A CASE STUDY IN ACCOUNTING ETHICS AT WORLDCOM

A. INTRODUCTION On 21 July 2002 the second largest telecommunications company in the U.S., WorldCom, Inc., applied for bankruptcy protection. WorldCom failed because of the bad business decisions of its executives to manipulate earnings with improper accounting entries. The key executives involved in the fraud were CEO Bernard Ebbers and CFO Scott Sullivan. The accountants who were pressured by Ebbers and Sullivan to prepare improper accounting entries included Director of General Accounting Bufford Yates, Controller David Meyers, Director of Legal Entity Accounting Troy Norman, and Director of Management Reporting Betty Vinson. Each was convicted of securities fraud and received federal jail sentences, including billionaire Bernie Ebbers who received a 25-year sentence in federal prison.1 Betty Vinson received a 5-month jail sentence. Another key player in this sad story of greed and conflicting loyalties is Vice President of Internal Audit Cynthia Cooper, a whistleblower who with two other internal auditors, Gene Morse and Glyn Smith, doggedly investigated and revealed the fraud to WorldComs audit committee. In this case study you will read about the ethical pressure faced by Betty Vinson and Cythia Cooper as they each balanced conflicting loyalties between family, employer, and profession. Betty first balked then caved to the pressure and ruined her career; Cynthia did not cave and was named one of three Persons of the Year by Time Magazine in 2002 for her moral courage at WorldCom (Lacayo and Ripley 2002).

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1

Faber, David. The Rise and Fraud of WorldCom. CNBC, 8 September 2003.

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In December 2005, two years after this case was written, the telecommunications industry consolidated further. Verizon Communications acquired MCI/WorldCom and SBC Communications acquired AT&T Corporation, which had been in business since the 19th Century. The acquisition of MCI/WorldCom was the direct result of the behavior of WorldCom's senior managers as documented above. While it can be argued that the demise of AT&T Corp. was not wholly attributable to WorldCom's behavior, AT&T Corp.'s decimation certainly was facilitated by the events surrounding WorldCom, since WorldCom was the benchmark long distance telephone and Internet communications service provider. Indeed, the ripple effect of WorldCom's demise goes far beyond one company and several senior managers. It had a profound effect on an entire industry. This postscript will update the WorldCom story by focusing on what happened to the company after it declared bankruptcy and before it was acquired by Verizon. The postscript also will relate subsequent important events in the telecommunications industry, the effect of WorldCom's problems on its competitors and labor market, and the impact WorldCom had on the lives of the key players associated with the fraud and its exposure.

B. WorldCom Case
Worldcom was originally a company long distance telephone service provider. During the 90s the company was doing some acquisitions of other telecom companies who then increase pendapatnnya of $ 152 million in 1990 to $ 392 billion in 2001, which in turn puts WorldCom in position 42 of the 500 other companies Majah's version of fortune. Acquisitions that have taken place in 1998 when the company took over MCI worlcom the second largest in the U.S. peruahaan engaged in long-distance telecommunications. And in the same year the company bought Worldcom UUNet, Compuserve, and AOL data networks (American Online) which confirmed the position of the operator Worldcom became No. 1 in the Internet infrastructure. In 1990 occurred the fundamental problems in the economy that is too large capacity Worldcom telecom. This problem occurs because in 1998 U.S. economic recession that reduced demand for the infrastructure of the Internet's impact on revenue drastis.hal Worldcom pendpatan dropped dramatically so this is far from the diharapkan.padahal for

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acquisition costs and to finance infrastructure investments Worldcom use of funding sources outside or debt. Worldcom is not the only company that has financial problems pda that time, other companies are experiencing financial problems between lainQwest Communications, Global Crossing, Adelphia, Lucent Technologies, and Enron. Tersebuit companies have invested heavily in the internet business. As in the earlier company Worldcom investors suffered huge losses. Worldcom company's stock market value fall from about 150 billion dollars (January 2000) to around $ 150 million (1 July 2002). The state attempted mebuatan management accounting practices to avoid the bad news. Accounting Practice In its report on June 25, Worldcom admitted that the company classifies more than $ 3.8 billion for the network load as the network is spending modal.beben load kepda Worldcom paid by other companies for telecommunication networks, such as the cost of access and messaging cost for Worldcom. Reported approximately $ 3.005 billion has been one diklasifiksi in 2001, while the remaining approximately $ 797 million in the first quarter of the data 2002.berdasarkan pad Worldcom $ 14.7 billion in 2001 served as an expense. By moving expense accounts to capital accounts, Worldcommampu raise revenue or profit. Worldcom able to increase profits through expense account recorded lower, while higher asset account is recorded as capitalized expenses are presented as an investment expense. If it is not detected this practice will result in a lower net income in the years brikutnya. Because the network load capitalization will didepresiasikan.secara essence capitalization load network will enable the company to allocate biyanya in a few years in the future, maybe between 10 years and even more. Worldcom accounting staff were interviewed before 25 June. In March 2002 the SEC requesting data from the company in the form of items related to the Financial Statements. It includes: 1. sales commissions and bills are problematic 2. administrsi sanctions against income berhubungn with customers in a large scale

