints.
7-122. Information Security. In the defense, the OPFOR emphasizes radio silence and alter-
nate communications methods. Rigid adherence to information security procedures and limiting
radio transmissions to the minimum required can complicate the enemys attempts to identify
defensive positions and structures.

Electronic Warfare
7-123. EW activities conducted in support of the defense focus on identifying and disrupting the
enemy maneuver C2 networks, disrupting control links associated with enemy fire support and
tactical aviation assets, and identifying sensor and target acquisition systems. As in the offense,
specific targets are assigned a priority based on the expected impact of their disruption, as well
as the time and location on the battlefield.
7-124. Signals Reconnaissance. In support of the defense, a division or separate brigade re-
ceives intelligence from the parent OSC concerning the projected enemy forces structure, compo-
sition, and intentions. This is especially critical for the signals reconnaissance effort, due to the
relatively short range of the tactical systems employed by the division or brigade.

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 _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 7

7-125. The OPFOR may choose to deploy signals reconnaissance assets forward within the dis-
ruption zone. These systems deploy along a baseline that best allows intercept and DF in the
projected area through which the enemy main effort must travel. When possible, the assets de-
ploy to pre-surveyed positions. It is extremely critical to select sites with access routes concealed
from enemy observation.
7-126. Deploying vulnerable electronic systems forward is a risk the commander may assume to
gain a tactical advantage. This deployment does allow the short-ranged tactical systems to col-
lect on targets they would otherwise be unable to reach from positions within the battle zone.
7-127. As the enemy forces approach, the OPFOR targets specific types of units for identifica-
tion and locating, to include
All reconnaissance units and systems, both ground-based and airborne.
Command links and CPs of leading maneuver units (although typically
most are still out of range).
Engineer units, especially obstacle-clearing and crossing assets.
Fire support and aviation nets, especially FACs and forward observers.
Jammers.

7-128. Reconnaissance and engineer activities are high priorities for detection and locating,
since they are excellent indicators of enemy intentions. The enemy moves obstacle-clearing
equipment and water-crossing systems, such as pontoon bridges, into the areas where he expects
to pass the main effort, and, in the case of rivers, where he plans to cross. The actions of recon-
naissance assets, particularly ground reconnaissance patrols, similarly indicate likely intentions
of the enemy main effort. Enemy jammers are always a high-priority target, due to their poten-
tial effect on OPFOR command and control.
7-129. As the enemy commits forces to the attack, the OPFOR tasks its signals reconnaissance
assets with identifying and locating the enemys main-effort maneuver and fire support ele-
ments, as well as those support units dedicated to supporting the main effort. The focus at this
time is on providing targeting, as well as details on enemy strength and intentions. Targeting
priorities for intercept and DF include
Maneuver battalion and brigade nets.
Artillery nets.
FAC and attack helicopter nets.
Air defense nets.
Communications jammers and SIGINT systems.
Engineer nets.
As command elements of these enemy units (such as CPs and communica-
tions nodes) are identified and located, the coordinates are passed to the divi-
sion (or brigade) for confirmation and targeting by fires.

7-130. Primary targets for the radar intercept and DF assets are the enemys battlefield surveil-
lance radars, weapon-locating radars, and air defense radars. In particular, detection of the en-
emys battlefield surveillance radars provides a key indication of his main effort, as well as a
general location of the enemys leading forces.

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

7-131. Electronic Jamming. The OPFOR conducts electronic jamming from the disruption
zone, although limited in scope. Because jammers are also limited in number, it dedicates them
to the defenses main effort.
7-132. There are a number of circumstances where jamming is appropriate, and at times, criti-
cal. These include
Jamming of maneuver and fire support nets in support of withdrawing
forces.
Jamming of C2 nets associated with NBC and precision weapons.
Jamming of reconnaissance reporting nets.
Jamming as part of a deception plan.
While the commander may employ jamming at other times, he must consider
the potential gain against the risk of detection.

7-133. The OPFOR takes advantage of the time prior to an enemy attack to emplace expendable
jammers (EXJAMs). These jammers can disrupt enemy communications nets. When used in con-
junction with terrain (such as at natural choke points, mountain passes, or valleys), they can
achieve significant results despite their short range and low power. The OPFOR can also use them to
support a deception plan, without risking expensive vehicle-based systems.
7-134. While limited in number, artillery-delivered EXJAMs may be employed. These jammers
are especially useful in those areas where support is not available from more powerful vehicle-
mounted jammers. Proximity fuze jammers deployed to protect high-value assets are active,
since the high-value assets are within indirect fire range from enemy artillery.
7-135. The OPFOR also employs jamming in the battle zone in support of its main defense force.
Once enemy forces close with the defending units, jamming activities focus primarily on enemy
maneuver and fire support assets engaged in his main effort, as well as any assets directly sup-
porting them.
7-136. Jamming priorities are similar to those for signals reconnaissance. Maneuver units are
jammed in order to disrupt coordination between and within units, especially when enemy units
are achieving varying degrees of success. Reporting links between reconnaissance and engineer
elements and the supported maneuver units are attacked as they attempt to exploit OPFOR
weaknesses the enemy may have found.

Physical Destruction
7-137. During the defense, IW-related destruction measures focus on destroying enemy assets
critical to the control of the attack. As in the offense, indirect fire, ground attack, and possibly air
attack all can contribute to the effort. Specific targets vary based upon location and time, but
typical high-priority targets include
Precision weapons systems.
C2 nodes and facilities.
Artillery, tactical aviation, and air defense systems.
Reserves.
RISTA systems.

7-138. Special emphasis is given to destruction of RISTA capabilities prior to the attack on OP-
FOR defensive positions. Once the attack begins, the OPFOR heavily targets enemy C2 nodes

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responsible for the planning and conduct of the attack, along with supporting communications.
Typically, destruction of C2 nodes prior to the attack may allow the enemy time to reconstitute
his control, whereas targeting them once forces are committed to the attack can cause a far
greater disruptive effect.

IW PLANNING
7-139. OPFOR IW planning occurs at all levels of conflict and before and after conflict. At the
strategic level, the initial focus is achieving State objectives and supporting the SCP. Perception
management, protection and security measures, and deception activities are critical at this level.
7-140. As tensions escalate, IW at the operational level can be employed to disrupt the enemys
information systems, further demonstrating national resolve and military capability. The opera-
tional-level chief of IW formulates the IW plan as an integral part of all ground, air, sea, and
space operations within the OSC. At the tactical level, IW activities focus on deception activities,
the disruption of enemy military communications, and protection and security for OPFOR mili-
tary actions (see TacticalLevel IW above).
7-141. An effective IW action demands the coordination of activities and capabilities into a sin-
gle, focused plan. Any or all elements of IW may be effectively used in any given plan. Figure 6-1 pro-
vides examples of objectives and targets.

IW Element Objectives Targets

Electronic Warfare Exploit, disrupt, deny, and degrade the en- C2 and RISTA assets and
emys use of the electromagnetic spectrum. networks.

Computer Warfare Disrupt, deny, or degrade the enemys C2 and RISTA assets and
computer networks and information flow. networks.

Deception Mislead enemy decision makers. Key military decision mak-

ers.
Cause confusion and delays in decision-
making process.

Persuade adversarys population and inter- General population and in-

national community to support OPFOR ob- ternational media sources
jectives. and Internet sites.

Physical Destruction Destroy enemys information infrastructures. C2 nodes and links, RISTA
assets, telecommunications,
and power sources.

Protection and Security Protect critical assets. Enemy RISTA assets.

Measures

Perception Management Distort reality or manipulate information to RISTA assets, media

support OPFOR goals. sources (international and
domestic).

Information Attack Objectives vary based on situational needs Computer networks, soft-
ware, hardware, telecom-

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

and objectives of the attack. munications, power sources,

and any other electronic
source or conduit of com-
munication or information.

Figure 6-1. IW Elements, Planning Objectives, and Targets

IW INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
7-142. The OPFOR requires precise and reliable knowledge of the enemys military information
architecture, including the design and training of his command structure, his decision-making
philosophies, and his communications and sensor capabilities. While not necessarily collected by
tactical assets, information related to an enemy nations civil communications, information sys-
tem software, and even how the media influence decision makers may be exploited on the battle-
field.
7-143. Information collected through reconnaissance is critical to the OPFOR IW planning proc-
ess. The OPFOR uses all forms of information collection, ranging from signals and ground recon-
naissance, to engineer reconnaissance, to radars and NBC detection systems. It can also use hu-
man intelligence assets such as agents and sympathizers. Each type provides critical pieces of
the enemy commanders plan that, when integrated, provide an accurate understanding of the
plan while minimizing the likelihood of accepting enemy deception for reality.

STAFF RESPONSIBILITIES
7-144. There is a chief of IW under the intelligence officer at division and brigade level, who has
responsibilities that parallel those of the chiefs of IW in the General Staff and on operational-
level military staffs. Within tactical-level staffs, the intelligence officer and chief of IW are re-
sponsible for ensuring that all IW actions undertaken at their level are in concert with the opera-
tional-level IW plan, the overall military IW plan, and the SIWP. As necessary, the Chief of IW
in the General Staff or the operational-level chief of IW can directly task each tactical-level chief
of IW to support the SIW campaign or the operational-level IW plan. (See the Strategic IW and
Operational-Level IW sections of this chapter.)

Intelligence Officer
7-145. The intelligence officer heads the intelligence and information section of the primary
staff. He ensures that all intelligence requirements are met and executes staff supervision over
the IW plan. He coordinates the support of all necessary operational-, theater-, or national-level
assets required for execution of the division (or brigade) IW plan. He must effectively task organ-
ize his staff resources to plan, conduct, and execute IW in a manner that supports strategic and
operational-level IW plans. Traditional staff functions and relationships may be expanded or
even redefined. (See Chapter 2 for a more detailed discussion of staff responsibilities and organi-
zation.)

Chief of IW
7-146. The division (or brigade) chief of IW belongs to the secondary staff, heading the IW sub-
section under the intelligence officer, under whose supervision he formulates the IW plan as an
integral part of division- or brigade-level planning. An effective IW action demands the coordina-
tion of all activities and capabilities into a single, focused plan. Any or all elements of IW may be
effectively used in any given plan.

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 _________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 7

7-147. The chief of IW supervises the execution of the division (or brigade) IW plan. He is re-
sponsible for
Coordinating the employment of IW assets, both those constituent to
the division (or brigade) level and (with the help of his intelligence of-
ficer and those at higher levels) those assets available at higher levels
that could support his IW plan.
Planning for and supervising all information protection and security
measures.
Supervising the implementation of the deception plan and perception
management objectives.
Working with the operations section of the staff to ensure that targets
scheduled for destruction support the IW plan, and if not, resolving
conflicts between IW needs and tactical needs.
Recommending to the intelligence officer any necessary actions re-
quired to implement the IW plan.

7-148. The chief of IW at each level of command submits his IW plan to the chief of IW at the
next-higher level. The senior chief of IW issues directives to subordinate units chiefs of IW.
These directives are part of the next-higher commands battle plan (operations plan) or combat
order (operational directive), and can be part of the SCP. What the subordinates plan and exe-
cute must be in concert with the higher plan and the higher headquarters also needs to ensure
that the IW plan of one subordinate does not conflict with that of its adjacent units.
7-149. The chief of IW also plays a key role in coordinating IW activities with other staff sec-
tions and subsections, particularly with members of the functional staff. For instance, he coordi-
nates with the division-level chief of integrated fires (or brigade-level chief of fire support) to en-
sure that deception and protection and security measures contribute to the success of fire sup-
port to overall offensive and defensive actions. He coordinates with the chief of force protection to
prevent or mitigate the effects of hostile actions on critical information and information systems.
He works closely with the chief of population management and representatives from the Minis-
try of Public Information regarding coordination of PSYWAR and other perception management
activities.

PLANNING
7-150. A key element in planning the offense or defense is organizing IW activities that are ap-
propriate and necessary to support whatever type of offensive or defensive action is being
planned. The success of IW during any form of action relies on the effectiveness of earlier IW ac-
tivities. Of course, it is important for all tactical-level IW plans to fit into the overall aims and
plans already set into motion at the operational and strategic levels.
7-151. The components of a tactical-level IW plan include, at a minimum, the following:
Statement of national- and operational-level military objectives and
goals.
IW objectives of the next-higher level of command.
Definition of the missions of IW (public, private, military, and nonmili-
tary).
Identification of all applicable State elements of power to assist in the
execution of the IW plan.

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

Potential targets and tools for destruction, degradation, or exploitation.

Intelligence required to conduct IW missions.
Specific unit responsibilities.
Other specific plan elements can include a review of the enemys IW capabili-
ties, a tactical analysis of all relevant information infrastructures (owners
and vulnerabilities), requirements of IW capabilities, an organizational plan
and staff responsibilities, a deception plan, and perception management ob-
jectives.

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 Chapter 8

Reconnaissance
To the OPFOR, the single most important component of military action is
reconnaissance. Reconnaissance represents all measures associated with
organizing, collecting, and studying information on the enemy, terrain,
and weather in the area of upcoming battles. Aggressive, continuous
reconnaissance allows the timely accomplishment of combat missions
with minimum losses. Poor reconnaissance can lead directly to failure.
The OPFOR will commit significant resources to any reconnaissance
mission.

The OPFOR treats reconnaissance as an offensive action, since the enemy

typically defends vital information with security actions and camouflage,
concealment, cover, and deception (C3D) measures. Thus, reconnaissance
plans must always have a provision for defeating the enemys efforts to
protect himself.

COMBINED ARMS MISSION

8-1. Reconnaissance is a combined arms mission, not solely the business of
reconnaissance troops. It involves the integrated efforts of troops from several
branches. OPFOR reconnaissance actions often include the use of
paramilitary and affiliated forces. Reconnaissance elements that are defeated
before or during the accomplishment of their mission are reconstituted from
any appropriate source.
8-2. This chapter focuses primarily on the reconnaissance activities of ground
maneuver forces and specialized ground reconnaissance troops. However,
there are also specialized reconnaissance assets in other arms, which other
chapters in this manual discuss in more detail:
Signals reconnaissance (Chapter 7).
Artillery target acquisition (Chapter 9).
Aerial reconnaissance (Chapter 10).
Air defense reconnaissance, early warning, and target acquisition
(Chapter 11).
Engineer reconnaissance (Chapter 12).
NBC reconnaissance (Chapter 13).
Special reconnaissance (Chapter 15).

8-1
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

The integrated efforts of any or all of these reconnaissance means may be

necessary to support specific missions. Efficient and accurate reconnaissance
is also crucial to ensuring the success of information warfare (IW) activities.

CONCEPT
8-3. For the OPFOR, reconnaissance is a critical element of combat support.
In modern combat, the battlefield develops unevenly, and units cannot rely
on the security of their flanks or rear in fact there may not even be flanks
or rear. Friendly and enemy forces can become mixed, with the combat
situation developing and changing quickly. Reconnaissance elements must
warn commanders of developing threats and identify enemy strengths and
vulnerabilities. The OPFOR organizes reconnaissance to acquire continuous,
timely, and accurate information about the enemys NBC and precision
weapons; force disposition and intentions; and terrain and weather. This
information is vital to the OPFOR decision-making and planning process.
Reconnaissance can decisively influence the outcome of a battle.

PRINCIPLES
8-4. With the speed and potential non-linearity of modern combat, the role of
reconnaissance has increased in importance. Without decisive actions of
reconnaissance forces and assets, it is impossible to preempt the enemy, seize
the initiative, and conduct a successful battle. The OPFOR uses the following
set of interrelated principles to guide its reconnaissance activities:

Focus
8-5. Reconnaissance action must serve the commanders needs and focus on
elements and objectives critical to the execution of combat missions. Each
unit develops a comprehensive reconnaissance plan in accordance with the
organizations mission. The reconnaissance plan must coordinate all available
assets into an integrated plan.
8-6. The OPFOR understands that information is not the same thing as
knowledge. With the number of sensors available to the tactical commander,
the danger exists that analysts and decision makers could become
overwhelmed with raw data. Therefore, all reconnaissance activities should
focus on answering specific information requirements.

Continuity
8-7. The modern, fluid battlefield demands continuous reconnaissance to
provide an uninterrupted flow of information under all conditions.
Reconnaissance provides constant coverage of the enemy situation, using a
wide variety of redundant assets. Not only must reconnaissance units answer
specific requests for information; they also must continuously collect
information on all aspects of the enemy, weather, and terrain to fully meet
future requirements. The variety of overlapping assets ensures greater
validity of collected information. Continuous reconnaissance decreases the
likelihood that the enemy could carry out successful deception.
8-8. Reconnaissance units attempt to maintain contact with the enemy at all
times. They conduct reconnaissance in all directions, in order to prevent

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surprise. They collect information during all battle phases, 24 hours a day, in
all weather conditions.
8-9. To ensure this continuity, units conducting reconnaissance must
maintain a high state of combat readiness. They must be able to sustain
themselves wherever they deploy, without relying on others for transport or
subsistence. In the event that a specialized reconnaissance unit is destroyed
or becomes combat ineffective, commanders reassign the mission to
appropriate forces.

Aggressiveness
8-10. Aggressiveness is the vigorous search for information, including the
willingness to fight for it if necessary. Reconnaissance troops must collect
information creatively and make maximum use of all assets and methods to
ensure success on the battlefield. The OPFOR vigorously employs all
available collection resources and adheres carefully to the reconnaissance
plan. However, it will alter the plan when its own initiatives or enemy
actions dictate.
8-11. Although reconnaissance is the primary mission, all reconnaissance
units train to defend themselves. Reconnaissance troops penetrate enemy
defenses, avoiding contact if possible. When required, they can ambush and
raid enemy forces. They do what is necessary to fulfill the commanders
information needs.
8-12. The information requirement determines the techniques to use.
Reconnaissance patrols by mechanized forces are not always the best means.
Ambushes and raids are fruitful sources of information from captured
prisoners, documents, and equipment. Such information-gathering actions
are generally more important than any associated damage, but there are
exceptions. Reconnaissance elements are often called upon to destroy high-
value targets they find.

Timeliness
8-13. Timely information is critical on the modern battlefield. Because of the
high mobility of modern forces, there are frequent and sharp changes in the
battlefield situation. As a result, information quickly becomes outdated. The
best intelligence is useless if it is not received in time. Timely reporting
enables the commander to exploit temporary enemy vulnerabilities and
windows of opportunity. Using increased data automation, he can adjust
plans to fit a dynamic battlefield. The OPFOR achieves timeliness through
increased automation for C2 and processing of information; real-time or near
real-time aerial downlinks; and satellite downlinks. This timeliness is
especially critical for the success of integrated fires commands (IFCs).

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Camouflage, Concealment, Cover and Deception

8-14. The OPFOR is aware that the enemy may learn a great deal about its
intentions by discovering its reconnaissance plan. Commanders understand it
is often not possible to completely hide the fact that reconnaissance is being
conducted. However, every effort is made to conceal the scale, missions,
targets, and nature of reconnaissance missions. Specific measures can
include conducting reconnaissance across a broad range of targets, concealing
the actions of reconnaissance elements, and covering and concealing
assembly areas of reconnaissance forces and assets.
8-15. The OPFOR can also use C3D to paint a picture that confirms the
enemys stereotyped views of how the OPFOR fights. By showing the enemy
what he expects to see, the reconnaissance effort can help to establish the
conditions for success during ensuing combat. This is a critical part of IW (see
Chapter 7).

Accuracy and Reliability

8-16. The OPFOR uses all available reconnaissance means to verify the
accuracy and reliability of reported information. A commander must base his
decisions on reconnaissance information; so, the more accurate and complete
the information, the better the decision. To maximize results, the plan
requires accurate information on the enemys size, location, equipment, and
combat readiness. The accuracy and reliability of reconnaissance information
are critical to the destruction of high-value targets such as enemy weapons of
mass destruction (WMD), precision weapons, attack aviation, logistics
centers, C2, and communications. The OPFOR achieves accuracy through the
creation of overlapping coverage and the use of improved technology.
8-17. Reconnaissance must reliably clarify the true enemy situation in spite
of enemy C3D and counter-reconnaissance activities. The first step is to tailor
reconnaissance efforts to the tactical situation, selecting and allocating
reconnaissance forces in accordance with their capabilities in terms of
missions and targets.
8-18. The next step is to compare, cross-check, recheck, and integrate
reconnaissance reports from multiple means of acquisition. The study and
integration of reconnaissance information collected by multiple sources can
help in identifying and assessing false targets and other false indicators of
enemy actions or intentions.

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ASSETS
8-19. Tactical reconnaissance supports division and below. It provides
reconnaissance needed to plan and carry out tactical actions within each
commanders area of responsibility (AOR). Divisions and below perform
tactical reconnaissance using specially-trained reconnaissance resources and
combat troops from maneuver units. Figure 8-1 summarizes the range
capabilities of the reconnaissance assets that can support tactical
commanders.

Distance in Kilometers

10 20 40 60 100 200 400 800

1. Satellite No Limit

2. Aerial
a. Photographic Reconnaissance 600
b. UAV (RPV and Drone) 300+

3. Electronic Intercept and Direction Finding Against

a. Artillery and Air Defense Radars 25 50
b. VHF/UHF (low / high power) 30 80
c. HF Ground Wave 80+
d. HF Sky Wave No Limit
(Visual Limits)
e. Airborne Radar and Communications

4. Special Reconnaissance
a. Theater SPF Assets 100-500+
b. OSC SPF Assets 100-500
c. Division LRR Company
100

5. Mechanized Reconnaissance
a. IRPs from Division
Reconnaissance Battalion 50+
b. IRPs from Brigade
Reconnaissance Company 50

6. Artillery Observation
a. Surveillance and Countermortar/
20+
Counterbattery Radars
b. Sound Ranging 25
c. Flash Spotting (Visual Limits)
d. RPV 60

Figure 8-1. Effective Ranges of Reconnaissance Assets

GROUND RECONNAISSANCE
8-20. Tactical units may send out independent reconnaissance patrols (IRPs)
to perform ground reconnaissance. The size of such patrols can vary, but is
usually an augmented reconnaissance or combat arms platoon.
8-21. Long-range reconnaissance (LRR) units may form additional IRPs, or
their vehicles can supplement patrols formed by the other reconnaissance
units. However, LRR personnel are specially trained for insertion in small
reconnaissance teams at distances up to 100 km beyond the battle line.

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8-22. A tactical group may receive a special-purpose forces (SPF) unit to

support its IFC or to perform other special reconnaissance and direct action
missions. The SPF operate in small teams or as several teams grouped into a
detachment. They can perform some of the same types of reconnaissance
tasks as the LRR teams. However, the SPF receive special training and
equipment that allows them to operate farther out and for longer periods. See
Chapter 15 for more information on SPF.
8-23. Signals reconnaissance assets include radio intercept and direction-
finding (DF) and radar intercept and DF systems as well as equipment
designed to exploit signals from cellular, digital, satellite, fiber-optic, and
computer network systems. See Chapter 7 for more detail on signals
reconnaissance.
8-24. Engineer units can also dispatch one or more engineer reconnaissance
patrols. This type of patrol consists of a squad or a platoon of engineer
specialists sent out to obtain engineer intelligence on the enemy and the
terrain. In enemy territory, it deploys as part of another ground
reconnaissance element. See Chapter 12 for more detail on engineer
reconnaissance.
8-25. Chemical reconnaissance units establish NBC observation posts as well
as NBC reconnaissance patrols. Chemical defense units can also attach
individual chemical and radiological specialists to reconnaissance, security,
reserve and independent elements. Their role is to identify and mark areas of
contamination, to determine the extent and nature of any NBC
contamination and finding routes around contaminated areas. They may also
find the shortest route through an area with low levels of contamination and
select certain areas for decontamination. They monitor the effects of chemical
or nuclear weapons and provide warning of downwind hazards. See Chapter
13 for more detail on NBC reconnaissance.
8-26. Artillery units often have their own reconnaissance assets. These
include artillery command and reconnaissance vehicles, mobile
reconnaissance posts, battlefield surveillance radars, target acquisition
radars, counterfire radars, and sound and flash equipment. In addition,
artillery reconnaissance assets may be made available from OSC level. See
Chapter 8 for more detail on artillery target acquisition.
8-27. Insurgent and terrorist forces employ a wide range of reconnaissance
techniques, often quite sophisticated. Their primary ground reconnaissance
means is surveillance by teams that blend carefully and completely into the
local population.

AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE
8-28. Aerial reconnaissance includes visual observation, imagery, and signals
reconnaissance from airborne platforms. These platforms may be either
piloted aircraft or remotely-piloted vehicles (UAVs). 1

1
The UAV represents one of two types of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV); the other type is the drone. An UAV can
be flown by remote control from a ground station, over a flight path of the controllers choosing. A drone, on the
other hand, flies a set course programmed into its onboard flight control system prior to launch. See the appropriate
OPFOR organization guide and equipment guide for details on UAV and drone organizations and capabilities.

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Rotary- and Fixed-Wing Aircraft

8-29. Dedicated reconnaissance helicopters, depending on equipment, can
conduct visual, thermal imaging, photographic, infrared, and signals
reconnaissance. Attack helicopter crews report any unexpected enemy
activity observed during their missions. They can report such perishable
information immediately by radio to a ground command post (CP) unless
such reporting would interfere with successful completion of their assigned
mission. In the latter case, they report this information during post-mission
debriefing. Transport helicopters or fixed-wing aircraft can insert LRR
elements to distances not practicable with armored reconnaissance vehicles.
See Chapter 10 for more information on aerial reconnaissance.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

8-30. UAV missions are planned by the chief of reconnaissance (COR). Flight
profiles can vary according to the mission. For surveillance missions, the
UAV typically uses a figure-eight or racetrack pattern to maintain it over the
assigned surveillance area. (See Figures 8-2 and 8-3.) For reconnaissance,
intelligence collection, target acquisition, and battle damage assessment
(BDA) missions, a zigzag or loop pattern allows thorough coverage over a
specific target area. (See Figures 8-4 and 8-5.) UAV operators can vary these
basic flight patterns by taking control of the UAV and changing its altitude,
speed, or direction of flight. This allows UAVs to search for high-priority
targets or to collect more detailed information on such targets once it locates
them.

10 km 5 km e
Lin
ttle
Ba
Ground Control
Station

Target

Figure 8-2. Figure-Eight Flight Path for UAV

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8-31. While the radio command link gives an UAV greater flexibility, it also
limits the range of the UAV to the line-of-sight transmission range from its
control station. However, many UAVs can also operate in a preprogrammed
mode at longer ranges.
8-32. As the UAV acquires priority point and area targets during these
missions, it immediately transmits video imagery of the target to its ground
control station. Personnel at the ground control station must use terrain and
map association to determine target location in terms of grid coordinates. By
this method, trained personnel can usually determine target location to
within 100 m. Even with modern UAVs equipped with Global Positioning
System (GPS) receivers, the transmission from the UAV gives the location of
the UAV, not the location of the target. However, knowing the precise
location of the UAV at the time it took the imagery can greatly facilitate
terrain and map association.
8-33. Having determined the target location, the ground control station
personnel must then transmit the target location via secure radio
communications to the COR. For UAVs from artillery target acquisition
elements, the target data would go directly to the artillery fire control
element.

10 km

e
Lin
tle
Ground Control Ba
Station

Target

Figure 8-3. Racetrack Flight Path for UAV

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Ba
ttle
Lin
e

Figure 8-4. Zigzag Flight Path for UAV

ce
aissan
ep Reconn
De
Forw
ard A
rea R
econ
nais
sanc
Bat e
tle Target
Lin
e Target

Target

Target

Launcher

Figure 8-5. Loop Flight Path for UAV

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RECONNAISSANCE PLANNING
8-34. The purpose of reconnaissance planning is to thoroughly coordinate the
actions of all reconnaissance organizations and levels. Ultimately, the
planning must ensure that missions, targets, times, forms of action, zones of
reconnaissance responsibility (ZORRs), and the exchange of information are
fully coordinated.

ZONES OF RECONNAISSANCE RESPONSIBILITY

8-35. Each tactical group and detachment has one or more ZORRs. This zone
is the combination of the units AOR and the area outside of the AOR that
can be observed by the units technical sensors. (See Figure 8-6.)

DTG ZORR

DTG AOR

Figure 8-6. Zone of Reconnaissance Responsibility

8-36. By definition, the ZORR extends into adjacent unit AORs. This is to
serve the dual functions of overlapping coverage and preventing surprise.
Within this zone, the headquarters must be able to monitor enemy activity
sufficiently to ensure that unexpected enemy moves do not disrupt its own
plans. Reconnaissance in this zone should provide early warning of potential
enemy movement into the AOR from any direction.

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COMMANDER
8-37. Reconnaissance planning begins with the commander. Following the
receipt of combat orders, the maneuver commander determines what
additional information is necessary to conduct his mission. To fight the battle
properly, the tactical commander typically needs information on
Enemy positions, boundaries, and strong and weak points.
The location of key enemy systems and installations (such as FARPs,
counterfire radars, C2 nodes, or logistics centers).
The location and movement of enemy reserves.
Possible axes for enemy counterattacks.
Terrain trafficability and cover.
The location of and approaches to obstacles.

8-38. There are several pieces of information that can be of great interest
before and during the battle. General aims that guide the reconnaissance
process prior to the initiation of combat are the timely detection or
determination of
Enemy preparations for an attack with conventional or precision
weapons, or WMD.
Indications of the enemys concept for upcoming action.
Groupings of enemy forces and their preparation for combat.
Changes in the grouping or composition of these forces.

8-39. After combat begins, general information requirements can include

The effects of precision weapons and WMD.
Further changes in the grouping or composition of enemy forces.
Activities and composition of enemy reserves.
Enemy preparations to prevent the deployment of friendly troops.
Enemy preparations to launch amphibious, airmobile, or airborne
assaults.

8-40. The commander analyzes his requirements for information and

determines the reconnaissance needed. He defines the data he wants and
when he needs it. Then the commander states broad reconnaissance
instructions to his chief of intelligence. The amount of time available for
conducting reconnaissance determines the amount of detail contained in the
commanders instructions. If little time is available, the commanders
instructions may be very short and simple.
8-41. The commanders instructions to the chief of intelligence outline the
overall aim or goal of reconnaissance and the priorities of the reconnaissance
mission. This can include specific reconnaissance tasks assigned by the
commander or by higher headquarters. The commander can also assign
specific objectives, sectors, areas, or axes for concentrating the main
reconnaissance effort. His instructions may specify which reconnaissance

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assets may or may not be used prior to combat. He establishes the type of
information required and the deadline for receipt of this information.

CHIEF OF STAFF
8-42. The chief of staff interprets the commanders instructions and converts
them into specific tasks. At this point, if not before, the general aims of the
reconnaissance effort become specific information requirements and taskings
to reconnaissance units.
8-43. The chief of staff has overall responsibility for providing the necessary
information for the commander to make decisions. At the tactical level, he
has a more clearly defined role in structuring the reconnaissance effort than
at higher levels.
8-44. Because reconnaissance is a combined arms task, the chief of staff must
coordinate the overall reconnaissance effort. Aside from reconnaissance
troops, various other combat, combat support, and combat service support
branches have reconnaissance tasks and capabilities. Thus, coordination
involves not only ground reconnaissance, but also the efforts of target
acquisition elements and chemical, engineer, and signals reconnaissance, as
well as any aerial reconnaissance assets allocated to support the maneuver
units mission. The chief of staff can ensure that the various branches report
the results of all these reconnaissance efforts through the COR and the
intelligence officer to the commander.
8-45. Upon receipt of the commanders reconnaissance instructions, the chief
of staff refines the requirements and passes them to the intelligence officer
for the detailed development of the reconnaissance plan. The chief of staff
provides any other information available on targets and areas for
concentration of the reconnaissance effort.

INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
8-46. The intelligence officers instructions to the COR specify details of the
missions identified by the commander, and the method of execution. He
determines the sequence for the performance of these tasks and the
manpower and equipment necessary to complete them. He specifies the
reconnaissance assets to be used for the priority reconnaissance tasks. He
determines the principal means of preparing and supporting reconnaissance
units, and ensuring their interaction and coordination. He then specifies to
the COR the times for preparing the reconnaissance plan and issuing combat
orders to reconnaissance units.
8-47. The intelligence officer is responsible for the coordination between
recon and IW, communications requirements. He reviews the efforts of all
three areas and resolves conflicts. For example, if the IW plan recommended
a particular enemy command and control center for destruction, but the
reconnaissance plan sought to collect vital information from it, the
intelligence officer would choose the course of action that best supported the
commanders intent.

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CHIEF OF RECONNAISSANCE
8-48. In tactical group headquarters, the intelligence and information section
of the staff includes a reconnaissance subsection headed by the COR. This
staff officer is responsible for organizing reconnaissance in accordance with
the commanders general plan. The COR works for and reports to the
intelligence officer. Along with or through the intelligence officer, he reports
to the commander concerning the organization of reconnaissance planning.
8-49. Like other section and subsection chiefs on the division and brigade
staff, the COR has a dual reporting chain. He is responsible to the
commander and chief of staff in whose headquarters he serves. However, he
also receives additional instructions and guidance from his COR counterpart
at the next-higher level. For example, a DTG COR coordinates with the OSC
COR and with the CORs of subordinate BTGs. Through these channels, he can
request reconnaissance support from higher levels or task reconnaissance
elements of subordinate brigades to perform missions for the division. Thus, a
tactical-level COR has access to information collected by means not available to
him, such as aerial reconnaissance. He is also responsible for passing the results
of reconnaissance both up and down the chain of command.
8-50. To the reconnaissance missions he receives from the chief of staff, the
COR adds specific instructions to complete the reconnaissance plan. His
knowledge of enemy doctrine, and his access to current intelligence enable
him to assign precise missions to reconnaissance assets at his own level of
command. He establishes time constraints, reporting schedules, and
reporting methods. He also establishes measures for interaction and
coordination of reconnaissance actions to ensure accomplishment of all
missions and objectives. He organizes and continuously monitors
communications with all maneuver units and with the headquarters of
subordinate reconnaissance units. He can also provide guidance to
immediately subordinate maneuver units regarding their contribution to the
higher units reconnaissance effort.

RECONNAISSANCE PLAN
8-51. The COR at tactical group level develops a reconnaissance plan within
the framework of the higher headquarters mission and the higher
commanders decision for combat. He combines this information with the
higher headquarters instructions on conduct of the reconnaissance mission,
information currently available on the enemy, and status of reconnaissance
assets.
8-52. Depending on the situation, the reconnaissance plan may include
The AORs of friendly units.
The commanders concept and mission.
All available information regarding known and suspected enemy
groupings and intentions.
A list of tasks (including obtaining new information, confirming
previously available information, BDA, and calling for fire on targets of
opportunity).
A list of priority targets for reconnaissance.

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

The deployment of reconnaissance assets in terms of these tasks and

targets.
The time and sequence for executing the tasks.
Restrictions on reconnaissance actions during specific times or in
certain areas.
The method and time for reporting.

8-53. The content of reconnaissance missions depends on the commanders

information requirements. These, in turn, depend on the nature of the units
combat missions.
8-54. In the offense, reconnaissance must establish the enemys effective
combat strength, affiliation, combat effectiveness, and whether or not he has
NBC or precision weapons. It must discover firing positions for weapons,
strongpoints, gaps, and the nature of engineer preparation of defensive
positions. It is also important to locate and track enemy reserves and possible
axes for counterattacks. Reconnaissance must identify terrain that may
present trafficability problems for advancing OPFOR units.
8-55. In the defense, reconnaissance must cover enemy preparation for an
attack and determine the possible time of the attack. It must establish the
makeup of the enemy grouping and identify the axis of his main attack and
the nature of his maneuver. It is especially important to determine the
locations of firing positions of artillery and other weapons, locations of C2
facilities, the combat effectiveness of enemy troops, and their affiliation. The
plan should include reconnaissance tasks for the entire course of defensive
actions, as well as tasks that support an eventual transition to the offense.

INFORMATION FLOW AND COMMUNICATIONS

8-56. The commanders instructions, the reconnaissance plan, and combat
orders to reconnaissance elements identify information requirements and
specify how and when to report this information. To minimize radio traffic on
command nets, the flow of information both up and down the chain of command
normally is through reconnaissance channels. Commanders determine how
frequently they wish to receive various types of situational data.
8-57. A reconnaissance element typically reports to the commander of its
parent reconnaissance unit or to the COR (or chief of staff) of the maneuver
unit that dispatched it. In exceptional cases, however, the capability for skip-
echelon communications allows the leader of a reconnaissance unit to report
to a higher level if so directed in specific instructions.

Reporting
8-58. Standard operating procedures developed for reconnaissance reporting
seek to ensure that the supported commander receives critical information he
requires to make a decision. To reduce the likelihood of information overload,
there are two different reporting categories: periodic (reports submitted at a
set time) and aperiodic (reports submitted on the staffs own initiative
resulting from significant changes in the situation).

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8-59. Under the direction of the COR, the reconnaissance subsection on a

division or brigade staff evaluates and summarizes incoming information for
the commander. It disseminates this information to those command and staff
elements that require it, including higher headquarters and adjacent units. It
is important to study information from all sources before reaching conclusions.
This includes even information believed to be false because it contradicts
information from other sources and does not correspond to the developing
situation. The study of this false information can reveal the methods the enemy
is using for deception.

Reconnaissance Report
8-60. Commanders and staffs receive reports from reconnaissance elements
and/or CORs. Depending on the situation, these reports may be in the form of
briefings, radio communications, or written reports.
8-61. The term reconnaissance report also applies to a specific document
prepared by the headquarters of a brigade, division, or OSC for reporting
information about the enemy to a higher headquarters. It may be a periodic
reconnaissance report forwarded every few hours at set times specified in
instructions. It may also be an aperiodic report prepared at the initiative of
the subordinate commander or by special request from the higher commander.
In either case, it includes, at a minimum, the following:
The general nature of enemy activities throughout the reporting units
entire ZORR.
The disposition and grouping of enemy forces in each area or axis
within the ZORR.
Significant changes that have occurred since the previous report.
The reporting units conclusions about possible enemy actions based on
these indications.
The source of the data and the time received.
Reconnaissance Summary
8-62. The reconnaissance summary is a report, prepared by the headquarters
of a division or brigade that contains information about the enemy covering a
given period of time. The reporting unit sends this summary to the higher
headquarters at times established in instructions. It is normally provided
once a day as a brief narrative of the highlights of the past 24 hours. It is also
sent to adjacent and subordinate headquarters for information purposes. It
typically includes the following:
The general nature of enemy activities in the AOR.
Data about the enemys precision weapons and WMD and their
employment.
The positions of enemy forces at the time of preparation of the
summary.
Information about the enemys air (and naval) forces, air defense, CPs,
radar equipment, logistics installations, obstacles, and field
fortifications.

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

The reporting units general assessment of the disposition, activities,

and condition of enemy forces and the nature of forthcoming enemy
activities.
Information gaps to be addressed during further reconnaissance.
The summary may include the significant results of prisoner interrogation or
exploitation of captured documents or equipment.

RECONNAISSANCE ORGANIZATIONS
8-63. The general term reconnaissance organization applies to any unit or
detachment given a specific reconnaissance mission. Some reconnaissance
organizations are formed on the basis of a reconnaissance unit, but others come
from maneuver units or other sources.
8-64. At the tactical level, the ground forces employ a variety of
reconnaissance organizations, tasked and tailored to fit the specific needs of
the tactical commander in a particular situation. These organizations vary in
size and composition from a few scouts to a battalion.
8-65. Reconnaissance units at the tactical level may either operate
independently or be task organized with personnel from maneuver units into
special types of reconnaissance organizations. They may or may not have
augmentation such as mechanized infantry troops, tanks, artillery, engineers,
NBC reconnaissance personnel, and other specialists.

COMMANDERS RECONNAISSANCE
8-66. Tactical commanders conduct a personal commanders reconnaissance,
where possible, as part of the planning process. The commander goes to a
field site in the vicinity of planned combat actions to conduct a visual study of
the enemy and terrain. He takes with him his subordinate maneuver
commanders, the commanders of dedicated and supporting units, and staff
officers. The purpose of this reconnaissance is to refine and verify, on the
terrain, and add details to the general plan already made on a map and
missions already assigned to the troops; however, it can also occur prior to
making battle plans. During the reconnaissance, the commander issues an
oral combat order and organizes coordination.
8-67. Prior to departure for the field site, time permitting, a commanders
reconnaissance plan is drawn up. It specifies the purpose and objective of the
commanders personal reconnaissance, principal tasks, the composition of the
reconnaissance group, routes and means of transportation, halt points for
reconnaissance activity, and the principal items to be covered at each halt
point. The OPFOR takes elaborate measures to disguise the conduct of this
reconnaissance and the ranks of the participants in the commanders
reconnaissance group.

OBSERVER
8-68. Within a squad, platoon, or company, an individual can be assigned as
an observer. This observer can reconnoiter the ground and airspace, enemy
and terrain, and observe the actions and position of his own unit, its
subordinate units, and adjacent units.

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OBSERVATION POST
8-69. The observation post (OP) is a team assigned the mission of conducting
surveillance of enemy in a given zone or location. An OP can have literally
any organization and can be drawn from any type force. Typically OPs are
kept small and own and/or are given sensor and communications capability
that permits stealthy and rapid movement and provides the OP with the
ability to locate, track and report on its recon targets.
8-70. OPs typically operate in enemy-controlled areas. The recon plan will
include the method by which the OP penetrates enemy security forces, eludes
detection and observes and reports on the enemy. OPs will often be called
upon to perform the infiltration tactical task. The IW plan will often include
C3D measures that assist in preventing enemy detection of OPs. This C3D
effort may include employing cover from the local population or affiliated
forces.

PATROL SQUAD
8-71. A patrol squad is, as the name implies, a single squad sent out with a
reconnaissance mission. It can be a single vehicle (patrol vehicle or tank) or a
reconnaissance or infantry squad on foot. Patrol squads may be the only
reconnaissance element deployed when the risk of meeting the enemy is low.
However, they can also be deployed from a larger reconnaissance element,
such as any platoon-size patrol. Any maneuver company or battalion
operating in isolation from the main force can send out a patrol squad, even
when not performing reconnaissance missions. This occurs chiefly when the
maneuver unit is on the move or when occupying an assembly area.
8-72. As a rule, the patrol squad operates off-road, moving from one suitable
observation point to another. It typically reconnoiters places where an enemy
unit could be concealed, such as hills, woods, or built-up areas. If it sights the
enemy, the patrol squad immediately reports this to the commander or
platoon leader who dispatched it, and then continues to carry out
observation. In the event of a sudden meeting with the enemy, the patrol
squad can open fire on him.

RECONNAISSANCE TEAM
8-73. The reconnaissance team is an element, usually at squad strength,
formed from specially trained personnel (e.g. from a LRR company). It
conducts independent actions in the enemy rear to discover precision
weapons, WMD, C2 facilities, reserves, airfields, and other priority targets. A
reconnaissance team may be inserted into the enemy rear on foot or in an
armored reconnaissance vehicle. If the team leaves its vehicle behind,
insertion could also be by helicopter or by parachute landing from fixed-wing
aircraft.

RECONNAISSANCE PATROL
8-74. A reconnaissance patrol (RP) is a platoon-size tactical reconnaissance
organization with the mission of acquiring information about the enemy and
the terrain. The OPFOR distinguishes among various types of patrols that fit
under the general descriptive term reconnaissance patrol. These specific

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types of reconnaissance include the IRP, officer reconnaissance patrol, and

fighting patrol (FP). The generic term also includes engineer reconnaissance
patrols and NBC reconnaissance patrols (see Chapters 12 and 13,
respectively).
8-75. Other than a generic descriptor for these specific types, the OPFOR
also uses the term reconnaissance patrol to describe a tactical reconnaissance
organization dispatched from a reconnaissance detachment in the process of
accomplishing its mission. This type of RP is not independent, because it is
a subordinate of a larger reconnaissance element.
8-76. It is difficult to distinguish among the various types of RP by their
strength, composition, or position on the battlefield. The size of each patrol is
up to a platoon, augmented when necessary. A patrol in this configuration
could be an RP, FP, or IRP. They all accomplish their missions through
observation, ambushes, raids, andwhen necessarycombat.
8-77. In the event of unexpected contact with the enemy, all types of RP try
to break contact and then reach a position from which to identify and report
the strength, composition, and location of the enemy force. If the patrol
discovers the enemy in an unexpected position, the patrol leader immediately
executes the actions on contact battle drill (see Chapter 5).
8-78. If a patrol observes enemy reconnaissance or security elements, its task
is to avoid contact and continue on to locate the main force as rapidly as
possible. In the event of a surprise encounter with a small enemy force, when
evasion is impossible, the patrol acts decisively to destroy the enemy, capture
prisoners, if possible, and continue its mission.

INDEPENDENT RECONNAISSANCE PATROL

8-79. A tactical group may send out independent reconnaissance patrols with
a specific mission to conduct reconnaissance of the enemy and terrain. Each
IRP is usually a reconnaissance or combat arms platoon, often augmented
with engineers and NBC specialists. The size of each patrol depends on the
terrain, enemy strength, and the importance of the axis or objective.
8-80. In the offense, an IRP is assigned a mission either an axis or an
objective. In defensive situations, the IRPs are used to scout enemy reserves
moving up from the rear or attacking on an open flank. An IRP can also
support antilanding defense during an airborne or amphibious landing by the
enemy.
8-81. As with other types of RP, the IRP accomplishes its missions through
observation, ambushes, or raids. It may conduct reconnaissance by combat, if
necessary, but becomes engaged in battle only if it cannot carry out its
mission by any other method, if it suddenly encounters the enemy, or if it
detects enemy precision weapons or other high-priority targets. Both the RP
and the IRP can dispatch patrol squads to examine terrain features, detect
enemy forces, or provide security. However, an IRP operates at a greater
distance from the parent brigade or division than the RP and may stay out
longer.
8-82. The distance from the parent unit depends on the nature of the
mission, the composition of the patrol, the terrain, and ability to maintain

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communications with the unit that dispatched it. IRPs move on multiple
axes, although the main axis receives the primary reconnaissance effort.

OFFICER RECONNAISSANCE PATROL

8-83. A maneuver unit can send out an officer reconnaissance patrol when
there has been an abrupt, unexpected situation change. The purpose of this
patrol can be to update information on the enemy and terrain in the battle
area, to determine the position of friendly troops, or to check contradictory
situation data.
8-84. Depending on assigned missions, this patrol can consist of one to three
officers with communications equipment, and possibly two to five soldiers
assigned for security. This patrol can move by helicopter, tank, IFV, APC, or
other vehicle. The officer reconnaissance patrol allows the commander to
oversee and maintain tight control over the maneuver of his subordinate
force. These patrols usually do not go outside the area under the immediate
control of that commanders unit.

FIGHTING PATROL
8-85. The fighting patrol is a platoon-size element, normally composed of
combat troops, dispatched from maneuver battalions (and sometimes
companies). When necessary, engineer and NBC reconnaissance elements
and other specialists can be allocated to the patrol. Units dispatch one or
more FPs depending on the tactical situation.
8-86. An FP is generally deployed to reconnoiter and provide security. FPs
are dispatched from units conducting tactical movement, during battle in the
absence of direct contact with the enemy, and in other cases where it is
difficult for the unit to directly observe the enemys actions. The main
mission of the FP is the timely detection of advancing enemy, locating enemy
direct fire weapons, especially antitank weapons, and locating minefields. An
FP normally moves in such a way that its parent unit can provide it indirect
fire support.
8-87. An FP employs the same techniques as other reconnaissance patrols.
Because of its security function, however, it is harder for the FP to avoid
becoming engaged in combat with the enemy. It may engage a weaker enemy
force using an ambush, or it may avoid contact altogether, taking up a
concealed observation point or maneuvering around superior enemy forces. If
it encounters what it considers to be enemy scouts or security forces, it
attempts to penetrate them to locate the enemys main force. FPs are also
often called upon to fix enemy forces they encounter, to permit other security
elements to maneuver to destroy them.

RECONNAISSANCE DETACHMENT
8-88. The largest organization the OPFOR employs at the tactical level to
supplement specialized reconnaissance is the reconnaissance detachment
(RD). It is typically a task-organized combat arms company or battalion. The
detachment often receives such assets as tanks (if it is not a tank unit), air
defense, artillery, engineers, or NBC specialists. The RD dispatches platoon-
size RPs to reconnoiter specific objectives along the detachments axis.

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8-89. Although an RD typically consists of combat troops, its primary mission

is reconnaissance. If it does encounter a weak enemy force, it may engage
that force and take prisoners. When the detachment encounters the enemys
main forces, it assumes an observation mission, attempts to determine the
composition and disposition of those forces, reports to the commander who
sent it out, and continues its mission.
8-90. The RD is employed primarily in the offense. Its mission is to acquire
information on the terrain and the enemys location or gaps in his defenses. It
can also reconnoiter key objectives. It conducts reconnaissance by observation,
terrain inspection, ambushes, raids, andonly when necessaryby combat.
8-91. In the defense, in the absence of close contact with the enemy, a
division or brigade may send out an RD into the disruption zone to determine
the enemys composition and main avenue of attack. The role of the RD is to
establish contact with an advancing enemy force and monitor its progress. An
RD can also reconnoiter enemy airborne or amphibious landing forces in
support of an antilanding reserve.

RECONNAISSANCE METHODS
8-92. Reconnaissance elements collect information by various methods. These
can include observation, listening (eavesdropping), raids, ambushes, imaging,
interception of transmissions and DF of electronic resources, questioning of
local inhabitants, interrogation of prisoners of war and defectors, and the
study of documents and equipment captured from the enemy.
8-93. Information is also acquired during combat by maneuver units. Tactical
units may also receive information on the enemy from higher headquarters
and adjacent units.
8-94. More specifically, RPs can gather information using a number of
standard methods, including
Observation.
Raids.
Ambushes.
Reconnaissance Attack.
Other tactical reconnaissance organizations may use some of the same
techniques.

OBSERVATION
8-95. Observation is the coordinated inspection of the enemy, terrain,
weather, obstacles, and adjacent friendly forces during all types of combat
activity. This type of reconnaissance, performed by troops conducting direct
observation of the objective, is the most common method of gathering
reconnaissance information. It is also one of the most reliable and accurate
methods. In many cases, it is the only source of information.
8-96. The OPFOR has great confidence in the utility of observation, but it
also recognizes the limitations. It is often difficult to determine enemy
intentions through observation alone. To supplement observation, the

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_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 8

OPFOR conducts raids and ambushes to capture information that can give a
clearer picture of enemy strengths and intentions.

RAIDS
8-97. The raid is more aggressive than most methods of reconnaissance
because it involves the active search for and engagement of selected enemy
targets. A raid can occur in any terrain, in any season, at any time of day or
night, and under various weather conditions. However, it is generally
conducted at night or under conditions of limited visibility.
8-98. Reconnaissance tactics involve two methods of conducting raids. The
difference is in the purpose of the raid, the depth of the target, and the type
of reconnaissance element performing it. See Chapter 3 for information on
the execution of raids in general.

Reconnaissance Raid
8-99. The primary goal of a reconnaissance raid is to obtain information; any
damage or destruction of enemy installations is incidental. It consists of the
covert approach of the raiding unit to a preplanned and previously studied
target (objective); a surprise attack to capture prisoners, documents, and
equipment; and a swift withdrawal to friendly positions. The depth of the
raid is limited to the enemys forward edge or his immediate tactical depth.
The raiding unit is usually a reconnaissance or maneuver unit up to platoon
size, with some augmentation.
8-100. The reconnaissance raid is normally takes place in enemy-held
terrain, typically during preparation for an attack. Typical targets are
individual soldiers or small groups of soldiers. These might be isolated firing
positions, OPs and observers; isolated sentries and guard posts; couriers;
small, isolated work details; staffs; or communications centers.

AMBUSH
8-101. Reconnaissance by ambush (reconnaissance ambush) is a method of
reconnaissance accomplished by surprise attack, from cover, for the purpose
of seizing prisoners, documents, and samples of weapons or equipment. The
ambush is similar to the raid with two exceptions:
The ambush is more of a passive tactic than the raid; the ambush unit
selects a concealed position along a probable route of enemy travel and
attacks enemy units when the situation is favorable.
The ambushing unit can consist of a specialized reconnaissance patrol
or infantry unit.
For information on the execution of ambushes, see Chapter 3.
8-102. Typical targets for ambush are solitary enemy soldiers or small groups
moving on foot or in vehicles. The most favorable conditions for finding such
isolated targets are when the enemy is preparing for an attack or when he is
regrouping or relieving his forces. In preparing for an attack, the enemy
sends out reconnaissance elements and small groups of engineers looking for
passages in obstacles; there is also increased movement within the enemy

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position. During regrouping or relief, newly assigned enemy personnel that

are unfamiliar with the terrain and situation may become isolated.
8-103. Information collection is the most common purpose of an ambush
conducted by reconnaissance patrols. However, patrols also may execute an
ambush to delay reserves or to inflict damage on a target of opportunity.
Reconnaissance ambushes can occur in all kinds of battle, on any terrain, at any
time or year or day, and under various weather conditions.

RECONNAISSANCE ATTACK
8-104. The most ambitiousand least preferredground reconnaissance
tactic is reconnaissance attack. When other means of gaining information
have failed, a reconnaissance detachment can undertake a reconnaissance
attack.
8-105. In execution, a recon attack is similar to a search and attack. The
primary difference is that a search and attack is designed to destroy the
enemy or restrict freedom of movement. A reconnaissance attack is designed
to gain information. It is structured to penetrate or dislocate the enemys
security forces and permit reconnaissance and/or surveillance of
reconnaissance objectives.
8-106. Most commonly, a recon attack is conducted when the enemys
security structure is of sufficient effectiveness that a concerted independent
effort must be made to achieve the commanders intelligence requirements.
8-107. A recon attack is conducted as a search and attack (Chapter 3) with
the following specific components:
It will include at least one recon element for each recon objective. The
number of recon elements for each recon objective is primarily
determined by the level of uncertainty over the location of those
objectives.
The action elements of a recon attack are the recon elements.
Normally, any recon elements in the detachment support the
detachment by detecting critical targets and forces during the course of
the operation. But in a recon attack, the recon elements gaining
information is the focus of the operation.
8-108. The recon objectives may be force or terrain/facility oriented, but the
overall objective of a recon attack is force oriented.

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_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 8

Security Element
Fixing Element

CP

?
Security Element

Fixing Element Enemy QRF

HQ?
Recon Element
Enemy Log
Suspected Center
Enemy HQ

CP
Fixing Element

Recon Element

Security Element
Security Element

Fig 8-7 Reconnaissance Attack

8-23
 Chapter 9

Indirect Fire Support

The integration of air, artillery, missile and non-lethal assets into a uni-
fied fire support plan is a major task for the combined arms commander.
Integration is a decisive element, fundamental to the success of any tacti-
cal action on the modern battlefield. The OPFOR does not consider itself
to be an artillery-centric army. Rather, it views itself as using various
forms of fire support to achieve success during offensive and defensive
combat. In the offense, fire support is important to the success of any at-
tack. It can destroy key enemy systems; disrupt, immobilize, or destroy
enemy groupings; and repel counterattacks. Fire support is also the cor-
nerstone of any defense, blunting attacks at the crucial point in the battle.
It disrupts enemy preparations for the attack and repels forces.

Modern battle is, above all, a firefightin which indirect fire plays a deci-
sive role in the effective engagement of the enemy. Uninterrupted and
very close cooperation with the maneuver of supported combined arms
units is the basis of the actions of indirect fire support units.

FIRE SUPPORT CONCEPTS

9-1. Fire support is the collective and coordinated use of target acquisition,
indirect fire weapons, aircraft, and other lethal and nonlethal means in sup-
port of a battle plan. The goal is to synchronize all available fire support sys-
tems to achieve the most effective results, thereby maximizing combat power.
Effective fire support enables OPFOR ground forces to attack successfully
and quickly to exploit weaknesses. Commanders try to accomplish their mis-
sions using a combination of maneuver and fire. The OPFOR continues to ex-
pand and upgrade fire support systems to achieve a qualitative edge over its
regional opponents. However, it realizes that it may be at a qualitative dis-
advantage compared to a modern extraregional force.
9-2. The OPFOR stresses that fire support should combine air assets, sur-
face-to-surface missiles (SSMs), and artillery into an integrated attack
throughout the enemy's defenses. The combined arms commander always
seeks to increase the effectiveness of air and missile strikes and artillery fire
to destroy enemy formations, weapon systems, or key components of an en-
emy combat system. (See Systems Warfare later in this chapter and in Chap-
ter 1.) This ensures continuous fire support for maneuver units throughout
the area of responsibility (AOR).
9-3. The OPFOR considers information warfare (IW) an essential element of
fire support. It provides a nonlethal alternative or supplement to attack by
fire and maneuver. It is integrated into the overall concept of the battle, to
confuse, deceive, delay, and disorganize the enemy.

9-1
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

FIRE SUPPORT PRINCIPLES

9-4. The principles of fire support are the framework for a thought process
that ensures the most effective use of fire support assets. These principles
apply at all levels of command, regardless of the specific fire support assets
available:
Plan early and continuously.
Exploit all available reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and
target acquisition (RISTA) assets.
Consider airspace management and the use of all fire support (lethal
and nonlethal) means.
Use the lowest level of command capable of furnishing effective support.
Avoid unnecessary duplication of effort.
Use the most effective means to accomplish the mission.
Provide rapid and effective coordination.
Provide for flexibility of employment.
Provide for safeguarding and survivability of the OPFOR fire support
assets.
Attempt to achieve surprise when possible.
Deliver highly accurate and effective fire.

SYSTEMS WARFARE
9-5. The foundation of OPFOR planning is the systems warfare approach to
combat. Thus, the OPFOR analyzes its own combat system and how it can use
the combined effects of this system of systems to degrade or destroy the en-
emys combat system. In systems warfare, the subsystems or components of a
combat system are targeted and destroyed individually. Once a favorable com-
bat situation has developed, the targeted enemy subsystem is quickly destroyed
in high-intensity battle, thus making the enemys overall combat system vul-
nerable to destruction or at least degrading its effectiveness. (See Systems War-
fare in Chapter 1 for further information.)
9-6. Within the systems warfare approach, the OPFOR employs a fire sup-
port concept centered on a phased-cycle of finding a critical component of the
enemy combat system and fixing its location with RISTA assets; engaging it
with precision fires, maneuver, or other means; and recovering to support the
fight against another part of the enemy force. The primary reason for attack-
ing an enemy with fires is to destroy one or more key components of the en-
emys combat system and/or to create favorable conditions for destroying
other parts of his combat system.

TECHNIQUES TO EXPLOIT ENEMY VULNERABILITIES

9-7. The OPFOR seeks to avoid enemy strengths and exploits his vulnerabili-
ties. In conflicts with extraregional powers, the OPFOR typically would be
operating from relative strategic weakness. Therefore, it seeks to tactically
outmaneuver, overwhelm, and outpace the enemy. It also seeks to deny him
any sanctuary on the battlefield, as well as in the local theater or in his stra-
tegic depth.

9-2
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 9

9-8. During regional operations, the OPFOR will use fire support means
(primarily aviation, SSM, and long-range rocket strikes) to attack targets in
the homeland of a regional opponent. During all types of operations in a stra-
tegic campaign, the OPFOR may use various fire support assets in access-
control operations and attack of the enemys lines of communication (LOCs)
and rear. It will attack the most vulnerable parts of the enemys combat sys-
tem. This may include strikes on the infrastructure or even civilian targets.
Such OPFOR attacks will be coordinated with perception management efforts
to convey the view that these terror tactics are no worse than enemy bombing
campaigns.
9-9. The OPFOR will also leverage the effects of its available fire support
means by integrating them into an integrated fires command (IFC) in organi-
zations down to division or division tactical group (DTG) level. The IFC (de-
scribed in detail in Chapter 2) synchronizes and focuses the efforts of RISTA
and fire to destroy key enemy formations or systemsor key components of
an enemy combat system. Destroying such targets can not only shift the bal-
ance of power in the region in the OPFORs favor, but also undermine enemy
morale and resolve.

TARGET DAMAGE CRITERIA

9-10. Target damage is the effect of fires on a given military target. It results
in total, partial, or temporary loss of the targets combat effectiveness. The
OPFOR categories of target damage are annihilation, demolition, neutraliza-
tion, and harassment. 1 Of these categories, the first three fall under the gen-
eral term destruction.

Annihilation
9-11. Annihilation fires render targets completely combat-ineffective and in-
capable of reconstruction or token resistance. For a point target such as an
antitank guided missile launcher, the OPFOR must expend enough muni-
tions to ensure a 70 to 90 percent probability of kill. For area targets such as
platoon strongpoints or nuclear artillery assets, the OPFOR must fire enough
rounds to destroy from 50 to 60 percent of the targets within the group. These
fires result in the group ceasing to exist as a viable fighting force.

Demolition
9-12. The OPFOR uses the term demolition in reference to the destruction of
buildings and engineer works (such as bridges, fortifications, or roads).
Demolition requires enough munitions to make such material objects unfit for
further use.

Neutralization
9-13. Fire for neutralization inflicts enough losses on a target to
Cause it to temporarily lose its combat effectiveness, or
Restrict or prohibit its maneuver, or

1
The use of precision weapons may render such target damage criteria obsolete, since precision
weapons are always supposed to annihilate the targets completely, not just destroying a certain percent-
age of them.

9-3
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

2
Disrupt its command and control (C ) capability.
To achieve neutralization, the OPFOR must deliver enough munitions to de-
stroy 30 percent of a group of unobserved targets. The expectation is that the
target is severely damaged but could again become capable of coordinated re-
sistance after the fire is lifted. The term neutralization applies only in an ar-
tillery context.

Harassment
9-14. The OPFOR uses a limited number of fire support systems and muni-
tions within a prescribed time to deliver harassment fires. The goal of these
fires is to put psychological pressure on enemy personnel in locations such as
defensive positions, command posts (CPs), and logistics installations. Suc-
cessful harassment fire inhibits maneuver, lowers morale, interrupts rest,
and weakens enemy combat readiness.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

9-15. OPFOR tactical fire support is designed to be controlled at the lowest
possible level. This ensures flexibility, survivability and the proper level of
support to the tactical commander.
9-16. OPFOR commanders will allocate fire support assets and means to
subordinates in direct correlation to their need based on the scheme of ma-
neuver. The OPFOR will not retain assets at a higher level simply to pre-
serve flexibility if a subordinate needs an asset to acco0mplish a mission,
every effort is made to ensure he has it.

COMMAND AND SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS

9-17. Units that provide indirect fire support for maneuver units may have
one of three command and support relationships: constituent, dedicated, or
supporting:
Commanders of indirect fire support units in a subordinate (constitu-
ent or dedicated) status report directly to the commander of the ma-
neuver unit or IFC to which they are subordinate. Units in a dedicated
status continue to receive logistics support from their parent indirect
fire support headquarters.
Commanders of indirect fire support units in a supporting status are
commanded by their parent organization but receive missions from
their supported headquarters for the duration of the relationship.
INTEGRATED FIRES COMMAND
9-18. In combat, the IFC forms the framework for the C2 of indirect fires in
the division. A division or DTG always has an IFC, even if it receives no addi-
tional fire support units during task organization. 2 There is one IFC per divi-

2
A division or DTG would still have an IFC headquarters, even if it loses its originally organic fire
2
support assets to another command during task organization. This facilitates C of any fire support assets
that might be reallocated to that division or DTG during some subsequent phase of combat.

9-4
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 9

sion or DTG, to support the tactical battle plan. However, each IFC is capable
of engaging designated operational and strategic targets, if necessary.
9-19. The DTG deputy commander is the IFC commander. Through his IFC
commander, the DTG commander exercises C2 over all subordinate (constitu-
ent and dedicated) indirect fire support and associated RISTA assets retained
at this level of command. The following procedures apply to this process:
The DTG commander specifies the organization of forces for combat
and the tasks for indirect fire support assets.
The IFC commander conducts and coordinates fire support planning.
He also coordinates with the DTG chief of reconnaissance and the re-
connaissance subsection for targeting data.

9-20. The IFC commander can also control (but not command) fire support
and RISTA assets allocated to the DTG in a supporting relationship. He can
give them mission priorities, but they are still commanded by their parent
organization.

BRIGADE-LEVEL FIRE SUPPORT

9-21. A brigade that does not receive augmentation has whatever fire support
unit was organic to the brigade in the administrative force structure. That
fire support unit is directly under the C2 of the brigade commander, who is
advised by his chief of fire support (CFS) and the fire support coordination
center (FSCC) in the operations section of his staff.
9-22. A brigade that becomes a BTG may receive additional fire support units
(artillery, SSMs, or army aviation) in a constituent or dedicated relationship.
Each of these additional fire support units, along with whatever fire support
unit was originally organic to the base brigade in the administrative force
structure (unless the BTGs higher command has reallocated that organic
unit to some other subordinate during the organization of its fighting force
structure), is under the direct C2 of the BTG commander, advised by his CFS
and FSCC.
9-23. Any brigade or BTG may receive one or more additional fire support
units allocated to it in a supporting relationship. The supporting fire support
unit(s) remain under the command of their parent headquarters (be that a
fire support headquarters in some higher commands IFC or some higher
headquarters remaining in its original status in the administrative force
structure) and may or may not be located in the supported brigades or BTGs
AOR. However, the supported brigade or BTG commander can give mission
priorities to these supporting fire support units and (if the supporting units
are in his AOR) position these assets to carry out such missions.

FIRE SUPPORT BELOW BRIGADE LEVEL

9-24. A brigade or BTG can allocate some of its constituent or dedicated indi-
rect fire support assets to a maneuver battalion in a constituent or dedicated
relationship. More commonly, however, the brigade or BTG could employ
some of its constituent or dedicated fire support units (or parts of units) to
provide fire support for a particular battalion or detachment in a supporting
relationship.

9-5
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

CHIEF OF INTEGRATED FIRES

9-25. Within the operations section of the division staff, there is a chief of in-
tegrated fires. This officer is responsible for coordinating and advising the
commander on the effective integration of C2 and RISTA means with fire
support means (including precision fires) to support the overall battle plan.
He controls, but does not command, the fire support units subordinate to or
supporting the division. He advises the division commander on how best to
use available fire support assets.

CHIEF OF FIRE SUPPORT

9-26. On the staff of maneuver unit commanders at brigade and battalion
level, there is an officer responsible for planning and coordinating indirect
fire support. At this level, his title is chief of fire support (CFS). The CFS con-
trols, but does not command, the indirect fire support units subordinate to or
supporting his maneuver unit. He advises the maneuver commander on how
best to use available fire support assets.

FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION CENTER

9-27. A fire support coordination center (FSCC) is established at each organ-
izational level (maneuver battalion to IFC). The FSCC is the staff element re-
sponsible for the planning and coordination of fires to support the respective
maneuver unit. It performs the following battle coordination functions:
Acquire and identify high-payoff targets (HPTs).
Recommend targets.
Use target value analysis to identify target priorities.
Determine fire support needs.
Expedite fire support.
Assess fire support effects.
Change fire support plans.
Coordinate the timing of fire support attacks (to include IW).
Recommend the use of aviation.

SUPPORTING MANEUVER COMMANDERS FIRE REQUESTS

9-28. Requests for supporting fires may originate at any organizational level.
They are initiated when constituent or dedicated fire support means at that
level are fully engaged, when the range of the target exceeds the constituent
or dedicated fire support means, or when the constituent or dedicated fire
support means have suffered combat loss. There are two methods of request-
ing supporting fires. The preferred method is for the request to be forwarded
from the brigade commander to the integrated fires subsection in the division
headquarters. An alternate method is for the brigade commander to request
supporting fires from the division commander. The division commander ei-
ther approves or denies the request. If the request is approved, the division
commander tasks the IFC to provide the requested support.

9-6
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 9

NAVAL FIRE SUPPORT

9-29. Naval fire support, when available, is not allocated to a DTG as part of
its IFC, since a DTG is not a joint command. Rather, naval assets may be al-
located to an IFC at operational-strategic command (OSC) or theater level.
Naval fire support (which includes shipborne gunfire and sea-launched cruise
missiles) can give the OSC commander another means of long-range indirect
fires. A division or DTG can request naval fire support through OSC chan-
nels.
9-30. A theater or OSC that receives naval fire support assets in a constitu-
ent or dedicated relationship may further allocate such naval assets to a divi-
sion or DTG in a supporting relationship. However, such naval assets remain
under the command of the theater- or OSC-level IFC.
9-31. Another option is for naval fire support assets to remain under the
command of the Navy but to provide support for ground operations. During
the course of such a supporting relationship, if enemy actions threaten naval
operations, the target attack priorities of the ship may cause it to suspend or
cancel land fire missions until the other threats subside. Once the threats
have subsided, the fire support assets resume their support of the ground
maneuver force.
9-32. A naval fire support liaison team augments the operations section of
the division- or DTG-level IFC staff when naval fire support is required to
support a ground maneuver force, even in a supporting relationship. The liai-
son team provides special staff representation and advice on naval fire sup-
port to the IFC commander. Additionally, it coordinates requests for naval
fire support and operates the naval fire support nets in the IFC FSCC.
9-33. Members of the naval fire support liaison team are specially trained in
the conduct of naval gunfire. However, the observer procedures are simplified
and standardized so that any supporting arms observer can effectively adjust
the fires of a supporting naval vessel with a minimum of additional training.

CONTROL OF FIRE SUPPORT OBSERVERS

9-34. The FSCC has three control options available to it when monitoring ob-
servers requests for fire. (See Figure 9-3 for various methods of reporting
targets for attack, starting from the point of detection by a human observer
or other sensor.) After considering the tactical mission, the degree of training
of the observers, and the availability of fire support assets, the FSCC deter-
mines which option is best suited for the mission.

Decentralized Option
9-35. The observer may call for fire from any fire support assets available to
support the mission. This is the most responsive request, but allows the
FSCC the least amount of control. Since the observer is allowed to determine
which asset should engage each target, this option generally requires a
highly trained observer.

9-7
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

Predesignated Option
9-36. The observer is assigned a particular fire asset from which he may re-
quest support, and he operates on that fire units radio net. If the observer
thinks that the target requires a different fire support asset, he must request
permission from the FSCC to change assets. Permission is granted on a case-
by-case basis. Under this option, fire support is highly responsive if the FSCC
determines that the asset is suitable to the type of target.

Centralized Option
9-37. The observer must contact the FSCC for each call for fire, and the
FSCC refers the observer, or relays his request, to an appropriate fire support
asset. This option is the least responsive for the observer, but offers the high-
est degree of control to the FSCC. This option is generally used when a ma-
neuver commander acts as an observer.

Tailoring
9-38. Since the level of training and the tactical situation vary for each ob-
server, the FSCC may assign the appropriate option to each supported unit.
For example, a special-purpose forces (SPF) or reconnaissance unit may be
predesignated. A maneuver unit may be centralized. An observer from an in-
direct fire support unit may be decentralized.

FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING

9-39. Fire support planning is the determination of the content, manner, and
sequence of delivery of fire on the enemy in a battle or operation. The OPFOR
accomplishes fire support planning at the highest possible levels. The fire
support plan also includes input from subordinate units. The fire support
planning process includes
Target acquisition.
Organization of forces for combat.
Assignment of tactical fire support missions.
Determination of ammunition requirements.
Formulation of a detailed fire support plan.

9-40. Fire support planning includes consideration of the following:

The scheme of maneuver of the supported forces.
The enemy force to receive fire.
The location and character of individual targets within the designated
enemy force.
The required or desired level of target damage.
Fire support assets available, both delivery systems and ordnance.
Requirements for allocation of weapons and units (organization of
forces for combat).
Missions assigned to IFCs, units, and weapons.

9-8
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 9

The manner and procedure of delivery of fire during the performance of

missions.
Requirements and distribution of ammunition by missions.
Organization of coordination and command and control.
Preparation of appropriately detailed fire support plans at various lev-
els.

9-41. In the OPFORs top-down approach to the planning and allocation of

indirect fire support, fire support planning occurs at the highest level possi-
ble. The IFC commander at the OSC or division level or the CFS at brigade
level plans and coordinates indirect fire support, always under the direction
of the maneuver commander. The highest level of participating units coordi-
nates and approves the fire support plan, with input from subordinate units.
OSC and division headquarters perform general fire support planning. De-
tailed planning occurs in maneuver brigades, IFCs, and indirect fire support
units. The fires of all indirect fire support units within a brigade are incorpo-
rated into the brigade fire support plan. In turn, brigade fire support plans
become part of division fire support plans. Division fire support plans become
part of OSC fire support plans.
9-42. In its simplest form, fire support planning is the process of determining
the best way to engage all of the enemys units with firesensuring that the
required level of damage is inflicted in a manner consistent with the com-
manders concept of the battle. Above all else, this means that the fire sup-
port plan must match his concept for the sequence with which the battle will
develop. The focus of fire support planning is on establishing and maintain-
ing fire superiority over the enemy. Therefore, timing is critical.

ESTIMATE OF SITUATION
9-43. The planning process begins with an estimate of the situation. This es-
timate includes the following:
Scheme of maneuver of supported forces.
Locations and type of enemy targets.
Required level of damage.
Delivery means and ordnance available.

9-44. The commander, his IFC commander, and other staff members estab-
lish the basis for fire support planning during the commanders reconnais-
sance of the area of anticipated action. During this reconnaissance, the com-
mander refines the organization of forces for combat and the means of coordi-
nation. The division commander gives the IFC commander the information
base to determine the following:
Targets for indirect fire weapons to engage and fire upon.
Priority of each target.
Sequence in which to attack targets.
Time to attack each target.

9-9
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

9-45. The commander of an indirect fire support unit at any level coordinates
the fires under his control. He determines new requirements and missions
and, with the IFC commander or brigade CFS, makes suggestions to the ma-
neuver commander about adjustments in tactical organization as the situa-
tion develops.

IFC PLANNING
9-46. An IFC commander and members of his staff conduct their planning in
coordination with the rest of the division staff, concurrently with the division
staff developing the battle plan. Planning considerations include target type,
dimensions, degree of protection, mobility, and range to the target.

Allocation Procedures
9-47. The OPFOR carefully calculates fire support requirements in terms of
weapons and munitions needed to produce a required effect on enemy targets.
If insufficient fire support or ammunition is available to achieve the neces-
sary result, the OPFOR does not fire less and hope for the best. Rather, if
necessary, it engages fewer targets, adjusting the tactical, or even opera-
tional, fire support plan.
9-48. Fire support assets that are allocated to a DTG and not used in the IFC
are allocated, in a constituent or dedicated relationship, to subordinate BTGs.
Fire support units remaining under IFC command may provide fires for ma-
neuver brigades or BTGs in a supporting relationship. The supporting rela-
tionship allows the IFC commander the flexibility to task fire support assets
to engage key enemy targets throughout the AOR.

FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION MEASURES

9-49. Fires pose a potential hazard to friendly maneuver forces and aircraft
activities. (See Chapter 10 for more information on air and artillery coordina-
tion measures.) To reduce potential conflicts between indirect fires and ma-
neuver forces or aircraft, information pertaining to firing positions, targeted
areas, and fire support plans is distributed to commanders and their staffs.
The fire support plan includes a map with graphics outlining the following
control lines:
Coordinated Fire Line. A line beyond which indirect fire systems
can fire at any time within the AOR of the establishing headquarters
without additional coordination.
Final Coordination Line. A line established by the appropriate ma-
neuver commander to ensure coordination of fire of converging friendly
forces. It can be used to prohibit fires or the effects of fires across the
line without coordination with the affected force. For example, this line
may be used during link-up operations between an airborne or heli-
borne insertion and converging ground forces.
Joint Fire Line. A line established by the appropriate OSC-level and
above commander to ensure coordination of fire not under his control
but which may affect his operations. The joint fire line is used to coor-
dinate fires of air, ground, or sea weapons systems using various types
of ammunition against surface targets.

9-10
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 9

Safety Line. A line that denotes the fragmentation footprint of indi-

rect fire munitions or bombs/rockets released from aircraft. This indi-
cates the minimum distance between the impact area and the nearest
friendly troops.
ASSIGNING FIRE MISSIONS
9-50. When assigning missions, indirect fire support commanders and plan-
ners consider several variables, depending on the situation. These variables
include
Type of target (for example, equipment or personnel, deliberate or
hasty defensive positions, hard- or soft-skinned vehicles, point or area
targets).
Deployment of target (dug-in or in the open).
Whether the target is stationary or moving.
Whether the target is under direct observation during the artillery at-
tack.
Range to the target.
Type, caliber, and number of weapons engaging the target.
Types of ammunition available.
Time available to prepare for firing.

INDIRECT FIRE SUPPORT WEAPONS

9-51. OPFOR indirect fire support weapons consists of cannon systems,
MRLs, mortars, and SSMs. These systems can be either towed or self-
propelled (SP).

CANNON SYSTEMS
9-52. Cannon artillery includes field guns, howitzers, and hybrid systems. Of
the two basic types, field guns generally have longer tubes, higher muzzle ve-
locities, and longer ranges with higher-trajectory fire. Howitzers can deliver
both low- and high-angle fire; the high-angle fire lends itself to attacking tar-
gets located behind cover or on reserve slopes. Hybrid cannon systems in-
clude gun-howitzers, which combine the principal characteristics of both guns
and howitzers, and are particularly useful for counterbattery fire. There are
also combination guns that can fire fin-stabilized, direct-fire projectiles, spin-
stabilized howitzer projectiles, and conventional mortar projectiles.
9-53. The various systems make tradeoffs in their performance. Guns gener-
ally sacrifice mobility and projectile lethality for increased range, howitzers
sacrifice range for versatility, and combination guns trade some of everything
in order to gain versatility.
9-54. Towed cannon systems are lightweight, low-cost, simple, and extremely
mobile on hard surfaces. Their disadvantages are a lack of cross-country mo-
bility and no gun crew protection against nuclear, biological, and chemical
(NBC) strikes or conventional counterbattery fire. The OPFOR continues to
employ towed weapons, especially in artillery units at echelons above divi-
sion, but its current emphasis is on acquiring SP artillery systems.

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

9-55. Tracked, SP systems greatly enhance the artillerys ability to provide

continuous support to mechanized infantry and tank brigades. Their cross-
country mobility and speed allows them to keep pace with combined arms
combat. Their armor protection improves crew and weapon survivability.
However, these SP systems can have ammunition resupply limitations be-
cause they depend on soft-skinned, wheeled vehicles for logistics support.

MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHERS

9-56. Compared to cannon artillery, MRLs are relatively uncomplicated and
easy to operate and maintain, and they are highly mobile. They offer an eco-
nomical means to deliver massive, destructive fires on an area-type target in
a very short period of time. The principal disadvantage of MRLs is that ex-
cessive dispersion does not permit direct, close support to maneuver ele-
ments. To compensate for this relative lack of accuracy, MRLs use salvo fire
from their multiple tubes and often fire as battery and battalion groups.
Some MRLs can fire guided projectiles.
9-57. The OPFOR rarely uses MRLs alone, but rather as a complement to
mortar and cannon artillery fires. For instance, MRLs can provide the initial
area coverage fires, while cannons and mortars either maintain fire at a
steady volume or attack high-value point targets. MRLs are also excellent
weapons for counterbattery fire, especially when the enemy uses large-area
dispersion for survivability.
9-58. The OPFOR categorizes MRLs as large-caliber (220-mm and larger)
and medium-caliber (100- up to 220-mm). 3 It uses MRLs to deliver heavy fire
on important targets at decisive moments in a battle. The MRL is an excel-
lent area coverage weapon, and its rapid ripple fire is an excellent delivery
system for high-explosive (HE), volumetric explosive (VEX), and smoke pro-
jectiles; chemical agents; submunitions; and scatterable mines.

MORTARS
9-59. In infantry and motorized infantry brigades, mortars are constituent at
the brigade level, and each infantry battalion has additional mortars. In
mechanized infantry brigades, each mechanized infantry battalion has an or-
ganic mortar battery. These indirect fire support weapons help the brigade to
maintain effective fire support.
9-60. Compared to cannon systems, mortars generally sacrifice range. How-
ever, their mobility makes them well suited for close support of maneuver
units. Their high-angle fire enhances fragmentation effects and permits at-
tack of targets in deep defilade. They are ideal weapons for attacking targets
on reverse slopes, in narrow gullies, in ditches, in cities, and in other areas
that are difficult to reach with low-angle fire. Mortars are especially effective
for smoke and illumination missions.
9-61. Traditionally, mortars have been area-type weapons due to their lack of
accuracy. However, modern ammunition developments have led to the avail-

3
The OPFOR recognizes a third category of small-caliber (less than 100-mm) MRLs, but regards
these as relatively low in combat effectiveness.

9-12
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 9

ability of smart mortar projectiles, as well as improved terminal effective-

ness for all mortar rounds.

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES
9-62. SSMs include tactical- through strategic-level ballistic missiles and
land-attack cruise missiles using warheads ranging from conventional to nu-
clear. SSMs normally use liquid or solid propellant and are normally trans-
ported on a transporter-erector-launcher (TEL). Some OPFOR SSMs are in-
digenously designed variants of other nations SSMs and have improved ca-
pabilities in delivering conventional, chemical, and nuclear munitions. SSMs
are the weapon of choice where a precision engagement is required and econ-
omy of force is desired against relatively fixed targets. The OPFOR expects to
employ SSMs against
Weapons of mass destruction delivery systems and storage sites.
Aerial and sea ports of debarkation (APODs and SPODs).
C2 facilities.
Key transportation hubs.
Major logistics operating bases.
Theater air and missile defense locations.

9-63. Figure 9-1 shows how SSMs are normally classified, according to their
ranges. Missiles with ranges up to 5,500 km belong to the larger category of
theater ballistic missiles (TBMs).

SSM Type Range

Short-Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM) Up to and including 1,000 km

Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) 1,001-3,000 km

Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) 3,001-5,500 km

Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) Greater than 5,500 km

Figure 9-1. Classification of Surface-to-Surface Missiles

9-64. SRBMs typically belong to the administrative force structure of ground

forces. Thus, they will often be part of an OSC. The longer-range MRBMs,
IRBMs, and ICBMs would typically belong to the Strategic Forces, but could
be allocated to an OSCs IFC and thus could be based within the AOR of a di-
vision but controlled at higher level.
9-65. The term theater missiles includes both TBMs and cruise missiles.
OPFOR cruise missiles can be launched from ground launchers or naval plat-
forms. 4 Most ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles are generally em-

4
OPFOR fixed-wing aircraft may also employ air-launched cruise missiles, possibly in land-attack
roles.

9-13
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

ployed in antiship roles. However, applications may be developed for use

against ground targets, as land-attack cruise missiles.

AMMUNITION OPTIONS
9-66. A wide variety of ammunition types may be available. In addition to
standard ammunition, there are various types in the special munitions family
for use against HPTs.

STANDARD MUNITIONS
9-67. The default munition is fragmentation high-explosive (Frag-HE) with a
proximity or time fuze, except when the target is dug-in troops, vehicles, and
equipment. These targets would be engaged with a 50-50 mix of point-
detonating and short-delay-fuzed Frag-HE projectiles. Dug-in targets are as-
sumed to have overhead cover for personnel positions and hull-down positions for
vehicles. Frag-HE with a 25-75 mix of airburst and point-detonating projectiles is
the preferred engagement when the target is unidentified troops and equipment.

COURSE-CORRECTED MUNITIONS
9-68. Course-corrected munitions (CCM) are designed to defeat area targets
with major ammunition reductions. CCM are 5 to 10 times more accurate
than conventional projectiles or rockets at longer ranges. CCM compare the
actual flight path to the calculated flight path and change the trajectory to
correct to the desired flight. This correction method is commonly referred to
as should-hit to did-hit data. However, CCM do not correct for inaccurate or
untimely target location.
9-69. CCM use a variety of tracking schemes and actuators for course correc-
tion. CCM tracking schemes include inertial guidance, global positioning system
(GPS), and external radar or radio transponder tracking (active and passive).
The actuators include fins, thrusters, drag brakes, shifting mass, and bent nose.
9-70. CCM are capable of engaging any target. The munition does not care
about the signature of the target. However, the warhead effects must match
the target. Typical payloads include both Frag-HE and advanced munitions
such as dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM), sensor-
fuzed submunitions (SFSM), or terminally homing munitions.
9-71. CCM size limit does not allow for the shielding of the electronics. Thus,
they are vulnerable to an electronic attack by an enemy with a substantial
electronic attack capability. Severe winds in target area can also affect the
accuracy of CCM.

ADVANCED MUNITIONS
9-72. Indirect fire support targeting with advanced munitions prioritizes tar-
gets for engagement. Prioritization is essential to avoid the waste of highly
capable, relatively costly munitions. Numerous factors can affect prioritiza-
tion, with the following five determinants predominating:
Classification of the target.
Location accuracy.
Timeliness of targeting data.

9-14
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 9

Type of operation.
Availability of advanced munitions.

9-73. Figure 9-2 indicates a relative priority of munitions against generic

target types. A dash indicates that a particular munition type is not appro-
priate for a given target. The default munition in every case is Frag-HE.

Target Type
Munition Type

DPICM SALP APSM ATSM THMPd SFSMd Flechette VEX

SP Artillery 4 3b 6 5 2 1 7
Towed or Unidentified b e
Artillery 1 3 5 6 2 4
Lightly Armored Vehicle b
Column 3 4 6 5 2 1 7
Heavy Armored/ c
Mixed Vehicle Column 4 3 6 5 1 2 - 7
b
Electronics or Radar 2 3 5 6 1 7 4 1
Sitesa
Armored CPs 4 3b 5 6 2 1 7
Unarmored CPs 3 4b 7 8 6 5 1 2
Prepared Fighting Position c
with Armored Vehicles 2 1 6 5 4 3 7
Armored Missile or b
Rocket Launcher 4 3 7 6 5 2 1
Unarmored Missile or
Rocket Launcher 2 4b 8 7 6 5 3 1
b
Exposed Troops 2 4 5 1 3
Dug-In Troops and b e
Equipment 4 1 5 2 3
Field Logistics Site/Porta 2 3b 4 5 7 8 6 1
Airfield/FARPa 2 3b 4 5 7 8 6 1
a
ATSM, THMP, and SFSM are only effective if vehicles are present.
b
SALP with Frag-HE warhead is preferred, if available.
c
SALP with HEAT warhead is preferred, if available.
d
Targeting data for these munitions should be less than 10 minutes old for mobile targets.
e
Flechette is second choice only if artillery is known to be towed or open-mount, or if dug-in troops or equip-
ment lack overhead cover.

Figure 9-2. Targeting Priority Matrix for Advanced Artillery Munitions

Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions

9-74. A DPICM round is a good general-purpose munition for most targets.
Targets engaged by cannon-delivered DPICM have to be located to accuracies
of no less than 200 m for group targets and 150 m for point targets. Targets
engaged by MRL-delivered DPICM have to be located to accuracies no less
than 350 m for group targets and 250 m for point targets.
9-75. The preferred cannon engagement method for large-area targets
(greater than 200 x 200 m) is at least one battalion (18 to 24 guns). Smaller
targets are normally engaged by a battery (6 to 8 guns) and point targets by a
platoon (3 to 4 guns). MRL engagements are normally by platoon or battery.

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

Semiactive Laser-Guided Projectiles

9-76. Two classes of semiactive laser-guided projectiles (SALP) exist for field
artillery. The first is equipped with a Frag-HE warhead, and the other is
equipped with a high-explosive antitank (HEAT) warhead, with a limited
secondary fragmentation effect. The former is, like its unguided counterpart,
more of a general-purpose munition. The laser guidance is simply a mecha-
nism to get a projectile close to or atop the targeted point. While not primar-
ily designed to penetrate armor, the kinetic energy of the impacting shell, de-
lay fuzing, and the explosive lethal mechanism can result in extensive dam-
age to tanks in virtually all cases.
9-77. OPFOR artillery units train under realistic field conditions in order to
effectively use laser-guided munitions. The training includes both gun crews
and laser target designator (LTD) operators engaging and destroying station-
ary and moving targets. The targets are arrayed as a potential enemy would
deploy forces on the battlefield. Thus, the LTD operator develops the skills
required to determine laser-guided munition targets and learns the condi-
tions that either enhance or degrade the use of the munition. Predicting when
a target will enter a kill zone is a very difficult task when using a laser-
guided munition. Therefore, LTD operators learn how to plan kill zones along
avenues of approach or counterattacks in order to engage and destroy moving
targets.
9-78. Timeliness is critical during the engagement of a moving target. The
likelihood of a SALP achieving a first-round hit is severely reduced if the pro-
jectile is not delivered on time. Even the likelihood of a second-round hit is
diminished due to the variation in location of a moving target. Therefore, the
employment of the SALP is enhanced through the training of units in pre-
planning kill zones. Prior to engagement, the LTD operator conducts a ter-
rain reconnaissance of the kill zone using the laser rangefinder on the target
designator. He predetermines the points of engagement covered by the
SALPs seeker footprint. The battery fire direction center (FDC) calculates
gun range and azimuth settings in advance, and the gun crew chief records
them. This translates into a higher probability of a first-round hit and de-
struction of the moving target. LTD operators and firing units train to the
standard of achieving a direct hit on a moving vehicle on the first or second shot.
9-79. A major shortcoming of employing laser-guided munitions is the re-
quirement to illuminate the target with the laser beam for 5 to 15 seconds.
Long target-illumination times enable enemy targets equipped with laser
warning detectors to effectively employ countermeasures that prevent further
illumination of the target by the laser beam. Thus, the guidance of the SALP
is disrupted, and the target survives the engagement. 5
9-80. An effective counter-countermeasure is the use of an initial laser offset
procedure. This requires the LTD operator to first determine a land feature
or easily referenced landmark within the kill zone. The operator surveys the

5
The most effective means of protection are laser warning detectors that automatically cue gre-
nade launchers to fire a number of smoke grenades within 2 to 3 seconds after detection of a laser beam.
A smoke cloud builds up around the vehicle 6 to 8 seconds after firing. The smoke cloud bends or refracts
the laser beam and provides a false homing point for the SALP. In essence, an effective laser protection
screen is deployed around the target within 8 to 11 seconds after a laser detection.

9-16
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 9

kill zone for background conditions that may cause sufficient backscatter
(from other reflecting surfaces) to provide the target early warning of the
LTD laser beam. The LTD operator lases at the predetermined offset point
(15 to 20 m from the target) at the beginning of the fire mission. Either a
munition approach light-emitting diode on the shot-synchronization equip-
ment or a blinking signal light in the optics of the LTD alerts the operator or
his assistant to the SALPs acquisition of the laser beam. The operator begins
shifting the LTD crosshairs to the center of the target 4 to 5 seconds after the
signal prompt. The shifting of the laser beam from the offset point to the tar-
get is 2 to 3 seconds prior to the terminal phase of projectile flight. The offset
procedure process takes a total of 6 to 8 seconds. Thus, the SALP is able hit
and destroy the target prior to employment of laser countermeasures. The
offset procedure requires a skilled LTD operator due to the requirement for
increased hand and eye coordination during the laser beam-shifting process.

Antipersonnel and Antitank Scatterable Mines

9-81. Although very different in effects, antipersonnel scatterable mines
(APSM) and antitank scatterable mines (ATSM) are nearly always dispensed
together to make mineclearing operations more difficult. These mixed mine-
fields can be dropped on the target directly or can be emplaced to retard traf-
fic, either anticipated or confirmed. Target locations provided by radar or sig-
nals reconnaissance must be known with a location error of not more than
650 m for MRL scatterable mines and 350 m for cannon-delivered mines.
9-82. MRL engagements normally take place by battery or battalion, with
antitank mine densities of 0.005 to 0.01 mine/m2 for an area minefield, or 1
mine per meter of frontage for a linear minefield. A common mix is one or two
antipersonnel mines per every seven to nine antitank mines. The maximum
minefield size depends on the desired mine density but normally does not ex-
ceed 75 to 100 hectares. The desired method of engagement is mixed mine-
fields, with batteries or platoons mixing one launcher carrying APSM and the
remainder carrying ATSM. Moving columns may be engaged by MRL firing
ATSM, with the mines acting as the primary damage-causing mechanism.
9-83. Cannon engagements invariably take place by battalion due to the
large number of mines emplaced. A special munitions unit that is assigned
the mining mission for a specific time is most likely to deliver cannon-
delivered mines. This unit may constitute the commanders emergency scat-
terable mine capability, because of the cannon units ability to deliver mines
in a wide variety of conditions. The maximum size of a cannon-delivered
minefield would be 16 to 20 hectares.
9-84. One technique used to increase the effectiveness of advanced top-attack
munitions is to immobilize the target first with mines. Against enemy howit-
zers or MRLs using shoot-and-move tactics, on-call mining missions from
either cannon or MRL units can stop the target with scatterable mines, for
subsequent engagement by top-attack munitions. This type of attack can en-
hance the effectiveness of both types of munitions.
9-85. The last-minute or surprise use of scatterable mines from MRLs or
cannon artillery (or from minelayers, helicopters, or aircraft) increases the ef-
fectiveness of the minefield. The sudden introduction of minefields into areas

9-17
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

thought to be clear can either delay the enemy or canalize him into other
minefields or kill zones. Enemy forces in such a case would have little to no
intelligence as to the existence of these mines until it was too late and would
have little time to organize clearing efforts.
9-86. One method is to lay MRL-delivered minefields in a checkerboard
pattern of smaller (400 x 400 m) minefields. This makes it harder for the en-
emy to locate the separate fields and delays his mineclearing efforts. Re-
peated encounters with smaller minefields can cause him more attrition and
confusion than a single, long minefield that he only needs to breach once.
This method can break up attacking formations and cause loss of morale and
momentum. Breaching multiple minefields also can cause increased expendi-
ture of mineclearing means.

Terminally Homing Mortar Projectiles

9-87. Terminally homing mortar projectiles (THMP) are generally limited to
targets within 5 to 8 km of the battle line. They are employed against vehi-
cles of all types. However, they will generally be reserved for tanks and
ATGM-firing vehicles. Although these munitions have a secondary fragmen-
tation effect, they generally are not used against personnel.
9-88. THMP are generally fired by battery salvos (six mortars) to maximize
the number of engagements that occur in a relatively clean environment.
Each platoon in the battery fires two to four mortar projectiles at each vehicle
when vehicles are deployed in fighting positions and in columns with a spac-
ing of 50 m or more. Vehicles that are tightly grouped (less than 50 m) or
congested columns are engaged with several battery salvos. Each firing bat-
tery fires up to three to four rounds per tube to ensure the target area is cov-
ered.
9-89. If the targeted force is employing countermeasures such as thermal de-
coys or infrared-suppressive materials (that the firing unit considers to be ef-
fective), the firing unit uses the next-best munition that is available. It does
not use THMP if the target vehicles have negligible thermal signatures (en-
gines not running or otherwise in low contrast with background or vehicles
under trees). If countermeasures are of an unknown type or capability, the
firing unit defers to the next-best munition until it can determine the coun-
termeasure efficacy.

Sensor-Fuzed Submunitions
9-90. Although SFSM can be used against a wide variety of targets, armored
vehicles of various types are the primary targets. These munitions have a
relatively small search area and a kinetic-energy kill mechanism. Because of
the accuracy of the delivery system and the small footprint, cannon-delivered
SFSM can be used against targets 2 km or more from friendly ground forces.
9-91. The engagement is normally by platoon or battery, with each unit firing
at a specifically targeted area. The size of target area can be up to 12 hec-
tares for a firing platoon or 20 hectares for a battery. Larger targets will be
divided up and engaged by separate platoons. For employment of SFSM, the
target-location error cannot be greater than 350 m. Preferably, it should be
less than 200 m. If only a small number of SFSM are available (four to five

9-18
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 9

rounds per tube per day), then the firing unit would use the next-best muni-
tion until the target location error is reduced below 200 m. Moving targets
(such as convoys) will generally not be engaged by SFSM.

Flechette
9-92. Flechette-filled artillery projectiles are antipersonnel munitions that
are highly lethal, as much as five times as lethal as conventional Frag-HE
projectiles. They are useful against all targets with large numbers of person-
nel, excluding personnel in armored vehicles, bunkers, and field fortifications
with overhead cover. Because of the shape, distribution density, and terminal
velocity of flechettes, they are useful against personnel wearing woven-fabric
body armor and against personnel in shallow trenches and positions without
overhead cover.
9-93. Flechette projectiles require adjustment due to their use of mechanical
time fuzes, and their effects are very sensitive to burst height. An offset ad-
justment is normally used to avoid warning the target. To maximize shock ef-
fects, an engagement with flechette projectiles normally occurs with a mini-
mum of a battery (four to eight guns), and battalion massed fires are most
desirable. The target area is normally 8 hectares or less for a single battery
or battalion, with larger effects requiring multiple battalions.

Volumetric Explosives
9-94. The use of VEX 6 is normally limited to MRL warheads, with diameters
normally greater than 160 mm. These warheads are used against any target
that has a target-location error less than 500 m and consists primarily of soft-
skinned vehicles, personnel, and equipment presenting a large surface area
(such as radars, bridging equipment, frame buildings, and aircraft on the
ground). Increasing the accuracy of the delivery system can enhance VEX
warhead effectiveness. For example, a course-corrected rocket can reduce
dispersion in the target area.
9-95. Engagement with VEX warheads is normally by battery (six to eight
launchers). Battalion missions would consist of three independent targets in
the same vicinity. The maximum target size for a battery strike can be 25 to
36 hectares, depending on the hardness of the target. VEX warheads can also
be targeted against minefields that use simple, single-impulse-detonated
mines. VEX warheads are not used (except as a last resort) on targets that
contain numerous armored vehicles or troops in extensive enclosed fortifica-
tions.

PRECISION MUNITIONS
9-96. Some of the advanced munitions described above fall into the category
of precision munitions, which have a guidance or homing element. The
OPFOR defines a precision weapon as one capable of delivering guided con-
ventional munitions with a high probability of destroying enemy targets with
a first-round hit (within range of the weapon delivery system). The presence
of the precision munition transforms a weapon into a precision weapon. How-
ever, a precision weapon system must also incorporate a target acquisition

6
Artillery VEX are commonly referred to as fuel-air explosives or enhanced-blast explosives.

9-19
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

and tracking subsystem and a missile or projectile guidance subsystem. Some

of these subsystems may be combined.
9-97. Precision weapons have enabled the OPFOR to mass firepower at criti-
cal points on the battlefield and simultaneously reduce ammunition expendi-
ture and mission time. Reconnaissance fire (defined later in this chapter) is
an effective form of precision weapon engagement. It is sometimes called a
unified precision weapon system, because it links the highly accurate
weapon to an automated reconnaissance and control system.
9-98. Precision munitions delivered by mortars, artillery, missiles, and air-
craft can include
Homing and guided SSMs (some delivering advanced submunitions).
Semiactive laser-guided artillery projectiles and bombs.
Sensor-fuzed artillery submunitions.
Terminally homing cannon and mortar projectiles.
Terminally homing submunitions.

9-99. Precision munitions are primarily designed to effectively defeat ar-

mored vehicles; SP artillery systems; MRLs; C2 and RISTA centers; defensive
fortifications; and bridges. 7
9-100. Not all OPFOR artillery units have precision munitions, making it
necessary to allocate those rounds available against high-value targets
(HVTs). Even the units that do receive them do not distribute them evenly
among all delivery means, but typically designate one particular subelement
to fire them.

NBC WEAPONS
9-101. The OPFOR might use NBC weapons either to deter aggression or as
a response to an enemy attack on the State. The State considers the employ-
ment of NBC weapons as a responsibility of the National Command Author-
ity. Delivery means such as long-range missiles and rockets are political
tools, first and foremost. The OPFOR has SSMs capable of carrying nuclear,
chemical, or biological warheads. Additionally, it can employ aircraft systems
and cruise missiles to deliver an NBC strike.
9-102. OPFOR military doctrine distinguishes between fire support and an
NBC strike. However, the two are closely related. Strategic and operational
fire support units must plan and deliver the strikes. They must also adjust
the fire support plan to account for the effects of NBC strikes on the enemy.
Such strikes greatly affect the tempo of combat activity. This, in turn, influ-
ences the type of fire support required. It also influences the kind of logistics
support needed, such as fuel or ammunition.
9-103. If needed, the majority of OPFOR artillery (152-mm and above) is ca-
pable of firing nuclear or chemical munitions. However, continued improve-
ments in conventional munitions, especially precision munitions, increase the

7
Air-delivered precision munitions include homing and guided air-to-surface missiles (including
radar-seeking antiradiation missiles); guided bombs and cluster bombs containing homing elements; and
air-launched cruise missiles.

9-20
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 9

likelihood that the OPFOR can achieve operational- or tactical-level fire su-
periority at the desired location and time without resorting to NBC weapons.

TARGETING
9-104. Targeting is the process of selecting targets and matching the appro-
priate response, taking into account operational requirements and OPFOR
capabilities. Targeting requires constant interaction between maneuver, re-
connaissance, fire support, and IW, at all levels. Target value analysis is an
analytical tool that is used in the targeting process by which the supported
maneuver commander
Provides focus for his target acquisition effort.
Identifies priorities for the engagement of enemy targets that will fa-
cilitate the success of his mission.
Identifies the target damage criteria.
Permits planning for identified contingencies based on enemy options
available when the enemy operation fails.
HIGH-VALUE TARGETS
9-105. HVTs are targets deemed important to the enemy commander for the
successful accomplishment of his mission. The loss of HVTs can be expected
to contribute to a substantial degradation of an important battlefield func-
tion.

HIGH-PAYOFF TARGETS
9-106. HPTs are HVTs that must be successfully acquired and attacked to
contribute substantially to the success of OPFOR operations and tactical ac-
tions. They are developed on the basis of factors such as enemy situation,
unit mission, terrain, and the time and resources available. They are not de-
pendent on the ability of the fire support unit to acquire or attack them. If an
HPT is beyond the capability of the target acquisition or reconnaissance unit
to acquire, it should be passed to the next-higher headquarters as a priority
intelligence requirement.
9-107. Based on a battlefield analysis, the division or DTG commander, with
advice from his IFC commander, selects HPTs and establishes a prioritized
list of them. The HPT list identifies the HPTs for a specific point in the battle
in the order of their priority for acquisition and attack. While their target
value is usually the greatest factor contributing to the target payoff, other
considerations include the following:
Sequence or order of occurrence.
Ability to locate and identify the target.
Degree of accuracy and identification available from the acquisition
system.
Ability to engage and defeat the target in accordance with the estab-
lished target damage criteria.
Resource requirements necessary to accomplish all of the above.

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

TIME-SENSITIVE TARGETS
9-108. Time-sensitive targets are those targets requiring an immediate re-
sponse. The reason for the urgency is that they either pose (or will soon pose)
a clear and present danger to the OPFOR or are highly lucrative, fleeting
targets of opportunity.

TARGET ATTACK METHODOLOGY

9-109. The vast array of targets anticipated on the battlefield can generate
competing demands for fire support. These demands could exceed the capabil-
ity of fire support assets to adequately respond to all requirements. There-
fore, the OPFOR uses the target attack methodology of plan, detect, deliver,
and assess.

Plan
9-110. The plan phase provides the focus and priorities for the reconnais-
sance collection management and fire planning process. It employs an esti-
mate of enemy intent, capabilities, and vulnerabilities in conjunction with an
understanding of the OPFOR mission and concept of battle. During the plan
phase, the division or DTG commander, with advice from his IFC com-
mander, makes a determination of what HPTs to look for, when and where
they are likely to appear on the battlefield, who (reconnaissance or target ac-
quisition assets) can locate them, and how the targets should be attacked.

Detect
9-111. During the detect phase, the reconnaissance plan is executed. As
specified targets are located, the appropriate command observation post
(COP) or delivery system is notified to initiate the attack of the target.
9-112. Figure 9-3 illustrates the varying methods of reporting targets for at-
tack from the point of detection by a sensor through delivery. The figure dis-
plays the methods along a range from the least to the most responsive.

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_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 9

WEAPON
PLATFORM
LEGEND

Units equipped with firing

systems with onboard manual
FIRING UNIT or automated fire direction
capability
COP/FDC

WEAPON
PLATFORM
DTG IFC
FSCC

FIRING UNIT WEAPON

DTG COP/FDC PLATFORM
INTEL & IINFO
SECTION

DTG IFC FIRING UNIT WEAPON

SENSOR HQ
OR DOWNLINK FSCC COP/FDC PLATFORM
SITE

HUMINT/TECH HUMINT/TECH HUMINT/TECH HUMINT/TECH

SENSOR OR
SENSOR MANEUVER CDR SENSOR SENSOR

Less Responsive More Responsive

Figure 9-3. Target Report Flow

Deliver
9-113. Timely, accurate delivery is the culmination of synchronization of fire
support. The delivery is rapidly executed by having designated attack sys-
tems respond to the maneuver commanders guidance when the HPTs are ob-
served.

Assess
9-114. Following the attack of the target, the RISTA assets are cued to de-
termine if the target has been defeated in accordance with the established
target damage criteria. If it is determined that the target damage criteria are
not achieved, delivery assets re-engage the target until the desired target
damage has been achieved.

METHODS OF FIRE
9-115. Critical to the success of OPFOR combat actions is the ability to plan,
detect, deliver, and assess fire (in accordance with the commanders target
damage criteria) against enemy C2 and RISTA and weapons systems
throughout the AOR. The focus is a systems warfare approach to combat,

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

where the objective of the combat action is to deny the enemys combat sys-
tem its synergistic capabilities. Thus, the OPFOR is able to compel enemy
forces into multiple and rapid tactical transitions and to create opportunity
by keeping them off balance, breaking their momentum, and slowing move-
ment. The OPFOR uses various types of fire against the enemy. The methods
of fire may have different purposes in the offense and defense.

INDIRECT FIRE SUPPORT TO A STRIKE

9-116. Indirect fire support to a strike involves the employment of a wide va-
riety of ammunition types (such as standard, course-corrected, advanced, and
precision munitions) to destroy an enemy formation after typically setting the
conditions for its destruction through reconnaissance fire. IFC indirect fire
support units are assigned interdiction fire missions to support the maneuver
component throughout the strike. Constituent and dedicated indirect fire
support units (allocated to the maneuver component) provide close support
fire throughout the battle. Thus, indirect fire support to a strike incorporates
other methods of fire.

RECONNAISSANCE FIRE
9-117. Reconnaissance fire is the integration of RISTA, fire control, and
weapon systems into a closed-loop, automated fire support system that de-
tects, identifies, and destroys critical targets in minutes. This integration ca-
pability normally exists only in an IFC. One reason for this requirement for
accelerated engagement is that high-value targets may expose themselves for
only fleeting periods. Reconnaissance fire is primarily designed to attack and
destroy key enemy capabilities and/or set the conditions for a strike (see
Chapter 3).
9-118. Reconnaissance fire enables the OPFOR to deliver rotary-wing air,
SSM, cruise missile, and artillery fires (including precision munitions) on en-
emy targets within a very short time after acquisition. The OPFOR can use
reconnaissance fire in offensive and defensive phases of combat. Assets des-
ignated for reconnaissance fire use are under control of the IFC commander,
and control remains centralized for planning, analysis, and evaluation of re-
connaissance data, and for execution of the reconnaissance fire mission. This
type of arrangement allows the assets to execute other missions or taskings
until the desired HPTs are detected. The IFC commander may establish a
window of time for assets tasked to support reconnaissance fire (based on an
intelligence assessment of when the enemy targets should be in designated
kill zones).
9-119. The division commander selects and establishes the target priority
and target damage criteria of the combat system component or components to
be attacked in order to force the favorable condition to conduct a strike. The
IFC staff and fire support component commanders develop the fire support
plan designed to conduct reconnaissance fire necessary to create the favor-
able condition. The IFC commander then briefs the fire support plan to the
division commander to ensure compliance with the overall battle plan. The
IFC executes reconnaissance fire in accordance with the approved fire sup-
port plan.

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_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 9

CLOSE SUPPORT FIRE

9-120. Close support fire is fire used to support maneuver forces and attack
targets of immediate concern to units such as battalions and brigades. The
requirement is to provide a quick response time and accurate fires capable of
either neutralizing or defeating all types of targets.

INTERDICTION FIRE
9-121. Interdiction fire is fire designed to attack targets in depth (such as lo-
gistics sites or assembly areas) and to prevent enemy follow-on or reserve
forces from reinforcing or influencing a battle or situation. Generally, inter-
diction fire (when compared to close fire) has a slower response time, espe-
cially for stationary targets; accuracy may be lower; and the targets are gen-
erally not as well protected. However, technological improvements such as
course-corrected rockets, projectiles, and fuzes facilitate long-range precision
targeting.
9-122. The OPFOR employs long-range strike assets (operating from dis-
persed areas) to continuously engage targeted forces and systems. Opera-
tional and tactical RISTA systems direct them.

COUNTERFIRE
9-123. Counterfire is fire designed to destroy the enemy fire support infra-
structure throughout the battlefield. The fire support infrastructure includes
mortars, cannon, rockets, missiles, fire support C2 and RISTA, and logistics
assets. Counterfire enables the ground forces to achieve effective fire support
on the battlefield. It is especially important for the early destruction of the
enemys long-range and precision weapons.

COUNTERBATTERY FIRE
9-124. Counterbattery fire is fire that accomplishes the annihilation or neu-
tralization of enemy artillery batteries. It enables ground forces the ability to
maneuver on the battlefield with little to no suppression by enemy artillery.
However, combat with enemy artillery requires more than counterbattery
fire. It requires the destruction of the enemy C2 centers as well as his artil-
lery support structure.

FINAL PROTECTIVE FIRE

9-125. Final protective fire is an immediately available preplanned barrier of
indirect and direct fire designed to prevent an advancing enemy from pene-
trating a defensive position. Final protective fire is coordinated with direct
fire assets to enhance the lethality of friendly weapon systems on the enemy
force.

FIRE SUPPORT OF MANEUVER OPERATIONS

9-126. The fire support of maneuver operations is characterized by the use of
all available fire support to carry out the commanders plan. The OPFOR be-
lieves that fire support must be flexible to meet all contingencies during com-
bat. The OPFOR masses fires against an enemy objective with available fire

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

support assets, with the goal of achieving the commanders specified target
damage criteria in the shortest time possible.

OFFENSE
9-127. Fire support considerations for the offense apply to all types of offen-
sive action discussed in Chapter 3. The OPFOR plans and executes fires to
support the attack and complete the destruction of the enemy. The use of se-
lected lines or zones controls the shifting of fires, displacement of fire support
units, and changes in command and support relationships between fire sup-
port units and maneuver units. Fires are planned to
Suppress enemy troop activity and weapon systems.
Deny the enemy information about friendly forces.
Prevent the enemy from restoring fire support, C2, and RISTA systems
neutralized during previous fire support missions.
Deny the enemy the ability to use reserve forces to conduct a counter-
attack.
If necessary, create favorable conditions for the conduct of a strike.
Support the exploitation force.
DEFENSE
9-128. Fire support considerations for the defense apply to all types of defen-
sive action discussed in Chapter 4. Key is the application of fire support as
early as possible throughout the AOR in support of the defensive battle plan.
Emphasis is placed on RISTA assets locating enemy formations and attack
positions, with the goal of determining the direction and composition of the
enemy main attack. Carefully analyzing the terrain over which the enemy
will advance and canalizing his movement into kill zones can create condi-
tions for fires in the defense. Fires are planned to
Deny the enemy information about friendly forces.
Develop the situation early by forcing the enemy to deploy early and
thus reveal the location of his main effort.
Maximize the effect of obstacles as combat multipliers.
Create favorable conditions for the conduct of a strike and counterat-
tacks.
9-129. Close-support fire is directed against advancing enemy maneuver
units. Close support fire includes fires within defensive positions that are ini-
tiated after the enemy has successfully penetrated friendly defensive posi-
tions. Indirect fires are used against enemy forces that have become wedged
against defensive positions. The indirect fires may be massed or concentrated
(point). The intent is to annihilate enemy forces in kill zones, thus preventing
continuation of enemy offensive operations. Counterbattery fires also will be
used to neutralize enemy artillery supporting the attack.
9-130. Final protective fire is planned along the most likely avenue of ap-
proach into the defensive position. Because the likely direction of attack can
change as the enemy situation develops, the final protective fire section of the
battle plan is reviewed an updated as required.

9-26
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 9

TACTICAL DEPLOYMENT
9-131. There are some basics of indirect fire support employment that apply
to any tactical situationoffense or defense. These relate to the effectiveness
and survivability of indirect fire weapon systems and units.
9-132. Two factors govern the deployment of indirect fire support: continuity
and dispersion. The need for continuity of fire support leads to indirect fire
support units being deployed in positions to support the maneuver force
throughout the battlefield. The OPFOR understands that unplanned move-
ments to alternate firing positions deny the maneuver force the amount of
fire support it requires. Therefore, the OPFOR adheres to the principle of
flexibility of employment in order to ensure the delivery of highly accurate
and effective fires. Dispersion is the requirement to space batteries and bat-
talions so that the enemy cannot destroy them with a single fire strike. Coun-
terfire continues to be the greatest threat facing indirect fire units. Disper-
sion is a principle technique used to survive the counterfire threat. It is the
least expensive technique in terms of effort and time.
9-133. The factors of accuracy and consistency are important since they de-
termine the time and quantity of ammunition required to effectively attack a
target. Accuracy is a measure of the precision with which the mean point of
impact (MPI) of a group of rounds can be placed on the target. Consistency is
a measure of the spread of rounds about the MPI when each round is aimed
at the same target. Accuracy is the function of the overall indirect fire sup-
port system. This includes many sources of error, such as survey of the weap-
ons, target location, ammunition variations, instrument precision (calibra-
tion), meteorology, and operator error. Consistency is affected by round-to-
round variations in factors such as muzzle velocity, meteorology, sight setting
and laying, and ramming during loading.
9-134. Another factor affecting the dispersion of rounds at a target is the
spread or dispersion of the weapons at their firing position. The primary fac-
tor affecting the dispersion of the weapons in a position is type of terrain. For
example, complex terrain such as heavily forested, mountainous, urban, and
jungle-type terrain affects not only the mobility of weapon systems but also
their ability to disperse within limitations of the weapon system. Tradition-
ally when operating in complex of terrain, dispersion between mortar sys-
tems and cannon can range from 20 to 50 m, with MRL systems ranging from
50 to 60 m. However, to increase the survivability of the weapon systems
against enemy counterfire and air attacks, it is advisable for mortar, cannon,
and MRL systems to disperse no closer than 50 m from each other, as terrain
permits.
9-135. Normally, it is acceptable or easier to fire each gun on the same bear-
ing (lines of fire parallel) or with the bearings converged so that each projec-
tile was aimed at exactly the same point. This is due to the inability of man-
ual or some automated fire direction systems to be fast enough to predict the
separate bearings and elevation for each gun in an optimum way. Recent ad-
vancements in technology have enabled ballistic computing to be fast enough
to predict the separate bearing and elevation for each gun, so that the indi-
vidual aim points cover the specified target dimensions and orientation in an
optimum way. However, other factors, such as the enemy situation and capa-

9-27
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

bilities, terrain, weapon flexibility 8 , communications, unit training, and type

of sheaf all have an impact on the distance between weapon systems at a fir-
ing position.

MORTAR AND CANNON FIRING POSITIONS

9-136. Based on detailed map analysis, the senior maneuver or artillery
headquarters selects the firing position areas for the artillery battalion.
When possible, the artillery battalion commander also conducts ground re-
connaissance of the area. When moving into an unfamiliar area, an artillery
battalion (or an artillery regiment or brigade) may send out an artillery re-
connaissance patrol to find possible firing positions or sites for COPs and
routes of movement to them. The artillery battalion commander designates
the individual battery positions or position areas in his orders to the batter-
ies.

TYPES OF BATTALION FIRING POSITION AREAS

9-137. According to their purpose, firing position areas may be primary, al-
ternate, or temporary areas. These have applications in both offense and de-
fense.

Primary
9-138. The primary firing position area is designated for carrying out the
primary fire missions in all types of battle. Its distance from the battle line of
friendly units depends on the battalions place in the IFC, the range of artil-
lery systems, the nature of the terrain, and other conditions. Within the bat-
talion firing position area, each battery has a primary firing position and pos-
sibly one or two alternate positions.

Alternate
9-139. The alternate firing position area is usually designated in a defensive
situation for battalion or battery maneuver and to carry out fire missions
during an intentional or forced abandonment of the primary firing position
area. A battalion usually has one or two alternate firing position areas to the
flanks of the primary area or in the depth of the defense. An alternate area
can be several kilometers from the original location.

Temporary
9-140. The temporary firing position area can be designated for carrying out
individual fire missions. It could be forward of the battle zone, for support of
maneuver units defending in the disruption zone or for firing on distant tar-
gets. It could also be for carrying out missions as roving units. Other missions
could include supporting the commitment of an exploitation force or commit-
ment of a reserve unit to a spoiling attack or counterattack.

8
Flexibility is the ability of a weapon to deliver fire over a wide front (traverse) and at all angles of
elevation without time-consuming shifts. Flexibility is achieved by maximum on-carriage elevation and
traverse. Flexibility of towed weapons is achieved through the use of rear-mounted trunions, split trails,
and pintle traverse or a pivot and socket, and a firing platform. Flexibility of SP weapons is achieved
through the use of ring and race traverse and rear-mounted trunion.

9-28
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 9

BATTALION BATTLE FORMATION

9-141. Within a battalion firing position area, batteries typically locate 500 to
2,000 m apart. At any given time, the firing positions of the three dispersed
batteries normally form a large triangle. The triangle can be a forward or re-
verse wedge pointed toward or away from the enemy. The triangle is not al-
ways equilateral and sometimes even takes a form approaching a straight
line. As batteries occupy alternate firing positions, the size and shape of the
triangle can change considerably. Taking into account one or two alternate
firing positions for each battery, the actual shape of the firing position area
may not be a triangle at all.
9-142. For a battalion minus one battery (allocated to a lower-level maneuver
unit), the firing position area is a straight line, possibly echeloned left or
right. Figure 9-4 shows an example of an artillery battalion battle formation.
(For the sake of simplicity, this figure does not show alternate battery firing
positions within the battalion temporary and alternate firing position areas.)
The battalion chief of staff operates the battalion fire direction center (FDC),
which normally is inside the triangle of batteries and located 300 to 500 m
from one of the batteries.

I
1
I I
1 1
Battalion I Battalion
Primary 3 Alternate
I
Firing Position Firing Position
I 2
Area I Area
I
2
2 3
I
Temporary 2
Firing Position

Battalion Battalion
Temporary Alternate
Firing Position Firing Position
Area Area

Figure 9-4. Artillery Battalion Battle Formation (Example)

9-143. The artillery battalion commander typically positions his COP vehicle
where he can observe as much as possible of the battalions sector of fire.
Since this COP needs to communicate over longer distances, it may locate on
the reverse slope of a hill, where it can elevate its antenna mast. The battal-
ion battle formation can also include other types of observation posts (OPs), if

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

employed. (See Figures 8-4 and 8-5 for examples of deployment of the various
OPs in a battalion battle formation.) It could also include artillery reconnais-
sance elements allocated from the parent artillery regiment or brigade.

BATTERY FIRING POSITIONS

9-144. A firing position is the sector of terrain occupied or prepared for occu-
pation by a batterys firing platoons for delivery of fire. Selection of this loca-
tion it is normally the responsibility of the battery commander, but he may
receive guidance from the artillery battalion commander. The artillery battal-
ion commander can assign the battery a firing position and COP location. If,
instead, he designates a battery firing position area, the battery commander
can select two or three firing positions for the battery within that area. At a
given time, both of the batterys firing platoons are usually at a single firing
position. In certain cases, each firing platoon may deploy at an independent
firing position when using split-battery or roving unit tactics.

Types of Positions
9-145. As with battalion firing position areas, battery firing positions may be
primary, alternate, or temporary. In the offense, an artillery battery can use
any or all of those, and possibly create deception firing positions. The defense
can require primary, alternate, temporary, and deception positions. The func-
tions of primary and alternate firing positions are much the same as for bat-
talion firing position areas.
9-146. Temporary. A temporary firing position can allow a battery to ac-
complish special, short-term, or emergency missions. In the defense, a battery
can use a temporary firing position near the forward edge or forward of the
main defensive zone to support maneuver units defending in the security
zone or to fire on a distant target. A temporary position can also be for use by
a roving battery or platoon. Although temporary, these firing positions can be
prepared and camouflaged.
9-147. Deception. A battery (or battalion) may prepare deception firing posi-
tions and COP sites on its own or as part of the senior commanders deception
plan. Their purpose is to mislead the enemy as to the actual deployment of
artillery units. Their preparation and camouflage must not differ sharply
from that of actual positions and sites. A roving unit may periodically deliver
fire from the deception firing position.

BATTERY BATTLE FORMATION

9-148. A battery firing position includes places for artillery systems and am-
munition, the battery senior officers vehicle (FDC), and prime movers or
ammunition resupply vehicles. The battery COP may or may not be within
the firing position. The battery battle formation can also include a forward or
lateral OP (FOP or LOP), if employed.
9-149. The battery commander normally positions his COP vehicle in hull de-
filade on terrain that permits him to observe the entire sector of fire for his
battery. Depending on the situation, he can also choose to keep his vehicle in
complete defilade and dismount his COP. The battery senior officer operates
the battery FDC, which can be up to 200 m from the nearest artillery

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_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 9

weapon. The battery senior officer or gun position officers select individual
gun firing positions.
9-150. Figure 9-5 is an example of a howitzer battery deployment in linear
formation. In this example, the battery forms a straight line with equal in-
tervals between guns. This pattern of deployment reduces emplacement and
displacement time. It also simplifies the computation procedures required for
battery fire missions. The reduced computation and mission times enable
batteries to complete missions and relocate more quickly. This lessens their
exposure to enemy fire and compensates for the vulnerability inherent in the
formation.

Minimum
400 m

FOP

Up to 300 m
Weapon Pit
20-50 m (MG or ATGL)

15-20 m

15-30 m

Up to
Ammo 200 m
Shelter
200 to
500 m

Ammo Recess Battery

(Immediate Ammo) FDC
NOTE:
Slit trenches and crew shelters
may be dug beside gun pits and
n
itio command posts. Positions may
Pos be linked by communication
at e
ern trenches.
o Alt
T
Towing Vehicles
Hidden in the
Woods

Figure 9-5. Howitzer Battery Deployment (Linear Formation)

9-31
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

9-151. For increased survivability, artillery uses formations that vary the in-
terval between guns and disperse the guns in depth with the aid of com-
puters. Guns may be in a wave formation, a forward or reverse wedge, or a
semicircle. Figure 9-6 gives some examples of the nonlinear formations a bat-
tery might use. Even with computers, batteries may retain the linear forma-
tion for speed and simplicity. Its goal is to reduce the time that a firing bat-
tery remains in position after the first round fires.

Up to 200 m Up to 200 m

Base Piece
Base Piece
2
2 Up to
250 m

20-50 m Battery
FDC
Battery
Base Piece FDC
Battery
FDC
40 to
Up to 50 m
1 250 m
30 m

1
2
20-50 m
20-50 m

30-50 m Up to 200 m

Not to Scale

Figure 9-6. Nonlinear Deployment Patterns of a Howitzer Battery (Examples)

9-152. Given the tempo of modern combat, artillery must now deliver effec-
tive fire from emergency positions without firing a registration. The use of
improved rangefinders can reduce adjustment time and eliminate the need
for registration for many types of missions.
9-153. Battery firing positions consist of two firing platoons of three guns
each. 9 The platoons may be separated a few hundred meters for greater sur-
vivability. Each platoon has a platoon headquarters and three gun sections.
The platoon leader of one firing platoon is the battery senior officer, if there is
not a separate officer for that position. The battery commander of an attached

9
Some artillery units allocated from the operational level have firing platoons of four guns.

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_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 9

or supporting battery normally deploys near the COP of the maneuver unit to
which it is attached or which it is supporting.

CONCEALMENT
9-154. In selecting firing positions, both battalion and battery commanders
consider the concealment offered by the terrain. With respect to concealment,
firing positions can fall into one of two categories:
Concealed positions.
Unconcealed or open positions.
In either case, the entrance to and exit from all gun positions should be con-
cealed as much as possible.

Concealed Position
9-155. A concealed position is one in which the artillery systems are not ex-
posed to enemy air or ground observation during delivery of fire. A primary
way for an indirect fire unit to survive an enemy that has air parity or supe-
riority is to occupy well concealed positions so that the enemy cannot detect
the firing unit as a target. Site selection for an indirect fire position takes
into account
The possibility of delivering fire at given minimum quadrant elevations
and large deflection shifts from the base line.
The possibility of direct fire for self-defense.
The availability of convenient access routes and camouflage conditions.

9-156. For cannon systems, it is advisable to select firing positions primarily

on avenues of likely tank approach, but behind natural antitank (AT) obsta-
cles and minefields. For mortar and MRL units, firing positions should be in
areas inaccessible to tanks, as much as possible. Deployment of artillery sys-
tems within the firing position depends on the terrain.

Unconcealed or Open Position

9-157. An unconcealed or open position is one in which the firing systems are
not concealed from enemy air or ground observation. Such a position is usu-
ally found in desert type environments or environments where the lack of
vegetation makes it difficult to camouflage the firing position. Even for an
unconcealed position, site selection takes into account the possibility of
camouflaging the artillery systems and the availability of concealed access
routes.
9-158. The firing position should afford cover for the gun crews and their
ammunition. If engineer assets are available, digging in all of the batterys
vehicles below the ground surface and stretching camouflage nets flat or
nearly flat over the vehicles provides not only good concealment from ground
observation but also excellent cover against direct fire weapons. Another
technique is to increase the distance between firing systems and support ve-
hicles and equipment. Good locations for unconcealed firing positions may be
near fences, thickets, and roads, or in ditches. Even if initially concealed and
camouflaged, the systems become exposed and observable at the start of fir-
ing.

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

9-159. Terrain masking is important, especially when deploying within range

of enemy antitank guided missiles (ATGMs) and other direct fire weapons.
The position should allow the battery to accomplish a direct fire mission at
the weapons maximum effective direct fire range. Individual weapons should
have interlocking fires with adjacent weapons. From such a position, the unit
can deliver direct fire to destroy enemy tanks, other armored vehicles, and
AT weapons or to demolish weapon emplacements and fortifications.

MORTAR AND CANNON EMPLACEMENT AND DISPLACEMENT

9-160. The specific technique used during the occupation of a firing position
will vary based upon whether or not the occupation is conducted into a previ-
ously reconnoitered position. Generally, the OPFOR attempts to occupy posi-
tions that have been prepared for occupation.

Deliberate Positions
9-161. When time permits, the battery senior officer will send an artillery re-
connaissance patrol forward to lay out and secure the future firing position.
The position of each howitzer and the FDC will be marked with numbered
cards and the vehicles will proceed to their assigned positions during occupa-
tion. A guide stake is emplaced at each howitzer position for the driver of the
prime mover or SP howitzer to use when roughly aligning the cannon on the
azimuth of fire. The howitzers may have luminous tape or paint (inside the
gunners door) for easy identification during periods of limited visibility. Once
the base piece has halted, the senior officer uses the onboard periscopic aim-
ing circle of his artillery command and reconnaissance vehicle (ACRV) to lay
the howitzer for direction. Depending on the situation and time available, the
remaining howitzers are either laid from the senior officers ACRV or recipro-
cally from the base howitzer. The senior officer measures the azimuth and
distance from his location to each of the howitzers and uses the data to com-
pute individual locations and piece corrections based upon the disposition of
the howitzers.

Hasty Positions
9-162. In the event the unit is required to occupy an unplanned position, the
battery senior officer positions his ACRV at the selected battery center, ori-
ented in the direction of the azimuth of fire (determined from the onboard
land navigation system). The leading howitzer pulls in beside the senior offi-
cers ACRV, and the other howitzers pull on-line, alternating sides. Once the
base piece has halted, the senior officer repositions his vehicle at the left rear
of the battery firing position and lays the howitzer for direction. The remain-
ing howitzers are laid either reciprocally from the base howitzer or from the
senior officers ACRV.

Battery Emplacement Using GPS and an ACRV

9-163. The survey team from the batterys artillery reconnaissance patrol de-
termines the battery center using GPS and the data to one of the guns to be
used as a base piece. Other members of the artillery reconnaissance patrol
mark each howitzer position (with a guide stake or camouflage net pole, for

9-34
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 9

instance) using GPS and record the data for future reference. The howitzers
are guided (by their ground guides) to their respective positions (predeter-
mined by GPS) using a compass for orientation. Once the base piece has
halted, the senior officer uses his onboard periscopic aiming circle to lay the
howitzer for direction. The remaining howitzers are laid either reciprocally
from the base howitzer or from the senior officers ACRV.

Battery Emplacement Using GPS and a Ground-Mounted Aiming Circle

9-164. The survey team, other artillery reconnaissance patrol members, and
platoon sergeants follow the same initial procedures as for the vehicle-
mounted aiming circle. The platoon sergeants set up the two aiming circles.
Each aiming circle is marked with a different color of luminous paint or light
for identification during periods of limited visibility. The first aiming circle is
set up magnetically, and the second aiming circle is laid off of the first. The
howitzers are guided (by their ground guides) to their respective positions
(predetermined by GPS) using a compass for orientation. A communications
link is established between the howitzers, FDC, and aiming circles using wire
(preferred method) or short-range radios. The battery senior officer sets up
and magnetically orients a safety circle over the orienting station grid estab-
lished by GPS. The safety circle is checked against the first aiming circle, and
a simultaneous observation is conducted with the battalions surveyed point
or one of the other batteries. Once the simultaneous observation is complete,
the battery commander compares the survey azimuth to the magnetic azi-
muth in the battery computer. Immediately after being laid, each howitzer
obtains a referred deflection to the safety circle and verifies the information
to be checked out as safe.

Battery Displacement
9-165. The battery commander determines a battery rally point at least 300
m away from the occupied position. The rally point location is given to each
howitzer crew chief, the FDC, and the ammunition transport section chief.
During displacement, each howitzer crew proceeds in the most expeditious
manner to the rally point. Upon arrival at the rally point, the travel locks (on
guns lacking the automated travel lock) are emplaced and a check of all
equipment and personnel is conducted prior to movement to the batterys al-
ternate or temporary position. The rally point is occupied no longer than 3 to
5 minutes.

MRL FIRING POSITIONS

9-166. Prior to occupying their firing positions, MRLs usually remain in a
camouflaged assembly area short distance away from the firing point. The
launchers usually have their full complement of ready rockets loaded. Then
MRL batteries move forward to support the battle, with one or more ammu-
nition trucks accompanying each launcher to the firing position.
9-167. Immediately after firing, MRLs normally move to either a camou-
flaged position or to a new firing position to evade counterbattery fire. The
OPFOR also employs MRLs in roving unit missions and counterattacks.

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

9-168. For MRLs, the battery firing position includes all the same things
listed above for a cannon artillery firing position. In addition, it includes a
loading point and a meteorological station. For some MRLs, crews can launch
rockets remotely from shallow trench shelters located 50 m or more from the
launcher vehicle. The battery senior officer operates the battery FDC, which
usually is 150 to 300 m behind the line of MRLs.

MRL EMPLACEMENT AND DISPLACEMENT

9-169. Like mortar and cannon emplacement and displacement, the specific
technique used during the occupation of a firing position will vary based on
whether or not the occupation is conducted in a previously reconnoitered po-
sition. Generally, the OPFOR attempts to occupy positions that are reconnoi-
tered prior to occupation.
9-170. The requirements for the MRL firing position are relatively simple.
They should be covered positions so that the battery may safely occupy them
without risking direct observation by the enemy. When practical, there
should be covered routes into and out of the firing position. The position area
should be generally level, since a cant of greater than 3 to 4 degrees makes it
impossible to properly emplace the launcher. The senior officer will locate his
ACRV in a position advantageous for controlling the entire battery. The de-
sired location is one centrally located within the battery. The positioning be-
tween launchers is based upon the firing position, the mission, and the
method of fire. Communications within the battery may be by voice, radio, or
wire depending on visibility, time, and the threat.
9-171. Most MRL vehicle cabins accommodates both the launch preparation
and firing equipment. These vehicle cabins also contain louvered windows or
shutters for protection during firing. MRL crew members operating these
types of systems remain inside the cab during the fire mission. However,
MRL crews operating from a launch cabin not capable of affording protection
during firing or operating an MRL with a remote firing capability use the fol-
lowing procedure. Once the weapons are laid on the target, the crews move to
a covered position beside the launcher at a distance of up to 60 m. The crew
position is also in an area avoiding the blast danger to the rear of the launch-
ers.
9-172. Resupply and other support vehicles (such as maintenance vans or
cargo trucks) are positioned in a covered and concealed position to the rear of
the launchers. This position is terrain-dependent, but is always out of the
backblast danger area (approximately 150 to 360 m. Additionally, the support
vehicles are positioned far enough away that the destruction of either the
launchers or the support vehicles will not be a hazard to other battery ele-
ments.

Deliberate Firing Positions

9-173. When time permits, the battery senior officer will send an artillery re-
connaissance patrol forward to lay out and secure the future firing position.
This is a laborious process that is not frequently used. This process is used
primarily for initial firing positions or those planned for nighttime occupa-
tion. The artillery reconnaissance patrol is responsible for determining the

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_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 9

coordinates of the battery center and the directions for several distant aiming
points. It is also responsible for conducting a security sweep of the position
(checking for mines, enemy observers, or ground-emplaced reconnaissance
sensors) and for marking the positions for each of the vehicles (firing and
support). The position of each MRL and the fire direction center (FDC) is
marked with numbered cards, and the vehicles proceed to their assigned po-
sitions during occupation. A guide stake is emplaced at each MRL position for
the driver to use when roughly aligning the launcher on the azimuth of fire.
The MRLs may have luminous tape or paint on the vehicle body for easy
identification during periods of limited visibility.
9-174. Once the artillery reconnaissance patrol has completed the reconnais-
sance of the planned position, the senior officer returns to the original firing
position (or assembly area) to guide the battery to the new location. Once the
base MRL has halted, the senior officer uses his ACRVs onboard periscopic
aiming circle to lay the MRL for direction. The remaining MRLs are laid from
the senior officers ACRV. The senior officer measures the azimuth and dis-
tance from his location to each of the MRLs and uses the data to compute in-
dividual locations and piece corrections based upon the disposition of the
MRLs.

Hasty Firing Positions

9-175. Typically, OPFOR MRL batteries will occupy sites that are unplanned,
but reconnoitered prior to occupation. Prior to the senior officers ACRV occu-
pying the position, artillery reconnaissance patrol members conduct a secu-
rity sweep. Then the battery senior officer positions his ACRV at the selected
battery center, oriented in the direction of the azimuth of fire (determined
from the onboard land navigation system). The leading MRL pulls in beside
the senior officers ACRV, and the other MRLs pull on-line, alternating sides.
Once the base MRL has halted, the senior officer repositions his vehicle at
the left rear of the battery firing position and lays the MRL for direction. The
remaining MRLs are laid from the senior officers ACRV.

Battery Emplacement Using GPS and an ACRV

9-176. The survey team from the batterys artillery reconnaissance patrol de-
termines the battery center using GPS and the data to each MRL position.
Other members of the artillery reconnaissance patrol mark each MRL posi-
tion (with a guide stake or camouflage net pole, for example) using GPS and
record the data for future reference. The MRLs are guided (by their ground
guides) to their respective positions (predetermined by GPS) using a compass
for orientation. Once the base MRL has halted, the senior officer uses his on-
board periscopic aiming circle to lay the MRL for direction. The remaining
MRLs are laid from the senior officers ACRV.

Battery Emplacement Using GPS and a Ground-Mounted Aiming Circle

9-177. The survey team, other artillery reconnaissance patrol members, and
platoon sergeants follow the same initial procedures as for the vehicle-
mounted aiming circle. The platoon sergeants set up the two aiming circles.
Each aiming circle is marked with a different color of luminous paint or light
for identification during periods of limited visibility. The first aiming circle is

9-37
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

set up magnetically, and the second aiming circle is laid off of the first. The
MRLs are guided (by their ground guides) to their respective positions (pre-
determined by GPS) using a compass for orientation. A communications link
is established between the MRLs, FDC, and aiming circles using wire (pre-
ferred method) or short-range radios. The battery senior officer sets up and
magnetically orients a safety circle over the orienting station grid established
by GPS. The safety circle is checked against the first aiming circle, and a si-
multaneous observation is conducted with the battalions surveyed point or
one of the other batteries. Once the simultaneous observation is complete, the
battery commander compares the survey azimuth to the magnetic azimuth in
the battery computer. Immediately after being laid, each MRL obtains a re-
ferred deflection to the safety circle and verifies the information to be checked
out as safe.

Battery Displacement
9-178. The battery commander determines a battery rally point at least 300
m away from the occupied position. The rally point location is given to each
MRL crew chief, the FDC, and the ammunition transport section chief. Dur-
ing displacement, each MRL crew proceeds in the most expeditious manner to
the rally point. Upon arrival at the rally point, a check of all equipment and
personnel is conducted prior to movement to the batterys next firing position.
The rally point is occupied no longer than 3 to 5 minutes.

SSM EMPLOYMENT
9-179. SSMs may be fired from both fixed and mobile launchers. The OPFOR
prefers to fire SSMs from mobile launchers. The value of a mobile SSM is its
crews ability to rapidly move the SSM from a hide site to a launch site, per-
form pre-launch procedures, launch the missile, and displace from the launch
site in a short time.
9-180. A missile mounted on a wheeled or tracked vehicle chassis character-
izes the mobile launcher. The vehicle is referred to as a transporter, erector,
and launcher (TEL). The vehicles that provide the mobility to these missile
systems range from specially designed vehicles with mobility-enhancing fea-
tures to modified commercial or military all-wheel-drive trucks, to commer-
cial trucks and trailers. Generally, TELs are unarmored and have vital com-
ponents such as erection and pre-launch control panels and auxiliary power
equipment exposed or covered by thin metal.

SSM LAUNCH SITE

9-181. SSMs are launched from a deliberate (prepared) site or a hasty (un-
prepared) site as well as from a road movement. A deliberate launch site is
located close to a road and consists of a pre-surveyed hard surface (firm soil
or concrete) launch pad or area. The launch pad is aligned to predetermined
targets to simplify the TEL alignment process. The entire site, including the
launch pad, is concealed when unoccupied. A hasty launch site is also located
close to a road and consists of a hard surface launch area that is not pre-
surveyed. During a road movement, the SSM unit can receive an order to es-
tablish a hasty launch site and immediately launch the missile. However, the

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_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 9

OPFOR considers this procedure unusual and will use this only in emergency
situations.
9-182. Normally, the TEL stops near the selected launch point, and the
launch point coordinates are determined using the TELs onboard navigation
or survey system. The launch azimuth is determined using the launch point
coordinates and target coordinate information. The TEL is then positioned on
the launch point, and launch preparation begins. Once the missile is fired,
the TEL quickly displaces from the launch site to a resupply point or hide
site.

READINESS CONDITIONS
9-183. The OPFOR use four readiness condition to describe the status for
SSMs. They are stand down, standby, alert, and ready.

Stand Down
9-184. Stand down is sometimes referred to as garrison or administrative
status. During this stage, the missile is located on a TEL in a missile storage
and checkout building. General support equipment such as empty propellant
vehicles, warhead vans, and other vehicles are maintained in normal unit
storage areas. The warhead and the propellant (when needed) arrive from
separate storage points via motor transport, rail, water, or air. The SSM crew
follows normal duty and training schedules and periodically performs system
maintenance. Additionally, they occasionally conduct filed training.

Standby
9-185. The SSM is deployed in a forward operating location and remains in a
hide position. The hide site may be
Bunkers or underground facilities.
Culverts or bridges.
Revetments.
Civilian buildings.
Vegetation with camouflage nets.
9-186. The distance between the hide site and the launch position is depend-
ent upon the terrain and operational capabilities of the SSM. During this
stage, the warhead may or may not be present. The warhead may be stored in
a hardened facility near the launch site or in a warhead van. General support
equipment vehicles such as propellant and oxidizer vehicles, maintenance
vans, and engineer equipment are located in dispersed locations near the
hide site.

Alert
9-187. During the alert stage, the SSM deploys to predetermined locations in
preparation for launch. Once the TEL is on the launch point, the missile may
be erected on the launch stand with the propellant loaded. The crew has
completed all subsystem checks and monitors the missile status.

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

Ready
9-188. The SSM is erected on the launch stand, propellant and (oxidizer if
necessary) are loaded, and the final guidance alignment is completed. The
launch pad and apron is cleared and the umbilicals remain attached. The
crew has completed all system checkouts and final checks and continues to
monitor the missile status.

SECURITY AND DEFENSE

9-189. There are three primary types of security and defense functions per-
formed for deployed missile units:
Passive defense measures against visual and electronic detection.
Physical site security.
Air defense coverage.
Passive Defense Measures
9-190. The OPFOR considers SSMs a high priority asset that affords protec-
tion against intelligence sensors and platforms and air and ground attack as-
sets (including enemy special operations forces). It uses camouflage, conceal-
ment, cover, and deception (C3D) concepts designed to enhance the surviv-
ability of the SSM. These concepts include use of the following:
Radar-absorbing paints, nets, and covers.
Smoke and obscurants.
Radar corner reflectors and jammers.
Decoy launchers and launch sites.

9-191. The OPFOR also attempts to keep the signatures of launch-related ac-
tivity to a minimum. These signatures include the following:
Excessive radio communications.
Activities at facilities previously associated with SSM activities.
Unusual placement of air defense assets.
Employment of large security forces.

9-192. The OPFOR uses a variety of means of communicating firing orders.

These include landline, couriers, and short coded burst radio transmissions.
Regardless of the communications means, the firing orders are always in a
secure code format.

Physical Site Security

9-193. The OPFOR assigns a maneuver unit to provide security for the de-
ployed SSMs. The security unit may range in size from a platoon to a com-
pany. The security force protects convoys and provides local security patrols
once the missiles are deployed.

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_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 9

BATTERY DEPLOYMENT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND

PROCEDURES
9-194. The OPFOR employs indirect fire support tactical concepts that in-
clude a variety of battery tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for effec-
tiveness and survivability. The plans for the employment of the battery are
very thorough and cover
Mission.
Location of firing positions.
Method of fire.
Number of rounds to be fired from each position.
Movement schedule of the battery.
Duration of the battery mission.

9-195. The TTPs are applicable to all indirect fire units. These techniques
also provide the battery commander with more flexibility to conduct multiple
fire missions simultaneously, since the battery can organize into more than
one distinct firing unit. The techniques include
Fire from dispersed locations.
Fire and decoy.
Shoot and move.
Fire from fixed locations.

FIRE FROM DISPERSED LOCATIONS

9-196. The OPFOR employs indirect fire support weapons with a variety of
dispersed battery techniques applicable to mortar, cannon, and MRL units. A
common technique is to increase the intervals between the weapon systems
in the firing position. Two other effective techniques are the split-battery
(two-platoon) and dispersed-platoon formations.

Split Battery
9-197. Split battery is a tactic designed to increase the survivability of
OPFOR artillery against enemy counterfire and counterbattery fire. Position-
ing the firing platoons 200 to 500 m apart can move at least one platoon from
the beaten zone of a conventional fire strike. As a countermeasure to preci-
sion munitions and submunitions, the increased dispersion can keep one pla-
toon out of the seeker footprint of munitions employed against the other pla-
toon. This can force the enemy to either employ more munitions over a larger
target area or increase the number of targets to be serviced. In most cases,
the battery COP can control the fires of both platoons. The battery FDC
would deploy with one of the platoons but maintain communications with the
other platoon.
9-198. When using advanced or precision munitions, a single firing platoon
can provide fire support with the lethality of a battery or battalion using con-
ventional munitions. The use of such munitions reduces the time required for
a unit to execute fire missions, thereby reducing its exposure time to enemy

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

RISTA systems and precision weapons strikes. This reduction involves the
battery engaging targets from hide positions and engaging only one, or at
most two, targets from one position without moving.

Dispersed Platoon
9-199. Dispersed platoon is another tactic designed to increase the survivabil-
ity of OPFOR indirect fire support weapons against enemy counterfire and
counterbattery fire. The tactic also facilitates the employment of single firing
systems or pairs in multiple small areas that would not accommodate larger
groups of firing systems. Thus, the firing unit is able to maximize scarce ter-
rain resources and still maintain the ability to mass the effects of indirect
fires. If the battery is organized as a six-gun (3x6 battalion) configuration,
the platoon occupies positions with the guns dispersed up to 150 m apart.
Each platoon is dispersed at least 500 to 1000 m apart. If the battery is or-
ganized as an eight-gun (3x8 battalion) configuration, the firing systems are
dispersed in sections of two each. In this case, each two-gun section is dis-
persed at least 300 m apart with each platoon at 500 to 1000 m apart.
9-200. The dispersed platoon is clearly the most survivable technique against
enemy counterfire. The tactic requires highly trained personnel capable of
executing a very complex, decentralized type of operation. The tactic also
works best with firing systems incorporating onboard position location (such
as GPS), fire direction, and survey systems.

FIRE AND DECOY

9-201. The OPFOR employs fire-and-decoy techniques to increase survivabil-
ity as well as to deceive the enemy of the actual firing unit location. The
techniques include roving gun, roving units, deception battery, and false bat-
tery.

Roving Gun
9-202. Roving gun is a technique designed as a countermeasure against an
enemy that has a sophisticated target acquisition capability. The goal is for
the enemy to detect and engage this target, thinking that it is an entire unit,
expending munitions that would otherwise have been used on an actual tar-
get. Enemy units that are particularly susceptible to this technique are those
capable of accurately detecting units as soon as they begin firing and then at-
tacking the target within a matter of minutes.
9-203. Within his assigned area, the battery commander selects a primary
roving gun position and one or more alternate firing positions. Each position
is at least 500 m away from the previous position. The battery commander
also selects the primary and alternate positions for the remainder of the bat-
tery at least 500 m away from the roving gun primary and alternate posi-
tions. One or two weapons occupy a firing position apart from the rest of the
unit and begin to fire on the enemy. Upon completion of the firing mission,
the roving gun immediately moves or displaces to an alternate firing position.
Depending on the enemy and friendly tactical situation, the remainder of the
battery may remain silent or fire close support, counterfire, or counterbattery
missions

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_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 9

9-204. A number of limitations preclude widespread adoption of this tech-

nique. First, there must be sufficient maneuver area so that fire against the
roving gun does not engage another friendly unit. Second, the firing positions
chosen must be plausible firing positions (for example, they cannot be located
in swamps or narrow defiles that could not be occupied by a firing battery).
Third, the enemy must be predisposed to engage the indirect fire position
immediately. Also there is a real danger that the enemy may prove to be
more responsive than imagined; thus the roving gun could become an unin-
tended sacrifice.

Roving Unit
9-205. Roving unit is another technique designed as a countermeasure
against an enemy that has a sophisticated target acquisition capability. It is
similar to the roving-gun technique. The difference is that roving unit in-
volves the displacement of the firing unit versus the individual indirect fire
weapon system. Taking advantage of the mobility of SP artillery, the OPFOR
can move artillery batteries or platoons within an assigned firing position
area to escape enemy counterbattery fire. Within his assigned area, the bat-
tery commander selects a primary position and one or more alternate firing
positions. Each position is at least 500 m away from the previous position.
The roving battery or platoon fires a mission of no more than 3 to 4 minutes
duration and then moves to an alternate position. This technique is useful
during a long offensive preparation or in the defense when forward or rear-
ward movement is limited.
9-206. The goal of roving indirect fire support units is to confuse the enemy
as to the deployment and fire support plans of friendly artillery forces. They
can also engage important targets without disclosing the location of the main
fire support formation. Therefore, the brigade CFS usually develops the plans
for the deployment of roving units in detail.
9-207. Based on instructions from the senior commander or CFS, the indirect
fire support battalion commander organizes the execution of the plan by a
battery or platoon. The roving unit may leave camouflaged decoys in the pri-
mary firing position to create the impression of use. For convenience or to en-
hance the deception, the roving unit could fire from a site prepared as a de-
ception firing position. The COP of the battery supplying the roving element
controls the fire of the entire battery. When one platoon performs the roving
mission, the battery FDC may maneuver with the roving platoon or remain
in the primary firing position.

Deception Battery
9-208. The deception battery is a technique where the OPFOR creates an ad-
ditional battery in an attempt to deceive the enemy of the actual battalion lo-
cation. This technique is also referred to as the fourth battery technique.
The OPFOR may use two methods to create a deception battery.
9-209. The preferred method is for a battery to split into two platoons with
the battery commander in charge of one platoon and the battery senior officer
in charge of the other platoon. The battery FDC also splits into two sections
to support each platoon. Additional weapon systems are allocated to the two

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

platoons from the remaining two batteries to provide each platoon a signa-
ture of a battery.
9-210. A second method is for the battalion commander to issue instructions
for each firing battery to provide one to two weapons systems to create the
deception battery. Either a battery commander or battery senior officer (or a
separate officer such as the battalions most experienced platoon leader) is di-
rected by the battalion commander to command the deception battery. Fire
direction for the deception battery is provided from the battalion COP.

