NASA

SP-4012

NASA HISTORICAL

DATA BOOK

Volume V

NASA

Launch Systems, Space Transportation, Spaceflight, and Space Science 1979-1988

Human

Judy A. Rumerman

The NASA History Series

National Aeronautics and Space NASA History Office Office of Policy and Plans Washington, D.C.

Administration

1999

Library (Revised NASA

of Congress fl_r vol. 5) historical

Cataloguing-in-Publication

Data

data book.

(The NASA

historical

series)

(NASA

SP ; 4012)

Vol. i is a republication of: NASA hislorical data book, 1958-1968./Jane Van Nimmen and Leonard C. Bruno. Vol. 5 in series: Includes Contents: Nimmen 1958-1968 The NASA history series. and indexes. 1958-1968 -/ Jane Van and projects, and prov. 5. v. 2. Programs v. 3. Programs

bibliographical v. 1 NASA / Linda and Leonard

references resources, Ezell --

C. Bruno

Neuman

jects, 1969--1978 / Linda Neuman Ezell -- v. 4. NASA resources, 1969-1978 / Ihor Gawdiak with Helen FedorNASA launch systems, States. space transporlalion, Aeronautics human and Space

spaceflight,

and space I. United

science,

1979-1988 National

/ Judy A. Rumerman.

Administration--History. Leonard C. III. Ezell,

1. Van Nimmen, Jane. 11. Bruno, Linda Neuman. IV. Gawdiak, Ihor. V. VIII. Series: NASA SP ; 4012.

Rumerman, Judy A. VI. Series. VII. Series.

For sale by the U.S. Government Superintendent

Printing

Office DC 20402-9328

of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, tSBN 0-16-050030-3

CONTENTS

List of Figures and Tables ...................................................................... Preface Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter and Acknowledgments One: Introduction Two: Launch .............................................................

v xi ! 11 105 361 527 535 537

......................................................................

Systems ............................................................. Spaceflight .................

Three: Space Transportation/Human Four: Space Science

.............................................................

Index ................................................................................................... About the Compiler ............................................................................ The NASA History Series ..................................................................

iii

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

Chapter Figure Chapter Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure

One: 1-1 Two: 2-1 2-2 2-3 2-4 2-5 2-6 2-7 2-8 2-9 2-10 2-11 2-12 2-13 2-14 2-15 2-16 2-17

Introduction Program Launch Office Functional Areas 7

Systems 14 16 16 17 18 20 24 30 31 31 32 38 41 44 48 50 55

NASA Space Transportation System (1988) Top-Level Launch Vehicle Organizational Structure Office of Space Transportation (as of October 1979) Code M/Code O Split (as of February 1980) Code M Merger (as of October 1982) Office of Space Flight 1986 Reorganization Expendable Launch Vehicle Success Rate Atlas-Centaur Launch Vehicle Delta 3914 Delta 3920/PAM-D Scout-D Launch Vehicle (Used in 1979) External Tank Solid Rocket Booster Solid Rocket Motor Redesign Schedule Inertial Upper Stage Transfer Orbit Stage Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle Appropriated Budget by Launch Vehicle and Launch-Related Component Atlas E/F Funding History Atlas-Centaur Funding History Delta Funding History Scout Funding History Space Shuttle Main Engine Funding History Solid Rocket Boosters Funding History External Tank Funding History Upper Stages Funding History Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle Funding History Tethered Satellite System Funding History Advanced Programs/Planning Funding History ELV Success Rate by Year and Launch Vehicle for NASA Launches NASA Atlas E/F Vehicle Launches Atlas E/F Characteristics NASA Atlas-Centaur Vehicle Launches Atlas-Centaur Characteristics

Table 2-1 Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table 2-2 2-3 2-4 2-5 2-6 2-7 2-8 2-9 2-10 2-11 2-12 2-13 2-14 2-15 2-16 2-17

59 63 64 65 66 67 69 71 73 75 76 77 78 79 8O 82 83

Table 2-18 Table 2-19 Table 2-20 Table 2-21 Table 2-22 Table 2-23 Table 2-24 Table 2-25 Table 2-26 Table 2-27 Table 2-28 Table 2-29 Table 2-30 Table 2-3l Table 2-32
Chapter Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure 3-1 3-2 3-3 3-4 3-5 3-6 3-7 3-8 3-9 3-10 3-11 3-12 Three:

Chronology ofDelta Vehicle Launches Delta 2914 Characteristics Delta 3910/3914 Characteristics Delta 3920/3924 Characteristics NASA Scout Launches Scout Characteristics (G-1) STS-Launched Missions Space Shuttle Main Engine Characteristics MainEngine Development and Selected Events Space Shuttle External Tank Characteristics External Tank Development and Selected Events Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster Characteristics Chronology ofSelected Solid Rocket Booster Development Events Upper Stage Development Transfer OrbitStage Characteristics
Space Transportation/Human Spaceflight

84 86 87 88 89 90 91 93 94 95 96 97 98 101 103

NSTS Organization Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance Office Organization Space Station Program Management Approach Office of Space Station Organization (December 1986) Space Shuttle Orbiter Typical STS Flight Profile Types of Intact Aborts Pallet Structure and Panels Spacelab Igloo Structure Insulating Materials STS-I Entry Flight Profile Continuous Flow Electrophoresis System Mid-deck Gallery Location STS-5 Payload Configuration Payload Flight Test Article Manned Maneuvering Unit Solar Max On-Orbit Berthed Configuration Long Duration Exposure Facility Configuration STS 51-A Cargo Configuration STS 61-A Cargo Configuration EASE/ACCESS Configuration Integrated MSL-2 Payload Tracking and Data Relay Satellite On-Orbit Configuration STS 5 I-L Data and Design Analysis Task Force Space Shuttle Return to Flight Space Shuttle Return to Flight Milestones Field Joint Redesign vi

110 113 116 117 124 132 138 149 149 159 163 170 171 173 175 176 177 179 183 184 185 186 211 213 220 221

Figure 3-13 Figure 3-14 Figure 3-15 Figure 3-16 Figure 3-17 Figure 3-18 Figure 3-19 Figure 3-20 Figure 3-21 Figure 3-22 Figure 3-23 Figure 3 -24 Figure 3-25 Figure 3-26

3-27 Figure 3-28 Figure 3-29 Figure 3-30 Figure 3-31 Figure 3-32 Figure 3-33 Figure 3-34 Figure 3-35 Figure 3-36 Figure 3-37 Figure 3-38 Figure 3-39 Figure 3-40 Figure 3-41 Figure Table 3-I Table 3-2 Table 3-3 Table 3-4 Table 3-5 3--6 Table Table 3-7 Table 3-8 3-9 Table Table 3-10 Table 3-11 Table 3-12 Table 3-13 Table 3-14 Table 3-15 Table 3-16 Table 3-17 Table 3-18 Table 3-19 Table 3-20 Table 3-21 Table 3-22 Table 3-23
Table Table Table Table Table Table Table 3-24 3-25 3-26 3-27 3-28 3-29 3-30

Extendible Rod Escape System Availability ofFourth Orbiter System Integrity Assurance Program Major Orbiter Modifications Dual KeelFinal Assembly Configuration Revised Baseline Configuration (1987), Block I Enhanced Configuration, Block1I Habitation Module FlightTelerobotic Servicer Photovoltaic Module Mobile Servicing System and Special Purpose Dexterous Manipulator Columbus Attached Laboratory Columbus Free-Flying Laboratory Columbus Polar Platform Japanese Experiment Module
Total Human Spaceflight Funding History Programmed Budget by Budget Category Orbiter Funding History Orbiter Replacement Funding History Launch and Mission Support Funding History Launch and Landing Operations Funding History Spaceflight Operations Program Funding History Flight Operations Funding History Spacelab Funding History Space Station Funding History Orbiter Characteristics Typical Launch Processing/Terminal Count Sequence Space Shuttle Launch Elements Mission Command and Control Positions and Responsibilities Shuttle Extravehicular Activity STS- 1-STS-4 Mission Summary STS-1 Mission Characteristics STS-2 Mission Characteristics STS-3 Mission Characteristics STS-4 Mission Characteristics STS-5-STS-27 Mission Summary STS-5 Mission Characteristics STS-6 Mission Characteristics STS-7 Mission Characteristics STS-8 Mission Characteristics STS-9 Mission Characteristics STS 41-B Mission Characteristics STS 41-C Mission Characteristics STS 41-D Mission Characteristics STS 41-G Mission Characteristics vii

226 228 229 230 244 245 245 247 249 249 250 251 252 253 253
256 259 260 261 262 264 265 266 267 268 269 271 272 273 274 275 277 279 281 283 285 294 296 298 300 302 303 306 307 3O9

Table 3-31 Table 3-32 Table 3-33 Table 3-34 Table 3-35 Table 3-36 Table 3-37 Table 3-38 Table 3-39 Table 3-40 Table 3-41 Table 3-42 Table 3-43 Table 3-44 Table 3-45 Table 3-46 Table 3-47 Table 3-48 Table 349 Table 3-50 Table 3-51
Chapter Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure 4-1 4-2 4-3 4-4 4-5 4-6 4-7 4-8 Four:

STS 51-AMission Characteristics STS 51-C Mission Characteristics STS 51-DMission Characteristics STS 5I-BMission Characteristics STS 51-G Mission Characteristics STS 51-F Mission Characteristics STS 51-IMission Characteristics STS 51-J Mission Characteristics STS 6I-AMission Characteristics STS 61-BMission Characteristics STS 61-C Mission Characteristics STS 51-LMission Characteristics STS-26 Mission Characteristics STS-27 Mission Characteristics Return toFlightChronology Sequence ofMajor Events oftheChallenger
Accident Chronology of Events Prior to Launch of Challenger (STS 51-L) Related to Temperature Concerns Schedule for Implementation of Recommendations (as of July 14, 1986) Revised Shuttle Manifest (as of October 3, 1986) Space Station Work Packages Japanese Space Station Components Space Science

312 313 314 317 318 321 323 324 325 326 328 333 334 337 338 342

345 354 356 359 360

Office of Space Science (Through November 1981) Office of Space Science and Applications (Established November 1981) HEAO High-Spectral Resolution Gamma Ray Spectrometer HEAO Isotopic Composition of Primary Cosmic Rays HEAO Heavy Nuclei Experiment Solar Maximum Instruments Solar Mesospheric Explorer Satellite Configuration Altitude Regions to Be Measured by Solar Mesospheric Explorer Instruments Infrared Astronomy Satellite Configuration Exploded View of the European X-Ray Observatory Satellite Distortion of Earth's Magnetic Field Spartan 1 Plasma Diagnostics Package Experiment Hardware Spartan Halley Configuration San Marco D/L Spacecraft Spacelab I Module Experiment Locations (Port Side) viii

369 370 376 376 377 378 380 381 382 385 387 389 390 391 393 395

Figure 4-9 Figure 4-10 Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure 4-11 4-12 4-13 4-14 4-15 4-16

4-17 Figure 4-18 Figure 4-19 Figure 4-20 Figure 4-21 Figure 4-22 Figure 4-23 Figure 4-24 Figure 4-25 Figure 4-26 Figure 4-27 Figure 4-28 Figure 4-29 Figure 4-30 Figure 4-31 Figure 4-32 Figure 4-33 Figure

Spacelab 1 Module Experiment Locations (Starboard Side) Spacelab 1 Pallet Experiment Locations Spacelab 3 Experiment Module Layout (Looking Down From the Top) Spacelab 2 Configuration OSS-I Payload Configuration Hubble Space Telescope Compton Gamma Ray Observatory Configuration Extreme Ultraviolet Explorer Observatory Two Phases of the Extreme Ultraviolet Explorer Mission ROSAT Flight Configuration Cosmic Background Explorer Observatory IExploded View) Cosmic Background Explorer Orbital Alignments Magellan Spacecraft Configuration Magellan Orbit Galileo Mission Galileo Spacecraft Ulysses Spacecraft Configuration

396 397 398 398 400 404 405 407 4O8 409 411 412 417 418 419 420 421 422 425 426 426 426 427 427 428 429 429 43O 430 431 431 431 432 432

Table 4-1 Table 4-2 Table 4-3 Table 4-4 Table 4-5 Table 4-6 Table 4-7 Table 4-8
Table 4-9 Table 4-10 Table 4-11 Table 4-12 Table 4-13 Table 4-14 Table 4-15 Table 4-16 Table 4-17