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3. accounting policies for merger 4. loans to the CEO 5. integration of computer systems with MCI Worldcom 6. analysis of the expected revenue shares WC July 1, 2002 WorldCom announced that the reserve account at Worldcom also investigated / examined. Company made this account to anticipate extraordinary events that can not be predicted. Such as tax debt next year. Seharusnyaakun should not be manipulated to earn an income. August 8, Worldcom admitted that they had used the allowance account are not true. Indictments were reported on the 28th of August is that the reduced reserve account to cover the cost of the network that has been capitalized. Audit questions Based on this background, the presentation of the network load as capital expenditures ditemukanoleh internal auditor Cynthia Cooper. The auditor Cynthia Cooper in May 2002 to discuss the matter to the chief financial officer Scott D. Worldcom Sullivan and corporate controller at the David F. Myers. Cooper reported the matter at the head of the audit committee Max Bobbitt, around June 12. Which then Max Bobbitt asked KPMG as external auditor to conduct an investigation at that time. WorldCom chief financial officer are required to correct the misstatements / incorrect classification. After further discussion Scott D. Sullivan dismissed the announcement held at Worldcom. On the same day David F. Myers resigned. Reported that Sullivan had never consulted presentation to the External data Artuhr Anderson as auditor in 2001. and Arthur Anderson also stated that Sullivan was never consulted him. On July 15, Tauzi which is the House Energy and Commerce Committee, said that based on internal documents and emails Worldcom executives indicate that the actual misstatement already know that since the beginning of summer 2000.Internal auditors are the initial defense against errors paktek-accounting practices and accounting fraud. One question

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to the Internal Auditor Worldcom is why it took a long time (1 year) to uncover these misstatements. Though considering that so large capitalization value and its effect on the value of net income and total assets harusnnya could be expressed faster. Questions heavier dilyangkan the Arthur Anderson accounting firm, some observers claim that Arthur Anderson knew about the misstatements made Worldcom. Because Arthur Anderson should be tasked to audit such mistakes, especially mistakes is very material. Some observers also claim that Arthur Anderson should have been more sensitive to Worldcom's financial condition, which could result in the company's management melakuakan case beyond reasonable accounting practices. Impact June 25, 2002, Worldcom stock of $ 64.5 in mid-1999 to less than $ 2 per share. And fell again to less than $ 1 a share value ultimately less than 1 cent. Worldcom employees who have company stock as part of their pension funds also suffered losses. At the end of 2000 approximately 32% or $ 642.3 million of their pension in the form of saham.Dan announced it would lay off 17,000 employees out of a total of 85 thousand employees. July 21, 2002, Worldcom bankruptcy protection while the program of the United States justice department. Worldcom reported assets of $ 103 billion with total debt of $ 41 billion. Worldcom bankruptcy was the biggest bankruptcy in United States In 2004 the name changed mnjadi MCI Worldcom, and Worldcom CEO Ebbers be changed from john Sidgemore. Scott D. Sullivan was charged with a maximum prison sentence of 25 years in prison while Ebbers was charged with a prison sentence of more than 25 years.