False Battery
9-211. The false battery is a technique that involves the use of active and de-
coy weapon firing positions to give the appearance of a battery firing position.
Depending on conditions such as the terrain, enemy situation, and mission,
the battery commander may employ up to two indirect fire support weapons
in each platoon position with the camouflaged decoys or derelict equipment in
the primary firing position to create the impression of use. (Derelict equip-
ment is real pieces of military equipment that are non-operationaloften
damaged or unserviceable. Given that it is a real piece of equipment, a dere-
lict has the same visual and radar characteristics of an operational piece of
equipment.) The remaining indirect fire support weapons move to a hide site
500 m from the decoy position. The FDC is capable of producing the firing or-
ders for the two firing units.
9-212. The OPFOR also use this technique to exploit a vulnerability of
weapon-locating radars (WLRs). Enemy commanders realize that the number
of OPFOR indirect fire support weapons firing will influence their radar per-
formance. This is because the number of weapons rapidly firing many rounds
can quickly fill the radar temporary display queue. Thus, indirect fire support
weapons firing from new locations will not be detected unless the technician
reduces the backlog from the temporary display queue. Location averaging
and automatic censoring modes are used to prevent the overloading of the
target display queue. The automatic censoring mode causes an examination
of each round for proximity to previous weapons locations in permanent stor-
age. Enemy commanders also establish a predetermined threshold criterion
(certain number of rounds coming out of a certain diameter) for WLR. If a
round appears to originate from a previous indirect fire support weapon loca-
tion and/or the threshold criterion from one location is not reached, the radar
technician deletes the track. For example, an enemy commander establishes
a threshold criterion of six or eight rounds to represent a battery firing posi-
tion. If the WLR technician receive detections that are less than the estab-
lished criterion, the tracks are deleted. If the OPFOR firing unit occupying a
false battery position meets the threshold criterion, the WLR technician
passes the target to the respective enemy counterfire unit. Thus the OPFOR
has accomplished the objective of deceiving the enemy to either fire at a false
unit location or ignore the location.
9-213. The false battery technique can create a stealthy condition during the
employment of an indirect fire support special weapons battery. For example,
a special weapons battery normally fires one to two SALP rounds per firing
mission. If the enemy WLR technician receives detections that are less than

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_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 9

the established criterion for a battery (six to eight rounds) the tracks are de-
leted. Thus, the special weapons battery virtually goes undetected.

SHOOT AND MOVE

9-214. Shoot and move is a technique that involves the rapid displacement of
a firing unit from a firing position immediately after completion of a fire mis-
sion. It is an effective countermeasure in protecting indirect fire support as-
sets from enemy counterfire and counterbattery fire. The shoot-and-move
technique requires sufficient room free of other units (in the event that one of
the position areas is attacked). Unless the weapons are in constant communi-
cations with a controlling headquarters or FDC and are capable of rapid dis-
placement, sufficient units must be available to provide continuous support to
the maneuver commander. This technique is an ineffective option if the unit
lacks integral survey and/or land navigation capability, firing data computa-
tion and/or data transmission systems, and reliable communications.
9-215. The technique is advantageous to SP indirect fire support weapon sys-
tems incorporating position location systems, onboard fire direction computa-
tion, and a digital communication capability. Emphasis is on massing fires
from dispersed locations to hit key targets at key times. This involves centralized
planning and decentralized execution. Indirect fire support units place high pri-
ority on locating and destroying enemy C2 and RISTA systems and nodes.

Artillery Sniper Attacks

9-216. The indirect fire weapon sniper attack or artillery sniper is an inter-
diction technique that is used to cause casualties among enemy personnel,
deny or hinder his use of certain routes, or require him to employ a dispro-
portionate number of soldiers to rid the area of snipers. It is economical in
the use of personnel and has a demoralizing effect on the enemy. The OPFOR
uses the artillery sniper team to accomplish the following:
Attack HVTs such as C2, RISTA platforms, attack helicopters, and air
defense platforms.
Cover minefields or obstacles.
Attack field fortifications and observation posts prior to an attack.
Minimize collateral damage during adaptive operations.
Conduct counter-sniper missions.
Conduct covert ambushes.

9-217. The artillery sniper team consists of two basic elements: ob-
server/sniper and firing. The observer/sniper element may cover an area that
has been mined, act as part of a raiding or ambush force, or operate inde-
pendently. The following is an example of the composition of an LTD-
equipped observer/sniper element:
1 x sniper and 1 x observer.
2 x LTD operators.
1 X radioman (can call for fire).
1 x team leader.

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9-218. The firing element is equipped with laser guided projectiles and can
range in size from a battery to an autonomous weapon. The OPFOR takes a
different approach from an extraregional force on the use of SALP. The
OPFOR realizes that the extraregional force considers SALPs as artillery-
fired ATGMs against armored formations. However, the OPFOR views
SALPs as a compliment to traditional sniper missions.

Autonomous Weapon Attack

9-219. Autonomous weapon attack is a technique designed for single indirect
fire systems to attack single or multiple targets from dispersed locations.
This technique exploits the capability of indirect fire systems incorporating
onboard position location (such as GPS), fire direction, and survey systems.
When properly conducted and coordinated with other activities, autonomous
weapon attacks can make significant contributions to the destruction of en-
emy combat power and his will to fight. Although tactical in execution,
autonomous weapon attacks can contribute to operational and/or strategic ob-
jectives and have both immediate and long-range effect upon the enemy, his
military force, and continued popular support for his intervention in the re-
gion. Therefore, the autonomous weapon attack is the most closely controlled
tactic available and is employed only against carefully selected targets.
9-220. The OSC commander can establish both the firing and target damage
criteria and exercise C2 of units conducting autonomous weapon attacks. The
IFC at OSC or division level recommends the firing systems to the OSC
commander, who approves those assets to perform that mission. The IFC de-
velops the firing orders and firing data computation and transmits this in-
formation in a coded format to the firing unit. Because the OPFORs commu-
nications are particularly vulnerable to attacks, transmission may have to be
via a civilian telephone system (to include cellular phone), messenger, or even
newspaper.
9-221. The OPFOR can use autonomous weapon attacks with one or more of
the following objectives:
Delay the deployment of enemy forces.
Inflict casualties.
Destroy and/or severely damage rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft.
Interdict LOCs.
Destroy enemy logistics facilities.

9-222. The OPFOR often uses SP and towed MRLs and single-round rocket
launchers to conduct autonomous weapon attacks. Both the single-round
rocket launchers and towed MRL may be configured for mounting on a vehi-
cle or waterborne craft. Whenever possible, the OPFOR use fabricated covers
(canvas, metal, or other materials) to disguise the MRLs and single-round
rocket launchers. The goal is to reduce the signature of the firing system and
allow it to blend in with commercial vehicular or waterborne traffic.
9-223. The OPFOR continuously analyzes the enemys counterfire tactics to
determine strengths and exploit weaknesses. Then it employs countermea-

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_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 9

sures to degrade the effectiveness of the enemy counterfire tactics. These

countermeasures include but are not limited to
Air defense ambushes using shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles
against enemy RISTA and attack platforms.
Ambush of enemy search patrols.
Destruction of enemy target-locating and ground surveillance radars
and sensors.
Use of deception positions.

9-224. Target Analysis. During the conduct of autonomous weapon attacks,

targets are not attacked indiscriminately but are part of an overall scheme or
plan to destroy an enemy complex. A target complex is a series of interrelated
or dependent target elements that together serve a common function. The
target could also be part of the infrastructure or a particular part of the en-
emy combat system.
9-225. The OPFOR considers the following five factors for selection of targets
in a particular target complex: criticality, vulnerability, accessibility, recov-
erability, and effect on the local population. The FSCC uses diagrams, maps,
photographs, and other intelligence to analyze a target complex and select
targets for attack that offer maximum timeliness and effect. The analysis en-
ables the OSC to select the appropriate system or mechanism to conduct an
attack. Some of the simplest operations can either cause or create favorable
conditions for great damage to the enemy.
9-226. Firing Site Characteristics. The OPFOR uses military or civilian
maps to determine prominent or readily identifiable terrain features for
autonomous weapon firing sites. These terrain features may be road or canal
intersections, trail junctions, stream junctions, recreational fields, grave-
yards, religious or national monuments and shrines. The weapon firing sites
are usually in areas that afford mask clearance and that have a good access
route in and out of the area. The OPFOR prefers to locate the weapon firing
sites near urban areas in order to take advantage of established enemy rules
of engagement or restrictions for collateral damage avoidance. The OPFOR
also attempts to gain information that enables it to determine the location of
enemy military unit boundaries. The OPFOR establishes weapon firing sites
along unit or international boundaries to take advantage of the difficulty en-
countered by enemy forces, particularly enemy allied or coalition forces, in
obtaining fire clearances near boundaries.
9-227. Conduct of Fire. Usually the OPFOR will conduct autonomous
weapon attack missions during periods of limited visibility (such as night,
fog, or dust). However, depending on the availability of the target, the mis-
sions may be conducted during daylight hours. Upon completion of the firing
mission, the weapon system usually displaces and attempts to avoid detection
by merging into civilian vehicle traffic flow. However, the OPFOR will not
hesitate to reuse a autonomous weapon firing site. It bases its decisions for
the reuse of previously occupied weapon firing sites on the type and fre-
quency of enemy surveillance of the site as well as the response time and type
of enemy response to a firing mission.

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

9-228. The autonomous weapon attacks may be part of a combined or inde-

pendent access-control action to impede the deployment of forces. For exam-
ple, the OSC may decide to employ mortars and rockets in attacking the
APOD or SPOD simultaneously or sequentially. The attacks are conducted at
irregular times (such as 0910, 0956, 1034, 1121, and so forth) based on a
schedule developed by the FSCC.
9-229. Resupply. The OPFOR establishes hidden ammunition storage loca-
tions or caches along access routes near the weapon firing sites. Commercial
and military vehicles, as well as waterborne vessels are used to transport the
rockets to the hidden locations. If a cache is discovered by enemy troops, the
FSCC will direct the firing unit to another cache.

FIRE FROM FIXED LOCATIONS

9-230. The fire-from-fixed-locations technique is generally employed where
there is limited movement in areas such as mountains, jungles, or urban ar-
eas. The firing battery occupies dispersed pre-surveyed positions and may use
hide sites for as measures of both survivability and force preservation for the
conduct of future battles and operations. The hide site may be
Bunkers.
Underground storage facilities.
Hardened sites, caves, and tunnels.
Culverts or bridges.
Revetments.
Civilian buildings.
Vegetation with camouflage nets.
The distance between the hide site and the firing position is dependent upon
the terrain and operational capabilities of the weapon system.
9-231. Position hardening presupposes an enemy attack and represents
measures taken to minimize the effectiveness of enemy fires. The hardening
may be applied to the weapon or crew, independently or in concert.
9-232. Constructed field fortifications around weapons are common in war-
fare characterized by little movement. The positions typically consist of an
earthen berm around the weapon and adjacent bunkers for personnel and
ammunition. Such positions clearly do not protect against munitions deliv-
ered inside the berm. Because of the effort required to prepare these posi-
tions, they are only practical when the unit will be stationary or if there are
sufficient positions to permit the crew to move among several firing positions.
Such measures also tend to make firing positions easier for the enemy to lo-
cate with electro-optical reconnaissance systems.

INDIRECT FIRE UNIT MOVEMENT

9-233. The movement of an indirect fire support battalion can follow several
different patterns depending on such factors as enemy situation, mission, ter-
rain, weather, and visibility. Once the battalion has reached the assembly
area and completed its organization of forces for combat, it may move by bat-
talion or by battery.

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_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 9

9-234. Movement is particularly important during offensive actions, when

the indirect fire support unit must keep pace with the advance of supported
maneuver units. Fire support planners strive to maintain continuous support
from the initiation of preparatory fire until the accomplishment of the offen-
sive mission, including the commitment of the exploitation force. As an indi-
rect fire support unit shifts its fires successively deeper into the enemy de-
fenses, displacement of indirect fire support units becomes necessary. Thus,
after the initial fires in support of the attack, indirect fire support units sup-
porting or attached to fixing and assault forces begin to displace. This dis-
placement is preplanned to accommodate the advance of the attacking ma-
neuver forces.

BY BOUNDS
9-235. The indirect fire support unit normally displaces by bounds, attempt-
ing to retain two-thirds of its weapons in positions within range to provide
continuous support for the attacking or withdrawing force. In planning de-
ployment of their units, indirect fire support commanders follow the rule of a
third. For example, when only a third of the maximum range of their indi-
rect fire support weapons remains in front of the attacking OPFOR troops,
they move a third of their force forward. Once redeployment starts, no more
than a third of the available guns is moving at any one time. This leaves two-
thirds of the weapons in position to support tactical maneuver actions.

BY BATTALION
9-236. Movement by battalion is possible only when the battalion has not
been committed to battle or when there are other units available to perform
any required fire missions while the battalion is moving. All elements of the
battalion displace at the same time (based on a movement schedule) and are
typically expected to be in their new positions at the same time.

BY BATTERY
9-237. In the offense or defense, the most common movement technique is for
an indirect fire support battalion to move by battery. The battalion moves its
batteries individually by bounds. Depending on the route and the pace of
combat, there may be a temporary halt to rearm and refuel during the
movement. Once the battery is in position and ready to fire, the next battery
starts to displace. Typically, the battalion FDC displaces with the center bat-
tery.
9-238. Movement of an indirect fire support battery is typically by order of
the battery or battalion commander and is under the command of the battery
senior officer. The battery senior officers vehicle (battery FDC) leads the bat-
tery column, followed by the indirect fire support weapons. The indirect fire
support weapon designated as the base weapon leads the other indirect fire
support weapons. They are followed, in turn, by battery ammunition and
supply vehicles.

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

TARGET ACQUISITION AND RECONNAISSANCE

9-239. Indirect fire target acquisition is the process of detecting and locating
hostile mortar, cannon, and rocket units with sufficient accuracy, reliability,
and responsiveness for counterfire and counterbattery fire to be directed
against the enemy unit. Recent technological advances in RISTA and fire
control systems provide the OPFOR a capability to rapidly disseminate in-
formation on suspected enemy targets within one minute or less. This in-
cludes the time from acquisition to computation by an FDC and the initial
transmission of data to a firing battery. Under favorable conditions, the first
artillery round may be on target within 2 to 4 minutes of acquisition. The de-
sired identify-destroy cycle should not last any longer than 6 to 10 minutes.
The following is a discussion of the types of RISTA systems available for ar-
tillery target acquisition.

WEAPON-LOCATING RADARS
9-240. WLRs are probably the most reliable artillery target acquisition sys-
tem. They are programmed to detect targets following a ballistic path, and
they are almost impossible to deceive. (Any system that follows a non-
ballistic or altered ballistic path may not be locatable to the same degree of
accuracy, if at all.) Older radars tracked the projectile in flight or used the
position and time difference as the projectile passed through the radars split
or dual beam. These systems were easily overloaded, and multiple targets led
to inaccurate locations or a complete inability to determine a location.
Phased-array radars have effectively solved this problem.

SOUND RANGING
9-241. Sound ranging was the high-technology artillery target acquisition
system of World War I. Although its basic principle (using a sound waves dif-
ferent arrival times at a series of microphones) is unchanged, numerous up-
grades have occurred. The most common one involves using surface-emplaced
microphones and a computer (with graphical display) to process the data. The
required parameters and microphone coordinates are fed into the computer
for the different functions of the system. Most modern-day sound-ranging
systems can be characterized as completely automated, EMP-protected, ac-
companied by a meteorological unit, resistant to electronic jamming, and
completely passive. However, sound ranging is still limited by a number of
factors, particularly the requirement that each microphone location be sur-
veyed. Microphones cannot process targets when sound waves arrive at less
than 0.5-second interval. Thus, sound ranging requires data to measure the
effects of meteorological changes on the speed of sound. High winds, other
meteorological conditions, and terrain can degrade the performance of sound-
ranging systems.

FLASH RANGING
9-242. Flash ranging is often used as a companion to sound ranging. Flash
ranging involves determining the lines of bearing to a muzzle flash from sev-
eral surveyed OPs. Flash ranging is very slow and not automated. It is easily
fooled by flash simulators and generally requiring commanding terrain for

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_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 9

the OPs. Therefore, flash ranging has been deleted from the inventory of
most OPFOR target acquisition units.

BATTLEFIELD SURVEILLANCE RADAR

9-243. Selected battlefield surveillance radars (BSR) can be used for both
target location and fire adjustment. However, they are ineffective as artillery-
locating or weapon-locating systems. When long-range systems are available
to field artillery units, they are used to develop general artillery target intel-
ligence but not to locate firing weapons.

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE

9-244. An unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) is considered as a RISTA asset
that can be used to support counterfire missions. There are two kinds of
UAVs: drones or remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs). UAVs can provide in-
creased range and possibly offer increased accuracy and responsiveness de-
pending on the sensor suite chosen. UAVs used for dedicated artillery target
acquisition generally rely on a television sensor and data downlink such as a
sensor suite, but can add infrared linescan and other reduced-visibility sen-
sors.

HUMAN INTELLIGENCE
9-245. Artillery target acquisition assets also include human intelligence
(HUMINT) sources or observer units. HUMINT is another RISTA asset that
can be used to support a counterfire mission. HUMINT assets are units such
as FOPs, artillery reconnaissance patrols, and special reconnaissance forces.

OBSERVATION POSTS
9-246. The OPFOR uses an extensive system of OPs to provide fire support to
the maneuver forces. These OPs are mobile in order to accompany rapidly
moving forces. They may be in wheeled or tracked vehicles, or in the air. The
configuration depends upon the level of command and the type of units.
9-247. After establishing a functional OP, scout observers can construct a de-
ception OP to confuse the enemy about the actual position of the OP. Figure
8-7 shows an example of the deployment of some of the most common types of
OPs discussed below. Other vehicles serve as FDCs and mobile reconnais-
sance posts (MRPs). Artillery commanders can also send out artillery recon-
naissance patrols.

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

I
FOP
2

I
FOP
3
I
1 LOP

II
II I
2

Temporary Firing
Position

I
I
2
2

Battalion Alternate Firing I Battalion Primary Firing

Position Area Position Area
1
I
I
3 I
1
3

Figure 9-7. Observation Posts in the Battle Formation of an Artillery Battalion (Example)

Command Observation Post

9-248. In indirect fire support battalions and batteries, the COP serves as
both an OP and CP. 10 From it, the fire support commander
Controls the fire and maneuver of his subordinates.
Conducts reconnaissance of the enemy and terrain in his zone or sector
of fire.
Observes the actions of friendly combined arms units and maintains
coordination with them.
Since the artillery battalion is the basic firing unit, its COP is the place
where decisions are made and from which orders stem.

9-249. The battalion COP normally contains the battalion commander, chief
of reconnaissance, and chief of communications. 11 The battery COP normally
10
An indirect fire support regiment or brigade can have a COP, sometimes called a forward CP. It
can also have other types of OPs. Although these observers could adjust fire on selected targets, they
normally pass target information to subordinate battalions for engagement.
11
Depending on the type of combat action, the chief of communications may be part of the battal-
ion FDC, rather than the COP.

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_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 9

includes the battery commander and the control platoon leader (who is re-
sponsible for reconnaissance and signal functions). 12 In addition to these of-
ficers, COPs at both battalion and battery level include fire direction, com-
munications, and reconnaissance personnel. In either case, these personnel
can operate the COP either on the ground or mounted in an ACRV.
9-250. In most cases, the commander of an attached or supporting artillery
unit colocates his COP with the COP or forward CP of the maneuver unit
commander to which the artillery unit is attached or which it is supporting,
or at least locates it near that COP. From that position, both the maneuver
and artillery commanders should be able to observe the zone of responsibility
or sector of fire. When the artillery unit is neither attached nor supporting,
but remains directly subordinate to the senior maneuver or IFC commander,
its COP is positioned near that commanders CP or COP.
9-251. Other OPs and artillery reconnaissance patrols send reconnaissance
data to the COP. The artillery commander determines which targets are to be
engaged, and the COP relays target data to the firing position.

Forward Observation Post

9-252. Artillery commanders can establish one or more FOPs to supplement
the COP. The purpose of the FOP is to conduct reconnaissance of the enemy
and observe the terrain directly in front of the forward maneuver units. It
can locate and adjust fires against targets that the COP is not in a position to
observe. It also assures continuous close fire support for the maneuver forces
when the COP is displacing. An FOP may be with the supported unit com-
mander or with one of the advance maneuver elements. This enables it to
maintain closer communication and coordination with supported maneuver
forces.
9-253. At the battalion and battery levels, the FOPs often contain the battal-
ion chief of reconnaissance (or the batterys control platoon leader), a scout,
and a radio operator. The FOP can deploy on foot or mounted in an MRP ve-
hicle that has a battlefield surveillance radar, as well as observation and
rangefinding equipment.

Lateral Observation Post

9-254. An artillery commander may establish an LOP to cover areas not ob-
servable from the COP or FOPs. The LOP is usually on the flank of the sup-
ported unit and should have a good view of the artillery units zone of respon-
sibility. An LOP can work with a COP or FOP to conduct bilateral observa-
tion of a target area for improved accuracy. At battalion level and higher ar-
tillery echelons, the LOP accurately locates targets, reference and registra-
tion points, and can adjust fire. The artillery unit or the divisions artillery
regiment may send reconnaissance and communications personnel to form
the LOP. The LOP can deploy on foot or in a vehicle, such as an MRP. An
LOP is generally smaller that a COP, manned by two to three reconnaissance
specialists who communicate back to the COP.

12
Depending on the type of combat action, the platoon leader of the control platoon may be part of
the battery FDC, rather than the COP.

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

Aerial Observation Post

9-255. The artillery commander may use an aerial observation post (AOP) to
supplement FOPs and LOPs. The AOP is generally established to cover rap-
idly moving forces in areas larger than can be covered by a ground OP. The
AOP is especially effective during heliborne assaults or a pursuit.

Mobile Reconnaissance Post

9-256. An MRP is an armored, tracked vehicle with a battlefield surveillance
radar and other observation and rangefinding equipment. This vehicle is de-
signed to operate nearor even acrossthe battle line. It has a data trans-
mission system for passing target information and fire missions directly to
associated FDCs. There is typically one of these vehicles per artillery battal-
ion, one in the artillery regiments headquarters, and one in its target acqui-
sition battery. However, the regiment typically uses an MRP to support its
own COP. At battalion level, an MRP may function as an FOP or LOP. How-
ever, it can also remain near the COP in a forward position or within the ar-
tillery battalion firing position area. The artillery regiment or battalion com-
mander designates the position and the sector of observation for the MRP.
9-257. In the offense, the MRP may advance closely behind or within lead
mechanized infantry or tank units. It can conduct reconnaissance and fire
missions on the move or during short halts. During movement, the MRP can
move as part of an artillery reconnaissance patrol. This single vehicle can
perform reconnaissance and adjust artillery fire on targets while located with
these units. In the defense, MRPs may form part of the combat outposts in
the disruption zone. In either offense or defense, an artillery reconnaissance
patrol can also set up an FOP behind enemy lines to adjust artillery fire and
to report on enemy organization and deployment. Its primary mission is to lo-
cate enemy artillery units.

TARGET MARKING TECHNIQUES

9-258. Since firing unit commanders and observers do not always select their
own targets, it is often necessary to mark the target to facilitate its identifica-
tion and subsequent attack. The two principal methods are by computation
and marking the target with smoke.

Computational Method
9-259. The preferred technique for identifying targets is to provide the orien-
tation data for the observer. This would normally be done in situations where
the indirect fire support regiments FDC is passing a target it has located to a
subordinate indirect fire support battalion commander or when a battalion
commander passes a target to a subordinate battery commander. Using the
standard plotting board, the original observer can plot the location of the tar-
get and the new observer, and then compute the new observers direction and
range to the target. At that point, the new observer can simply orient his ob-
servation equipment on the directed azimuth and locate the target at the in-
dicated range. While leaving little room for error, this technique is time-
consuming and not well suited to a fluid or fast-moving battle.

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_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 9

Target-Marking Smoke
9-260. The fastest and easiest method of target marking is simply to mark
the target with a colored smoke projectile. This allows all observers to imme-
diately identify and locate the target. This also has the disadvantage of warn-
ing the target, but is acceptable when the target is unable to move (at least
between being marked and being engaged). Almost any projectile could be
used to mark the target, but smoke projectiles offer longer dwell times and
therefore increase the chance of all observers being able to locate the target.

TARGET ACQUISITION ZONES

9-261. The maneuver commander and the IFC commander conducts a battle-
field analysis to determine the targets to be acquired and attacked, where
and when targets are likely to be found, and who can locate them. Upon com-
pletion of this process, the IFC commander establishes target acquisition
zones to focus the target acquisition assets. Each asset is assigned a target
acquisition zone of responsibility.

Detailed Target Zone

9-262. The detailed target zone (DTZ) is an enemy area that the maneuver
commander wishes to monitor closely. It is used to protect maneuver forces or
assets whose loss could seriously jeopardize the mission. Targets acquired in
this zone are reported to the FDC ahead of general target zone detection.

General Target Zone

9-263. The general target zone (GTZ) is a search area that is established to
monitor enemy targets the commander wants neutralized or annihilated. The
GTZ is the second most responsive priority for requests for fire.

Censor Zones
9-264. The censor zone (CZ) is an area from which the commander wishes to
ignore all target detections. A CZ may be used to ignore a friendly indirect
fire support position that, because of its aspect angle to the WLR, could be
detected as enemy artillery. This situation is common in nonlinear, non-
contiguous operations as well as linear operations where friendly units are in
enemy territory.

RADAR TECHNICAL AND TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

9-265. As the target acquisition planner selects a general position for radars,
he must be aware of the technical and tactical considerations that influence
his selection. Some of these considerations cannot be fully determined by the
planner and can be applied only by the radar technician as he makes the ac-
tual site selection. During the site selection process, the radar technician con-
siders the following points:
Accessibility.
Communications.
Concealment.
Cover.

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

Radar attenuation.
Routes of approach.
Security.
Survey.
Slope.
Aspect angle.
Cable length.

ACCESSIBILITY
9-266. Depending on mission requirements, the radar site must be accessible
by road, air, or water. Accessibility depends on the mobility characteristics of
the radar platform.

COMMUNICATIONS
9-267. The communications requirements depend on the mission and there-
fore will vary. The site must permit establishment of the required communi-
cations. If large hills or mountainous terrain exists between the radar site
and the supported unit, direct communications may not be possible by radio
unless a radio relay station is used. Another deciding factor is the effective-
ness of enemy electronic countermeasures (ECM). If the enemys ECM are ac-
tive and effective, wire communications may be necessary.

CONCEALMENT
9-268. The maximum use of natural concealment, such as trees and shrubs,
should be considered in selecting a site for the radar. However, the conceal-
ment must not interfere with the radar beam. The edge of a tree line is the
most desirable location for a radar site. The radar can be placed on the outer
edge of the tree line and camouflaged to blend into the background trees. The
remaining support vehicles and equipment can be placed in the woods and
hidden from view by camouflage nets, trees, and other types of camouflage.
Camouflage should be a continuous function of the radar section.

COVER
9-269. If possible, the radar should be emplaced in defilade. This affords pro-
tection from enemy observation and fires. The exception to this is a BSR,
which must have a line of sight to the target area.

RADAR ATTENUATION
9-270. The area in front of the antenna is important when selecting a site.
Items such as trees, foliage, buildings, and equipment may cause attenuation
of the radar beams or multipath errors. Attenuation of the radar beams re-
duces the chance of detecting enemy projectiles.
9-271. If other radar sets are operating in the same area, care should be
taken to ensure that the antennas do not face each other. This is especially
true of radars of the same type that operate on the same frequency.

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ROUTES OF APPROACH
9-272. The radar site selected should have more than one covered route of
approach. These routes will allow occupation of the site that is unobserved by
the enemy. One must consider road conditions, overhead clearances, bridges,
and water crossing areas.

SECURITY
9-273. The radar technician should try to locate the radar site within the pe-
rimeter of an adjacent maneuver unit. This will improve his local security. If
feasible, the radar section could be augmented with a reinforced maneuver
squad or platoon.

SURVEY
9-274. A WLR must be sited accurately in order to provide accurate target lo-
cations. A survey section should be available near the site to assist in deter-
mining site data. If a survey team is not available, the radar section will con-
duct a hasty survey. The hasty survey will provide the data required to ini-
tialize the radar.

SLOPE
9-275. The slope of the ground is important for proper drainage and quick
leveling of the antenna. The radar will not function properly without leveling.
The drainage must also be checked to ensure that radar equipment will not
become stuck in heavy rain.

ASPECT ANGLE
9-276. The aspect angle is the angle between the radar antenna and the tar-
get path. The aspect angle is similar to Angle T. Angle T is the angle formed
by the intersection of the gun-target line and the observer target line with its
vertex at the target.

CABLE LENGTH
9-277. Once the technical aspects of choosing a radar site have been ad-
dressed, the length of the systems cables must be considered for systems that
are either mounted on a trailer or configured in a two-vehicle set. The two-
vehicle set consists of one vehicle that carries the radar while the other vehi-
cle carries the command cabin and system power supply. The cables attach
the command cabin and system power supply to the radar. The cable lengths
are limiting factors in the actual layout of the radar position area.

WLR SURVIVABILTY
9-278. Every effort should be made to reduce the vulnerability of WLRs to di-
rection finding and analysis. These efforts include occupying optimum sites,
reducing radiation times, and narrowing the sector of search.

Optimum Sites
9-279. The best countermeasure to enemy electronic warfare (EW) is to oc-
cupy an optimum site. An optimum site is one in which the WLR is emplaced

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

on level terrain having a gentle downward slope for the first 200 m in front of
the radar and then a sharp rise to a screening crest. In an optimum site, tun-
neling is effective in reducing side-lobe radiation. However, the number of op-
timum sites for positioning may be limited.

Screening Crest
9-280. The use of a screening crest is absolutely critical to radar survivability
in an environment where the enemy has ECM capability. A screening crest is
not essential for locating enemy weapons with the WLR. However, it does in-
crease survivability of the system by serving as a defense against enemy ob-
servation, direct fire, and ECM. A WLR site must be selected to ensure that
the screening crest is high enough to protect the radar section from the en-
emy yet low enough to allow the WLR to track an enemy projectile on its as-
cending trajectory. The WLR technician conducts a map reconnaissance and
estimates his mask angle for future positions. The WLR technician should try
to select his radar site so that the screening crest is within 1,000 m of the
site.

Double Screening Crests

9-281. The use of two screening crests makes the radar more difficult for the
enemy to locate. Radiation that is diffracted by the first crest and diffracted
again by the second crest cannot be accurately located by direction finding.

Tunneling
9-282. Tunneling is the technique of reducing the side, top, and back lobes of
radiation by careful site selection. Positioning the WLR so that vegetation is
to the sides and rear is an example of tunneling. Tunneling also may be ac-
complished by the use of digging-in or by sandbagging the position.

Background
9-283. Background is the area against which the target is detected. Nor-
mally, background considerations are associated with moving target locating
radars. Backgrounds can be open, hard, or soft. An open background just
above a screening crest is optimum for a WLR.

Reduce Radiating Time

9-284. The shorter a WLR radiates, the less apt it is to be acquired. There-
fore, radiation time should be kept to the absolute minimum when feasible.

Narrow the Sector of Search

9-285. Another countermeasure to reduce the vulnerability is to narrow the
WLR sector of search. Although most WLRs can search a wide sector, in an
EW threat environment, the beam should be narrowed to the minimum to ac-
complish the mission.

BSR SURVIVABILTY
9-286. Like WLRs, BSRs produce a distinctive electromagnetic signature that
makes them particularly vulnerable to enemy ECM. Additionally, BSRs re-

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quire an electronic line of sight to the target and are emplaced in areas that
make them extremely vulnerable to visual detection.

Optimum Site
9-287. A site that facilitates good cover and concealment is critical for a BSR
to survive. Normally, the system should be elevated and employed during
pertiods of limited visibility. Tunneling and narrowing of sectors of search, as
discussed for WLRs, also apply to BSRs.

Reduce Radiating Time

9-288. Like WLRs, the shorter a BSR radiates, the less apt it is to be ac-
quired. Therefore, radiation time should be kept to the absolute minimum
when feasible.

Narrow the Sector of Search

9-289. Like WLRs, the BSR beam should be narrowed to the minimum to ac-
complish the mission. This reduces the likelihood of being acquired.

Background
9-290. If there are no terrain features or vegetation to reflect or absorb the
radar beam beyond the target area, the background is open. Unrestricted ac-
cess to unreflected radar beams is an ideal situation for enemy EW operators.
Hard backgrounds such as rock, buildings, bunkers, or structures reflect ra-
dar beams. During reflection, the beam is bent and some phase shifting oc-
curs. A phenomenon know as multipath effect (the receiving of the same sig-
nal from different directions and out of phase with each other) makes it diffi-
cult to obtain good direction-finding bearings to the radar. However, this does
not keep the radar intercept operator from performing signal analysis. Hard
backgrounds are better than open backgrounds but not as good as soft back-
grounds such as foliage, tree lines, or brush. If a BSR is oriented toward soft
ground and is sighted to take advantage of tunneling, its vulnerability to in-
tercept and direction-finding will be reduced considerably.

WLR CUEING
9-291. Cueing is the process designed to prompt, or notify, another target ac-
quisition asset to begin a search for a target in a specific area. Cueing of
WLRs is one of the most difficult planning decisions. Although individually
scheduled cueings may be random, preplanned cueing schedules are often
ineffective and unnecessarily subject the radars to enemy-direction finding
and analysis. Target acquisition commanders who operate under specific cue-
ing guidance can cue radars more effectively. The cueing guidance is designed
to fully exploit the radar potential and still minimize or eliminate unneces-
sary radiation. The situation will dictate who can best cue the radar and the
specific conditions under which it can be cued.
9-292. Cueing must be based on real-time information so that the WLR has a
high probability of tracking projectiles when it is turned on. Cueing sources
capable of providing this information may include
Fire support observers such as COPs, AOPs, or MRPs.

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SPF and maneuver reconnaissance personnel.

Reconnaissance and target acquisition systems such as EW platforms,
sound-ranging systems, BSRs, and UAVs.

9-293. Cueing of WLRs may be centralized, with all requests going through
the radar controlling headquarters, or it may be decentralized. For decentral-
ized cueing, the controlling indirect fire support headquarters will establish
cueing guidance, to include authorized cueing sources, communications links,
and conditions under which the radar may be cued.
9-294. Communications links used to cue radars should be defined in the cue-
ing guidance. The preferred means of communications between the WLR and
the indirect fire support unit is wire. However, voice radio nets that are nor-
mally monitored by the radar are the most responsive means. Messages are
normally sent by voice unless the radar and the cueing source are provided
with a digital communications capability. Because this link is usually an in-
direct fire support unit command net, cueing sources should restrict the time
they use the net. Cueing sources should use the radio net only in the time re-
quired to initially establish communications and then to cue the radar as
necessary.
9-295. The special conditions under which the WLR should be cued must be
passed to the cueing sources. For example, enemy artillery or mortar attacks
that are observed by a cueing source but does no serious damage may not
constitute cause for cueing the radar. Rather, the criterion for cueing the
WLR are fires causing significant damage such as enemy neutralizing or an-
nihilation fires.
9-296. The maneuver unit and/or fire support rehearsals should include the
activation of cueing sources by use of the appropriate cueing guidance. Clari-
fication of the cueing guidance or designation of other cueing sources, if re-
quired, should be issued at that time.

TARGET ACQUISITION RADARS IN THE OFFENSE

9-297. The primary role of target acquisition radars in the offense is to pro-
tect the friendly force by locating targets for engagement. During offensive
actions, particular attention must be given to planning target acquisition to
facilitate future actions. Target acquisition planners need to ensure a smooth
transition from one phase of the battle to the next by providing for continuous
coverage of the zone of responsibility.
9-298. Assets may have to be decentralized to facilitate C2 and movement.
Cueing should be more decentralized during the offense. The controlling
headquarters must inform the radar sections who the designated cueing
sources are and which ones have priority. This action is necessary to stream-
line the acquisition and counterfire effort when committed maneuver forces
may be particularly vulnerable to enemy indirect fire.
9-299. High-tempo offensive actions may require target acquisition assets to
move a pace that a survey of the future sites may be unavailable. Therefore,
the target acquisition assets may have to use hasty survey procedures for
control until a survey is available.

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TARGET ACQUISITION RADARS IN THE DEFENSE

9-300. The primary role of target acquisition radars in the defense is to pro-
tect the units and facilities the commander deems critical to a successful de-
fense. Target acquisition planners must also consider how to execute a tran-
sition from defensive to offensive actions such as counterattacks. The posi-
tioning, task organization, and mission should facilitate the transition.

FIRE DIRECTION AND COMPUTATION

9-301. Fire direction is the process of determining the specific data required
by the crew to orient the weapon and set (or possibly program) the fuze to
function properly. It is sometimes called technical fire control.

FIRE DIRECTION CENTER

9-302. In addition to a COP, both battalions and batteries have FDCs at the
firing position. The FDC contains the artillery battalion chief of staff or the
battery senior officer, plus fire direction specialists and communications per-
sonnel. The battalion or battery commander in the COP chooses the targets of
opportunity for firing. He also decides how to attack the targets relayed to
him by the maneuver forces he is supporting. The COP and the FDC may
conduct fire direction computations simultaneously. However, the battalion
FDC has primary responsibility for obtaining and processing meteorological
and survey data and determining firing data using computers and backup in-
struments. A battery FDC may receive fully computed firing data from the
battalion FDC. Like the COPs, FDCs are mounted in tracked or wheeled
ACRVs.

FIRE COMPUTATION
9-303. The OPFOR may employ either manual or automated computation to
determine firing data. Figure 8-8 reflects the average processing time for the
indicated computational method for an average FDC.

Data Requirement Manual Automated

Determine Initial Data 2 minutes 15 seconds (estimated) 45 seconds (estimated)

Determine Subsequent Data 55 seconds (estimated) 20-30 seconds (estimated)

Figure 9-8. Average Time Required for an FDC to Compute Firing Data

Manual
9-304. Manual computation requires the FDC to mark the firing units loca-
tion a chart and then determining the direction and range to the target. The
range determines the propelling charge, and the effect of the two determines
the elevation setting and time of flight. Time of flight is used to determine
the fuze setting. The major factor determining responsiveness is operator
training, while accuracy depends on both operator training and the validity of
supporting data (such as survey, meteorological data, and propellant tem-

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peratures). Adding a simple hand-held calculator to perform arithmetic com-

putations can enhance the responsiveness and accuracy of manual fire direc-
tion.

Automated
9-305. Automation can greatly enhance the responsiveness of fire direction
computations. The level of automation can range from a single battalion- or
battery-level computer that determines a single solution for each battery to
computers (located at the battery FDC) capable of determining data for indi-
vidual weapon platforms. These fire direction computers can quickly calcu-
late corrections in elevation and deflection settings for each firing platoon
and possibly for each weapon. This is particularly useful during frequent
moves.
9-306. The fire direction computers may be part of an automated fire control
system (AFCS). An AFCS is comprised of subsystems for reconnaissance, ini-
tial orientation and location fixing, weather and ballistic information, com-
munications, and data transmission The OPFOR can employ AFCSs that are
automatically linked to a data-processing computer. Automatic connections to
external reconnaissance means can include radars, sound-ranging systems,
UAVs, and reconnaissance helicopters. The system can also have links with
higher, lower, and adjacent headquarters. The OPFOR can adapt the AFCS
to new types of weapon platforms, ammunition, and reconnaissance systems.

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FIRING DATA
9-307. The following individuals are responsible for the preparation and ac-
curacy of firing data:
The battalion chief of staff (in the battalion FDC).
The battery senior officer (in the battery FDC).
The fire direction specialists located in the firing position (in the bat-
tery FDC).
The fire direction specialists located in the battalion FDC.
The fire direction specialists located in the battalion and battery COPs.

9-308. This system demands that the battery commander, senior officer, and
battalion chief of staff be as proficient in computing firing data as the fire di-
rection specialists. The independent computation of firing data by different
individuals significantly reduces the chances for a large error. This technique
also ensures that a fire direction system is readily available if the fire direc-
tion capability at either the COP or FDC is destroyed or suppressed.
9-309. The battalion and battery commanders have overall responsibility for
the execution of fire missions. Therefore, they supervise the fire direction
specialists in their respective COPs, who must be prepared to assume the
functions of the FDC if the latter is put out of action. The battery senior offi-
cer and the battalion chief of staff supervise the work of the fire direction
specialists in their respective FDCs.
9-310. The FDC in the battery firing position receives target data from artil-
lery reconnaissance patrols, OPs, or COPs. The fire direction specialists lo-
cated at the battery firing position compute (either manually or electroni-
cally) the firing data for the targets. A battery FDC may receive fully com-
puted firing data from the battalion FDC, or even the battalion COP. In any
case, the battery senior officer (or his designated representative) verifies the
firing data and relays the data to the gun platoons, where the gunners set the
data on the gun in preparation to fire. He also reports this data to the battal-
ion FDC and the battery commander.
9-311. The fire direction specialists in the battery COP may also compute the
firing data as a separate check on the data supplied by the firing position fire
direction specialists. If for some reason the data from the battery COP is
ready before that of the firing position, the battery commander transmits his
data directly to the firing position. If a difference exists between the firing
data supplied by the fire direction specialists at the firing position and the
COP, the battery commander or battalion chief of staff decides which data is
passed to the gun platoons to fire.
9-312. When the indirect fire support battalion controls the conduct of fire, it
conducts the observation, computation, and firing similar to battery level.
The battalion commander is at the battalion COP near the COP or CP of the
supported commander. Target acquisition and fire direction specialists assist
him in acquiring targets, computing fire missions, and adjusting fire. Nor-
mally the battalion chief of staff is in charge of the battalion firing position
area and the battalion FDC. Depending on the type of mission, battalion dis-

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persion, and time available, battalion fire direction personnel may compute
the gunnery problem for the entire battalion or run check computations while
each battery computes its own data. The battalion commander gives the or-
der to fire. He can require each battery commander to adjust fire for his own
unit by weapon or by battery salvos.
9-313. Forward ground or air OPs supplement battery and battalion COPs.
Observation teams can locate forward in armored vehicles. Forward and air
observers transmit target data to the battalion chief of staff, at the battalion
FDC, for computation.
9-314. The OPFOR also integrates electronic computers into its field artillery
battalions to exploit this new capability for firing procedures. The battalion
probably still has centralized control of fire mission computation and fire con-
trol. It can give battery fire direction personnel fully computed data that is
ready to pass to the guns. Centralizing electronic computation at battalion
level is consistent with establishing the battalion as the basic firing unit in
OPFOR artillery. The battalion and battery may run check computations
manually on a routine or random basis.

LOGISTICS
9-315. The OPFOR applies the push forward concept of logistics. Units do
not request ammunition; rather they are allocated ammunition in the fire
support plan to support the maneuver battle. Ammunition has the highest
priority within the OPFOR supply system. The determination of required ex-
penditures is the responsibility of the IFC commander or CFS, while the chief
of logistics is responsible for delivery.

AMMUNITION RESUPPLY
9-316. The OPFOR uses standard cargo trucks as resupply vehicles for can-
non and mortar systems; for towed systems, the trucks also serve as prime
movers. The only dedicated ammunition resupply vehicles are for some MRL
systems. These vehicles have the same chassis as the rocket launcher and are
fitted with racks to hold the rockets during transport. Resupply vehicles for
large-caliber MRLs have cranes for reloading the launcher.
9-317. To the maximum extent possible, the ammunition remains loaded on
resupply vehicles to maintain mobility. In most cases, the ammunition pack-
aging is designed so that two men can easily move any single item, lessening
the requirement for materiel-handling equipment at ammunition transfer
points and in the firing position.
9-318. To facilitate the movement of ammunition, general practice is to es-
tablish ammunition transfer points for each IFC or maneuver brigade. Under
normal circumstances, the artillery battalion sends its resupply vehicles to
this point to pick up ammunition and deliver it to the firing unit. Transport
units may skip an echelon, if necessary, to keep units resupplied.

BATTERY RESUPPLY
9-319. When necessary, the battery will make one halt to reload the indirect
fire support weapons, refuel (if required), and conduct necessary mainte-

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nance. Normally, this halt is short in duration and the unit will proceed to its
next firing position once resupply and maintenance actions are completed.
The resupply point is normally a location that is ideally covered and con-
cealed along the route to the next firing position. If the size of the resupply
point is large enough, all of the batterys indirect fire support weapons are re-
supplied simultaneously. If not, the maximum number of indirect fire support
weapons that can be occupy the site at one time are resupplied followed by
the remaining indirect fire support weapons. The resupply action is normally
done in the order of movement. All of the vehicles remain in the area until
the resupply action is completed.
9-320. If there is sufficient time available, the senior officer of the battery
will take an advance party forward to prepare the next location. The battery
senior officer may exercise the option to return and guide the battery to the
next location. Or, the senior officer may designate personnel to guide the bat-
tery to the next firing location.
9-321. Depending on the threat, time, terrain, and other conditions, the bat-
tery commander may accept the risk of conducting a resupply in the firing
point. Whenever feasible, the transport unit offloads in the firing position any
ammunition the firing unit will consume prior to repositioning. However, this
is the least preferable method of resupply and if all possible should not be at-
tempted.

RECONSTITUTION AND REORGANIZATION

9-322. Restoring combat effectiveness of subordinates is one of the most im-
portant duties of indirect fire battalion and battery commanders. It in-
cludes
Determining the degree of combat effectiveness of subordinates.
Detailing missions to subordinates that are still combat-effective.
Withdrawing units from areas of destruction or contamination.
Providing units with replacement personnel, weapons, ammunition,
fuel, and other supplies.
Restoring disrupted command and control.

9-323. The OPFOR makes an effort to keep some units at full strength rather
than all units at an equally reduced level. Usually, the unit with the fewest
losses is the first to receive replacement personnel and equipment. However,
once the casualties or equipment losses are sufficient to threaten the total
loss of combat effectiveness, the commander may apply the concept of com-
posite unit replacement. The composite unit concept involves a unit formed
from other units reduced by combat action.

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 Chapter 10

Aviation
The ability of the OPFOR to employ its aviation assets will be dependent
on the level of airspace dominance the OPFOR possesses. When fighting a
regional opponent, the OPFOR expects to establish and maintain air
superiority and thus to employ its aviation with relative ease. When faced
with a superior enemy, however, the OPFOR will alter aviation missions
to ensure the most effective use of its air power without the unnecessary
loss of assets. This chapter will discuss the OPFOR aviation tactics of
both fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. When appropriate, the discussion
will include the distinctions of fighting a regional foe versus an
extraregional foe. For more information on the impact of strategic
concepts on aviation operations and airspace dominance, see FM 7-100.1.

ORGANIZATION
10-1. Aviation forces are constituent or dedicated to specified levels of
command to meet mission requirements. Organizational structures are
designed to maintain the appropriate level of centralized control to ensure
the limited number of assets are available at the right place and time. For
more information on the organization of aviation units at the operational-
level or above, see FM 7-100.1. However, even aviation units that are task
organized above the tactical level can perform missions that have tactical-
level impact and, therefore, must be addressed in a tactical context.

DECENTRALIZED VS CENTRALIZED CONTROL

10-2. The OPFOR will task organize aviation assets, similar to ground
elements, to tailor the force for the specific mission. For this reason, it is
possible to task organize a fixedwing unit to an operational-strategic
command (OSC), while army aviation assets can be found subordinate to an
OSC or to a division tactical group (DTG) or a brigade tactical group (BTG) 1 .
The OPFOR is more likely to task organize its aviation to the lowest levels
against a regional opponent, when it has established air superiority. This
decentralized control allows the ground commander greater flexibility and
responsiveness from OPFOR aviation assets.
10-3. However, against an extraregional force the OPFOR is apt to maintain
control of its helicopters and airplanes at OSC and theater level, respectively.
This centralized control allows the OPFOR to better protect its assets, more
1
A tactical group is a task-organized unit organized around the baseline, administrative structure of a division or
brigade. Throughout this chapter, the terms DTG or BTG will be used to identify that level of command, since a
maneuver division or brigade does not include constituent or dedicated aviation assets unless it has been task
organized as a tactical group. The terms division or brigade will be used only to highlight differences (when they
occur) from a tactical group.

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

thoroughly plan missions, and improve reaction time during the limited
windows of opportunity.

COMMAND AND SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS

10-4. The OPFOR employs its aviation assets using its standard command
and support relationships. Since army aviation assets are not found below the
operational level in the administrative force structure, it is the OPFOR practice
to augment tactical maneuver units by allocating aviation assets in one of three
command and support relationships: constituent, dedicated, or supporting.

Constituent
10-5. A constituent command relationship is the assignment of a unit to a
headquarters. The headquarters has the authority for its employment and
the responsibility for all of its logistics support. An example of this type of
command relationship would be a medium-lift helicopter battalion assigned
to a DTG to provide the transportation capabilities for its ground forces.

Dedicated
10-6. A dedicated command relationship is similar to constituent with the
exception of logistics support. The subordinate unit still receives logistics
support from its parent aviation unit. An example of a dedicated relationship
is an attack helicopter battalion dedicated to a DTG. The battalion continues
to receive logistics support from its parent combat helicopter brigade, while
the DTG has sole employment authority of the battalion.

Supporting
10-7. A supporting aviation unit remains under the command of its parent
organization. It also receives all of its support from its parent unit. It
executes missions according to the supported units priorities. The supported
unit plans and employs the asset for the time allotted by the higher
headquarters. The principle advantage of this is to the parent commander
who retains maximum control of his most flexible assets. An example of a
supporting relationship is the employment of theater or OSC attack aircraft
in the DAS role at division or brigade level.

FIXED-WING AVIATION
10-8. Fixed-wing assets of the Air Force are not task organized in a
constituent or dedicated relationship below the OSC level, since that is the
lowest level of joint command. However, Air Force units retained at higher
levels of command might have a supporting relationship with a division,
DTG, brigade, or BTG. Subject to the approval of the theater or OSC commander
to whom they are subordinate, they can also respond to mission requests from
tactical-level units (see the section on Request Process later in this chapter).

ROTARY-WING AVIATION
10-9. Helicopters are employed across the battlefield to support the ground
commander in the combined arms fight. Because of their flexibility,
maneuverability, speed, and firepower, they have the capability to execute
missions down to the BTG level. Helicopters can be called upon to execute

10-2
________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 10

any mission to support both the offense and defense. Based on mission,
command and support relationship, and availability of aircraft, the OPFOR
organizes its helicopters using three methods: Attack helicopters and possibly
some combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) helicopters with
missions related to fire support can be part of a DTGs integrated fires
command (IFC); other CS and CSS helicopters can be directly subordinate to
the DTG commander; still other attack, CS, and/or CSS helicopters can be
subordinate to a BTG commander.

Aviation in DTG IFC

10-10. The IFC is a command and control (C2) structure with a task
organization that allows rapid employment of aviation systems with other
ground systems. The assignment to the IFC may be in either a constituent or
a dedicated relationship, but it is always tailored for the specific mission of
the organization it supports. An IFC may be found at DTG and higher levels
and is normally commanded by the organizations deputy commander. Figure
10-1 shows an example of an IFC at DTG level.

DTG
COMMANDER

IFC
COMMANDER
COMMANDERS
OF OTHER
SUBORDINATE
FORCES

ARTILLERY ARMY AVIATION LONG-RANGE INTEGRATED

RECON SUPPORT
COMPONENT COMPONENT COMPONENT GROUP

ATTACK MEDIUM-LIFT
HELICOPTER HELICOPTER
BATTALION BATTALION

Figure 10-1. Example of Aviation in a DTG IFC

10-11. An IFC may be organized to include an army aviation component. The

missions assigned can include attack, direct air support (DAS), and
reconnaissance for an attack helicopter unit, or the IFC may employ CSS
helicopters for troop movement, resupply, and C2 platforms. The command
and support relationship to the IFC is based on the type of mission, available

10-3
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

assets, and duration of the mission. If the IFC requires continuous lift
capabilities to rapidly employ forces, a lift helicopter battalion may be
constituent or dedicated to the IFC. On the other hand, if the movement of
troops is a one-time requirement, the helicopter battalion may not become
part of the IFC, but instead may have a supporting relationship for the
duration of the mission while remaining under the control of the parent
aviation unit. The same applies to the attack helicopter units. See Chapter 2
and Chapter 8 for more details on the IFC.

Aviation in DTG Other Than in IFC

10-12. Because the IFC is tailored for fire support missions, not all aviation
assets are organized under the IFC headquarters. Army aviation units that
are constituent or dedicated to a DTG, but not associated with fire support,
are directly subordinate to the DTG commander or perhaps to a BTG within
the DTG. Figure 10-2 shows an example of aviation units that might be
outside the IFC in a DTG organization.

DTG
COMMANDER

IFC

MANEUVER SEPARATE OTHER

HELICOPTER SUBORDINATE
BTG/BDE
BTG BATTALION FORCES
BTG

Figure 10-2. Example of DTG-Level Aviation Other Than in the IFC

10-13. A combat helicopter brigade or one or more of its battalions may

become constituent or dedicated to a DTG. In this case, the attack helicopters
are most likely to be employed in the DAS, attack, reconnaissance, and
security roles outlined later in this chapter. In the first two of those missions,
they would most likely be part of the DTGs IFC (unless allocated to a
subordinate BTG). In reconnaissance and security roles, however, they could
be employed outside of the IFC unless those roles are specifically related to
fire support.
10-14. As an exception to the rule, a highly-trained unit equipped with
modern attack helicopters may be employed as a maneuver element in the
ground commanders scheme of maneuver. In this role, the attack helicopter
unit can be used as a fixing, assault, or exploitation force in the offense, or
serve as a disruption or counterattack force in the defense. In either offense

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or defense, it could serve as a reserve or deception force. Such missions would

require thorough planning and rehearsals to be successful.
10-15. For CS and CSS helicopters units, the various missions are assigned
primarily with a supporting relationship. However, some units that rely on
routine support may be allocated a helicopter battalion or company with a
constituent or dedicated command relationship.
10-16. If allocated to a DTG in a constituent or dedicated relationship, a
combat helicopter brigades lift helicopter and reconnaissance helicopter
battalions (or companies from them) would normally be in the DTGs IFC
only if they perform missions associated with fire support. Otherwise they
would be outside the IFC, under either the DTG commander or one of his
BTG commanders. This would also be true of CS and CSS helicopters from
separate helicopter battalions that were not part of a combat helicopter brigade.
10-17. If a DTG is allocated an entire combat helicopter brigade (or major
parts of one), that brigades headquarters would typically come under the IFC
headquarters, especially if that is where most of its battalions are employed.
If most of its subordinate battalions are employed outside the IFC, the
brigade headquarters could be directly under the DTG headquarters.

Aviation in BTG
10-18. Attack, CS, and/or CSS helicopters can be directly subordinate to a
BTG commander. An example of this would be an infantry BTG conducting
heliborne assaults. Such a BTG may include a medium-lift helicopter
battalion to insert infantry units and an attack helicopter battalion to provide
security and armed escort for the troop-carrying helicopters or to prepare the
landing zone (LZ) by fire (see Figure 10-3).

BTG
COMMANDER

TANK ATTACK MEDIUM-LIFT

INFANTRY HELICOPTER
BATTALION HELICOPTER
BRIGADE BATTALION BATTALION

HOWITZER
ATGM
BATTERY
BATTERY
(122-mm)

Figure 10-3. Example of Aviation in a BTG

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AIRSPACE MANAGEMENT
10-19. The OPFOR assigns its organizations an area of responsibility (AOR)
that includes not only the surface area of a defined geographic space but also
the associated airspace. The coordinated use of battlefield airspace and aerial
delivery of ordnance close to friendly troops are two problems any combined
arms force faces. OPFOR doctrine stresses the need to provide maximum
aviation support to ground force commanders. Therefore, aviation control and
communications are closely aligned with those of the ground force to ensure
effective and continuous communications.
10-20. To reduce air-to-ground coordination problems during the execution of
missions, the OPFOR employs proactive staff elements and control measures
to ensure coordination with ground maneuver units. Planners can use attack
helicopters, fixed-wing ground-attack aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs), and artillery simultaneously in the same part of the AOR only if
coordination measures exist and controlling elements are working in
conjunction with each other to ensure deconfliction.

CHIEF OF AIRSPACE OPERATIONS

10-21. Air and ground force commanders and staffs work out coordination
procedures between aviation elements and ground forces before the launch of
combat air missions. These procedures are the responsibility of the chief of
airspace operations (CAO) at all levels of command down to brigade or BTG,
even when no aviation units are subordinate to that headquarters.
10-22. At every level of command, the CAO is responsible for airspace
deconfliction. To assist in that function, he has a staff at his disposal for
coordination and deconfliction of air missions. He and his staff make up the
airspace operations subsection (AOS) under the operations officer. This staff
subsection includes liaison officers from all subordinate units requiring
airspace deconfliction; this ensures that the aviation, fire support, and air
defense units continually coordinate all operations with each other. Since
aviation assets are not constituent or dedicated to the pure division or
brigade, the primary functions of the CAO and his staff there are to request
and monitor employment of higher-level aviation assets allocated to the
division or brigade in a supporting role.

AIRSPACE OPERATIONS SUBSECTION

10-23. This coordination occurs in a staff element referred to as an airspace
operations subsection (AOS). The overall mission of the AOS is to advise
commanders and staffs on the use of all air assets and to deconflict airspace
use. There is an AOS at each level of command down to and including
maneuver brigades. These AOSs all perform the same mission, but vary in
size and complexity.
10-24. The AOSs form a vertical and horizontal channel through which
airspace coordination requirements, plans, orders, and information are
coordinated, disseminated, and synchronized with the battle plan. They
transmit air support requests to higher-level AOSs and aviation
organizations, coordinate all air support, and maintain communication with
and provide deconfliction for all aircraft in the AOR. The AOS may divide

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into two or more cells. The primary cell is located in the main command post
(CP), while smaller AOS cells may be in the forward CP and/or IFC CP.

Theater-Level
10-25. For issues related to air support and interface, the theater-level CAO
coordinates with aviation assets within the theater, including the theater air
army CP (Air Force) and army aviation CP, and elements of the subordinate
air defense and artillery units. The AOS at theater level consists of several
dozen individuals with aviation, artillery, or air defense coordination
experience filling permanent staff positions and interfacing with their
respective subordinate units.
10-26. The AOS is the theater commanders primary means of turning his
guidance into a comprehensive plan for air operations. It allocates resources
and tasks forces through the publishing of the aviation support plan (ASP).
For more information, see the Aviation Support Plan section of this chapter.
10-27. The AOS establishes vectoring and target designation posts (VTDPs)
as necessary to exercise control of aircraft in a designated AOR. These posts
are air traffic control facilities that support the movement of aviation assets
within an AOR and can also direct aircraft to ground targets. The VTDPs are
primarily ground-based and serve as an intermediate air traffic control
facility between the aircrafts parent unit and the forward air controller
(FAC). (See below under BTG.) They accomplish direct coordination among
helicopters, ground-attack and fighter aircraft, ground-based air defense
units, and FACs, primarily through VHF voice transmission. These posts are
equipped with radar, communications, and automated equipment used for
identification and tracking of both friendly and enemy aircraft.
10-28. Occasionally the OPFOR can employ airborne command and control
(C2) aircraft to perform the same intercept function as a VTDP. These aircraft
are referred to as airborne control stations (ABNCSs), and may be used to
augment or replace VTDPs within the OPFOR AOR.
10-29. In mountainous terrain with VTDP radar deadspace, visual observers
(VOs) are used. These observers are connected into the VTDP network via
VHF communications. Each observer section is equipped with radios,
binoculars, and sound detection devices.
10-30. If the OPFOR uses ABNCSs or VOs, their employment is no different
than that of a VTDP. They control the flow of friendly aircraft, and provide
enemy intercept data to OPFOR counterair aircraft and air defense units.

OSC-Level
10-31. The AOS at OSC level is manned and equipped similar to the theater-
level AOS. When the theater only has one OSC, the theater AOS functions
are performed by the OSC AOS.

DTG-Level
10-32. At the DTG level, this subsection has some personnel filling
permanent staff positions and some liaisons from subordinate units. Air
support coordination is controlled by the interaction between staffs within

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

the fire support coordination center, army aviation CP, and subordinate air
defense unit CP. These staffs provide deconfliction for all aircraft operating
within their AOR by monitoring radar and radio communications.
10-33. Since Air Force aviation units are not constituent or dedicated to a
ground forces division or DTG, the supporting aviation regiments or
squadrons normally colocate a CP with the division or DTG main CP. This
facilitates the close coordination required by the AOS.

BTG-Level
10-34. The BTG-level AOS is located with the BTG main CP to assist the
commander and staff in all tasks associated with planning and employing air
support assets. The AOS is responsible for coordinating air support by
serving as the primary
Liaison between the BTG staff and the DTGs AOS.
Liaison between ground forces and supporting fixed- or rotary-wing
aircraft.
Director for attacking aircraft by passing messages directly to the flight
leader about targets.

10-35. The CAO is responsible for the operation of the AOS. He coordinates
with the BTG commander to ensure proper integration of air missions into
the overall scheme of maneuver. If a BTG employs a forward CP, a
subelement or representative of the AOS may locate forward with the
commander, if required. These representatives are also qualified to perform
the duties of a FAC if necessary, but this is not preferred.
10-36. The BTG AOS is responsible for the coordination of all airspace and
air routes within the BTGs AOR. It coordinates with the air defense units,
aviation units, and the chief of fire support. The AOS serves as the central
point of contact for all actions between the ground force and aviation units. It
continually monitors the status of ongoing and planned missions and the
availability of air support.
10-37. FACs may colocate with the maneuver battalions when air strikes or
support missions are planned, or when the brigade or BTG commander
expects the battalions to require immediate or on-call air support. The FAC is
a senior helicopter pilot experienced in combat helicopter brigade support
procedures. The FACs goal is to employ fixed- and/or rotary-wing aircraft
simultaneously in the same area, and coordinate aircraft employment with
artillery fires. If successful, impacts coincide in time, with different target
sectors allocated.
10-38. The FAC arrives at the maneuver battalions CP prior to a mission
with his own radio set for communications with helicopters and/or fixed-wing
aircraft. The type of radio, which he must provide, is based on the type of
aviation he supports, since fixed-wing and rotary-wing missions use different
frequencies for communication. The radio is either VHF or UHF. Provision is
made in the brigade or BTG headquarters for a FAC vehicle, and it has
unique mounts for these radio sets.

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10-39. A FAC plans air missions to support the ground commanders scheme
of maneuver (based on the sortie allocations from higher headquarters),
establishes control procedures, and orchestrates mission execution. He serves
as the ground commanders direct liaison with aviation support.

Battalion
10-40. A maneuver battalion seldom has a staff member dedicated to serve as
an air representative and rarely receives a dedicated FAC. The brigade or
BTG may allocate a FAC to a battalion when air support is planned
specifically in its AOR. In such cases, a FAC works in conjunction with the
commander and an artillery observer to coordinate the actions of attack
aircraft with the artillery fires and the ground scheme of maneuver.

AIRSPACE CONTROL MEASURES

10-41. The purpose of airspace control measures is to maximize the
effectiveness of combat missions. Airspace control measures are established
so that ground and aviation units may apply timely, efficient, and mutually
supporting combat power while minimizing the risk of fratricide. This is
accomplished through two methods: positive control and procedural control.
In the airspace coordination order (ACO) portion of the ASP, the CAO
delineates all positive and procedural airspace control measures.

Positive Control
10-42. Positive control is a method of airspace control that relies on electronic
means such as positive identification, tracking, and aircraft vectoring, done
by radar control or electronic monitoring. Positive control is established by
air traffic control services around airbases and in the support zone. As
aircraft depart these areas, they are handed off to subordinate airspace
coordination facilities (such as a VTDP, ABNCS, or VO) and then finally to
the FAC as they approach his AOR.

Procedural Control
10-43. Procedural control relies on previously coordinated and disseminated
orders or procedures to control the operation and flow of air traffic. These
procedures, coupled with the OPFOR emphasis that combined arms forces
must be generally familiar with each others tactics and equipment, help
alleviate problems that arise in coordination during combat.
10-44. The OPFOR employs coordination procedures that separate airspace
horizontally, vertically, or both. This buffer zone minimizes the possibility of
fratricide while maximizing ordnance effects. Figure 10-4 depicts the
different airspace coordination procedures available to the OPFOR.

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Artillery Coordinating Altitude at 6,000 m

ROZ

Airspace Control Zone

ROZ
Airspace DTG
Control
OSC

Zone

DTG

= Air Control Points = Air Routes Fixed-wing / Rotary-wing

Coordinating Altitude at 275 / 175 m

Figure 10-4. Airspace Procedural Control Measures (Example)

10-45. Coordinating Altitudes. A coordinating altitude outlines an

arbitrary altitude below which fixed-wing aircraft do not fly, and above which
rotary-wing aircraft do not fly. Artillery coordinating altitudes exist to
deconflict artillery shell trajectories and fixed-wing traffic at high altitudes. A
buffer zone may exist between coordinating altitudes to allow small altitude
deviations. For example, coordinating altitudes are generally no higher than
175 m above ground level (AGL) for helicopters and no lower than 275 m AGL
for fixed-wing aircraft. Deviating from these altitudes requires further
coordination. Artillery coordinating altitudes are generally established at
6,000 m AGL or higher. Fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft planning extended
penetration of the coordinating altitudes must notify the appropriate AOS,
but prior coordinating altitude deviation approval is not required.
10-46. Airspace Control Zones. These zones define airspace that is
characterized by a high density of aircraft or a high concentration of usage.
An airspace control zone has defined dimensions that coincide with
geographic or manmade features and extend vertically to a given altitude.
The requesting authority, such as a brigade or division commander, dictates
air defense weapon control status within the airspace control zone.

10-47. Restricted Operations Zones. A restricted operations zone (ROZ) is

established to define a volume of airspace for a specific mission or purpose,
such as a drop zone, landing zone, UAV flight pattern, or electronic warfare
(EW) aircraft flight route. A ROZ is used to restrict some or all airspace users
until termination of the mission. It may restrict airspace horizontally and/or

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vertically and by time of usage. A ROZ, for example, may be set up to restrict
airspace from 1,500 to 3,000 m AGL, 5 km in all directions from a given
point, from 0200 to 0600 hours, for the purpose of UAV overflights. The
requesting authority, such as a brigade or division commander, controls air
defense weapon control status within the ROZ.
10-48. Air Routes. Air routes are made up of air corridors and air control
points. These control measures are implemented to control the travel of
aircraft through friendly airspace and to prevent friendly forces from firing
on friendly aircraft. Air control points are predetermined points over the
ground at a given altitude where the air route changes direction or links with
another air route. An air corridor is the path of linked air control points
starting at the initial point (IP) and ending at the release point.
10-49. Some air routes may include the use of mandatory reporting points.
These points serve to control and monitor the flow of air traffic by requiring
radio calls to the controlling authority stating the aircrafts position. An air
route, for example, may dictate: returning aircraft fly above 1,500 m AGL,
outbound aircraft fly below 1,500 m AGL, all helicopters below 30 m AGL. All
aircraft should see and avoid other aircraft and remain within 500 m of the
corridor centerline for safe transit.
10-50. Every level of command down to BTG has a unique airspace structure
supporting the movement of aircraft within its AOR. Air routes run from the
supporting airfields, through the theater and/or OSC airspace controlled by
the VTDPs, to a crossing checkpoint at the DTG boundary. The aircraft
then follows the airspace structure unique to that particular DTG until it
reaches a BTG boundary. The BTG will provide routes that support the
mission taking the aircraft to the landing zone (LZ), pick-up zone (PZ), or to
an initial contact point where control is assumed by the FAC. Using the ASP,
the routes are published and distributed to each level of command. Each air
defense element is responsible to disseminate the information to the troops
within those boundaries to prevent the fratricide of friendly aircraft. The ASP
incorporates all forward arming and refueling points (FARPs) and all
planned LZ/PZs. The ASP may change the route structure on a daily basis.

Air Defense Control Measures

10-51. To coordinate the use of aviation assets with ground forces, the
OPFOR utilizes different types of air defense weapons control status and
procedural controls. Primarily, it employs a system of identification, friend or
foe (IFF) between aircraft and air defense systems. To protect friendly
aircraft from fratricide from non-IFF-capable systems, strict procedural
controls are enacted. These control measures were mentioned in the previous
section and are disseminated daily using the ASP through AOS channels and
aviation unit headquarters elements.
10-52. The air defense coverage may be switched off to allow friendly
aircraft to pass on a mission planned in advance and then switched on as
they exit the area. For other missions, air defense coverage may allow
aircraft to transit only on safe corridors based on air routes or other
procedural methods. If aircraft deviate from these coordinated areas, they
risk being shot down by friendly ground force units. The OPFOR views the

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possible loss of aircraft through fratricide as a lesser risk than allowing gaps
in its radar and air defense coverage that the enemy might exploit. See also
Chapter 10 for more information on air defense asset employment.

Fire Support Coordination Measures

10-53. Fires from mortars, cannon and rocket artillery, and surface-to-
surface missiles (SSMs) pose a potential hazard to friendly aircraft activities.
The highest probability of conflict between aircraft and surface-to-surface
indirect weapons fire occurs at relatively low altitudes in the immediate
vicinity of firing positions and targeted areas. To reduce these potential
conflicts between indirect fires and aircraft, information pertaining to firing
positions, targeted areas, and fire support plans is provided to the AOS at
each level of command. See Chapter 8 for more information on artillery asset
employment and coordination measures.

MISSIONS
10-54. The OPFOR considers the ability of its aviation assets to provide
responsive and continuous fire support to ground forces a tremendous
influence on the battlefield. It emphasizes that aviation must be employed
early to achieve the following goals:
Early attainment of air superiority.
Effective reconnaissance and targeting.
A coordinated attack on enemy targets at all tactical and operational
depths.
Employment in mass during all phases of combat.
Survivability and responsiveness using effective planning and preparation.

10-55. Aviation assets perform numerous other missions to support ground

forces in combat and logistics roles. Many of these missions are performed by
elements located at the operational or strategic level. However, tactical
ground force commanders may feel their impact.

AIR FORCE
10-56. As enemy air and ground forces are introduced into an AOR, the Air
Force must concentrate missions to gain the desired degree of airspace
dominance. However, the operational situation dictates the amount of
aircraft dedicated to the attainment of air dominance versus support of
ground forces.
10-57. Initially, most theater air assets conduct strategic- and operational-
level missions. Examples of these higher-level missions are strategic
bombing, counterair, air interdiction, theater air reconnaissance, EW, and
NBC delivery.
10-58. Early operational and tactical aviation missionssuch as air
interdiction and attacks (air strikes) on ground targetsmay allow the
OPFOR to attain air superiority from the outset, at least against a regional
opponent. The degree of airspace dominance dictates aircraft employment
throughout the theater at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

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Degree of Airspace Dominance

10-59. The degree of airspace dominance has the following affects on the
missions of the Air Force and how it supports the ground force:
Aircraft sortie rates change.
Aircraft missions may be restricted.
Depth and distance of mission execution may be limited.
Aircraft may assume other roles than those for which they are
specifically designed.
Aircraft ordnance changes.

10-60. The OPFOR uses standardized terms to define the degree of airspace
dominance. This allows planners to best employ assets in the theater to
satisfy the requirements to support ground forces.
10-61. Air Supremacy. Air supremacy is defined as the condition when the
enemy air force is incapable of effective interference. Through the complete
destruction of the enemy air forces, this condition is the ultimate goal of air
operations. Yet, this condition may be difficult or even impossible to achieve.
It may occur, however, through the establishment of a diplomatic no-fly
zone. Under the condition of air supremacy, the OPFOR commander employs
all of his aircraft at will.
10-62. Air Superiority. Air superiority is defined as the condition when the
conduct of operations is possible at a given time and place without prohibitive
interference by the enemy. The most efficient method of attaining air superiority
is to attack enemy early warning, C2, and ground-based air defense sites, and
enemy aviation assets close to their source of maintenance and launch facilities.

10-63. The OPFOR expects to be capable of achieving air superiority against

a regional opponent. However, if it is faced with a superior enemy, the
theater commander may be forced to hold more aircraft in reserve and to
redirect aircraft from ground support to air defense operations. This will
increase the burden on rotary-wing assets to fill the ground support role.
10-64. Local Air Superiority. Even though the OPFOR hopes to attain air
superiority, it recognizes the potential for only local air superiority to exist.
Purely geographic in nature, this condition is characterized by well-timed
aviation missions to coincide with enemy aircraft downtime, returning
sorties, aircraft rearming, or gaps in air defense coverage. This condition may
also occur in areas across the theater where the OPFOR or the enemy may
not have adequate assets available to ensure air superiority. In certain
situations or against certain enemies, local air superiority for a specified
period of time may be a more realistic goal.
10-65. Air Parity. Air parity is defined as the functional equivalency
between enemy and friendly air forces in strength and capability to attack
and destroy targets. Under the condition of air parity, where neither side has
gained superiority, some enemy capabilities affect friendly ground forces at
times and places on the battlefield. Air parity manifests itself to the commander
primarily in the amount of fixed-wing aircraft used for DAS of ground forces.

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

More aircraft are dedicated to interdiction and attack missions to gain air
superiority.

Counterair
10-66. Counterair missions integrate offensive and defensive actions to
establish and maintain the desired degree of air dominance. For the mission
of countering enemy air forces, the OPFOR is heavily reliant on VTDPs as
well as friendly air defense assets. OPFOR aircraft survivability and success
in counterair missions depend on the ability of the VTDP network to identify
enemy targets and redirect fighters in flight to the proper location at the
most opportune time for a successful engagement. This mission primarily
falls on the assets at the operational or theater level. OPFOR ground force
commanders may feel the effects of this, because assets needed to support
counterair missions may detract from the ability of the theater or OSC to
support the tactical maneuver.

Reconnaissance and Targeting

10-67. The theater or OSC commanders staff prepares an overall
reconnaissance plan detailing tasks for all aviation reconnaissance assets.
Operational-level air reconnaissance is the principal method to gather deep
target intelligence. Yet, the information the aircrews obtain from those
missions is analyzed and disseminated to tactical commanders.
10-68. Specifically-equipped aviation assets (such as a reconnaissance
aviation regiment) have the primary responsibility for air reconnaissance.
They provide reconnaissance support for tactical combat actions by
transmitting target information to ground CPs via radio from specially
equipped reconnaissance aircraft. The division or DTG conducts its own
tactical reconnaissance primarily through ground reconnaissance and UAV
assets. Aircrews at all levels of command returning from missions are
instructed to report sighted enemy locations and activities. The classification
and location of targets obtained through intelligence gathering is the basis
for planning air interdiction and attack missions.

Interdiction
10-69. The theater air forces conduct air interdiction missions to annihilate,
or neutralize the enemys military potential before it can be used to inflict
damage on friendly forces. These missions are flown to the extent of the
enemys operational width and depth, and they require little integration
between friendly air and ground assets.
10-70. Interdiction missions are flown to attack targets beyond the range of
friendly surface weapons. These missions are usually planned and conducted
at an operational level by the OSC to achieve theater and/or OSC objectives.
Therefore, the tactical ground force commanders provide very little input to
target selection and little or no assistance during the mission execution.
Maneuver commanders may notice the impact of these missions and factor
the results into their planning process.
10-71. Air interdiction missions are planned at the highest level to
synchronize, complement, and reinforce the ground force scheme of

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maneuver. Typical targets include bridges, roads, railroads, airfields, and

large troop support facilities such as supply depots or logistics bases.

Attack
10-72. The OPFOR considers air strikes within the enemys tactical depth to
be attack missions. These are deliberate missions to attack priority enemy
targets such as assembly areas, supply routes, artillery or antitank positions,
multiple rocket launcher (MRL) positions, forward air bases, and reserves.
10-73. With attack missions, the ground force commander nominates targets
to facilitate his scheme of maneuver. (For more information, see Planning
and Preparation later in this chapter.) Targets are classified as single,
multiple, line, or area. Figure 10-5 shows the OPFOR classification of targets
and attack techniques.