Total Space Science Funding History Programmed Budget by Budget Category High Energy Astronomy Observatories Development Funding History Solar Maximum Mission Development Funding History Space Telescope Development Funding History Solar Polar Mission Development Funding History Gamma Ray Observatory Development Funding History Shuttle/Spacelab Payload Development Funding History Explorer Development Funding History Physics and Astronomy Mission Operations and Data Analysis Funding History Physics and Astronomy Research and Analysis Funding History Physics and Astronomy Suborbital Programs Funding History Space Station Planning Funding History Jupiter Orbiter/Probe and Galileo Programs Funding History Venus Radar Mapper/Magellan Funding History Global Geospace Science Funding History International Solar Polar Mission/Ulysses Development Funding History
ix

Table 4-18 Table 4-19 Table 4-20 Table 4-21 Table 4-22 Table 4-23 Table 4-24 Table 4-25 Table Table Table Table Table 4-26 4-27 4-28 4-29 4-30

Mars Geoscience/Climatology Orbiter Program Funding History Lunar and Planetary Mission Operations and Data Analysis Funding History Lunar and Planetary Research and Analysis Funding History Life Sciences Flight Experiments Program Funding History Life Sciences/Vestibular Function Research Funding History Life Sciences Research and Analysis Funding History Science Missions ( 1979-1988) Spacecraft Charging at High Altitudes Characteristics UK-6 (Ariel) Characteristics HEAO-3 Characteristics Solar Maximum Mission Dynamics Explorer 1 and 2 Characteristics Solar Mesospheric Explorer Instrument Characteristics Solar Mesospheric Explorer Characteristics Infrared Astronomy Satellite Characteristics European X-Ray Observatory Satellite Characteristics Shuttle Pallet Satellite-01 Characteristics Hilat Characteristics Charge Composition Explorer Characteristics Ion Release Module Characteristics United Kingdom Subsatellite Characteristics Spartan 1 Characteristics Plasma Diagnostics Package Characteristics Spartan 203 Characteristics Polar BEAR Characteristics San Marco D/L Characteristics Chronology of Spacelab Development Spacelab I Experiments Spacelab 3 Experiments Spacelab 2 Experiments Spacelab D-I Experiments OSS- I Investigations Hubble Space Telescope Development Ulysses Historical Summary

432 433 433 434 434 435 436 437 439 441 442 444 446 447 449 451 452 453 454 455 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 480 499 5O5 512 516 518 525

Table 4-31 Table 4-32 Table 4-33 Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table 4-34 4-35 4-36 4-37 4-38 4-39 4-40 4-41 4-42 4-43 4-44 4-45 4-46 4-47 4-48 4-49 4-50 4-51

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

In 1973, NASA published the first volume of the NASA Historical Data Book, a hefty tome containing mostly tabular data on the resources of the space agency between 1958 and 1968. There, broken into detailed tables, were the facts and figures associated with the budget, facilities, procurement, installations, and personnel of NASA during that formative decade. In 1988, NASA reissued that first volume of the data book and added two additional volumes on the agency's programs and projects, one each for 1958-1968 and 1969-1978. NASA published a fourth volume in 1994 that addressed NASA resources for the period between 1969 and 1978. This fifth volume of the NASA Historical Data Book is a continuation of

those earlier efforts. This fundamental reference tool presents information, much of it statistical, documenting the development of four critical areas of NASA responsibility for the period between 1979 and 1988. This volume includes detailed information on the development and operation of launch systems, space transportation, human spaceflight, and space science during this era. As such, it contains in-depth statistical information about the early Space Shuttle program through the return to flight in 1988, the early efforts to build a space station, the development of new launch systems, and the launching of seventeen space science missions. A companion volume will appear late in 1999_ documenting applications, support operations, aeronautics, and resources NASA during the period between 1979 and 1988. the space aspects of

There are numerous people at NASA associated with historical study, technical information, and the mechanics of publishing who helped in myriad ways in the preparation of this historical data book. Stephen J. Garber helped in the management of the project and handled final proofing and publication. M. Louise Alstork edited and prepared the index of the work. Nadine J. Andreassen of the NASA History Office performed editorial and proofreading work on the project; and the staffs of the NASA Headquarters Library, the Scientific and Technical Information Program, and the NASA Document Services Center provided assistance in locating and preparing for publication the documentary materials in this work. The NASA Headquarters Printing and Design Office developed the layout and handled printing. Specifically, we wish to acknowledge the work of Jane E. Penn, Jonathan L. Friedman, Joel Vendette, Patricia M. Talbert, and Kelly L. Rindfusz for their editorial and design work. In addition, Michael Cmkovic, Stanley Artis, and Jeffrey Thompson saw the book through the publication process. Thanks are due them all. xi

:_:_:_ i)i_i iiiiii!iiii_iiii_il !i_:i

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

NASA began its operations as the nation's civilian space agency in 1958 following the passage of the National Aeronautics and Space Act. It succeeded the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA). The new organization was charged with preserving the role of the United States "as a leader in aeronautical and space science and technology" and in its application, with expanding our knowledge of the Earth's atmosphere and space, and with exploring flight both within and outside the atmosphere. By the 1980s, NASA had established itself as an agency with considerable achievements on record. The decade was marked by the inauguration of the Space Shuttle flights and haunted by the 1986 Challenger accident that temporarily halted the program. The agency also enjoyed the strong support of President Ronald Reagan, who enthusiastically announced the start of both the Space Station program and the National Aerospace Plane program. Overview of the Agency

NASA is an independent federal government agency that, during the 1980s, consisted of 10 field installations located around the United States, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (a government-owned facility staffed by the California Institute of Technology), and a Headquarters located in Washington, D.C. Headquarters was divided into a number of program and staff offices that provided overall program management and handled administrative functions for the agency. Each program office had responsibility for particular program areas (see Figure 1-1). Headquarters also interacted with Congress and the Executive Branch. NASA's structure was quite decentralized. Although Headquarters had overall program responsibility, each installation was responsible for the day-to-day execution and operations of its projects, managed its own facility, hired its own personnel, and awarded its own procurements. Each installation also focused on particular types of projects and discipline areas.

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Program and Project Development

NASA called most of its activities programs or projects. The agency defined a program as "a related series of undertakings which are funded for the most part from NASA's R&D appropriation, which continue over a period of time (normally years), and which are designed to pursue a broad scientific or technical goal." A project is "a defined, time-limited activity with clearly established objectives and boundary conditions executed to gain knowledge, create a capability, or provide a service .... A project is normally an element of a program.'" NASA's flight programs and projects followed prescribed phases (with associated letter designators) in their development and execution. This sequence of activities consisted of concept development (Pre-Phase A), mission analysis (Phase A), definition or system design (Phase B), execution (design, development, test, and evaluation) (Phase C/D), launch and deployment operations (Phase E), and mission operations, maintenance, and disposal (Phase F). Although most concepts for missions originated within a field installation, Headquarters retained project responsibility through Phase B. Once a program or project was approved and funded by Congress, the principal responsibility for program or project implementation shifted to the field installation. Internal agency reviews were held during and between each phase of a project. Before moving to Phase C/D, NASA held a major agency review, and approval and funding by Congress were required. Particular activities never moved beyond Phase B, nor were they meant to. For instance, many aeronautics activities were designed as research efforts and were intended to be turned over to the private sector or to other government agencies once Phase B concluded. NASA's Budget Process

NASA's activities relied on getting a reasonable level of funding from Congress. The federal budget process was quite complex, and a brief description as it relates to NASA is presented here. Additional information can be found in Chapter 8, "Finances and Procurement," in Volume VI of the NASA Historical Data Book. NASA operated on a fiscal year (FY) that ran from October 1 through September 30 of the following year. Through FY 1983, the agency budget was broken into three accounts or appropriation categories: Research and Development (R&D), Research and Program Management (R&PM), and Construction of Facilities (C of F). An additional appropriation, Space Flight, Control, and Data Communications (SFC&DC) was added in FY 1984 for ongoing Shuttle-related and tracking and data acquisition activities. Although a program office could administer activities from

'NASA Management Instruction 7120.3, "Space Flight Program and Project Management," February 6, 1985.

INTRODUCTION

more than one appropriation category, such as the Office of Space Flight, which managed both R&D and SFC&DC activities, all funds were designated for particular appropriation categories and could not be transferred between accounts without congressional approval. Congress appropriated operating funds each year. These appropriations were the culmination of a series of activities that required at least two years of effort by the installations and Headquarters. Two years before a budget year began, Headquarters sent guidelines to each installation that contained programmatic and budget information based on its long-range plans and the budget forecasts from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Each installation then prepared a detailed budget, or Program Operating Plan (POP), for the fiscal year that would begin two years in the future. The installation also refined the budget for the remainder of the current fiscal year and the next fiscal year that it had already submitted and had approved, and it provided less detailed budget figures for later years. Upon approval from each installation's comptroller and director, this budget was forwarded to the appropriate Headquarters-level program office, to the NASA comptroller's office, and the NASA administrator. Headquarters reviewed the budget requests from each installation, held discussions with the installations, and negotiated with OMB to arrive at a budget that looked realistic and had a fair chance of passage by Congress. Following these negotiations, NASA formally submitted its budget requests to OMB. This became part of the administration's budget that went to Congress in January of each year. When Congress received the budget, NASA's proposed budget first went to the House and Senate science committees that were charged with authorizing the agency's budget. Each committee held hearings, usually with NASA administrators; reviewed the submission in great detail; debated, revised, and approved the submitted budget: and sent it to the full House or Senate for approval. The authorization committees could limit how much could be appropriated and often set extensive conditions on how the funds were to be spent. Each house approved its own authorization bill, which was then submitted to a House-Senate conference committee to resolve any differences. After this took place, the compromise bill was passed by the full House and Senate and submitted to the President for his signature. The process to appropriate funds was similar, with the bills going to the proper appropriations committees for discussion, revision, and approval. However, in practice, the appropriations committees usually did not review the proposed budget in as great detail as the authorization committees. Upon committee approval, the appropriations bills went to the full House and Senate, back to a conference committee if necessary, and finally to the President. After approval by the President, OMB established controls on the release of appropriated funds to the various agencies, including NASA.

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

OnceNASA receivedcontrolover its appropriated funds,it earmarked thefundsfor various programs, projects, andfacilities,eachof whichhadan "account" with theagency established for it. Fundswere thencommitted, obligated, costed, andfinallydisbursed according tothe progression of activities,whichhopefullycoincided with the timingof events spelledout in the budget. NASA monitored all of its financial activities scrupulously, first at theprojectandinstallation levelandthen at the Headquarters level. Its financialtransactions wereeventually reviewed by thecongressional General Accounting Officeto ensure that theywerelegalandfollowedprescribed procedures. Inthebudget tables thatfollowin each chapter, the"request" or "submission" column contains theamount thatOMBsubmitted toCongress. It may not be the initial request thatNASA submitted to OMB. The "authorization" is theceilingsetby theauthorization committees in their bill. The"appropriation" is theamount provided totheagency. The"programmed" column shows theamount theagency actually spent duringthe fiscalyearfora particular program.

INTRODUCTION

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CHAPTER TWO

LAUNCH SYSTEMS

CHAPTER TWO

LAUNCH

SYSTEMS

Introduction Launch systems provide access to space, obviously a necessary component of all spaceflights. The elements of launch systems include the various vehicles, engines, boosters, and other propulsive and launch devices that help propel a spacecraft into space and position it properly. From 1979 through 1988, NASA used both expendable launch vehicles (ELVs)--those that can be used only once--and reusable launch vehicles. This chapter addresses both types of vehicles, as well as other launch system-related elements. NASA used three families of ELVs (Scout, Delta, and Atlas) and one reusable launch vehicle (Space Shuttle) from 1979 through 1988 (Figure 2-1). Each family of ELVs had several models, which are described in this chapter. For the Space Shuttle, or Space Transportation System (STS), the solid rocket booster, external tank, and main engine elements comprised the launch-related elements and are addressed. The orbital maneuvering vehicle and the various types of upper stages that boosted satellites into their desired orbit are also described. This chapter includes an overview of the management of NASA's launch vehicle program and summarizes the agency's launch vehicle budget. In addition, this chapter addresses other launch vehicle development, such as certain elements of advanced programs. Several trends that began earlier in NASA's history continued in this decade (1979-1988). The trend toward acquiring launch vehicles and services from the commercial sector continued, as did the use of NASAlaunched vehicles for commercial payloads. President Reagan's policy directive of May 1983 reiterated U.S. government support for commercial ELV activities and the resulting shift toward commercialization of ELV activities. His directive stated that the "U.S. government fully endorses and will facilitate commercialization of U.S. Expendable Launch Vehicles." His directive said that the United States would encourage use of its national ranges for commercial ELV operations and would "make available, on a reimbursable basis, facilities, equipment, tooling, and services that are required to support the production and operation of

13

14

NASA

HISTORICAL

DATA BOOK

2u
(81)

SPACE SHUTTLE

bDELTA 16 (3O) SCOUT /_

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FEET Figure 2-I. NASA Space Transportation System (1988) U.S. commercial ELVs." Use of these facilities would be priced to encourage "viable commercial ELV launch activities.'" The policy also stated the government's intention of replacing ELVs with the STS as the primary launch system for most spaceflights. (Original plans called for a rate flight of up to fifty Space Shuttle flights per year.) However, as early as FY 1984, Congress recognized that relying exclusively on the Shuttle for all types of launches might not be the best policy. Congress stated in the 1984 appropriations bill that "the Space Shuttle system should be used primarily as a launch vehicle for government defense and civil payloads only" and "commercial customers for communications satellites and other purposes should begin to look to the commercialization of existing expendable launch vehicles. ''2 The Challenger accident, which delayed the Space Shuttle program, also con-

'Announcement of the Private Sector, May Weekly Compilation of :House Committee Development-Independent Accompany H.R. 3133,

U.S. Government Support for Commercial Operations by 16, 1983, from National Archives and Records Service's Presidential Documents for May 16, 1983, pp. 721-23. on Appropriations, Department of Housing and Urban Agencies Appropriation Bill, 1984, Report to 98th Cong., 1st sess., 1983, H. Rept. 98-- (unnumbered).