From Benchmark to Bankrupt

Between July 2002 when WorldCom declared bankruptcy and April 2004 when it emerged from bankruptcy as MCI, company officials worked feverishly to restate the financials and reorganize the company. The new CEO Michael Capellas (formerly CEO of Compaq Computer) and the newly appointed CFO Robert Blakely faced the daunting task of settling the company's outstanding debt of around $35 billion and performing a rigorous financial audit of the company. This was a monumental task, at one point utilizing an army of

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over 500 WorldCom employees, over 200 employees of the company's outside auditor, KPMG, and a supplemental workforce of almost 600 people from Deloitte & Touch. As Joseph McCafferty notes, "(a)t the peak of the audit, in late 2003, WorldCom had about 1,500 people working on the restatement, under the combined management of Blakely and five controllers(the t) otal cost to complete it: a mind-blowing $365 million"(McCafferty, 2004). In addition to revealing sloppy and fraudulent bookkeeping, the post-bankruptcy audit found two important new pieces of information that only served to increase the amount of fraud at WorldCom. First, "WorldCom had overvalued several acquisitions by a total of $5.8 billion"(McCafferty, 2004). In addition, Sullivan and Ebbers, "had claimed a pretax profit for 2000 of $7.6 billion" (McCafferty, 2004). In reality, WorldCom lost "$48.9 billion (including a $47 billion write-down of impaired assets)." Consequently, instead of a $10 billion profit for the years 2000 and 2001, WorldCom had a combined loss for the years 2000 through 2002 (the year it declared bankruptcy) of $73.7 billion. If the $5.8 billion of overvalued assets is added to this figure, the total fraud at WorldCom amounted to a staggering $79.5 billion. Although the newly audited financial statements exposed the impact of the WorldCom fraud on the company's shareholders, creditors, and other stakeholders, other information made public since 2002 revealed the effects of the fraud on the company's competitors and the telecommunications industry as a whole. These show that the fall of WorldCom altered the fortunes of a number of telecommunications industry participants, none more so than AT&T Corporation. The CNBC news show, "The Big Lie: Inside the Rise and Fraud of WorldCom," exposed the extent of the WorldCom fraud on several key participants, including the thenchairmen of AT&T and Sprint (Faber, 2003). The so-called "big lie" was promoted through a spreadsheet developed by Tom Stluka, a capacity planner at WorldCom, that modeled in Excel format the amount of traffic WorldCom could expect in a best-case scenario of Internet growth. In essence, "Stluka's model suggested that in the best of all possible worlds Internet traffic would double every 100 days" (Faber, 2003). In working with the model, Stluka simply assigned variables appropriate"(Faber, 2003). with various parameters to "whatever we think is

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This was innocent enough, had it remained an exercise. A problem emerged when the exercise was extended and integrated into corporate strategy, when it was adopted and implemented by WorldCom and then by the telecommunications industry. Within a year, "other companies were touting it" and the model was given credibility it should not have been accorded (Faber, 2003). As Stluka explains, "there were a lot of people who were saying 10X growth, doubling every three to four months, doubling every 100 days, 1,000 percent, that kind of thing" (Faber, 2003). But it wasn't true. "I don't recall traffic ... in fact growing at that rate still, WorldCom's lie had become an immutable law." Optimistic scenarios with little foundation in reality began to spread and pervade the industry. They became emblematic of the "smoke and mirrors" behavior not only at WorldCom prior to its collapse, but the industry as a whole. Fictitious numbers drove not just WorldCom, but also other companies as they reacted to WorldCom's optimistic projections. According to Michael Armstrong, then chairman and CEO of AT&T, "For some period of time, I can recall that we were back-filling that expectation with laying cable, something like 2,200 miles of cable an hour" (Faber, 2003). He adds: "Think of all the companies that went out of business that assumed that that was real." The fallout from the WorldCom debacle was significant. Verizon obtained the freshly minted MCI for $7.6 billion, but not the $35 billion of debt MCI had when it declared bankruptcy (Alexander, 2005). Although WorldCom was one of the largest telecommunications companies with nearly $160 billion in assets, shareholder suits obtained $6.1 billion from a variety of sources including investment banks, former board members and auditors of WorldCom (Belson, 2005). If this sum were evenly distributed among the firms 2.968 billion common shares, the payoff would (have been) well under $1 a share for a stock that peaked at $49.91 on Jan. 2000" (Alexander, 2005, 3). There are more losers in the aftermath of the WorldCom wreck. The reemerged MCI was left with about 55,000 employees, down from 88,000 at its peak. Since March 2001, however, "about 300,000 telecommunications workers have lost their jobs. The sector's total employment-1.032 million-is at an eight year low" (Alexander, 2005, 3). The carnage does not stop there. Telecommunications equipment manufacturers such as Lucent Technologies, Nortell Networks, and Corning, while benefiting initially from WorldCom's groundless predictions, suffered in the end with layoffs and depressed share prices. Perhaps most

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significant, in December 2005, the venerable AT&T Corporation ceased to exist as an independent company.