Classification Example Target Attack Technique

An MRL, tank, or armored vehicle; Single pair of aircraft using lower-
Single (or Point)
parked aircraft or helicopter; radar, level or dive delivery of ordnance
observation post, or bunker
Group of 10-20 single targets, Attack by a small group of (2-8)
Multiple
occupying an area of 1-1.5 km2 aircraft
Tactical march column (usually 1 km Attack by a single or small group of
Line
or longer), a train, or a runway aircraft along the long axis of the
target, or flanks
Assembly areas of battalion or larger Massive and concentrated air
Area
unit, supply depot, large C2 center, or attacks delivered from various
airfield altitudes and directions

Figure 10-5. Classification of Attack Targets

10-74. Attack missions are planned by the AOS to ensure coordination

between the aviation force and the ground force and to ensure survivability.
Based on the target classification, aircraft sorties and ordnance types are
requested to achieve the desired results. The missions are well planned with
triggers to signal aircraft launch. Procedures for airspace deconfliction are
enacted prior to launch.
10-75. The ground force commander uses attack missions to shape the
battlefield. By attacking priority targets, these missions should prepare the
conditions for his success over the ensuing 24 hours or reinforce successful
attacks by his ground forces. Attack missions can help create penetrations,
cover withdrawals, and guard flanks, and can be most effective when
employed at decisive points in a battle. The ground force commander plans
an energetic scheme of maneuver to complement attack missions and trap or
destroy major elements of the enemy force.

Direct Air Support

10-76. The objective of DAS is to disrupt and destroy enemy forces in
proximity to friendly forces. Although DAS is the least efficient application of air
forces in terms of damaging enemy capabilities, it is the most critical to ensuring
the success and survival of ground forces. These missions have the greatest

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

potential to make an especially important contribution to the ground force

commanders plan. He must be ready to exploit the effects of DAS through rapid
maneuver, either by closing with and destroying the enemy or by bypassing
enemy forces.
10-77. Due to the proximity of these missions to friendly ground forces,
extensive care is taken to minimize fratricide. Effective DAS requires reliable
air-to-ground communications and flexible, responsive command and control.
(See Airspace Control Measures earlier in this chapter.) It requires aviation
components to appreciate the capabilities, limitations, and risks to ground
forces; it also requires the ground component to understand the capabilities
and limitations of DAS.
10-78. The OPFOR normally conducts DAS with fixed-wing ground-attack
aircraft and rotary-wing attack aircraft. These missions typically extend only to
the range of friendly ground-based systems. That is, OPFOR aircraft are covered
by the fire of friendly weapon systems, and under the air defense coverage of
friendly systems. They target objects of immediate concern to the ground force
commander when the fires of his constituent or dedicated assets are not capable
of engaging the enemy or when a mass concentration of fire is required.
10-79. DAS missions are entirely controlled by the FAC. Once the AOS or the
VTDP notifies the FAC that aircraft are inbound to his location, he
establishes communication with the aircraft and provides the necessary data
for the aircraft to complete their mission. A FAC controls all aspects of their
mission. FAC control procedures include
Establishing an IP.
Establishing attack positions (APs), normally at maximum effective
weapons range.
Issuing control graphics.
Identifying and marking friendly troop locations.

10-80. As the aircraft travel inbound from the IP, the FAC provides the pilots
with target location (either in grid coordinates or in relation to a
predetermined reference point), the exact time to execute the attack, and
information on the ground situation. He may also give the flight leader a
signal to direct the flight to climb, acquire the target, and attack.
10-81. The primary responsibility of pinpointing the target is left up to the flight
leader; he orders the flight into different formations, divides the target, and
assigns individual sectors to the aircraft in his flight. The FAC assesses damage
and adjusts the flight for successive target runs if necessary. So, the FAC must
maintain visual contact with the target while the aircraft are on station.

Airlift, Transport, Airborne, Airdrop, and Aerial Resupply

10-82. Airlift, transport, airborne, airdrop, and aerial resupply missions are
all fixed-wing transport aircraft missions that are performed by operational-
level assets. 2 They may, however, have impacts on the tactical ground force

2
Air Force or army aviation helicopter units and mixed aviation units can also perform some of these
missions.

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commander, by limiting his maneuver. For example, if a forward airbase or

an airdrop site is set up by the operational-level commander to resupply
adjacent tactical units, a large area is dedicated to the Air Force for the
mission. This area may present an obstacle or a restriction to the ground
scheme of maneuver for the tactical commander.

ARMY AVIATION
10-83. Army aviation is a component of the ground forces and is intended for
actions directly in the interests of combined arms organizations. Based on the
type of missions performed, army aviation is divided by predominate aircraft
capabilities into attack, CS, and CSS aviation.
10-84. Attack helicopters are the primary assets used to provide firepower to
ground forces. These assets can perform armed reconnaissance or fire support
in all types and phases of ground combat. They can also provide fire support
for heliborne landings. Other helicopters can also conduct heliborne landings,
lay minefields, or perform a variety of logistics, reconnaissance, liaison, and
communications functions in accordance with the plans of the supported
combined arms organizations. Some helicopters are capable of performing in
multiple roles.

Attack Helicopters
10-85. Attack helicopters (also referred to as fire support helicopters), rather
than fixed-wing aircraft, provide the preponderance of the support to the
ground force and provide an excellent fire and maneuver capability to the
ground commander. The primary categories of tactical missions for attack
helicopters are attack, DAS, and reconnaissance and security. Some attack
helicopters may be modified to perform air-to-air combat roles.
10-86. Attack helicopters may have integral cannons or miniguns, and have
the provisions to mount antitank guided missiles (ATGMs), rockets, bombs,
or other ordnance on fuselage or under-wing hardpoints. Most employ target
acquisition and sighting systems.
10-87. The OPFOR may employ multirole helicopters in the same capacity as
a pure attack helicopters, but generally with less firepower. These aircraft
have the provisions to carry a limited number of passengers and may have
mounts for a cannon, rocket pods, or a few ATGMs. They are small, relatively
quiet, and easy to conceal from radar and visual detection when silhouetted
against background clutter.
10-88. Helicopter Attack. Helicopter attack missions are conducted within
the enemys tactical depth. Similar to the fixed-wing attack mission, the
purpose of helicopter attack missions is to destroy priority enemy targets
such as artillery or antitank positions, MRL positions, and reserves. The
OPFOR may employ army aviation helicopters to attack counterattacking
enemy armor columns or enemy columns moving forward to reinforce
engaged units.
10-89. Deep autonomous attack helicopter missions in the disruption zone
are the exception rather than the rule, yet they may occur against an
extremely high-priority target. The commander understands the risks involved

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in missions such as these and realizes the high probability of loss of aircraft and
crews.
10-90. For these disruption zone attacks, the OPFOR will launch the
minimal number of aircraft (two to four) to accomplish the mission.
Suppression of air enemy defenses (SEAD) is normally executed in support of
the mission. The focus of the SEAD is to destroy, degrade, or neutralize
enemy air defense systems in a specific area through either attack or
electronic jamming. The depth of these helicopter attacks will be primarily
limited by the range or endurance of the aircraft. Consideration is given for
planning additional contingency time for the aircrews to react to unexpected
actions in enemy territory. The distance may also be limited by the range of
the artillery. Normally, if attack helicopters are operating deep, they are
operating as part of an IFC at OSC or DTG level. If the target cannot be
engaged with (precision) artillery, the OPFOR can send attack helicopters.
10-91. The primary deep mission in the disruption zone for attack helicopters
is in support of heliborne landings. These helicopters can provide security
and armed escort for troop-carrying helicopters. They may prepare the LZ by
fire and remain after the insertion to provide DAS to the ground force. The
number of aircraft employed depends on the size of the force, the degree of
protection desired, and expected enemy resistance. For more information on
the heliborne landings, see Combat Support Helicopters.
10-92. Like fixed-wing attack missions, helicopter attack missions are
planned by the AOS to ensure coordination between the aviation force and
the ground force, and minimize the risk of the mission. Based on the target,
number of available helicopters, and required ammunition, missions are
planned to achieve the desired results. The missions are planned in detail
with triggers to signal aircraft launch. Rehearsals are performed to identify
any problems and increase the probability of mission success.
10-93. Direct Air Support. The disruption and battle zones provide
opportunities to the commander to effectively employ attack helicopters when
the enemy presents numerous targets in the open. Armed with ATGMs and
rockets, helicopters provide DAS for the advance of the ground forces by
flying behind OPFOR ground forces and firing over them. This places the
helicopters out of friendly direct fire ranges and behind or under friendly
artillery trajectories.
10-94. Since army aviation serves as the ground force commanders primary
asset for air support, DAS is the most common type of mission. In the DAS
role, helicopters can augment fixed-wing DAS, ground-based artillery, and
direct fires from ground forces. This fire support is conducted throughout the
disruption and battle zones. Attack helicopters destroy tanks, antitank
weapons, and other armored targets located in proximity to friendly units.
10-95. DAS missions use two to eight aircraft per mission. They are flown
using the wingman concept with a minimum of two aircraft. The wingman
has the responsibility to provide local security while lead is focused on the
target. Helicopters firing ATGMs are exposed and vulnerable during missile
flight. To minimize exposure time, the helicopters can also employ rockets or
the main gun in lieu of ATGMs, but with less effectiveness.

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10-96. While in proximity to friendly forces, attack helicopters are afforded

the protection of air defense assets and the covering fire of ground systems.
Using the integrated fires of tank or mechanized forces, artillery, and attack
helicopters, the commander creates corridors through the enemys forward
ground forces. These corridors, coupled with SEAD, allow further
employment of all other types of air assets.
10-97. In the defense, helicopters can be used to counterattack tank or
mechanized forces while serving as the commanders antitank reserve. The
commander may employ them to independently execute a counterattack into
the flanks of an enemy formation. Armed with ATGMs and rockets, the
helicopter force seeks routes allowing undetected approach to the flanks of
the enemy force. If terrain variations do not provide adequate concealment
for the force, the helicopters may use smoke to conceal their approach. The
helicopter formation then engages enemy targets from APs along preplanned
attack routes.
10-98. Reconnaissance and Security. Attack helicopters are used for
armed reconnaissance when visibility is limited, target information is
incomplete, or enemy flanks are unprotected. In these circumstances attack
helicopters, by flights of two, conduct high-speed, low-altitude penetration of
enemy lines. Targets of opportunity such as radars, communication nodes,
missile launchers, and antitank weapons are engaged at the discretion of the
flight or formation leader. Because these missions are considered hazardous,
they are normally reserved for very experienced pilots, and therefore are
quite risky to the ground force commander.
10-99. Commanders also employ attack helicopters to provide assistance with
the ground force counterreconnaissance battle. These helicopters are
launched in small numbers to positions in the disruption zone to engage
enemy ground reconnaissance assets as they approach friendly positions. The
commanders intent is to deny the enemy the reconnaissance information
that may expose weaknesses in his scheme of maneuver.
10-100. Attack helicopters may be employed to protect the flanks of a tank or
mechanized column in the attack or counterattack and in a tactical
movement by screening the column from the enemy. The aircraft protect the
column by flying along the route or maneuvering by bounds using the cover and
concealment of the terrain along the route. Similarly, they may serve as convoy
escort.
10-101. Counterair. Helicopter air-to-air combat modifications are
commonly available on the open market, and newer helicopters may be
designed with the capability. 3 Helicopters can employ from external weapon
racks the same missiles used as surface-to-air missiles in the ground forces.
Several antitank guided missiles (ATGMs) are able to engage other aircraft
from aerial platforms, and mounted automatic weapons may also be
employed. Helicopters equipped with such weapons (if available) are the only
form of air-to-air engagement available to support the tactical ground force
commander.

3
While attack helicopters are likely candidates for this role, other types of helicopter could be configured to mount
air-to-air weapons.

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Combat Support Helicopters

10-102. Combat support helicopters serve in numerous roles. They are
designed with troop- or cargo-carrying capabilities and can be armed with
miniguns or machineguns fired by crewmembers other than the pilots. They
have provisions to carry external loads such as fuel tanks, ATGMs, rockets,
or EW equipment on external hardpoints or underslung on cargo hooks. Their
primary function is to act as transport aircraft in the heliborne landing and
to serve in other supporting roles. Thus, the resulting cargo weights limit the
type and amount of armament used. If the OPFOR lacks a dedicated attack
airframe, these helicopters may perform both roles. They would be less
effective than designed attack helicopters, because they lack an integral fire
control, sensor, and optic systems.
10-103. The OPFOR launches a heliborne landing for the purpose of inserting
a ground force or reconnaissance assets, usually in the disruption zone. This
normally occurs under the cover of darkness and up to 2 to 6 hours prior to a
planned ground attack.
10-104. LZs are selected beyond the range of enemy direct fire weapon
systems and prior to insertion are targeted with artillery (if within range) or
escorting attack aircraft. After troop insertion, the CS helicopters depart, and
the attack helicopters may remain. Forces remaining in position longer than
24 hours are resupplied by helicopter.
10-105. In addition, CS helicopters are called upon to transport antitank squads
or perform electronic jamming. Combat support aircraft can also supplement
obstacle detachments by laying mines along threatened flanks and gaps, and
assist in the preparation of complex battle positions by providing logistics
support. They may also fill a variety of other support or logistics functions.

Combat Service Support Helicopters

10-106. Helicopters providing CSS are large and lightly armed (if at all). They
have large cargo areas with provisions to load freight and fuel internally or
carry them underslung on cargo hooks. Their movement is usually limited to
conducting resupply missions in the support zone, yet they may be employed
in the battle and disruption zones in some circumstances.
10-107. These aircraft may be employed to transport an airborne or heliborne
force. Attack aircraft may escort them to the drop or landing zone. The forces
they carry are used to augment the prior insertion of a heliborne force by CS
helicopters once the objective is secured.
10-108. Some CSS helicopters can be fitted with extra fuel tanks and
pressurized refueling hoses and may be employed to establish a FARP prior
to a heliborne insertion or attack mission. They do not perform this mission
in enemy territory.
10-109. These helicopters may also be used in search and rescue, and
downed-aircraft recovery roles. Missions such as these are escorted by two to
four attack helicopters.

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Forward Arming and Refueling Point Employment

10-110. The flight services elements of the army aviation units have the
personnel and equipment to establish FARPs. 4 The OPFOR does not place as
much emphasis on FARP employment as do military forces of some other
nations. This is due to the lack of deep autonomous attack helicopter
missions that would require FARPs.
10-111. FARPs will normally be established within friendly territory to
support helicopter missions. FARPs are placed near open areas to allow for
landing sites, but with nearby terrain that affords cover and concealment
from the enemy. FARP operations will move to an alternate site if
compromised. The flight services element may set up temporary or deception
FARPs based on supporting the ground force scheme of maneuver. A combat
helicopter brigade has the ability to place one FARP per attack helicopter
battalion. The FARP includes four to six refueling points and an area for
rearming. Under reasonable conditions, a flight of four aircraft can expect to be
replenished with fuel and ammunition in 45 minutes. In maximum employment
conditions, this time increases due to logistics constraints and a finite number of
refueling points. Also, in adverse weather and at night, these times increase.
Some aircraft may perform area security while others in the flight are refueled
and rearmed. Upon completion of the air support mission, the FARPs are
moved or removed, while aircraft recover to their holding areas or airfields.

PLANNING AND PREPARATION

10-112. Ground commanders can employ air support, integrated with other
forms of fire support, throughout the AOR to attack the greatest threats to
successful ground combat. Mission planners are responsible for incorporating
the most current information on enemy and friendly positions, current
weather, terrain, fire support plans, and EW targets to plan air support
missions that complement the ground maneuver plan.
10-113. Planned missions afford ground maneuver commanders greater freedom
of movement and flexibility by allowing them to mass firepower at decisive
points to annihilate or neutralize enemy forces. At every level of command from
battalion to OSC, ground commanders nominate targets for air support assets to
attack. Assets are requested, forces are allocated, an ASP is produced, and pre-
mission planning is performed to maximize effects and minimize risk.

TARGET SELECTION
10-114. At theater and OSC levels, the targets are selected based on strategic
or operational-level goals. At tactical levels, targets are selected to shape the
battlefield for the success of the ground forces. The targeting process is
mostly preplanned, based on integrating the fires of ground assets (such as
artillery, MRLs, and SSMs) and aviation assets. It is a continuous, ongoing
process designed to exploit current intelligence and attack high-priority
targets in all phases of the battle to best achieve the commanders scheme of
maneuver. As the tactical battle continues, targets are selected from the existing
targeting database, or new ones emerge as windows of opportunities develop.

4
Air Force helicopter units would also use the same tactics.

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10-115. Target lists are categorized and prioritized based on depth into the
enemy forces. The OPFOR attempts to plan targets for its attack aircraft
which shape the battlefield versus reacting to ground maneuver forces that
require immediate support. However, the following priorities are established:
Enemy forward positions, maneuver units, artillery, and C2 nodes.
Deeper artillery, C2 nodes, reserves, assembly areas, supply routes,
artillery or antitank positions, MRL positions, and forward air bases.
Deeper reserves, lines of communication, airbases, and troop support
and logistics facilities.
10-116. From these target lists, requests for artillery fire and air support are
generated at every level down to battalion. The targeting responsibilities of
the ground force do not end with target nomination. Commanders and their
AOSs planning fires must continue to refine and update target information
until the desired results are achieved. The forum for this is the targeting
meeting held within the AOS at every level of command. These ASEs
correlate the ground force commanders targeting priorities with actual
targets, plan attack positions, incorporate FAC input from prior missions,
and discuss mobile targets. The latter is particularly important, since mobile
targets represent the most difficult problem facing ground force commanders.
When considering mobile targets, commanders may employ one of three methods
to control the timing of the air attack: on-call, immediate, or preplanned. For
more information on this subject, see Aviation Support Plan below.
10-117. Commanders plan for targeting contingencies during the course of a
battle. When a target of opportunity presents itself, the commanderthrough
his AOS and FACshas the ability to redirect his air support to attack the
new target. Additionally, pilots have the capability of acquiring targets in the
performance of their mission. This presents an ability to exploit targets of
opportunity that present themselves to the pilots, provided the targets are
included on the commanders targeting list.

REQUEST PROCESS
10-118. Formally, the lowest command level capable of requesting aviation
support is the brigade or BTG. Battalion commanders input requests to the
brigade or BTG. However, as every commander plans and conducts combat
actions, he identifies situations where aviation attacks or DAS can be
employed to enhance mission accomplishment. The brigade or BTG AOS also
assists in nominating targets and integrating aviation into the overall
scheme of maneuver. This same procedure occurs at each level of
organization by the supporting AOS.
10-119. Air support requests from ground maneuver forces are screened at
every level of command to determine whether or not
Ground support missions can be supported while meeting strategic- or
operational-level air requirements.
The level of air support to ground forces meets operational and tactical
requirements for achieving the goals of ground battle plan.
Alternate systems (such as artillery, MRLs, or SSMs) would be more
effective to accomplish the mission.

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Air requests are supportable based on current available aircraft.

Planned airspace usage, artillery fires, and intelligence requirements
can be met.

10-120. All requests for aviation support are compiled and submitted through
AOS channels for approval by the theater and OSC commander. The DTG
commander will approve missions for rotary-wing aircraft constituent or
dedicated to his level of command. The AOS must divide the requests
between those supportable by rotary-wing assets and those supportable by
fixed-wing assets. Helicopter missions are ranked by assigned priority and
precedence, and given to the executing army aviation headquarters for
planning. Some air support requests continue on to be filled by theater or
OSC fixed-wing assets. If approved, these requests are also assigned a
priority and precedence. Requests for air support are submitted as early as
72 hours prior to the requested aircraft on-station time and no later than 24
hours prior to the start of the ASP.
10-121. Preplanned, immediate, and on-call refer to the requests themselves.
Preplanned requests are those submitted in time to be included in the
published ASP. Immediate requests fill operational or tactical requirements
that are too late to be published in the ASP. On-call mission requests do not
state a specific aircraft time-on-target. They involve aircraft placed on an
appropriate alert status and employed when requested by the supported unit.
Aircraft used to fill immediate requests may come from on-call missions
established for this purpose.
10-122. Starting at the brigade or BTG level, the CAO submits the air
support requests. He submits preplanned requests through ground command
and staff channels, or immediate requests through AOS channels. On-call
requests are transmitted by the FACs or the AOS to the division or DTG AOS
using VHF communications.
10-123. The AOS at every level is of key importance in the processing of
immediate air support requests. This type of request is primarily passed via
the FACs and AOSs to the level of command that controls the required
aircraft. If an OSC aviation unit can support the requesting ground force, it
fills the requirement. If not, the request will be passed up to the theater ASE.
Once an immediate request is approved at the theater or OSC level
(depending on the type of supporting aircraft), the ASE tasks on-call missions
or diverts scheduled missions to satisfy that request.
10-124. Once a request is approved at either theater or OSC level, it is
forwarded to the aviation unit to determine if it is supportable based on the
projected sortie generation rate and operational tempo. If disapproved at any
level, the requests are returned to the originator through AOS channels with an
explanation.
10-125. For all requests, the higher aviation command or IFC provides the
required information (including target, location, required on-station time,
and radio frequency) to the tasked unit. Each aviation unit then conducts its
own mission planning and coordinates directly with the ground maneuver
unit. The approved missions and enacted airspace procedures are
disseminated to all levels of ground and aviation commands through the ASP.

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SORTIE GENERATION
10-126. The aviation units are able to manipulate and predict to some extent
their ability to launch and sustain aircraft. This information is compiled and
forwarded up to the AOS at theater and OSC level where it is reconciled with
the commanders scheme of maneuver and the requests for air support.
There, the commander determines the number of air assets to best fit into his
plans for the operation. The decision is made how to employ all of the
available air assets to accomplish the theater or operational goals, including
support to ground forces. The resulting product is known as the maximum
sorties available in a single 24-hour period.
10-127. The OPFOR defines an aircraft sortie as a flight by one aircraft in an
air action. Across the theater, the maximum aircraft sortie rates are
determined daily incorporating many factors, at every level of organization.
Figure 10-6 contains a generic formula that holds true for both fixed- and
rotary-wing aircraft. It can incorporate many of the factors involved, which
are listed in the paragraphs following the figure.

Maximum Theoretical Sorties/Day =

(Total Aircraft Available Attrition) x Allocation x OR Rates x Aircraft Sorties/Day
An example calculation of sortie generation rate follows.

Conditions:
110 total aircraft.
10 lost yesterday through combat action.
The commander wants 40 % dedicated to DAS, 30 % to attack, and 30 % to interdiction.
OR rate today = 80 % based on logistics sustainability and maintenance posture.
Aircraft sorties/day are: 3.5 DAS, 2.0 attack, and 2.5 interdiction.

(110 10) x 40 % x 80 % x 3.5 = 112 DAS sorties today

(110 10) x 30 % x 80 % x 2.0 = 48 attack sorties today
(110 10) x 30 % x 80 % x 2.5 = 60 interdiction sorties today

Figure 9-6. Calculation of Aircraft Sorties (Example)

Total Aircraft Available

10-128. Total aircraft available, or flyable, is calculated to incorporate all
aircraft regardless of type or mission. This number can be calculated to
account for aircraft by specific mission type.

Attrition
10-129. Attritted, or non-flyable, aircraft is the number of aircraft losses
due to combat, fratricide, or irreparable enemy damage since the last sortie
generation calculation. Attritted aircraft may be returned to service for
future sortie generation cycles.

Allocation
10-130. Allocation or how flying, is the ground force commanders intent on
how sorties should be allocated to individual missions, such as interdiction,

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attack, DAS, counterair, airlift, or transport. As hostilities develop in the

region, the OPFOR balances the strategic- and operational-level goals against
the tactical air support requirements to determine how to best allocate the
aircraft to specific missions to attain the desired effect or change upon the
enemy. At the strategic level, this allows the ground commander to account
for the air objectives and ground force objectives. At the operational and
tactical levels, it allows ground force commanders to allocate percentages of
air support assets to best fit the ground scheme of maneuver.
10-131. Depending on how the OPFOR perceives the air situation, the
allocation may differ. (See Degree of Air Dominance earlier in this chapter.)
Multirole aircraft prove most valuable in considering allocation. They can
quickly and easily be tailored to perform different missions based on the
commanders needs. Commanders may also elect to keep a number aircraft as
a reserve ready to serve if needed for unexpected contingencies.

Operational Readiness Rate

10-132. The operational readiness rate (OR rate), or ready-to-fly rate, refers
to the capability of a unit, equipment, or weapon system to perform the
mission or function for which it was organized or designed. This encompasses
the ability of the OPFOR to sustain its aerial forces. Factors such as on-hand
major end items, spare part availability, scheduled aircraft maintenance,
logistics and resupply procedures, transportation capabilities, and aircraft
cannibalization and/or transfer procedures are considered. Initially, an OR
rate in excess of 85 to 90 percent is considered normal. As hostilities continue,
this rate can diminish considerably, based on the above-listed factors.

Aircraft Sorties per Day

10-133. The number of aircraft sorties each day, or turns per day, varies
with each type of aircraft and is primarily a function of mission duration and
the time required to refuel and rearm the aircraft for the next mission. This
also can incorporate the human factors of pilot-to-aircraft ratio, aircrew
availability, proficiency, endurance, and training level. It can also encompass
the availability of fuel and proper munitions for the intended mission. If the
aircraft is fueled, properly armed, and mission-ready, it cannot fly the
planned number of sorties per day without a qualified, prepared crew to man
the cockpit.
10-134. Commanders must balance their ability to regenerate their aviation
assets against their willingness to allow that ability to be degraded through
loss of assets. Planning rates allow aviation units to operate at a certain
sortie rate for a certain period of time, normally 30 days, without resupply.
Units may elect to operate in a sustain mode with a slower operational
tempo, planned maintenance, and a normal logistics flow. This allows them
to operate at a higher rate over a longer stretch of time.
10-135. Alternatively, units may elect to conduct surge operations. This is
characterized by a higher than usual operational tempo, and neglecting
preventive maintenance and scheduled services for 1 to 2 weeks. This gives
them the ability to fly more sorties than normal in a short period of time.
Compared to sustain mode, surge operations actually force a slower

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operational tempo over the long term, since more extensive maintenance
needs to be performed on these aircraft. Eventually logistics stocks are
depleted and fatigue increases. Following an extended surge, a unit must
recover by performing the maintenance that has been neglected. If the unit
returns to surge rate prior to recovery, its sortie generation capability may
continue to fall, and future recovery time increases.

AVIATION SUPPORT PLAN

10-136. The theater or OSC AOS publishes a daily document called the ASP.
This document has two parts: the air tasking order (ATO) and the airspace
coordination order (ACO). The ATO is the portion that outlines all approved
fixed-wing, rotary-wing, and UAV missions to include interdiction, attack,
DAS, counterair, reconnaissance, airlift, transport, or aerial refueling. The
ATO development process is continual and starts with requirements for air
support that are submitted as requests. These requests are changed, refined,
or reviewed at each days targeting meeting. (See Target Selection earlier in
this chapter for more information.) All requests must be finalized and
submitted no later than 24 hours prior to the beginning of the next ATO
cycle. The ATO is published 12 hours prior to going into effect, which occurs
in the early morning hours and continues for 24 hours.
10-137. To publish the ATO, the theater or OSC AOSwith the assistance of
the air army (Air Force) CP, the army aviation CP, and the theater or OSC
IFC CPreconciles air support requests from all levels of command with
sortie generation capabilities and command objectives for the allocation of air
assets to publish the ATO. Ground commanders are advised to submit
preplanned requests for on-call missions to ensure availability of sufficient
sorties with appropriate ordnance to respond to immediate air support
requests. If more aircraft are available on a given day than required for
combat operations, the excess are either assigned missions to augment the
air missions already planned or held in reserve. Conversely, if there are more
air support requests than available aircraft, missions are filled based on the
priority assigned to each request.
10-138. Once the ATO is published, it is an execution order. All published
missions occur for that 24-hour period. Ground force commanders may not
know which unit or what type of aircraft will support them, but they are
assured the support.
10-139. The second portion of the published ASP is the ACO. This is also an
execution order that delineates all positive and procedural airspace controls
enacted to best accomplish the ATO. The ACO controls the combined efforts
of all aviation assets, and missile and artillery forces. The ASP is
disseminated to all air and ground force units AOSs.
10-140. The OPFOR uses three types of air support requests to meet the
needs of ground force commanders. The names are based on the types of
request and on the timing of the air support. They are preplanned,
immediate, and on-call.

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Preplanned
10-141. DAS missions are primarily preplanned. The ground force
commander identifies the targets, times, and desired damage for the
missions. The IFC commander determines the force, size, ordnance, and
technique that can accomplish the mission. The IFC staff plans these
missions in great detail and integrates them with other forms of fire support.
The target selection process identifies possible kill zones for the application of
aviation assets. The sortie generation process coupled with the ASP cycle,
assigns aviation assets to the highest-priority missions to attack targets
allowing the ground force commander to achieve his scheme of maneuver.
Aircraft are allocated, prepared with the proper ordnance and
countermeasures, and launched to attack a target at a specific time and place
as a part of an integrated ground and air scheme of maneuver.
10-142. After ASP confirmation of preplanned requests for air support, a
ground force commander consults his IFC staff to finalize detailed plans for
the coordinated air and ground scheme of maneuver in his AOR. If they plan
to use attack helicopters, the planners coordinate directly with the army
aviation unit to ensure target deconfliction and to limit fratricide. The
planned attack allows the ground force to update targets, current enemy and
friendly situation, and disposition of enemy air defenses just prior to the
mission.
10-143. Additional detailed pre-mission planning and coordination done prior
to a preplanned mission by the ground force and the aviation force specifies
Target description and desired results.
Type and number of assets required to accomplish the mission.
Time.
Location.
Attack technique.
Ordnance required.
Communication frequencies and codes.
Approach and departure routes.
EW support.

10-144. Once airborne, the aircraft proceed to a designated checkpoint behind

friendly lines and confirm their target assignment with VTDPs controlling
their transit through the AOR to their APs. En route to the IP, the flight
receives target updates from the VTDP or the FAC.
10-145. Preplanned missions are similar for CS and CSS helicopters. Most of
the missions flown by these types of helicopters are preplanned in nature.
The lack of time-critical constraints allows the aviation unit and the
maneuver unit to conduct the greatest amount of coordination before the
mission even commences. This coordination can cover issues such as LZ/PZ
preparation, equipment preparation, pick-up and drop-off times, airspace
management, and communications. Preplanned missions also allow the
aviation units to take all possible steps to minimize risk throughout the
course of the mission.

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Immediate
10-146. Most air support missions are preplanned, but immediate missions
also are used extensively. Ground force commanders can request them
through AOS channels for inclusion in the ASP. By doing this, ground force
commanders identify general times and places where they believe air support
is required, but without finalizing the intricate details as in a preplanned
mission. An immediate mission allows the ground force commander to have
air support assets readily available to employ at a given time against targets.
This type of request is used primarily for attack aircraft. If a CS aircraft is
needed for this type of mission, it locates in the vicinity of the requesting CP
and assumes more of an on-call role.
10-147. The ASP allocates air support assets for immediate missions. Some
pre-mission planning and coordination occurs between the supported and
supporting forces to ensure aircraft survivability. Aircraft designated for
immediate missions can be airborne or on the ground at airfields. Before
takeoff, pilots are briefed on a checkpoint to proceed to, and possible target
type and location. Aircraft are prepared with the ordnance and
countermeasures for the most probable target they may encounter. As the
ground force commander decides he needs the air support to engage, he
notifies the AOS or the FAC to pass the request. The request is passed to the
attack helicopter battalions or to the fixed-wing units. See Figure 10-7 for
details on the immediate DAS request process.

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________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 10

or
1. Unit detects target.

13. Ordnance on target.

2. Commander
14. Assessment.
decides to
request DAS. 12. Aircraft depart the IP for attack.

3. Unit FAC FAC 11. FAC briefs aircraft,

passes request to controls attack.
BTG AOS.
4. DTG IFC monitors 10. VTDP tells DAS aircraft
and approves rotary-wing approaching contact point to
if available. If not, forwards contact FAC and passes any
5. OSC/theater AOS to higher. critical updates to flight lead.
coordinates with
IFC commander for
aviation assets.
Rotary-wing
Fixed-wing assets 6a. Attack helicopters
assets assigned mission
through aviation unit HQ. or
6. OSC/theater 9. VTDP
IFC commander controls aircraft
approves request transit forward.
7. Air Force unit scrambled
for fixed-wing DAS.
from supporting DAS 8. Aircraft launched or
aviation regiment HQ. diverted from holding
areas.

Figure 10-7. Immediate DAS Request Process

10-148. The aircraft are launched from airbases, or released from holding
areas. 5 The flight or formation establishes communications with the VTDP as
it moves forward. En route, the aircraft are briefed on the frequency and contact
point to establish communications with the FAC, and receive critical mission
updates. With communication established, the FAC gives them final target
designation and confirmation, and the aircraft depart the IP for the attack.
10-149. In some cases, there may be an excess of aircraft available as
compared to requested missions outlined in the ASP. Then the theater or
OSC IFC commander can establish a pool of aircraft to be available for
immediate missions if unforeseen contingencies develop. He may also
designate that multirole aircraft be configured for DAS. These extra aircraft
may be armed and prepared for generic targets and launched to holding
areas. Once in the holding area, they serve as an available asset to
subordinate ground force commanders that require immediate air support.
The ground commanders FAC requests these aircraft and briefs them on the
target en route. Sometimes the OPFOR refers to this practice as push DAS.

5
A holding area is a site (on the ground or in the air) located between airbases or FARPs and IPs that may be
occupied for short periods of time by aircraft while coordination is being made for movement to the IPs.

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On-Call
10-150. Planners may allocate aviation assets for on-call missions where the
ground force commander can time the attack at his discretion. He bases the
trigger for the attack on the enemys reaction to the OPFOR scheme of
maneuver at planned decision points. This allows him to mass his fires at
decisive places and times on the battlefield, and to refrain from employing
the attack assets if the target no longer threatens. Additionally, he may elect
to shift the assets to attack another target. If not supporting a preplanned
mission, CS and CSS helicopters assume an on-call role. By using these
methods of employment, the commander can conserve his air assets for use
when needed, or avoid the need for the ground forces to halt their attack to
wait for an unnecessary preplanned air support mission.
10-151. On-call mission requests do not state a specific aircraft time-on-
target. They involve aircraft placed on an appropriate alert status and then
employed when requested by the supported unit. Prior to the employment of
air assets, the ground force will have established communications or liaison
with the aviation unit. On cue from the ground force, the aviation unit
performs the necessary preparations to launch when the ground force
requires the air support.

READINESS CONDITIONS
10-152. The OPFOR recognizes three levels of combat readiness for fixed- and
rotary-wing aircraft and aircrews. Aviation unit CPs use these three
categories to describe varying levels of alert status or readiness conditions
and thus to guide the units to total mission preparedness for the most
probable launch execution order. Aircraft in categories one and two can be
expected to respond to on-call missions timed by the ground force
commander. Figure 10-8 lists the categories and shows their duration and
time before assets can be in the air. Based on his decision points, the ground
force commander tells the designated aviation unit when to increase the level
of readiness. Under these conditions, both parties prepare to execute the air
support mission when needed.

Category Crew and Aircraft Duration of Time

Readiness Before
Takeoff

One Aircraft are fully serviced and armed. Combat crews are briefed on 1-2 hours 3-5
their mission and are in the aircraft ready to start engines. Ground minutes
personnel are assisting the combat crews.

Two Aircraft are fully serviced and armed. Combat crews are briefed and 2-4 hours 15
are on standby in the vicinity of the aircraft, ready to take off within a minutes
specified short period of time after receiving a mission order.

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Three Aircraft are refueled and serviced. Cannons are loaded. External 2-4 days 1-2 hours
systems (bombs, rockets, missiles, fuel tanks, etc.) are not loaded.
Combat crews are designated, but not on standby; they have not
been briefed on the air and ground situation, but will be before takeoff.

Figure 10-8. Levels of Combat Readiness

10-153. Army aviation tends to operate from FARPs or holding areas. A flight
of helicopters held at the highest state of readiness should reach its target in
15 to 20 minutes; a full squadron requires up to 25 minutes. Preparation of a
follow-on attack could take as little as 15 to 20 minutes depending on the
number of helicopters involved and refuel and rearm procedures. Fixed-wing
aircraft, at the highest readiness state, should reach their target in 20 to 30
minutes after launch, since the aircraft are based further away, but travel at
much faster speeds. Ground commanders are aware of these approximate
aircraft transit times and factor them into the launch trigger.

RISK MANAGEMENT
10-154. Effective pre-mission planning and preparation are paramount to
increasing the survivability of aircraft in combat. Prior to any aviation
mission, aircrews must have a detailed intelligence picture of the battlefield.
They use this information to plan every aspect of the mission. This helps
crews to determine ingress and egress routes through gaps in enemy air
defense coverage and to plan tactical maneuvers. Similarly, they try to use
routes that afford cover and concealment from the enemy, while allowing the
protection of friendly air defense assets.

Deception and Surprise

10-155. The OPFOR emphasizes the importance of deception and surprise to
paralyze hostile air defenses and enhance aircraft survivability. Aircraft
approach target areas at the lowest permissible altitude, given weather and
terrain restrictions. They maintain minimum radio transmissions, emanating
only the minimum required communications and sensor signals. The OPFOR
exploits detected gaps in enemy radar coverage and often uses decoy flights
in advance of attacking aircraft to distract enemy air defense systems. If
more than one pass is necessary to destroy the target, attacking formations
approach the target from different directions or from bright sunlight,
minimizing air defense effectiveness, visual detection, and recognition.

Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

10-156. Whenever possible, the combined arms commander includes a plan
for SEAD. He can employ other aviation assets, artillery, MRLs, SSMs, and
EW assets to prepare the ingress and egress routes for helicopters and fixed-
wing aircraft air support missions. The entire purpose behind SEAD is to
disarm or disable enemy early warning radars and to destroy or reduce
enemy air defense assets that may come to bear on friendly aircraft. If SEAD
is employed, it precedes the approaching aircraft by 20 seconds to one
minute. SEAD may be employed along the flight route to cover areas where

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the aircraft are unprotected by terrain or friendly weapon systems. It may

also be employed to prepare the AP prior to aircraft occupation.
10-157. The effectiveness of air support may be increased through the use of
artillery to suppress enemy air defenses. Additionally, suppression of
electronic systems that provide early warning, target acquisition, fire control,
communications, and data support for air defense systems is a high priority.
Specially-equipped airborne and ground-based EW systems target both the
radar and C2 networks used by enemy air defense. Both fixed- and rotary-
wing aircraft, particularly the most advanced, employ a mix of radar warning
receivers, self-protection jammers, flares, and chaff.

FLIGHT TACTICS
10-158. To obtain the full potential desired from an air assets, different
tactics are employed by fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft. The OPFOR
prefers to employ fixed-wing aircraft more frequently on missions with
previously reconnoitered routes, fixed or semifixed targets, and greater
depths. Fixed-wing aircraft are vulnerable to ground-based air defenses when
executing ground attacks. This necessitates a low-altitude, high-speed target
approach and minimum time in the target area. Under such conditions the
pilots ability to visually acquire and properly identify the target may be
extremely limited.
10-159. The OPFOR prefers to use helicopters for time-sensitive attacks close
to friendly forces. Helicopters have reduced logistics requirements compared
to fixed-wing aircraft, allowing their deployment close to the battle zone. This
proximity enhances their ability to respond to requests for air support.
Tactically, helicopters have two advantages over fixed-wing aircraft: their
ability to maneuver relatively undetected, and systems that allow the pilots
to rapidly evaluate and react to battlefield conditions.

FIXED-WING TACTICS
10-160. Fixed-wing assets can be employed at the strategic, operational, and
tactical levels simultaneously. The tactics employed by fixed-wing assets to
support tactical ground force battles are designed to ensure aircraft
survivability in a high-threat air defense environment and provide
supporting fires to the scheme of maneuver. Fixed-wing aircraft are employed
much less often than attack helicopters to support the ground force
commander. Yet, when effectively employed, these aircraft have the ability to
give friendly forces great advantages in firepower, mobility, and shock effects.

Formations
10-161. Fixed-wing interdiction, attack, and DAS missions are usually
conducted in two-ship formations. The wingman flies in an echelon or trail
position, with lateral and vertical separation depending on terrain and enemy
air defense threat.

Low-Level Engagement Profiles

10-162. During low-level air interdiction, attack, and DAS missions, the
aircraft can employ several engagement profiles. The four discussed here

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are the 90-degree battle curve, 180-degree battle curve, attack from the
loop, and the combined looping battle curve. All four profiles begin in the
same way: the aircraft approach the target at low altitude (typically 30 to
100 m AGL) and then initiate a climb to an altitude of 500 to 2,500 m
AGL. The differences among these profiles are in where the aircraft start
the climb and how they maneuver during the climb and subsequent dive.
All four profiles end in the same way: from the altitude reached in the
climb, the aircraft dive toward the target at a 10- to 20-degree angle,
release their ordnance, and then egress the area at a high-speed, in low-
level flight.

10-163. In the 90-degree battle curve (Figure 10-9), the attacking aircraft
approach a position 3 to 8 km abeam of the target. At that point, the aircraft
initiate a 90-degree turn toward the target. As the aircraft turn, they gain
altitude. The aircraft are at the peak of their climb when they turn the full 90
degrees and should be aligned with the target.

500-2,500 m AGL

10o-20o

30-100 m AGL

3-8 km

Figure 10-9. 90-Degree Battle Curve

10-164. The 180-degree battle curve (Figure 9-11) requires the attacking
aircraft to fly at least 3 km past the target. They continue past this point for
another 10 seconds, then begin a climb while executing a sweeping 180-
degree turn. The aircraft are at the peak of their climb when they end the
turn, and should be aligned with the target.
10-165. In the attack from the loop (Figure 9-11), the aircraft execute a
climbing inside loop beginning approximately 3 km away from the target. On
the downward side of the loop, the aircraft align themselves with the target.

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

500-2,500 m AGL

10o-20o

30-100 m AGL

3 km

Figure 9-11. 180-Degree Battle Curve

500-2,500 m AGL

30-100 m AGL

Approx. 3 km

Figure 9-12. Attack from the Loop

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________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 10

10-166. Another possibility is the combined looping battle curve (Figure 9-13),
which is a combination of the loop, and the 180-degree battle curve. This
profile requires the attacking aircraft to fly at least 3 km past the target. The
aircraft will continue past this point for another 10 seconds, then begin a
climb while executing an inside loop. At the apex of the loop, the aircraft roll
level, and align with the target.

500-2,500 m AGL
10o-20o

30-100 m AGL
3 km

Figure 9-13. Combined Looping Battle Curve

Alternative DAS Engagement Profile

10-167. In addition to the four profiles used for low-level interdiction, attack,
and DAS missions, DAS missions can follow another engagement profile,
possibly starting from a higher altitude. In this profile, the attacking aircraft
fly a non-evasive approach toward the target. Once the aircraft are within
1,500 m of the target, they dive toward the target at a 10 to 20-degree angle,
release their ordnance, and execute evasive maneuvers (varying airspeed
and altitudes while using available terrain for cover) to exit the target
area.

ROTARY-WING TACTICS
10-168. Many of the tactics and techniques used by the OPFOR are similar to
tactics employed worldwide. Helicopter design dictates the capabilities and
limitations of each aircraft and, to a large extent, their employment. Some
minor variations among models can cause similarly designed helicopters to
differ in hovering capabilities, cargo and load capacities, and employment
characteristics.

Flight Modes
10-169. All OPFOR helicopters can employ any of three differing flight modes:
nap-of-the earth (NOE), contour, or low-level. See Figure 9-14.

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

Low-Leve l

Conto ur

NOE

Low-Leve l

Conto ur

NOE

Figure 9-14. Helicopter Flight Modes

10-170. Nap-of-the-Earth. NOE is flown at varying airspeeds and altitudes

as close to the earths surface as possible while following the contours of the
terrain. It is a weaving flight path that orients along the axis of movement
and takes advantage of terrain masking.
10-171. Contour. This mode is flown at relatively low altitudes conforming
generally to the contours of the terrain. The flight is characterized by varying
altitudes and varying airspeed. This mode of flight is most often employed
with helicopters offering limited maneuverability. Because altitudes are
higher than NOE, aircrews are able to fly at higher airspeeds to reduce
exposure times. The aircraft may begin in support zones at contour altitudes
and then reduce altitude and airspeed to NOE flight as the probability of
enemy contact increases.
10-172. Low-Level. This mode is flown at low altitude, with constant
heading, airspeed, and altitude to facilitate speed and ease of movement
while minimizing detection. It is used only in areas where enemy contact is
not likely.

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Attack Helicopter Employment

10-173. Employment of attack helicopters varies according to scheme of
maneuver and the desired results in an attack. Ground force commanders
may elect to subdivide helicopter units and employ them at varying strengths
as needed. This allows for longer asset employment and accounts for
variations in strength of asset coverage. For example, if an attack helicopter
battalion has 20 attack aircraft, it may be arranged in five companies of four
aircraft each (assuming that the unit has not been attritted and has no
aircraft that are in scheduled maintenance). Any number of companies may
be employed on a mission.
10-174. The battalion commander typically employs his aircraft as companies,
unless conditions dictate employment as a battalion. Subordinate company
commanders decide employment within the companies. They may choose
employment as a company or in pairs. The OPFOR categorizes these
employment methods as maximum, alternating, and continual. (See Figure 9-
15.) The descriptions below apply to the employment of a battalion;
however, with minor adjustment they also apply to employment of
companies.

Maximum

FARP
or
Holding Area

Alternating

FARP
or
Holding Area

Continual

FARP
or
Holding Area
= Represents one company of an attack helicopter battalion

Figure 9-15. Helicopter Employment

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

10-175. Maximum. The entire helicopter force is launched simultaneously to

different APs to produce a great force multiplier and shock effect for the
OPFOR to rapidly defeat the enemy. The aircraft remain in the APs as long
as their fuel and ammunition last, and as long as they are afforded the
security of friendly air defense coverage. This employment method allows the
OPFOR a great advantage in the battle, yet it removes supporting aviation
assets from the battle for several hours after they attack, since they must
return to rear areas for refueling and rearming. This high number of aircraft
requiring service at the FARP at the same time places a heavy demand on
the logistics system.
10-176. Alternating. The alternating method allows for some helicopter
companies to attack the target, while the others wait in a holding area or at
the FARP. For example, as the two companies engaging the enemy begin to
break contact, the third and fourth fly in to continue the attack. As the latter
leave station, they are replaced by the fifth company to continue the attack,
but at a diminished rate. The alternating method allows the OPFOR to
achieve a moderate amount of shock effects and force multiplier initially, but
it allows for a longer engagement than the maximum method. This method
also does not strain the logistics system as much. Therefore, the aircraft
serviced at the FARP have the potential to return to the battle quicker and
replace the company or companies in the AP.
10-177. Continual. The continual method employs only one helicopter
company at any given time. While one company is in the AP, another is
waiting in a holding area to replace it, a third is waiting in the FARP, and
the other two flights are in transit between any two of the points. As the first
breaks contact to return to the FARP, the others rotate forward. One moves
in to continue the attack, while another assumes its position in the
deployment area. This method allows the OPFOR the opportunity to keep
constant pressure on the enemy with supporting aviation assets. It places
little strain on the operation of the FARP, so individual companies can expect
a quick turnaround time. This method allows the engagement to continue
indefinitely, based only on the logistics capabilities to resupply the FARP,
and the fatigue of the aircrews.

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Attack Helicopter Formations

10-178. Attack helicopters utilize several formations in the attack, and the
OPFOR stresses their use in flights consisting of companies or pairs. The
most common formations used are line abreast, echelon (left or right), or trail.
See Figure 9-16 for examples of these formations.
10-179. In any of the three formations, separation between aircraft can be up
to 90 m horizontally. Altitude may vary by up to 10 m between helicopters in
a pair. Separation between pairs in trail can be up to 20 to 40 seconds, and
vertical separation between pairs can vary from 100 to 300 m. Separation
depends on terrain, visibility, aircrew proficiency, and the enemy air defense
threat.

Trail

20-40 sec.
Up to 90 m

Echelon (Right)

30o 30o

Line Abreast

Not to Scale

Figure 9-16. Attack Helicopter Formations

10-180. Once the FAC provides the flight with target location, the flight
commander executes attack control. Inbound to the AP from the IP, he orders
the appropriate formation, divides the target, assigns individual target
sectors, and determines the movement technique and engagement profile.

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

Movement Techniques
10-181. Approaching the AP from the IP, the flight commander may employ
movement techniques based on the likelihood of enemy contact. The
techniques are traveling, traveling overwatch, and bounding overwatch. 6 See
Figure 9-17 for additional clarification.

Traveling
1. Both aircraft move simultaneously
and continuously at low-level altitudes.
2. Aircraft fly at constant altitude.
3. Aircraft move at constant rate of speed.

Traveling Overwatch
1. Lead aircraft moves continuously
at contour altitudes at constant speed.
2. Trail aircraft moves as necessary
to overwatch the lead aircraft.

Bounding Overwatch
1. Both aircraft fly at contour or NOE
altitudes at low airspeed.
2. Only one aircraft moves at a time.
3. Each moves into a new position under
the protection of the trailing aircraft.

Figure 9-17. Helicopter Movement Techniques

Engagement Techniques
10-182. OPFOR engagement techniques, like much of the helicopter doctrine
and employment techniques used worldwide, are based on the capabilities
and performance of the aircraft and the ordnance they carry. The flight
commander selects the appropriate engagement profile for his flight as
determined by the situation. Either a hovering fire or a running fire is
employed. The design of some helicopters makes them more conducive to the
6
The traveling overwatch and bounding overwatch techniques can be used by all armed helicopters, not just attack
helicopters.

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________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 10

employment of the hovering technique, versus other helicopters that may

require a running technique. Even two of the exact same model helicopters
flying similar profiles under the same atmospheric conditions may perform
differently based on gross weight. One may be able to hover because of a
lighter fuel load and no cargo. However, the other may have a full fuel tank
and be loaded to its maximum gross weight. This would cause the latter
helicopter to require a running attack technique.
10-183. Hover Fire. The OPFOR employs hover fire (Figure 9-18) in the
attack if the capabilities of the aircraft allow. APs are chosen so that
surrounding terrain provides cover and concealment for attack helicopters.
They should also afford good, unrestricted fields of fire as the OPFOR
attempts to engage the enemy at the maximum effective range of its
weapons. These APs are near the ground forces, within the range of friendly
air defense assets, and within range of friendly artillery. In the defense, the
OPFOR prefers this technique, rather than running fire, and chooses APs to
provide flanking fire on advancing enemy formations.

Moving Hover Fire Stationary Hover Fire

(ATGM) (ATGM)

50-80 m
10-40 m
5-10 m 50-80 m 5-10 m 10-40 m

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 km 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 km

0-30 km/h 0-10 km/h

Moving Hover Fire

(Rocket/Gun)

10-40 m
50-80 m
5-10 m
Target

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 km

0-30 km/h
Not to Scale

Figure 9-18. Hover Fire Profiles

10-184. In the APs, the aircraft form into the attack pair, and mask
themselves behind covering terrain. They unmask vertically or horizontally,
fire their ordnance, and then remask. Based on a quick battle damage
assessment, the FAC then directs the aircraft to engage the enemy again or
to disengage. Because the AP was compromised, standard practice is to move
to another location within the AP or to an alternate AP before firing again.

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

10-185. In hover fire, the helicopter may either be stationary or moving

slightly. In either case, the pilot must keep the aircraft stable, for most
accurate delivery of ordnance. In moving hover fire, the helicopter
deliberately makes horizontal movement, which may be in any direction.
However, movement is always below effective translational lift airspeed. The
pilot can allow the helicopter to drift with the wind, if the threat situation
and terrain permit.
10-186. If their weapons afford them a greater standoff range than enemy air
defense systems can range, attack helicopters may not be concerned about
masking. This allows them to employ their ordnance at the maximum range
capable, and with a clearer shot at the target. These conditions also facilitate
use of stationary hover fire.
10-187. Running Fire. If not employing a static AP with hover fire, attack
helicopters can perform an attack using running fire (Figure 9-19). They can
attack as a company or break down into pairs. Both simultaneous and
successive attacks can be conducted from either one or two directions
depending on the situation and target area.

Running Fire Running Fire

(ATGM) (Rocket/Gun)
20o 20o

10-40 m
< 60 m 10-40 m < 60 m
Target

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 km 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 km

90-185 90-280 km/h 90-185 90-280 km/h

km/h km/h
Not to Scale

Figure 9-19. Running Fire Profiles

10-188. The running fire profile is flown with an altitude that is terrain-
dependant and is characterized by an increase in altitude prior to weapons
release in order to acquire line of sight to the target. Airspeed varies between
90 and 280 km/h. The forward airspeed during running fire adds stability to
the helicopter and thus increases the accuracy of ordnance delivery,
especially for rockets. The dive to engage the target also results in fewer rotor
down-wash effects on munitions, further increasing accuracy.
10-189. Engagements using running fire begin with a high-speed, low-
altitude run using one of the movement techniques from the IP to the AP.
The flight commander selects an IP about 8 to 10 km from the target. The IP
is typically an easily identifiable terrain feature along the desired route to
the target. Beginning at the IP, the helicopters move toward the target,
usually at contour altitudes, using terrain to mask the approach. Once the
AP is reached, the flight commander directs the helicopters to climb and
acquire the target. When the target is identified, the helicopters execute a

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shallow dive toward the target and engage it. Depending on the range of the
weapon system to be used for the engagement, they may level off for a short
distance, between acquiring the target and beginning a dive toward the
target.
10-190. The distance at which the helicopters begin the dive and begin firing
depends on the type of ordnance to be used. The helicopters begin firing
during the dive, as they reach the most effective range for their munitions.
The wingman maintains his position during the firing run and releases his
ordnance simultaneously with the lead. The running fire profile can be used
for delivery of either guided or unguided munitions.
10-191. For firing guns or delivering unguided rockets, helicopter pairs
acquire the target and enter a shallow dive, not exceeding 20 degrees, along
the attack heading. For delivery of fire from guns, the dive may begin about 1
km to 1.5 km from the target and the helicopters begin firing. For firing
rockets, the dive might begin from 1 to 5 km from the target, depending on
the range of the rockets used. The wingman generally maintains an echelon
position behind the lead, and both aircraft fire their guns and/or rockets,
disengaging as soon as the ordnance is expended. Disengaging the firing run
features a descending turn in an attempt to remask. The disengagement turn
is away from the wingman. This maneuver allows multiple pairs to attack the
same target, with each pair covering the disengagement maneuvers of the
preceding pair. Timing between pairs can be as little as 15 seconds, but is
normally 20 to 30 seconds. The timing is dependent on the overall threat to
helicopters, and their ability to cycle sorties into the target area. Total
exposure time from attack initiation to remasking averages 15 to 30 seconds,
dependant on whether the target location is known or the pilots must search
before acquiring.
10-192. The running fire profile can also be used when employing ATGMs,
but with some modifications. Altitude on the approach may vary with terrain,
but usually is within a contour flight mode. During the pass, the pilot
initiates the approach, while the weapons operator attempts to visually
acquire the target and gain line of sight for the weapon system. Once the
target is acquired, the helicopter must be kept on a stable flight path as the
weapons operator tracks the target and fires the ATGM. Firing usually
occurs from 2 to 8 km away from the target, depending on ATGM carried.
After launch, the helicopter must remain stable to keep the target within the
constraints of the operators sights to maintain line-of-sight with the target.
Minimum aircraft exposure times, at missile maximum effective ranges, can
be up to 25 seconds depending on type of missile.
10-193. At the end of the firing run (regardless of the types of munitions
delivered), all aircraft break off and dive down and away from the target
area, leaving at minimum altitude and using terrain masking. The FAC then
directs the aircraft to return to the same AP, a different AP, the IP, a holding
area, or a refueling point. If more than one pass is needed, helicopters may
approach from another direction, or from the sun, to hinder visual
identification. This type of attack is normally conducted during daylight. Yet,
attacks using this technique can be conducted with the use of flares during
darkness or periods of limited visibility if the target is illuminated. Target

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

identification and engagement distances are shorter when using this

technique at night.

CS and CSS Helicopter Employment

10-194. Combat support and CSS helicopters primarily perform preplanned
missions to support the ground force commander. In this role, these
helicopters are employed individually or in pairs across the width and depth
of the battlefield, but primarily in the support zones, to perform their
individual missions as required. If they are flying in areas where enemy
contact is likely, they operate with attack helicopter escort.
10-195. The CS and CSS helicopters fly to an LZ/PZ established by the
ground force unit. It is carefully planned to ensure a landing area clear of
debris and with minimal slope. The takeoff and landing direction is into the
wind, and landing spots within the LZ/PZ are carefully marked to allow
proper spacing and safe operating distances between aircraft. The marked
sites should allow for both larger and smaller helicopters to maneuver in the
LZ/PZ without their rotor downwash interfering with the operation of each
other.
10-196. An airfield or LZ/PZ without an air traffic controller would have an
assigned air-to-air radio frequency. Inbound flights make a call on that
frequency approximately 10 km away. In this radio call, the flight
commander states his intentions, requests information on the wind direction
and the established landing direction, and passes all pertinent information:
number of aircraft, formation used, and loads carried. If other aircraft are
already operating in the LZ/PZ, they return the call stating their intentions,
size of helicopter, and their location and number within the LZ/PZ. They also
notify the incoming flight of the landing direction in use, and the inbound
flight adopts the same procedures.
10-197. Similarly, if the helicopter or flight is arriving at a specific units
LZ/PZ, the flight or formation leader makes an initial radio call to the ground
force point of contact on a predetermined frequency upon entering the AOR.
Another radio call is made 3 to 5 km away from the LZ/PZ. If there are no
other aircraft operating in the vicinity, the flight commander or flight leader
states his intended landing direction. Once communication is established
with the ground force and landing is assured, the aircraft requests a
frequency change from the VTDP, and continues with no positive air traffic
control into the LZ/PZ.
10-198. On takeoff, similar procedures are followed. The flight commander
announces his intentions to taxi and takeoff. If operating alone in the LZ/PZ,
he can set his own procedures. If operating in conjunction with other aircraft,
he uses the procedures already in effect. Another radio call is made to notify
the LZ/PZ traffic the flight is clear of the LZ/PZ. The aircraft or flight lead
then reports when leaving the ground forces units AOR.

WEATHER AND NIGHT CAPABILITIES

10-199. Some OPFOR aircraft possess limited aerial night and adverse
weather capabilities. Night-vision goggles or night systems are not regularly
employed, yet the OPFOR continually improves techniques for air support

10-44
________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 10

operations in bad weather and at night. Although most aircraft are equipped
for navigation during darkness and limited visibility, they are not equipped
well enough to perform their tactical mission the same as if it were daylight.
Night systems, infrared radar, or avionics upgrades are readily available for
procurement on the open market. Regardless of modern systems capabilities,
the OPFOR still expects pilots to navigate by land, search for targets
visually, and determine distances to targets. The effectiveness of air support
depends on the ability of aircrews to positively identify targets in prevailing
weather and light conditions.
10-200. The OPFOR realizes that system upgrades and improvements are
financially more attainable and easier to procure in smaller numbers. It also
understands that every aircraft in the inventory does not require the
modification. Similarly equipped units or higher-capability aircraft working
in conjunction with unimproved aircraft can still present a definitive edge to
OPFOR aviation and the ground force commander. Even a limited number of
upgraded aircraft may have a significant impact on the battle.
10-201. Currently, flights in poor weather or at night are primarily conducted
by helicopters, since they are routinely employed in marginal weather
conditions, well below those acceptable to fixed-wing aircraft. They navigate
through the use of instruments. This forces air assets to fly at a higher
altitude and at slower airspeeds. Although this allows the OPFOR to
accomplish missions in less than ideal conditions, it exposes the aircraft to
greater danger. They are no longer afforded the cover and concealment of
terrain, and may be unsupported by direct fire coverage from friendly ground
force units.
10-202. Older or unmodified OPFOR aircraft are not likely to have any night-
fighting capabilities without the aid of artificial illumination. Artificial
illumination is still not adequate to fire ATGMs using day-only visual
sighting, although guns and rockets can be effective under these conditions. If
employed, illumination (flares or illuminating rounds) is fired from artillery
or aerial platforms to assist friendly forces in engaging the enemy during
periods of darkness or limited visibility.
10-203. The use of precision munitions offers a higher probability of the
ordnance hitting the target than conventional projectiles or rockets that have
ballistic trajectories. Precision munitions may be used for surgical air attacks
in minimal weather conditions against targets like bridges, small targets
(weapon emplacements or armored vehicles), and specific buildings. External
stores racks may allow OPFOR aircraft to carry precision munitions, yet most
aircraft do not have the systems to aim or deliver these weapons to hit their
intended targets. The munitions must be guided by other ground-based
sources. Newer or recently modified aircraft may be able to deliver precision
munitions in bad weather or at night.

10-45
 Chapter 11

Air Defense Support

The OPFOR system of air defense includes the strategic, operational, and
tactical levels. This chapter concentrates on tactical-level air defense. It
discusses operational-level air defense when it contributes to an under-
standing of tactical air defense and the relationship between the two.
More detailed information on air defense at the strategic and operational
level can be found in FM 7-100.1. The goal of the tactical air defense sys-
tem is to reduce the effectiveness of enemy air attacks preventing enemy
air action from disrupting the activities of ground forces.

AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM

11-1. Air defense effectively supports the concept and requirements of com-
bined arms combat. A large number and variety of weapons and associated
equipment integrated into a redundant air defense system best accomplish
air defense.

CONCEPTS
11-2. OPFOR air defense doctrine emphasizes two key and interrelated con-
cepts. The first is that air defense is an integral part of combined arms com-
bat. The maneuver unit commander who disregards the enemy air threat or
fails to properly plan for defending against it risks mission failure.
11-3. The second concept is that air defense weapons, radars, and associated
equipment cannot be regarded as single pieces of equipment or even units
engaged in combat actions but as parts of an integrated system of air defense.
Proper integration of these assets as both a system and integral part of mis-
sion planning and execution for mission accomplishment is the ideal way the
commander can effectively deal with the enemy air threat.
11-4. Against a regional neighbor the OPFOR has confidence that it can ef-
fectively conduct a totally integrated air defense; however, it also recognizes
that it is unlikely to be able to defend its entire airspace in the event of ex-
traregional intervention. Fundamentally, the OPFOR accepts that it may not
be able to employ a nationally integrated air defense system against a mod-
ern extraregional force. Thus the OPFOR is prepared to adapt its air defense
operations and tactics to employ integrated air defense at sector levels. At
sector level units may be hard-wired and do not require as large a footprint
physically and electronically.
11-5. In choosing to fight within sectors, the OPFOR accepts risks, in that air
defense sectors present seams in the defenses and may be unable to provide
mutual support. On the other hand sector defense porvides three descrete
benefits: facilitating passive air defense, reducing the signature of defensive

11-1
Draft FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) __________________________________________________________

systems, and enabling the OPFOR to mass air defense assets from dispersed
sites to protect the most critical targets. The OPFOR also employs passive
air defense techniques including dispersal, deception, and camouflage. To
the exent possible,it disperses high value assets.

PHASES
11-6. Essential to integration and successful employment at the strategic and
operational level is the use of three phases. The first includes all actions
taken to destroy enemy aircraft before they are employed. Aviation, surface-
to-surface missiles (SSM), special-purpose forces (SPF), affiliated organiza-
tions, and artillery are used to destroy air command and control (C2) facili-
ties, aviation support facilities, and the enemys aircraft while they are still
on the ground. This phase is conducted using primarily strategic and opera-
tional assets of the Army and the Air Force. The second phase aims at de-
stroying enemy aircraft while in flight and before they enter the airspace over
OPFOR ground maneuver forces. Again this mission is performed primarily
at the strategic and operational levels. Interceptor aircraft and long- and me-
dium-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) conduct this phase of the air de-
fense. The third phase entails the destruction of enemy aircraft that have
penetrated into the airspace over OPFOR ground maneuver forces. Tactical
fighters, short- to medium-range SAMs, antiaircraft (AA) guns, and other
weapons of the ground maneuver units execute this phase. It is in this phase
that ground-based tactical air defense plays its primary role. The objective is
to deny enemy aviation the ability to interfere with ground maneuver units.
Air defense forces can accomplish this either by destroying enemy aircraft or
by forcing them to expend their munitions beyond effective range or diverting
their aircraft before reaching their targets.

PRINCIPLES
11-7. The OPFOR follows several basic principles when conducting air de-
fense: surprise, firepower, mobility, continuity, initiative, coordination, and
security. Of these, the element of surprise is the most critical.

Surprise
11-8. Achieving surprise is fundamental to any successful air defense battle.
At the tactical level, surprise can be achieved through a variety of means.
The positioning of air defense systems in unexpected locations; the use of
camouflage, concealment, cover and deception (C3D), and the use of non-air
defense systems in conjunction with air defense systems can all be important
in creating the element of surprise.

Firepower
11-9. The OPFOR force structure includes a wide variety of air defense
weapons (both missiles and guns). This mix of capabilities gives ground force
commanders outstanding firepower for air defense. It is important that air
defense planning consider and employ all assets available, across all arms to
achieve maximum firepower.

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________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 11

Mobility
11-10. When planning air defense, the commander must always consider the
mobility of air defense weapons and the time required for their deployment.
The ground forces, for which air defenses provide cover, are quite mobile and
frequently change formation as they deploy. The air enemy is mobile and can
attack from many directions or altitudes. Therefore, the commander must use
to the maximum the mobility and firepower of his assets, creating optimum
groupings and fire plans. Tactical dispersion of ground maneuver forces has
become increasingly important and the commander must take this require-
ment into consideration when assigning missions and deploying air defense
assets.

Continuity
11-11. Air defense forces must provide continuous protection of critical or-
ganizations and assets. Only constantly moving air defense units that have
adequate logistics support can ensure comprehensive coverage. They must
provide air defense day or night in all weather conditions. Mobility contrib-
utes directly to continuity.

Initiative
11-12. The modern battlefield is a fluid and volatile environment where air
defense unit commanders must respond to constant changes in the situation.
This demands aggressive action, initiative, and originality. Commanders
must operate efficiently when communications with other air defense units
fail. If the supported unit receives a modified mission, the commander must
reevaluate his own units deployment in light of the new requirements. He
also must be aware of changes in the tactics enemy air forces employ.

Coordination
11-13. The OPFOR stresses coordination between supported maneuver and
supporting air defense units, between air defense units, and with other arms.
It views air defense as a single system composed of various parts. All tactical-
level air defense weapons must coordinate precisely with flanking units, with
operational-level air defense, and with aviation. Failure to coordinate can re-
sult in gaps where they are not wanted, excessive ammunition expenditure,
and casualties to friendly air forces.

Security
11-14. The OPFOR recognizes that enemy air assets can attack from any
quarter. Therefore, it must provide security for units at any depth and from
any direction. Air defense must function with unremitting reliability and
overall security. This requires careful deployment, uninterrupted ammuni-
tion supply, and a comprehensive early warning system. Commanders must
factor security into air defense planning.

ASSETS
11-15. The OPFOR inventory of ground-based air defense weapons includes a
variety of missiles, guns, and support equipment. The OPFOR has an admin-
istrative force structure that manages its military forces in peacetime. This

11-3
Draft FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) __________________________________________________________

force structure is the aggregate of various military headquarters, facilities

and installations designed to man, train and equip the forces. In peacetime
forces are commonly grouped for administrative purposes into army groups,
armies, or corps at the operational level and into divisions or separate bri-
gades at the tactical level. In wartime these administrative headquarters
serve as force providers during the creation of fighting headquarters. Espe-
cially at the operational level, and often at the higher tactical levels, the
OPFORs go-to-war structures can differ from the administrative force struc-
ture. Other parts of the administrative force structure consist of assets cen-
trally controlled at the national or theater level, such as the national-level
Air Defense Forces under the Air Force.

Administrative Force Structure

11-16. There are air defense weapons at every organizational level from army
group through maneuver company. The OPFOR has large numbers of surveil-
lance and target acquisition radars. The majority of air defense surveillance
radars are concentrated above the tactical level. Since OPFOR air defense is
so closely integrated at various levels of command, it is difficult to discuss air
defense assets without some examination of those systems in the army
groups, armies, or corps of the administrative force structure.
11-17. Regardless of the number of armies or corps, an army group will nor-
mally include an early warning regiment or brigade, two long-range SAM
brigades, an air defense division, and an air defense jamming regiment. The
air defense divisions structure, that is the number of SAM brigades and AA
gun regiments it will have, corresponds directly to the number of armies and
corps assigned to the army group.
11-18. Armies contain a long-range SAM brigade and an early warning bat-
talion while the corps has the long-range SAM brigade but no early warning
battalion. See the applicable OPFOR organization guide for more information
regarding air defense assets at army and corps level. In time of war and de-
pendent on the mission, these assets would normally be allocated to opera-
tional strategic commands (OSCs).

Operational-Strategic Commands
11-19. The OSC is the OPFORs primary operational organization. It is to
these operational-level headquarters, activated during time of war, that
forces are allocated from the administrative force structure. Most of the air
defense organizations located at army group, army or Corps level will nor-
mally but, not always, be found at OSC level. It is also at this level that air
defense, would be able to use joint assets of the Army and the Air Force.

Divisions
11-20. Most maneuver divisions contain a SAM regiment. The regiment is
fully capable of providing air defense coverage for the entire division. Divi-
sions can be assigned to create task-organized division tactical groups
(DTGs). When this occurs, consideration must be given to allocating addi-
tional air defense assets to insure protection of the augmented force. In some
situations the DTG may be allocated assets normally associated with opera-
tional-level organizations.

11-4
________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 11

Divisional and Separate Brigades

11-21. Divisional maneuver brigades contain organic air defense assets. They
may also have additional assets within their assigned battalions. Like the di-
vision, brigades may be task organized as brigade tactical groups (BTGs) and
may require additional air defense assets to protect newly allocated units. A
brigades or BTG can serve as detachments to perform a specific offensive
mission and the organization of its air defense assets requires careful consid-
eration in light of that mission. Separate brigades typically contain a more
robust capability than divisional brigades, even without augmentation.

Battalions
11-22. Maneuver battalions may or may not have organic air defense assets.
Battalions, like brigades, can serve as detachments to perform a specific of-
fensive mission. When assigning air defense assets to battalions or brigades
designated detachments, planners need to pay special attention to the com-
mand and support relationship they assign (see Chapter 2).

Tactical Level Assets

11-23. Tactical-level air defense includes short- and medium-range SAMs,
short-range AA guns, and shoulder-fired SAMs. Tactical air defense assets
may also include some combination AA gun and missile systems, offering
added flexibility. The OPFORs tactical air defenses support the need to pro-
tect ground forces and the desire to seize any opportunity to shoot down high-
visibility (flagship) enemy airframes.
11-24. The OPFOR believes that every soldier with a shoulder-fired SAM is
an air defense firing unit. The small size and easy portability of these sys-
tems provides the opportunity for ambush of enemy airframes operating in
any area near OPFOR units. The OPFOR could also employ them to set traps
for enemy helicopters in an attempt to bring down what it perceives to be an
enemy flagship system.
11-25. Throughout maneuver units, there are a number of systems designed
for air defense and other systems that can be used in an air defense role. The
heavy AA machineguns on tanks are specifically designed for air defense.
Machineguns on APCs and automatic cannon on IFVs can engage both
ground and air targets. Some antitank guided missiles (ATGMs) can be effec-
tive against low-flying rotary-wing aircraft. Field artillery and small arms
can also be integral parts of the air defense scheme.
11-26. Radar-controlled self-propelled AA guns can fire on the move. Aside
from short-range air defense, they also can be employed against all but the
heaviest of enemy ground force systems, as well as against personnel, with
devastating effects.
11-27. A variety of relatively new systems, which significantly enhance air
defense capabilities, have entered the OPFOR inventory. These include but
are not limited to remote helicopter infared (IR) sensing devices and passive
acoustic acquisition systems. Anti-helicopter mines are widely available and
increase the OPFOR ability to deny firing positions and landing sites to en-
emy rotary-wing aircraft.

11-5
Draft FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) __________________________________________________________

11-28. The OPFOR also recognizes that air defense is a combined arms effort.
The use of artillery in conjunction with anti-helicopters mines against attack
helicopter firing postions is just one example of this approach. The OPFOR
continuosly looks for new and adaptive ways of employing not only air de-
fense systems but also systems not traditionally associated with air defense.
(See the All Arms Air Defense portion of Chapter 5.) It attempts to adapt
these systems and develop new tactics which may help to fill the void when a
specific capability is denied by a more sophisticated enemy.

NONLETHAL AIR DEFENSE ASSETS

11-29. The OPFOR also uses nonlethal air defense-related systems, such as
air defense jammers and radar corner reflectors, it sees the employment of
such systems a potential combat multiplier, when employed in conjunction
with SAM and AA gun systems.

Air Defense Jammers

11-30. OPFOR operational-level commands can have air defense jamming
units. These units employ a variety of radar and communications jamming
and target acquisition systems. Electronic intercept systems provide target-
ing information to the jammers.
11-31. Air defense jammers target the onboard emitters of enemy aircraft
used for terrain-following, navigation, and radar-aided bombing, as well as
airborne radar reconnaissance systems. The goal of jamming these systems is
twofold. The primary goal is to force the attacking enemy aircraft to alter
their flight profile, bringing them into the targeting umbrella of SAMs or AA
guns. Jamming the terrain-following radars or radar altimeters employed by
attacking aircraft does this by forcing low-flying aircraft to gain altitude. The
secondary goal is to cause the aircraft to miss their target or abort the mis-
sion through the disruption of radar-aided bombing and target acquisition
systems.
11-32. The OPFOR deploys air defense jamming assets, in conjunction with
lethal systems, to defend what the OPFOR has identified as high-value as-
sets. Examples of these include air bases, major logistics centers, critical lines
of communication (LOCs) and choke points, and higher-level military com-
mand posts (CPs).

Corner Reflectors
11-33. Passive systems such as radar corner reflectors provide a low-cost and
effective addition to expensive air defense jammers. These systems can de-
ceive enemy airborne surveillance and target acquisition radars by providing
false or multiple targets. Corner reflectors can also mask or distort radar ref-
erence points.

GPS Jammers
11-34. The OPFOR also can employ low-cost GPS jammers to disrupt aircraft
navigation and precision munitions targeting. GPS jammers are also effective
against cruise missiles.

11-6
________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 11

PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE MEASURES

11-35. In addition to active air defense, the OPFOR practices a variety of
passive air defense measures, particularly use of camouflage, concealment,
cover, and deception (C3D).
11-36. When conducting actions against a superior foe, the OPFOR must seek
to operate on the margins of enemy technology and maneuver during periods
of reduced exposure. Sophisticated camouflage, deception, decoy, or mockup
systems can degrade the effects of enemy systems.