LAUNCH SYSTEMS

15

tributedto thedevelopment of a "mixedfleet strategy," whichrecommended using bothELVsandtheShuttle?

Management of the Launch Vehicle Program

Two NASA program offices shared management responsibility for the launch vehicle program: Code M (at different times called the Office of Space Transportation, the Office of Space Transportation Acquisition, and the Office of Space Flight) and Code O (the Office of Space Transportation Operations). Launch system management generally resided in two or more divisions within these offices, depending on what launch system elements were involved. The organizational charts that follow illustrate the top-level structure of Codes M and O during the period 1979-1988. As in other parts of this chapter, there is some overlap between the management-related material presented in this chapter and the material in Chapter 3, "Space Transportation and Human Spaceflight." Also during the period 1979 through 1988, two major reorganizations in the launch vehicle area occurred (Figure 2-2): the split of the Office of Space Transportation into Codes M and O in 1979 (Phase I) and the merger of the two program offices into Code M in 1982 (Phase II). In addition, the adoption of the mixed fleet strategy following the loss of the Challenger reconfigured a number of divisions (Phase III). These management reorganizations reflected NASNs relative emphasis on the Space Shuttle or on ELVs as NASNs primary launch vehicle, as well as the transition of the Shuttle from developmental to operational status. Phase (Code I: Split of Code M Into M) and Space Transportation Space Transportation Operations (Code O) Acquisition

John F. Yardley, the original associate administrator for the Office of Space Transportation Systems since its establishment in 1977, continued in that capacity, providing continuous assessment of STS development, acquisition, and operations status. In October 1979, Charles R. Gunn assumed the new position of deputy associate administrator for STS (Operations) within Code M, a position designed to provide transition management in anticipation of the formation of a new program office planned for later that year (Figure 2-3).

'NASA Office of Space Flight, Mixed Fleet Study, January 12, 1987. The NASA Advisory Council had also established a Task Force on Issues of a Mixed Fleet in March 1987 to study the issues associated with the employment of a mixed fleet of launch vehicles and endorsed the Office of Space Flight study results in its Study of the Issues of a Mixed Fleet. Further references to a mixed fleet are found in remarks made by NASA Administrator James C. Fletcher on May 15, 1987.

16

NASA

HISTORICAL

DATA

BOOK

Phase I Split of Code M, creating new Office of Space Transportation Operations (Code O) (November 1979)

_1
Office of Space Transportation Acquisition (Code M) John Yardley James Abrahamson
................................................ Phase II _-_

Office of Space Transportation I (Code M) John Yard ey

I
Office of Space Transportation Operations.(Code O) Stan ey we ss
]

Merger of Codes M and O to create the Office or Space Flight (August 1982)

.iFmli_tCr_ hm _) n .... _Jesse-Moore--

Richard Truly

Phase III Post- Challenger 1986 to return to flight September 1988

Mixed

Fleet

Strategy

Figure 2-2 Top-Level

Launch

Vehicle

Organizational

Structure

Office

of

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Transportation Jofln YIIrdley Adrnlnlltrmtor CharkDI Gunn

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M)

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The formal establishment of the new Office of Space Operations (Code O) occurred in November 1979, and Dr. Stanley I. Weiss became its first permanent associate administrator in July 1980. Code O was the principal interface with all STS users and assumed responsibilities for Space Shuttle operations and functions, including scheduling, manifesting, pricing, launch service agreements, Spacelab, and ELVs, except for the development of Space Shuttle upper stages. The ELV program-Atlas, Centaur, Delta, Scout, and Atlas F--moved to Code O and was managed by Joseph B. Mahon, who had launch vehicle management during NASNs Yardley remained associate administrator when L. Michael Weeks assumed associate played a significant role in second decade. for Code M until May 1981, administrator responsibilities.

LAUNCH SYSTEMS

17

Two newdivisions within CodeM wereestablished in May 1981. The UpperStage Division,with FrankVanRenssalaer as director,assumed responsibility formanaging thewide-body Centaur, theInertial Upper Stage (IUS), the Solid Spinning UpperStage(SSUS), andthe Solar-Electric Propulsion System. TheSolidRocket Booster andExternal Tank Division, with JerryFittsasdirector, wasalsocreated. In November 1981, Major General James A.Abrahamson, onassignment fromtheAir Force, assumed duties aspermanent associate administrator of Code M (Figure 2-4).
Office of Space Transportation Systems (Code M) John Yard ey I I

I
Orbiter Programs act ng M Ma kin - Electrical Systems - Eogr & Inl - Structural Sgt

I
I Ground Systems Pligh[ Tests I E Andrews & - Flight Tesl - Launch & Landing Syst - Flighl Syslems

I
H Cohen I

I
Programs J. Disher Advanced Adv Concepts Adv Development I

[Re" i la i3; I

[En .... l nePr l ysBms 1o ......

W Dankhoff (acting) Engineerin LeRoy & Int Day Admmmtrahon CR. Hovell - Systems Engtneenng - STS Integration - Cost & Schedule Analysis - Adm. & Program Spl - STS Program & Budgel Control

_qqpt(a) E Van Ex Renssalaer ndabte Solid Rocket Booster Upper Stages External Tank

(a) May 1981--Expendable Equipment Division disestablished. New divisions established Upper Stages Division--Frank Van Renssalaer. Branches--Centaur, Solar Electric Propulsion Systems, IUS, and SSUS Solid Rocket Boosler and External Tank Division--Jerry Fitts. Branches--Solid Rockel Booster and External Tank

Figure 2-4. Code M/Code 0 Split (as of Februar3., 1980) (1 of 2)

Transportation Operations (Code Office Space Stanleyof Weiss

O)

I
Analysis STS Effecliveness [ VehiclesLaunch Expendable J Mahon Ailas-Cenlaur Della Scout Alias F - Integraled

J
Ops. - STS Operations Budget - Spacelab Program Budq_et - ELV_'rogram BuOget - Adm & programSpt - Resources Integralion

STS

Utilization C Lee

- Engineering - Integralion & Test

- Mission Analysis & Integration - Policy, Planning & Launch Services Agreements

Figure 2-4. Code M/Code 0 Split (as q( February 1980) (2 of 2)

18 Phase H: Merger

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK of Codes M and 0 Into the Office of Space Flight

In preparation for Space Shuttle operations, Codes M and O merged in 1982 into the Office of Space Flight, Code M, with Abrahamson serving as associate administrator (Figure 2-5). Weiss became NASA's chief engineer Code M was responsible for the fourth and final developmental Shuttle flight, the operational flights that would follow, future Shuttle procurements, and ELVs. The new office structure included the Special Programs Division (responsible for managing ELVs and upper stages), with Mahon continuing to lead that division, the Spacelab Division, the Customer Services Division, the Space Shuttle Operations Office, and the Space Station Task Force. This task force, under the direction of John D. Hodge, developed the programmatic aspects of a space station, including mission analysis, requirements definition, and program management In April 1984, an interim Space Station Program Office superseded the Space Station Task Force and, in August 1984, became the permanent Office of Space Station (Code S), with Philip E. Culbertson serving as associate administrator In the second quarter of 1983, organizational responsibility for ELVs moved from the Special Programs Division to the newly formed Space Transportation Support Division, still under the leadership of Joseph Mahon. Jesse W. Moore took over as Code M associate administrator on August 1, 1984, replacing Abrahamson, who accepted a new assignment

Figure

2-5.

Code

M Merger

(as of October

1982)

LAUNCH SYSTEMS

19

in the Department of Defense (DOD). Moore was succeeded by Rear Admiral Richard H. Truly, a former astronaut, on February 20, 1986. Phase 111: Post-Challenger Launch Vehicle Management

From the first Space Shuttle orbital test flight in April 1981 through STS 61 -C on January 12, 1986, NASA flew twenty-four successful Shuttle missions, and the agency was well on its way to establishing the Shuttle as its only launch vehicle. The loss of the Challenger (STS 51-L) on January 26, 1986, grounded the Shuttle fleet for thirty-two months. When flights resumed with STS-26 in September 1988, NASA planned a more conservative launch rate of twelve launches per year. The reduction of the planned flight rate forced many payloads to procure ELV launch services and forced NASA to plan to limit Shuttle use to payloads that required a crewed presence or the unique capabilities of the Shuttle. It also forced NASA to recognize the inadvisability of relying totally on the Shuttle. The resulting adoption of a "mixed fleet strategy" included increased NASADOD collaboration for the acquisition of launch vehicles and the purchase of ELV launch services. This acquisition strategy consisted of competitive procurements of the vehicle, software, and engineering and logistical work, except for an initial transitional period through 1991, when procurements would be noncompetitive if it was shown that it was in the government's best interest to match assured launch vehicle availability with payloads and established mission requirements. The mixed fleet strategy was aimed at a healthy and affordable launch capability, assured access to space, the utilization of a mixed fleet to support NASA mission requirements, a dual-launch capability for critical payloads, an expanded national launch capability, the protection of the Shuttle fleet, and the fostering of ELV commercialization. This last goal was in accordance with the Reagan administration's policy of encouraging the growth of the fledgling commercial launch business whenever possible. The Office of Commercial Programs (established in 1984) was designated to serve as an advocate to ensure that NASA's internal decision-making process encouraged and facilitated the development of a domestic industrial base to provide access to space. During this regrouping period, the ELV program continued to be managed at Headquarters within the Office of Space Flight, through the Space Transportation Support Division, with Joseph Mahon serving as division director and Peter Eaton as chief of ELVs, until late 1986. During this period, the Tethered Satellite System and the Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle also became responsibilities of this division. In late 1986, Code M reorganized into the basic configuration that it would keep through 1988 (Figure 2-6). This included a new management and operations structure for the National Space Transportation System (NSTS). Arnold J. Aldrich was named director of the NSTS at NASA Headquarters. A new Flight Systems Division, still under the leadership of Mahon, consisted of divisions for ELVs and upper stages, as well as divisions for advanced programs and

20

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

of Spaca F_ {_ Rk:r6_ T_ay

M)

P_,g

- Sadety,Rd., & OA

-0_

--_ arrwr &

omce O_ce

- Um_r,c_d

Figure

2-6.

Office

of Space

Flight

1986

Reorganization

Space Shuttle carrier systems. The Propulsion Division was eliminated as part of the NSTS's move to clarify the points of authority and responsibility in the Shuttle program and to establish clear lines of communication in the information transfer and decision-making processes. Money for NASA's Launch Systems

From 1979 through 1983, all funds for NASA's launch systems came from the Research and Development (R&D) appropriation. Beginning in FY 1984, Congress authorized a new appropriation, Space Flight, Control, and Data Communications (SFC&DC), to segregate funds for ongoing Space Shuttle-related activities. This appropriation was in response to an October 1983 recommendation by the NASA Advisory Council, which stated that the operating budgets, facilities, and personnel required to support an operational Space Shuttle be "fenced" from the rest of NASA's programs. The council maintained that such an action would speed the transition to more efficient operations, help reduce costs, and ease the transfer of STS operations to the private sector or some new government operating agency, should such a transfer be desired/SFC&DC was used for Space Shuttle production and capability development, space transportation operations (including ELVs), and space and ground network communications and data systems activities. Most data in this section came from two sources. Programmed (actual) figures came from the yearly budget estimates prepared by NASA's Budget Operations Division, Office of the Comptroller. Data on NASA's submissions and congressional action came from the chronological history budget submissions issued for each fiscal year.