The Impact on Individuals

The WorldCom fiasco had a permanent effect on the lives of its key players as well. Cynthia Cooper, who spearheaded the uncovering of the fraud, went on to become one of Time Magazine's 2002 Persons of the Year. She also received a number of awards, including the 2003 Accounting Exemplar Award, given to an individual who has made notable contributions to professionalism and ethics in accounting practice or education. At present, she travels extensively, speaking to students and professionals about the importance of strong ethical and moral leadership in business (Nationwide Speakers Bureau, 2004). Even so, as Dennis Moberg points out, "After Ebbers and Sullivan left the company, "...Cooper was treated less positively than her virtuous acts warranted. In an interview with her on 11 May 2005, she indicated that, for two years following their departure, her salary was frozen, her auditing position authority was circumscribed, and her budget was cut""(Moberg, 2006, 416). As far as the protagonists are concerned, in April 2002, CEO Bernie Ebbers resigned and two months later, CFO Scott Sullivan was fired. Shortly thereafter, in August 2002, Sullivan and former Controller David Myers were arrested and charged with securities fraud. In November 2002, former Compaq chief Michael Capellas was named CEO of WorldCom and in April 2003, Robert Blakely was named the company's CFO. In March 2004, Sullivan pleaded guilty to criminal charges (McCafferty, 2004). At that time, too, Ebbers was formally charged with one count of conspiracy to commit securities fraud, one count of securities fraud, and seven counts of fraud related to false filings with the Security and Exchange Commission (United States District Court - Southern District of New York, 2004). Two months later, in May of 2004, Citigroup settled class action litigation for $1.64 billion after-tax brought on behalf of purchasers of WorldCom securities (Citigroup Inc., 2004). In like manner, JPMorgan Chase & Co., agreed to pay $2 billion to settle claims by investors that it should have known WorldCom's books were fraudulent when it helped sell $5 billion in company bonds (Rovella, 2005). On March 15, 2005, Ebbers was found guilty of all charges and on July 13th of that year, sentenced to twenty-five years in prison, which was possibly a life sentence for the 63-

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year-old. He was expected to report to a federal prison on October 12th, but remained free while his lawyers appealed his conviction (Pappalardo, 2005). At the time of his conviction, Ebbers' lawyers claimed the judge in the case gave the jury inappropriate instructions about Ebbers' knowledge of WorldCom's accounting fraud (Pappalardo, 2005). By January of 2006, Reid Weingarten, Ebber's lawyer, was claiming that the previous trial was manipulated against Ebbers because three high level WorldCom executives were barred from testifying on Ebbers' behalf. At that time, too, Judge Jose Cabranes of the US Second Circuit Court of Appeals commented, "There are many violent criminals who don't get 25 years in prison. Twenty years does seem an awfully long time" (MacIntyre, 2006). Weingarten went on to assert that the government "should have charged the three former WorldCom employees that could have helped exonerate Ebbers or let them go" (Reporter, 2006). He charged, too, that "the jury was wrongly instructed that it could convict Ebbers on the basis of so-called "conscious avoidance" of knowledge of the fraud at WorldCom" (Reporter, 2006). Perhaps most compellingly, Weingarten called into question the fairness of Ebbers' sentence that was five times as long as that given to ex-WorldCom financial chief Scott Sullivan (Reporter, 2006). Weingarten's claims are not without merit. In August 2005, former CFO Sullivan was sentenced to five years in prison for his role in engineering the $11 billion accounting fraud. His relatively light sentence was part of a bargain wherein he agreed to plead guilty to the charges filed against him and to cooperate with prosecutors as they built a case against Ebbers. In doing so, Sullivan became the prosecution's main witness against Ebbers and the only person to testify that he discussed the WorldCom fraud directly with Ebbers (Ferranti, 2005). Others involved in the scandal were also treated less harshly than Ebbers. In September 2005, judgments were rendered approving settlement and dismissing action against David Myers and a number of others associated with WorldCom (United States District Court - Southern District of New York, Judgment Approving Settlement and Dismissing Action Against Buford Yates and David Myers, 2005, Judgment Approving Settlement and Dismissing Action Against James C. Allen, Judith Areen, Carl J. Aycock, Max E. Bobbitt, Clifford L. Alexander, Jr., Francesco Galesi, Stiles A. Kellett, Jr., Gordon S. Macklin, John A. Porter, Bert C. Roberts, Jr., The Estate of John W. Sidgmore, and Lawrence C. Tucker, 2005).