Camouflage, Concealment, Cover, and Deception

11-37. The OPFOR emphasizes the use of natural terrain and vegetation,
camouflage netting and other artificial materials, smokescreens, and decoy
equipment to provide C3D. Deception includes dummy positions and decoys.
The OPFOR can use quick-setup, high-fidelity decoys; derelict vehicles; radar
emitter decoys; quick-hardening foams; and many other types of manufac-
tured and field-expedient means. It also employs simple heat sources to con-
fuse infrared sensors and weapons seekers.
11-38. The dispersion measures discussed below should be employed with
consideration of the protective and screening properties of natural and artifi-
cial screens, and would be combined with thermal camouflage and engineer
preparation of positions. Natural screens consist of vegetation, terrain folds,
populated areas, and local features or objects. Artificial screens include cam-
ouflage nets that would enhance natural screens, and radar-opaque screens
using local features, radar nets, metallic nets, and corner reflectors. Con-
cealment would be combined with the use of dummy positions, using decoy
equipment and activities. Like real positions, dummy positions would be
changed periodically. Dummy emitters and jammers would be used to attract
enemy reconnaissance and targeting.

Maneuver and Dispersal

11-39. Maneuver and dispersal of air defense assets, both emitters and other
types of equipment, is important for their survival in both combat and march
formations. Sudden maneuver and periodic changes of position are simple
and effective means to counter enemy reconnaissance and precision weapons;
these measures are planned and implemented at the tactical level.
11-40. All, or only a portion of, the elements of air defense units may maneu-
ver to alternate positions, depending on such factors as the degree of air
threat, time of day, and meteorological conditions. The first elements to shift
positions are those that have performed combat alert duty for an extended
period, or that have been deployed in the position they currently occupy since
before the onset of combat. The optimum configuration for shifting to alter-
nate positions involves no more than one-third of the assets of a given unit
shifting at one time, to maintain adequate air defense coverage.
11-41. The OPFOR uses certain rules of thumb for distances related to dis-
persion and distances of air defense units from supported units and from the
battle line. The OPFOR recognizes that these distances vary with the situa-
tion and the threat. Of special concern is the enemy ATGM and precision
weapon capability. If it is high, the OPFOR increases the spacing between

11-7
Draft FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) __________________________________________________________

SAM launchers and the distances of air defense systems from the battle line.
Ideally, the degree of dispersal for units would be the same whether the en-
emy is employing conventional or precision weapons or even tactical nuclear
weapons. A general rule for the degree of dispersion is that the enemy strike
should not destroy two adjacent units simultaneously. A maximum of one-
third of a unit should be vulnerable to a single precision weapon or nuclear
strike.

AIR DEFENSE SECURITY

11-42. Other measures taken to improve air defense system security include
the following:
Signals security. SAM and AA gun system radars, which move for-
ward to cover the initial assault, remain silent until after the assault
begins.
Frequency spread. Each of the air defense systems operates within
separate radar frequency bands. (No one jamming system could oper-
ate simultaneously against all bands.)
Frequency diversity. Tracking and guidance radars change frequen-
cies to overcome jamming.
Multiple and interchangeable missile guidance systems. Some
OPFOR systems work on pulsed radar; others work on continuous
waves. Some radar tracking systems also possess optical tracking for
continued operations in a high electronic counter-measure (ECM) envi-
ronment; others systems use infrared homing.
Mobility. All OPFOR tactical air defense systems and most opera-
tional-level systems are mobile. They can quickly change positions af-
ter firing or after enemy reconnaissance units detect them.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

11-43. It is the intent for air defense forces at all levels of command to create
a continuous, unbroken umbrella of air defense coverage. An integrated
communications system is established to provide target information and
early warning to air defense and ground maneuver units. Integration is both
vertical and horizontal. Vertical integration is between the strategic, opera-
tional and tactical levels, while horizontal integration is within each of these
levels. Enemy capabilities may present a situation where a totally integrated
system at the strategic and or operational level is neither possible nor even
desirable (see FM 7-100.1) At the tactical level, the commander normally
strives to achieve horizontal integration. His ability to integrate or be inte-
grated vertically will depend on the air defense course of action taken at the
next-higher level. Commanders should be flexible and prepared to use non-
standard solutions to prevent gaps from developing during combat.

CENTRALIZATION VERSUS DECENTRALIZATION

11-44. Air defense C2 relationships are subject to conflicting pressures for
centralization and decentralization. Factors favoring the former include
greater efficiency and effectiveness of centralized target detection systems
and the increased ranges of modern SAM systems. Factors favoring the latter

11-8
________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 11

include the need for flexibility to support fast-paced operations by maneuver

units and the many contingencies that can arise in local situations.
11-45. Centralized control is necessary, especially during defense, to ensure
that the coverage of air defense units is mutually supporting and comprehen-
sive. At the same time, decentralized control is required as OPFOR air de-
fense commanders are expected to demonstrate aggressive action and origi-
nality, responding to changes in the tactical situation and operating effec-
tively when cut off from communications with other air defense units.

DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

11-46. At division and brigade, the commander of the air defense units at
that level has the following duties and responsibilities:
Organize, plan, and conduct the air defense of the organization.
Prepare recommendations on the employment of air defense assets.
Contribute to the maneuver commanders decision-making process.
Know the situation, status, and capabilities of air defense units at any
stage of the battle.
Issue orders to air defense units and staffs of subordinate units.
Direct the regrouping of forces during the battle.
Coordinate logistics support of air defense units.
Establish coordination between air defense units.
Organize communications.
Provide liaison to the division or brigade staff.
Monitor the execution of orders.
Assist subordinate units/staffs.

11-47. It is the unit commander who is responsible for the success or failure
of these operations. For example, during the planning phase, the division or
brigade commander (assisted by the aerospace operations officer and force
protection staff officers) personally directs the deployment of his air defense
weapons to support his mission and establishes priorities and procedures for
logistics support. At the maneuver battalion level, the maneuver battalion
commander has overall responsibility for the organization and conduct of air
defense.
11-48. The OSC commander plays a major role in the control of air defense
assets of his subordinates. He may direct some assets be used to augment the
air defenses of the OSC. He may direct that other assets be used to provide
OSC-wide coverage of gaps. There may be situations when the OSC will spec-
ify how divisional maneuver brigades employ their air defense batteries. Al-
though this would not be common practice, a lack of assets within the com-
mand could require that the OSC commander take such action. The division
can dictate how maneuver brigades employ their air defense batteries. Fi-
nally, the maneuver brigades air defense commander has overall responsibil-
ity for the coordinated air defense coverage and administrative control of the
shoulder-fired SAM gunners constituent to the maneuver battalions.

11-9
Draft FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) __________________________________________________________

11-49. The operations section is the primary staff section responsible for air
defense. Within that section is the aerospace subsection that does the plan-
ning and insures that those plans are executed within the commanders in-
tent. The aerospace subsection is assisted in this effort by the force protection
staff element. It is the force protection staff element that receives liaison
teams from constituent, dedicated and supporting air defense units associ-
ated with the division or DTG.

COMMAND POSTS AND COMMUNICATIONS

11-50. The division aerospace operations officer (AOO) and his staff normally
colocates with the division staff at the division main command post (CP). Also
located there is the aviation control group with whom he closely coordinates
for airspace management. (See Chapter 9 for additional information on air-
space management.) A staff member is located at the forward CP to repre-
sent the AOO and advise the division commander.
11-51. The division air defense organization has a target acquisition battery
that includes surveillance and height-finding radars, identification friend or
foe (IFF) interrogators, communications vehicles, and CPs. The surveillance
section of the battery provides redundancy in that it can take over the CPs
function in an emergency. The basic rule for the establishment of communica-
tions between supported and supporting unit is that the higher command al-
locates landline, radio relay, and mobile communication means, while radio
equipment is allocated by both higher and subordinate levels. This ensures
proper coordination of communications. If communication is lost, the com-
manders and staffs of all units involved are responsible for the immediate
restoration of communication. An air defense and NBC warning communica-
tions net is established to warn maneuver units, the staffs, and logistics units
of incoming enemy aircraft. The warning is communicated through signal
equipment that is specially allocated for this purpose.

RECONNAISSANCE
11-52. Reconnaissance is a perfect example of the systematic approach the
OPFOR takes in conducting air defense. Although this chapter primarily ad-
dresses ground-based air defense at the tactical level, ground-based and air-
borne reconnaissance assets at the operational level play a major role in
gathering, integrating, and disseminating information to tactical units. The
principal objective of reconnaissance is to establish a system that not only
provides the earliest possible warning of approaching enemy aircraft but also
develops target information for planning and conducting the air defense. The
OPFOR concept of air defense reconnaissance includes terrain reconnais-
sance and air surveillance.

TERRAIN RECONNAISSANCE
11-53. Both the commander of the supported maneuver unit and the com-
mander of the supporting air defense element usually conduct terrain recon-
naissance. A preliminary map reconnaissance can tentatively identify posi-
tions for deployment of air defense weapons in defensive positions, along
movement routes, or in areas to be seized by advancing forces. (See also
Movement of Air Defense Units in this chapter.) Significant emphasis is

11-10
________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 11

placed on identifying all potential attack routes for low-flying enemy aircraft
of all types. Routes of approach suitable for armed helicopters and positions
from which these helicopters might fire ATGMs are of special concern, since
the OPFOR considers such helicopters an especially serious threat to ground
maneuver units.

AIR SURVEILLANCE
11-54. Air surveillance is conducted by radar, electro-optical means, and by
visual observation. Radar is used for technical surveillance, providing an all-
weather detection capability. Radars fall into the general categories of sur-
veillance and fire control. Surveillance radars include early warning, target
acquisition, and height-finding radars. Some fire control radars also have a
limited target acquisition capability.
11-55. Preliminary target data is passed from higher-level radar units to air
defense commanders and their firing batteries; this practice reduces the vul-
nerability of battery radars and radar-equipped gun carriages and missile
launchers to ECM. Ideally, only those aircraft that have been positively iden-
tified as hostile will be engaged.
11-56. Despite the presence of a technologically advanced early warning sys-
tem, the OPFOR continues to stress the importance of visual surveillance. An
effective system of visual surveillance may often provide the first warning of
an enemy air attack, especially one conducted by armed helicopters using
nap-of-the-earth techniques. This is especially true at the small unit level.
Air observers are posted in all units when operating close to enemy forces or
in areas where enemy air attack is considered likely. In the defense, posts are
set up at suitable locations, usually on terrain offering good visibility, near
CPs, and/or close to air defense units in firing positions. During tactical
movement and during both the defense and offense, observers are posted on
each vehicle. Observers are changed frequently to reduce fatigue and main-
tain their effectiveness.
11-57. The information required by air defense units is divided into two cate-
gories. The first category includes all data from which a determination of
probable enemy air actions may be derived. These data are necessary for
planning and organizing the air defense system. Included in this category
are
Tactical-technical characteristics and combat capability of enemy air-
craft.
Composition and strength of enemy air power.
Locations of airfields and forward arming and refueling points
(FARPs).
Avenues of low-level flight.
C2 sites.
Potential armed helicopter firing positions.
11-58. The second category includes data on which to develop a clear picture
of the air situation and determine the enemys plans, air order of battle, and
strike objectives. These data are needed to conduct the air battle (assign tar-
gets to fire units or reposition units. Included in this category are the exact

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Draft FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) __________________________________________________________

coordinates (which change constantly), types, numbers, direction, speed, and

altitude of aircraft in flight. The determination of the first category of infor-
mation is a joint responsibility of all reconnaissance elements, and the second
is the specific responsibility of air defense reconnaissance and target acquisi-
tion elements.

MISSION ASSIGNMENT
11-59. Whatever the nature of combat being conducted by maneuver forces,
the actions of supporting air defense units are, as the term implies, inher-
ently defensive. Assigning specific missions to air defense units requires an
understanding of the types of missions, the planning considerations involved,
and the engagement procedures used.

MISSIONS
11-60. The primary mission of OPFOR ground-based air defense systems is to
protect maneuver units and installations from attack by fixed- and rotary-
wing aircraft, thus reducing the availability of enemy air assets to influence
the development of the ground battle. As part of the overall air defense effort,
these forces also perform a variety of other missions, including the following:
Timely detection of incoming aircraft, continuous tracking of airborne
targets, and warning troops of attacking aircraft.
Protection of the immediate rear with a primary emphasis on protect-
ing targets that play key roles in supplying troops.
Destruction of enemy reconnaissance aircraft.
Destruction of airborne or air assaults during overflight, airdrop, or
landing.
Prevention of deeper penetration by enemy aircraft, in cooperation
with adjacent air defense elements.
The prevention of reinforcement or resupply of encircled enemy forces.
MISSION PLANNING AND EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS

11-61. Missions are assigned to air defense units after detailed studies of the
role and features of the defended unit or area. Assignment of an air defense
mission normally is based on the availability and technical characteristics of
air defense units. Consideration is given to
The effective range of the air defense units specific weapon system. If
the effective range does not exceed 10 km, the air defense unit is not
assigned a mission covering 30 km. The same applies to altitude; a unit
of small-caliber AA guns is not assigned a mission of independently
protecting an object that can be successfully hit by an airstrike from al-
titudes over 2,000 m.
Effectiveness of fire of an air defense units weapon usually is described
by its probability of destroying an air target. If the probability is small,
the object may be covered by several air defense elements.

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If enemy aircraft are capable of striking the object during any weather
condition, units without fire control radar are not capable of providing
adequate air defense.
An air defense system chosen to defend a given object must have at
least the same mobility as the object defended.
The availability and capability of early warning and target acquisition
radars, weapons, electronic jamming and electronic protection meas-
ures ability, and the operating requirements of these systems.
11-62. The essence of an air defense units combat mission can be expressed
in two words: to cover. Combat orders indicate the combat units to be cov-
ered, as well as the starting time and duration of the air defense mission.
Also given are the degree of readiness and procedures for conducting fire,
procedures for organizing early warning, target acquisition, and communica-
tions; routes of movement to the fire or launch position area; coordination be-
tween ground troops and friendly aviation, control, communications, and lo-
gistics elements, and other applicable instructions.
11-63. The characteristics of the objects to be defended are the determining
factors in the tactical employment of air defense units. Primary among these
are the combat function and location of the defended unit or object. This is
determined primarily by the role and location of ground combat units, logis-
tics units, and the current tactical situation. Other factors have a consider-
able influence on a decision as to the type and quantity of air defense units
assigned, such as
Sensitivity of the target. A fuel dump is more sensitive to air strikes
than a fuel depot. A mountain road is considerably more critical than a
road on a plain, since damage to the road surface would forces troops to
halt in the first case, but not necessarily in the second.
Geometric dimensions of a target. The larger the target, the
greater the probability of its being hit. If a targets dimensions are
large, it can be attacked from horizontal flight at medium-to-high alti-
tudes. In most cases, targets of smaller dimensions would be attacked
from very low altitudes or by diving aircraft.
Mobility of a target. Targets maneuvering on the battlefield are
harder to locate and attack than are fixed targets. The enemy will,
therefore, most likely attempt to destroy them immediately upon detec-
tion. Stationary or immobile targets are not necessarily subject to air
strikes immediately upon their detection, but as the tactical situation
warrants.
Weather and visibility. Various kinds of weather and night time
conditions can affect the possibility of attacking aircraft locating a tar-
get. The possibility of attacking aircraft locating a target in various
kinds of weather and at night. Reference points on the approaches to
the target, and at the targets location, can be used for navigational
fixes to more accurately acquire the target.
11-64. The tactical importance of units and facilities is not constant but
changes during the course of combat as assigned missions are accomplished.
For example, the role of a battalion advancing along the main axis and that
of a battalion removed to the reserve are not of equal importance with respect

11-13
Draft FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) __________________________________________________________

to successful accomplishment of the combat mission. Also, a water-crossing

site loses value after the main body of troops has crossed it. Over time, there
is a systematic and continuos reappraisal of the role and function of combat
units and support facilities. Their role and signifigance in accomplishing the
overall mission can change and therefore their priority for protection can
change also. In certain cases, there may be insufficient air defense assets to
cover all targets. In those cases, air defense units are relieved from covering
targets that have become of secondary importance and are assigned to cover
new, more important targets to ensure the ability of the combined arms
forces to complete their missions without interference from enemy air action.
11-65. Air defense planning is not strictly limited to considerations for the
employment of air defense systems. It also includes coordination with other
arms. Air defense planners should view air defense as pulling together all
aspects and potential contributions of other arms to supplement and com-
plement the air defense plan Airspace management is one obvious require-
ment; however, there is also the need to identify likely air avenues of ap-
proach and hovering sites for enemy rotary-wing aircraft. The hovering sites
would be submitted through artillery channels as preplanned targets avail-
able on-call. Similar coordination is also required with electronic warfare
elements and engineers.

ENGAGEMENT PROCEDURES
11-66. Aircraft posing the greatest threat are engaged on a priority basis.
Aircraft are engaged with as many weapons as possible and in the shortest
time possible to achieve the greatest destructive and deterrent effect. The
preferred engagement technique is to continue firing at an already engaged
target rather than to switch from target to target, unless a later-acquired
target seriously threatens the air defense unit itself or a high-priority target.
The OPFOR would rather engage an enemy aircraft prematurely and waste
some ammunition than wait too long and allow the aircraft to gain a favor-
able attack position. Aircraft are fired on as long as they remain within
range. Air observers and weapons crews outside the attacked sector maintain
continuous observation and readiness to fire in order to prevent the enemy
from conducting a successful attack from several directions simultaneously.
11-67. The OPFOR emphasizes that air defense units do not have to destroy
aircraft to accomplish their mission, although such destruction is obviously
desirable. The mission is accomplished if air defense units prevent enemy
aircraft from conducting successful air activities. For example, air defense
units can force enemy aircraft to break off their attacks or to expend their
ordnance inaccurately without having to destroy the aircraft. In fact, the
mere presence of active and effective air defense weapons systems can reduce
the effectiveness of enemy air activities by forcing aircraft to avoid the sys-
tems or to operate using less than optimum procedures.

EMPLOYMENT TECHNIQUES
11-68. The details of the employment of air defense assets are not templated,
carbon copy solutions. Employment options depend on several factors, some
of which are

11-14
________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 11

Missions assigned.
Scale of the missions.
Availability and capability of systems.
Enemy air order of battle.
Priority of the protected target.
Conditions under which combat is waged and the type of combat.
Specific terrain and meteorological conditions.
Whatever the nature of combat actions conducted by maneuver forces, the ac-
tions of supporting air defense units must prevent enemy aircraft from suc-
cessfully attacking maneuver forces engaged in either offensive or defensive
actions.
MOVEMENT OF AIR DEFENSE UNITS
11-69. Where time permits, alternate positions are reconnoitered and pre-
pared in advance. Ideally, major movements are conducted at night or in ad-
verse weather. The OPFOR seeks to maintain effective air defense coverage
by ensuring that not all elements relocate at the same time, leaving one or
more firing batteries in their positions to provide coverage while others move.
If the air threat is not imminent, the air defense unit may move separately to
its new position. In this case, the air defense battery commander usually con-
ducts an initial map reconnaissance and designates the movement route and
tentative firing positions in the new area. He sends out a reconnaissance pa-
trol that normally consists of one of the firing platoon leaders, several sol-
diers and a vehicle. This patrol conducts route reconnaissance, identifies
temporary firing positions along the movement route, and conducts limited
NBC reconnaissance. The reconnaissance patrol then confirms the suitability
and location of the new positions. The reconnaissance patrol can operate as
part of a supported maneuver units reconnaissance patrol, as part of the re-
connaissance patrol of the next-higher air defense unit, or it can carry out its
mission independently.
11-70. Ideally, every air defense unit should have two to three alternate posi-
tions; movement to them can be carried out at night or under conditions of
limited visibility whenever possible. Air defense units would most likely move
to alternate positions immediately after enemy reconnaissance aircraft have
overflown their current position, after an air strike has been repulsed, or af-
ter units have been at a single position for an extended period.
11-71. For divisional air defense assets, this extended period of time would
consist of approximately 4 to 6 hours, after which they would move to alter-
nate positions. This time could obviously be reduced when there is a high
threat of air or precision attack. In some cases, given the systems capability
to do so, moves could take place as often as every 10 minutes. For more in-
formation see Passive Air Defense Measures.
11-72. The total time for movement of air defense units includes the time for
leaving the position, moving to the area of the new position, and occupying
this position. It is the mission of commanders and staffs to reduce this time to
the minimum, since during this period the unit is removed from battle. How-
ever, a necessary condition for air defense effectiveness is the destruction of

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Draft FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) __________________________________________________________

enemy aircraft on the approaches to the supported units. This must be taken
into account, along with survivability considerations, when determining the
frequency of changing positions. The procedure and time periods for move-
ment, and occupying and preparing positions, are determined during plan-
ning for combat.

LOCAL SECURITY AND SELF-DEFENSE

11-73. Air defense units at division and below are usually deployed close to
enemy ground forces, where vulnerability to both ground and air attack is
significantly greater. Self-defense against air attack is accomplished through
the use of the units primary weapons and small-caliber AA guns and shoul-
der-fired SAMs.
11-74. Units equipped with AA guns can defend themselves against ground
attack, to some extent, through the employment of their systems in a direct
fire role. Personnel armed with light antitank weapons can augment local
ground defense capabilities. If SAM batteries are threatened by ground at-
tack, they can move to more secure positions without seriously degrading
their capability to continue their primary mission.

AIR DEFENSE OF TACTICAL MOVEMENT

11-75. The OPFOR anticipates that units conducting tactical movement may
be subjected to intense attacks by both fixed-wing ground-attack aircraft and
armed rotary-wing aircraft. They also recognize that these attacks can occur
anywhere on the battlefield. Accordingly, units engaged in movement are
protected by their organic assets and, in many cases, are allocated additional
air defense assets from their parent unit.
11-76. In general, air defense units are integrated into tactical units and are
ready to fire. Many SAM and AA gun systems can be fired on the move; how-
ever, stationary engagements are preferred. SAM units that require setup
time may move along separate routes by bounds, alternating moves by pla-
toon or battery. Tactical units may also receive air defense coverage from air
defense units of higher echelons and possibly adjacent units. In the interests
of secrecy, air defense radars and associated communications systems of the
moving unit are placed in a standby and receive-only mode, respectively, un-
less absolutely required to engage enemy aircraft.
11-77. Enemy air attacks are considered particularly likely at obstacles (such
as river crossings) or at choke points (mountain passes, defiles, or places
where off-road movement is restricted, such as in swampy areas). To ensure
air defense coverage for units moving through such areas, a portion of a units
air defense weapons may be dispatched ahead of the unit to deploy in and
around the obstacle to provide effective coverage as the unit passes. The re-
mainder is spread throughout the supported unit. If adequate coverage of the
unit can be maintained by higher-echelon and adjacent unit assets, then the
entire air defense unit may be sent forward of the parent unit formation. Al-
ternatively, individual batteries or sections may be sent ahead. If the re-
stricted terrain area is of such size as to exceed weapon and or sensor cover-
age of the air defense weapons, then air defense elements may move by

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________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 11

bounds ahead of each other to provide continuous coverage by the parent

unit.
11-78. Reconnaissance and air surveillance are vital to protecting moving
units from air attack. Air observers are posted on all vehicles, and air defense
elements, including shoulder-fired SAM gunners, remain ready to engage
targets at all times. As in other tactical situations, shoulder-fired SAM gun-
ners are assigned specific sectors of observation and fire to preclude several
gunners engaging one target. Vehicle-mounted weapons are also employed.
For example, anti-aircraft machineguns on tanks are specifically designed
for this purpose; missile-firing tanks have a capability against rotary-wing
aircraft. If the tactical situation requires and terrain conditions permit, sur-
veillance and target acquisition radars may be set up at suitable locations ad-
jacent to the movement routes to provide continuous radar coverage.
11-79. Brigade air defense weapons play a major role in the defense of units
on the move. These systems are normally employed in mutually supporting
pairs. System range determines the distance that can be maintained between
them. The systems must also ensure that they maintain sufficient distance
from other vehicles to ensure an unobstructed field of fire in engaging low-
flying aircraft. Whenever a column stops, even for brief periods, brigade sys-
tems pull off to the side of the road with the rest of the column and remain
ready for action.
11-80. Battery personnel who are not operating with the firing platoons may
be directed to engage enemy aircraft with small-arms fire. In some circum-
stances, a supported unit may continue to move while the air defense ele-
ments halt to engage enemy aircraft. This is not the recommended course of
action, because it leaves the supported unit with reduced or no coverage
while the air defense elements are engaged.

AIR DEFENSE AMBUSHES AND ROVING UNITS

11-81. The OPFOR recognizes the disproportionate effects that sudden, un-
expected destruction of an aircraft or small group of aircraft can have can on
enemy tactics and morale. For example, the surprise destruction of one or two
lead aircraft on what the enemy perceived to be a clear avenue of approach,
could cause an enemy airmobile assault to be called off or seriously disrupted.
Air defense ambushes may set up at temporary firing positions to surprise
and destroy enemy aircraft and disorganize enemy fixed-wing aircraft and ro-
tary-wing operations. Ambushes and roving air defense units can cause the
enemy to believe that significant air defense units are located in areas where
actually there are only a few weapons. This can reduce the effectiveness of
enemy reconnaissance and the likelihood of enemy air attack in the area con-
cerned. Tactical air defense ambushes usually comprise a single AA gun or
SAM weapon, section, platoon, or battery with the mission of engaging enemy
aircraft from a hidden or unexpected position.
11-82. Air defense ambushes are placed on secondary and tertiary air ave-
nues of approach, along flanks, forward, behind and in gaps between units.
Often they are placed in terrain that offers poor fields of observation and fire
window shots. Ambushes can be placed in valleys or defiles likely to be
used as ingress/egress routes by infiltrating aircraft, or placed on adjacent

11-17
Draft FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) __________________________________________________________

heights to shoot down onto them; or placed just behind a crest to catch air-
craft from behind as they clear a ridge. Single launcher shoulder-fired SAM
ambushes may be set up on wooden platforms built in treetops to catch air-
craft flying over a forest.
11-83. In urban areas, AA guns or blinding lasers could be set up within the
top or middle floors of buildings to fire laterally or even down on low-flying
aircraft while remaining unseen from almost every angle. Weather conditions
may also facilitate the use of an air defense ambush. For example, low cloud
bases may force enemy aircraft down into the envelope of a particular
weapon. Ambushing units may work in concert with smoke/aerosol dispens-
ing units, or ground-based jammers that jam low-flying aircrafts terrain-
following radar, forcing it up into the ambush weapons optimum engagement
envelope.
11-84. Occasionally AA guns may choose not to employ their radars, using
strictly electro-optical sights. This tactic takes into account the capability of
modern aircraft, including attack helicopters, to detect radar and infared sys-
tems.
11-85. Air defense ambushes are often employed when there is a perceived
inadequacy of air defense assets. Typical missions include defending second-
echelon maneuver units, CPs and reserves, artillery and missile units, other
air defense units in firing positions, river-crossing sites, and first-echelon
maneuver units.
11-86. The unit or weapon assigned to an air defense ambush usually occu-
pies the site in hours of darkness or under the cover of poor visibility condi-
tions. The unit or weapon is carefully camouflaged and keeps all its emitters
off or in dummy load until ordered to engage a target. It may assume a hide
position and establish local ground security and air observers. Depending on
the unit or weapon involved and the situation, it may be able to receive
automated surveillance and target tracking data from its parent unit. More
than one air defense ambush, involving more than one weapon type may be
established along an air avenue of approach. These may work independently
or in concert depending on the situation. Target engagement decisions may
be left up to the ambushing unit commander.
11-87. Air defense ambushes may be planned and executed on short notice
with little preparation, or involve elaborate preparation and camouflage,
tracking enemy aircraft over several days to discern operational patterns and
possibly weaknesses, optimum weather patterns for a specific ambush site.
Detailed preparations can involve removal of tracer ammunition from AA gun
ammunition belts so that near misses do not alert the target aircraft, or con-
struction of air observers/shoulder-fired SAM tree-stands in remote loca-
tions, with provision made for the alert of the ambush unit through wire, vis-
ual, or radio signals. Decoys or derelict weapons may be placed to draw the
attention of enemy aircrews, causing them to enter the ambush zone or fire at
the wrong target. Visual decoys can be made more believeable through the
use of imitative communications or even decoy emitters. The key to a suc-
cessful pre-planned ambush is creating a credible target or set of targets that
the enemy will attack. Special engagement techniques may be used, such as

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________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 11

delaying radar illumination until the last possible moment, coupled with a
favorable cloud base and remote track information from other sensors.
11-88. When a target is detected, the ambushing weapon or unit prepares to
engage, which may involve removal of some camouflage, or a short movement
from its hide position to its firing position. The ambushing unit fires on the
target until it is destroyed or until the target moves out of its firing zone. Af-
ter ensuring that it is safe to move, the ambushing unit or weapon immedi-
ately displaces via a concealed route to a new ambush site or returns to its
parent unit.
11-89. Employment of roving units is similar to that of air defense ambushes.
The primary difference is that, while an ambushing unit lies in wait for ap-
proaching enemy aircraft, a roving unit moves to the most likely areas of en-
emy air attack and occupies a series of predesignated positions in the sup-
ported units area of responsibility (AOR). The commander of the roving unit
identifies these positions during his terrain reconnaissance and coordinates
them with the air defense and maneuver unit commanders. The roving unit
occupies these positions according to a prearranged schedule or on order of
the air defense unit commander. Ambushing and roving units terminate their
missions and return to previously designated primary firing positions upon
direction of the commander of the parent air defense unit.

AIR DEFENSE AGAINST UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES

11-90. The OPFOR recognizes the increasing importance of unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs) on the battlefield to both its own forces and those of the en-
emy. They can perform high-and low- altitude missions, collect the full spec-
trum of intelligence, and immediately downlink the data to a ground station.
They have the capability to loiter or to fly deep. They can collect against a
predetermined target or look for targets of opportunity. Their construction
can make them difficult or easy to detect.
11-91. Typically the enemy conducts reconnaissance missions using UAVs
operating in the window between low-flying helicopters and higher-altitude
fixed-wing aircraft. This altitude window is between 300 to 4,000 m. The
most common technique is to approach the target area at high altitude and,
once at the target area, drop down to a lower altitude that optimizes the ca-
pabilities of the sensor package on board. Once the mission is complete in the
target area, the UAV climbs to higher altitude and departs the mission area.
11-92. Most UAV systems consist of three basic subsystems: the air vehicle,
the ground station, and the launcher. (In some cases the latter two may be
one vehicle.) There are also a variety of communication data links between
the ground station and the air vehicle. Some systems also include satellite
links. Countering tactical UAVs requires not only an integrated air defense
system but also an integrated all arms approach. Air defense commanders
and planners should view the three UAV subsystems as three separate tar-
gets which can be countered through a variety of means. This view reinforces
the concept of an integrated system that includes coordination with others
arms to ensure all targets are addressed. These means are both passive and
active.

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Draft FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) __________________________________________________________

PASSIVE
11-93. Since the mission the UAV is executing may not be apparent, actions
should be taken to counter all possibilities. The integrated use of the passive
measures described under survivability combined with C3D can reduce the ef-
fectiveness of UAVs. The use of a variety of decoys provides a false picture of
the mission area to the enemy and to a large extent can deny information or
distort the information collected by the UAV.

ACTIVE
11-94. A wide variety and large number of active measures are available to
the OPFOR to counter UAVs. The effectiveness of air defense radars can vary
dependent on the radar cross section (RCS) and altitude of the vehicle. Of
course, this does not preclude the use of radar, since these factors are consid-
erations in detecting any aircraft. The relative small size of many UAVs obvi-
ously reduces their RCS.
11-95. A of sound-ranging systems are available which can provide early
warning and azimuth of an approaching UAV. This in turn provides air de-
fense weapons and maneuver unit weapons an opportunity to prepare for the
vehicles approach and to put up a large volume of fire, provided the UAV can
subsequently be visually detected. The early warning provided by sound
ranging increases the probability that visual observers will be able to spot the
vehicle.
11-96. The location of UAV ground stations and launchers should constitute
a high priority for reconnaissance. Since UAVs can also support enemy mul-
tiple rocket launchers (MRL) targeting and fires from long range, their prior-
ity for destruction increases. Locating these targets can be tied to artillery,
MRL or aircraft strike complexes which can quickly engage the targets once
the information is received. The use special-purpose forces operating in the
enemy rear can also be a valuable asset in locating launchers and ground sta-
tions. They can either take direct action to destroy the targets or relay loca-
tion information to allow other means to be employed against them.
11-97. Jamming techniques can also be used to counter UAV system data
links. In some cases data links cannot be jammed but they can be monitored.
The effectiveness of these procedures varies according to the UAV system be-
ing attacked. High power spot/barrage noise jammers can be effectively used
to mask ground targets from side looking airborne radars. Many satellite up-
and downlinks employed are through the use of the commercial telecommuni-
cation infrastructure. This infrastructure and supporting satellites can be
jammed or monitored to some degree. Countering UAVs should not be viewed
as just a defense against the aerial vehicle, although that is important. The
air defense staff must coordinate with other arms to ensure that UAVs are
being attacked not just in the air, but that their related subsystems are also
addressed. The successful destruction of a UAV ground station has a far
greater impact than the destruction of a single air vehicle.

AIR DEFENSE AT NIGHT

11-98. Air defense can be conducted at night or during other periods of re-
duced visibility almost as effectively as during periods of normal visibility,

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because of the numerous surveillance and fire control radars in air defense
units and the inherent limitations of enemy aircraft maneuvers and coordina-
tion at night. Commanders prefer to move or realign units at night or during
other periods of reduced visibility to reduce the likelihood of detection by the
enemy, and such moves must be covered by air defenses.
11-99. Air defense units frequently deploy closer to supported units at night
and, like other units are more likely to conduct maintenance and resupply at
night. The OPFOR recognizes, however, that the increasing night capabilities
of aircraft and the proliferation of night strike packages requires air de-
fenses be ready 24 hours a day.
11-100. The greatest difficulty in tactical night air defense is in evaluating
the impact of terrain on a units tactical mission, especially if the unit is mov-
ing into a previously unoccupied area. If a timely and comprehensive terrain
reconnaissance cannot be conducted because of darkness, movement and es-
tablishment of new positions are far more difficult. To assist in the accurate
assessment of local terrain positions, air defense units use reconnaissance pa-
trols when they relocate at night.
11-101. From a technical standpoint, IR systems have trouble acquiring tar-
gets during hours of darkness, because the gunner must visually acquire the
target before launch. (This problem is shared by all shoulder-fired SAM sys-
tems. Thus, it is a target acquisition problem not a seeker limitation.) These
problems can be significantly reduced with the use of available night-vision
devices. In addition, various clip-on image-intensifier night sights can be
fitted to some shoulder-fired SAMs. Some radar-guided SAMs possess electro-
optical tracking backup that can be used in daylight hours in the event the
radar is jammed, and a night low-light-level television channel for engage-
ments in clear nighttime conditions. On some systems, the electro-optical
mode is considered the primary mode for target engagement, with radar-only
engagement mode being the second choice.

OFFENSE
11-102. The OPFOR ground force structure includes air defense units, which
are equipped with a variety of systems having the firepower, mobility, and
range to fully support fast-moving tank and mechanized forces in dynamic of-
fensive operations. Air defense units of an OSC conduct basically an area de-
fense, engaging enemy aircraft at some distance from the supported maneu-
ver divisions and themselves. The divisional air defense regiments conduct
primarily an area defense, though there is a significant element of point de-
fense in support of the divisions maneuver brigades. Air defense by batteries
and the shoulder-fired SAMs of the maneuver brigades is largely of the point
type, owing to the nature of the units to be defended and the capabilities of
their weapons.

ASSEMBLY AREA
11-103. Assembly areas are most commonly used in the offense and therefore
are addressed in this section. Brigade or division assembly areas are essen-
tially composed of a series of battalion assembly areas. The brigade com-
mander assigns air defense elements, normally a platoon of AA gun or gun-

11-21
Draft FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) __________________________________________________________

missile systems, the mission of supporting a particular battalion for a speci-

fied period of time. This period can begin before the battalion moves into its
assembly area, in which case the platoon provides protection to the battalion
during movement to the assembly area.
11-104. The air defense element may also join the maneuver battalion in the
assembly area, although it is preferable to have both arrive at the same time
to ensure the battalion is not exposed to possible enemy air attack. In either
case, the air defense platoon leader reports to the maneuver battalion com-
mander, and direct communications are established between the two units.
The platoon continues to maintain communications with the brigades air de-
fense battery or battalion. It also receives information from the division air
defense target identification and warning network; this ensures timely re-
ceipt of information on the tactical situation.
11-105. While in the assembly area, the maneuver battalion commander uses
all available C3D techniques to reduce the likelihood of detection. Addition-
ally, a 360-degree surveillance of the surrounding airspace provides early
warning, while proper placement of air defense weapons increases the en-
gagement envelope to the maximum extent possible. The maneuver battalion
commander and the supporting air defense platoon leader, from the parent
brigade air defense battalion, work closely to integrate their weapons into an
effective air defense plan. The battalion commander provides guidance for the
placement of all air defense systems while the air defense platoon leader su-
pervises the details of the placement of his weapons. As is the case in most
tactical situations, the platoon leader must ensure that his AA gun-missile or
gun systems are kept within mutually supporting distance. As a rule, one
crew in each pair of systems remains alert, except when warning of an air at-
tack is received. Any attached or organic shoulder-fired SAMs supplement
the defense and the attached air defense platoon leader may be given some
degree of control over the SAM gunners. Radio silence and light discipline are
observed. If the supported unit is to remain in the assembly area overnight,
the air defense systems are dug in.
11-106. Observation posts and firing positions are often colocated. This is es-
pecially true in the case of shoulder-fired SAM systems. The posts and firing
positions should be positioned to provide comprehensive observation and in-
terlocking fires on the most likely approach routes for low-flying fixed or ro-
tary-wing aircraft. All other weapons, to include AA machineguns on tanks
and ATGMs, are further integrated. Even planning for the use and integra-
tion of massed small-arms fire is essential to an effective air defense at the
tactical level.
11-107. The net result of the proper planning and execution at battalion and
further integration into the overall air defense scheme of the brigade, divi-
sion, and higher levels of command is the requirement for enemy aviation to
pass through overlapping coverage to attack the assembly area. Attacking
enemy aircraft must first penetrate the OSC, and division engagement enve-
lopes formed by their respective missile units. The aircraft then come within
range of the maneuver brigade and battalion systems. Missile, gun and gun-
missile systems engage enemy aircraft as soon as they come within range.
Shoulder-fired SAM gunners engage aircraft that maneuver to avoid these
systems or pass over the shoulder-fired SAM positions. Finally, small arms

11-22
________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 11

and vehicle-mounted weapons engage enemy aircraft that pass over the ma-
neuver battalions positions.

AIR DEFENSE IN SUPPORT OF OFFENSIVE ACTIONS

11-108. Employment of air defense varies between the three basic zones that
make up an organizations AOR. In the best case situation the division will
have sufficient assets to provide coverage over its AOR. Ideally, brigades or
BTGs should also be able to provide coverage for their units and vertically in-
tegrate with division coverage. The degreee to which these assumptions apply
depend on mission, assets available and enemy capabilities. Against a re-
gional opponent the OPFOR is fully confident of its abilitily to provide com-
plete coverage to its units at all times such coverage is required. In the event
of extra reginal intervention and the OPFOR begins to transition to adaptive
operations air defense must change accordingly.
11-109. The greatest exception to this rule of thumb could occur in the dis-
ruption zone. The commander may create a disruption zone that extends well
into enemy-held territory. In this case, disruption forces operating in that
area may or may not have coverage. SPF and affiliated forces may rely
strictly on C3D for protection from enemy air. Stay-behind regular forces
should have sufficient man-portable assets to provide protection for the force.
Some of the stay-behind forces may be air defense teams, equipped with man-
portable assets and assigned pre-planned targets to ambush. Coverage for
maneuver forces in the disruption zone is a priority, but air defense units
may be assigned missions that are offensive in nature and not directly tied to
the defense of a specific organization or site. Their missions could include es-
tablishing air defense ambush sites along likely air ingress routes, an inte-
grated effort to destroy FARPs or aircraft using FARPs, and actions to de-
stroy UAVs before they reach the battle zone.
11-110. Air defense in the battle zone requires assets that provide coverage
and have the mobility to move with those supported forces. Relative to the
battle and disruption zones the commander can afford to defend the support
zone with less mobile assets. Requirements differ for units involved in the
three types of offensive actions: the attack, the limited objective attack and
the strike. These offensive actions are discussed in the following paragraphs.

Attack
11-111. There are two forms of attack: the integrated attack and the dis-
persed attack. An integrated attack has as its ultimate goal the penetration
of enemy defenses and subsequent destruction of his support infrastructure.
The integrated attack may be conducted from positions in direct contact with
the enemy, or require a tactical movement forward from behind forces in con-
tact. In the former case, the forces in contact constitute the bulk of the fixing
force. While protection of this force is important, the situation may permit
the allocation of fewer air defense assets in favor of the assault and exploita-
tion forces.
11-112. The dispersed attack is normally conducted when confronted by a
superior enemy and/or when unable to mass or provide integrated command
and control. An important consideration in task organizing air defense assets

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Draft FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) __________________________________________________________

for the integrated or dispersed attack is the degree of movement required for
the fixing force, the assault force, and the exploitation force to accomplish
their missions. It is especially important to support units conducting the
penetration, prevent the enemy from conducting air reconnaissance, and pre-
vent him from locating the movement of forces and assets. During troop
movement and deployment for the attack, an attack from the air represents
the greatest danger; therefore, the primary mission of air defense is to protect
that movement and deployment. During the attack, the positions of sup-
ported maneuver units change and the success of air defense units in per-
forming their missions is determined by their ability to accompany maneuver
forces without separating from them by a distance at which effective coverage
is not maintained. The complexity and dynamism of the situation require sys-
tematic analysis of the supported units missions and maintaining continuous
communication with them.
11-113. The assets contained in the divisions air defense units are capable of
providing the commander with true area defense and medium-altitude cover-
age. Their mission is to protect the divisions maneuver elements and other
units within its AOR. Assets redeploy as necessary to maintain coverage of
advancing forces. Many systems are capable of providing air surveillance on
the move and rely on their short setup time to respond to detected enemy air-
craft. They can also displace by pairs or as batteries to provide stationary
coverage of the force as it moves.
11-114. There is no fixed pattern of deployment. The decision for deployment
depends primarily on the supported units mission, the terrain, and on the
ground and air tactical situations. Generally, OSC level weapons deploy
rearward from the forward edge at from one-third to one-half their engage-
ment range. This rule of thumb applies to both the offense and the defense.
(Some differences are identified in the defense section of this chapter.) The
OPFOR recognizes that rules of thumb are just that, and the tactical situa-
tion and common sense may dictate that these distances and positioning be
modified. Redeployment takes into account the requirement for maintaining
mutual support among air defense units, covering the main threat, and pro-
viding comprehensive coverage to all elements within the division AOR. In
addition to maneuver units, coverage must include the division headquarters,
artillery units, and logistics units. C2, terrain mobility, and dispersion to re-
duce vulnerability are also considered in both deploying and redeploying.
11-115. In the dispersed attack it is still the goal for the division to be able to
provide coverage for all units in its AOR. There may be times when disper-
sion is so great that this is not possible. In these cases the commander must
strive to position his assets to support forces in priority of their importance to
mission accomplishment. Some risk may have to be taken in certain areas
and commanders should plan for increased C3D and the increased use of
other arms to assist in those areas. Allocation of air defense units is weighted
in favor of maneuver units in those areas where the threat is perceived to be
the greatest. Accordingly, maneuver elements normally have their organic air
defense assets augmented by divisional air defense assets. If these batteries
are equipped with SAMs, they need not operate in the maneuver brigades
formation; the range capability of their radars and missiles allows them to
provide support from positions farther away. This provides an additional ad-

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________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 11

vantage to the commander in enabling him to more quickly shift priorities of

air defense coverage in the event the enemy increases his attacks in other ar-
eas.
11-116. As the supported unit performs its assigned missions, it continuously
changes its location and combat formation. The air defense unit commander
must respond to these changes and redeploy his weapons in a timely manner
to provide continuous and effective coverage to the supported unit. The meth-
ods of movement of air defense units in the offense depend on the situation,
missions of the supported units, the effective range of systems, and their ma-
neuver capabilities.

Limited-Objective Attack
11-117. A limited-objective attack seeks to achieve results critical to the bat-
tle by destroying or denying the enemy key capabilities through primarily
military means. The primary objective of this type of attack is a particular
enemy capability. This section discusses the role of air defense in protecting
units involved in a limited objective attack. Air defense systems or organiza-
tions can also have a role as a key system conducting the attack. For exam-
ple, air defense may be the principle means of destroying certain airborne
flagship systems. There are four types of limited-objective attack: the sophis-
ticated ambush, the raid, the spoiling attack, and the counterattack.
11-118. Air defense support to a sophisticated ambush requires special atten-
tion to task organizing. Elements involved may not have the constituent air
defense assets required to protect them during the conduct of the sophisti-
cated ambush. As in other situations, the commander must ensure that the
assets allocated to them have the necessary mobility and capabilities to sup-
port the mission. Finally, consideration should be given to the amount of cov-
erage provided by assets located at higher levels of command. The reposition-
ing of some air defense assets within a division, for example, may allow con-
tinued protection of the division while also providing mid-altitude coverage
for the sophisticated ambush element. From an air defense perspective, the
key element in the sophisticated ambush is the fixing force. Since its mission
is to prevent enemy response and security forces from discovering the exploi-
tation force it must be prepared to engage and defeat aircraft supporting
suchforces.
11-119. The raid is similar to the sophisticated ambush in terms of the con-
siderations for air defense. Given the nature of the forces normally associated
with conducting a raid, air defense assets accompanying the raiding unit
should be man-portable. The commander may also consider providing the ma-
jority of air defense support of the raid with systems not actually accompany-
ing the raiding element. When assets do accompany the raiding elements, the
situation and terrain may be particularly conducive to the establishment of
air defense ambushes as a primary means of providing local coverage.
11-120. The spoiling attack allows less time for the commander to allocate
additional assets to the force conducting the attack. This problem can be
largely mitigated when initially allocating assets to the forces that typically
conduct this mission. The commander must also be prepared to shift the pri-
orities of available air defense units that on short notice could support the ac-

11-25
Draft FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) __________________________________________________________

tion from their position or with a minimum of repositioning. Quick response

forces which deploy by means of rotary-wing aircraft would be equipped with
man-portable systems, and the requirement for a quick reassigment of priori-
ties of other air defense units within range takes on extra importance.
11-121. Support considerations for the counterattack are similar to those of
the spoiling attack. A key difference is that larger forces are involved due to
difference in purpose. Commanders must be prepared to make rapid shifts in
priority assignments. They should also begin anticipating requirements to
support a rapid transition of the remainder of the force to offensive actions.
Fixing forces involved in the counterattack should not require extensive
changes in air defense mission assignment. The assault force, if one is used,
needs sufficient assets to allow it to effectively engage rotary-wing aircraft
that will be part of any mobile forces committed against it. The exploitation
force requires sufficient assets to defend against air attack once discovered
and to allow it to consolidate its gains.

Strike
11-122. A strike seeks to achieve a tactical or operational decision through
the rapid destruction of a key enemy organization through a synergistic com-
bination of massed fires and maneuver. Divisions conduct strikes. The ma-
neuver is normally conducted in the form of a dispersed attack. Obviously the
two key priorities for air defense units are protecting the maneuver force and
precision fire assets. More than in any of the previously described offensive
actions, a key component of the air defense plan is its integration into the de-
ception plan. It is extremely important that air defense not serve as a means
of assisting enemy forces in determining the disposition, location, and inten-
tion of units participating in the strike. This can be accomplished in a variety
of ways. The most important is that air defense planners ensure that air de-
fense units and decoy units or systems are arrayed in a fashion that will sup-
port the deception plan.

DEFENSE
11-123. As in the offense, the division and its subordinate brigades have suffi-
cient assets to provide air defense coverage for all of their units. In cases
where a DTG or BTG has been formed, additional air defense assets should
be allocated to satisfy increased requirements. During transition and adap-
tive operations the employment of a decentralized defense, where C2 capabili-
ties have been degraded, sufficient assets are available to protect forces, but
the ability to integrate horizontally and thus provide mutual support will
likely be effected. The same would apply to the commanders ability to
achieve vertical integration between brigade and division assets. In the inte-
grated defense, the ability to integrate air defense assets is higher.
11-124. In a situational defense the limited time available determines the air
defense organization. Under these conditions the role of mobility, actions of
commanders and staffs, speed and secrecy in the maneuver of units and of
their deployment, and the organization of C2 increases.

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________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 11

ORGANIZING THE DEFENSE

11-125. When organizing the defense the commander designates three princi-
pal zones within his AOR. Each serves a purpose and provides a basic under-
standing of the types of missions air defense will perform in defending forces
located within them. In the disruption zone, the OPFOR seeks to delay en-
emy forces or destroy them before they can decisively engage forces in the
battle zone. The battle zone is the area in which the main defense force oper-
ates. The support zone is that area designed to be sufficiently free of enemy
forces to allow effective logistics and administrative support of forces.

Disruption Zone
11-126. The forces defending the disruption zone are tasked to force the en-
emy to reveal his intentions, delay his advance, and to create lucrative tar-
gets. It is the area from which the division executes long-range fires and
strikes and mounts an aggressive counter-reconnaissance battle. Air defense
should provide area coverage to defend forces in the zone and provide point
defense for key assets involved in conducting fires. It is essential that air de-
fense assets assigned have mobility equal to those they are defending. Even
the systems providing point defense must be highly mobile and capable of
moving with units as they displace to hides or new firing positions or conduct
survivability moves. Paramount to the success of air defense in the disruption
zone is participation in the counter-reconnaissance effort. This effort must be
both creative and aggressive. The extensive use of air defense ambushes lo-
cated along likely routes of ingress and egress is essential. Early warning,
tracking, and remote cueing are key. When necessary the OPFOR will move
divisional assets normally located in the battle zone well into the disruption
zone to accomplish this. This, in conjunction with the well-planned use of
other arms to achieve what is traditionally thought of counter-air or air de-
fense missions, allows the OPFOR to attack air platforms in the disruption
zone and beyond.

Battle Zone
11-127. In the battle zone where the main defense force operates, emphasis is
on protecting the fighting forces. This is accomplished through a combination
of area and point defense. Priority for divisional assets is the protection of
those forces where an enemy penetration is expected or those assigned to kill
zones. Protection of long-range fire systems and reserves are the next priori-
ties. Forces designated to stay behind in the disruption zone and move to hide
positions are activated to conduct air defense ambushes from within enemy
depth. The use of other arms to attack enemy rotary-wing aircraft at their fir-
ing positions is also part of the air defense effort.
11-128. Elements of the maneuver brigades air defense unit deploy to cover
its battalions. Their fires are integrated with those of the division. Where
necessary divisional assets are assigned supporting missions to brigades.
Brigade assets are pushed down to battalions when required. Shoulder-fired
SAMs can augment the maneuver battalions, to close gaps in the coverage or
establish ambushes.

Support Zone

11-27
Draft FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) __________________________________________________________

11-129. In the support zone, the commander can assign less mobile air de-
fense elements to protect assets. The use of point protection is increased rela-
tive to the other zones within the AOR. C3D, particularly the use of deception
positions, also take on special emphasis within the support zone.

AIR DEFENSE SUPPORT OF DEFENSIVE ACTIONS

11-130. Maneuver defense and area defense are the two basic types of defen-
sive actions. Maneuver defenses are normally integrated defenses when they
are part of a linear defense, while a decentralized maneuver defense normally
occurs during transition operations when C2D systems have been degraded to
some degree. Area defense can be integrated or decentralized. Within the
context of a larger operation, forces can conduct both maneuver and area de-
fenses.

Maneuver Defense
11-131. The key to air defense support of the maneuver defense lies in mobil-
ity. Air defense units must be positioned to cover defending elements but ca-
pable of displacing with rapidly-moving ground maneuver forces. Ideally,
most air defense assets can be positioned with the shielding force and provide
adequate coverage for the contact force. Distances between the two forces are
key in determining if systems can provide coverage to the depth required. In
any case, it is essential that sufficient mobile assets be allocated to the con-
tact force to cover its movement to the rear and to cover the flanks.
11-132. As the contact force initiates its movement to begin the hand-off to
the shielding force, assets positioned with the shielding force to cover the con-
tact force can begin movement by alternating bounds to the line where the
the new shielding force position is located. In many situations, it may be pos-
sible to position longer-range systems behind the initial positions of both the
contact and shielding forces. This increases the time and continuity of cover-
age and allows more time for displacement. Again, units could displace to po-
sitions behind the subsequent contact or shielding force positions. It is essen-
tial that planners allocate and position systems that are capable of respond-
ing to a highly fluid situation. Commanders should take advantage of range,
mobility, and creative means of positioning to allow sufficient standoff to pre-
vent their systems from being destroyed by enemy direct fire systems.
11-133. Air defense planners need to take into account the requirement to
support rapidly executed ground counterattacks. Assets supporting and mov-
ing with counterattacking forces could be man-portable shoulder-fired SAMs.
Longer-range systems are positioned with defending forces where they can
cover the counterattacking force. In the maneuver defense, air defense units
must displace more frequently than in the area defense. This displacement
requires units or parts of units to move by bounds. One element continues
cover while the other moves. This means reduced coverage for at least part of
the time. Taking this into account, additional assets could be allocated to
make up the difference. In any case, moves should be planned in detail and
every effort made to reduce the number required. In the maneuver defense,
the need for frequent displacement often mitigates the requirement for sur-
vivability moves.

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________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 11

Area Defense
11-134. The OPFOR conducts an area defense to deny key areas or when it is
overmatched. The defense may be intended to preserve forces, force the en-
emy to withdraw, or inflict sufficient casualties to cause him to loose the abil-
ity to continue offensive operations. The main defense force occupies battle
positions set in complex terrain. The disruption force conducts continuous
combat actions to allow enemy forces no respite. Logistics are decentralized,
often relying on caches that have been pre-positioned.
11-135. Air defense considerations in the disruption zone are similar to those
found in the maneuver defense. Forces in the disrutption zone must be capa-
ble of rapidly attacking the enemy or shifting to a maneuver defense or a
combination of the two. Frequent displacement is the rule. In many cases
dispersed ambush forces and precision weapons systems will require point
protection. Area coverage is desirable in trying to attack enemy aerial recon-
naissance assets and preventing effective employment of ground-attack plat-
forms. The disruption zone will require a relatively high density of shoulder-
fired SAMs and a well thought out and executed air defense ambush plan.
11-136. The battle zone, set in complex terrain, presents a whole set of prob-
lems which the air defender must solve. Complex terrain limits the capabili-
ties of line-of-sight systems. This includes acquisition, tracking, and firing
systems. A detailed terrain analysis, which takes into account the masking
features of the terrain, is essential. Although not desirable, some acquisition
systems will have to be positioned on high ground to be effective. The use of
C3D is key to mitigating the vulnerabilities of systems so sited. No matter
what techniques are used, there will be gaps in coverage. Some of these gaps
may be areas in which the commander chooses to take risks. Others can be
covered by shorter-range but more suitable systems. The use of ambushes
from hides could be particularly effective as the enemy attempts to exploit
these gaps.

11-29
 Chapter 12

Engineer Support
The OPFOR realizes that engineer support is vital for the successful exe-
cution of combat. Due to the fluid nature of modern combat, effective en-
gineer support is essential for ground forces to employ or preserve combat
power, as the conditions dictate. Engineer support can give combat forces
the ability to maneuver quickly to exploit windows of opportunity, and it
can help change the nature of the conflict to something for which the en-
emy is not prepared.

ADAPTIVE ENGINEER SUPPORT

12-1. OPFOR engineers must be flexible enough to support two basic types of
combat. The first is the fight against a regional enemy, in which the OPFOR
expects to dominate what is generally a traditional, conventional fight. The
second is the fight against the extraregional enemy, a fight in which the
OPFOR expects to be overmatched in conventional capabilities. When the ex-
traregional enemy builds up enough combat power to become the dominant
force in the region, this will most likely compel the OPFOR to fight a defen-
sive fight. In order to defeat this extraregional force, the OPFOR employs in-
novative, adaptive tactics to level the battlefield. An example of this innova-
tiveness is the manner in which the OPFOR attempts to change the nature of
the conflict. To accomplish this, the OPFOR attempts to place the enemy on
the defense rather than offense, wherever possible. One means of accomplish-
ing this is the constant and ubiquitous use of mine warfare. There is no sanc-
tuary for the enemymines are everywhere. Two examples of this are
Emplacement of toe-popper mines on enemy foot traffic routes to pro-
duce wounds, not kills. This stresses the medical evacuation system
and creates a tentativeness among enemy soldiers. This could be tied
in with attacks on the enemys medical evacuation system.
Maximum use of antihelicopter mines against possible attack helicop-
ter firing positions or landing zones.
Other examples of adaptive methods engineers are likely to employ against
an extraregional enemy (in addition to methods used in a more conventional
battle) are interspersed throughout the Defense section of this chapter.

MISSIONS AND TASKS

12-2. The primary engineer missions performed in combat are reconnais-
sance, mobility, countermobility, and survivability. Some example s of spe-
cific tasks are to
Reconnoiter the enemy and the terrain.
Prepare fortifications.

12-1
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

Prepare and maintain routes of movement and supply.

Clear passages through obstacles and areas of destruction.
Equip and maintain gap crossings.
Establish engineer obstacles.
Extract and purify water and establish water supply points.
Carry out engineer measures to eliminate the aftereffects of nuclear,
biological, and chemical (NBC) and precision weapons.
Support information warfare and carry out engineer camouflage, con-
cealment, cover, and deception (C3D) measures.

12-3. The OPFOR plans the complete integration of civilian and military en-
gineer resources. For example, maneuver commanders may use civilian
earthmoving, road-building, and construction equipment and personnel in
support zones. This allows constituent combat engineer equipment and per-
sonnel to accompany maneuver forces in battle. Civilian workers or maneu-
ver units can perform many basic combat engineer tasks, with engineers pro-
viding guidance and technical expertise.
12-4. Engineer tasks are a shared responsibility throughout the OPFOR. For
instance, combat troops, as well as engineers, perform mine warfare tasks
such as minelaying, minefield recording, and mine removal or breaching. En-
gineer and combat arms personnel also perform survivability tasks such as
constructing fortifications, clearing fields of fire, and camouflage. The same is
true for water-obstacle crossings, where some units and equipment can ford,
swim, or snorkel across with little or no engineer support. Although the high-
est level of engineer training and the greatest technical capabilities exist in
the engineer troops, all military personnel and units train in fundamental
engineer tasks.
12-5. The OPFORs intent is to make the entire force as flexible and capable
as possible while minimizing dependence on limited engineer support. This
allows maneuver forces to autonomously execute rudimentary or basic engi-
neer tasks. It also frees the engineer troops to
Perform engineer-specific or critical tasks supporting the maneuver
commanders intent.
Exploit and expand successful engineer effort begun by the combat
troops.
Support units that have little or no engineer capability.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

12-6. Engineer units allocated to a tactical group in constituent or dedicated
relationships may be retained directly under the command of the tactical
group commander. Rather than keeping all organic and allocated engineer
assets under his direct command and control (C2), the tactical group com-
mander may suballocate some of his constituent or dedicated engineer units
to his subordinate units. Additionally, tactical group commanders con-

12-2
________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 12

trolbut do not commandother engineer assets that are allocated to them

in a supporting relationship
12-7. In the case of a DTG, the commander can allocate engineer units to his
integrated fires command (IFC) and/or integrated support command (ISC).
Some engineer units may be grouped under the integrated support groups
(ISGs) that perform combat support tasks for the IFC or the division.

STAFF RESPONSIBILITY
12-8. In maneuver divisions and brigades, engineer officers are permanent
members of functional staff subsections under the chief of force protection
and the chief of infrastructure management, who in turn advise the opera-
tions officer within their respective areas of expertise. Additionally, an engi-
neer liaison team from each subordinate or supporting engineer unit sup-
ports the staff. It provides the operations officer with detailed expertise on
engineer functions and direct communications to subordinate units executing
such functions. The engineer liaison team also coordinates, as necessary,
with other staff elements, including the chief of information warfare (IW).
Liaison team leaders speak for the commanders of their respective units.
12-9. The maneuver commander specifies the tactical combat action(s) of his
subordinate and supporting units, their start time and duration, and the area
for these actions to take place. With this information, the engineer officers on
his staff determine the required engineer missions to support the maneuver
commanders plan. They prioritize engineer efforts to execute the technical
tasks necessary to accomplish the overall mission. They can then determine
the appropriate mix of troops, equipment, and materials necessary to perform
the tasks under current conditions. They advise the commander and his staff on
the best employment of available engineer assets to support the maneuver com-
manders mission, intent, and objectives.
12-10. The engineer liaison teams keep their respective engineer unit com-
manders informed of requirements for engineer support and pass on any
guidance from the maneuver unit commander and staff on possible task or-
ganization. Then they monitor the execution of the directed missions. They
provide input to the maneuver commanders combat orders and battle plans,
the reconnaissance plan, the obstacle plan, and deception plans. They help
organize the crossing of water obstacles and other barriers, and the prepara-
tion and maintenance of movement routes. They coordinate with the division
or brigade chief of logistics regarding the preparation, improvement, and
maintenance of supply and evacuation routes.
12-11. The main steps that the liaison teams perform in support of combat
actions are
Helping the engineer unit commander decide the appropriate organiza-
tion of engineer support and reporting it to the maneuver commander.
Participating in the reconnaissance conducted by the maneuver com-
mander.
Monitoring the completion of tasks by engineer units during the prepa-
ration for, and conduct of, combat.
Reporting the status of engineer support to the maneuver commander.

12-3
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

TASK ORGANIZATION
12-12. There are no doctrinal constraints on task organization for mission
success. The ability to allocate assets downward and to task organize is re-
strained only by the availability of assets and the nature of the mission.
12-13. Although engineer assets generally are constituent at no lower than
brigade level, the OPFOR prefers to task organize for mission success at even
lower levels, when the assets are available. This may dictate that, instead of
maintaining engineer units, the commander may choose to break them down
and combine them into smaller (sometimes much, much smaller) multirole
engineer support elements. These engineer elements range in size from com-
panies down to multirole platoons and engineer squads.
12-14. Engineer assets deploy throughout the battlefield and perform nu-
merous distinct missions simultaneously during the course of the battle. In
this way, route-clearing assets perform one function, while others perform
demolitions, lay mines, construct obstacles, prepare defensive fighting posi-
tions, or set up water purification sites. Occasionally, the combined arms
commander can also attach to these groupings additional non-engineer as-
sets, such as artillery, tank, or infantry troops. He can also augment maneu-
ver elements with the engineer groups.
12-15. The following is a list of typical task-oriented engineer groupings:
Obstacle detachment (OD, see Countermobility).
Movement support detachment (MSD, see Mobility).
Engineer reconnaissance patrol (ERP, see Engineer Reconnaissance).

SUPPORT TO INFORMATION WARFARE

12-16. The complete integration of engineer support of IW is critical at the
tactical level, especially when fighting an extraregional enemy. Deception is
one of the basic elements of IW. Engineer support of the deception plan is vi-
tal for the deception to succeed. (See the subsection on C3D above.) Engi-
neers largest role in an integrated deception plan is that of constructing
physical decoys (simulations in deception positions) enabling the enemy to
see what he expects to see.
12-17. However, engineer support to IW is not limited to C3D measures. For
example, engineers may support the IW campaign with psychological warfare
activities to lower morale and instill a sense of tentativeness among enemy
soldiers, and to undermine confidence of enemy-friendly populations. This
can be achieved simply by the ubiquitous use of booby traps and AP mines.
See Chapter 7 for additional information on IW at the tactical level.

ENGINEER RECONNAISSANCE
12-18. Engineers conduct reconnaissance independently, or combined with
chemical and reconnaissance elements. If the maneuver unit commander
needs unique, specific engineer data for planning and preparation, he may
order or request the use of engineer assets to form engineer reconnaissance

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patrols, observation posts, and photographic reconnaissance posts. Engineer

reconnaissance elements usually gather the following information:
Enemy engineer preparation of fighting positions.
Location, type, and composition of enemy obstacles.
Conditions of roads, bridges, water obstacle-crossing sites, and routes.
Presence of local building materials and water supplies.
Protective and camouflaging properties of the terrain.
Enemy obstacles and demolitions created both during the preparation
for the attack and during the attack.
Movement routes and trafficability of off-road terrain for the attacking
combat units.
Locations where the enemy established obstacles during his with-
drawal.
Water obstacles on the main axis of advance.
Local materials available for engineer tasks.
12-19. Water obstacles place additional requirements on engineer reconnais-
sance missions. Depending on the situation, an engineer reconnaissance pa-
trol, the reconnaissance element of an MSD, or engineers constituent to other
forces can reconnoiter a water obstacle. The reconnaissance includes deter-
mining
The depth, width, and current velocity.
The composition of the bottom.
The presence of underwater obstructions or mines.
Possible fording, ferrying, bridging, and snorkeling sites.
The composition, height, and slope of the banks.
Approach and exit routes.
The camouflage potential of the area.
The presence and nature of obstacles on the banks.
Critical terrain features overlooking both banks.
The composition and types of enemy equipment and obstacles.
Information on the nature of enemy fortifications and defensive posi-
tions enemy defenses.

RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS
12-20. To provide engineer expertise, the OPFOR can attach engineer spe-
cialists to accompany a division, brigade, or even battalion tactical reconnais-
sance patrols. Additionally, reconnaissance elements of maneuver units can
provide limited engineer-related information, although with less technical
precision. However, under most conditions, the missions of all these recon-
naissance elements preclude them from concentrating solely on engineer re-
quirements. Therefore, the maneuver commander may order or request the
engineer unit to form its own engineer reconnaissance elements to provide
the specific data he needs for planning.

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12-21. A brigade (or in some cases, a maneuver battalion) can include two or
three engineer reconnaissance personnel in a regular reconnaissance patrol
or security element. When engineer personnel augment other patrols in this
manner, there is not likely to be a separate engineer reconnaissance patrol.

ENGINEER RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS

12-22. When the engineer mission is expected to be a complicated one, how-
ever, it is better to form one or two engineer reconnaissance patrols. Such pa-
trols vary in strength from a squad to a platoon. The use of two patrols allows
the conduct of engineer reconnaissance by the leapfrog method. Ideally, the
engineer reconnaissance patrol(s) would begin their mission 1 to 2 hours be-
fore the main body of the brigade or battalion starts to move. They assess the
routes chosen by the staff, checking the validity of plans made from a map
and reporting on
Obstacles and the effort required to overcome them.
Conditions of crossing sites on water obstacles.
The general nature of the terrain.
Engineer advice is an important element in the selection of routes and cross-
ing points.
12-23. Engineer reconnaissance patrols vary in strength from a squad to a
platoon. A divisional brigade is more likely to form a squad-size patrol from
its engineer company. The engineer reconnaissance patrol can also include
one or two NBC reconnaissance specialists.

ROUTE RECONNAISSANCE
12-24. When engineers reconnoiter routes, one of their goals is to identify
anything that could impede mobility. They report information on the condi-
tion of the roads, obstacles and bypasses, and bridge locations to the com-
manders of the engineer and/or maneuver units that sent them out. Taking
into consideration any guidance from supported commanders and their staffs,
the engineer unit commander can increase the size of his reconnaissance
element and divide it into smaller teams in order to cover several points si-
multaneously. This allows him to assess a large number of features in the
shortest amount of time.
12-25. When moving in areas where contact with enemy forces is unlikely,
the engineer or maneuver commander can send an engineer reconnaissance
patrol ahead to obtain the required data. When anticipating enemy contact,
engineer reconnaissance and data collection may be limited to reports from
troop reconnaissance elements reporting on the engineer aspects observed
along the route.
12-26. When reconnoitering routes, engineers attempt to
Verify the condition of the route.
Determine aspects of off-road terrain.
Identify all obstacles and locate bypasses or recommended breach sites.
Inspect bridges and dams.
Identify suitable halt and assembly areas.

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12-27. When the OPFOR route of advance encompasses potential water ob-
stacles, engineer reconnaissance patrols try to find spots to set up ferry and
bridge crossings, plus assembly or preparation areas. If bridges exist, engi-
neers gather information on the support structure, load capacity, necessary
repairs, and the presence of mines and demolitions on the approaches and on
the bridge itself.

MOBILITY
12-28. Due the dominance of the OPFOR in the region when fighting a re-
gional foe, the OPFOR generally has freedom to maneuver wherever it wants
whenever it wants. If the enemy hinders the movement of the OPFOR the
OPFOR has alternatives because it dominates the region. However when
fighting an extraregional foe, it is especially critical that the OPFOR main-
tain the ability to move unimpeded. This ability allows the OPFOR to control
the access and tempo of enemy forces. As long as the OPFOR has complete
access to the battlefield, it will allow no sanctuary to the enemy and deter-
mine the nature of the conflict. Engineer support can create opportunities for
infiltration of small forces into unexpected locations, to inflict damage or to
support IW.
12-29. Engineers are responsible for accomplishing tasks permitting the un-
impeded movement of forces along the movement route, plus activities at as-
sembly and halt areas. They also support the crossing of water obstacles. Fig-
ure 12-1 lists the specific engineer technical tasks that provide the required
support for tactical missions prior to and during tactical movement.

Tactical Missions Engineer

Requiring Engineer Support Technical Tasks

Preparation of assembly and halt areas. Conduct engineer reconnaissance of enemy and terrain.
Tactical movement. Clear passages in obstacles and perform demolition work.
Crossing water obstacles. Establish and maintain water obstacle-crossing sites.
Extract/purify water and establish water supply points.
Carry out engineer camouflage measures.
Prepare and maintain movement routes.
Prepare fortifications at assembly and halt areas.
Eliminate aftereffects of NBC attacks.

Figure 12-1. Engineer Support for Preparation and Conduct of Tactical Movement

MOVEMENT ROUTES
12-30. A maneuver commander determines the movement route. It can follow
any line and may include existing roads, cross-country roads, and off-road ar-
eas. After careful consideration of reconnaissance data and consultation with
engineer officers on his staff, he specifies the particular movement route(s)

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

his force will use. The engineer units and their liaison teams in the maneu-
ver units staff are then responsible for planning and coordinating engineer
support to prepare and maintain the specified movement routes. They pro-
vide input to the engineer support plan for the commander, who then issues
orders, missions, and requirements to the constituent and dedicated engineer
unit commanders for execution.

MOVEMENT SUPPORT DETACHMENT

12-31. The MSD is a task-oriented, temporary grouping of engineer assets to
support route clearance and movement of the force in preparation for, and
during tactical movement.
12-32. The composition of an MSD is not fixed and varies depending upon
the
Condition of the terrain.
Character of enemy actions.
Amount of work necessary.
Assigned rate of movement for the columns.
Availability of engineer troops and equipment.

12-33. Since its different technical tasks involve different types of equipment,
the MSD frequently task organizes into elements to allow concurrent actions
along the movement route. Typical groups are a reconnaissance and obstacle-
clearing element, plus one or two road and bridge construction and repair
elements.
12-34. Reconnaissance and Obstacle-Clearing Element. Responsibili-
ties of the reconnaissance and obstacle-clearing element include
Marking the movement route.
Making immediate assessments of the terrain and obstacles.
Identifying bypasses.
Creating and marking passages through obstacles.
Determining the character of destruction along the route.
Locating building materials.

12-35. Reinforcing assets from the division engineer battalion can use explo-
sive charges or mechanical equipment to overcome rubble, rock barriers, and
dragons teeth (concrete pillars or iron posts). Engineers can breach wire ob-
stacles after examining them for boobytraps and electrification. Tree barriers
may require the use of dozer blades or explosives.
12-36. The reconnaissance and obstacle-clearing element typically includes
An engineer unit base.
Hand-held or vehicle-mounted mine-detection equipment.
Explosives.
Mineclearing vehicles such a tank with roller and plows.

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________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 12

Route- or obstacle-clearing vehicles.

12-37. Road and Bridge Construction and Repair Element. The road
and bridge construction and repair element usually has tank- or truck-
launched bridges, route-clearing vehicles, and one or more engineer squads,
plus cranes and road graders. The equipment varies depending on mission
requirements and what was passed down from higher levels of command.
12-38. To support movement preparation, the engineer commander creates
an MSD before the tactical movement. Their mission includes
Route reconnaissance.
Mineclearing and obstacle clearing along the route.
Reinforcement of bridges and repairs to roads.
Construction of bypasses.
Builds and reinforces bridges.
Establishes fords and bypasses.
Strengthens the route in swampy sections.
Removes rubble.
Repairs damage.

Position During Tactical Movement

12-39. While moving, the MSD travels in advance of the main body preparing
the route so the main body can continue its advance unimpeded. Elements of
the MSD are often performing tasks in proximity to elements of the security
detachment (SD). The location of the MSD in relation to the SD depends
upon the possibility of enemy contact. When enemy contact is likely, the
MSD may follow the SD. If enemy contact is unlikely, the MSD may be well
ahead of the SD.

OFFENSE
12-40. In support of the offense, engineers are responsible for providing the
troops, equipment, and materials required to satisfy the tactical missions
specified in Figure 12-2. This figure also identifies technical tasks that the
engineers must perform in support of the offense.
12-41. During preparation for the offense, the engineers focus on four major
activities:
Preparing routes for the advance and employment of combat forces.
Providing survivability support to units in assembly areas.
Establishing passages in obstacles and minefields.
Equipping crossings over water obstacles.

12-42. During the offense, the engineers primary mission is to support the
attack and assist in maintaining a high tempo of combat. Once the attack has
started, engineer troops continue to perform tasks contributing to high rates
of advance. Occasionally, they create obstacles to protect flanks, disrupt
counterattacks, and block enemy reinforcements. Ongoing engineer reconnais-

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

sance is performed independently or in conjunction with other reconnaissance

elements.
12-43. The OPFOR views commitment of exploitation forces or reserves as
one of the most critical and vulnerable periods of combat. Engineer troops
play a vital part in ensuring its success. They ensure the forces timely arri-
val on the line of commitment and provide support for its deployment and
protection against flank attacks.

Tactical Missions Engineer

Requiring Engineer Support Technical Tasks

Movement forward, deployment, and transition to the Conduct engineer reconnaissance of enemy and
offense. terrain.
Preparation of assembly areas. Prepare fortifications in assembly areas.
Crossing water obstacles. Clear passages in obstacles and perform demo-
Supporting disruption and battle zones. lition work.
Repelling counterattacks. Establish and maintain water obstacle-crossing
Penetration of enemy defenses. sites.
Conduct of the battle. Establish obstacles.
Commitment of exploitation force or reserve. Extract/purify water and establish water supply
Reinforcing captured positions. points.
Carry out engineer camouflage measures.
Prepare and maintain movement routes.
Eliminate aftereffects of NBC strikes.

Figure 12-2. Engineer Support for Preparation and Conduct of the Offense

OBSTACLE BREACHING
12-44. The OPFOR is prepared to overcome obstacles during all phases of
combat. In the offense, the OPFOR expects to cross obstacles on movement
routes, and throughout the enemy defense. Creating passages for the ad-
vance of the force in the face of enemy resistance is a combined arms task.