4NASA, House

Fiscal

Year

1985

Budget Report,

Submission, issued April 22,

Chronological 1986, p. 15.

Histoo;

Authorization

Committee

LAUNCH SYSTEMS

21

Table 2-1 shows the total appropriated amounts for launch vehicles and launch-related components. Tables 2-2 through 2-12 show the requested amount that NASA submitted to Congress, the amount authorized for each item or program, the final appropriation, and the programmed (or actual) amounts spent for each item or program. The submission represented the amount agreed to by NASA and OMB, not necessarily the initial request NASA made to the President's budget officer. The authorized amount was the ceiling set by Congress for a particular purpose. The appropriated amount reflected the amount that Congress actually allowed the Treasury to provide for specific purposes? As is obvious from examining the tables, funds for launch vehicles and other launch-related components were often rolled up into the total R&D or SFC&DC appropriation or other major budget category ("undistributed" funds). This made tracking the funding levels specifically designated for launch systems difficult. However, supporting congressional committee documentation clarified some of Congress's intentions. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Congress intended that most space launches were to move from ELVs to the Space Shuttle as soon as the Shuttle became operational. This goal was being rethought by 1984, and it was replaced by a mixed fleet strategy after 1986. However, even though the government returned to using ELVs for many missions, it never again took prime responsibility for most launch system costs. From 1985 through 1987, Congress declared that the NASA ELV program would be completely funded on a reimbursable basis. Launch costs would be paid by the customer (for example, commercial entities, other government agencies, or foreign governments). Not until 1988 did Congress provide direct funding for two Delta II launch vehicles that would be used for NASA launches in the early 1990s. Although the federal government funded the Shuttle to a much greater degree, it was also to be used, when possible, for commercial or other government missions in which the customer would pay part of the launch and payload costs. In some fiscal years, ELVs, upper stages, Shuttle-related launch elements, and advanced programs had their own budget lines in the congressional budget submissions. However, no element always had its own budget line. To follow the changes that took place, readers should consult the notes that follow each table as well as examine the data in each table. Additional data relating to the major Space Shuttle budget categories can be found in the budget tables in Chapter 3. NASA's budget structure changed from one year to the next depending on the status of various programs and budget priorities. From 1979 through 1983, all launch-related activities fell under the R&D appropriation.

_The term "appropriation" is used in two ways. It names a major budget category (for instance, R&D or SFC&DC). It is also used to designate an amount that Congress allows an agency to spend (for example, NASA's FY 1986 appropriation was $7,546.7 million).

22

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Launch elements werefoundin theSpace FlightOperations program, the SpaceShuttle program,and the ELV program.The SpaceFlight Operations program included themajorcategories of space transportation systems operations capability development, space transportation system operations, andadvanced programs (among othersnot relevant here). Upper stages werefoundin twoareas: space transportation systems operations capability development included space transportation system upper stages, andspace transportation system operations included upperstage operations. TheSpace Shuttleprogram included design, development, test,and evaluation (DDT&E),whichencompassed budget itemsfor theorbiter, mainengine, external tank,solidrocketbooster (SRB),andlaunchand landing. TheDDT&Ecategory waseliminated afterFY 1982. Theproduction category alsowasincorporated into theSpace Shuttle program. Production included budget line itemsfor theorbiter,mainengine, and launch andlanding. The ELV programincludedbudgetitemsfor the Delta,Scout, Centaur, andAtlasE (FY 1982 wasthelastyearthattheAtlasFappeared in thebudget.) FY 1984 wasa transition year. Budget submissions (whichweresubmittedtoCongress asearlyasFY 1982) andauthorizations werestill part of theR&D appropriation. By thetimethecongressional appropriations committee acted,theSFC&DCappropriation wasin place.Twomajor categories, Shuttle production andoperational capability andspace transportation operations, werein SFC&DC.Shuttleproduction andoperational capabilitycontained budgetitemsfor the orbiter,launchand mission support, propulsion systems (includingthe mainengine,solid rocket booster, external tank,andsystems support), andchanges andsystemsupgrading. Space transportation operations included Shuttleoperations and ELVs.Shuttleoperations includedflight operations, flight hardware (encompassing theorbiter,solidrocketbooster, andexternal tank),andlaunchandlanding. ELVsincluded theDeltaandScout. (FY 1984 wasthelastyearthattherewasaseparate ELVbudget category until the FY 1988 budget.) R&D's SpaceTransportationCapability Development program retained upper stages, advanced programs, andthe Tethered Satellite System. Beginning in FY 1985, mostlaunch-related activitiesmoved to the SFC&DC appropriation. In 1987, NASAinitiated theExpendable Launch Vehicles/Mixed Fleetprogram to providelaunchservices for selected NASApayloads notrequiring theSpace Shuttle's capabilities.
Space Shuttle Funding Funds for the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) were split into a DDT&E line item and a production line item from 1979 through 1983. Funds for the external tank and SRB were all designated as DDT&E. Beginning with FY 1984, SSME, external tank, and SRB funds were

LAUNCH SYSTEMS

23

located in thecapability development/flight hardware category andin the Propulsion System program. Capability development included continuing capability development tasksfor theorbiter,mainengine, external tank, andSRBandthedevelopment of thefilamentwound case SRB. Congress defined propulsion systems assystems thatprovided "for theproduction of theSSME, theimplementation of thecapability tosupport operational requirements, andtheanomaly resolution fortheSSME,SRB,andexternaltank." Some Space Shuttle fundswerelocated in theflight hardware budget category. Flight hardware provided for the procurement of theexternal tank,themanufacturing andrefurbishment of SRBhardware andmotors, and space components for the mainengine;orbiterspares, including external tankdisconnects, sustaining engineering, andlogisticssupport for external tank,SRB,andmainengine flight hardware elements; and maintenance andoperation of flightcrewequipment. Tables 2-1 through 2-9 providedatafor thelaunch-related elements of the Space Shuttleandotherassociated items.Budgetdatafor additional Shuttlecomponents andthe majorShuttlebudget categories are foundin theChapter 3 budget tables.
Characteristics The following sections describe the launch vehicles and launch-related components used by NASA during the period 1979 through 1988. A chronology of each vehicle's use and its development is also presented, as well as the characteristics of each launch vehicle and launch-related component. In some cases, finding the "correct" figures for some characteristics was difficult. The specified height, weight, or thrust of a launch vehicle occasionally differed among NASA, contractor, and media sources. Measurements, therefore, are approximate. Height or length was measured in several different ways, and sources varied on where a stage began and ended for measuring purposes. The heights of individual stages were generally without any payload. However, the overall height of the assembled launch vehicle may include the payload. Source material did not always indicate whether the overall length included the payload, and sometimes one mission operations report published two figures for the height of a launch vehicle within the same report. Thrust was also expressed in more than one way. Source material referred to thrust "in a vacuum," "at sea level," "average," "nominal," and "maximum." Thrust levels vary during a launch and were sometimes presented as a range of values or as a percentage of "rated thrust." Frequently, there was no indication of which definition of thrust was being used. This chapter uses the following abbreviations for propellants: LH._ = liquid hydrogen, LOX = liquid oxygen, N_,H_, = hydrazine, N20_ = nitrogen tetroxide, RJ-1 = liquid hydrocarbon, and RP-I = kerosene.

24

NASA HISTORICAL

DATA BOOK

Expendable

Launch

Vehicles

From 1979 through 1988, NASA attempted seventy-four launches with a 94.6-percent success rate using the expendable Atlas E/F, AtlasCentaur, Delta, or all-solid-fueled Scout vehicle--all vehicles that had been used during NASA's second decade. During this time, the agency continued to built Deltas and maintained its capability to build Scouts and Atlases on demand. It did not emphasize ELV development but rather focused on Space Shuttle development and the start of STS operational status. However, the adoption of the mixed fleet strategy returned some attention to ELV development The following section summarizes ELV activities during the decade from 1979 through 1988. Figure 2-7 and Table 2-13 present the success rate of each launch vehicle.

% S u c c e $ 8 f u I 1979 lg80 1981 1982 lg83 Year 1984 lg85 1986 1_g67 1988

Figure 2-7. Expendable Launch Vehicle Success Rate

1979 NASA conducted nine launches during 1979, all successful. These used the Scout, the Atlas E/F, the Atlas-Centaur, and the Delta. Of the nine launches, three launched NASA scientific and application payloads, and six supported other U.S. government and nongovernment reimbursing customers? A Scout vehicle launched the NASA Stratospheric Aerosol and Gas Experiment (SAGE), a NASA magnetic satellite (Magsat), and a reimbursable United Kingdom scientific satellite (UK-6/Ariel). An AtlasCentaur launched a FltSatCom DOD communications satellite and a NASA scientific satellite (HEAO-3). Three launches used the Delta: one domestic communications satellite for Western Union, another for RCA, and an experimental satellite, called SCATHA, for DOD. A weather satellite was launched on an Atlas F by the Air Force for NASA and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).

_Aeronautics U.S. Government

and Space Report of the President, Printing Office (GPO), 1980), p. 39.

1979

(Washington,

DC:

LAUNCH SYSTEMS 1980

25

Seven ELV launches took place in 1980: three on Deltas, three on Atlas-Centaurs, and one on an Atlas E Of the seven, one was for NASA: the other six were reimbursable launches for other U.S. government, international, and domestic commercial customers that paid NASA for the launch and launch support costs. 7 A Delta launched the Solar Maximum Mission, the single NASA mission, with the goal of observing solar flares and other active Sun phenomena and measuring total radiative output of the Sun over a six-month period. A Delta also launched GOES 4 (Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite) for NOAA. The third Delta launch, for Satellite Business Systems (SBS), provided integrated, all-digital, interferencefree transmission of telephone, computer, electronic mail, and videoconferencing to clients. An Atlas-Centaur launched FltSatCom 3 and 4 for the Navy and DOD. An Atlas-Centaur also launched Intelsat V F-2. This was the first in a series of nine satellites launched by NASA for lntelsat and was the first three-axis stabilized Intelsat satellite. An Atlas F launched NOAA-B, the third in a series of Sun-synchronous operational environmental monitoring satellites launched by NASA for NOAA. A booster tailed to place this satellite in proper orbit, causing mission failure. 1981 During 1981, NASA launched missions on eleven ELVs: one on a Scout, five using Deltas (two with dual payloads), four on Atlas-Centaurs, and one using an Atlas E All but two were reimbursable launches for other agencies or commercial customers, and all were successful. _ A Scout vehicle launched the DOD navigation satellite, NOVA 1. In five launches, the Delta, NASA's most-used launch vehicle, deployed seven satellites. Two of these launches placed NASA's scientific Explorer satellites into orbit: Dynamics Explorer 1 and 2 on one Delta and the Solar Mesosphere Explorer (along with Uosat for the University of Surrey, England) on the other. The other three Delta launches had paying customers, including the GOES 5 weather satellite for NOAA and two communications satellites, one for SBS and one for RCA. An Atlas-Centaur, which was the largest ELV being used by NASA, launched four missions: Comstar D-4, a domestic communications satellite for Comsat; two Intelsat V communications satellites for Intelsat; and the last in the current series of FltSatCom communications satellites for DOD. An Atlas F launched the NOAA 7 weather satellite for NOAA. "Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, GPO, 1981). _Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, GPO, 1982). 1980 (Washington, 1981 (Washington, DC: DC:

26

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

In addition, ELVscontinued to providebackup support to STScustomers during theearly development andtransition phase of theSTS system.
1982 NASA launched nine missions on nine ELVs in 1982, using seven Deltas and two Atlas-Centaurs. Of the nine, eight were reimbursable launches for other agencies or commercial customers, and one was a NASA applications mission." The Delta supported six commercial and international communications missions for which NASA was fully reimbursed: RCA's Satcom 4 and 5, Western Union's Westar 4 and 5, India's Insat IA, and Canada's Telesat G (Anik D- 1). In addition, a Delta launched Landsat 4 for NASA. The Landsat and Telesat launches used improved, more powerful Deltas. An Aerojet engine and a tank with a larger diameter increased the Delta weight-carrying capability into geostationary-transfer orbit by 140 kilograms. An AtlasCentaur launched two communications satellites for the Intelsat. 1983 During 1983, NASA launched eleven satellites on eleven ELVs, using eight Deltas, one Atlas E, one Atlas-Centaur, and one Scout. A Delta launch vehicle carried the European Space Agency's EXOSAT x-ray observatory to a highly elliptical polar orbit. Other 1983 payloads launched into orbit on NASA ELVs were the NASA-Netherlands Infrared Astronomy Satellite (IRAS), NOAA 8 and GOES 6 for NOAA, Hilat for the Air Force, Intelsat VF-6 for Intelsat, Galaxy 1 and 2 for Hughes Communications, Telstar 3A for AT&T, and Satcom 1R and 2R for RCA; all except IRAS were reimbursable.'" The increased commercial use of NASA's launch fleet and launch services conformed to President Reagan's policy statement on May 16, 1983, in which he announced that the U.S. government would facilitate the commercial operation of the ELV program. 1984 During 1984, NASA's ELVs provided launch support to seven satellite missions using four Deltas, one Scout, one Atlas-Centaur, and one Atlas E. During this period, the Delta vehicle completed its forty-third consecutive successful launch with the launching of the NATO-IIID satellite in November 1984. In addition, a Delta successfully launched Landsat 5 for NOAA in March (Landsat program management had trans"Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, 1982 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1983).p. 19. _'_eronautics and Space Report_fthe President, 1983 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1984). p. 17.