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At the time of this update, Ebbers has been convicted by a court of law, but remains free on bail while he pursues an appeal. Although the extent of his punishment is under contention, one thing remains clear - that Ebbers and the other officers at WorldCom are guilty of presiding over what is to date, the largest corporate fraud in history.

C. Resume Chronological : The situation

WorldCom is a telecommunications company which was lead by CEO, Bernard Ebbers, and CFO, Scott Sullivan. In 1999, WorldCom was not meeting Wall Streets revenue and earnings expectations, and it appeared that the coming year would produce more bad news. The CFO argued for setting realistic targets. However, the CEO insisted that the company needed double digit growth, and pushed for aggressive targets. These aggressive targets were not supported by historical data or strategic assessments. In order to meet these targets, WorldCom began boosting its revenue through a wide range of accounting measures, including drawing down on reserves set aside for expenses. The economic situation at the time was not taken into account when implementing these aggressive accounting measures. Other similar companies were reporting declining revenues. It was identified that the management who were making the aggressive accounting decisions, were also posting the journals to the general ledger, and reviewing and approving the reporting. Pressure was placed on personnel who did not support the aggressive targets. A great deal of focus was put on team work and being a strong team player, which is said to have been a strategy to reduce dissenting opinions, eventually leading the organisation to follow a groupthink attitude. In 2000, the telecommunications industry entered a downturn and WorldComs aggressive growth strategy suffered a serious set back. However, due to the accounting measures used, by Q3 in 2000, the company managed to meet the Wall Street expectations.

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 Finally, WorldComs stock price started to plummet, and the CEO faced margin calls from his bankers, forcing him to either sell his shares or repay the loans. He did not want to sell his shares as his doing so would put further downward pressure on the stock price. Therefore, WorldCom directors lent the CEO US$400 million to meet the loans requirements. Before the release of Q1 results, 2002, the company s revenue was declining, making the task of showing revenue growth through accounting manoeuvres nearly impossible. The disastrous first quarter results were released, and the CEO, Bernard Ebbers, was asked to resign.

What are the issues?

- Beginning modestly in mid-year 1999 and continuing at an accelerated pace through May 2002 : The company (under the direction of Ebbers (CEO) and Sullivan (CFO)) used fraudulent accounting methods to mask its declining earnings by painting a false picture of financial growth and profitability to prop up the price of WorldCom s stock. - The fraud was accomplished primarily in two ways : Underreporting line costs (interconnection expenses with other telecommunication companies) by capitalising these costs on the balance sheet rather than properly expensing them. Inflating revenues with bogus accounting entries from "corporate unallocated revenue accounts.

The outcome
- Over the course of its operations, WorldCom has successfully acquired a total of 65 companies, of which 11 were acquired between 1991 and 1997, and in that course has accumulated around $41 billion in debt. By the time it declared bankruptcy in 2002, the organization had a combined loss of $73.7 billion. - In 2002, a small team of internal auditors at WorldCom worked together, often at night and in secret, to investigate and unearth $3.8 billion in fraud. Shortly thereafter, the

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companys audit committee and board of directors were notified of the fraud and acted swiftly: Sullivan was fired, Arthur Andersen withdrew its audit opinion for 2001, and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commision (SEC) launched an investigation into these matters on June 26, 2002. - By the end of 2003, it was estimated that the company's total assets had been inflated by around $11 billion. - On July 21, 2002, WorldCom filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Protection

D. Analysis Control environment

Unrealistic growth targets (double digits) when expectations were low.

Managements philosophy was to be aggressive. Increased pressure on people who did not support the aggressive targets. The culture and atmosphere encouraged by aggressive targets led to dishonest, illegal and unethical activities. A great deal of focus was put on team work and being a strong team player, which is said to have been a strategy to reduce dissenting opinions, eventually leading the organisation to follow a groupthink attitude. Directors were allowed to loan $400m to WorldCom to meet loan requirements to cover up financial difficulties. The control environment allowed this unethical activity to happen.

Risk assessment
Inadequate assessment of internal and external factors, and objectives before setting aggressive targets. Economic conditions were not considered when implementing aggressive accounting measures. Other similar companies were declining.