Explosive Obstacle Breaching

12-45. Explosive devices are the most significant obstacles the OPFOR ex-
pects to encounter. The OPFOR expects the enemy to use explosive obstacles
and other obstructions for defensive purposes to impede the OPFORs ad-
vance. In order for the OPFOR to conduct (or continue) an attack, maneuver
units must breach these obstacles under direct and/or indirect fire. Units en-
gaged in breaching these obstacles are extremely vulnerable to all enemy
fires. Whenever possible, the OPFOR attempts breach a minefield from tacti-
cal movement, with minimum delay, and press the attack without first halt-
ing to consolidate on the far side of the obstacle.
12-46. The OPFOR may be required to breach enemy minefields when fight-
ing an extraregional enemy. Although it may breach them in the more con-
ventional manner described here, the OPFOR can also devise innovative

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methods to cross minefields. One such method might be to manually clear a

path through the minefield through covert action. Several lanes could be
cleared in this fashion. Then, at a time of the OPFORs own choosing, dis-
mounted troops could infiltrate through the minefield and rendezvous at a
designated location on the other side, undetected by the enemy.

1 Dismounted infiltration.
2
Feint.
3
Covert breach.

Fig. 12-3 Covert Breach

Organizing Forces for Explosive Obstacle Breaching

12-47. There are three fundamental methods by which the OPFOR organizes
for breach operations. First, and most preferable, is to make no special al-
terations to task organization for breach operations. A detachment is ex-
pected to breach as part of its battle drill (see Chapter 5) and its higher com-
mander will make every attempt to include in its task organization the
means necessary to breach any anticipated obstacles without the need to de-
viate from the basic structure of action, support and security elements or the
need for outside assistance.
12-48. Should any anticipated obstacles require significant allocation of spe-
cialist assets or more articulation in the detachments maneuver, the de-

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

tachment commander may form a clearing element. A clearing element is a

type of specialist element that penetrates obstacles permitting the action
element to accomplish the detachments tactical task.
12-49. Complex or extensive obstacles may require the formation of a Ma-
neuver Support Detachment (MSD). The MSD is a task-oriented, temporary
grouping of engineer assets to support route clearance and movement of the
force in preparation for, and during tactical movement. MSDs are typically
formed by tactical groups to support the movement of multiple detachments
through a given zone of obstacles or to support their movement across a ma-
jor water obstacle.

Planning Explosive Obstacle Breaching

12-50. Planning and preparation for the breaching of an explosive obstacle
includes:
Reconnaissance of the obstacle, including attempts to locate a bypass,
and marking optimal breach locations
Infiltration of stealth breach teams, if possible.

Explosive Obstacle Breaching Methods

12-51. The OPFOR has three basic means to breach a minefield: explosive,
mechanical and manual.
12-52. Explosive means such as line charges, bangalore torpedoes and volum-
teric explosives all work by detonating mines through explosive pressures.
12-53. Mechanical mine-clearing plows or plow and roller combinations
mounted on combat vehicles provide the main countermine capability to con-
ventional forces. These systems detonate mines by striking them in advance
of coming into contact with a vehicle or by physically moving the mines out of
a defined path.
12-54. Manual breaching requires personnel to physically displace or defuse
explosive devices.

Mechanized Breaching
12-55. Mechanized units make use of all three breaching methods to rapidly
create lanes through obstacles with minimal delay. All OPFOR mechanized
units are trained, equipped and expected to breach explosive obstacles with-
out resorting to requests for help to higher levels of command.

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________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 12

Enemy Defensive Platoons Led

Position by Tanks with
Plows or Roller-Plows
ll

ll
Legend: Tank with Bangalore Roller Lane Widened
Roller-Plow Torpedo Installation Point by Roller-Plow
Tank with Plow Tank
AT Minefield Roller-Plow Breach Breach
Plow

Figure 12-4. Mechanized Breach (Example)

12-56. Despite the advantages of mechanical means attached or integral to

combat and combat engineer vehicles, it is still preferred that explosive
breach means, whether mechanized or employed by infantry or engineer
forces, be the primary method for executing a mechanized breach. This is be-
cause mechanical means place the combat vehicles at more risk. Mechanized
explosive means are also the least vulnerable to booby traps placed in and
around obstacles to make their breaching more difficult.
12-57. If at all possible, non-mechanized and/or affiliated forces, typically
employing C3D to prevent detection while creating the breach, will breach
anticipated obstacles in advance.

Nonexplosive Obstacle Breaching

12-58. The breaching of non-explosive obstacles is essentially the same as
breaching explosive ones with these salient differences:
Mechanical and manual breach methods will typically take precedence.
Significant non-explosive obstacles (large AT ditches, rivers, rubble
from a collapsed multi-story building) will not be rapidly breachable by
manual means, if at all.

12-59. During the offense, an MSD also creates lanes through nonexplosive
obstacles. In this case, the MSD may group require additional engineer aug-

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

mentation beyond just countermine equipment. For example, it may employ

obstacle-clearing vehicles to knock down berms. It may also use truck-
launched bridges to cross AT ditches.

WATER OBSTACLE CROSSING

12-60. The enemy is expected to use rivers and other water obstacles for de-
fensive purposes. In order to conduct (or continue) an attack, OPFOR ma-
neuver units must often cross water obstacles whose opposite banks may or
may not be occupied by the enemy. Crossing is a generic term identifying the
site of a water obstacle crossing or the act of crossing. 1 Crossing involves us-
ing bridges, ferries, fords, or amphibious combat equipment. The OPFOR
identifies two methods of overcoming water obstaclesopposed crossing
(when expecting enemy contact) and unopposed crossing (when not expecting
enemy contact). However, it expects most crossings to be opposed by air and
ground defense and made without the advantage of an existing bridge or con-
venient fording site.
12-61. Rarely would the OPFOR attempt the classic opposed water crossing
(described below under Opposed Crossing) when fighting an extraregional
foe. However, there may be times when the OPFOR must cross rivers in ter-
ritory occupied by the enemy. Even then, it would typically only attempt the
opposed crossing if convinced of success and if the enemy did not believe the
OPFOR would attempt the crossing. This crossing would be integrated into
the overall operation plan and the IW plan.
12-62. More likely however, when opposing an extraregional enemy, the
OPFOR would attempt to cross the river covertly at night or during inclem-
ent weather. This would allow the OPFOR to infiltrate unitsa few vehicles
at a timeacross the river. The units would regroup at a designated area
and continue operations in enemy territory. Engineer support for this may
only be engineer reconnaissance of the river and routes. It may also call for
the engineers to build (undetected) an underwater bridge out of sandbags, or
to make rafts rigged to transport vehicles.
12-63. Crossing is a generic term identifying the site of a water obstacle
crossing or the act of crossing. 2 Crossing involves using bridges, ferries,
fords, or amphibious combat equipment. The OPFOR identifies two methods
of overcoming water obstaclesopposed crossing (when expecting enemy con-
tact) and unopposed crossing (when not expecting enemy contact). However,
it expects that most crossings will be opposed.
12-64. The OPFOR also expects to make most crossings without the advan-
tage of an existing bridge or convenient fording site. Therefore, engineers
must provide specialized bridging and amphibious transport (tracked am-
phibians and ferries) to facilitate a timely crossing. Crossing of water obsta-
cles always requires some measure of engineer preparation, even if it is only
1
Aside from water obstacles, crossings can involve other kinds of gaps, such as ravines. These
other kinds of gap crossing can employ some of the same engineer assets and methods used to overcome
water obstacles.
2
Aside from water obstacles, crossings can involve other kinds of gaps, such as ravines. These other
kinds of gap crossing can employ some of the same engineer assets and methods used to overcome wa-
ter obstacles.

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________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 12

limited to engineer reconnaissance at the crossing site. Therefore, constituent

and dedicated engineer units deploy well forward.

Organizing Forces for Water Obstacle Crossing

12-65. There are no doctrinal constraints on task organization for mission
success. The ability to allocate assets downward and to task organize is re-
strained only by the availability of assets and the nature of the mission.
12-66. Crossing force. The crossing force is essentially the exploitation force
for the obstacle crossing. It is the force whose movement the operation is de-
signed to facilitate.
12-67. Crossing site force. The crossing site force is the assault force of the
crossing. Its mission is to enable the crossing force to move rapidly through
or over the obstacle and continue its mission.
12-68. Security force. The security force has the same function as that in any
offensive course of action. Security forces for obstacle crossings will typically
have a strong air defense capability.

Crossing Zones and Sites

12-69. A crossing zone is a specialized form of AOR. It is the AOR of the
crossing force and is commanded by the crossing commander. Its size and
orientation depend on the nature of the obstacle, the number of crossing
sites, the size force that needs to cross and the ability to neutralize the en-
emy. Under favorable conditions, the sector of opposed crossing may be iden-
tical with the units attack zone.
12-70. At tactical group level, the CELT advises the commander on selection
of crossing sites within the crossing zone based on reconnaissance of the ob-
stacle and approaches to it. The number of crossing sites within a zone de-
pends on the tactical situation, nature of the water obstacle and surrounding
terrain, and types of crossing equipment available. There are usually sepa-
rate sites for each type of crossing means: swimming, fording, snorkeling,
tracked amphibian, ferry, and bridge. Especially for opposed crossings, pref-
erence is given to those sites where there are
Relatively weak enemy defenses.
Concealed movement routes to the water obstacle and a bend toward
the attackers.
12-71. Crossing site force commanders have responsibility for the conduct of
the crossing and the tactical arrangement and security of the crossing zone.
Crossing force units are placed in a supporting relationship to the crossing
site commander while within the crossing zone.

Categories
12-72. The width of the water obstacle affects the method of crossing, the
type of crossing, the need for reinforcement, and the length of time to conduct
the crossing. In terms of width, obstacle categories are narrow (less than 100
m), medium (100 to 250 m), wide (250 to 600 m), and large (greater than 600
m). In terms of depth, shallow water obstacles are up to 1.5 m in depth, deep
obstacles are 1.5 to 5 m in depth, and very deep obstacles are over 5 m deep.

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

12-73. Although canals are narrow obstacles, engineers place them in a spe-
cial category because their deep water and steep banks make it difficult to
use tracked amphibians, ferries, and standard bridging equipment. It is often
necessary to erect piers and special constructions to negotiate them.

Reconnaissance
12-74. Depending on the situation, an engineer reconnaissance patrol, the
reconnaissance element of an MSD, or engineers attached to other division
and brigade reconnaissance elements can reconnoiter a water obstacle. The
reconnaissance includes determining
The depth, width, and current velocity.
The composition of the bottom.
The presence of underwater obstructions or mines.
Possible fording, ferrying, bridging, and snorkeling sites.
The composition, height, and slope of the banks.
Approach and exit routes.
The camouflage potential of the area.
The presence and nature of obstacles on the banks.
Critical terrain features overlooking both banks.
Information on enemy defenses.
The engineers transmit this information to the CELT for planning purposes.
They mark recommended crossing sites, bypasses, routes, and critical areas
for the follow-on engineer elements responsible for establishing the crossing.
12-75. The divisions engineer battalion has qualified divers with scuba gear;
specialized vehicles and equipment to analyze soil data, stream velocities and
depth; and mine-detection equipment. Commanders can also use maps, aerial
photographs, engineer and combat patrols, radars, signals reconnaissance,
and human intelligence to gather data on crossing sites.
12-76. The number of engineer reconnaissance patrols depends on the width
of the water obstacle and the number of required crossing sitespatrols vary
from squad to platoon size. The patrols can be equipped with tracked am-
phibians, scout cars, or APCs and sometimes with special engineer recon-
naissance vehicles.

Planning and Preparation

12-77. Based on reconnaissance, the commander organizes his unit to ensure
the most expedient crossing and continuation of the offense. When approach-
ing a water obstacle, he selects his units formation based on the mission, en-
emy, and terrain. Constituent engineer assets deploy well forward. Mecha-
nized infantry units lead, while fire support and direct air support elements
deploy forward to overcome expected enemy resistance on the line of the ob-
stacle. As in an ordinary attack, this involves lateral deployment of the for-
mation as late as possible and immediately before assaulting the water ob-
stacle. Direct air support is more critical during water obstacle crossings
than during other types of ground combat action.

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12-78. Units engaged in a water obstacle crossing are extremely vulnerable

to enemy aviation. Therefore, there is a need for air defense at crossing sites
before a crossing is attempted. In some tactical situations, air defense assets
may move across first to maximize the range of their weapons to protect sub-
sequent units making the crossing. Placement and movement sequence of air
defense assets varies as the commander assesses each crossing individually.
(See Air Defense below.)
12-79. Crossing of water obstacles always requires some measure of engineer
preparation, even if it is only limited to engineer reconnaissance at the cross-
ing site. Whenever possible, the OPFOR attempts to cross water obstacles
with minimum delay and press the attack into the enemys depth without
first halting to consolidate on the far bank.

Means
12-80. The OPFOR places high priority on the fielding of water obstacle-
crossing systems. Any obstacle that slows the tactical movement causes a
concentration of forces and invites destruction. To ensure a rapid advance,
many OPFOR APCs, IFVs, and reconnaissance vehicles are amphibious, as
are some self-propelled artillery and tactical SAM carriers. Therefore, the
OPFOR employs amphibious combat vehicles and specialized water obstacle-
crossing systems at the brigade and division level whenever possible. If APCs
and IFVs are amphibious, virtually all vehicles within mechanized infantry
or tank battalions would have either an amphibious or snorkeling capability.
During crossings, tracked amphibians are primarily used for carrying towed
artillery pieces, trucks, small vehicles, and troops. When not engaged in a
crossing, they may be used as tracked cargo carriers. The OPFOR recognizes
the need for tactical water obstacle-crossing assets during all types of combat
and ensures sufficient assets are readily available in engineer units at higher
levels.
12-81. The OPFOR crosses some narrow water obstacles by fording, by
swimming with amphibious combat vehicles, or by using tank- or truck-
mounted and low-water bridges. Other narrow obstacles (up to 100 m) and
medium obstacles require tracked amphibians, ferries, or pontoon bridges.
Wide and large water obstacles require tracked amphibians, ferries, or pon-
toon bridges (sometimes configured as rafts or ferries). Crossing large water
obstacles may necessitate the use of heavy floating bridges or girder bridges
erected by special-category engineers of the strategic-level transportation
services.
12-82. The characteristics of the water obstacle mainly determine the
method chosen for the crossing, although the nature of enemy defenses, the
mission, and the availability of engineer systems are also factors. Figure 12-3
lists the preferred crossing methods.

Water Obstacle Characteristics Preferred Crossing Method

Depth <1.5 m Ford

Depth >1.5 m Ferry or bridge

12-17
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

Width <20 m Tank- or truck-launched bridge

Width 20-100 m Pontoon bridge

Width >100 m Ferry or tracked amphibian

Figure 12-5. Preferred Water Obstacle-Crossing Methods

EXECUTING WATER CROSSINGS

12-83. C3D is the primary consideration in conducting a water crossing. The
OPFOR is aware that even a crossing considered unopposed is vulnerable to
air and missile attack. The OPFOR will make every effort to conceal and
protect crossing units, sites and means from detection and attack.

Opposed Crossing
12-84. Opposed water crossings are the least preferred method of overcoming
an obstacle. This type of crossing requires secrecy, surprise, and high speed
supported by C3D and direct and indirect fire. To preserve the secrecy of the
intended crossing and its location, the OPFOR generally uses minimal prepa-
ration or construction prior to its execution. It emphasizes conducting the
crossing while moving as swiftly as possible and then continuing the offense
on the opposite bank.
12-85. In a mechanized crossing, the OPFOR maximizes the speed and ma-
neuverability advantages of combat vehicles. In the initial wave of the lead
elements, amphibious APCs or IFVs make a rapid amphibious crossing to
seize a bridgehead on the far bank. The crossing is usually covered from the
near bank by all available fires and usually takes place either at night or un-
der a smokescreen. These fires include direct artillery and tank fires, as well
as all available indirect fires. Direct air support, generally fixed-wing, is
more critical during water obstacle crossings than during other types of
ground combat action. See Chapter 11 for details on air defense support of
the crossing. Heliborne (or, less probably, airborne) forces may seize and hold
a bridgehead on the far bank.
12-86. In non-mechanized opposed crossings, C3D generally takes a greater
role. Feints and demonstrations may be used to confuse the enemy as to the
actual crossing zone. Low-visibility conditions are also ideal for conducting
both opposed and unopposed crossings.

Tactical Group Crossings

12-87. Typically, a DTG crosses a major water obstacle with task organized
crossing forces and BTGs operating in separate crossing zones. A DTGs com-
bat elements can cross a significant water obstacle in approximately 5 or 6
hours.
12-88. A typical crossing zone is up to 10 km wide, with two to three detach-
ments crossing first. A BTGs combat elements can cross a significant water
obstacle in approximately 2 to 3 hours.

12-18
________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 12

Unopposed Crossings
12-89. After an opposed crossing, the OPFOR can move company- or platoon-
size pontoon bridge units to the crossing site. If preceding units (including
the SD of a brigade) have eliminated enemy resistance at the water obstacle,
battalions in the main body of a brigade can conduct an unopposed crossing.
If the brigade(s) must conduct an opposed crossing and are successful, this al-
lows the divisions follow-on forces to conduct an unopposed crossing.
12-90. Bridges. Bridge crossings are a typical feature of unopposed cross-
ings. Construction of bridges starts when the enemy is denied the ability to
subject the crossing to direct or observed fire. Bridges have greater load-
bearing and throughput capacities than other crossing means and are pre-
ferred in order to maintain high rates of advance.
12-91. The division commander may send out an independent mission de-
tachment (IMD) ahead of the SDs of his lead brigades when there is an op-
portunity to seize a bridgehead over an undefended or poorly defended water
obstacle or bridge. The brigade can possibly send out an IMD of its own. In
either case, the IMD attempts to bypass enemy resistance forward of the wa-
ter obstacle and infiltrates to the far side of the water obstacle to establish a
bridgehead.
12-92. If the air situation is unfavorable, the OPFOR may only use bridges
during periods of limited visibility. At other times, it would tuck the bridges
into the bank and camouflage them.
12-93. The crossing commander designates TCPs, OPs, and work teams at
the crossing site. A bridge team is assigned to inspect pontoon couplings and
bank moorings, to evaluate and repair damage, and to monitor entry and exit
of vehicles.
12-94. Low-water bridges can free pontoon bridges, ferries, and tracked am-
phibians for use in other crossings. Low-water bridging is relatively perma-
nent, using piling to provide support.
12-95. Ferries. Ferry crossings are used to transport nonamphibious heavy
equipment across medium to wide water obstacles. This usually requires
three to four ferries per site. Ferries can be joined into a pontoon bridge or
can be used as individual ferries. Individual folding pontoon bridge sections
can also be used as ferries. Ferries are not usually employed in the initial
wave of an opposed or unopposed crossing but rather in subsequent waves of
tanks and other combat vehicles.
12-96. Ferry crossings begin can 15 to 20 minutes after the start of an op-
posed crossing. Ferries are launched from prepared ramps, and personnel
from the ferry platoon create landing ramps on the far bank. Floating pon-
toon bridge rafts are maneuvered and positioned by powerboats.
12-97. Engineer missions in the unopposed crossing are the same as they are
in the opposed crossing, but engineers are also assigned to prepare mooring
and launching sites and to assemble the ferries. Based on engineer recon-
naissance data, the crossing commander selects mooring sites, determines
the number and disposition of ferries or pontoon bridges used as ferries, and

12-19
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

plans traffic control. An engineer squad or a traffic control squad directs

movement to the sites.
12-98. Tank Snorkeling. Such crossings are attempted when fording, bridge,
or ferry crossing sites are not available or when an opportunity for surprise
exists. Snorkeling is attempted only at water obstacles that have
Depths of 5.5 m or less.
Prepared entry and exit points.
Entry slope of 47 percent (25) or less.
Exit slope of 27 percent (15) or less.
Stream velocities of 3 m/s or less.
Hard, level bottoms with no boulders, craters, or soft spots.

12-99. Fording. In opposed and unopposed crossings, the OPFOR estab-

lishes fords at shallow water crossing sites. Since fordings are not as compli-
cated as other crossings, the unit may remain in tactical movement forma-
tion. If possible, multiple units cross simultaneously on a wide frontage.
12-100. Deeper fords can be undertaken by tanks without the use of snorkels
but may require partial sealing of the tanks up to the turret ring. When par-
tially sealed, air for the engine and crew is drawn in through open turret
hatches. Deep fording by tanks is limited to depths not exceeding 2.3 to 2.5
m, depending on currents.
12-101. Assembly and Preparation Areas. Engineers assist in the prepa-
ration of assembly areas and of boarding and preparation areas near crossing
sites. As units leave assembly areas, they pass through an engineer regulat-
ing point (ERP). The ERP is a checkpoint to ensure that vehicles do not ex-
ceed the capacity of the crossing means. At the ERP, vehicle drivers receive
final instructions on site-specific procedures and information, such as vehicle
speed and interval. Near the ERP is the first of a series of TCPs to direct the
unit to the appropriate crossing site and avoid bunching up at the crossing
site or on the approach route.
12-102. Figure 12-4 shows an example of a mechanized infantry battalion
crossing supported by tracked amphibians, ferries, and a pontoon bridge. In
this example, two companies cross by amphibious means, while the third
company and support elements are able to cross over a pontoon bridge in tac-
tical movement formation. Normally, bridges are erected only after the far
bank is secured to a depth precluding enemy direct fire on the crossing site.
However, if the enemy defense has been neutralized by fire or the opposite
bank has been seized by airborne or heliborne forces, bridge construction
may begin along with the opposed crossing.

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________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 12

Up to 5 km
CC

ACC

CC
I ERP
Battalion
ACC Assembly
Area

RI I
VE
R

Legend:

CC Crossing Commander
CC Tracked Amphibian
Assistant Crossing Crossing Site
ACC
Commander
Ferry
Engineer Regulating Crossing
ERP Site
ACC Point

Traffic Control Point Amphibious

Combat Vehicle
Crossing Site
Road Signs

Line of Deployment into

R

Platoon Columns
IV
E
R

Figure 12-6. Engineer Support of a Mechanized Infantry Battalion Crossing (Example)

Air Defense
12-103. Forces conducting water obstacle crossings are high priority targets
for enemy air strikes. Thus, the importance of air defense increases. The mis-
sion of air defense units is to protect the airspace above and around the cross-
ing site. For more information on air defense, see Chapter 10.
12-104. The OPFOR expects that most water obstacle crossings will be op-
posed by enemy air and ground defense and made without the advantage of
an existing bridge, convenient fording sites, or defensive air cover. Accord-
ingly, doctrine calls for conducting such opposed crossings rapidly, without
slowing the pace of the offense. The leading maneuver battalions and bri-
gades may have to provide their own air defense while crossing and then
cover the crossing of follow-on forces.
12-105. For unopposed crossings, the maneuver unit may cross a water obsta-
cle without deploying from its movement formation. In this case, division- or
brigade-level air defense units can establish firing positions on the near bank
to cover the site for the time it takes the column to cross. The air defense
units then move to the far bank and either establish firing positions or con-
tinue to move.

Smoke
12-106. Most opposed crossings are conducted under the cover of smoke or
other obscurants, which can degrade the enemys ability to locate and target
the actual crossing sites. However, smoke can also degrade or prevent visual

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

acquisition of air threats by some OPFOR air defense systems. Therefore,

wind and obscurant conditions must be accounted for in the deployment of
air defense weapons for the crossing. For more information on smoke em-
ployment, see Chapter 12.

DEFENSE
12-107. The necessity for OPFOR engineers to support two basic battles, one
against a regional enemy and one against an extraregional enemy, was dis-
cussed earlier in this chapter. Since the extraregional enemy is the dominant
force in the region the OPFOR generally fights a defensive fight. In order to
defeat this extraregional force the OPFOR employs innovative engineer
methods to level the battlefield in addition to those employed in the more
conventional battle. Some examples of these methods are found later in this
section.
12-108. Engineer support for the defense focuses on reconnaissance, coun-
termobility support, and survivability support. It places emphasis on fortify-
ing battle positions and assembly areas, performing engineer C3D measures,
and adapting the terrain for defense. The defense is also conducive to the ex-
tensive use of various obstacles to interfere with the enemys advance.
12-109. The general aims of engineer support the defense include
Control access and tempo by delaying, disaggregating, and canalizing
enemy forces.
Establishing conditions necessary for organizing the defense.
Preparing and maintaining maneuver (and supply) routes.
Building fortifications of lines, battle positions, and assembly areas.
Ensure the integration of engineer support to IW and preparing de-
ception positions.
Protecting personnel and equipment from the effects of conventional
direct and indirect fires, precision munitions, and NBC strikes.
Creating or improving existing obstacles.
Providing potable water to the force.

12-110. The type and scale of engineer support depends on the tactical situa-
tion, enemy forces, and the conditions under which the DTG assumes the de-
fense. If the OPFOR does so during the course of the offense, support may
have to begin with the protection of threatened axes by ODs and ATRs and
the route work needed for regrouping. If the OPFOR assumes a defense when
not in contact with the enemy, support can begin with the creation of defen-
sive works and the improvement of routes necessary for the OPFOR units to
deploy. In the disruption and battle zones, the goals of engineer support are
to hold up the enemy advance. In the battle zones, engineer support facili-
tates organized withdrawal, maneuver, or counterattack by friendly forces.
12-111. Defensive planning measures ensure extensive use of obstacles, inte-
grated with preplanned direct and indirect fires, to affect the enemys ad-
vance and facilitate his destruction. Figure 12-5 identifies tactical missions

12-22
 ________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 12

supported by engineer efforts. The performance of technical tasks satisfies

the tactical requirements for engineers.

Tactical Missions Engineer

Requiring Engineer Support Technical Tasks

Repelling enemy attacks in front of the battle line. Conduct engineer reconnaissance of enemy and ter-
Preparation of defensive areas. rain.
Troop movement. Prepare fortifications in defensive positions.
Battle to hold positions. Clear passages in obstacles and perform demolition
Repelling enemy penetrations of defense. work.
Overcoming covering force zone. Establish and maintain water obstacle-crossing sites.
Counterattack by exploitation forces or reserve. Establish and improve obstacles.
Reinforcing lines taken in counterattack. Extract/purify water and establish water supply points.
Transition to the offense. Carry out engineer camouflage measures.
Prepare and maintain movement routes.
Eliminate aftereffects of NBC strikes.

Figure 12-7. Engineer Support for Preparation and Conduct of the Defense

12-112. The CELT determines the extent of engineer preparation necessary

after considering the conditions that caused the OPFOR to assume the de-
fense. If it is during the course of the offense, support begins with the ODs
and ATRs protecting threatened axes and the improving of the route(s)
needed for regrouping. If it is a defense not in contact with the enemy, sup-
port begins with the creation of defense works and the improvement of routes
for the unit to deploy. In both cases, engineer work supports development of
the battle position by enhancing the effectiveness of OPFOR weapons and
protecting personnel and equipment from the effects of conventional fire and
weapons of mass destruction.

COUNTERMOBILITY
12-113. The OPFOR makes extensive use of countermobility operations to
control access and tempo by delaying, disaggregating, and canalizing enemy
forces. The obstacle plan is innovative and completely integrated with the
maneuver, fire support, and IW plans.
12-114. OPFOR engineer obstacles include any actions taken to inflict losses
and to delay and impede enemy movement. The creation of engineer obsta-
cles and execution of demolition activities are critical engineer functions in
all phases of the battle.
12-115. Countermobility support is extremely innovative, especially when the
OPFOR fights an extraregional enemy. Minefields may be irregular-shaped
and are thoroughly merged with the terrain. They also tend to be much
smaller than those laid in regional operations (especially linear operations),
which may easily be over a kilometer in length. Some example adaptive en-
gineer countermobility methods likely to be employed against an extrare-
gional enemy (in addition to methods used in a more conventional battle)
are

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

The intermittent laying of mines along road or trails involves the en-
emy in prolonged, potentially dangerous and time-consuming detection
and clearance operations, and requires a great deal of manpower.
Enemy LOCs will be mined and re-mined. This requires the extrare-
gional forces to constantly sweep for mines. Once a road is swept and
left unsecured, the OPFOR re-mines it.
Control access by denying the enemy key facilities. For example, de-
stroying airfield runways in the APOD or docks in the SPOD.
Deny LOCs from APOD/SPODs to enemy maneuver units, staging ar-
eas, or base camps. Contain (or trap) enemy forces in specific areas
such as APOD/SPOD and built-up areas.
Maximize the use of controlled minefields. This lets the OPFOR pass
through the minefield and activate it prior to the arrival of enemy
units. It can also be used to trap enemy units. This is used in conjunc-
tion with artillery as a kill zone.
Use off-road and chemical mines whenever possible. Always use anti-
handling devices (AHD) to slow clearing efforts.
Target vehicle mine plows/rollers as HPTs.
Use plastic mines to defeat mine detection sweeps.
Plant underwater mines at port or ford sites.

12-116. In the defense, engineer obstacles

Protect flanks.
Disrupt attacks.
Block enemy reinforcements, exploitation forces, or reserves.
Strengthen the defense.
Disrupt enemy activities.
Canalize the enemy into kill zones.
Cover gaps between defenders.

12-117. The OPFOR divides engineer obstacles into three categories:

Explosive obstaclesminefields, groups of mines, and objects prepared
for demolition.
Nonexplosive obstaclesAT ditches, escarpments, abatis, wire barri-
ers, and water obstacles.
Combination obstaclesa combination of explosive and nonexplosive
obstacles.

12-118. Of the three categories, explosive obstacles are the most common.
Engineers and others can emplace minefields more easily and quickly when
compared to the construction effort for nonexplosive obstacles. Additionally,
the OPFOR plans for the self-destruct or self-neutralization capabilities fre-
quently found in scatterable mines. It can also lay mines with remote-control
devices to activate or deactivate the minefield at will. This minimizes the ad-

12-24
________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 12

verse effect of friendly minefields on future actions and reduces the need for
the OPFOR to breach its own obstacles.
12-119. However, this is not the case with nonexplosive obstacles, which are
time- and resource-intensive to install and eliminate. For these reasons, the
OPFOR usually emplaces mines and other explosive obstacles first, and even-
tually supplements them by constructing nonexplosive obstacles.
12-120. When this occurs, they create combination obstacles, which are the
next most common after the explosive type. It is extremely rare for the
OPFOR to use a nonexplosive obstacle in isolation without any mines, explo-
sives, or booby traps.

OBSTACLE DETACHMENT
12-121. The OD is the basic building block of the OPFORs countermobility
effort. It is a task organization composed primarily of engineers. An OD can
vary in size depending on the tactical situation and the needs of the com-
mander.
12-122. ODs are temporary, task-organized groupings of engineer assets in-
tended to create minefields and obstacles. Their basic equipment includes
mechanical minelayers and trucks carrying mines, explosives, and other
equipment. They are sometimes augmented with mechanized infantry troops
for close protection and extra labor. The size and composition of the OD de-
pend on the tactical situation and the needs of the maneuver commander..
12-123. In addition to minelayers, ODs may add other engineer resources to
support critical obstacle development. The division may supplement the OD
with engineers for demolition work, ditchers to create antitank (AT) ditches,
and other engineer systems. This augmentation does not normally occur until
the earthmoving equipment completes other tasks, such as preparing fortifi-
cations.
12-124. The OD uses its ability to rapidly lay minefields and construct obsta-
cles to
Close gaps in the defense.
Deny the enemy access to key terrain.
Block the axis of an enemy armored advance.
Block enemy penetrations.
Channel the enemy into a kill zone and contain him there.
Protect the flank of a counterattacking force.

12-125. In the defense, the OPFOR commander may hold the OD and other
forces in reserve and can quickly employ them during an enemy attack, to
mine potentially vulnerable gaps. Engineer tasks during the defense imple-
ment obstacle plans, particularly AT obstacles. Together with ATRs, ODs
provide a quick-reaction AT force to block enemy penetrations.
12-126. Engineers create obstacles on possible enemy approaches to OPFOR
battle positions or artillery and air defense firing positions, in the gaps be-

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

tween battle positions, and on flanks. They normally construct barrier sys-
tems in coordination with the overall fire support plan.
12-127. Engineers can lay mines and construct obstacles in the disruption
zone and on likely enemy armored avenues of approach. They can also lay
obstacles in the depth of friendly units in the battle zone, and at subsequent
defensive lines throughout the AOR. However, simultaneous obstacle con-
struction throughout the AOR can only occur when sufficient time, equip-
ment, and personnel are available. In any part of the AOR, minefields and
other obstacles require barriers, security, and marked maneuver passages.
12-128. In preparation for movement, the division or brigade creates one or
more ODs to maximize mechanical minelaying and explosive obstacle sup-
port for maneuver forces. The OD provides countermobility support and de-
nies key terrain to the enemy. Its mission is to alter the tactical situation by
emplacing obstacles in response to enemy actions. During the tactical move-
ment, the OPFOR commanders greatest concern is armor attacks against the
flanks. Therefore, the OD emplaces AT obstacles in front of detected armor
threats or along possible routes suitable for armored vehicles. For additional
information on the employment and augmentation of the OD, see the discus-
sion of Obstacle Detachment [WHERE?].
12-129. Although the OD can act independently, the division or brigade often
assigns it to move and act in close coordination with the antitank reserve
(ATR). Even in the latter case, the OD still reports directly to the engineer
unit commander, who assigns its priorities, areas of concern, and task or-
ganization. This arrangement provides the maneuver commander with a
combination of organizations capable of rapidly emplacing AT obstacles as
well as covering the obstacles with AT fires. A minelaying squad of an engi-
neer mine warfare platoon or minelayer platoon usually serves as the core of
an OD.
12-130. While conducting tactical movement, the OD may travel behind the
SD and in front of the main body. Sometimes, it may move on a threatened
flank or forward within the main body, ready to deploy to either flank.
12-131. Following the maneuver commanders guidance, the engineer liaison
team recommends positioning of the OD so it can quickly deploy in response
to enemy actions. This may be to seal a critical area or to provide time to
shift forces and fires. The maneuver commander, the engineer liaison
team(s), and other staff elements monitor the progress of the tactical move-
ment and plan for possible enemy courses of action. They then identify possi-
ble deployment lines for the ATR and obstacle-emplacement locations for the
OD. If reconnaissance assets report enemy activity along a given axis that
confirms a course of action, the commander dispatches an OD and an ATR to
the appropriate deployment line to conduct their missions.

OBSTACLE PLANNING
12-132. Creating engineer obstacles and carrying out demolition activities are
significant engineer functions in all phases of the battle. The obstacle plan is
tailored and integrated into the overall operation plan with mutually sup-
porting systems of fire, as exemplified by the habitual association between
the OD and the ATR. Just as it develops a fire support plan, it also develops

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________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 12

an integrated obstacle plan tailored specifically to each unique tactical situa-

tion. Engineer obstacles include any actions taken to inflict losses and to de-
lay and impede enemy movement. In the offense, obstacles protect flanks,
disrupt counterattacks, and strengthen captured positions. In the defense,
engineer obstacles may strengthen the defense, disrupt enemy operations,
and cover gaps.
12-133. Engineers can lay mines and construct obstacles in the disruption
zone and on likely enemy armored avenues of approach. They can also lay
obstacles in the depth of friendly units in the battle zone, and at subsequent
defensive lines throughout the AOR. However, simultaneous obstacle con-
struction throughout the AOR can only occur when sufficient time, equip-
ment, and personnel are available. In any part of the AOR, minefields and
other obstacles require barriers, security, and marked maneuver passages.
12-134. To develop the obstacle plan, the CELT conducts an evaluation of the
situation from an engineer perspective. He usually performs his analysis in
the sequence outlined in Figure 12-6. Using this information, plus his com-
manders scheme of maneuver, he determines engineer allocations and pri-
orities, and directs obstacle development and other engineer preparation.

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

Sequence Determine and Evaluate

1. Enemy Enemy engineer capabilities.

Possible enemy engineer courses of action.
Composition of enemy engineer units, with available equipment.

2. Terrain Masking properties.

Suitability for fortifications, sustainment, mobility, and countermobility measures.
Fields of fire and avenues of approach.
Target acquisition and weapon ranges.
Natural obstacles and key terrain features.
Impact on friendly and enemy forces and actions.

3. Weather Impact on friendly and enemy forces and actions.

4. Time Available Impact on friendly and enemy forces and actions.

5. Resources Available Composition of engineer resources.

Available equipment and types of mines.
Capabilities of available resources to support the current battle.
Resources required to support upcoming combat actions.

Figure 12-8. Sequence of Analysis of Tactical Situation in Obstacle Planning

Explosive Obstacles
12-135. The OPFOR emphasizes the use of explosive obstacles. These include
mines and demolitions. The widespread use of landmines on todays battle-
fields results from a combination of mass production, plastic mines, improved
battlefield delivery systems, and development of sophisticated fuzing. Re-
motely-delivered mines have expanded capability for changing the tempo of
battle.
12-136. Mines. Mines are the most significant obstacles the OPFOR can em-
ploy and are usually emplaced in groups or in minefields. Therefore, mine-
fields and minelaying are afforded separate sections below.
12-137. Demolitions. The OPFOR emphasizes the importance of roads as
high-speed avenues of attack for both friendly and enemy forces. Therefore, it
views the use of demolitions on roads as a significant way to disrupt enemy
movement. Critical points at which the OPFOR might use demolitions in-
clude overpasses, bridges, ravines, intersections, bypasses, approaches to wa-
ter obstacles, and roadways through urban or other complex terrain.

Nonexplosive Obstacles
12-138. Nonexplosive obstacles fall into three categories: AT, AP, and anti-
landing. Nonexplosive AT obstacles include ditches, dragons teeth, and vari-
ous other manmade and natural barriers. AP obstacles include concertina
and barbed wire. Antilanding obstacles include dragons teeth, AT ditches,
and wire obstacles. The OPFOR uses these obstacles at potential drop or
landing zones for amphibious, airborne, or heliborne assaults. The primary

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________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 12

responsibility for the construction of nonexplosive obstacles rests with the

maneuver unit.

MINEFIELDS
12-139. The OPFOR frequently uses minefields during all phases of combat.
There are five basic types of OPFOR minefield:
Antitank (AT).
Antipersonnel (AP).
Mixed.
Decoy.
Antilanding.

12-140. The OPFOR stresses the importance of covering minefields with both
direct and indirect fires, particularly with long-range AT weapons. Minefields
inflict damage on attacking enemy forces and slow and canalize enemy forces
into kill zones covered by massed fires. Whenever possible, the OPFOR con-
tains enemy forces in a window of vulnerability for the longest time possible.
This facilitates the destruction of the enemy.
12-141. Conventional OPFOR minefields generally conform to doctrinal stan-
dards. This standardization ensures that engineers and combat personnel fol-
low consistent, uniform practices. Scatterable minefields, however, are much
less predictable in pattern. Maneuver commanders use combat personnel to
emplace protective minefields around fighting positions, while engineers
shape the battlefield for the maneuver commander.
12-142. Commanders of battalions and companies emplacing mines prepare
minefield records in three copies: one for the unit, one to the brigade, and one
to the division. The CELT at division and brigade level then uses the records
to prepare combined obstacle overlays for the maneuver commander. Mine-
fields are a fundamental part of the total obstacle plan that incorporates bar-
riers and terrain features.

Antitank
12-143. AT minefields are the primary type of OPFOR engineer obstacle and
serve to destroy or disable armored vehicles. They are primarily established
in belts consisting of multiple rows on avenues that are favorable for tanks in
front of the battle line and on the flanks. Where difficult terrain is available,
minefield belts will be tied into terrain obstacles to reduce the mine require-
ment. They are also placed at unit boundaries and in the depths to cover ar-
tillery firing positions, command posts (CPs), and other objectives.
12-144. The OPFOR usually emplaces AT minefields on a frontage of 200 to
300 m or more and to a depth of 60 to 120 m. The mines are laid in three or
four rows with approximately 20 to 40 m separating each row. The normal
spacing between AT mines in the rows is 4 to 5.5 m for pressure-activated
mines, and 9 to 12 m for full-width-attack mines. The normal mine outlay for
1 km of frontage in AT minefields is usually 300 to 400 full-width-attack
mines, or 550 to 750 pressure-activated mines. This mine outlay can reach
1,000 or more AT mines per km of frontage on major avenues of approach.

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

The OPFOR refers to this density of mines as a minefield of increased effec-

tiveness.
12-145. In urban environments, the OPFOR may place groups of AT mines on
narrow streets and alleys. It calculates emplacement of AT mines at the rate
of one mine per 100 m of street or alley. Figure 12-7 illustrates the general
emplacement of an AT minefield with track-attack mines. Figure 12-8 shows
an AT minefield with full-width-attack mines.

Track-Attack Mines

Enemy

Row 1
4-5.5 m
20-40 m

Row 2

Row 3

Track-attack mines Row 4

Figure 12-9. AT Minefield Configuration with Track-Attack Mines (Example)

Full-Width-Attack Mines

Enemy

Row 1
9-12 m
20-40 m

Row 2

Row 3

Row 4

Figure 12-10. AT Minefield Configuration with Full-Width-Attack Mines (Example)

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________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 12

Antipersonnel
12-146. On the battlefield, the modern AP mine is used to
Inflict personnel casualties.
Hinder soldiers in clearing AT minefields.
Establish defensive positions.
Deny access to terrain.

12-147. The OPFOR can set up conventional AP minefields on the forward

edge of friendly defensive positions, in front of AT minefields, or along dis-
mounted avenues of approach. These minefields can consist of blast mines,
fragmentation mines, or a mixture of the two. The OPFOR emplaces AP
minefields on a frontage of 30 to 300 m or more with a depth of 10 to 50 m or
more. It usually lays AP mines in two to four rows with a distance of 5 m or
more between rows.
12-148. The OPFOR may emplace 2,000 to 3,000 blast and 100 to 300 frag-
mentation mines per km of frontage. An AP minefield of increased effective-
ness may have as much as three times the normal outlay of AP mines. Inter-
vals between mines in a row are at least 1 m for blast mines and up to twice
their destructive radius for fragmentation mines. Figure 12-9 shows varia-
tions of the employment of AP minefields.
12-149. Emplacement of minefields with increased effectiveness is more
likely on dismounted avenues of approach. In urban environments, the
OPFOR can emplace 2 to 3 fragmentation mines for every 50 to 100 m of
street. It prefers to use blast mines and fragmentation mines within build-
ings.

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

Enemy

X X X X X Row 1
Row 1
5-6 m
No Less Than 1 m

Row 2 X X X X Row 2

5m+ 5m+

Row 3 Row 3

Row 4 Trip Wire Activated Fragmentation Mines

with an Effective Radius of 5-6 m

Blast Mines

X X X Row 1 X X X X X X Row 1
15-20 m
13 m + 25 m

X X X Row 2 X X X X Row 2
25-50 m

Row 3
Row 3

Fragmentation Mines with a Radius Trip Wire Activated Fragmentation Mines

of Destruction of 15-20 m with a Radius of Destruction of 25 m +
Legend:
O = AP Mine
X = Stake
X = Trip Wire Fuze

Figure 12-11. AP Minefield Configuration (Example)

Mixed
12-150. Mixed minefields contain both AT and AP mines. A mixed minefield
is generally viewed as a minefield with pure homogenous rows of either AP or
AT mines. This is mainly due to the physical constraints of mechanical mine-
layers. They cannot lay both AT and AP mines in the same row. This does not
preclude mixed minefields from having a mixture of both AT and AP mines.
They can be laid manually or remotely. It is easy to remotely seed an area
with a combination of both. However, the AT mine requirements govern the
mixed minefields parameters, outlay, and density. In areas that are not suit-
able for armored vehicles, AP mines constitute the majority of mixed mine
obstacles. Figure 12-10 shows an example of a mixed minefield with blast AP
rows between AT rows.

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Blast AP Rows Between AT Rows.

Enemy

Row 1

Row 2

Row 3

Row 4

Figure 12-12. Mixed Minefield with Blast AP Rows between AT Rows (Example)

12-151. Combat arms personnel set up nonexplosive and mixed minefield ob-
stacles to cover their defensive positions. Engineers lay mixed minefields in
front of the battle line and on primary avenues into the defensive depth.
Mixed minefields are usually established in front of unit positions that are
transitioning to the defense. Figure 12-11 illustrates an example of a mixed
minefield with an AP minefield leading to full width AT minefield.

Decoy
12-152. Decoy minefields are a significant form of deception to slow move-
ment or deceive as to true unit locations. The OPFOR uses decoy, or false
minefields to mislead the enemy as to the locations of actual minefields. As
part of tactical deception, units typically give the impression of minelaying
activity, usually scarification of the soil, minelaying debris, minefield fences
and markers.

Antilanding
12-153. Antilanding minefields prevent landings by amphibious, airborne, or
heliborne assault forces. The OPFOR uses antilanding mines at possible
landing or drop zones (LZs or DZs) or when conducting combat along the sea-
coast or inland water features. It employs explosive, nonexplosive, and com-
bination obstacles. Minefields established in the water consist of bottom and
anchored mines and, at shallower depths, waterproof mines. The OPFOR
uses all types of mines above the shoreline, emplacing them following normal
minefield doctrine. At LZs and DZs it uses fragmentation and directional AP
mines. It also emplaces antihelicopter mines in locations it believes will be
used as firing (battle) positions for enemy attack helicopters or in possible
LZs to be used by lift helicopters.

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AP Minefield Leading to Full-Width AT Minefield.

Enemy

5+ m

Row 1
9-12 m
20-40 m

Row 2

Row 3

Row 4

Figure 12-13. Mixed Minefield with an AP Minefield Leading to Full-Width AT Minefield (Exam-
ple)

Controlled
12-154. Some OPFOR units have the capability to lay controlled minefields.
These minefields consist of landmines with electronic switches (on/off) giving
the operator control over the operational status of the minefield. The opera-
tor can change the status of an area of the battlefield and make it either haz-
ardous for the enemy or render the area safe for friendly troops. This is done
either by a direct hardwire link or by radio. An entire minefield can be em-
placed and turned on or off, as necessary, to best support friendly operations.
12-155. On a smaller scale, select passages in a conventional minefield can
contain controllable landmines, allowing for the option of clearing safe lanes
for friendly use. The addition of selectable anti-removal and self-destruct fea-
tures to controlled mines enhances flexibility and overall effectiveness. Con-
trolled minefields can also be established in a maneuver defense to ensure
unrestricted maneuver of units over mined areas and to cut off enemy units
in pursuit.

MINELAYING
12-156. Mines are an essential element of both offensive and defensive com-
bat. The means of emplacing minefields can be manual, mechanical, or re-
mote. Since minelaying is a common task skill, manual emplacement is per-
formed by anybody and is the method employed by maneuver units. How-
ever, manual minelaying is labor-intensive and requires the expenditure of
more time than may be available during high-speed maneuver. Therefore,
OPFOR engineers may have towed and/or tracked conventional mechanical
minelaying vehicles that can quickly emplace both buried and surface-laid
minefields. The engineers may also have vehicle-mounted scatterable mine-
laying systems. These mechanical systems to allow engineer forces to quickly

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mine an area just prior to or during the battle. Engineer resources are sup-
plemented by remote mine delivery from artillery and aircraft. Infantry units
can also have man-portable remote mine dispensers.
12-157. The methods and extent of minelaying depend on
The OPFORs intentions.
The tactical situation.
Terrain characteristics.
The type of mine.
Time available.
Available engineer support.

12-158. With the high tempo of the modern mobile battlefield, the use of re-
motely-delivered mines is increasing. In volume, however, they do not exceed
the use of conventional landmines. Conventional minefields are better suited
to protecting defensive positions that the OPFOR intends to maintain for
some time. In this case, it expends greater time and effort to bury and cam-
ouflage the mines and integrate the minefields into the total defensive
scheme. Mine density in these types of fields is also greater. These minefields
are more likely to have a mix of AT and AP mines. In setting up a fully pre-
pared defense, troops of all units take part in preparing obstacles and laying
mines.

Manual
12-159. The OPFOR manually emplaces minefields when
There is no contact with the enemy.
Mechanical minelayers are unavailable.
Use of mechanical minelayers is inadvisable because of terrain restric-
tions.
A mine warfare platoon can manually lay 200 to 300 AT mines in 1 to 2
hours. It can recover about 200 AT mines an hour, if the mines are not
equipped with self-destruct or antihandling devices.

Mechanical
12-160. OPFOR engineers rely extensively on mechanical minelayers. These
can bury or surface-lay AT mines. The layout of mechanically emplaced mine-
fields is the same as those emplaced by hand.
12-161. The normal sequence for mechanically laying mines is to emplace the
most forward minefield first and to work progressively back to friendly de-
fensive positions. The engineers align the mechanical minelayers parallel to
the battle line. The minelayers start at separate intervals. This staggers the
minelayers in a 30- to 45-degree echelon formation as they travel along the
battle line. This method ensures that mines in one row are not directly be-
hind those in another when approached by the enemy. This increases the
probability for a mine encounter by ensuring that if an attacker misses the
first mine, he should still encounter one in subsequent rows. Mines can also
be emplaced by helicopters or vehicles with the use of chutes (slides). Mine

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chutes can also be used to assist manual burial emplacement or to surface-

lay mines. Figure 12-12 illustrates the mechanical AT minelaying sequence.

4-5.5 m Track Attack

or
9-12 m Full-Width Attack

Figure 12-14. Mechanical AT Minelaying Sequence (Example)

Remote
12-162. Remote minelaying gives the OPFOR a capability to strike targets
and rapidly project mines deep in enemy territory or anywhere in the AOR. It
provides increased tactical responsiveness and flexibility and reduces the
manpower requirement for minelaying, as well as minimizes exposure of the
minelaying equipment to enemy fire. Once emplaced, these minefields can
instantaneously affect the tactical situation and degrade the enemys reac-
tion time to the sudden appearance of the obstacle. Thus, they are ideally
suited to the highly mobile, lethal battlefield of modern warfare. Since many
scatterable landmines feature self-destruct and antidisturbance fuzing, they
are well suited for missions that deny terrain for a specific period.
12-163. Remote delivery is useful against enemy reinforcing units, areas of
troop concentration, CPs, firing positions, and other objectives. It can protect
flanks or block enemy penetrations. The OPFOR prefers to trap a force inside
a minefield rather than merely creating an obstacle that the enemy can by-
pass. Therefore, remote minelaying can create two types of minefields: cover-
ing and containing. A covering minefield can block the movement route of an
advancing or withdrawing enemy. A containing minefield can prevent the
enemy unit from moving out of a deployment area (or firing position) or
within the area.
12-164. The OPFOR uses remotely-delivered or scatterable mines to reduce
enemy mobility, inflict losses, and to create the conditions for the destruction
of an enemy force. Scatterable mines also have a psychological effect on en-
emy morale. They can be laid close to friendly positions and covered by
friendly fire or laid deep in enemy territory. Minefields created by scatterable
mines lack precise boundaries or a definitive mine emplacement pattern, and
generally remain on or near the surface of the ground.

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12-165. Scatterable mines can be delivered from jet aircraft, helicopters, mul-
tiple rocket launchers (MRLs), trucks, and other ground vehicles, or by dis-
mounted soldiers in the forward parapet of fighting positions. These mines
are scattered randomly on the ground with no semblance to classical pat-
terns. Frequently, these types of landmines also incorporate self-destruct or
self-neutralization features to control and limit their active duration once
emplaced. After the allotted time has expired, the terrain can again be used
by friendly forces.
12-166. The OPFOR prefers to retain the element of surprise and therefore
employs remotely-delivered, scatterable mines immediately before combat or
during the course of the battle. When dispensed, these minefields are gener-
ally laid immediately in front of attacking, reinforcing, and withdrawing en-
emy troops, or may be emplaced directly on enemy formations. Possible uses
of scatterable mines are to
Isolate enemy forces.
Disrupt the attacking forces, causing them to deploy early and expend
mineclearing assets.
Disrupt and delay enemy exploitation forces, reserves, or counterattack
forces.
Prevent enemy artillery from displacing during counterbattery fire.
Interdict lines of communication.
Prevent the use of a logistics site.
Obstruct a choke point.
Protect flanks.
Seal breaches in friendly obstacles or gaps between units.

12-167. Artillery. Some cannon artillery systems are capable of delivering

both AP and AT mines. However, MRLs are the primary means of remote
minelaying. The principal advantage of MRL mine delivery is its ability to
quickly emplace large minefields in a single volley, while minimizing expo-
sure to enemy targeting and weapon systems. For example, a single volley
from a 220-mm MRL battery can deliver over 2,300 AT scatterable mines to a
range of 10 to 35 km. With these mines, it can emplace a covering minefield
approximately 3 km wide or a containing minefield about 1,200 m wide and
1,200 m deep.
12-168. Infantry. The OPFOR may also employ small, man-portable remote
mine dispensers with its lower-level infantry units. These mine dispensers,
weighing only a few pounds, can be either pulled like a handcart or carried
by a soldier. Depending upon the design, infantry remote minelaying systems
propel mine canisters out to approximately 100 m, while rocket-dispensed
systems may go out as far as 3,000 m. The operator loads the mine-filled
rockets (or a propelling charge and mine canister) into the launch tube,
mounts the system on the edge of a trench or firing parapet, aims the tube,
connects the wire to the tube, moves off to a safe distance, and connects the
wire to the blasting mechanism. With a trained operator, it takes only a few
minutes to set up the dispenser and create a minefield.

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12-169. Infantry-fired ground dispensers are ideal for installing small, defen-
sive, AP or AT minefields. They allow low-level units to remotely emplace
minefields to protect their battle positions, flanks, and boundaries between
units, or to cover firing lines and gaps in combat formations. They can
quickly close breaches in existing protective minefields and increase the den-
sity of mines on armor avenues of approach.
12-170. Ground Vehicles. Within recent years, the trend has been to mount
scatterable-mine dispensers on ground vehicles. Both AP and AT mines can
be launched from ground vehicles. This also gives the engineers the ability to
re-seed or reinforce an obstacle without entering the minefield itself.
12-171. Aerial. Other than the above-mentioned ground force systems for
remote minelaying, aircraft and helicopters can remotely deliver mines. The
following paragraphs describe aerial minelaying capabilities.
12-172. Bombers or ground-attack aircraft can lay remotely-delivered mine-
fields throughout the AOR. Aircraft are only used to deliver mines beyond
the battle line when they cannot be delivered (for whatever reasons) by indi-
rect fire means. Delivering mines from low altitudes deep in enemy territory
increases the risk of losing the aircraft to enemy ground fires or air defense.
Therefore, fixed-wing aircraft are generally used to deliver ordnance such as
scatterable mines beyond the range of OPFOR artillery systems (including
MRLs). Ground-attack aircraft lay these minefields in the enemys tactical
depths.
12-173. High-performance aircraft can lay mines at a speed of 400 to 800
km/h from an elevation of 50 to 200 m. Aircraft-delivered scatterable mine
canisters are dropped on parachutes. The canisters are set to burst open at a
predetermined height to scatter the mines.
12-174. Helicopter minelaying systems are used to emplace large barrier
minefields in the execution of OSC or division offensive or defensive maneu-
ver plans. This type of aerial minelaying is normally conducted over friendly
territoryalong the flanks or in the rear areas. When supporting an airborne
or heliborne landing, helicopters may lay mines on enemy territory.
12-175. Both AT and AP minefields can be laid using aerial minelaying sys-
tems. Some attack and medium-lift helicopters and a few light helicopters
have the capability to perform minelaying missions. A light helicopter does
not carry armament when accomplishing these missions. Medium-lift and at-
tack helicopters are most commonly used for aerial minelaying.
12-176. Some helicopters can dispense conventional mines by the addition of
an internal minelaying chute within their cargo area. Mines are contained on
custom mine racks and then fed manually or automatically onto the chute.
The mines are then armed as they are dispensed. These heliborne minelaying
systems can be used in formations of two, three, or four and operate rela-
tively similar to the ground mechanical minelaying systems. The speed of
minelaying can vary from 20 to 300 km/h from an altitude of 30 to 100 m.
While at a near hover above the ground, the helicopters operate 20 to 40 m
apart, with each laying a straight-line row. The mines in each row can be
staggered and the distance between mines depends on whether the mines are
pressure-initiated or full-width attack mines.

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________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 12

12-177. One light helicopter can deliver 60 to 80 AT mines or 100 or 120 AP

mines. A medium-lift helicopter equipped with a minelaying system delivers
100 to 140 AT mines or 200 to 220 AP mines on a single sortie. To lay a mine-
field 15 by 30 m with AT mines takes approximately six sorties of a single
light helicopter or approximately four flights of a single medium-lift helicop-
ter.

SURVIVABILITY

12-178. The construction of battle and fighting positions is a labor-intensive

process and is therefore a shared responsibility of engineers and supported
units. Maximum use of civilian engineer assets and personnel continues dur-
ing adaptive operations. Full preparation of defensive positions involves
Fighting positions for individual and crew-served weapons.
Fighting trenches and communication trenches.
Firing positions for tanks, IFVs, APCs, air defense, and other weapon
systems.
Protection for CPs and logistics sites.

12-179. Survivability activities when fighting an extraregional enemy have

several unique engineer requirements. Some examples are to
Take full advantage of the screening, protective, and C3D techniques,
along with careful selection of terrain to passively deny the enemy the
ability to acquire OPFOR positions for targeting.
Make extensive use of local building materials, equipment, and work
force.
Protect CPs and logistics sites.
Bury communications lines.
Construct false positions, equipment, movement routes, and lines of
communication.
Assimilate minefields and obstacles to the terrain.
Prepare caves, tunnels, and tunnel complexes in which troops can live
and from which they can fight.
Fortification
12-180. Although engineers have the bulk of specialized equipment for con-
structing sophisticated survivability positions, engineer support at brigade
level and lower is very limited. Therefore, maneuver units at battalion and
below exert maximum effort to develop and improve their own positions. This
process starts with infantry using shovels and armored vehicles using inte-
gral self-entrenching blades, if available. When building the positions, they
must take advantage of the protective and camouflaging properties of the ter-
rain, local building materials, engineer construction equipment, explosives,
and prefabricated installations.
12-181. Meanwhile, engineers using specialized equipment dig positions for
critical sites such as medical facilities and C2 centers. As scarce engineer

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

equipment becomes available, it supports maneuver units by augmenting

and improving on the work the units have already begun. Considering the
projected time of stay, the conditions of the terrain, and the upcoming combat
tasks, the maneuver commander determines the amount, sequence, and time
for the fortification of an area.
12-182. Levels of Fortification Protection. Fortified positions increase
OPFOR weapons effectiveness. They also protect personnel, weapons, and
material from enemy targeting and reconnaissance assets, and from the ef-
fects of enemy attack. The OPFOR categorizes field fortifications according to
purpose. It divides them into structures for
Firing and observation.
Protection for personnel, equipment, and material.

12-183. Fortification Priorities. Commanders assign fortification priorities

to tasks that provide the best level of protection at all times against a possi-
ble enemy attack. The normal priority is from front to rear, beginning with
the primary fighting positions, then the temporary positions, alternate posi-
tions, and if possible deception positions. One of the greatest factors influenc-
ing the level and sequence of fortification preparation is whether the transi-
tion to the defense occurs in contact or out of contact with the enemy.
12-184. If forward maneuver units are in contact with the enemy, they pre-
pare their own hasty positions as best as possible. The maneuver unit is re-
sponsible for the majority of defensive fortifications. This includes emplacing
minefields and nonexplosive obstacles.
12-185. When not in direct contact with the enemy and when the situation
permits, engineer excavating and bulldozer equipment may be used to
Dig communications and fighting trenches and tank and IFV or APC
emplacements. (For the most effective use of the heavy equipment, the
supported mechanized infantry or tank unit must lay out and mark the
areas for ditching.)
Fortify squad trenches and platoon battle positions.
Provide engineer reconnaissance.
Emplace engineer obstacles.
Prepare alternate fighting positions.
Preferably, engineer preparations occur at night or under other conditions of
reduced visibility.
12-186. Shared Responsibilities for Field Fortifications. Engineer tasks
are a shared responsibility throughout the OPFOR. Engineer and combat
personnel perform survivability tasks such as constructing fortifications,
clearing fields of fire, and camouflage. Although the highest level of engineer
training and the greatest technical capabilities exist in the engineer troops,
all military personnel and units train somewhat in fundamental engineer
tasks. The majority of defensive preparation is conducted at the maneuver
unit level. The following are several examples of specific responsibilities:
Soldiers: dig individual fighting positions and trenches.

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________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 12

Combat vehicles: several hundred vehicles in a mechanized infantry

division may have self-entrenching capability.
Engineers: construct fortified positions and communications trenches;
dig in critical equipment, C2 sites, and logistics facilities.
Camouflage, Concealment, Cover, and Deception
12-187. The OPFOR uses various C3D measures to mislead the enemy about
size and location of forces and weapon systems and about the nature of de-
fensive engineer preparations. Defensive measures include
Use of screening properties of terrain, darkness, and other conditions
of limited visibility during engineer preparation of defensive positions
and positioning of forces.
Camouflage painting of material.
Use of local materials and standard-issue camouflage screens.
Strict camouflage, noise, and light discipline.
Construction of false battle positions, decoy positions, and decoy
equipment.
False actions to draw attention.
Assimilation of minefields and obstacles to the terrain.

12-188. Artificial Camouflage. The OPFOR employs artificial camouflage

as a supplement when natural screens cannot provide the concealment of
forces and combat material. It includes both natural and manufactured cam-
ouflage. The OPFOR uses camouflage nets and screens extensively. It im-
proves multispectral screening by using camouflage nets, covers, and indi-
vidual camouflage equipment.
12-189. Decoys. The OPFOR uses deception activities and equipment to
counter enemy reconnaissance. All engineer units receive special training in
constructing decoys from locally available materials. These decoys cover a
wide spectrum of types and must be introduced or discovered in the same
priority a real or existing unit would emplace them. The general priority of
engineer construction is from front to rear, beginning with the primary fight-
ing positions, then the temporary and alternate positions. The time sequence
in which these appear gives credibility to the deception. The engineers may
use obsolete or derelict equipment for deceptive purposes. The emphasis is on
tactical systems and measures that provide effective concealment and deception.
12-190. To aid in water obstacle crossings, engineers can construct deception
crossing sites, before or at the same time they are establishing actual ones.
They try to draw the enemys attention to simulated crossing sites while real
ones remain carefully camouflaged. They give authenticity to simulated
crossings by using corner reflectors, by deploying vehicles on roads and other
approaches to them, by moving simulated vehicles across them, and by posi-
tioning construction and bridging equipment near simulated sites.
12-191. The OPFOR plans to employ mock-ups and decoys as an integral part
of battles. Simulations can obscure OPFOR intentions and cause the enemy
to waste effort by destroying decoys. The engineers bear a major responsibil-

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

ity for constructing simulations. The OPFOR places emphasis on those engi-
neer camouflage measures that it can transport easily and construct rapidly.
12-192. The following conditions must exist in order for decoy equipment to
be successful:
Placement must be in areas where the enemy would reasonably expect
to find that type of actual equipment in use.
Dimensions of simulated equipment must approximate those of actual
equipment.

12-193. The simulations that engineers construct can represent any type
equipment in the OPFOR inventory. Actual equipment that is not functional
due to combat damage or mechanical malfunction can be made to appear op-
erational by repainting it to conceal damage or by constructing components
to simulate destroyed parts.
12-194. Engineers can create false excavations to simulate revetments, hull-
defilade vehicle trenches, or individual fighting positions. These false excava-
tions may be only half the depth of actual excavations, although the engi-
neers may create the appearance of greater depth by adding dark materials
such as branches, grass, or soil to the bottoms. Troops can temporarily occupy
these deception positions and fire from them to aid deception.

12-195. In preparation for offensive action, the primary use of field fortifica-
tion is in the preparation of assembly areas. Even there, the tasks of prepa-
ration typically exceed the capability of engineers constituent to the brigade
and even that of those likely attached as reinforcements. Maneuver com-
manders realize that fortification of battle positions is a shared responsibil-
ity. Consequently, the preparation of assembly area positions becomes a
shared responsibility involving all available personnel and equipment.
12-196. This process is performed simultaneously throughout the force, with
infantry using shovels and armored vehicles using integral self-entrenching
blades, if available. Meanwhile, specialized engineer equipment digs posi-
tions for critical sites such as medical facilities and command and control (C2)
centers. As scarce engineer equipment becomes available, it is then tasked to
support maneuver units by augmenting and improving on the work the units
have already begun.
12-197. The goal is to prepare a separate assembly area for each battalion-
size unit, using engineer equipment to construct positions for vehicles shortly
after they arrive at their assigned location. Within 1 to 2 hours, engineers dig
assembly area fighting positions for all personnel. The engineers may pre-
pare prefabricated structures for battalion command posts and carefully
camouflage all structures.
12-198. During the offense, the goals of C3D are essentially the same as dur-
ing tactical movement. Offensive measures include
Selection of terrain for its screening effect.
Use of obscurants (smokescreens).

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________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 12

Use of artificial and natural camouflage screens.

Simulation of characteristic defensive measuresto mine the terrain
in view of the enemy with decoy minefields or to give the appearance of
reinforced defensive positions.
Use of concealed routes for movement of supplies and reserves.

12-43
 Chapter 13

NBC and Smoke

The use of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons can have an
enormous impact on all combat actions. 1 Not only does the sheer killing
and destructive power of these weapons affect the tactical battlefield, but
the strategic, operational, psychological, environmental, economic, and
political consequences of their use affect strategic campaign plans and op-
erational design.

In response to foreign developments, the OPFOR maintains a capability

to conduct chemical, nuclear, and possibly biological warfare. However, it
would prefer to avoid the use of NBC weapons by either sideespecially
nuclear and biological weapons. Both nuclear and biological weapons
characteristically have lethal effects over much larger areas than do
chemical weapons. The effects of biological weapons can be difficult to lo-
calize and to employ in combat without affecting friendly forces; their ef-
fects on the enemy can be difficult to predict. Unlike nuclear or biological
weapons, chemical agents can be used to affect limited areas of the battle-
field. The consequences of chemical weapons use are more predictable and
thus more readily integrated into battle plans.

Because chemical employment is more likely than nuclear or biological,

this chapter begins by focusing on OPFOR chemical capabilities. Because
the OPFOR may also have some nuclear and biological capabilities, these
also deserve discussion, despite of the lower probability of their employ-
ment. The chapter concludes with discussions of NBC protection and em-
ployment of smoke.

PREPAREDNESS
13-1. Due to the proliferation of NBC weapons, the OPFOR must anticipate
their use, particularly the employment of chemical weapons. OPFOR plan-
1
NBC weapons are a subset of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), although the latter exclude the de-
livery means where such means is a separable and divisible part of the weapon. WMD are weapons or
devices intended for or capable of causing a high order of physical destruction or mass casualties (death
or serious bodily injury to a significant number of people). The casualty-producing elements of WMD can
continue inflicting casualties on the enemy and exert powerful psychological effects on the enemy's mo-
rale for some time after delivery. Existing types of WMD include chemical, biological, and nuclear weap-
ons. However, technological advances are making it possible to develop WMD based on qualitatively new
principles, such as infrasonic (acoustic), radiological (enhanced-radiation), or particle-beam weapons. In
addition, conventional weapons, such as precision weapons or volumetric explosives, can also take on
the properties of WMD.

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

ners believe that the best solution is to locate and destroy enemy NBC weap-
ons and their supporting infrastructure before the enemy can use them
against OPFOR troops or the State. In case this fails and it is necessary to
continue combat actions despite the presence of contaminants, the OPFOR
has developed and fielded a wide range of NBC detection and warning de-
vices, individual and collective protection equipment, and decontamination
equipment.

MULTIPLE OPTIONS
13-2. Force modernization has introduced a degree of flexibility previously
unavailable to combined arms commanders. It creates multiple options for
the employment of forces at strategic, operational, and tactical levels with or
without the use of NBC weapons. Many of the same delivery means available
for NBC weapons can also be used to deliver precision weapons that can often
achieve desired effects without the stigma associated with NBC weapons.
13-3. The OPFOR might use NBC weapons either to deter aggression or as a
response to an enemy attack on the State. It has surface-to-surface missiles
(SSMs) capable of carrying nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads. Most
OPFOR artillery is capable of delivering chemical munitions, and most sys-
tems 152-mm and larger are capable of firing nuclear rounds. Additionally,
the OPFOR could use aircraft systems and cruise missiles to deliver an NBC
attack. The State has also trained special-purpose forces (SPF) as alternate
means of delivering NBC munitions packages.
13-4. The threat of using these systems to deliver NBC weapons is also an
intimidating factor. Should any regional opponent use its own NBC capabil-
ity against the State, the State is prepared to retaliate in kind. It is also pos-
sible that the State could use NBC against a regional neighbor as a warning
to any potential extraregional enemy that it is willing to use such weapons.
The fact that NBC weapons may also place noncombatants at risk is also a
positive factor from the States perspective. Thus, it may use or threaten to
use NBC weapons as a way of applying political, economic, or psychological
pressure by allowing the enemy no sanctuary.

TARGETING
13-5. The OPFOR considers the following targets to be suitable for the em-
ployment of NBC weapons:
NBC delivery means and their supply structure.
Precision weapons.
Prepared defensive positions.
Reserves and troop concentrations.
Command and control (C2); reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance,
and target acquisition (RISTA); and communications centers.
Key air defense sites.
Logistics installations, especially port facilities.
Airfields the OPFOR does not intend to use immediately.

13-2
 Chapter 13

Enemy NBC delivery means (aircraft, artillery, missiles, and rockets) nor-
mally receive the highest priority. The suitability of other targets depends on
the OPFORs missions, the current military and political situation, and the
NBC weapons available for use. 2

STAFF RESPONSIBILITY
13-6. On the functional staff of a division- or brigade-level headquarters
(such as an OSC), the chief of WMD is responsible for planning the offensive
use of WMD, including NBC weapons. (See the subsections on Release under
Chemical Warfare, Nuclear Warfare, and Biological Warfare below.) The
WMD staff element advises the command group and the primary and secon-
dary staff on issues pertaining to NBC employment. The WMD element re-
ceives liaison teams from any subordinate or supporting units that contain
WMD delivery means.
13-7. NBC defense comes under the chief of force protection. The force pro-
tection element of the functional staff may receive liaison teams from any
subordinate or supporting chemical defense units. However, those units can
also send liaison teams to other parts of the staff, as necessary (including, for
example, the chief of reconnaissance).

CHEMICAL WARFARE
13-8. The OPFOR is equipped, structured, and trained to conduct both offen-
sive and defensive chemical warfare. It is continually striving to improve its
chemical warfare capabilities. It believes that an army using chemical weap-
ons must be prepared to fight in the environment it creates. Therefore, it
views chemical defense as part of a viable offensive chemical warfare capabil-
ity. It maintains a large inventory of individual and collective chemical pro-
tection and decontamination equipment. (See the NBC Protection portion of
this chapter.)

WEAPONS AND AGENTS

13-9. Virtually all OPFOR indirect fire weapons can deliver chemical agents.
These delivery means include aircraft, multiple rocket launchers (MRLs), ar-
tillery, mines, rockets, and missiles. Other possible delivery means could in-
clude SPF, affiliated insurgent or terrorist organizations, or civilian sympa-
thizers.
13-10. One way of classifying chemical agents according to the effect they
have on persons. Thus, there are two major types, each with subcategories.
Lethal agents, categorized by how they attack and kill personnel, include
nerve, blood, blister, and choking agents. Nonlethal agents include incapaci-
tants and irritants.

Nerve Agents
13-11. Nerve agents are fast-acting. Practically odorless and colorless, they
attack the bodys nervous system, causing convulsions and eventually death.
Nerve agents are further classified as either G- or V-agents. At low concen-
2
The same list of targets would apply for enemy use of NBC weapons against the OPFOR.

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trations, the GB series incapacitates; it kills if inhaled or absorbed through

the skin. The rate of action is very rapid if inhaled, but slower if absorbed
through the skin. V-agents produce similar effects, but are quicker-acting
and more persistent than G-agents.

Blood Agents
13-12. Blood agents block the bodys oxygen transferal mechanisms, leading
to death by suffocation. A common blood agent is hydrogen cyanide (AC). It
kills quickly and dissipates rapidly.

Blister Agents
13-13. Blister agents, such as mustard (H) or lewisite (L) and combinations of
these two compounds, can disable or kill after contact with the skin, being
inhaled into the lungs, or being ingested. Contact with the skin can cause
painful blisters, and eye contact can cause blindness. These agents are espe-
cially lethal when inhaled.

Choking Agents
13-14. Choking agents, such as phosgene (CG) and diphosgene (DP), block
respiration by damaging the breathing mechanism, which can be fatal. As
with blood agents, this type is nonpersistent, and poisoning comes through
inhalation. Signs and symptoms of toxicity may be delayed up to 24 hours.

Incapacitants
13-15. Incapacitants include psychochemical agents and paralyzants. These
agents can disrupt a victims mental and physical capabilities. The victim
may not lose consciousness, and the effects usually wear off without leaving
permanent physical injuries.

Irritants
13-16. Irritants, also known as riot-control agents, cause a strong burning
sensation in the eyes, mouth, skin, and respiratory tract. The best known of
these agents is tear gas (CS). Their effects are also temporary. Victims re-
cover completely without having any serious aftereffects.

AGENT PERSISTENCY
13-17. Chemical agents are also categorized according to their persistency.
Generally, the OPFOR would use persistent agents on areas it does not plan
to enter and nonpersistent agents where it does.

Persistent Agents
13-18. Persistent agents can retain their disabling or lethal characteristics
from days to weeks, depending on environmental conditions. Aside from pro-
ducing mass casualties initially, persistent agents can produce a steady rate
of attrition and have a devastating effect on morale. They can seriously de-
grade the performance of personnel in protective clothing or impose delays
for decontamination.

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Nonpersistent Agents
13-19. Nonpersistent agents generally last a shorter period of time than per-
sistent agents, depending on weather conditions. The use of a nonpersistent
agent at a critical moment in battle can produce casualties or force enemy
troops into a higher level of individual protective measures. With proper tim-
ing and distance, the OPFOR can employ nonpersistent agents and then have
its maneuver units advance into or occupy an enemy position without having
to decontaminate the area or don protective gear.

OTHER TOXIC CHEMICALS

13-20. In addition to traditional chemical warfare agents, the OPFOR may
find creative and adaptive ways to cause chemical hazards using chemicals
commonly present in industry or in everyday households. In the right combi-
nation, or in and of themselves, the large-scale release of such chemicals can
present a health risk, whether caused by military operations, intentional use,
or accidental release.