LAUNCH

SYSTEMS

27

ferred to NOAA in 1983); AMPTE, a joint American, British, and German space physics mission involving three satellites, in August; and Galaxy-C in September. Other payloads launched during 1984 by NASA ELVs included a Navy navigation satellite by a Scout, an Intelsat communications satellite by an Atlas-Centaur, and a NOAA weather satellite by an\Atlas F vehicle. The launch of the Intelsat satellite experienced an anomaly in the launch vehicle that resulted in mission failure. All missions, except the NASA scientific satellite AMPTE, were reimbursable launches for other U.S. government, international, and domestic commercial missions that paid NASA for launch and launch support." In accordance with President Reagan's policy directive to encourage commercialization of the launch vehicle program, Delta, Atlas-Centaur, and Scout ELVs were under active consideration during this time by commercial operators for use by private industry. NASA and Transpace Carriers, Inc. (TCI), signed an interim agreement for exclusive rights to market the Delta vehicle, and negotiations took place with General Dynamics on the Atlas-Centaur. A Commerce Business Daily announcement, published August 8, 1984, solicited interest for the private use of the Scout launch vehicle. Ten companies expressed interest in assuming a total or partial takeover of this vehicle system. Also in August 1984, President Reagan approved a National Space Strategy strategy cial ELV tions. It intended to implement the 1983 National Space Policy. This called for the United States to encourage and facilitate commeroperations and minimize government regulation of these operaalso mandated that the U.S. national security sector pursue an

improved assured launch capability to satisfy the need for a launch system that complemented the STS as a hedge against "unforeseen technical and operational problems" and to use in case of crisis situations. To accomplish this, the national security sector should "pursue the use of a limited number of ELVs. '''-_ 1985 In 1985, NASA's ELVs continued to provide launch support during the transition of payloads to the Space Shuttle. Five launches took place using ELVs. Two of these were DOD satellites launched on Scouts--one from the Western Space and Missile Center and the other from the Wallops Flight Facility. Atlas-Centaurs launched the remaining three missions for Intelsat on a reimbursable basis. _

1'Aeronautics GPO,

and Space

Report

_[" the President,

1984 (Washington,

DC:

1985), p. 23 _'White House Fact Sheet, "National Space Strategy," August 15, 1984. t'Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, 1985 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1986).

28 1986

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

In 1986, NASA's ELVs launched five space application missions for NOAA and DOD. A Scout launched the Polar Beacon Experiments and Auroral Research satellite (Polar Bear) from Vandenberg Air Force Base; an Arias-Centaur launched a FltSatCom satellite in December; an Atlas E launched a NOAA satellite; and two Delta vehicles were used---one to launch a NOAA GOES satellite and the other to launch a DOD mission. One of the Delta vehicles failed during launch and was destroyed before boosting the GOES satellite into transfer orbit. An investigation concluded that the failure was caused by an electrical short in the vehicle wiring. Wiring modifications were incorporated into all remaining Delta vehicles. In September, the second Delta vehicle successfully launched a DOD mission." Partly as a result of the Challenger accident, NASA initiated studies in 1986 on the need to establish a Mixed Fleet Transportation System, consisting of the Space Shuttle and existing or new ELVs. This policy replaced the earlier stated intention to make the Shuttle NASA's sole launch vehicle. 1987 In 1987, NASA launched four spacecraft missions using ELVs. Three of these missions were successful: a Delta launch of GOES 7 for NOAA into geostationary orbit in February; a Delta launch of Palapa B-2, a communications satellite for the Indonesian government, in March; and a Scout launch of a Navy Transit satellite in September. In March, an AtlasCentaur launch attempt of FltSatCom 6, a Navy communications satellite, failed when lightning in the vicinity of the vehicle caused the engines to malfunction. The range safety officer destroyed the vehicle approximately fifty-one seconds after launch.'-' 1988 The ELV program had a perfect launch record in 1988 with six successful launches. In February, a Delta ELV lifted a classified DOD payload into orbit. This launch marked the final east coast Delta launch by a NASA launch team. A NASA-Air Force agreement, effective July 1, officially transferred custody of Delta Launch Complex 17 at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station to the Air Force. Over a twenty-eight-year period, NASA had launched 143 Deltas from the two Complex 17 pads. A similar transaction transferred accountability for Atlas/Centaur Launch Complex 36 to the Air Force) 6

'"Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, 1986 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1987). _-'Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, 1987 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1988). a6Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, 1988 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1989).

LAUNCH SYSTEMS

29

Also in 1988,a Scoutlaunched SanMarcosDL from the San Marcolaunchfacility in theIndianOcean, a NASA-Italianscientific mission,during March. Its goal was to explore the relationship between solaractivity andmeteorological phenomena by studyingthe dynamicprocesses that occurin the troposphere, stratosphere, and thermosphere. In April, another Scoutdeployed the SOOS-3, a Navy navigation satellite.In June,a third Scoutcarriedthe NOVA-II, the third in a seriesof improvedNavyTransitnavigation satellites, into space. Thefinal Scoutlaunch of theyeardeployed afourth SOOS mission in August. In September, an Atlas E launched NOAA H, a
National Weather Service meteorological into Sun-synchronous orbit. This satellite search-and-rescue instruments. satellite funded by NOAA, payload included on-board

In addition to arranging for the purchase of launch services from the commercial sector, NASA took steps to divest itself of an adjunct ELV capability and by making NASA-owned ELV property and services available to the private sector. During 1988, NASA finalized a barter agreement with General Dynamics that gave the company ownership of NASA's Atlas-Centaur flight and nonflight assets. In exchange, General Dynamics agreed to provide the agency with two Atlas-Centaur launches at no charge. An agreement was signed for the first launch service--supporting the FltSatCom F-8 Navy mission. NASA and General Dynamics also completed a letter contract for a second launch service to support the NASA-DOD Combined Release and Radiation Effects Satellite (CRRES) mission. In addition, NASA transferred its Delta vehicle program to the U.S. Air Force. Finally, enabling agreements were completed to allow ELV companies to negotiate directly with the appropriate NASA installation. During 1988, NASA Headquarters signed enabling agreements with McDonnell Douglas, Martin Marietta, and LTV Corporation. The Kennedy Space Center and General Dynamics signed a subagreement in March to allow Genera/ Dynamics to take over maintenance and operations for Launch Complex 36. EL V Characteristics The Atlas Family The basic Atlas launch vehicle was a one-and-a-half stage stainless steel design built by the Space Systems Division of General Dynamics. It was designed as an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and was considered an Air Force vehicle. However, the Atlas launch vehicle was also used successfully in civilian space missions dating from NASA's early days. The Atlas launched all three of the unmanned lunar exploration programs (Ranger, Lunar Orbiter, and Surveyor). Atlas vehicles also launched the Mariner probes to Mars, Venus, and Mercury and the Pioneer probes to Jupiter, Saturn, and Venus.

3O

NASA

HISTORICAL

DATA BOOK

NASA used two families of Atlas vehicles during the 1979-1988 period: the Atlas E/F series and the Atlas-Centaur series. The Atlas E/F launched seven satellites during this time, six of them successful (Table 2-14). The Atlas E/F space booster was a refurbished ICBM. It burned kerosene (RP-I) and liquid oxygen in its three main engines, two Rocketdyne MA-3 booster engines, and one sustainer engine. The Atlas E/F also used two small vernier engines located at the base of the RP-I tank for added stability during flight (Table 2-15). The Atlas E/F was designed to deliver payloads directly into low-Earth orbit without the use of an upper D stage. The Atlas-Centaur (Figure 2-8) was the nation's first high-energy launch vehicle propelled by liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen. Developed and launched under the direction of the Lewis Research Center, it became operational in 1966 with the launch of Surveyor l, the first U.S. spacecraft to softland on the Moon's surface. Beginning in 1979, the Centaur stage was used only in combination with the Atlas booster, but it had been successfully used earlier in combination with the Titan III booster to launch payloads into interplanetary trajectories, sending two Helios spacecraft toward the Sun and two Viking spacecraft toward Mars? 7 From 1979 through 1988, the Atlas-Centaur launched 18 satellites with only two failures (Table 2-16). The Centaur stage for the Atlas booster was upgraded in 1973 and incorporated an integrated electronic system controlled by a digital computer. This flight-proven "astrionics" system checked itself and all other systems prior to and during the launch phase; '

m e,,,_, sta_ -...._

,_._m

At_ s_g,-""

[] II ---

Figure 2-8. Atlas-Centaur &_u_wh Vehicle

during flight, it controlled all events after the liftoff. This system was located on the equipment module on the forward end of the Centaur stage. The 16,000-word capacity computer replaced the original 4,800-word capacity computer and enabled it to take over many of the functions previously handled by separate mechanical and electrical systems. The new Centaur system handled navigation, guidance tasks, control pressurization, propellant management, telemetry formats and transmission, and initiation of vehicle events (Table 2-17).

'TFor details, IH." Programs 1988).

see Linda Neuman and Projects,

Ezell, NASA Historical (Washington,

Data Book, Volume NASA SP-4012,

1969-1978

DC:

LAUNCH SYSTEMS
The Delta Family

31

NASA has used the Delta launch vehicle since the agency's inception. In 1959, NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center awarded a contract to Douglas Aircraft Company (later McDonnell Douglas) to produce and integrate twelve launch vehicles. The Delta, using components from the Air Force's Thor intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) program and the Navy's Vanguard launch program, was available eighteen months later. The Delta has evolved since that time to meet the increasing demands of its payloads and has been the most widely used launch vehicle in the U.S. space program, with thirty-five launches from 1979 through 1988 and thirty-fbur of them successful (Table 2-18). The Delta configurations of the late 1970s and early 1980s were designated the 3900 series. Figure 2-9 illustrates the 3914, and Figure 2-10 shows the 3920 with the Payload Assist Module (PAM) upper stage. The 3900 series resembled the earlier 2900 series (Table 2-19), except for the replacement of the Castor II solid strap-on motors with nine larger and more powerful Castor IV solid motors (Tables 2-20 and 2-21). The RS-27 engine, manufactured by the Rocketdyne Division of Rockwell International, powered the first stage of the Delta. It was a singlestart power plant, gimba[-mounted and operated on a combination of liquid oxygen and kerosene (RP-1). The thrust chamber was regeneratively

I---

244 cm OCa. F_dng

2.44 m dla. Fairing-,,PAM-D Second-,,Stage 35,5 m

Stm

First --Stage
35,38 m Ovm_l L_gth

I'--I

I"

Castor IV Solids Main Englne _

Figure 2-9. Delta 3914

Figure 2-10. Delta 3920/PAM-D

32

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK through 292 tubes that comprised the

cooled, with the fuel circulating inner wall of the chamber. The following vehicle: four-digit

code designated

the type of Delta launch

1st digit designated the type of strap-on engines: 2 = Castor |I, extended long tank Thor with RS-27 main engine 3 --- Castor IV, extended long tank Thor with RS-27 main engine 2rid digit designated the number of strap-on engines 3rd digit designated the type of second stage and manufacturer: 1 = ninety-six-inch manufactured by TRW (TR-201) 2 = ninety-six-inch stretched tank manufactured by Aerojet (AJ10-118K) 4th digit designated the type of third stage: 0 = no third stage 3 = TE-364-3 4 --- TE-364-4

For example, a model designation of 3914 indicated the use of Castor IV strap-on engines, extended long tank with an RS-27 main engine; nine strap-ons; a ninety-six-inch second stage manufactured by TRW; and a TE-3644 third stage engine. A PAM designation appended to the last digit indicated the use of a McDonnell-Douglas PAM. Scout Launch Vehicle

Fourth Stago snd Spacecr,,ft l I |l Third Stage i r_ _Spacecrllft Altair _ IliA IIA

Antares

Cmstor UA Second Stage

The standard Scout launch vehicle (Scout is an acronym for Solid Controlled Orbital Utility Test) was a solid propellant fourstage booster system. It was the world's first all-solid propellant launch vehicle and was one of NASA's most reliable launch vehicles. The Scout was the smallest of the basic launch vehicles used by NASA and was used for orbit, probe, and reentry Earth missions (Figure 2-11 ).