Control activities
Poor segregation of duties:

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 Reconciliation preparation and reviews Journals preparation and reviews

Information and communication

WorldCom CEO, Bernard Ebbers, and CFO, Scott Sullivan knowingly reported information to their stakeholders, including employees and shareholders, that lacked support and integrity. They communicated false targets and outcomes to Wall Street to ensure the stock price of WorldCom continued to escalate and consequently decided to use a wide range of accounting measures to meet these targets. Access to data entry and manipulation was not appropriately segregated.

Monitoring
There is limited evidence to suggest appropriate review financial reporting controls were being reviewed independently. There was a lack of stringent monitoring of the internal control system and therefore the quality of the controls around the posting of journal entries to the general ledger was not identified as a weak control.

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Ethical Perspective
As defined, teleology is a consequentialism-based theory in a business situation where, managers must consider which action generates the best overall consequences for all parties involved. This often entails a cost/benefit analysis aimed at identifying the action that will maximize benefit for all the stakeholders of the organization Indeed, WorldComs overstatement classifying payments using other companies communications networks as capital expenditures and manipulating its reserve accounts was questionable. Perhaps when interpreting accounting standards the companys top executives utilized the teleological theory where the good over the right became the benchmark of moral behavior. In other words, the good is the greatest happiness of the greatest number of persons The decisions and actions instigated by WorldComs executives believed they did no harm and their accounting practices where justified. It helped to increase investor and stockholders interest, making the company profitable over the past several years where all stakeholders benefited. Since the goal was the greatest good for the greatest number, in this case the stakeholders, that good may be achieved under conditions that are harmful to some (other stakeholders), balanced by a greater good (positive profits)

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Conclusion
WorldCom cases drawn from the above conclusion that every ethical behavior and confidence (trust) may affect the company's operations. weve, ethics in business will not benefit immediately, because it's the business person must learn to see the long-term prospects. And Impact on Accounting Profession Activity recording manipulation of the financial statements that do not in spite of aid management accountant. Accountants who do provide information that led to the financial statement users do not receive the information fair. Accountants have violated ethics porfesinya. Manipulation of the recording of the incident that led to the financial statements of a broad impact on the business activities that would not be fair to make government intervention to create new rules governing the accounting profession with a view to prevent any practices that would violate ethics by public accountants. Behavior and action ketidaketisan especially with regard to financial scandals affected the confidence of investors and the decreasing activity of the world's stock markets which caused stock prices. The main Keunci business success is his reputation as a businessman who uphold the integrity and trust of others. So those who violate the ethics of the case above for Sanctions penalty in Indonesia is still weak when compared to the punishment in the U.S.. In America, the perpetrators of criminal sanctions in the financial sector sentenced to 10 years in prison, while in Indonesia only sanctioned reprimand or revocation of a license to practice the profession of accounting and business people should consider the ethical standards for the benefit and sustainability of the business in the long run. In this case we can draw the conclusion that there is the case of a miraculous case of irregularities in the accounting professional ethics antanya are: 1. Professional responsibility As a profesional and also as seoarang public accountant whose work required by the accountant lain.dalam this case the work is not in accordance with the procedure and is not responsible for this can be evidenced by the demise of the public accounting firm Arthur Andersen named.

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2. technical standards Of the case that it can be concluded that the existence of a public accountant who publishes financial statements showing not meet technical standards to the detriment of interested parties such as investors WorldCom itself. 3. objectivity In this case the fraud occurred miraculous piihak-party presence felt in the lucrative and also the injured party by the CPA itself.

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References
.Ferranti, Marc. Ex-WorldCom CFO Sullivan Gets Five Years in Jail. Computerworld Inc., 12 August 2005. Nationwide Speakers Bureau, Inc. Cynthia Cooper: WorldCom Whistle Blower. 2004. Pappalardo, Denise. Ebbers Jail Time Put Off, For Now. Network World, Inc., 8 September 2005. Reporter. Appeals Court Hears Ebbers Case: Judge Questions Ex-WorldCom Chief's 25-year Sentence. Reuters, 30 January 2006. Rovella, David E. JPMorgan to Pay $2 Bln to Settle WorldCom Fraud Suit. Bloomberg L.P., 16 March 2005. http://money.howstuffworks.com/cooking-books9.htm http://www.worldcomfraudinfocenter.com/ http://yvesrey.wordpress.com/2011/02/10/kasus-skandal-akuntansi-pada-worldcom/ http://kartikatriperwirasari.wordpress.com/2010/06/01/world-com/

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