0% found this document useful (0 votes)
38 views

From Vision To Victory

General Schwarzkopf held a crucial briefing for his top commanders where he laid out his analysis of Iraqi forces and strengths/weaknesses of Coalition forces. He emphasized destroying Iraq's Republican Guard and communicated his vision down to the lowest levels so all understood the mission. Schwarzkopf maintained full authority over operations and allowed his commanders freedom to focus on their roles. When the mission began in January 1991, all knew what was expected of them. The mission succeeded in driving out Iraqi forces and liberating Kuwait while gaining air superiority and defeating much of Iraq's infrastructure and command.

Uploaded by

wlamiller
Copyright
© Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as DOC, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
0% found this document useful (0 votes)
38 views

From Vision To Victory

General Schwarzkopf held a crucial briefing for his top commanders where he laid out his analysis of Iraqi forces and strengths/weaknesses of Coalition forces. He emphasized destroying Iraq's Republican Guard and communicated his vision down to the lowest levels so all understood the mission. Schwarzkopf maintained full authority over operations and allowed his commanders freedom to focus on their roles. When the mission began in January 1991, all knew what was expected of them. The mission succeeded in driving out Iraqi forces and liberating Kuwait while gaining air superiority and defeating much of Iraq's infrastructure and command.

Uploaded by

wlamiller
Copyright
© Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as DOC, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
You are on page 1/ 2

GEN Norman Schwarzkopf From Vision to Victory

General Schwarzkopf knew that his 14 November briefing to 22 of his top commanders was probably his most important during the planning phase for Desert Storm. He wanted to ensure that no one would leave with questions about the mission ahead. He laid out his analysis of Iraqs forces: their force strength, their willingness to use chemical weapons, along with their weaknesses. He emphasized the strengths of his own forces and then revealed his vision. He laid out several objectives including destroying the Iraqis capability as an effective fighting force. His message was clear destroy the Republican Guard. One of Schwarzkopfs subordinate commanders reported in a later interview that it was a mission that even privates could understand and one upon which they could all concentrate their efforts. What had begun as a close-hold planning process was communicated horizontally and vertically so that each commander from division level and up heard the concept of operations from Schwarzkopf himself. Schwarzkopf was pleased that he had been given full authority by the President and Secretary of Defense to carry out his mission. In return, he stayed out of his commanders way, allowing them to focus on their jobs and not be distracted by higher headquarters. In mid-January 1991 when word was given by President Bush to begin the operation, those tasked with carrying out the orders knew what their commander expected. The mission succeeded in driving the Iraqi occupying forces out and liberating Kuwait. Air superiority was gained and maintained and much of Saddam Husseins infrastructure and command and control were defeated during the conflict. Stability in the Gulf Region was regained and the Republican Guard never fully recovered its fighting capability.

Website references: http://www.achievement.org/autodoc/page/sch0int-1 A PBS - Frontline website with actual interviews from General Schwarzkopf, Colin Powell, and others. Also includes a 9-minute presentation about the events leading up to the Gulf War: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/ http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR775/MR775.chap 5.pdf

http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/www/wwindx.htm

You might also like