)(

_Algol First Stage

IliA

Figure

2-1l.

Seout-D (Used in

Launch 1979)

Vehicle

LAUNCH SYSTEMS

33

The first Scout launch took place in 1960. Since that time, forty-six NASA Scout launches have taken place, including fourteen between 1979 and 1988, when every launch was successful (Table 2-22). In addition to NASA payloads, Scout clients included DOD, the European Space Research Organization, and several European governments. The Scout was used for both orbital and suborbital missions and has participated in research in navigation, astronomy, communications, meteorology, geodesy, meteoroids, reentry materials+ biology, and Earth and atmospheric sensing. It was the only U.S. ELV launched from three launch sites: Wallops on the Atlantic Ocean, Vandenberg on the Pacific Ocean, and the San Marco platform in the Indian Ocean. It could also inject satellites into a wider range of orbital inclinations than any other launch vehicle. Unlike NASA's larger ELVs, the Scout was assembled and the payload integrated and checked out in the horizontal position. The vehicle was raised to the vertical orientation prior to launch. The propulsion motors were arranged in tandem with transition sections between the stages to tie the structure together and to provide space for instrumentation. A standard fifth stage was available for highly elliptical and solar orbit missions. Scout's first-stage motor was based on an earlier version of the Navy's Polaris missile motor; the second-stage motor was developed from the Army's Sergeant surface-to-surface missile; and the third- and fourth-stage motors were adapted by NASA's Langley Research Center from the Navy's Vanguard missile. The fourth-stage motor used on the G model could carry almost four times as much payload to low-Earth orbit as the original model in 1960--that is, 225 kilograms versus fiftynine kilograms (Table 2-23). Vought Corporation, a subsidiary of LTV Corporation, was the prime contractor for the Scout launch vehicle. The Langley Research Center managed the Scout program. Space Shuttle The reusable, multipurpose Space Shuttle was designed to replace the ELVs that NASA used to deliver commercial, scientific, and applications spacecraft into Earth's orbit. Because of its unique design, the Space Shuttle served as a launch vehicle, a platform for scientific laboratories, an orbiting service center for other satellites, and a return carrier for previously orbited spacecraft. Beginning with its inaugural flight in 1981 and through 1988, NASA flew twenty-seven Shuttle missions (Table 2-24). This section focuses on the Shuttle's use as a launch vehicle. Chapter 3 discusses its use as a platform for scientific laboratories and servicing functions. The Space Shuttle system consisted of four primary elements: an orbiter spacecraft, two solid rocket boosters (SRBs), an external tank to house fuel and an oxidizer, and three main engines. Rockwell International built the orbiter and the main engines; Thiokol Corporation

34

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

produced the SRBmotors;andthe external tank wasbuilt by Martin MariettaCorporation. TheJohnson Space Center directed theorbiterand integration contracts, while theMarshallSpace FlightCentermanaged theSRB,external tank,andmainengine contracts. TheShuttle couldtransport upto29,500 kilograms of cargo intonearEarth orbit(185.2 to 1,111.2 kilometers). Thispayload wascarried ina bay about fouranda halfmeters in diameter andeighteen meters long.Major system requirements werethattheorbiterandthetwo SRBs bereusable andthattheorbiterhave amaximum 160-hour turnaround timeafterlandingfromtheprevious mission. Theorbitervehicle carried personnel and payloads toorbit,provided a space base forperforming theirassigned tasks, andreturned personnel andpayloads toEarth. Theorbiter provided a habitableenvironment for thecrewandpassengers, including scientists and engineers. Additional orbitercharacteristics areaddressed in Chapter 3. TheShuttle waslaunched in anuprightposition, with thrustprovidedbythethree mainengines andthetwoSRBs. Afterabout twominutes, atanaltitude of aboutforty-fourkilometers, thetwoboosters werespent andwereseparated fromtheorbiter. Theyfell intotheocean atpredetermined pointsandwererecovered for reuse. Themainengines continued firingforabout eightminutes, cuttingoff atabout109kilometers altitude just beforethespacecraft wasinserted intoorbit.Theexternal tankwasseparated, andit followed aballistictrajectorybackintoa remote area of theocean butwasnotrecovered. Twosmaller liquidrocketengines madeuptheorbitalmaneuvering system(OMS). The OMS injectedthe orbiter into orbit, performed maneuvers whilein orbit,andslowed thevehiclefor reentry. Afterreentry,theunpowered orbiterglidedtoEarthandlanded ona runway. The Shuttleusedtwo launchsites:the Kennedy Space Centerin FloridaandVandenberg Air ForceBasein California.Underoptimum conditions, the orbiterlandedat the site fromwhich it waslaunched. However, asshown in thetables in Chapter 3 thatdescribe theindividual Shuttle missions, weather conditions frequently forced theShuttle to land at Edwards Air ForceBasein California,eventhoughit hadbeen launched fromKennedy.
Main Propulsion System

The main propulsion system (MPS) consisted of three Space Shuttle main engines (SSMEs), three SSME controllers, the external tank, the orbiter MPS propellant management subsystem and helium subsystem, four ascent thrust vector control units, and six SSME hydraulic servo-actuators. The MPS, assisted by the two SRBs during the initial phases of the ascent trajectory, provided the velocity increment from liftoff to a predetermined velocity increment before orbit insertion. The Shuttle jettisoned the two SRBs after their fuel had been expended, but the MPS continued to thrust until the predetermined velocity was achieved. At that time, main engine cutoff (MECO) was initiated, the external tank was jettisoned, and

LAUNCH SYSTEMS

35

theOMSwasignitedto providethefinal velocityincrement for orbital insertion. Themagnitude of thevelocityincrement supplied by theOMS depended onpayload weight, mission trajectory, andsystem limitations. Alongwiththestart of the OMS thrusting maneuver (which settled the
MPS propellants), the remaining liquid oxygen propellant in the orbiter feed system and SSMEs was dumped through the nozzles of the engines. At the same time, the remaining liquid hydrogen propellant in the orbiter feed system and SSMEs was dumped overboard through the hydrogen fill and drain valves for six seconds. Then the hydrogen inboard fill and drain valve closed, and the hydrogen recirculation valve opened, continuing the dump. The hydrogen flowed through the engine hydrogen bleed valves to the orbiter hydrogen MPS line between the inboard and outboard hydrogen fill and drain valves, and the remaining hydrogen was dumped through the outboard fill and drain valve for approximately 120 seconds. During on-orbit operations, the flight crew vacuum made the MPS inert by opening the liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen fill and drain valves, which allowed the remaining propellants to be vented to space. Before entry into the Earth's atmosphere, the flight crew repressurized the MPS propellant lines with helium to prevent contaminants from being drawn into the lines during entry and to maintain internal positive pressure. MPS helium also purged the spacecraft's aft fuselage. The last activity involving the MPS occurred at the end of the landing rollout. At that time, the helium remaining in on-board helium storage tanks was released into the MPS to provide an inert atmosphere for safety. Main Engine The SSME represented a major advance in propulsion technology. Each engine had an operating life of seven and a half hours and fifty-five starts and the ability to throttle a thrust level that extended over a wide range (65 percent to 109 percent of rated power level). The SSME was the first large, liquid-fuel rocket engine designed to be reusable. A cluster of three SSMEs housed in the orbiter's aft fuselage provided the main propulsion for the orbiter. Ignited on the ground prior to launch, the cluster of liquid hydrogen-liquid oxygen engines operated in parallel with the SRBs during the initial ascent. After the boosters separated, the main engines continued to operate. The nominal operating time was approximately eight and a half minutes. The SSMEs developed thrust by using high-energy propellants in a staged combustion cycle. The propellants were partially combusted in dual preburners to produce highpressure hot gas to drive the turbopumps. Combustion was completed in the main combustion chamber. The cycle ensured maximum performance because it eliminated parasitic losses. The various thrust levels provided for high thrust during liftoff and the initial ascent phase but allowed thrust to be reduced to limit acceleration to three g's during the final ascent phase. The engines were gimbaled to provide pitch, yaw, and roll control during the orbiter boost phase.

36

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Keycomponents of each engine included fourturbopumps (twolowandtwohigh-pressure), twopreburners, themaininjector, themaincombustion chamber, thenozzle, andthehot-gas manifold. Themanifold was thestructural backbone oftheengine. It supported thetwopreburners, the high-pressure pumps, themaininjector, thepneumatic controlassembly, andthemaincombustion chamber with thenozzle. Table2-25 summarizesSSMEcharacteristics. TheSSMEwasthefirstrocket engine to useabuilt-inelectronic digital controller. Thecontrolleraccepted commands fromthe orbiterfor engine start, shutdown, andchange in throttlesetting andalsomonitored engineoperation. In the eventof a failure,thecontrollerautomatically corrected theproblem or shutdowntheengine safely.
Main Engine Margin Improvement Program. Improvements to the SSMEs for increased margin and durability began with a formal Phase II program in 1983. Phase II focused on turbomachinery to extend the time between high-pressure fuel turbopump (HPFT) overhauls by reducing the operating temperature in the HPFT and by incorporating margin improvements to the HPFT rotor dynamics (whirl), turbine blade, and HPFT bearings. Phase II certification was completed in 1985, and all the changes were incorporated into the SSMEs for the STS-26 mission. In addition to the Phase II improvements, NASA made additional changes to the SSME to further extend the engine's margin and durability. The main changes were to the high-pressure turbomachinery, main combustion chamber, hydraulic actuators, and high-pressure turbine discharge temperature sensors. Changes were also made in the controller software to improve engine control. Minor high-pressure turbomachinery design changes resulted in margin improvements to the turbine blades, thereby extending the operating life of the turbopumps. These changes included applying surface texture to important parts of the fuel turbine blades to improve the material properties in the pressure of hydrogen and incorporating a damper into the high-pressure oxidizer turbine blades to reduce vibration. Plating a welded outlet manifold with nickel increased the main combustion chamber's life. Margin improvements were also made to five hydraulic actuators to preclude a loss in redundancy on the launch pad. Improvements in quality were incorporated into the servo-component coil design, along with modifications to increase margin. To address a temperature sensor in-flight anomaly, the sensor was redesigned and extensively tested without problems. To certify the improvements to the SSMEs and demonstrate their reliability through margin (or limit) testing, NASA initiated a ground test program in December 1986, Its primary purposes were to certify the improvements and demonstrate the engine's reliability and operating margin. From December 1986 to December 1987, 151 tests and 52,363 seconds of operation (equivalent to 100 Shuttle missions) were performed. These hot-fire ground tests were performed at the single-engine test stands at the Stennis Space Center in Mississippi and at the Rockwell International Rocketdyne Division's Santa Susana Field Laboratory in California.

LAUNCH SYSTEMS

37

NASA alsoconducted checkout and acceptance tests of the three main engines for the STS-26 mission. Those tests, also at Stennis, began in August 1987, and all three STS-26 engines were delivered to the Kennedy Space Center by January 1988. Along with hardware improvements, NASA conducted several major reviews of requirements and procedures. These reviews addressed such topics as possible failure modes and effects, as well as the associated critical items list. Another review involved having a launch/abort reassessment team examine all launch-commit criteria, engine redlines, and software logic. NASA also performed a design certification review. Table 2-26 lists these improvements, as well as events that occurred earlier in the development of the SSME. A related effort involved Marshall Space Flight Center engineers who, working with their counterparts at Kennedy, accomplished a comprehensive launch operations and maintenance review. This ensured that engine processing activities at the launch site were consistent with the latest operational requirements.
External Tank

The external tank contained the propellants (liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen) for the SSMEs and supplied them under pressure to the three main engines in the orbiter during liftoff and ascent. Just prior to orbital insertion, the main engines cut off, and the external tank separated from the orbiter, descended through a ballistic trajectory over a predesignated area, broke up, and impacted in a remote ocean area. The tank was not recovered. The largest and heaviest (when loaded) element of the Space Shuttle, the external tank had three major components: a forward liquid oxygen tank; an unpressurized intertank, which contained most of the electrical components; and an aft liquid hydrogen tank. Beginning with the STS-6 mission, NASA used a lightweight external tank (LWT). For each kilogram of weight reduced from the original external tank, the cargocarrying capability of the Space Shuttle spacecraft increased one kilogram. The weight reduction was accomplished by eliminating portions of stringers (structural stiffeners running the length of the hydrogen tank), using fewer stiffener rings, and by modifying major frames in the hydrogen tank. Also, significant portions of the tank were milled differently to reduce thickness, and the weight of the external tank's aft SRB attachments was reduced by using a stronger, yet lighter and less expensive, titanium alloy. Earlier, the use of the LWT reduced the total weight by deleting the antigeyser line. The line paralleled the oxygen feed line and provided a circulation path for liquid oxygen to reduce the accumulation of gaseous oxygen in the feed line while the oxygen tank was being filled before launch. After NASA assessed propellant loading data from ground tests and the first four Space Shuttle missions, engineers removed the antigeyser line for STS-5 and subsequent missions. The total length and

38

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

prop_nt F_d, Prelumriza6on L Lines and Electrical Umblnoals

Orbiter

Aft

Orbiter Forwsrd _._

Intl_ank Urn_tlo_

r-O Plme

I_

vant v-'v* and Fairing

/_*_lk .