Toxic Industrial Chemicals

13-21. Toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) are chemical substances with acute
toxicity that are produced in large quantities for industrial purposes. Expo-
sure to some industrial chemicals can have a lethal or debilitating effect on
humans. The near-universal availability of large quantities of highly toxic
stored materials, their proximity to urban areas, their low cost, and the low
security associated with storage facilities, make them a potentially attractive
option for use as weapons of opportunity or weapons of mass destruction.
Employing a TIC against an opponent by means of a weapon delivery system,
whether conventional or unconventional, is considered a chemical warfare at-
tack, with the TIC used as a chemical agent. The target may be the enemys
military forces or his civilian population.
13-22. In addition to the threat from intentional use as weapons, catastro-
phic accidental releases of stored industrial chemicals may result from collat-
eral damage associated with military operations, electrical power interrup-
tion, or improper facility maintenance or shutdown procedures. These events
are common in armed conflict and post-conflict urban environments.
13-23. The most important factors to consider when assessing the potential
for adverse human health impacts from a chemical release are acute toxicity,
physical properties (volatility, reactivity, flammability), and the likelihood
that large quantities will be accidentally released or available for exploita-
tion. Foremost among these factors is acute toxicity.
13-24. The following are examples of high- and moderate-risk TICs, based on
acute toxicity by inhalation, worldwide availability (number of producers and
number of countries where the substance is available), and physical state
(gas, liquid, or solid) at standard temperature and pressure:
High-Risk. Ammonia, chlorine, fluorine, formaldehyde, hydrogen chlo-
ride, phosgene, sulfuric acid.
Moderate-Risk. Carbon monoxide, methyl bromide, nitrogen dioxide,
phosphine.

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13-25. This list does not include all chemicals with high toxicity and avail-
ability. Specifically, chemicals with low volatility are not included. Low-vapor
pressure chemicals include some of the most highly toxic chemicals widely
available, including most pesticides.
13-26. Some of the high-risk TICs are frequently present in an operational
environment. Chlorine (water treatment and cleaning materials), phosgene
(insecticides and fertilizers), and hydrogen cyanide are traditional chemical
warfare agents that are also considered TICs. Cyanide salts may be used to
contaminate food or water supplies. Hydrogen chloride is used in the produc-
tion of hydrochloric acid. Formaldehyde is a disinfectant and preservative.
Fluorine is a base element that is used to produce fluorocarbons. Fluorocar-
bons are any of various chemically inert compounds that contain both carbon
and fluorine. Fluorocarbons are present in common products are refrigerants,
lubricants, and nonstick coatings, and are used in the production of resins
and plastics.

Household Chemicals
13-27. The OPFOR understands that some everyday household chemicals
have incompatible properties that result in undesired chemical reaction when
mixed with other chemicals. This includes substances that will react to cause
an imminent threat to health and safety, such as explosion, fire, and/or the
formation of toxic materials. For example, chlorine bleach, when mixed with
ammonia, will generate the toxic gases chloramine and hydrazine that can
cause serious injury or death. Another example of such incompatibilities is
the reaction of alkali metals, such as sodium or potassium, with water. So-
dium is commonly used in the commercial manufacture of cyanide, azide, and
peroxide, and in photoelectric cells and sodium lamps. It has a very large la-
tent heat capacity and is used in molten form as a coolant in nuclear breeder
reactors. The mixture of sodium with water produces sodium hydroxide,
which can cause severe burns upon skin contact.

CHEMICAL RELEASE
13-28. Among NBC weapons, the State is most likely to use chemical weap-
ons against even an extraregional enemy, particularly if the enemy does not
have the capability to respond in kind. Since the State does not believe that
first use of chemical agents against units in the field would provoke a nuclear
response, it is less rigid than other nations in the control of chemical release.
13-29. Initially, the use of chemical weapons is subject to the same level of
decision as nuclear and biological weapons. At all levels of command, a
chemical weapons plan is part of the fire support plan. Once the National
Command Authority (NCA) has released initial authorization for the use of
chemical weapons, commanders can employ them freely, as the situation de-
mands. Then each commander at the operational-strategic command (OSC)
and lower levels who has systems capable of chemical delivery can imple-
ment the chemical portions of his fire support plan, as necessary.
13-30. After a decision for nuclear use, the OPFOR can employ chemical
weapons to complement nuclear weapons. However, the OPFOR perceives
that chemical weapons have a unique role, and their use does not depend on
initiation of nuclear warfare. It is possible that the OPFOR would use chemi-

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cal weapons early in an operation or strategic campaign or from its outset. It

would prefer not to use chemical weapons within the boundaries of the State.
However, it would contaminate its own soil if necessary in order to preserve
the regime or the States sovereignty.

OFFENSIVE CHEMICAL EMPLOYMENT

13-31. The basic principle of chemical warfare is to achieve surprise. It is
common to mix chemical rounds with high-explosive (HE) rounds in order to
achieve chemical surprise. Chemical casualties inflicted and the necessity of
chemical protective gear degrade enemy defensive actions. The OPFOR also
may use chemical agents to restrict the use of terrain. For example, contami-
nation of key points along the enemys lines of communication can seriously
disrupt his resupply and reinforcement, while simultaneously keeping those
points intact for subsequent use by the attacking OPFOR.
13-32. Nonpersistent agents are suitable for use against targets on axes the
OPFOR intends to exploit. While possibly used against deep targets, their
most likely role is to prepare the way for an assault by maneuver units, espe-
cially when enemy positions are not known in detail. The OPFOR may also
use nonpersistent agents against civilian population centers in order to cre-
ate panic and a flood of refugees.
13-33.Persistent agents are suitable against targets the OPFOR cannot de-
stroy by conventional or precision weapons. This can be because a target is
too large or located with insufficient accuracy for attack by other than an
area weapon. Persistent agents can neutralize such targets without a pinpoint
attack.
13-34. In the offense, likely chemical targets include
Troops occupying defensive positions, using nonpersistent agents de-
livered by MRLs to neutralize these troops just before launching a
ground attack. Ideally, these nonpersistent agents would be dissipating
just as the attacking OPFOR units enter area where the chemical at-
tack occurred.
NBC delivery systems, troop concentration areas, headquarters, and
artillery positions, using all types of chemical agents delivered by tube
artillery, MRLs, missiles, and aircraft.
Bypassed pockets of resistance (especially that pose a threat to the at-
tacking forces), using persistent agents.
Possible assembly areas for enemy counterattack forces, using persis-
tent agents.

13-35. The OPFOR could use chemical attacks against such targets simulta-
neously throughout the enemy defenses. These chemical attacks combine
with other forms of conventional attack to neutralize enemy nuclear capabil-
ity, C2 systems, and aviation. Subsequent chemical attacks may target logis-
tics facilities. The OPFOR would use persistent agents deep within the en-
emys rear and along troop flanks to protect advancing units.

DEFENSIVE CHEMICAL EMPLOYMENT

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13-36. When the enemy is preparing to attack, the OPFOR can use chemical
attacks to disrupt activity in his assembly areas, limit his ability to maneu-
ver into axes favorable to the attack, or deny routes of advance for his re-
serves. Once the enemy attack begins, the use of chemical agents can impede
an attacking force, destroying the momentum of the attack by causing casu-
alties or causing attacking troops to adopt protective measures. Persistent
chemical agents can deny the enemy certain terrain and canalize attacking
forces into kill zones.

NUCLEAR WARFARE
13-37. The OPFOR believes a war is most likely to begin with a phase of non-
nuclear combat that may include the use of chemical weapons. The OPFOR
emphasizes the destruction of as much as possible of enemy nuclear capabil-
ity during this nonnuclear phase. To do so, it would use air and missile at-
tacks; airborne, heliborne, and special-purpose forces; and rapid, deep pene-
trations by ground forces. The OPFOR hopes these attacks can deny the en-
emy a credible nuclear option.

DELIVERY MEANS
13-38. Nuclear delivery systems may include aircraft from both national- and
theater-level aviation, and SSMs. Most artillery 152-mm or larger is capable
of firing nuclear rounds, if such rounds are available. Other possible delivery
means could include SPF. The OPFOR is unlikely to use affiliated forces for
nuclear delivery.

TRANSITION TO NUCLEAR
13-39. Even when nuclear weapons are not used at the outset of a conflict,
OPFOR commanders deploy troops based on the assumption that a nuclear-
capable enemy might attack with nuclear weapons at any moment. The
OPFOR continuously updates its own plans for nuclear employment, al-
though it prefers to avoid nuclear warfare. As long as it achieves its objec-
tives, and there are no indications that the enemy is going to use nuclear
weapons, the OPFOR would likely not use them either. However, it could at-
tempt to preempt enemy nuclear use by conducting an initial nuclear attack.
Otherwise, any OPFOR decision to go nuclear would have to be made early in
the conflict, so that sufficient nonnuclear power would remain to follow up
and to exploit the gains of nuclear employment.
13-40. If any opponent were to use nuclear weapons against the State, the
State would respond in kind, as long as it is still capable. The same would be
true of any nuclear-capable opponent, if the State were the first to use nu-
clear means. While the State recognizes the advantage of its own first use, it
may risk first use only when the payoff appears to outweigh the potential
costs. Therefore, it will probably avoid the use of nuclear weapons against an
extraregional power unless survival of the regime or the nation is at stake.
13-41. The OPFOR is probably more likely to use its nuclear capability
against a regional opponent. The likelihood increases if that opponent uses or
threatens to use its own nuclear weapons against the State or does not have
the means to retaliate in kind. This could account for a nuclear or nuclear-

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threatened environment existing at the time an outside force might choose to

intervene in the region.

TYPES OF NUCLEAR ATTACK

13-42. The OPFOR categorizes nuclear attacks as either massed or individ-
ual attacks. The category depends on the number of targets hit and the num-
ber of nuclear munitions used.
13-43. A massed nuclear attack employs multiple nuclear munitions simul-
taneously or over a short time interval. The goal is to destroy a single large
enemy formation, or several formations, as well as other important enemy
targets. A massed attack can involve a single service of the States Armed
Forces, as in a nuclear missile attack by the Strategic Forces, or the com-
bined forces of different services.
13-44. An individual nuclear attack may hit a single target or group of tar-
gets. The attack consists of a single nuclear munition, such as a missile or
bomb.

NUCLEAR RELEASE
13-45. At all stages of a conflict, the OPFOR keeps nuclear forces ready to
make an attack. The decision to initiate nuclear warfare occurs at the highest
level of the State government. National-level planners develop the fire plan
for the initial nuclear attack for approval by the NCA.
13-46. After the initial nuclear release, the NCA may delegate employment
authority for subsequent nuclear attacks to an OSC commander. The com-
mander of the OSCs integrated fires command (IFC) submits to the OSC
commander, for approval and integration into OSC fire support plans, rec-
ommendations for the subsequent employment of nuclear and chemical
weapons.

OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR EMPLOYMENT

13-47. Once the NCA releases nuclear weapons, two principles govern their
use: mass and surprise. The OPFOR plans to conduct the initial nuclear at-
tack suddenly and in coordination with nonnuclear fires. Initial nuclear at-
tack objectives are to destroy the enemys main combat formations, C2 sys-
tems, and nuclear and precision weapons, thereby isolating the battlefield.
13-48. Nuclear attacks target and destroy the enemys defenses and set the
conditions for the exploitation force. Other fire support means support the
assault and fixing forces. The OPFOR may plan high-speed air and ground
offensive actions to exploit the nuclear attack.
13-49. If the enemy continues to offer organized resistance, the OPFOR
might employ subsequent nuclear attacks to reinitiate the offense. Nuclear
attacks can eliminate the threat of a counterattack or clear resistance from
the opposite bank in a water obstacle crossing. If the enemy begins to with-
draw, the OPFOR plans nuclear attacks on choke points where retreating
enemy forces present lucrative targets.

Planning

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13-50. Although the opening stages of an offensive action are likely to be con-
ventional, OPFOR planning focuses on the necessity of
Countering enemy employment of nuclear weapons.
Maintaining the initiative and momentum.
Maintaining fire superiority over the enemy (preempting his nuclear
attack, if necessary).

13-51. In deliberately planned offensive actions, the OPFOR plans nuclear

fires in detail. An exploitation force would probably receive the highest per-
centage of weapons; however, the OPFOR may also reserve weapons for other
large, important targets. In more fluid situations, such as during exploita-
tion, the commander may keep some nuclear weapon systems at high readi-
ness to fire on targets of opportunity. Nuclear allocations vary with the
strength of the enemy defense and the scheme of maneuver.
13-52. Since the enemy too is under nuclear threat, he also must disperse his
formations, which can make him more vulnerable to penetration by an at-
tacking force. However, the OPFOR realizes that enemy troops are also
highly mobile and capable of rapidly concentrating to protect a threatened
area. Therefore, it considers surprise and timing of offensive actions to be ex-
tremely critical in order to complicate enemy targeting and deny him the
time to use his mobility.

Execution
13-53. Upon securing a nuclear release, the OPFOR would direct nuclear at-
tacks against the strongest points of the enemys formations and throughout
his tactical and operational depth. This would create gaps through which
maneuver units, in nuclear-dispersed formations, would attack as an ex-
ploitation force. As closely as safety and circumstances permit, maneuver
forces follow up on attacks near the battle line. Airborne troops may exploit
deep attacks.
13-54. An exploitation force would probably attack to take full advantage of
the speed of advance it could expect to achieve. The aim of these maneuver
units would be to seize or neutralize remaining enemy nuclear weapons, de-
livery systems, and C2 systems. By attacking from different directions, the
maneuver units would try to split and isolate the enemy.
13-55. Commanders would ensure a rapid tempo of advance by assigning
tank and mechanized infantry units to the exploitation force. Such units are
quite effective in this role, because they have maneuverability, firepower,
lower vulnerability to enemy nuclear attacks, and the capability to achieve
penetrations of great depth.

DEFENSIVE NUCLEAR EMPLOYMENT

13-56. Primary uses of nuclear weapons in the defense are to
Destroy enemy nuclear and precision weapons and delivery means.
Destroy main attacking groups.
Conduct counterpreparations.

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Eliminate penetrations.
Support counterattacks.
Deny areas to the enemy.
If nuclear weapons degrade an enemy attack, the OPFOR could gain the op-
portunity to switch quickly to an offensive role.

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
13-57. The State closely controls information about the status of its biological
warfare capabilities. This creates uncertainty among its regional neighbors
and potential extraregional opponents as to what types of biological agents
the State might possess and how it might employ them.
13-58. Biological weapons can provide a great equalizer in the face of a nu-
merically and/or technologically superior adversary that the OPFOR cannot
defeat in a conventional confrontation. However, their effects on the enemy
can be difficult to predict, and the OPFOR must also be concerned about the
possibility that the effects could spread to friendly forces.

WEAPONS AND AGENTS

13-59. Biological weapons consist of pathogenic microbes, micro-organism
toxins, and bioregulating compounds. Depending on the specific type, these
weapons can incapacitate or kill people or animals and destroy plants, food
supplies, or materiel. The type of target being attacked determines the choice
of agent and dissemination system.

Pathogens
13-60. Pathogens cause diseases such as anthrax, cholera, plague, smallpox,
tularemia, or various types of fever. These weapons would be used against
targets such as food supplies, port facilities, and population centers to create
panic and disrupt mobilization plans.

Toxins
13-61. Toxins are produced by pathogens and also by snakes, spiders, sea
creatures, and plants. Toxins are faster acting and more stable than live
pathogens. Most toxins are easily produced through genetic engineering. Tox-
ins produce casualties rapidly and can be used against tactical and opera-
tional targets.

Bioregulators
13-62. Bioregulators are chemical compounds that are essential for the nor-
mal psychological and physiological functions. A wide variety of bioregulators
are normally present in the human body in extremely minute concentrations.
These low-molecular-weight compounds, usually peptides (made up of amino
acids), include neurotransmitters, hormones, and enzymes. Examples of bio-
regulators are insulin (a pancreatic protein hormone that is essential for the
metabolism of carbohydrates) and enkephalin (either of two pentapeptides
with opiate and analgesic activity that occur naturally in the brain and have
a marked affinity for opiate receptors).

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

13-63. These compounds can produce a wide range of harmful effects if intro-
duced into the body at higher than normal concentrations or if they have
been altered. Psychological effects could include exaggerated fear and pain.
In addition, bioregulators can cause severe physiological effects such as rapid
unconsciousness and, depending on such factors as dose and route of admini-
stration, can also be lethal. Unlike pathogens, which take hours or days to
act, bioregulators could act in only minutes. The small peptides, having fewer
than 12 amino-acid groups, are most amenable to military application.

AGENT EFFECTS
13-64. Biological weapons are extremely potent and provide wide-area cover-
age. Some biological agents are extremely persistent, retaining their capa-
bilities to infect for days, weeks, or longer. Biological weapons can take some
time (depending on the agent) to achieve their full effect. To allow these
agents sufficient time to take effect, the OPFOR may use clandestine means,
such as SPF or civilian sympathizers, to deliver biological agents in advance
of a planned attack or even before the war begins.

DELIVERY MEANS
13-65. It is possible to disseminate biological agents in a number of ways.
Generally, the objective is to expose enemy forces to an agent in the form of a
suspended cloud of very fine biological agent particles. Dissemination
through aerosols, either as droplets from liquid suspensions or by small par-
ticles from dry powders, is by far the most efficient method.
13-66. There are two basic types of biological munitions: point-source bom-
blets delivered directly on targets and line-source tanks that release the
agent upwind from the target. Within each category, there can be multiple
shapes and configurations.
13-67. Military systems, as well as unconventional means, can deliver bio-
logical agents. Potential delivery means include rockets, artillery shells, air-
craft sprayers, saboteurs, and infected rodents. Aside from SPF and civilian
sympathizers, the OPFOR might use affiliated insurgent or terrorist organi-
zations to deliver biological agents within the region, outside the immediate
region (to divert enemy attention and resources), or even in the homeland of
an extraregional opponent.

TARGETS
13-68. Probable targets for biological warfare pathogen attack are nuclear
delivery units, airfields, logistics facilities, and C2 centers. The OPFOR may
target biological weapons against objectives such as food supplies, water
sources, troop concentrations, convoys, and urban and rural population cen-
ters rather than against frontline forces. The use of biological agents against
rear area targets can disrupt and degrade enemy mobilization plans as well
as the subsequent conduct of war. This type of targeting can also reduce the
likelihood that friendly forces would become infected.

BIOLOGICAL RELEASE

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13-69. The decision to employ biological agents is a political decision made at

the national levelby the NCA. Besides the political ramifications, the State
recognizes a degree of danger inherent in the use of biological agents, due to
the difficulty or controlling an epidemic caused by them.
13-70. The prolonged incubation period makes it difficult to track down the
initial location and circumstances of contamination. Thus, there is the possi-
bility of plausible deniability. Even if an extraregional opponent might be
able to trace a biological attack back to the State, it may not be able to re-
spond in kind.

NBC PROTECTION
13-71. The OPFORs ability to protect itself against NBC weapons and to op-
erate in contaminated environments is at least the equal of any force in the
world, including extraregional forces. OPFOR planners readily admit that
casualties would be considerable in any future war involving the use of NBC
weapons. However, they believe that the timely use of active and passive
measures can significantly reduce a combat units vulnerability. These meas-
ures include but are not limited to protective equipment, correct employment
of reconnaissance assets, and expeditious decontamination procedures. The
OPFOR conducts rigorous training for chemical defense.
13-72. The OPFOR believes the best way to protect against NBC weapons is
to destroy delivery systems, which are always high-priority targets. Other
operational-tactical responses to the threat include
Dispersion: Concentrations must last for as short a time as possible.
Speed of advance: If the advance generates enough momentum, this
can make enemy targeting difficult and keep enemy systems on the
move.
Camouflage, concealment, cover, and deception (C3D): C3D measures
complicate enemy targeting.
Continuous contact: The enemy cannot attack with NBC weapons as
long as there is intermingling of friendly and enemy forces.
ORGANIZATION
13-73. Chemical defense units are responsible for nuclear and biological, as
well as chemical, protection and reconnaissance measures. In the adminis-
trative force structure, such units are organic to all maneuver units brigade
and above. During task organization, tactical-level commands may also re-
ceive additional chemical defense units allocated from the OSC or higher-
level tactical command. However, those higher headquarters typically retain
some chemical defense assets at their respective levels to deal with the threat
to the support zone and provide chemical defense reserves.
13-74. Chemical troops are a vital element of combat support. They provide
trained specialists for chemical defense units and for units of other arms. Ba-
sic tasks chemical troops can accomplish in support of combat troops in-
clude
Reconnoitering known or likely areas of NBC contamination.
Warning troops of the presence of NBC contamination.

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

Monitoring changes in the degree of contamination.

Monitoring the NBC contamination of personnel, weapons, and equip-
ment.
Performing decontamination activities.
Providing trained troops to handle chemical munitions.
They perform specialized NBC reconnaissance in addition to supporting
regular ground reconnaissance efforts described in Chapter 7.
13-75. NBC protection functions are not limited to maneuver units. Artillery
and air defense brigades have their own chemical defense units. Medical and
SSM units have some decontamination equipment. Engineer troops also are
important, performing functions such as decontaminating roads, building by-
passes, and purifying water supplies. Of course, all arms have a responsibil-
ity for chemical reconnaissance and at least partial decontamination without
specialist support. However, they can continue combat actions for only a lim-
ited time without complete decontamination by chemical troops.

EQUIPMENT
13-76. OPFOR troops have protective clothing. Most combat vehicles and
many noncombat vehicles have excellent overpressure and filtration systems.
Items of equipment for individual or collective protection are adequate to pro-
tect soldiers from contamination for hours, days, or longer, depending on the
nature and concentration of the contaminant. Antidotes provide protection
from the effects of agents. Agent detector kits and automatic alarms are
available in adequate quantities and are capable of detecting all standard
agents.
13-77. Chemical troops have a wide variety of dependable equipment that,
for the most part, is in good supply and allows them to accomplish a number
of tasks in support of combat troops. They have specialized equipment for de-
tecting and monitoring NBC contamination. They have some specialized
NBC reconnaissance vehicles, and they may use helicopters for NBC recon-
naissance. Decontamination equipment is also widely available.

RECONNAISSANCE
13-78. Chemical defense personnel assigned to reconnaissance elements of
chemical defense units perform NBC reconnaissance. This involves two gen-
eral types of activity: NBC observation posts and NBC reconnaissance pa-
trols. Such posts and patrols may augment any maneuver unit down to com-
pany level.
13-79. Under the guidance of the brigade chief of force protection, NBC in-
structors in maneuver battalions and other units subordinate to the brigade
train additional combat, combat support, and combat service support troops
for NBC observation and reconnaissance missions. Medical personnel also
have instruments to check casualties for NBC contamination.

NBC Observation Posts

13-80. A maneuver battalion or higher commander normally designates an
NBC observation post to locate near his forward command post (CP). Al-

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though specially trained combat troops can man an NBC observation post, it
normally is manned by a chemical reconnaissance squad of two to four chemi-
cal defense specialists. In some cases, it might comprise an entire chemical
reconnaissance platoon. More likely, a brigade commander would keep one
squad from that platoon to man the NBC observation post near his forward
CP. The functions of NBC observation posts are to
Detect NBC contamination.
Determine radiation levels and types of toxic substances.
Monitor the drift of radioactive clouds.
Report NBC information and meteorological data to higher headquar-
ters.
Give a general alarm to threatened troops.

13-81. When stationary, an NBC observation post is normally in a camou-

flaged trench or a dug-in NBC reconnaissance vehicle. During movement, it
moves in its own vehicle close to the combat unit commander. The observers
immediately activate NBC detection devices after an enemy overflight, mis-
sile burst, or artillery shelling.
13-82. When chemical troops are not available, virtually every company- or
battery-size combat, combat support, and combat service support unit can es-
tablish its own NBC observation post using its own troops trained as observ-
ers. This post is normally near the units CP or COP. Particularly in the de-
fense, a brigade could have over 40 such observers and observation posts de-
ployed.

NBC Reconnaissance Patrols

13-83. An NBC reconnaissance patrol attached to a maneuver, reconnais-
sance, or security element receives instructions from that units commander.
That commander tells the NBC reconnaissance patrol leader of any specific
areas to reconnoiter, the time for doing so, and the procedures for reporting
the results. A patrol may also receive reconnaissance assignments from the
brigade or division chief of the chemical laison team.
13-84. When operating in NBC reconnaissance patrols, chemical defense per-
sonnel travel in reconnaissance vehicles specially equipped with NBC detec-
tion and warning devices. Before a patrol begins its mission, its personnel
check their individual NBC protection equipment and detection instruments.
They also examine the NBC and communications equipment located on their
reconnaissance vehicle.
13-85. As a patrol performs its mission, a designated crewman observes the
readings of the onboard NBC survey meters. Upon discovering radioactive or
chemical contamination, the patrol determines the size and boundaries of the
contaminated area and the radiation level or type of toxic substance present.
The patrol leader then plots contaminated areas on his map, reports by radio
to his commander, and orders his patrol to mark the contaminated area. The
patrol designates bypass routes around contaminated areas or finds routes
(with the lowest levels of contamination) through the area.

13-15
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

13-86. The OPFOR can also use helicopters to perform NBC reconnaissance.
Helicopters equipped with chemical and radiological area survey instruments
are particularly useful for performing reconnaissance of areas with extremely
high contamination levels.

Augmentation to Other Reconnaissance and Security Elements

13-87. NBC reconnaissance elements are often attached to maneuver units,
sometimes becoming part of a security element or various types of reconnais-
sance patrol. A maneuver battalion (particularly one acting independently)
may receive chemical troops attached from the brigade-level chemical de-
fense company. The battalion would typically use these chemical augmen-
tees as part of a platoon-size fighting patrol.

NBC DETECTION AND WARNING REPORTS

13-88. The OPFOR transmits NBC warning information over communica-
tions channels in a parallel form using both the command net and the air de-
fense and NBC warning communications net. Depending of what type of unit
initially detected the contamination, detection reports leading to such warn-
ings may go either through chemical defense and force protection channels or
through the maneuver unit or ground reconnaissance reporting chain.

Detection Reports
13-89. When chemical defense units establish NBC observation posts or NBC
reconnaissance patrols, these reconnaissance elements report through the
chemical defense and force protection chain. Upon detection of contamina-
tion, an NBC observer or NBC reconnaissance patrol normally transmits an
NBC detection report to the commander of the parent chemical defense unit
that dispatched it and (if capable and directed to do so) possibly to the chief
of force protection (or chief of staff) on the staff of the commander to whom
the chemical defense unit is subordinate or supporting. In any case, the
chemical defense unit commander transmits the report to the chief of force
protection of the maneuver division or brigade.
13-90. When NBC observers (whether from the chemical troops or another
branch) are attached to regular ground reconnaissance elements, security
elements, or maneuver units, the NBC element that detects contamination
would initially pass the detection report through reconnaissance or maneuver
unit reporting channels. 3 Of course, they would report the detection to the
commander of the unit to which they are attached, and a ground reconnais-
sance or security element would pass the detection report to the unit that dis-
patched it.
13-91. For example, a reconnaissance patrol leader would transmit the detec-
tion information via reconnaissance reporting channels to his parent recon-
naissance unit commander and possibly by skip-echelon communications to
the chief of reconnaissance at brigade or division level. The reconnaissance
unit commander or chief of reconnaissance would then ensure that the chief
3
If the NBC augmentees have their own special NBC reconnaissance vehicles and associated radios, they
can also send NBC detection reports back to their parent chemical defense unit or the chief of force pro-
tection.

13-16
 Chapter 13

of staff and/or chief of force protection at his level receives the NBC detection
report and takes appropriate action. When a maneuver unit chief of staff or
chief of reconnaissance receives an NBC detection report through his own
channels, he immediately passes it to the chief of force protection at that
level (or to the next-higher level that has one).
13-92. Similarly, upon detection of contamination, an NBC observer in a
fighting patrol (FP) would transmit an NBC detection report to the FP
leader. The FP leader would use the battalion command net to transmit the
report to the maneuver battalion commander who sent out the FP. Using the
brigade command net, the maneuver battalion commander would inform the
maneuver brigade commander (or chief of staff) of the NBC detection report.
The brigade commander (or chief of staff) would consult with his chief of force
protection. Based on the finding of the chief of force protection, both he and
the brigade commander (or chief of staff) could then disseminate the NBC
warning report using their respective communications nets.

Warning Reports
13-93. The chief of force protection and his staff evaluate the NBC detection
report and determine whether it warrants the issuing of a warning. If it does,
they inform the maneuver commander (or his chief of staff). At this point, the
NBC detection report changes to an NBC warning report. Then, for example,
the maneuver brigade commander (or chief of staff) disseminates an NBC
warning report via the brigade command net to all subordinate unit com-
manders, and via the division command net to the division commander and
commanders of other brigades and other division subordinates. Simultane-
ously, the brigade chief of force protection disseminates the same NBC warn-
ing report to all the brigades units over the air defense and NBC warning
communications net. He would also inform the division chief of force protec-
tion. The desired goal is to rapidly disseminate NBC warning reports as soon
as possible to all affected units.
13-94. The division or brigade chief of force protection (and/or the chief of
staff) may issue an advance NBC warning based on the predicted develop-
ment of an NBC situation. NBC protective measures would change or be re-
scinded based on subsequent NBC detection reports or on warning reports
from higher, lower, or adjacent units. Changes in the NBC protective meas-
ures are disseminated by the maneuver division or brigade commander or
chief of staff and the chief force protection using their respective communica-
tions nets.

DECONTAMINATION
13-95. The OPFOR distinguishes between two types of decontamination of
personnel and equipment: partial and complete. It tries to perform one or
both as soon after exposure as possible. It also conducts decontamination of
terrain and movement routes.

Partial Decontamination
13-96. OPFOR doctrine dictates that a combat unit should conduct a partial
decontamination with organic equipment no later than one hour after expo-

13-17
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

sure to contamination. This entails a halt while troops decontaminate them-

selves and their clothing, individual weapons, crew-served weapons, and ve-
hicles. When forced to conduct partial decontamination in the contaminated
area, personnel remain in NBC protective gear. Following the completion of
partial decontamination, the unit resumes its mission.

Complete Decontamination
13-97. The commander of a maneuver unit directs complete decontamination
when the unit has already completed its mission but is still tactically dis-
persed. This type of decontamination involves the decontamination of the en-
tire surface of a contaminated piece of equipment. This usually requires spe-
cial decontamination stations established by decontamination units. Under
some circumstances, however, it may be accomplished by troops using indi-
vidual decontamination kits.
13-98. Chemical defense troops usually perform complete decontamination of
maneuver units. Decontamination units of chemical defense companies and
battalions can operate either as a whole or in smaller elements. For example,
the decontamination company of a chemical defense battalion may function
independently. It may be separated from the rest of the battalion by as much
as 20 km to decontaminate elements of a maneuver battalion or brigade-size
force.
13-99. Decontamination units deploy to uncontaminated areas where con-
taminated units are located. They set up near movement routes or establish
centrally located decontamination points to serve several troop units. Before
deploying his equipment, the commander of a decontamination unit dis-
patches a reconnaissance element to select a favorable site, mark areas for
setting up the equipment, and mark entry and exit routes.
13-100. Site selection depends on local features such as nearby roads,
cross-country routes, and sources of uncontaminated water. Another selection
criteria is the availability of camouflage, cover, and concealment. If natural
concealment is insufficient, smokescreening of the site can provide camou-
flage. After decontamination stations are set up, the decontamination unit
commander establishes security. The supported unit can also assign person-
nel to assist in providing security for the site.

Terrain and Route Decontamination

13-101. Decontamination of maneuver routes is necessary if OPFOR units
cannot safely bypass or cross the contaminated routes. The first priorities for
decontamination are routes (cross-country and roads) on the primary axes of
advance. The OPFOR decontaminates terrain by either removing or covering
the contaminated soil or by spraying liquid decontaminate with specially de-
signed decontamination vehicles.
13-102. For radiological decontamination, engineer earthmoving equip-
ment can remove the contaminated top layer of soil. An alternative is to cover
the area with uncontaminated materials (soil, wood, or other surfacing mate-
rials). Similarly, one means of decontamination and disinfection of chemical
and biological agents would be to remove a 3- to 4-cm layer of contaminated
ground.

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 Chapter 13

13-103. Another means of chemical or biological decontamination is the

use of terrain decontamination vehicles. These truck-mounted systems can
decontaminate or disinfect an area 5 m wide and 500 m long with a single
load of decontamination solvent. After decontaminating a route or area,
chemical defense troops must decontaminate or disinfect their own equip-
ment.
13-104. For terrain sector decontamination, chemical defense units
equipped with decontamination trucks assemble near the contaminated area.
When decontaminating or disinfecting sectors of terrain, they divide the sec-
tor into strips. The vehicles move on parallel axes using an echelon-right or
echelon-left formation with the lead vehicle downwind from the others. Indi-
vidual vehicles move at a distance of 30 to 50 m behind one another, but to
the left or right just far enough that the covered strips slightly overlap. See
Figure 13-1.

DECON
Wind Direction

DECON

DECON

DECON

DECON 5m

Figure 13-1. Decontamination Trucks Using Echelon-Left Formation

13-105. For road decontamination, the decontamination vehicles form a

column, with each vehicle assigned a sector of road. If the road is more than 5
m wide, then two or three vehicles form an echelon-right or echelon-left for-
mation (as used in terrain sector decontamination). Jet engine-type decon-
tamination vehicles are useful for decontaminating hard-surface roads or
runways.

RECOVERY ACTIVITIES
13-106. Commanders at all levels plan for restoring units that fall victim
to NBC attacks. This plan includes
Restoring comand and control.
Reconnoitering the target area.
Locating and rescuing casualties.
Decontaminating personnel and equipment.
Evacuating casualties.
Evacuating weapons and combat equipment.
Repairing vehicles.
Clearing obstructions.
Extinguishing fires.

13-19
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

13-107. To perform these tasks, the maneuver unit commander forms a

recovery detachment. Depending on the situation and availability of forces,
recovery detachments either come from organic units or from the reserves of
a higher headquarters. If formed from organic units, recovery detachments
generally are formed from the maneuver units exploitation force or reserve.
Regardless of origin, they include chemical reconnaissance and decontamina-
tion assets, engineers, medical and vehicle-repair personnel, and infantry
troops (for labor and security).
13-108. NBC reconnaissance patrols normally reach the area of destruc-
tion first, to establish the nature and extent of contamination. Priority for
decontamination and recovery help goes to personnel and equipment easily
returned to combat.
13-109. The recovery detachment commander selects locations for setting
up a medical point, NBC contamination station, damaged vehicle collection
point, and an area for reconstituting units. He also designates routes to and
from the area, for reinforcement and evacuation. He then reports to his next-
higher commander on the situation and the measures taken. Meanwhile, en-
gineers assigned to the detachment clear rubble, extinguish fires, rescue per-
sonnel, and build temporary roads.
13-110. The final step consists of reconstituting units and equipping them
with weapons and combat vehicles. While the recovery detachment performs
its mission, unaffected elements from a maneuver units exploitation force or
reserve provide security against any further enemy activity.

SMOKE
13-111. The OPFOR plans to employ smoke extensively on the battlefield
whenever the situation permits. Use of smoke can make it difficult for the
enemy to conduct observation, determine the true disposition of OPFOR
troops, and conduct fires (including precision weapon fires) or air attacks.
The possible presence of toxic smokes may cause the enemy to use chemical
protection systems, thus lowering his effectiveness, even if the OPFOR is us-
ing only neutral smoke.

ORGANIZATION
13-112. In the administrative force structure, army groups, armies, and
corps typically have smoke companies in their chemical defense battalions
and/or smoke battalions. In either case, the smoke companies each consist of
nine smoke-generating trucks. These assets are often allocated to OSCs,
which can then suballocate them to tactical-level subordinates.

AGENTS
13-113. Smoke agents may be either neutral or toxic. Neutral smoke
agents are liquid agents, pyrotechnic mixtures, or phosphorus agents with no
toxic characteristics. Toxic smokes (commonly referred to as combination
smoke) degrade electro-optical (EO) devices in the visual and near-infrared
(near-IR) wavebands; they also can debilitate an unmasked soldier by induc-
ing watering of eyes, vomiting, or itching.

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 Chapter 13

13-114. The OPFOR may use a number of different smoke agents or other
obscurants together. For instance, obscurants such as fog oil block portions of
the electromagnetic spectrum more fully when seeded with chaff. The vast
quantities of white phosphorus (WP) on the battlefield also suggest that ran-
dom mixtures of this agent with other obscurants (both manmade and natu-
ral) could occur, by chance or by design. The OPFOR recognizes the need to
counter target acquisition and guidance systems operating in the IR and mi-
crowave regions of the electromagnetic spectrum. It has fielded obscurants,
including chaff, capable of attenuating such wavelengths.

DELIVERY SYSTEMS
13-115. The OPFOR has an ample variety of equipment for smoke dis-
semination. Its munitions and equipment include
Smoke grenades.
Vehicle engine exhaust smoke systems (VEESS).
Smoke barrels, drums, and pots.
Mortar, artillery, and rocket smoke rounds.
Spray tanks (ground and air).
Smoke bombs.
Large-area smoke generators (ground and air).
13-116. Although not designed for this purpose, some decontamination
vehicles with chemical defense units can also generate smoke.
13-117. Smoke grenades include hand grenades, munitions for various
grenade launchers, and smoke grenade-dispensing systems on armored vehi-
cles. These grenades can provide quick smoke on the battlefield or fill gaps in
smokescreens established by other means. Some armored fighting vehicles
have forward-firing smoke grenade dispensers that can produce a bispectral
screen up to 300 m ahead of vehicles.
13-118. All armored fighting vehicles can generate smoke through their
exhaust systems. With these VEESS-equipped vehicles, a platoon can pro-
duce a screen that covers a battalion frontage for 4 to 6 minutes.
13-119. Smoke-filled artillery projectiles, smoke bombs, spray tanks, and
generator systems are also common. Artillery can fire WP rounds (which
have a moderate degrading effect on thermal imagers and a major one on la-
sers). The OPFOR makes considerable use of smoke pots emplaced by chemi-
cal troops, infantrymen, or other troops. The OPFOR still uses smoke bombs
or pots dropped by fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft.

TYPES OF SMOKESCREENS
13-120. The OPFOR recognizes three types of smokescreens: blinding,
camouflage, and decoy. Classification of each type as frontal, oblique, or flank
depends on the screens placement. Smokescreens are either stationary or
mobile depending on prevailing winds and the dispensing means used. Each
basic type can serve a different purpose. However, simultaneous use of all
types is possible.

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

Blinding
13-121. Blinding smokescreens can mask friendly forces from enemy gun-
ners, OPs, and target-acquisition systems. They can restrict the enemys abil-
ity to engage the OPFOR effectively. Delivery of WP and plasticized white
phosphorus (PWP) is possible using MRLs, artillery, mortars, fixed-wing air-
craft, or helicopters. The OPFOR lays blinding smoke directly in front of en-
emy positions, particularly those of antitank weapons and observation posts.
Blinding smoke can reduce a soldiers ability to acquire targets by a factor of
10, and its use can reduce casualties significantly.
13-122. Blinding smokescreens are part of the artillery preparation for an
attack and the fires in support of the attack. Likely targets are enemy defen-
sive positions, rear assembly areas, counterattacking forces, and fire support
positions. The screening properties of a blinding smokescreen can couple with
dust, HE combustion effects, and the incendiary effects of phosphorus. This
can create an environment in which fear and confusion add to the measured
effectiveness of the smoke.

Camouflage
13-123. The OPFOR uses camouflage smokescreens to support all kinds
of C3D measures. Such screens can cover maneuver, conceal the location of
units, hide the nature and direction of attacks, or mislead the enemy regard-
ing any of these. The camouflage smokescreen is useful on or ahead of
friendly troops.
13-124. These screens are normally effective up to the point where forces
deploy for combat. The number, size, and location of camouflage smoke-
screens vary depending on terrain, weather, and type of combat action. Cam-
ouflage also forces enemy attack helicopters to fly above or around a screen,
thus exposing themselves to attack. Camouflage smoke can also cover assem-
bly areas, approaches of exploitation forces, or withdrawals. Smokescreens
can also cover a wide surface area around fixed installations or mobile units
that do not move for extended periods.
13-125. Establishing camouflage smokescreens normally requires use of a
combination of smoke grenades, smoke barrels, smoke pots, vehicles mount-
ing smoke generating devices, and aircraft. Some decontamination vehicles
also have the capability to generate smoke.
13-126. Two smoke-generator vehicles can lay a smokescreen of sufficient
size to cover a battalion advancing to the attack. For larger smokescreens,
the OPFOR divides the smokescreen line into segments and assigns two ve-
hicles to each segment. Doctrinally, camouflage smokescreens should cover
an area at least five times the width of the attacking units frontage.
13-127. The threat of enemy helicopter-mounted antitank systems con-
cerns the OPFOR. Consequently, its doctrine calls for advancing forces to
move as close behind the smokescreen as possible. The higher the smoke-
screen, the higher an enemy helicopter must go to observe troop movement
behind the smokescreen, and the more vulnerable it is to ground-based air
defense weapons. Depending on weather and terrain, some large-area smoke
generators can produce screens up to several hundred meters high. There is

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 Chapter 13

considerable observation-free maneuver space behind a screen of this height.

Conversely, smoke pots provide a screen 5 to 10 m high. This screen masks
against ground observation but leaves the force vulnerable to helicopters
hugging the deck and popping up to shoot.
13-128. The protection produced by camouflage smoke also interacts as
a protective smoke. Just as smokescreens can degrade enemy night-vision
sights, the protective smoke can shield friendly EO devices from potentially
harmful laser radiation. This protective effect is greater with a darker smoke
cloud because of the better absorption capability of that cloud. Protective
smokescreens are also a good means of reducing the effects of thermal radia-
tion from nuclear explosions. A protective smokescreen is useful in front of,
around, or on top of friendly positions.

Decoy
13-129. A decoy screen can deceive an enemy about the location of
friendly forces and the probable direction of attack. If the enemy fires into
the decoy smoke, the OPFOR can pinpoint the enemy firing systems and ad-
just its fire plan for the true attack. The site and location of decoy screens
depend on the type of combat action, time available, terrain, and weather
conditions. One use of decoy smoke is to screen simultaneously several possi-
ble crossing sites at a water obstacle. This makes it difficult for the enemy to
determine which site(s) the OPFOR is actually using.

AREA SMOKESCREENS
13-130. Area smokescreens can cover wide surface areas occupied by fixed
or semifixed facilities, or by mobile facilities or units that must remain in one
location for extended periods. Screens set down on a broad frontage can also
cover maneuver forces. The OPFOR uses area smokescreens to counter en-
emy precision weapons and deep attacks.
13-131. The means of generating area smokescreens can be either subor-
dinate or supporting chemical units or the use of smoke pots, barrels, gre-
nades, and VEESS. As the situation dictates, the objects screened by area
smokescreens can include
Troop concentrations and assembly areas.
Command posts (CPs).
Radar sites.
Bridges and water obstacle-crossing sites.

13-132. The OPFOR can also screen air avenues of approach to such loca-
tions. It tries to eliminate reference points that could aid enemy aviation in
targeting a screened location. To create an effective smokescreen against air
attacks, the OPFOR must establish an effective air defense and NBC warn-
ing communications network so that a smokescreen can be generated in time
to degrade reconnaissance and targeting devices on incoming aircraft. Units
using smoke must maintain reliable communications and continuous coordi-
nation with air defense early warning units and air defense firing positions.

13-23
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

13-133. The OPFOR follows the following basic principles for generating
area smokescreens:
Screening should include not only the protected object but also surround-
ing terrain or manmade features so as to deny the enemy reference
points.
The protected installation should not be in the center of the screen.
The smoke release points must not disclose the outer contours of the
screened object.
Screening must be initiated early enough to allow the area to be blan-
keted by the time of the enemy attack.
If possible, decoy smokescreens should be used.
For larger objects (such as airfields and troop concentrations), the
screen should be at least twice as large as the object.
For smaller objects (such as depots, small crossing points, and radar
sites), the screen should be at least 15 times as large as the object.
13-134. Depending on terrain, smoke release points are set up within a
checkerboard pattern, in a ring (circle), or in a mix of the two patterns that
covers the area to be screened.

A O B O

A B C Smoke

C
2 km
O

W
ind
Di
D E F re
cti
o n

F
2 km
D O

O D
2 km 2 km 2 km
Sm O
ok O E
e

- Screen Object - Smokescreen CP O - Obscurant-Filled

Munitions Reserve

A, B, C,
- Smokescreening - Sector Smokescreening CP - Smoke
D, E, F
Sectors Release
Points

13-24
 Chapter 13

Figure 13-2. Checkerboard Area Smokescreen

Checkerboard Area Smokescreen

13-135. A checkerboard pattern is a rectangle that is divided into 4-km2
squares with smoke release points distributed evenly within each square
(Figure 13-2). This pattern is useful if the terrain is contoured or covered
with buildings, trees, or other obstructions that prevent the precise distribu-
tion of smoke points.

n
io
N O ct
re
Di
ind
A O W
B
A B
O

W E

D C
C

D O O

- Screen Object - Smokescreen CP O - Obscurant-Filled

Munitions Reserve

A, B,
- Smokescreening - Sector Smokescreening CP - Smoke
C, D
Sectors Release
Points

Figure 13-3. Ring Area Smokescreen

Ring Area Smokescreen

13-136. A circle or set of concentric rings of smoke release points works
well on relatively flat, featureless terrain (Figure 13-3). Generally, the dis-
tance between the target and the first obscurant-generation ring is 100 to
250 m. The distance between smoke release points within each ring varies
between 20 and 100 m, depending on the obscurant device being used and the
meteorological conditions.

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

A O B O C O

A B C D

2 km
O
F

O
E F G H

H
2 km
O
O

I J K L

2 km
O

2 km 2 km 2 km 2 km

O I O J O K O L

- Screen Object - Smokescreen CP O - Obscurant-Filled

Munitions Reserve

A, B, C, D, E, F,
- Smokescreening - Sector Smokescreening CP - Smoke
G, H, I, J, K, L
Sectors Release
Points

Figure 13-4. Mixed Area Smokescreen

Mixed Area Smokescreen

13-137. The OPFOR uses checkerboard area smokescreens and ring area
smokescreens together when objects 3 to 4 km apart must be screened simul-
taneously. The rings of smoke-generation lines are placed around each object
to be screened, and these rings are placed within the squares of a checker-
board. See Figure 12-4 for an example of a mixed area smokescreen.

TACTICAL SMOKESCREEN EMPLOYMENT

13-138. The use of smoke is an important part of tactical camouflage, con-
cealment, and deception efforts. The OPFOR can use smokescreens to blind
or deceive enemy forces and to conceal friendly forces from observation and
targeting. Smoke can screen units near the battle lines, as well as those in
suport zones, from direct fire, reconnaissance, and air attack. It has applica-
tions in tactical movement, offense, and defense. Smoke is very effective in
screening water obstacle crossings. It also has specific applications at night.

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 Chapter 13

Figure 13-5 shows tactical options for employing smoke and other obscur-
ants.

Placement Uses
Source
On On
Between Blinding Camouflage Decoy Signaling
Friendly Enemy
Smoke X X X X X X
Grenade

Smoke X X X X
Generator

Smoke X X X X X
Pot

VEESS X X X

Vehicle X X X
Dust

Helicopter X X X X X

Mortar/ X X X X X X
Artillery
Smoke

Rocket X X X

Aerial X X X
Bomb

Aircraft X X X X X X
Spray

Mortar/ X X X
Artillery
HE Dust

Figure 13-5. Tactical Employment of Smoke and Other Obscurants from Various Sources

Offense
13-139. The OPFOR emphasizes the use of smoke during the offense to
help reduce friendly battle losses. However, it understands that smoke may
hinder its own C2, battlefield observation, and target engagement capabili-
ties. In addition, the enemy may take advantage of OPFOR smokescreens to
shield his own maneuvers or to carry out a surprise attack or counterattack.
Thus, a smokescreen is successful when the OPFOR attackers are able to main-
tain their assigned axis and retain sight of the objective. To prevent the smoke
from interfering with friendly maneuver, OPFOR commanders coordinate the

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

planned location and duration of the smoke-generation lines or points with the
scheme of maneuver.
13-140. Smoke pots, artillery, mortars, and aircraft are the primary
means of smoke dissemination in the offense. Artillery and aircraft are used
to spread screening smoke throughout the tactical depth of the enemys de-
fense. They are also useful in screening the flanks of attacking units.
13-141. The OPFOR uses camouflage, blinding, and decoy smokescreens
to conceal the direction and time of attack. The OPFOR can place smoke on
enemy firing positions and observation posts before and during an attack.
Smoke has uses during any of the three basic types of offensive action: at-
tack, limited-objective attack, or strike.

I
Assault
I Force I

VEESS
I
I
I

Exploitation
Force

VEESS

Artillery-
Delivered
Win

Smoke
I
dD
irec

Fixing
Force
tion

Forest

Figure 13-6. Smoke in a Situational (Hasty) Attack (Example)

Attack
13-142. During an situational (hasty) attack, a camouflage smokescreen is
typically used to conceal combat formations that are advancing and maneu-
vering toward the enemys defensive positions. With a tail wind, the assault
and fixing forces can generate enough smoke to adequately screen their front
and then advance behind the screen as it blows toward the enemy. The ex-
ample in Figure 12-6 shows an independent mission detachment (IMD) based
on a mechanized infantry battalion with an additional tank company. This
IMD is advancing from a wooded area in platoon formations with a flanking

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 Chapter 13

wind. In such conditions, the IMD may use its VEESS-equipped tanks and
IFVs and smoke grenades. After turning on their VEESS, the tanks and IFVs
advance toward the enemys defensive positions while firing on visible tar-
gets. Dismounted infantrymen equipped with smoke grenades follow on foot
behind the extended line of tanks and IFVs. As gaps develop in the smoke-
screen, the infantrymen approach and throw smoke grenades. Infantrymen
can also fire incendiary smoke charges from a variant of the encapsulated
flamethrower out to a range of up to 1 km.
13-143. During a planned (deliberate) attack, a commander usually has
more opportunity to plan and prepare for a coordinated smokescreen than in
a situational (hasty) attack. Just as with the situational (hasty) attack, a
camouflage smokescreen is typically used to prevent observation of advanc-
ing asssault and fixing forces. As the advancing force nears the rear of
friendly units already in contact with the enemy, the units in contact may set
up a camouflage smokescreen using smoke pots and VEESS of forward-
deployed armored vehicles. In addition, artillery can deliver blinding smoke
on enemy defensive positions while the assault force negotiates minefields in
front of them. Figure 13-7 shows an example of smoke employment during such
an attack.

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

Artillery- Artillery- Smoke

Delivered Delivered Pots I
Smoke Smoke

Exploitation
Force

VEESS
I
I

Smoke
Artillery- I (-) Pots
Delivered
Smoke I (-)

Wind Dir
Smoke
Pots
Assault

ection
Force
Artillery-
Delivered
Smoke
Smoke
Pots I
Fixing I
Force

Figure 13-7. Smoke in an Attack (Example)

13-144. Because they are spontaneous and fluid, integrated attacks offer
the OPFOR the least opportunity to carefully plan and execute the use of
smoke. Because of the constantly changing conditions, the use of smoke is of-
ten planned and executed after the battle has begun.
13-145. A good example of the use of smoke during an integrated attack
involves an IMD using two camouflage and one decoy smokescreen. (See Fig-
ure 12-8.) In this example, an IMD based on a mechanized infantry battalion
with an additional tank company is attacking toward the enemys left flank
(as viewed by the OPFOR). It is camouflaging that attack with a smokescreen
laid by VEESS of tanks from the tank company. The tanks move at 100-m in-
tervals to create a continuous smoke cloud. The distance was calculated on
the basis of meteorological conditions and the fact that a smokescreen can ex-
tend 300 to 400 m from a VEESS and still remain impenetrable to vision.
Meanwhile, a mechanized infantry company facing the enemys right flank
lays a decoy smokescreen to divert the enemys attention from the actual at-
tack. The company on the left flank lays smoke pots along a 1,500-m line at in-

13-30
 Chapter 13

tervals of 20 to 25 m for a total burning time of 6 minutes. The company divides

the work among its three mechanized infantry platoons, with each responsible
for laying pots along 500 m of the line.

Decoy
Smokescreen Fixing
I Force

Smoke
Pots Camouflage
Smokescreen

II

Smoke
Pots
y
em
En
VEESS
I
VEESS

Wind Direction
I Exploitation
Force
I

Figure 13-8. Smoke in an Integrated Attack (Example)

13-146. Another example of smoke employment in a meeting battle could

be the simultaneous use of frontal camouflage and blinding smokescreens
during an enemy counterattack. Following an artillery attack against the en-
emy advancing for a counterattack, artillery would deliver blinding smoke di-
rectly in front of the advancing enemy and camouflage smoke in front of the
advancing MIBN. As soon as the blinding smokescreen on the enemy dissi-
pates, the battalions ATGMs and attached tanks would open fire on the en-
emy.
13-147. The OPFOR may use both blinding and camouflaging smoke-
screens during the exploitation of a retreating enemy. To protect against pos-
sible enemy counterattacks on the flanks, OPFOR artillery may fire camou-
flage screens there, as well as in front of the exploitation force. Helicopters
are also extremely useful for this purpose.

Defense
13-148. In the defense, the OPFOR may use of smokescreens for
Camouflaging the maneuver of friendly units.
Concealing engineer activities from enemy observation.

13-31
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

Screening replacements of units under conditions of good visibility.

Camouflaging the approach of friendly units for a counterattack.
Screening the movements of defending units between battle positions.
Providing flank and maneuver security.
Misleading the enemy on the disposition of reserves and planned coun-
terattack axes.

13-149. Because a completely obscured environment tends to aid the at-

tacker more than the defender, an OPFOR defense uses smoke to minimize
the enemys vision while allowing the defenders a fairly clear view of the en-
emys location. Smoke from artillery and mortar shells is the most effective
means of blinding an advancing enemy while keeping friendly forces out of
the obscured area. The OPFOR would use VEESS, smoke pots, and smoke
grenades only to assume the defense while in contact with the enemy, to
change positions, or to begin a withdrawal from contact.
13-150. Figure 13-9 shows an example of an IMD using smoke devices in
the defense to disrupt and subsequently defeat the attacking enemy. In this
example, one of the IMDs mechanized infantry companies disperses its pla-
toons and sends one of those platoons out to lay smoke along three successive
smoke-generation lines. As the enemy force approaches, it first encounters
smoke from two lines using smoke pots emplaced by the infantrymen and
then a final line created by the platoons IFVs using VEESS. The smoke from
those lines disrupts the enemy advance and creates a favorable situation for
the defending IMD to launch a counterattack with its tank company from the
flank.

I
Enemy
Smoke Smoke VEESS
Pots Pots

Co
un
ter
n

att
io
ct

ac
re

k
Di
d
in
W

13-32
 Chapter 13

Figure 13-9. Smoke in the Defense (Example)

Water Obstacle Crossing

13-151. Because of their vulnerability to air attack and direct fires, suc-
cessful water obstacle crossings require smokescreens for concealment. The
OPFOR can place 2 to 3 hours worth of screening smoke along a wide front-
age to cover units conducting water obstacle crossings. It may also place
floating pots and barrels in the water. It distinguishes between opposed and
unopposed crossings (see Chapters 5 and 11, respectively).
13-152. For opposed crossings, OPFOR doctrine emphasizes using all
three types of smokescreens (blinding, camouflage, and decoy). An opposed
crossing requires greater planning and preparation than an unopposed cross-
ing, because it anticipates contact with the enemy. First, unfavorable mete-
orological conditions are more difficult to overcome. Friendly forces must
have a tail wind or at least a flanking wind in order for smoke generators and
smoke pots on the near bank to screen the crossing sites. If the OPFOR faces
a head wind, only artillery or aircraft can deliver a blinding smokescreen
against enemy positions on the opposite bank. Whenever possible, the
OPFOR prefers to lay smoke on both sides of the river. The use of decoy
smoke at one or more other likely crossing sites can deceive the enemy as to
the actual crossing location. Figure 12-10 shows an example of an IMD based
on a mechanized infantry battalion with attached tanks using smoke deliv-
ered by several means to cover friendly forces and deceive and blind enemy
forces.

13-33
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

Artillery-
Delivered
Smoke

Smoke
Pots I
VEESS
II

Smoke
Artillery- Pots
Delivered
Smoke River

Smoke Pots and VEESS

Wi
nd
Dir
ec
tio
n

Figure 13-10. Smoke in an Opposed Water Obstable Crossing (Example)

13-153. Unopposed water obstacle crossings far from the battle line may
be crucial for supporting tactical and operational missions. Therefore, they
also require the use of smokescreens for concealment whenever feasible. As
with smoke use near the battle line, it is important to establish at least one
or two decoy smokescreens for every actual crossing site, because a smoke
cloud in the rear attracts the attention of enemy reconnaissance. Area
smokescreens are best for covering crossing sites and surrounding terrain.

Combat at Night
13-154. At night, the OPFOR can conceal its forces from enemy active
and passive night-vision and thermal imaging devices by using smoke and
other obscurants that are effective in the visible through far-IR portions of
the electromagnetic spectrum. The OPFOR uses smoke in three ways to
counter various types of enemy EO sensors:
For active night-vision devices, blind with smoke.
For passive night-vision devices, blind with illumination or combined
use of illuminating and smoke projectiles.

13-34
 Chapter 13

For thermal imaging devices, camouflage friendly troops with smoke

and illuminate enemy targets (to benefit friendly night-vision devices)
at the same time.

13-155. In essence, the OPFOR uses smoke when it cannot quickly de-
stroy or neutralize the enemy EO devices, or when the enemy has created
high levels of illumination within his defense. However, it can also use smoke
in conjunction with its own illumination.
13-156. In night combat, the OPFOR can use smoke to help illuminate
enemy vehicles and other targets. The most effective method is to use smoke
in conjunction with illuminating rounds to silhouette enemy vehicles and
other targets. A mechanized infantry battalion can use this method by firing
mortar smoke rounds to burst 50 to 100 m beyond the targets, interspersed
with illuminating rounds aimed just beyond the screen. This creates a broad,
bright background.
13-157. A more elaborate version of the latter method involves the use of
artillery-delivered smoke and illuminating rounds. The OPFOR can use
smoke and other obscurants to blind the enemys night-vision equipment.
Image intensifiers can be blinded by obscurants and forced to shut down by
flares or the flash of artillery shells. In the defense, therefore, OPFOR artil-
lery could use close support fire on advancing enemy forces, alternating
blinding smoke with illuminating rounds to blind enemy forces while simul-
taneously illuminating them for targeting. See Figure 12-11 for an example
of this technique.

13-35
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

Line of Departure into

Combat by Enemy
Tanks, APCs, or AFVs

Illuminating Line

Enemy

400-600 m

Blinding Line
250 m
250 m 250 m

Illuminating Line

1,600-2,400 m

Blinding Line

Illuminating Line

Enemy
Blinding Line

II II
II II
II
II

Figure 13-11. Example of Alternating Blinding Smoke and Illuminating Lines against the En-
emy at Night

SIGNALING SMOKE
13-158. Aside from smokescreens, the OPFOR also uses colored smoke for
signal purposes. Smoke can mark enemy positions or, occasionally, friendly
positions or movement routes for the information of supporting aircraft or ar-
tillery. By prearrangement, colored smoke may
Identify friendly units.
Identify targets.
Control the commencing and lifting of fire.
Coordinate fire and maneuver of combat units.

13-36
 Chapter 14

TACTICAL LOGISTICS
Logistics is the process of planning and executing the sustainment of
forces in support of military actions. In its larger sense, it includes the
development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, and evacua-
tion of equipment and other materiel. At the tactical level, it focuses on
the traditional combat service support functions of materiel support (sup-
ply), maintenance, transportation, personnel support, and medical sup-
port.

Logistics support is an integral factor in maintaining overall combat ca-

pability. Maneuver and fire support assets are combat-capable only as
long as they receive the necessary ammunition, fuel, and other combat
materiel required to sustain combat activity and only as long as their
weapons and equipment are kept in operating condition.

These tasks present a challenge in modern combat, where there is not al-
ways a clearly defined frontline or a relatively secure rear area. Combat
can spread over a deep and wide area. Within such an area, combat ac-
tions and attrition may not occur evenly or predictably. There may be ar-
eas of intense battles and local destruction, while other secondary or de-
fensive sectors have much lighter logistics demands. This requires a flexi-
ble logistics system designed to continue to sustain forces throughout con-
flict, adapting as conditions change.

OPERATIONAL LOGISTICS SUPPORT

14-1. Operational logistics links strategic-level logistics resources with the
tactical level of logistics, thus creating the conditions for effective sustain-
ment of a combat force. It covers the support activities required to sustain
campaigns and major operations. A dependable logistics system helps com-
manders seize and maintain the initiative. Conversely, attacking the enemys
support system can often threaten or weaken his center of gravity. Opera-
tional maneuver and the exploitation of operational or tactical success often
hinge on the adequacy of logistics and the ability of the force to safeguard its
critical lines of communication (LOCs), materiel, and infrastructure.
14-2. Operational logistics normally supports campaigns and provides
theater-wide logistics support, generally over a period of months. Operational
logisticians coordinate the allocation and distribution of resources within the
area of responsibility (AOR). They interface with tactical-level logisticians in
order to determine shortfalls and communicate these shortfalls back to the
strategic logistics complex to support operational priorities. Operational lo-
gisticians coordinate the flow of strategic capabilities within the theater

14-1
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

based on the commanders priorities. The State logistics system is de-

signed to provide continuous support to the civilian populace while simulta-
neously supporting military forces from the strategic level to the individual
fighting unit. The States national security strategy requires that the OPFOR
and the entire population be constantly prepared for the sudden outbreak of
war or natural disasters. The State continues to make major improvements
in all aspects of its logistics system. This includes an increased emphasis on
support zone security and plans for stockpiling war materiel throughout the
country.

TACTICAL STAFF RESPONSIBILITIES

14-3. At all levels of command, including division and brigade, the resources
section of the primary staff is the principal office for the logistics integration
of supply, maintenance, transportation, and services. 1 The resources officer
heads this section, with two subsections headed by secondary staff officers
who support him: the chief of logistics and the chief of administration.

RESOURCES OFFICER
14-4. The resources officer is responsible for the requisition, acquisition, dis-
tribution, and care of all of the commands resources, both human and mate-
riel. He ensures the commanders logistics and administrative requirements
are met and executes staff supervision over the commands logistics and ad-
ministrative procedures. One additional major task of the resources officer is
to free the commander from the need to bring his influence to bear on priority
logistics and administrative operations. He is also the officer in charge of the
sustainment command post.

CHIEF OF LOGISTICS
14-5. The chief of logistics is responsible for managing the order, receipt, and
distribution of supplies to sustain the command. He is responsible for the
condition and combat readiness of armaments and related combat equipment
and instruments. He is also responsible for their supply, proper utilization,
repair, and evacuation. He oversees the supply and maintenance of the com-
mands combat and technical equipment. These responsibilities encompass
the essential wartime tasks of organizing and controlling the commands re-
covery, repair, and replacement system. During combat, he keeps the com-
mander informed on the status of the commands equipment.

CHIEF OF ADMINISTRATION
14-6. The chief of administration supervises all personnel actions and trans-
actions in the command. His subsection maintains daily strength reports; re-
cords changes in table of organization and equipment of units in the adminis-
trative force structure; assigns personnel; requests replacements; records
losses; administers awards and decorations; and collects, records, and dis-
poses of war booty.

1
Throughout this chapter, references to division- and brigade-level logistics support may also apply to a division tac-
tical group (DTG) and brigade tactical group (BTG), unless specifically stated otherwise.

14-2
________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 13

RESOURCES
OFFICER

CHIEF CHIEF
OF OF
LOGISTICS ADMINISTRATION

LOGISTICS ADMINISTRATIVE
SUBSECTION SUBSECTION

Figure 14-1. Resources Section

TACTICAL LOGISTICS CONCEPTS

14-7. Logistics support must complement the force structure and sustain
combat actions. The logistics
elements must be ready to Tactical Logistics Concepts
provide full support at the start The OPFOR relies on the following lo-
of combat and be capable of rapid gistics concepts:
movement to keep pace with Centralized planning and decentral-
maneuver forces. A greater ized execution.
quantity of logistics support is Support forward.
concentrated on the combat force Sustainment from other sources.
assigned the principal mission in
a given operation or battle. The OPFOR relies on the following three con-
cepts: centralized planning and decentralized execution, support forward,
and sustainment from other sources.
14-8. To ensure both priority of effort and efficiency in the logistics process,
OPFOR logistics is characterized by the concept of centralized planning and
decentralized execution. Logistics plans are developed at higher levels and
executed by units and organizations at lower levels. At division and brigade
level, the resources officer has overall responsibility for logistics planning.
Centralized planning requires a focal point for logistics planning and re-
source allocation at all levels. Regardless of whether the focal point is an in-
dividual (the resources officer or his secondary staff) or a unit, it must be
constantly aware of requirements and capabilities. Decentralized execution
enhances the flexibility of lower-level commanders to meet local require-
ments and to rapidly reprioritize support.

14-3
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

14-9. A careful study of the missions of the total force allows planners to pro-
gram and measure logistics requirements. This requires concurrent opera-
tional, tactical, and logistics planning. Each level of command is responsible
for the timely and complete provision of logistics support to subordinate units
from available assets. The commander allocates these assets to support the
mission of his units, shifts resources according to the combat situation, and
retains some emergency reserves to meet unexpected contingencies. The bulk
of supplies and transport resources are concentrated at the strategic and op-
erational levels. This centralization of logistics resources contributes to op-
erational and tactical flexibility. It enables operational-level commanders to
concentrate support where it is needed most, if necessary switching axes rap-
idly to take advantage of unexpected opportunities. They can quickly strip
resources from stalled divisions or brigades and reallocate them to units
making better progress. Centralization of resources at the operational level
frees divisions or brigades and their subordinates of an unnecessarily large
logistics tail, making it easier for them to engage in high-speed maneuver
battles.
14-10. Logistics units are organized and deployed to support forward. The
guiding principle is that a combat force should retain its organic support re-
sources (such as trucks, recovery equipment, and ambulances) to support its
subordinate units. It should not have to use its own resources to go to support
areas to pick up supplies or to evacuate resources that can no longer contrib-
ute to combat power.
14-11. Finally, the logistics system may have to rely on sustainment from
other than military sources. Supplies may be procured or obtained from so-
cial groups, consumer cooperatives, government farms, or individual citizens,
and by coercion or foraging in the AOR. Captured enemy supplies and
equipment are another source of outside sustainment.

LOGISTICS MISSIONS
14-12. In operational and tactical logistics, three terms are used to describe
how the OPFOR provides support to the field. These terms are primary sup-
port, area support, and depot support.
14-13. Primary support is a mission given to supply, services, transportation,
and maintenance units that normally provide support directly to other units.
This allows the primary support unit to respond directly to the supported
units request for assistance or supplies.
14-14. Area support is a mission given to supply, services, transportation,
and maintenance units that normally provide support to primary support
units and other area support units. Lower-priority units may have to rely on
area support, rather than receiving supplies and services directly from the
next-higher echelon.
14-15. Depot support is a mission given to national-level or strategic units
that normally provide support to area support units. Depot support missions
include the receipt, storage, and issue of war stocks and domestically pro-
duced armaments and materiel, and the overhaul and rebuilding of major
end items.

14-4
________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 13

TAILORED LOGISTICS UNITS

14-16. The OPFOR concentrates the bulk of logistics units at two lev-
elstheater and operational-strategic command (OSC). This concentration
supports the OPFOR philosophy of streamlined, highly mobile combat ele-
ments at the tactical level. These higher levels maintain the responsibility
and the primary means for logistics support.
14-17. Tailoring allows allocation of logistics resources to the combat ele-
ments most essential to mission success. It also allows the OPFOR to assign
priorities for logistics support. Subordinate units receive assets according to
the importance of their mission, the nature of the terrain, and the level of
fighting anticipated. Commanders can not only reallocate their own re-
sources in line with changes in the situation, but can take away a subordi-
nates organic resources and assign them to another subordinate if the situa-
tion warrants.

ADMINISTRATIVE FORCE STRUCTURE

14-18. The administrative force structure is the aggregate of every military
headquarters, facilities, and installations that are designed to man, train,
and equip the OPFOR. Especially at the operational level, and often at the
higher tactical levels, these peacetime groupings differ from the OPFORs go-
to-war structure. In wartime, the normal role of the operational-level admin-
istrative headquarters is to serve as force providers during the creation of
fighting headquarters, such as OSCs. After transferring control of its major
fighting forces to one or more fighting headquarters, an administrative head-
quarters, facility, or installation continues to provide depot and area support-
level administrative, supply, and maintenance functions. Divisions and bri-
gades in the administrative force structure often become DTGs or BTGs in
the wartime force structure and thus have increased requirements for logis-
tics support.
14-19. The administrative force structure is a flexible organization. The
OPFOR tailors the administrative force structure to meet specific objectives
based on forces available, mission requirements, enemy forces, and the geog-
raphy of the AOR. Tailoring affects both the number and type of subordinate
combat elements and the number and type of assigned logistics units. The lo-
gistics function of the administrative force structure at the operational level
is extensive and complex, serving as the major connecting link between the
industrial base of the State and forces engaged in combat.

INTEGRATED SUPPORT COMMAND

14-20. The integrated support command (ISC) is the aggregate of combat ser-
vice support units (and perhaps some combat support units) organic to a divi-
sion and additional assets allocated from the administrative force structure
to a DTG. It contains such units that the division or DTG does not sub-
allocate to lower levels of command in a constituent or dedicated relation-
ship.
14-21. The division (or DTG) further allocates part of its ISC units as an in-
tegrated support group (ISG) to support its integrated fires command (IFC),
and the remainder supports the rest of the division, as a second ISG. For or-

14-5
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

ganizational efficiency, other combat service support units may be grouped in

this ISC and its ISGs, although they may support only one of the major units
of the division or IFC. Sometimes, an ISC or ISG might also include units
performing combat support tasks (such as chemical warfare, information
warfare (IW), or law enforcement) that support the division and its IFC. (See
Chapters 2 and 8 for more detail on the IFC.)
14-22. The ISCs mission is to provide command and control (C2), administra-
tive, operations, and support personnel and equipment required for forming
the nucleus of the two ISGs. The division resources officer (in consultation
with his chiefs of logistics and administration and the ISC commander) task
organizes the ISGs based upon support mission requirements.
14-23. The ISC commander and his staff are the division logisticians. The
ISC commander advises the division commander, resources officer, and the
rest of the division staff on those logistics matters pertaining to ISG func-
tions. The ISC commander normally receives guidance and direction from the
division commander. The overall responsibility for logistics planning belongs
to the division resources officer. The division commander tasks the ISC com-
mander to evaluate the logistics supportability of future operation plans or
courses of action. The ISC commander tasks and provides guidance to the
ISC staff. The ISC staff gives the alternatives and preferred solutions to the
commander for a decision.

ISC
COMMANDER

ISC DEPUTY COMMAND SECTION

COMMANDER

SUBORDINATE ISC CHIEF

UNIT LIASION OF
OFFICERS STAFF

ADMIN OPERATIONS SUPPORT

SECTION SECTION SECTION

SOCC

Figure 14-2. Integrated Support Command Headquarters

14-24. The ISC headquarters is composed of the ISC commander and his
command section, an administrative section, an operations section, and a
support section. (See figure 14-2.) The administrative and support sections
provide personnel and logistics support for the ISC staff. The operations sec-

14-6
________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 13

tion provides the control, coordination, and communication for the headquar-
ters. Additionally, the operations staff provides IW support for the headquar-
ters component. Located within the operations section is the support opera-
tions coordination center (SOCC). The SOCC is the staff element responsible
for the planning and coordination of support for the division and the IFC.
The SOCC relies principally on direct liaison among all the ISC subordinate
units to ensure the necessary coordination of logistics support for combat ac-
tions.

INTEGRATED SUPPORT GROUP

14-25. The ISG is a compilation of units performing various support tasks
such as logistics, chemical, law enforcement, or IW that support the division
and its IFC. Normally, separate ISGs are organized to support the division
and the IFC. The ISG has six major functions:
Supply.
Maintenance.
Transportation.
Medical support.
Personnel services.
Field services.

14-26. There is no standard ISG organizational structure. The number, type,

and mix of subordinate elements vary based on the tactical support situation.
For example, an ISG supporting a division composed mainly of tank and
mechanized infantry units will differ from an ISG supporting a division com-
posed mainly of infantry or motorized infantry units. Even within a division
that receives no augmentation, there can be variations as to which division
subordinates may belong to either of the ISGs and which ones are in which
ISG.
14-27. In essence, the ISG is tailored to the mission. In the case of a DTG, it
is also tailored to the task organization of the DTG. (See Figure 14-3 for one
example; the rather robust ISG in this example might be appropriate for a
DTG not relying on extensive support from a parent OSC.) As the number
and type of supported units change, the ISGs change the way in which sub-
ordinate units are organized to provide support. When the logistics units al-
located from the operational level are no longer required for ISG functions,
the primary or area support units will revert to control of their original
parent units in the administrative force structure or will otherwise be
assigned to other DTGs, as appropriate.

14-7
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

DTG

ISC

ISG

MATERIEL TANK
TRANSPORT MAINTENANCE
SUPPORT BATTALION
HEAVY-LIFT
BRIGADE BRIGADE

CHEMICAL TRAFFIC
SMOKE
DEFENSE CONTROL
BATTALION BATTALION
BATTALION

MEDICAL EVACUATION PERSONNEL

SERVICE
BATTALION BATTALION BATTALION

Figure 14-3. DTG ISG (Example)

MATERIEL SUPPORT
14-28. The OPFOR materiel support system comprises a mix of very modern
and less modern capabilities that vary depending on the priority of the sup-
ported units. Generally, high-priority or elite units enjoy the benefits of a ro-
bust materiel support system that affords a higher degree of flexibility and
responsiveness to rapid changes in plans. For such units, the system may be
fully automated to track requirements and control the issue of supplies. Less
capable units (including reserve and militia forces) typically have little or no
automation support. Both types of materiel support system are based on allo-
cating supplies and services to units in order to accomplish mission objec-
tives. However, the aim of the OPFOR is to continue the upgrade of its less
capable units to a robust supply system capable of sustaining the force in all
environments.
14-29. Supply includes actions to acquire, manage, receive, store, and issue
the materiel required to equip and sustain the force from deployment
through combat operations and recovery into State territory. The allocation
of supplies is based on the unit mission, supply reports, and the availability
of supplies. During peacetime, the OPFOR operates under the pull system
of supply. For example, units in the field may request materiel from a depot
where they must pick it up and deliver it to the field.
14-30. The OPFOR concept of services includes all troops, installations, and
duty positions that perform logistics support for combat arms units. Such ser-

14-8
________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 13

vices are not specific to the ground forces, but support other Armed Forces
components as well.
14-31. During wartime, however, the OPFOR operates under the forward
distribution or push system principle, in which the higher echelon directly
supplies and services the next-lower echelon. Supplies and services are deliv-
ered directly to subordinate elements using the organic transportation assets
of the higher headquarters. Lower-priority units may have to rely on area
support or even supply point distribution.

METHODS OF DISTRIBUTION
14-32. The three methods by which supplying units distribute supplies to us-
ing units are supply point distribution, unit distribution, and throughput. In
supply point distribution, the supplying unit issues supplies from a supply
point to a receiving unit. The receiving unit must go to the supply point and
use its own transportation to move supplies to where they are needed.
14-33. In unit distribution, the supplying unit issue supplies and delivers
supplies to the receiving units area in transportation assets the supplying
unit has arranged. Throughput is a method of distribution in which ship-
ments bypass intermediate supply points or logistics sites. Throughput elimi-
nates the need for double handling, uses transportation assets more effi-
ciently, and is more responsive to the users needs.