/_,,a,,_ . . j_-/"-/

LklukS Hydrogen T_k

_Tank

Figure 2-12. External Tank diameter of the external tank remained unchanged (Figure 2-12). Table 2-27 summarizes the external tank characteristics, and Table 2-28 presents a chronology of external development. As well as containing and delivering the propellant, the external tank served as the structural backbone of the Space Shuttle during launch operations. The external tank consisted of two primary tanks: a large hydrogen tank and a smaller oxygen tank, joined by an intertank to form one large propellant-storage container. Superlight ablator (SLA-561) and foam insulation sprayed on the forward part of the oxygen tank, the intertank, and the sides of the hydrogen tank protected the outer surfaces. The insulation reduced ice or frost formation during launch preparation, protecting the orbiter from free-falling ice during flight. This insulation also minimized heat leaks into the tank, avoided excessive boiling of the liquid propellants, and prevented liquification and solidification of the air next to the tank. The external tank attached to the orbiter at one forward attachment point and two aft points. In the aft attachment area, umbilicals carried fluids, gases, electrical signals, and electrical power between the tank and the orbiter. Electrical signals and controls between the orbiter and the two SRBs also were routed through those umbilicals. Liquid Oxygen Tank. The liquid oxygen tank was an aluminum monocoque structure composed of a fusion-welded assembly of preformed, chem-milled gores, panels, machined fittings, and ring chords. It operated in a pressure range of 1,035 to 1,138 mmHg. The tank contained antislosh and antivortex provisions to minimize liquid residuals and damp fluid motion. The tank fed into a 0.43-meter-diameter feedline that sent the liquid oxygen through the intertank, then outside the external tank to the aft righthand external tank/orbiter disconnect umbilical. The feedline permitted liquid oxygen to flow at approximately 1,268 kilograms per

LAUNCH SYSTEMS

39

second, with theSSMEs operating at 104percent of ratedthrust,or permitteda maximum flow of 71,979 litersperminute. Theliquid oxygen tank'sdouble-wedge nose conereduced dragandheating, contained the vehicle's ascent air datasystem, andserved asa lightning rod.
Intertank. The intertank was not a tank in itself but provided a mechanical connection between the liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen tanks. The primary functions of the intertank were to provide structural continuity to the propellant tanks, to serve as a protective compartment to house instruments, and to receive and distribute thrust loads from the SRBs. The intertank was a steel/aluminum semimonocoque cylindrical structure with flanges on each end for joining the liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen tanks. It housed external tank instrumentation components and provided an umbilical plate that interfaced with the ground facility arm for purging the gas supply, hazardous gas detection, and hydrogen gas boiloff during ground operations. It consisted of mechanically joined skin, stringers, and machined panels of aluminum alloy. The intertank was vented during flight. It contained the forward SRB-externai tank attach thrust beam and fittings that distributed the SRB loads to the liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen tanks. Liquid Hydrogen Tank. The liquid hydrogen tank was an aluminum semimonocoque structure of fusion-welded barrel sections, five major ring frames, and forward and aft ellipsoidal domes. Its operating pressure was 1,759 mmHg. The tank contained an antivortex baffle and siphon outlet to transmit the liquid hydrogen from the tank through a 0.43-meter line to the left aft umbilical. The liquid hydrogen feedline flow rate was 211.4 kilograms per second, with the SSMEs at 104 percent of rated thrust, or a maximum flow of 184,420 liters per minute. At the forward end of the liquid hydrogen tank was the external tank/orbiter forward attachment pod strut, and at its aft end were the two external tank/orbiter aft attachment bah fittings as well as the aft SRB-external tank stabilizing strut attachments. External Tank Thermal Protection System. The external tank thermal protection system consisted of sprayed-on foam insulation and premolded ablator materials. The system also included the use of phenolic thermal insulators to preclude air liquefaction. Thermal isolators were required for liquid hydrogen tank attachments to preclude the liquefaction of air-exposed metallic attachments and to reduce heat flow into the liquid hydrogen. The thermal protection system weighed 2,192 kilograms. External Tank Hardware. The external hardware, external tank/orbiter attachment fittings, umbilical fittings, and electrical and range safety system weighed 4,136.4 kilograms. Each propellant tank had a vent and relief valve at its forward end. This dual-function valve could be opened by ground support equipment for the vent function during prelaunch and could open during flight when the ullage (empty space) pressure of the liquid hydrogen tank reached 1,966 mmHg or the ullage pressure of the liquid oxygen tank reached 1,293 mmHg.

40

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Theliquidoxygen tankcontained a separate, pyrotechnically operated,propulsive tumble ventvalveatitsforward end.At separation, the liquid oxygen tumble vent valve was opened, providing impulse to assist in the separation maneuver and more positive control of the entry aerodynamics of the external tank. There were eight propellant-depletion sensors, four each for fuel and oxidizer. The fuel-depletion sensors were located in the bottom of the fuel tank. The oxidizer sensors were mounted in the orbiter liquid oxygen feedline manifold downstream of the feedline disconnect. During SSME thrusting, the orbiter general purpose computers constantly computed the instantaneous mass of the vehicle because of the usage of the propellants. Normally, MECO was based on a predetermined velocity; however, if any two of the fuel or oxidizer sensors sensed a dry condition, the engines would be shut down. The locations of the liquid oxygen sensors allowed the maximum amount of oxidizer to be consumed in the engines, while allowing sufficient time to shut down the engines before the oxidizer pumps ran dry. In addition, 500 kilograms of liquid hydrogen were loaded over and above that required by the six-to-one oxidizer/fuel engine mixture ratio. This assured that MECO from the depletion sensors was fuel rich; oxidizerrich engine shutdowns could cause burning and severe erosion of engine components. Four pressure transducers located at the top of the liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen tanks monitored the ullage pressures. Each of the two aft external tank umbilical plates mated with a corresponding plate on the orbiter. The plates helped maintain alignment among the umbilicals. Physical strength at the umbilical plates was provided by bolting corresponding umbilical plates together. When the orbiter general purpose computers commanded external tank separation, the bolts were severed by pyrotechnic devices. The external tank had five propellant umbilical valves that interfaced with orbiter umbilicals--two for the liquid oxygen tank and three for the liquid hydrogen tank. One of the liquid oxygen tank umbilical valves was for liquid oxygen, the other for gaseous oxygen. The liquid hydrogen tank umbilical had two valves for liquid and one for gas. The intermediatediameter liquid hydrogen umbilical was a recirculation umbilical used only during the liquid hydrogen chill-down sequence during prelaunch. The external tank also had two electrical umbilicals that carried electrical power from the orbiter to the tank and the two SRBs and provided information from the SRBs and external tank to the orbiter. A swing-armmounted cap to the fixed service structure covered the oxygen tank vent on top of the external tank during countdown and was retracted about two minutes before liftoff. The cap siphoned off oxygen vapor that threatened to form large ice on the external tank, thus protecting the orbiter's thermal protection system during launch. External Tank Range Safety System. A range safety system, monitored by the flight crew, provided for dispersing tank propellants if nec-

LAUNCH SYSTEMS

41

essary. It included a battery powersource, a receiver/decoder, antennas, andordnance.

Post-Challenger Modification. Prior to the launch of STS-26, NASA modified the external tank by strengthening the hydrogen pressurization line. In addition, freezer wrap was added to the hydrogen line. This permitted the visual detection of a hydrogen fire (Table 2-28). Solid Rocket Boosters The two SRBs provided the main thrust to lift the Space Shuttle off the pad and up to an altitude of about forty-four and a half kilometers. In addition, the two SRBs carried the entire weight of the external tank and orbiter and transmitted the weight load through their structure to the mobile launcher platform. The SRBs were ignited after the three SSMEs" thrust level was verified. The two SRBs provided 71.4 percent of the thrust at liftoff and during first-stage ascent. Seventy-five seconds after SRB separation, SRB apogee occurred at an altitude of approximately sixty-five kilometers. SRB impact occurred in the ocean approximately 226 kilometers downrange, to be recovered and returned for refurbishment and reuse. The primary elements of each booster were the motor (including case, propellant, igniter, and nozzle), structure, separation systems, operational flight instrumentation, recovery avionics, pyrotechnics, deceleration system, thrust vector control system, and range safety destruct system (Figure 2-13). Each booster attached to the external tank at the SRB's aft frame with two lateral sway braces and a diagonal attachment. The forward end of each SRB joined the external tank at the forward end
Nozzle Vector 4 Seper_on_/'_ and Thursl Conb'ol System

//

\_/_

SRB-External

Tank

Attachment

Rtng,

Aft Avion|ca

and

Swl_" Braces

Drogue

I/._'_T'_N\_

-_/"

SRB-Exter

r ta iTImk

X,,'_,_

)}j_'" Fo_ard Frustum Skirt

-""-- Rmm GyroAuambllesll), Flighl Avionics Instrurmmt_on, mid Rlnge B ec_'e_ Safety System

Nolm Fidrlng

Figure

2-13.

Solid

Rocket

Booster

42

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

of the SRB's forward skirt. On the launch pad, each booster also connected to the mobile launcher platform at the aft skirt with four bolts and nuts that were severed by small explosives at liftoff. The SRBs were used as matched pairs. Each consisted of four solid rocket motor (SRM) segments. The pairs were matched by loading each of the four motor segments in pairs from the same batches of propellant ingredients to minimize any thrust imbalance. The exhaust nozzle in the aft segment of each motor, in conjunction with the orbiter engines, steered the Space Shuttle during the powered phase of launch. The segmented-casing design assured maximum flexibility in fabrication and ease of transportation and handling. Each segment was shipped to the launch site on a heavy-duty rail car with a specially built cover. The propellant mixture in each SRB motor consisted of an ammonium perchlorate (oxidizer, 69.6 percent by weight), aluminum (fuel, 16 percent), iron oxide (a catalyst, 0.4 percent), a polymer (a binder that held the mixture together, 12.04 percent), and an epoxy curing agent (1.96 percent). The propellant was an eleven-point star-shaped perforation in the forward motor segment and a double-truncated-cone perforation in each of the aft segments and aft closure. This configuration provided high thrust at ignition and then reduced the thrust by approximately one-third fifty seconds after liftoff to prevent overstressing the vehicle during maximum dynamic pressure. The cone-shaped aft skirt supported the four aft separation motors. The aft section contained avionics, a thrust vector control system that consisted of two auxiliary power units and hydraulic pumps, hydraulic systems, and a nozzle extension jettison system. The forward section of each booster contained avionics, a sequencer, forward separation motors, a nose cone separation system, drogue and main parachutes, a recovery beacon, a recovery light, a parachute camera on selected flights, and a range safety system. Each SRB incorporated a range safety system that included a battery power source, a receiver-decoder, antennas, and ordnance. Each SRB had two integrated electronic assemblies, one forward and one aft. After burnout, the forward assembly initiated the release of the nose cap and frustum and turned on the recovery aids. The aft assembly, mounted in the external tank-SRB attach ring, connected with the forward assembly and the orbiter avionics systems for SRB ignition commands and nozzle thrust vector control. Each integrated electronic assembly had a multiplexer-demultiplexer, which sent or received more than one message, signal, or unit of information on a single communications channel. Eight booster separation motors (four in the nose frustum and four in the aft skirt) of each SRB thrust for 1.02 seconds at SRB separation from the external tank. SRB separation from the external tank was electrically initiated. Each solid rocket separation motor was 0.8 meter long and 32.5 centimeters in diameter (Table 2-29). Location aids were provided for each SRB, frustum-drogue chutes, and main parachutes. These included a transmitter, antenna, strobe/converter, battery, and saltwater switch electronics. The recovery crew

LAUNCH SYSTEMS

43

retrieved the SRBs,frustum/drogue chutes, andmainparachutes. The nozzles wereplugged, thesolidrocketmotors weredewatered, andthe crewtowedtheSRBs backto the launch site. Each booster was removed
from the water, and its components disassembled and washed with fresh and de-ionized water to limit saltwater corrosion. The motor segments, igniter, and nozzle were shipped back to Thiokol for refurbishment. The SRB nose caps and nozzle extensions were not recovered. Testing and production of the SRB were well under way in 1979. The booster performed well until the Challenger accident revealed flaws that had very likely existed for several missions but had resulted in little remedial action. The 1986 Challenger accident forced major modifications to the SRB and SRM. Post-Challenger Modifications. On June 13, 1986, President Reagan directed NASA to implement, as soon as possible, the recommendations of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident. During the downtime following the Challenger accident, NASA analyzed critical structural elements of the SRB, primarily focused in areas where anomalies had been noted during postflight inspection of recovered hardware. Anomalies had been noted in the attach ring where the SRBs joined the external tank. Some of the fasteners showed distress where the ring attached to the SRB motor case. Tests attributed this to the high loads encountered during water impact. To correct the situation and ensure higher strength margins during ascent, the attach ring was redesigned to encircle the motor case completely (360 degrees). Previously, the attach ring formed a '+C" and encircled the motor case 270 degrees. In addition, NASA performed special structural tests on the aft skirt. During this test program, an anomaly occurred in a critical weld between the hold-down post and skin of the skirt. A redesign added reinforcement brackets and fittings in the aft ring of the skirt. These modifications added approximately 200 kilograms to the weight of each SRB. Solid Rocket Motor Redesign. The Presidential Commission determined that the cause of the loss of the Challenger was "a failure in the joint between the two lower segments of the right solid rocket motor. The specific failure was the destruction of the seals that are intended to prevent hot gases from leaking through the joint during the propellant burn of the rocket motor. '''_ Consequently, NASA developed a plan for a redesigned solid rocket motor (RSRM). Safety in flight was the primary objective of the SRM redesign. Minimizing schedule impact by using existing hardware, to the extent practical, without compromising safety was another objective.