SUPPLY PRIORITIES
14-34. The OPFOR places primary emphasis on maintaining the supply of
ammunition, fuel, and weapons. Its logistics system typically operates on the
following sequence of priorities:
Ammunition of all types.
Petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL).
Spare parts and technical supplies (for equipment maintenance and
repair).
Rations, clothing, and medical supplies.

14-35. These priorities can change with the combat situation. For example,
during an attack, the principal demand is for ammunition. On the other
hand, a unit conducting a pursuit or advancing rapidly with no opposition
has a greater need for POL than for ammunition. Nonessential supplies may
not be delivered if it reduces the ability to provide essential combat supplies.
Ammunition and fuel resupply can comprise 80 percent or more of total
transportation requirements. Rations may be considered nonessential, for in-
stance, when units can obtain them by foraging.

PLANNING FACTORS
14-36. Essentially, all materiel support assets, from battalion level to the
MOD, are part of one system. When planning and coordinating division or
brigade logistics allocations, the division or brigade resources officer requisi-
tions and allocates supplies according to guidance from the division or bri-
gade commander and pre-established planning factors. Standard tables of lo-

14-9
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

gistics planning factors, based on experience and estimated expenditure

rates, indicate the amount and type of supplies required by a division or bri-
gade to perform a particular type of combat action. Like his counterparts at
higher and lower levels, the division or brigade resources officer refers to
these tables when planning for a combat action. Then he must ensure that
centralized planning provides adequate amounts of supplies, properly dis-
tributed to support the action. Thus, resources officers at all levels coordinate
requirements from a common point of reference.

STANDARD UNITS OF ISSUE

14-37. To simplify logistics planning and to standardize ordering and issuing
procedures, the OPFOR divides the major classes of materiel supplies into
specific quantities or distribution lots. These quantities are called basic load
for ammunition, refills for fuel, daily rations for food, and sets for spare parts
and accessories. Once a standardized planning factor has prescribed a spe-
cific quantity as the unit of issue, planners no longer need to refer the quan-
tity itself, and all future references are given in multiples of the unit of issue.
14-38. Logistics calculations with these standard units of issue normally in-
volve the weight of the unit of issue in metric tons, since this is a key pa-
rameter for transport planning. For certain computations, volume is also
computed. These figures can then be used for planning transport and storage
in connection with similar lots of weights and volumes of standardized units
of issue of ammunition, POL, rations, and other lots of combat equipment.

MAINTENANCE
14-39. Maintenance includes actions taken to keep materiel and equipment
in a serviceable condition, to return it to service, or to update and upgrade its
capability. Since supplies are limited, the OPFOR stresses preventive main-
tenance, technical inspections, and proper operating methods to extend the
life cycle of equipment. The maintenance system is designed to repair vehi-
cles and equipment in the battle zone or as close to it as possible. Repair fa-
cilities and units move near the scene of combat rather than waiting for dam-
aged equipment to be evacuated to them. Fixed and mobile repair units ex-
tend repair capabilities into the battle zone and provide service to the cus-
tomer unit. During wartime, the types of repair performed at each level de-
pend on the situation. Generally, they are of a lesser degree than in peace-
time. The OPFOR classifies three categories of repair: routine, medium, or
capital.
14-40. Routine repairssuch as replacements, adjustments, or repair of in-
dividual componentsrequire a short time to fix. Generally, maintenance
personnel do not disassemble major components as part of routine repair.
Medium repairs include the minor overhaul of equipment and the repair of
individual components requiring a short time to fix. Capital repairs are con-
ducted at depot level and involve the major overhaul and/or assembly of
equipment.

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TRANSPORTATION
14-41. Transportation is a critical function that cannot be looked at in isola-
tion; it is the one element that ties sustainment and all other battlefield ac-
tivities together. The OPFOR envisions an environment characterized by a
rapid tempo of nonlinear operations; wide dispersion of forces; the need to
concentrate rapidly for battle and disperse quickly; and the need to conduct a
wide range of actions simultaneously.
14-42. Military logistics planners base their estimates on the use of all
movement resources available. These estimates include tactical combat vehi-
cles as well as civilian transportation assets mobilized to move supplies,
equipment, and personnel. For example, during mobilization, civilian truck-
ing and bus companies may be organized as militia truck units to provide
transportation of cargo and personnel within the State or occupied territory.
The mobility of logistics units must match that of the supported force. If the
logistics support units fail to achieve this, they may jeopardize the overall
success of the combat action.

MOVEMENT PRINCIPLES
14-43. The principles of movement apply to all military transportation ser-
vices and remain constant throughout peace and war. Additionally, they ap-
ply regardless of the planning level. During wartime, civilian personnel,
transportation assets (including farm animals, vehicles, aircraft, and water
vessels), and materiel-handling equipment are mobilized to support the war
effort.

Centralized Planning and Decentralized Execution

14-44. Movement control is centralized at the highest level at which com-
manders charged with providing total logistics support and monitoring the
transportation system and infrastructure can exercise it. This requires a fo-
cal point for transportation movement planning and resource allocation at all
levels. That focal point, whether an individual (the resources officer or chief
of logistics) or unit, must be constantly aware of requirements and capabili-
ties. Decentralized execution enhances the flexibility of lower-level com-
manders to meet local requirements and to rapidly reprioritize support.

Regulated Movement
14-45. All movement is regulated according to command priorities. Move-
ments are not validated, approved, or initiated if any part of the transporta-
tion system cannot meet the requirement. Regulating transportation assets
and LOCs is required to prevent congestion, confusion, and conflict of move-
ments. Unregulated use of the transportation system can severely hamper
the movement of critical cargo and personnel supporting the battle or the
overall operation or strategic campaign. Therefore, traffic in the AOR is pro-
grammed to provide fluid movement throughout the transportation network.
14-46. The OPFOR traffic control service employs a system of measures or-
ganized and executed for the purpose of ensuring convoy and traffic regula-
tion as well as maintaining general order in areas where troops are deployed.
A traffic control battalion is responsible for traffic control and law enforce-

14-11
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

ment at the tactical level. It is responsible for directing military traffic along
convoy routes and ensuring that the proper convoy speed and spacing are
maintained. A traffic control battalion or brigade performs the same func-
tions at the operational level. The States Internal Security Forces support
movement control through protection of supply routes of movement in the
States homeland and of key transportation nodes and centers.
14-47. A movement program is a directive that allocates the available trans-
port mode capability to satisfy the movement requirements in accordance
with the commanders priorities. The program normally contains detailed in-
formation concerning origins, destinations, weights, and cube of cargo, and/or
types and number of personnel to be moved.

Fluid and Flexible Movement

14-48. The transportation system is designed to provide an uninterrupted
flow of traffic that adjusts rapidly to changing situations. It is flexible enough
to meet the changing priorities of a fluid battlefield and reallocate resources
as necessary. Adjustments must be made to meet the variations in combat in-
tensity. For example, when units are in the offense, the transportation sys-
tem expands to maintain the tempo of the battle. Conversely, when units are
in the defense, the system is contracted, the mode changes, and differing
cargo priorities may be necessary. Changes in the operational or tactical en-
vironment necessitate adjustments to operate in varying conditions and tac-
tical situations that may dictate the types of convoys and controls established
for movement.
14-49. The availability and use of road and rail networks, airfields, inland
waterways, ports, and beaches not only allow the transportation system to
respond to tactical changes, but also provide redundancy within the overall
transportation network. For example, if a portion of a road network is de-
stroyed or rendered unusable, the mode could change to rail or inland water-
way.

Maximum Use of Carrying Capacity

14-50. The principle of making maximum use of carrying capacity involves
more than just loading each transportation asset to its optimum carrying ca-
pacity. Transport capability that is not used in one day cannot be stored to
provide an increase in capability for subsequent days. Similarly, a situation
allowing fully-loaded transport to sit idle is just as much a loss of carrying
capacity as is a partially-loaded vehicle moving through the system. While al-
lowing for sufficient equipment, maintenance, and personnel rest, planners
should keep transportation assets loaded and moving as much as the situa-
tion permits.

TRANSPORTATION MODES
14-51. Transportation operations may include motor vehicles, rail, aircraft,
and waterway (coastal and inland) transport vessels. The OPFOR generally
uses motor vehicles to move large quantities of general cargo, POL, and per-
sonnel throughout the AOR. However, waterway transport vessels may be

14-12
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used to move large quantities of supplies and personnel along coastal or in-
land waterways to remote areas that are not accessible to motor vehicles.
14-52. As requirements for transportation fluctuate, each mode must be
properly used to accomplish the commanders objective. For example, air
transport is employed if reaction speed is the priority. Motor transport is con-
sidered the most flexible surface mode. It provides door-to-door delivery ser-
vice and an interface with all other transportation modes.
14-53. Motor transport becomes essential as supplies are moved forward
from railheads, field depots, or supply points to combat units. After the relo-
cation of supplies from national-level supply bases, the OPFOR distributes
them within OSCs and divisions primarily by truck. Within an OSC, the
heaviest truck transport requirements are primarily above the division level.
14-54. Under the control of the resources officer at each level, motor trans-
port resources are centralized for operational and tactical employment, espe-
cially in the pre-offensive buildup period and for resupply of advancing columns.
This centralized control facilitates the diversion of motor transport assets of re-
serve forces to support those units engaged in the main effort when necessary.

SUPPLY AND EVACUATION ROUTES

14-55. Within their AORs, divisions and brigades establish and improve sup-
ply and evacuation routes, using the network of military roads. Routes are
usually as follows:
Division routes: from the ISG deployment area to the deployment ar-
eas of the brigades materiel support units, IFC firing positions, and
the brigades medical points.
Brigade routes: from the deployment area of the brigades materiel
support unit(s) to the deployment areas of battalion-level supply and
service platoons, indirect fire support unit areas (or firing positions),
and battalion medical points.
14-56. The division or brigade resources officer, together with the chief of in-
frastructure management at that level, is responsible for the improvement of
supply and evacuation routes and their maintenance in passable condition.
At division and brigade levels, subordinate engineer elements perform road
maintenance. Engineer units at OSC or division level may form road and
bridge construction and repair groups to prepare and maintain these and
other movement routes. At national level, the Strategic Integration Director-
ate (SID) also organizes civil engineering and construction efforts required to
sustain military actions. During wartime, civil engineering units from the
Ministry of the Interior, as directed by the SID, may be employed at the na-
tional, OSC, and division levels. Employed on an area basis, these units are re-
sponsible for the upkeep of supply and evacuation routes and for repair of battle-
damaged roads and bridges. The chief of infrastructure management at the OSC
or division level must coordinate and prioritize the route construction and main-
tenance functions of both civil and combat engineers within his respective AOR.

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

PERSONNEL SUPPORT
14-57. The OPFOR considers people as one of the assets most critical to the
success of any military action. Thorough planning and efficient personnel
management directly influence mission readiness. During the course of bat-
tles and operations, timely personnel replacements are essential.

PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT
14-58. The division or brigade chief of administration is responsible for all
personnel actions and transactions in the command. At DTG level, a person-
nel service company or battalion provides the personnel to operate the per-
sonnel operations center. That centers major functions include providing per-
sonnel and administrative support, finance support, and legal support.

REPLACEMENT
14-59. Units may maintain strength by piecemeal replacement of casualties
during combat, particularly when lightly wounded personnel and damaged
equipment can return to parent units quickly. Once casualties are sufficient
to threaten total loss of combat effectiveness, the unit withdraws from con-
tact and reconstitutes. Timely replacement of ineffective units is vital to
maintaining momentum. The commander may choose to withdraw heavily
attritted units and consolidate them to form a smaller number of combat-
effective units.
14-60.Personnel replacement is based on unit strength reports and includes
the coordinated support and delivery of replacements and soldiers returning
from medical facilities. The unit strength report is used to assess a units
combat power, plan for future battles, and assign replacements on the battle-
field.

Individual Replacements
14-61. The OPFOR can use the system of individual replacements in both
peacetime and wartime. The sources of replacement personnel are school
graduates, reserve assignments, medical returnees, and normal assignments.

Incremental Replacements
14-62. The OPFOR may incrementally replace entire small units such as
weapons crews, squads, and platoons. Replacements can be obtained from
training units or reserve forces.

Composite Unit Formation

14-63. Composite units may be formed from other units reduced by combat
operations. Composite units may be constituted up to division and even OSC
level.

Whole-Unit Replacement
14-64. The OPFOR uses whole-unit replacement when massive losses occur
as a result of a combat action. Company-level and above units are brought
forward from reserve forces to replace combat forces rendered ineffective.

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Replacement Training
14-65. OPFOR planners realize that personnel replacement requirements
may necessitate any of the aforementioned procedures. Individual and unit
replacement exercises are held semiannually to maintain established profi-
ciency standards for personnel units. During these and other training exer-
cises, troops are moved by various modes of transportation such as motor ve-
hicles, waterway, aircraft, or rail.

14-15
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

MEDICAL SUPPORT
14-66. The basic principle of combat medical support is multistage evacua-
tion with minimum treatment by medical personnel at each unit level. They
treat the lightly wounded who can return to combat and those casualties who
would not survive further evacuation without immediate medical attention.
14-67. The OPFOR divides the range of medical treatment into three catego-
ries. The first category of procedures includes only mandatory lifesaving
measures. The second category includes procedures to prevent severe compli-
cations of wounds or injuries. The final category of treatment includes proce-
dures accomplished only when there is a low casualty load and reduced en-
emy activity.
14-68. In anticipation of an overtaxed combat medical support system,
OPFOR doctrine emphasizes the importance of self-help and mutual aid
among individual soldiers. This concept extends beyond the battlefield to
casualty collection points and unit aid stations. Self-help and mutual aid re-
duces the demands made on medical personnel, particularly when there is a
sudden and massive influx of casualties. Each soldier is required to attend a
first-aid training session.

MEDICAL LOGISTICS
14-69. The medical logistics system operates on a pull system. Personnel in
the field request medical materiel (including repair parts for medical equip-
ment) from a medical depot where it must be picked up and delivered to the
field. Normally, medical supplies are transported from the support zone to
the battle zone on cargo-carrying transport vehicles, water vessels, or air-
craft. However, ground ambulances returning to the battle zone may assist in
transporting medical supplies. A medical equipment maintenance unit at the
medical depot provides all medical equipment maintenance.

Level Available Care

Platoon Platoon medic (corpsman) provides basic first aid.

Company Company medic (paramedic) provides advanced first aid, pain relief, intravenous fluids,
treatment of most common illnesses.

Battalion Medical assistant (physicians assistant) provides limited medical intervention, minor sur-
gery, and treatment of most common illnesses; limited inpatient capability.

Brigade, BTG, Medical officers (physicians) provide trauma stabilization and minor surgical intervention.
and Division

DTG and Higher A field hospital provides major surgery and extended care.

OSC or Theater The Central Military Hospital and major civilian hospitals provide definitive care in fixed
Support Zone facilities.

Figure 14-4. Levels of Medical Care

14-16
________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 13

CASUALTY HANDLING
14-70. The OPFOR has shown success in handling combat casualties. This
success stems from emphasis placed on trauma training and close coordina-
tion with the civilian medical sector. Evacuation is based on a higher-to-
lower method. The next-higher echelon provides transportation for casual-
ties. Each level has specific responsibilities for the care of the sick and
wounded. (See Figure 13-4.) Besides treating the wounded, medical personnel
handle virtually all of their own administration, especially at lower levels. As
casualties move through the combat evacuation system, medical personnel at
each level make effective use of medical facilities by repeated sorting of the
wounded (triage). Helicopters are used for all military and civilian search
and rescue missions, medical evacuations, and domestic disaster relief
flights. During wartime situations, most casualties arrive at a hospital
within 6 to 12 hours after being wounded. The evacuation time is reduced to
2 hours during peacetime.

MEDICAL FACILITIES
14-71. A field hospital is the first level in the evacuation system capable of
conducting major surgery and giving extended care. It is mobile and capable
of deployment near the battle zone. It constitutes the largest and most exten-
sive military facility with this capability.
14-72. The best medical facility is the Central Army Hospital. During peace-
time, military personnel receive treatment at this hospital, which also is des-
ignated as one of the emergency medical care facilities for foreign diplomats,
their families, and tourists. The State also has designated some of its major
university hospitals as such emergency medical care facilities. This ensures
consistent high-quality medical staffing, care and treatment. A majority of
medical facilities or clinics in the outlying areas has sufficient numbers of
trained personnel, supplies, and reliable electric power and water. The facili-
ties also contain high-quality, sophisticated, domestic and imported medical
equipment. The pharmacies are stocked with high-quality, domestic, and for-
eign-produced pharmaceuticals. During wartime conditions, military person-
nel are treated at all of the major civilian hospitals in addition to field hospi-
tals.

NBC TREATMENT
14-73. Treating nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) casualties is a stan-
dard OPFOR trauma protocol. The NBC medical plan is based on three as-
sumptions:
Mass casualties will occur.
Casualties will be similar to those that medical personnel have been
trained to treat.
Medical personnel are able to treat the casualties in a decontaminated
environment.
The Central Army Hospital can be converted into a chemical decontamina-
tion center within 2 to 6 hours. Most of the remaining major hospitals require
up to 30 days to convert to a decontamination center.

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

BLOOD MANAGEMENT
14-74. The Ministry of Health maintains a Blood Management Office to over-
see the collection, processing, storage, and distribution of blood (to include
liquid blood and blood components) to alleviate the effects of a natural disas-
ter or war. Blood management services are provided to support both civilian
and military establishments. The main source of blood to support wartime
casualty requirements comes from the collection and processing of blood from
the civilian populace during peacetime. The blood is generally stored in pre-
positioned underground structures throughout the country.

SUPPORT OF COMBAT ACTIONS

14-75. During both offense and defense, OPFOR logistics units operate from
locations that are protected, concealed, and serviced by good road networks.
Commanders emphasize that logistics units make maximum use of urban ar-
eas to conduct logistics activities. The dispersion of logistics sites is consis-
tent with support requirements, control, and local security.
14-76. Logisticians must be continuously informed of battle plans and prob-
able changes to those plans. They coordinate logistics preparations with de-
ception plans to avoid giving away the element of surprise. Commanders em-
phasize passive security measures during the sustainment of combat actions.
Logistics unit commanders anticipate that at least 50 percent or more of
their work will be done in darkness or under other limited visibility condi-
tions. Therefore, noise and light discipline is a necessity when operating un-
der these conditions.

OFFENSE
14-77. The logistics objective in supporting offensive actions is to maintain
the momentum of the attack by supporting in the battle zone or as close to it
as possible. Both the battle zone and the support zone can move as the offen-
sive battle progresses.
14-78. Planners must consider the nature of the offensive action as it affects
logistics activities. For example, high fuel consumption may dictate making
provisions to position substantial quantities in or near the battle zone with-
out signaling the OPFORs intention to attack to the enemy. Responsive sup-
port is critical and is made more difficult by lengthening of supply lines and
by critical requirements for user resupply vehicles to stay close to their re-
spective units. Planning, coordination, communication, and above all flexibil-
ity are key elements to consider. Therefore, planners develop logistics plans
flexible enough to meet the changing priorities of a fluid battlefield.
14-79. In considering the attack, materiel support units ensure that all sup-
port equipment is ready and that supplies are best located for support. They
also ensure that sufficient transportation is available to support maneuver
and logistics plans. Normally, ammunition and fuel are the most important
supplies in the offense. However, consideration must be given to all supplies,
as well as other support procedures, specifically medical and maintenance.

14-18
________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 13

14-80. The following are examples of some specific considerations for plan-
ners to use during the development of logistics plans supporting offensive ac-
tions:
Maintenance units should pre-plan maintenance collection points
along movement routes, in order to reduce recovery requirements.
Supply points consisting of fuel and ammunition are positioned in the
battle zone or as close to it as possible.
Arrangements are made in advance for aerial resupply of critical items
in order to maintain the tempo of combat.
Planners arrange to throughput obstacle-breaching and bridging mate-
rial if required.
Planners must consider potential bypassed enemy units; they must
have the latest intelligence on the enemy situation.
DEFENSE
14-81. The logistics objective in supporting defensive actions is to sustain the
attrition of enemy attacking forces through support from dispersed sites lo-
cated in the support zone. A division support zone may be dispersed within
the support zones of subordinate brigades, or the division may have a sepa-
rate support zone site of its own.
14-82. During the defense, supply activity is greatest in the preparation
stage. Supplies generally are stockpiled or pre-positioned in initial and sub-
sequent defensive positions. Critical supplies such as ammunition and bar-
rier material should be as mobile as possible to ensure continuous support as
combat power is shifted in response to enemy attacks.
14-83. To support stay-behind forces, supply stockage levels may be two to
three times higher than normal amounts. This ensures a redundancy of
caches and needed equipment that cannot be readily resupplied. Stay-behind
forces may require unique maintenance support arrangements to ensure that
equipment remains operational.
14-84. Logistics units position themselves in relatively secure positions far
enough from maneuver and fire support units to be out of the flow of the bat-
tle. However, they should not be so far removed as to render the logistics ef-
fort less effective.
14-85. The following are examples of some specific considerations for plan-
ners to use during the development of logistics plans supporting defensive ac-
tions:
Maintenance units should position maintenance teams in the battle
zone to return the maximum number of weapons systems to the battle
as soon as possible.
Emphasis is on keeping supply and evacuation routes open.
Nonessential logistics units and operations move into the depth of the
support zone as early as possible.
In a maneuver defense, supply points consisting of fuel and ammuni-
tion are positioned as far forward as possible and in successive battle
positions.

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

SUPPORT ZONE SECURITY

14-86. The OPFOR expects any enemy to make an effort to conduct recon-
naissance, espionage, and diversionary action in its tactical and operational
support zones. These enemy actions can be particularly effective in areas
where the local population is not sympathetic to the OPFORs cause. In addi-
tion to these threats, the OPFOR anticipates attacks on its support zone by
airborne and heliborne forces as well as larger-scale attacks by enemy opera-
tional maneuver forces.
14-87. The OPFOR uses a security force to counter any threats in its support
zone. Each division or DTG deploys a considerable counterintelligence effort.
It can assign up to an entire BTG for security tasks. The security force is
equipped and trained for conventional as well as unconventional warfare. As
airborne and amphibious threats grow, there is increasing stress on deploy-
ing antilanding reserves, including, or even based on, heliborne units to pro-
vide a rapid reaction.
14-88. All logistics and communications units are capable of self-defense. The
convalescent sick and wounded provide a reserve of manpower for elements
near medical locations or reserve forces.

MISSION SUPPORT SITES

14-89. A mission support site (MSS) is a temporary base used by units that
are operating at a considerable distance from their support zone, during an
extended mission. The MSS may provide food, shelter, medical support, am-
munition, or demolitions. The use of an MSS eliminates unnecessary move-
ment of supplies and allows a force to move more rapidly to and from attack
sites or objectives. When selecting an MSS, consideration is given to cover
and concealment, proximity to the objective, proximity to supply routes, and
the presence of enemy security forces in the area. Security dictates that drop
zones or landing zones be a considerable distance from an MSS, cache, or
support zonealthough this may increase transportation problems.

POST-COMBAT SUPPORT
14-90. OPFOR logisticians are not only focused on supporting units in com-
bat. They are also focused on other post-combat support requirements such
as personnel replacement, weapon systems replacement, reconstitution, and
receiving and preparing reinforcements. (For information on personnel re-
placement, see the Personnel Support section of this chapter.)

WEAPON SYSTEMS REPLACEMENT

14-91. Weapon systems replacement is simply a procedure for providing a
weapon system to a combat unit. It involves processing the vehicle or equip-
ment from a storage or transportation configuration to a ready-to-fight condi-
tion. It also involves the integration of a completely trained crew with the
weapon system.

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________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 13

RECONSTITUTION
14-92. Reconstitution is performed in support of all combat actions. Although
it is mainly a command and operations function, the actual refitting, supply,
personnel fill, and medical actions are conducted by logistics units. There are
two methods for conducting reconstitution: reorganization and regeneration.

Reorganization
14-93. Reorganization is action taken to shift resources internally within a
degraded unit to increase its level of combat effectiveness. Reorganization is
normally done at unit level and requires only limited external support such
as supply replenishment, maintenance assistance, and limited personnel re-
placement. When continuity of the mission is of paramount importance, com-
posite units may be formed from other units reduced by combat actions.

Regeneration
14-94. Regeneration is action taken to rebuild a unit through large-scale re-
placement of personnel, equipment, and supplies. Additionally, it is action
taken to restore C2 and conduct mission-essential training. Overall, the effort
is directed at restoring the units cohesion, discipline, and fighting effective-
ness.

PREPARING REINFORCEMENTS
14-95. OPFOR strategic and operational logisticians prepare contingency
plans for the mobilization and reception of reserve forces. Once the unit per-
sonnel and equipment are mobilized, they are sustained, configured, and
transported to their respective OSC. Normally, strategic-level logistics units
provide this type of support. Once the units arrive at the OSC, the OSC as-
sumes responsibility for their further sustainment and transport, and they
are available for assignment to appropriate tactical-level missions.

14-21
 Chapter 15

Special-Purpose Forces
The OPFOR maintains a broad array of special-purpose forces (SPF) as
means to carry the battle to the enemys depth. In its administrative force
structure, these are national-level forces that the General Staff can use
against strategic objectives or for regional power projection. However, it of-
ten task organizes these assets to perform designated missions for opera-
tional- or even tactical-level commands. It may also allocate such forces
down to the operational and tactical levels to perform designated mis-
sions. These missions may support national-, theater-, operational-, or
tactical-level objectives. However, the SPF always conduct these missions
as small teams or detachments and would use the same types of tactical
action regardless of the level of command for which they perform the mis-
sions.

This chapter describes nature of SPF and the roles they can play at vari-
ous levels of command. Then it describes the basic forms of tactical action
they perform at any level, although the purpose of the action may be dif-
ferent at different levels.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

15-1. One of the OPFORs six service components, the SPF Command, pro-
vides the capability to attack both regional and extraregional enemies
throughout their strategic depth. In addition to conducting direct action, this
command fields strategic reconnaissance forces with which it is able to sup-
port national intelligence requirements. It also has a capability to support
terrorist and irregular forces operations. The SPF Command includes both
SPF units and commando units. Its assigned units provide a balanced capa-
bility including some tactical transport for use in inserting SPF or commando
units. (Command and control for the SPF Commands commando units is dis-
cussed under the subsection on Commandos later in this chapter.)
15-2. In addition to the SPF Command, three of the other five service com-
ponents have their own SPF. The Army, Naval, and Air Force SPF are in-
tended primarily for use at the operational level and enable each service to
conduct reconnaissance and direct action to the opponents operational depth.
All of these SPF organizations provide the OPFOR a flexible and capable
means of support to regional, transition, and adaptive operations.

ADMINISTRATIVE FORCE STRUCTURE

15-3. The SPF Command is directly subordinate to the Supreme High Com-
mand (SHC) and is thus under the control of the General Staff. The General
Staff normally reserves some SPF brigades under its own control for strate-

15-1
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

gic-level missions as directed by its Intelligence Directorate. Likewise, the

Army, Navy, and Air Force could maintain some of their own SPF directly
subordinate to the service headquarters, although most of them are intended
for use at the operational level and thus can be subordinate to operational-
level commands, even in the administrative force structure.
15-4. In peacetime and in garrisons within the State, SPF of both the SPF
Command and other services are organized administratively into SPF com-
panies, battalions, and brigades. These organizations facilitate peacetime
administrative control and training. However, even these administrative or-
ganizations do not have a fixed structure. Each consists of a varying number
of small SPF teams normally composed of 5 to 12 men each. The number of
teams contained in each administrative organization depends on the team
size required for specific missions that are envisioned for it. Every SPF mis-
sion is unique and unlike any other, and thus requires forces organized not in
a standard fashion but rather adapted into a task organization based on the
mission.

TASK ORGANIZATION
15-5. When the OPFOR establishes more than one theater headquarters, the
General Staff may allocate some SPF units to each theater. From those SPF
assets allocated to him in a constituent or dedicated relationship, the theater
commander can suballocate some or all of them to a subordinate operational-
strategic command (OSC).
15-6. The General Staff (or a theater commander with constituent or dedi-
cated SPF) can allocate SPF units to an OSC in a constituent or dedicated re-
lationship or place them in support of an OSC. These command and support
relationships ensure that SPF objectives support the overall mission of the
OSC to which the SPF units are allocated. Even in a supporting relationship,
the commander of the OSC receiving the SPF unit(s) establishes those units
objectives, priorities, and time of deployment. The OSC commander may em-
ploy the SPF units allocated to him as constituent or dedicated as part of his
integrated fires command (IFC), or he may suballocate them to his tactical-
level subordinates.
15-7. The SPF units of the Army, Navy, and Air Force may remain under the
control of the SHC or Theater commander or be allocated to an OSC. In the
latter case, the OSC commander may choose to suballocate them to tactical-
level subordinates.
15-8. SPF units from the SPF Command or other services can be allocated in
a constituent or dedicated status to be task organized as part of a tactical
group in order to perform specialized reconnaissance or direct action mis-
sions. In other cases, SPF units may be allocated in a supporting relation-
ship, while remaining under the command of their parent SPF organization.
15-9. Regardless of the parent administrative organization, SPF normally in-
filtrate and operate as small teams. When deployed, these teams may operate
individually, or they may be task organized into detachments. The terms
team and detachment indicate the temporary nature of the groupings. In the
course of an operation, teams can leave a detachment and join it again. Each
team may in turn break up into smaller teams (of as few as two men) or, con-

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versely, come together with other teams to form a larger team (of perhaps up
to 30 men), depending on the mission. At a designated time, several teams
can join up and form a detachment (for example, to conduct a raid), which
can at any moment split up again. This whole process can be planned before
the operation begins, or it can evolve during the course of the operation.
15-10. When deployed outside the State, each SPF team or detachment is in
direct communication with a higher headquarters. The controlling headquar-
ters may be an OSC, although in this case, typically SPF units receive orders
directly from the General Staff or theater headquarters.

INTEGRATED FIRES COMMAND

15-11. An IFC may include an SPF unit as one of its many components (see
Chapter 2). At OSC level, the SPF component provides the OPFOR the abil-
ity to attack both regional and extraregional enemies throughout the theater.
They conduct operations to achieve strategic military, political, economic,
and/or psychological objectives or to achieve tactical or operational goals in
support of strategic objectives. Such operations may have either long-range
or immediate impact on the enemy. If a DTG receives an SPF unit, this
would supplement other long-range reconnaissance (LRR) assets as part of
the IFCs LRR component.

SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE
15-12. SPF are a major source of human intelligence (HUMINT), placing
eyes on target in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive territory. They can
operate in small teams beyond the battle lines of the area of responsibility
(AOR), conducting long-range reconnaissance. Their priorities include
Precision weapons.
Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) delivery systems.
Headquarters and other command and control (C2) installations and
centers.
Reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition
(RISTA) systems and centers.
Rail, road, and air movement routes.
Airfields and ports.
Logistics facilities.
Air defense systems.
Once SPF teams locate such targets, they may simply monitor and report on
activity there, or they may conduct direct action or diversionary measures.
15-13. The SPF can train and employ affiliated forces and civilians to per-
form HUMINT activities. They may also operate in conjunction with
HUMINT agents controlled by the Intelligence Directorate of the General
Staff.

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DIRECT ACTION
15-14. Direct action involves an overt, covert, or clandestine attack by armed
individuals or groups to damage or destroy high-value targets or to kill or
seize a person or persons. Examples of direct-action missions for SPF units
are assassination, abduction, hostage taking, sabotage, capture, ambushes,
raids, rescue of hostages (civilian and military), and rescue and recovery of
downed pilots or aircrews. Implementation of direct-action missions depends
on the size of the enemys defenses, the element of surprise, and the assets
available to the SPF unit commander.
15-15. The term diversionary measures refers to direct actions of groups or
individuals operating in the enemys rear area. These measures include the
destruction or degradation of key military objectives and the disruption of C2,
communications, junctions, transport, and lines of communication (LOCs).
They could include misdirecting military road movement by moving road
markers and generating false communications. They also involve killing per-
sonnel, spreading disinformation, destroying military hardware, and other
actions to weaken the morale and will of the enemy by creating confusion and
panic. Diversionary measures may be part of a larger information warfare
(IW) campaign.

MISSIONS
15-16. While SPF belonging to other service components are designed for use
at the operational and tactical level, forces from the SPF Command provide a
regional and global strategic capability. Collectively, all these SPF assets can
engage the enemy simultaneously to his tactical, operational, and even stra-
tegic depth. They are prepared to attack enemy forces anywhere in the re-
gion, at overseas bases, at home stations, and even in military communities.
They can attack his airfields, seaports, transportation infrastructures, and
LOCs. Targets include not only enemy military forces and equipment, but
also government agency heads, contractors, private firms, and nongovern-
mental organizations involved in transporting troops and materiel into the
region or supporting enemy forces in any manner.
15-17. SPF are likely to be used against key political, economic, or population
centers or tangible targets whose destruction affects intangible centers of
gravity, rather than against military targets for purely military objectives.
These efforts often place noncombatants at risk and aim to apply diplomatic-
political, economic, and psychological pressure. The goal is to present the en-
emy with a nonlinear, simultaneous battlefield. Striking such targets will not
only deny the enemy sanctuary, but also weaken his national will, particu-
larly if the OPFOR can strike targets in the enemys homeland.
15-18. SPF actions increase the depth of the battle area. The SPFs simulta-
neous attack of both front and rear areas to disrupt or destroy enemy forces
includes the following basic missions:
Neutralize weapons of mass destruction and precision weapons.
Attack air defense facilities and airfields.
Disrupt LOCs.
Attack C2 and RISTA facilities.

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Exploit surprise to disrupt defensive actions.

Undermine morale and spread panic.
Disrupt enemy power supplies and transportation networks (power
utilities, POL transfer and storage sites, and internal transportation).
Conduct reconnaissance for future ground force operations or for air-
borne and/or amphibious landings.
Organize local guerrilla or partisan groups.
Prevent efficient movement of enemy reserves.
Assassinate important political and military figures.
Provide terminal guidance for attacking aircraft, missiles, and preci-
sion weapons.
In addition to these basic missions, SPF may have specific missions in peace-
time, transition to war, and wartime.

PEACETIME MISSIONS
15-19. During peacetime, the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff
carefully coordinates reconnaissance programs geared to meet the intelli-
gence requirements of the State and of the OPFOR if war should break out.
Aside from SPF troops, it maintains agent networks in the target country to
support SPF operations. Some of these agents actively engage in subversion;
others are sleepers, prepared to act on call in time of war. The SPF Com-
mand trains agents to operate as political agitators, intelligence collectors,
and saboteurs. The agents establish residence near military targets such as
airports, missile bases, arsenals, communications centers, logistics centers
and depots, and routes used for troop movements. Just before the beginning
of hostilities, SPF teams link up with agents already operating in the target
area.
15-20. Clandestine SPF sabotage agents do little intelligence collection.
Their job is to blend into the local culture, establish residences near trans-
port and power facilities, and when ordered, emplace explosive charges in
preselected targets.
15-21. Another important task for clandestine SPF sabotage agents in peace-
time is to acquire houses and plots of land to prepare safe areas where sabo-
tage teams (civilian and military) can find refuge after landing behind enemy
lines in times of hostilities. These places are usually in the countryside, in
forested areas near the sea, or in the mountains.
15-22. Agents provide incoming sabotage and assassination teams with safe
areas, motor transport, fuel, and supplies. They then guide the teams to their
objective. Both intelligence and sabotage agents can come under the control
of a theater or OSC chief of reconnaissance. The chief of reconnaissance can
transfer agents from one category to the other at any time or order them to
fulfill both roles.

TRANSITION TO WAR
15-23. Before hostilities begin, SPF conduct clandestine operations in the
target area. This increases the probability of destroying key targets well be-

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fore enemy force protection measures tighten. This is the most critical period
because clandestine elements can efficiently use the enemy's lack of aware-
ness as an opportunity to disorganize and disrupt troops and the local popu-
lation. Since the SPF often use terror tactics, direct action during this transi-
tion period still allows plausible deniability. Missions generally include the
following:
Conduct strategic and operational reconnaissance.
Train and assist insurgents operating in foreign countries.
Organize local guerrilla or partisan groups.
Weaken the target countrys military capabilities or will to fight
through either subversion or direct action.
Assassinate key military and political figures.
Sabotage enemy mobilization and deployment.

15-24. The General Staff directs the planning of SPF wartime missions,
which form an integral part of combined arms combat. Intended to support
theater- as well as OSC-level operations and sometimes tactical-level actions,
SPF are capable of operating throughout enemy territory.

WARTIME MISSIONS
15-25. SPF play an important role in support of both the offense and defense.
They may perform their missions separately, in support of strategic objec-
tives, or in support of a theater-level campaign, an OSC-level operation, or
DTG-level tactical action. Missions generally include some of the following:
Conduct deep reconnaissance operations.
Conduct direct action along tactical, operational, or strategic axes, in-
cluding ambushes and raids.
Destroy critical air defense systems and associated radars.
Support follow-on conventional military actions.
Assist local guerrillas (or insurgents in another country) to prepare for
offensive actions.
Provide communications, liaison, and support to stay-behind partisan
activities in the defense.

15-26. The OPFOR conducts SPF actions in the enemys tactical, operational,
and strategic depth to undermine his morale and to spread panic among the
civilian population and the political leadership. SPF actions can lead to a
flow of refugees, which can hamper enemy deployment, defensive maneuver,
and logistics.
15-27. The OPFOR has trained SPF as alternate means of delivering nuclear,
biological, or chemical (NBC) munitions packages it may develop for them.
This provides a worldwide strategic means of NBC delivery that is not lim-
ited to the range of the missiles of the Strategic Forces.
15-28. SPF allocated to an OSC or DTG often become part of the disruption
force, frequently operating in enemy-held territory before the beginning of an
operation or battle. At OSC level and sometimes at DTG level, they may be-

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come part of an IFC, to assist in locating and destroying key enemy forma-
tions or systems (see Chapter 2).

LOGISTICS
15-29. The secrecy during movement or delivery complicates resupply of the
deployed SPF team or detachment. A team leader or detachment commander
requesting extensive logistics support from the outside should limit his re-
quest to essential items not readily obtainable in the AOR. This could include
major items such as weapons, ammunition, demolitions, communications
equipment, medical supplies, or other items that are normally denied to the
local population by the enemy. The team leader or detachment commander
has several techniques available that will give him the supplies required
when he needs them.

ACCOMPANYING SUPPLIES
15-30. Accompanying supplies are items taken into the AOR by the SPF
team during insertion or infiltration. These supplies are issued at the staging
base in the final briefing stages and rigged by the team for delivery. When he
plans his accompanying supplies, the team leader or detachment commander
considers automatic resupply of survival and mission-essential items that he
will receive. The accompanying supplies, plus the automatic resupply, will
constitute the supply level of items required for the mission.

AUTOMATIC RESUPPLY
15-31. Automatic resupply is prearranged for time, location, and content dur-
ing the teams or detachments final preparation stage at the staging base.
The automatic resupply gives the team or detachment flexibility by allowing
it to include backup communications equipment, weapons, ammunition, dem-
olitions, medical supplies, and other items to support small-scale tactical ac-
tions and/or training of local insurgent, guerrilla or partisan groups that may
be affiliated with the OPFOR.
15-32. The supplies designated for the automatic resupply are selected on the
basis of available intelligence, indicating items essential to complete or con-
tinue the mission, conduct exfiltration, or support affiliated forces. Once they
are issued and received, they are rigged and prepared and stored for delivery
in accordance with the predetermined schedule.

ON-CALL SUPPLIES
15-33. After commitment into an AOR, and once it has established communi-
cations with its higher headquarters, the team or detachment is ready to be-
gin requesting supplies based on mission needs and the capability to receive
and store them.
15-34. In order to expedite supply requests, ensure accurate identification of
needs, and minimize communication transmission time, the team leader or
detachment commander uses a logistics brevity code system. The code in-
cludes the general category, unit designation, unit weight, total bundle
weight, and number of individual man-loads per package. The logistics brev-
ity code system is used to request three categories of supplies:

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Survival items (medical supplies, blankets, clothing, and food).

Mission-essential items (weapons, ammunition, and communications
equipment).
Bulk items (the aforementioned items in bulk quantities to support ex-
tended missions, or the rapid expansion of affiliated forces).
Each load is self-contained. For example, a weapon will be packaged with
ammunition, tools, cleaning equipment, and spare parts. Unused weight or
space will be used for additional survival items.

EMERGENCY RESUPPLY
15-35. The emergency resupply procedure is used to restore the combat ca-
pability of a team or detachment. This procedure is initiated when requested
or after sustaining losses from enemy actions, missing a scheduled radio con-
tact, discovering faulty equipment, or other incidents. Items delivered nor-
mally consist of communications equipment and other mission-essential
equipment.

RECONSTITUTION AND REORGANIZATION

15-36. Restoring combat effectiveness of subordinates is one of the most im-
portant duties of SPF commanders. It includes
Determining the degree of combat effectiveness of subordinates.
Assigning missions to subordinates that are still combat-effective.
Withdrawing units from areas of destruction or contamination.
Providing units with replacement personnel, weapons, ammunition,
fuel, and other supplies.
Restoring disrupted command and control.

15-37. The OPFOR makes an effort to keep some units at full strength rather
than all units at an equally reduced level. Usually, the unit with the fewest
losses is the first to receive replacement personnel and equipment. However,
once the casualties or equipment losses are sufficient to threaten the total
loss of combat effectiveness, the commander may apply the concept of com-
posite unit replacement. The composite unit concept involves a unit formed
from other units reduced by combat action.

MISSION SUPPORT SITES

15-38. A mission support site (MSS) is a temporary base used by units and
personnel who are away from their base camp, during an extended mission.
The MSS may provide food, shelter, medical support, ammunition, or demoli-
tions. The use of an MSS eliminates unnecessary movement of supplies and
allows a force to move more rapidly to and from objectives. When selecting an
MSS, consideration is given to cover and concealment, proximity to the objec-
tive, proximity to supply routes, and the presence of enemy security forces in
the area. Security dictates that drop zones (DZs) or landing zones be a con-
siderable distance from an MSS, cache, or base campalthough this may in-
crease transportation problems.

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________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 15

INFILTRATION
15-39. The success of SPF air and amphibious operations in support of mili-
tary operations is primarily dependent upon detailed planning and prepara-
tion. Infiltration techniques include
Air infiltration.
Water infiltration.
Land infiltration.
Stay-behind forces.
AIR INFILTRATION
15-40. Air delivery by parachute is one of the principal means available for
the infiltration of SPF personnel. In preparing a team for infiltration by
parachute, the team leader or detachment commander considers the follow-
ing:
Aircraft capabilities.
Reception personnel in the DZ.
Equipment and supplies.
Command and control.
Ground assembly.
Emergency plans.
The Air Force fields light transport aircraft for insertion of its own SPF or
those belonging to other service components, within the region. The SPF
Command also has some tactical transport for use in inserting SPF units.
Commercial aircraft may also be used to support high-altitude air drops.

HALO or HAHO Air Drop

15-41. When enemy air defense discourages normal infiltration by air, para-
chute entry from very high altitudes may be necessary. This may involve ei-
ther high-altitude low-opening (HALO) or high-altitude high-opening
(HAHO) techniques. Whenever this type of drop is planned in denied areas
protected by enemy radar and other detection devices, a system of jamming
or disruption of these systems should be established.
15-42. An important consideration is the availability of aircrews trained in
operating under arduous conditions in depressurized aircraft at high jump
altitudes. The team leader or detachment commander must devise a system
for freefall assembly of personnel after they have exited the aircraft, but be-
fore opening the parachutes. This is particularly important at night or when
conditions preclude visual contact with DZ markings. Assembly aids include
special marking devices and materials, visible at night, applied to pack trays,
backpacks, and other designated equipment.

Blind Drop
15-43. Selected SPF personnel may be air dropped during the initial infiltra-
tion phase on DZs devoid of reception personnel. This technique is referred to
as a blind drop and may be employed when an area is known to contain a
local insurgent element of sufficient size and nature to warrant cultivating as

15-9
FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

an affiliated force. In all probability, the insurgent force will be small, pas-
sive in nature, and untrained, but receptive to outside support. Other inter-
ested State agencies were either unable or did not have time and means to
train the insurgent element as DZ reception personnel. Additionally, the en-
emy situation might preclude normal DZ markings and recognition signals.
15-44. Once on the ground, SPF personnel move to the selected assembly
area and establish security. The SPF team or detachment attempts to make
contact with the local insurgent element.

WATER INFILTRATION
15-45. Water offers another practical means for infiltration into areas having
exposed coastlines and riverbanks. Water infiltration normally terminates in
a land movement phase. Considerations for water infiltration include the fol-
lowing:
Watercraft capabilities.
Reception personnel.
Equipment and supplies.
Command and control.
Ship-to-shore movement.
Land assembly and movement.
Emergency plans.

15-46. Infiltration by means of amphibious aircraft (to include mini-

submarine and semi-submersible insertion craft) landing on large lakes, riv-
ers, or coastal waters may be possible. In such a case, infiltration planning by
the team or detachment considers the ship-to-shore and subsequent land
movement characteristics of water infiltration.

LAND INFILTRATION
15-47. Land infiltration involves the use of different modes of transportation
or techniques such as commercial vehicles, railway trains, or infiltration on
foot, possibly along with refugees. It is conducted in a manner similar to that
of a long-range reconnaissance patrol infiltrating into enemy territory. Gen-
erally, guides are required. If guides are not available, the SPF team or de-
tachment must have detailed intelligence of the route, particularly if it is to
cross borders. Routes are selected to take maximum advantage of cover and
concealment and to avoid enemy outposts, patrols, and installations.
15-48. Before the mission, the team or detachment is briefed on the known
locations of selected individuals who will furnish assistance and on the estab-
lished means of contacting them. These individuals may be used as local
guides and sources of information, food, and shelter. Since there are local
sources for survival items, the SPF team or detachment can restrict the
equipment and supplies to be carried to mission-essential items (individual
arms, equipment, and communications equipment).

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________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 15

STAY-BEHIND
15-49. SPF teams may be pre-positioned in proposed AORs before the enemy
occupies these areas, thus providing the opportunity to organize the nucleus
of a guerilla or partisan force, conduct surveillance, or conduct direct action.
Stringent precautions are taken to preserve security, particularly that of the
refuge areas or other safe sites to be used during the initial period of enemy
occupation. Information concerning locations and identities within the in-
digenous organization is kept on a need-to-know basis. Contacts among vari-
ous elements use clandestine communications.
15-50. Dispersed caches, to include radio equipment, are pre-positioned when
possible. SPF personnel have a better chance of survival in small towns, vil-
lages, and rural areas. However, when stay-behind operations are attempted
in heavy populated urban areas, the SPF team or detachment is completely
dependent upon the indigenous organization for security, the contacts re-
quired for expansion, and the build-up effort.

RAID
15-51. A raid is a surprise attack of an enemy force, installation, or site. Such
attacks are characterized by secret movement to the objective area; brief, vio-
lent action; rapid disengagement from action; and swift, deceptive with-
drawal. Raids are conducted to destroy or damage supplies, equipment, or in-
stallations such as command posts, communication facilities, supply depots,
or radar sites; to capture supplies, equipment, or key personnel; or to cause
casualties among the enemy and his supporters. Raids also serve to distract
attention from other OPFOR actions, to keep the enemy off balance, and to
cause the enemy to deploy additional units to protect critical sites.
15-52. The raid is one of the basic tactical techniques employed by SPF in
both unconventional and counterinsurgency operations. The keys to the suc-
cessful accomplishment of any raid are flexibility and responsiveness to or-
ders and direction. In preparation for raids, the SPF team leader or detach-
ment commander should have plans (ready for implementation if necessary)
for the use of fire support, reinforcements, and immediate evacuation.

ORGANIZATION OF THE RAIDING FORCE

15-53. The size of the raiding force depends upon the mission, nature, and lo-
cation of the target, and the enemy situation. The raiding force may vary
from an SPF team attacking a checkpoint or a portion of unprotected railroad
track to a detachment attacking a large supply depot. Regardless of size, the
raiding force consists of two basic elementsassault and security.

Assault Element
15-54. The assault element is organized and trained to accomplish the objec-
tives of the raid. It consists of a main action group to execute the raid mission
and may include personnel detailed to execute special tasks that aid the
main group.
15-55. The main action group executes the major task ensuring the success of
the raid. For example, if the raid mission is to destroy a critical installation

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

such as a railroad bridge or tunnel, the main action group emplaces and deto-
nates the demolition charges. If the target, such as enemy personnel, is to be
neutralized by fire, the main action group conducts its attack with a high
proportion of automatic weapons. In some instances, the main action group
moves physically onto or into the target; in other instances, it is able to ac-
complish its task from a distance. The other elements of the raid are de-
signed to allow the main action group access to the target for the time re-
quired to accomplish the raid mission.
15-56. If required, special-task elements assist the main action group to
reach the target. They execute such complementary tasks as eliminating
guards, breaching and removing obstacles to the objective, conducting diver-
sionary or holding actions, and providing fire support. The special-task ele-
ments may precede, follow, or act concurrently with the main action group.

Security Element
15-57. The security element supports the raid by preventing the enemys ei-
ther reinforcing or escaping the objective area. The security element also cov-
ers the withdrawal of the assault element and act as a rear guard for the
raiding force. The size of the security element depends upon the size of the
enemys capability to intervene and disrupt the raid.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
15-58. The first step is the selection of the target, based upon its criticality,
vulnerability, and accessibility, and the recoverability of the raiding force.
Other important considerations are the nature of the terrain and the combat
effectiveness of the raiding force.
15-59. Secondly, the SPF and affiliated force commanders must consider any
possible adverse effects on their units and the civilian populace as a result of
the raid. The objective is to diminish the enemys military capability. How-
ever, an improperly timed raid may provoke an enemy counteraction for
which the OPFOR, the affiliated force, and/or the local populace are unpre-
pared. Also, an unsuccessful raid often has disastrous effects on morale. Suc-
cessful raids, on the other hand, raise morale and increase the prestige of the
SPF and affiliated units in the eyes of the local populace and make the popu-
lace more willing to provide needed support.
15-60. Thirdly, every precaution is taken to ensure that civilians are not
needlessly subjected to harsh reprisals because of the raid. The impact of suc-
cessful raids can be exploited in IW campaigns. However, it is important
that, before such action is taken, any possible unfavorable repercussions from
the population and the enemy military forces be considered. If a raid is un-
successful, IW activities will be required to lessen any adverse effects on the
SPF or affiliated force.
15-61. Fourthly, although detailed, the plan for a raid must be simple, and
its success should not depend upon too many contingencies. Activities in the
objective area are planned so as not to alert the target to be attacked. This
means that activities of the local populace and affiliated forces should con-
form to normal patterns. Time and space factors are carefully consid-
eredtime is allowed for assembly and movement, particularly during dark-

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________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 15

ness. All factors are considered to determine whether movement and attack
should be made during daylight or darkness. Darkness naturally favors sur-
prise and normally is the best time, especially when the raid is simple and
the physical layout of the objective is well known. Early dawn or dusk is fa-
vored when adequate knowledge of the objective or other factors necessitates
tight control of the raid. A withdrawal late in the day or at night makes close
pursuit by the enemy more difficult.

RECONNAISSANCE AND INTELLIGENCE

15-62. The raiding force commander must conduct a thorough reconnaissance
or have good intelligence of the objective, enemy forces capable of interven-
ing, the civilian populaces attitude and support, and the terrain to be trav-
ersed en route to and from the objective area. An intensive intelligence effort
precedes the raid. Affiliated intelligence and reconnaissance elements con-
duct reconnaissance of the route to the objective and of the objective itself.
During guerilla or partisan operations, an SPF raiding force can exploit local
sympathizers, who may act as guides. Surveillance of the objective begins
early and remains continuous up to the time of the raid. The raiding force
commander exercises extreme caution to ensure the secrecy of the impending
raid by careful assignment of missions to the affiliated reconnaissance ele-
ments so that the local population will not become alerted and alarmed.

REHEARSAL OF PARTICIPANTS
15-63. Realistic rehearsals by all participants are conducted for the raid.
During the rehearsal, the following actions are accomplished:
Terrain similar to that found in the objective area is used when avail-
able.
Sand tables, sketches, photographs, and objective mockups are used to
assist in the mission briefings.
Contingency actions are practiced.
Final rehearsals are conducted under conditions of visibility expected
in the objective area.
FINAL INSPECTION
15-64. The raiding force commander conducts a final inspection of personnel
and equipment before moving to the objective area. If possible, weapons are
test-fired, faulty equipment replaced, and the condition of the personnel
checked. During this inspection, a counterintelligence check is made of per-
sonal belongings to ensure no incriminating documents are carried on the
raid. This inspection assures the raiding force commander that his unit is
equipped and ready for the raid.

MOVEMENT
15-65. Movement to the objective area is planned and conducted to allow the
raiding force to approach undetected. Movement may be over single or multi-
ple routes. The pre-selected route or routes terminate in or near one or more
MSSs. Every effort is made to avoid contact with the enemy during move-
ment. Upon reaching the designated rendezvous and MSS, security elements

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

are deployed, and final coordination takes place prior to the assault elements
moving to the objective area.

ACTION IN THE OBJECTIVE AREA

15-66. Special-task elements move to their positions and eliminate sentries,
breach or remove obstacles, and execute other assigned tasks. The main ac-
tion group quickly follows the special-task elements into the objective area.

WITHDRAWAL
15-67. Once the objective of the raid has been accomplished, the main action
group withdraws, covered by pre-selected fire support elements or part of the
security element. If the raid is unsuccessful, it is terminated to prevent un-
due loss, and the special-task elements withdraw according to plan. The main
action group assembles at one or more rallying points while the security ele-
ments remain in position to cover the withdraw according to plan. The main
action group withdraws on a prearranged signal or time.
15-68. Withdrawal is designed to achieve maximum deception of the enemy
and facilitate further action by the raiding force. The various elements of the
raiding force withdraw on order, over predetermined routes through a series
of rallying points. If the enemy organizes a close pursuit of the main action
group, the security element assists by fire and movement, distracting the en-
emy and slowing him down. Elements of the raiding force that are closely
pursued by the enemy do not attempt to reach the initial rallying point.
Rather, they lead the enemy away from the remainder of the force and at-
tempt to break contact with him by evasive action in difficult or complex ter-
rain. If the situation permits, an attempt is made either to reestablish con-
tact with the rest of the raiding force at other rallying points, to continue to
the base area as a separate group, or to reach an area for evacuation.
15-69. The raiding force, or elements of it, may separate and proceed
15-70. Frequently, the raiding force disperses as small groups or individuals
to evade close pursuit. These smaller elements withdraw in different direc-
tions and reassemble at a later time at a predetermined place to conduct fur-
ther missions. During the withdrawal, elements of the raiding force can con-
duct other actions, such as an ambush of the pursuing enemy force.

LARGE RAIDS
15-71. When an objective is large, important to the enemy, and well guarded,
a larger raiding force is required to ensure a successful attack. Large raids
may involve the use of a relatively large SPF detachment, often in conjunc-
tion with affiliated forces. Although such actions are conducted similarly to
small raids, additional factors must be considered:
Movement to the objective area.
Command and control.
Training.
Fire support.
Timing.

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Withdrawal.
Movement to the Objective Area
15-72. Surprise is just as desirable as in a smaller raid, but it is usually
harder to achieve. The number of troops to be deployed and a longer move to
the objective area require additional MSSs at a greater distance from the ob-
jective to preserve secrecy. A large raiding force usually moves by small com-
ponents over multiple routes to the objective area. In some instances, larger
raids are conducted by regular infantry troops using heliborne landings sup-
ported by SPF personnel.

Command and Control

15-73. Another problem inherent in a large raid is that of command and con-
trol. Units without extensive radio communications equipment may find co-
ordination of dispersed elements difficult to achieve. Pyrotechnics, audible
signals, runners, or predesignated times may be used to coordinate actions.

Training
15-74. A high degree of training and discipline is required to execute a large
raid. Extensive rehearsals assist in preparing the force for the mission. In
particular, commanders and staffs must learn to use large numbers of small
units as a cohesive fighting force.

Fire Support
15-75. Additional fire support usually is a requirement for large raids. This
may mean secretly caching ammunition in MSSs over a period of time before
the raid. Individual members of affiliated forces and the SPF detachment
may carry a mortar, antiarmor weapon, single-shot rocket launcher, or a box
of machinegun ammunition and leave it at an MSS or firing position for a fire
support unit. Sufficient firepower is moved into areas within range of the se-
lected objective area and is on call to support the raid.

Timing
15-76. Timing is usually more difficult for a large raid. More time is required
to move units, and the main action group needs more time to perform its mis-
sion. This requires stronger security elements to isolate the objective for
longer periods. The timing of the raid takes on increased importance because
of the large numbers of personnel involved. Movement to the objective is usu-
ally accomplished during periods of limited visibility. However, because of
fire support coordination requirements and larger numbers of personnel, the
raid may take place during daylight hours.

Withdrawal
15-77. Smaller groups usually accomplish withdrawal from a large raid over
multiple routes in order to deceive the enemy and disperse his pursuit force.
Dispersed withdrawal has the added advantage of denying a lucrative target
to enemy air and fire support elements. However, the raiding force com-
mander must consider the possibility of an alert and aggressive enemy de-

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

feating the dispersed elements of the raiding force. All factors must be care-
fully weighed before deciding on how to conduct the withdrawal.

AMBUSH
15-78. An ambush is a surprise attack from a concealed position, used
against moving or temporarily halted targets such as truck convoys, railway
trains, boats, individual vehicles, and dismounted troops. In an ambush, en-
emy action determines the time, and the OPFOR sets the place. Ambushes
are conducted to destroy or capture personnel and supplies, harass and de-
moralize the enemy, delay or block movement of personnel and supplies, and
canalize enemy movement by making certain routes useless for traffic. They
usually result in concentrating the majority of movements to principal roads,
railroads, or waterways where targets are more vulnerable to attack by other
forces.

ORGANIZATION OF THE AMBUSH FORCE

15-79. The ambush force is organized into an assault element and security
elements. The assault element conducts the main attack against the ambush
target that includes halting the column, killing or capturing personnel, re-
covering supplies and equipment, and destroying unwanted vehicles or sup-
plies that cannot be moved.
15-80. Security elements are placed on roads and trails leading to the am-
bush site to warn the assault element of the enemy approach. These elements
isolate the ambush site using roadblocks, other ambushes, and outposts.
They also assist in covering the withdrawal of the assault element from the
ambush site. The distance between the security element and the assault ele-
ment is dictated by terrain. In many instances, it may be necessary to organ-
ize secondary ambushes and roadblocks to intercept and delay enemy rein-
forcements.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
15-81. The planning and preparation of an ambush is similar that for a raid,
except that selecting an ambush site is an additional consideration. The mis-
sion may be a single ambush against one target or a series of ambushes
against targets on one or more LOCs. The probable size, strength, and com-
position of the enemy force that is to be ambushed, formations the enemy is
likely to use, and enemy reinforcement capabilities are considered. Favorable
terrain for an ambush, providing unobserved routes for approach and with-
drawal, must be selected.
15-82. The time of the ambush should coincide with periods of limited visibil-
ity, offering a wider choice of positions and better opportunities to surprise
and confuse the enemy. However, movement and control are more difficult
during a night ambush. Night ambushes are more suitable when the mission
can be accomplished during, or immediately following, the initial burst of
fire. They require a maximum number of automatic weapons to be used at
close range. Night ambushes can hinder the enemys use of LOCs at night,
while friendly aircraft can attack the same routes during the day (if the en-
emy does not have air superiority). Daylight ambushes facilitate control and

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permit offensive action for a longer period of time. Daylight ambushes also
provide an opportunity for more effective fire from such weapons as rocket
launchers and antiarmor weapons.

SITE SELECTION
15-83. In selecting the ambush site, the basic consideration is favorable ter-
rain, although limitations such as deficiencies in firepower and lack of resup-
ply during actions may govern the choice of the ambush site. The site should
have firing positions offering concealment and favorable fields of fire. When-
ever possible, firing should be conducted from the screen of foliage. The ter-
rain at the site should serve to canalize the enemy into a kill zone. The entire
killing zone is covered by fire so that there is no dead space that would allow
the enemy to organize resistance. The ambush force should take advantage of
natural obstacles such as defiles, swamps, and cliffs to restrict enemy ma-
neuvers against the force. When natural obstacles do not exist, mines, demo-
litions, camouflage barbed or concertina wire, and other concealed obstacles
are employed to canalize the enemy.

MOVEMENT
15-84. The ambush force moves over a pre-selected route or routes to the am-
bush site. One or more MSSs or rendezvous points usually are necessary
along the route to the ambush site. Last-minute intelligence is provided by
reconnaissance elements, and final coordination for the ambush is made at
the MSS or the assembly area.

ACTION AT THE AMBUSH SITE

15-85. The ambush force moves to an assembly area near the ambush site.
Security elements take up their positions first and then the assault elements
move into place. As the approaching enemy force is detected, or at a predes-
ignated time, the ambush force commander decides whether or not to execute
the ambush. This decision is based on the size of the enemy force, enemy
guard and security measures, and the estimated value of the target in light of
the probable cost to the ambush force.
15-86. If the decision is made to execute the ambush, enemy security ele-
ments or advance guards are allowed to pass through the main ambush posi-
tion. When the head of the enemy main force reaches a predetermined point,
fire, demolitions, or obstacles halt it. At this signal, the entire assault ele-
ment opens fire. Designated security elements engage the enemys advance
and rear security elements to prevent reinforcement of the main force. The
volume of fire is violent, rapid, directed at enemy personnel exiting from ve-
hicles, and concentrated on vehicles mounting automatic weapons. Antiarmor
weapons (such as recoilless rifles and rocket launchers) are used against ar-
mored vehicles. Machineguns lay bands of fixed fire across escape routes, as
well as in the kill zone. Mortar projectiles, hand grenades, and rifle grenades
(end-of-barrel and under-barrel), and directional antipersonnel mines are
fired into the kill zone.
15-87. If the commander decides to assault the kill zone, the assault is
launched under a prearranged signal. After the enemy resistance has been

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

nullified, designated assault element personnel move into the kill zone to re-
cover supplies, equipment, and ammunition.
15-88. If the purpose of the ambush is to harass and demoralize the enemy, a
different tactic may be adopted. The enemy security element is selected as
the target of the ambush and the fire of the assault element is directed
against it. Repeated attacks against the enemy security element can
Cause the use of disproportionately strong forces in the enemy security
element. This may leave other portions of the enemy main force vul-
nerable or require the diversion of additional troops to convoy duty.
Create an adverse psychological effect upon enemy troops, and the con-
tinued casualties suffered by the enemy security force may make such
duty unpopular.
TERMINATION AND WITHDRAWAL
15-89. The ambush force commander decides when to terminate the action
and withdraw. He may do so either because the mission has been accom-
plished or because superior enemy reinforcements are arriving.
15-90. Withdrawal from the ambush site is similar to withdrawal from a raid
in that the security elements cover the assault elements. Before deciding on
how to conduct the withdrawal, the ambush force commander must consider
or weigh factors such as the possibility of an alert and aggressive enemy de-
feating the ambush force. If enemy forces in or near the ambush site are still
capable of returning fire when he terminates the ambush, he withdraws the
assault element first and then the security elements that cover the with-
drawal of the assault element.

AMBUSH OF FORCES PROTECTED BY ARMOR

15-91. Attacks against enemy forces protected by armored vehicles depend
upon the type and location of armored vehicles in the enemy force and the
weapons of the ambush force. If possible, armored vehicles are destroyed or
disabled by the fire of antiarmor weapons or mines and laser-guided artillery
or mortar projectiles. An effort is made to immobilize armored vehicles at a
point where they are unable to give protection to the rest of the force and
where they will block the route of other supporting vehicles.

AMBUSH OF RAILWAY TRAINS

15-92. Moving trains may be subjected to harassing fire, but the most effec-
tive ambush is derailment. The locomotive should be derailed on a down-
grade, at a sharp curve, or on a high bridge. This causes most of the cars to
overturn and results in extensive casualties among the passengers. It is de-
sirable to derail trains so that the wreckage remains on the tracks to delay
traffic for long periods of time. Fire is directed on the exits of overturned
coaches; and designated groups, armed with automatic weapons, rush for-
ward to assault coaches or railcars still standing. Other groups take supplies
from the freight cars and then set fire to the train.
15-93. Rails are removed from the track at some distance from the ambush
site in each direction to delay the arrival of reinforcements by train. In plan-
ning the ambush of a train, the ambush force commander considers the fact

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that the enemy may include armored rail cars in the train for its protection.
Security or advance guard locomotives or inspection cars may precede impor-
tant trains to check the track.

AMBUSH OF WATERWAY TRAFFIC

15-94. Waterway traffic, such as barges, patrol boats, or ships may be am-
bushed similar to a vehicular column. The ambush force may be able to mine
the waterway and thus stop traffic. If mining is not feasible, fire delivered by
antiarmor weapons (such as recoilless rifles and rocket launchers) can dam-
age or sink the watercraft. Fire should be directed at the engine room, the
waterline, and the bridge. Recovery of supplies may be possible if the craft is
beached on the banks of the waterway or grounded in shallow water.

OTHER INTERDICTION TECHNIQUES

15-95. Raids and ambushes are not the only interdiction techniques available
to SPF teams or detachments. They can also use other actions such as min-
ing, sniping, and expedient interdiction techniques against enemy forces.

MINING
15-96. Mining affords SPF and affiliated force commanders a means of inter-
dicting enemy LOCs and key areas with little expenditure of manpower.
Mines can be used alone or in conjunction with other actions. When they are
used alone, they are emplaced along LOCs or known enemy approaches when
traffic is light. This allows personnel emplacing the mines to complete the
task in secrecy without undue interference. The use of mines to cover the
withdrawal of a raiding or ambush force slows enemy pursuit, and their use
in the roadbeds of highways and railroads interferes with movement. Mines
can be emplaced around enemy installations or bases to cause casualties to
sentinels and patrols; limit movement; and cause low morale among enemy
troops.

SNIPING
15-97. Sniping is an interdiction technique that is economical in the use of
personnel and has a demoralizing effect on the enemy. Snipers can cause
casualties among enemy personnel, deny or hinder his use of certain routes,
and require him to employ a disproportionate number of troops to rid the
area of snipers. Snipers may cover an area that has been mined, act as part
of a raiding or ambush force, or act independently. Snipers operate best in
teams of two, alternating the duties of observer or spotter and sniper. Snip-
ers may be used effectively in access-control operations, firing from positions
in field fortifications and lookout towers.

EXPEDIENT INTERDICTION TECHNIQUES

15-98. Expedient interdiction techniques against enemy personnel can be
used to the fullest extent for security or access control against the enemy.
Some of these devices are barbed or concertina wire, sharpened stakes, im-
paling poles, man traps, and various types of boobytraps.

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

COMMANDOS
15-99. The SPF Command also includes elite commando units. Like SPF
units, commandos normally operate in enemy-controlled territory. In addi-
tion to proficiency in various infantry-type tactics, these elite units receive
training for more specialized commando missions.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

15-100. In the administrative force structure, commando battalions are
subordinate to the SPF Command. For administrative purposes, these battal-
ions may be grouped under a commando brigade headquarters. However,
commandos are employed as battalions, companies, platoons, and squads or
as small teams, depending on the type of mission. Commandos are elite
units, specially trained for missions in enemy territory. When assigned such
missions, the commando units may disperse into small teams (typically 5 to
12 men). These small teams are harder to detect during infiltration and pro-
vide the ability to strike many targets simultaneously to achieve maximum
effect. However, based on factors such as the enemy situation and the size of
the target, the individual teams may come together temporarily to form com-
mando detachments. If necessary, they can re-form into platoon- to company-
size units to perform attacks against critical military and civilian targets.
15-101. Commando units can be allocated in a constituent or dedicated
status to be task organized as part of an OSC or tactical group based on a
regular ground forces organization. Even is such cases, however, the reason
for incorporating a commando unit into such an organization normally would
be to perform specialized commando missions that contribute to the overall
mission for which that task organization was created. In other cases, com-
mando units may be allocated in a supporting relationship, while remaining
under the command of their parent commando unit or the SPF Command.

INFANTRY-TYPE MISSIONS
15-102. Sometimes, particularly in defensive situations, commandos may
be called on to perform regular infantry missions, filling gaps between dis-
persed regular forces. In this case, commandos would typically fight as com-
panies or battalions, using tactics similar to those of regular infantry units.

COMMANDO MISSIONS
15-103. Commando units generally conduct various types of reconnais-
sance and combat missions in the disruption zone or deep in enemy territory,
during larger operations or tactical actions that are either offensive or defen-
sive. The reconnaissance missions include actions such as surveillance, moni-
toring, and searches. Commando units are expected to conduct reconnais-
sance within the context of any combat mission. Conversely, when employed
as a reconnaissance element, the commando units activities are not limited
to reconnaissance. They are also tasked with assaulting and destroying mili-
tary or civilian targets.
15-104. Commandos provide the OPFOR with flexible, lethal forces capa-
ble of employment in a variety of roles. Typical missions that are assigned to
the commandos include but are not limited to

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Collecting information on deployment of enemy forces and reserve unit

movement.
Collecting information on logistics facilities and seaports.
Collecting information on enemy aircraft operating from forward air-
fields.
Conducting reconnaissance of terrain and enemy forces, in support of
the offense.
Locating and destroying enemy weapons of mass destruction.
Conducting team- or platoon-size raids and ambushes and destroy
critical military or civilian targets in enemy territory.
Conducing larger-scale (company- or battalion-size) raids and am-
bushes in the disruption zone or in enemy territory.
Clearing LOCs for use by supported units during the offense or de-
fense.
Clearing or emplacing obstacles.
Acting as an antilanding reserve.
INFILTRATION
15-105. Commandos generally conduct infiltration at night or under the
cover of reduced visibility. The method used depends on the mission, situa-
tion, terrain, time available, and available transportation means.
Overland (Foot)
15-106. For commando units, the most common method of infiltration is
by foot. The infiltrating units are dispersed to one or more areas, depending
on the size of the infiltrating force. Infiltration is accomplished as a unit or as
teams, using different routes. After careful consideration, routes are selected
in
Difficult or complex terrain the enemy may consider impassable.
Areas having sufficient camouflage to cover offensive operations.
Areas where streams or mountains form natural corridors.
Areas where the enemy is not using night observation or surveillance
equipment.
Gaps between enemy units.
Airborne
15-107. When time is limited and air transport is available, commandos
may be airdropped or air-landed from helicopters or fixed-wing transport air-
craft for deeper penetration. The enemy situation and terrain features in the
area selected as the DZ or LZ are carefully studied before airborne or heli-
borne infiltration. DZs are generally mountainous valleys, hills, and clear ar-
eas in or adjacent to a forest.
Seaborne (Waterborne)
15-108. Commando units may use naval vessels (to include mini-
submarine and semi-submersible insertion craft) for seaborne infiltration.
The landing sites are selected in coastal areas far from any hostile naval
bases, fishing villages, and coastal defense units. The landing time is deter-

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FM 7-100.2 (Final Draft Sep 04) _______________________________________________________________

mined by considering the time required to arrive at the landing site, mari-
time and coastal security measures employed by the enemy forces, tidal con-
ditions, hours of moonrise and moonset, and weather conditions. Commandos
can also infiltrate using watercraft on inland waterways.

OFFENSE
15-109. Commandos are employed as infiltration units during the offense.
Following overland, airborne, seaborne, or waterborne infiltration, comman-
dosoperating independentlymay perform various reconnaissance and
combat missions described above. However, they may also act in conjunction
with regular ground forces. In the latter role, commandos can conduct the fol-
lowing missions to ensure the success of the overall offensive action:
15-110. Disruption Force. In addition to reconnaissance missions, com-
mandos can be tasked with missions as part of the disruption force to
Remove or emplace obstacles.
Raid headquarters, LOCs, and tactical missile firing locations.
Occupy key terrain features (in advance of other forces).
Occupy ambush positions on enemy withdrawal routes.

15-111. Fixing Force. Commandos can set up ambushes or emplace ob-

stacles to prevent further enemy forces from coming to the aid of the target
the regular forces attack. They can occupy key terrain features that control
choke points that hinder enemy reserve unit movements. Such choke points
may be valleys, bridges, and crossroads that are critical for the enemy move-
ment.
15-112. Assault Force. Commandos conduct raids and ambushes against
C2 sites, logistics elements, fire support units (to include attack helicopter
units), and other high-priority civilian and military targets. They also con-
duct attacks against other objectives or seize terrain that hinders enemy re-
serve unit movements or hampers his withdrawal.
15-113. Exploitation Force. As part of an exploitation force, comman-
dos may attack a withdrawing enemy force from his flank and rear. Com-
mando units can be air-inserted ahead of the withdrawing enemy force to es-
tablish ambush positions along the enemys withdrawal route.

DEFENSE
15-114. During a defensive action conducted by a tactical group, com-
mando units allocated to it can support the action primarily in reconnais-
sance and tactical security roles. Commando units can conduct reconnais-
sance in the tactical group disruption zone. They may also act as a security
force. When acting as a security force, commandos are normally employed as
companies or battalions. The commando unit can be augmented with vehicles
and/or additional forces (such as tank or mechanized units, fire support, or
aviation) to act as an assault force in limited-objective attacks against enemy
airborne, air assault, or special operations forces units.
15-115. A commando battalion or company is seldom used as a combat
force in the battle zone because of organization, equipment, and limited fire-

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power. However, if the defensive mission is more important than reconnais-

sance or security, it may act as a combat force, using regular infantry tactics.
Commando units may fill gaps between the battle positions of regular forces.
When performing such infantry-type missions, commandos are normally em-
ployed as companies or battalions.
15-116. When maneuver forces are forced to withdraw from an area,
commando units can remain deployed in the disruption zone and battle zone
to perform reconnaissance, raids, and ambushes. The stay-behind comman-
dos attempt to maneuver in small teams to conduct reconnaissance and lim-
ited-objective attacks against enemy targets such as C2 sites, isolated combat
units, LOCs, and logistics units.

TRAINING AND EDUCATION

15-117. Normally, personnel selected for commando units come from sol-
diers who have served 3 to 7 years in infantry units. The training of selected
personnel is conducted over a period of 2 to 6 months, depending on the skill
level and educational background of the trainees. The training is designed to
familiarize trainees with advanced tactics and to prepare them to perform
regular infantry-type missions and more specialized commando missions,
with emphasis on infiltrating and fighting in complex terrain and at night.
Commando personnel receive training in areas such as
Infiltration.
Mountaineering.
Parachuting.
Swimming and waterborne infiltration.
Martial arts.
Reconnaissance and intelligence collection.
Marksmanship and sniper tactics.
Combat engineering and demolitions.
Fire support observation.
Additionally, all trainees are given thorough political training. Practical ex-
ercises and hands-on training are the principal training methods.
15-118. Commandos conduct extensive field exercises in areas where no
formal garrison or military facilities exist. The training of individual teams is
also enhanced by conducting raids against other commando and SPF units in
training areas or in remote areas.

15-23