'_Reportat a Glance, report to the President by the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Chapter IV, +'The Cause of the Accident," Finding (no pg. number).

44

NASA HISTORICAL

DATA BOOK

NASA established a joint redesign team with participants from the Marshall Space Flight Center, other NASA centers, Morton Thiokol, and outside NASA. The team developed an "SRM Redesign Project Plan" to formalize the methodology for SRM redesign and requalification. The plan provided an overview of the organizational responsibilities and relationships; the design objectives, criteria, and process; the verification approach and process; and a master schedule. Figure 2-14 shows the SRM Project Schedule as of August 1986. The companion "Development and Verification Plan" defined the test program and analyses required to verify the redesign and unchanged components of the SRM. The SRM was carefully and extensively redesigned. The RSRM received intense scrutiny and was subjected to a thorough certification process to verify that it worked properly and to qualify the motor for human spaceflight. NASA assessed all aspects of the existing SRM and required design changes in the field joint, case-to-nozzle joint, nozzle, factory joint, propellant grain shape, ignition system, and ground support equipment. The propellant, liner, and castable inhibitor formulations did not require changes. Design criteria were established for each component to ensure a safe design with an adequate margin of safety. These criteria focused on loads, environments, performance, redundancy, margins of safety, and verification philosophy. The team converted the criteria into specific design requirements during the Preliminary Requirements Reviews held in July and August 1986. NASA assessed the design developed from these requirements at the Preliminary Design Review held in September 1986 and baselined in October 1986. NASA approved the final design at the Critical Design
i 1986 Event A I ' 1987

1988 F'MAM

J IA!s OINID IJl_ MIAIMI J

I I

s,o N O

iJ

Major Design

Project Activities

MIte_ton_

I I II/I co.

F.c
! !

Concept

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LAUNCH SYSTEMS

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Review held in October 1987. Manufacture of the RSRM test hardware and the first flight hardware began prior to the Preliminary Design Review and continued in parallel with the hardware certification program. The Design Certification Review considered the analyses and test results versus the program and design requirements to certify that the RSRM was ready to fly. Specific Modifications. The SRM field-joint metal parts, internal case insulation, and seals were redesigned, and a weather protection system was added. The major change in the motor case was the new tang capture feature to provide a positive metal-to-metal interference fit around the circumference of the tang and clevis ends of the mating segments. The interference fit limited the deflection between the tang and clevis O-ring sealing surfaces caused by motor pressure and structural loads. The joints were designed so that the seals would not leak under twice the expected structural deflection and rate. The new design, with the tang capture feature, the interference fit, and the use of custom shims between the outer surface of the tang and inner surface of the outer clevis leg, controlled the O-ring sealing gap dimension. The sealing gap and the O-ring seals were designed so that a positive compression (squeeze) was always on the O-rings. The minimum and maximum squeeze requirements included the effects of temperature, O-ring resiliency and compression set, and pressure. The redesign increased the clevis O-ring groove dimension so that the O-ring never filled more than 90 percent of the O-ring groove, and pressure actuation was enhanced. The new field-joint design also included a new O-ring in the capture feature and an additional leak check port to ensure that the primary O-ring was positioned in the proper sealing direction at ignition. This new or third O-ring also served as a thermal barrier in case the sealed insulation was breached. The field-joint internal case insulation was modified to be sealed with a pressure-actuated flap called a j-seal, rather than with putty as in the STS 51 -L (Challenger) configuration. The redesign added longer field-joint-case mating pins, with a reconfigured retainer band, to improve the shear strength of the pins and increase the metal parts' joint margin of safety. The joint safety margins, both thermal and structural, were demonstrated over the full ranges of ambient temperature, storage compression, grease effect, assembly stresses, and other environments. The redesign incorporated external heaters with integral weather seals to maintain the joint and O-ring temperature at a minimum of 23.9 degrees Celsius. The weather seal also prevented water intrusion into the joint, Original Versus Redesigned SRM Case-to-Nozzle Joint. The SRM case-to-nozzle joint, which experienced several instances of O-ring erosion in flight, was redesigned to satisfy the same requirements imposed on the case field joint. Similar to the field joint, case-to-nozzle joint modifications were made in the metal parts, internal insulation, and O-rings. The redesign added radial bolts with Stato-O-Seals to minimize the joint

46

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

sealing gapopening. Theinternalinsulation wasmodifiedto besealed adhesively, andathirdO-ringwasincluded. ThethirdO-ringserved asa damor wiperin front of theprimaryO-ringto prevent thepolysulfide adhesive frombeing extruded in theprimary O-ringgroove. It alsoserved asa thermal barrierin casethepolysulfide adhesive wasbreached. The polysulfide adhesive replaced theputtyused in theSTS51-Ljoint. Also, the redesign added ananother leakcheckportto reduce theamount of trapped air in thejoint duringthenozzle installation process andtoaidin theleakcheckprocedure.
Nozzle. Redesigned internal joints of the nozzle metal parts incorporated redundant and verifiable O-rings at each joint. The modified nozzle steel fixed housing part permitted the incorporation of the 100 radial bolts that attached the fixed housing to the case's aft dome. The new nozzle nose inlet, cowl/boot, and aft exit cone assemblies used improved bonding techniques. Increasing the thickness of the aluminum nose inlet housing and improving the bonding process eliminated the distortion of the nose inlet assembly's metal-part-to-ablative-parts bond line. The changed tape-wrap angle of the carbon cloth fabric in the areas of the nose inlet and throat assembly parts improved the ablative insulation erosion tolerance. Some of these ply-angle changes had been in progress prior to STS 51-L. Additional structural support with increased thickness and contour changes to the cowl and outer boot ring increased their margins of safety. In addition, the outer boot ring ply configuration was altered. Factory Joint. The redesign incorporated minor modifications in the case factory joints by increasing the insulation thickness and layup to increase the margin of safety on the internal insulation. Longer pins were also added, along with a reconfigured retainer band and new weather seal to improve factory joint performance and increase the margin of safety. In addition, the redesign changed the O-ring and O-ring groove size to be consistent with the field joint. Propellant. The motor propellant forward transition region was recontoured to reduce the stress fields between the star and cylindrical portions of the propellant grain. Ignition System. The redesign incorporated several minor modifications into the ignition system. The aft end of the igniter steel case, which contained the igniter nozzle insert, was thickened to eliminate a localized weakness. The igniter internal case insulation was tapered to improve the manufacturing process. Finally, although vacuum putty was still used at the joint of the igniter and case forward dome, it eliminated asbestos as one of its constituents. Ground Support Equipment. Redesigned ground support equipment (!) minimized the case distortion during handling at the launch site, (2) improved the segment tang and clevis joint measurement system for more accurate reading of case diameters to facilitate stacking, (3) minimized the risk of O-ring damage during joint mating, and (4) improved leak testing of the igniter, case, and nozzle field joints. A ground support equipment assembly aid guided the segment tang into the clevis and

LAUNCH SYSTEMS

47

rounded thetwo parts with each other.Othergroundsupport equipment modifications included transportation monitoring equipment andtheliltingbeam.
Testing. Tests of the redesigned motor were carried out in a horizontal attitude, providing a more accurate simulation of actual conditions of the field joint that failed during the STS 5 I-L mission. In conjunction with the horizontal attitude for the RSRM full-scale testing, NASA incorporated externally applied loads. Morton Thiokol constructed a second horizontal test stand for certification of the redesigned SRM. The contractor used this new stand to simulate environmental stresses, loads, and temperatures experienced during an actual Space Shuttle launch and ascent. The new test stand also provided redundancy for the original stand. The testing program included five full-scale firings of the RSRM prior to STS-26 to verify the RSRM performance. These included two development motor tests, two qualification motor tests, and a production verification motor test. The production verification motor test in August 1988 intentionally introduced severe artificial flaws into the test motor to make sure that the redundant safety features implemented during the redesign effort worked as planned. Laboratory and component tests were used to determine component properties and characteristics. Subscale motor tests simulated gas dynamics and thermal conditions for components and subsystem design. Simulator tests, consisting of motors using full-size flight-type segments, verified joint design under full flight loads, pressure, and temperature. Full-scale tests verified analytical models and determined hardware assembly characteristics; joint deflection characteristics; joint performance under short duration, hot-gas tests, including joint flaws and flight loads; and redesigned hardware structural characteristics. Table 2-30 lists the events involved in the redesign of the SRB and SRM as well as earlier events in their development?" Upper Stages The upper stages boost payloads from the Space Shuttle's parking orbit or low-Earth orbit to geostationary-transfer orbit or geosynchronous orbit. They are also used on ELV missions to boost payloads from an early stage of the orbit maneuver into geostationary-transfer orbit or geosynchronous orbit. The development of the upper stages used by NASA began prior to 1979 and continued throughout the 1980s (Table 2-31). The upper stages could be grouped into three categories, according to their weight delivery capacity: Low capacity: 453- to 1,360-kilogram capacity to geosynchronous orbit

a_'SeeEzell, NASA Historical Data Book, Volume IH, for earlier events in SRB development.

48

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Medium capacity:1,360to 3,175-kilogram capacity to geosynchronous orbit Highcapacity: 3,175-to5,443-kilogram capacity to geosynchronous orbit
Upper Stages

Inertial

DOD designed and developed the Inertial Upper Stage (IUS) medium-capacity system for integration with both the Space Shuttle and Titan launch vehicle. It was used to deliver spacecraft into a wide range of Earth orbits beyond the Space Shuttle's capability. When used with the Shuttle, the solid-propellant IUS and its payload were deployed from the orbiter in low-Earth orbit. The IUS was then ignited to boost its payload to a higher energy orbit. NASA used a two-stage configuration of the IUS primarily to achieve geosynchronous orbit and a three-stage version for planetary orbits. The IUS was 5.18 meters long and 2.8 meters in diameter and weighed approximately 14,772 kilograms. It consisted of an aft skirt, an aft stage SRM with 9,707 kilograms of solid propellant generating 202,828.8 newtons of thrust, an interstage, a forward stage SRM with 2,727.3 kilograms of propellant generating 82,288 newtons of thrust and using an extendible exit cone, and an equipment support section. The equipment support section contained the avionics that provided guidance, navigation, telemetry, command and data management, reaction control, and electrical power. All mission-critical components of the avionics system and thrust vector actuators, reaction control thrusters, motor igniter, and pyrotechnic stage separation equipment were redundant to ensure better than 98-percent reliability (Figure 2-15).

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LAUNCH SYSTEMS

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The spacecraft was attached to the IUS at a maximum of eight attachment points. These points provided substantial load-carrying capability while minimizing thermal transfer. Several IUS interface connectors provided power and data transmission to the spacecraft. Access to these connectors could be provided on the spacecraft side of the interface plane or through the access door on the IUS equipment bay. The IUS provided a multilayer insulation blanket of aluminized Kapton with polyester net spacers and an aluminized beta cloth outer layer across the IUS and spacecraft interface. All IUS thermal blankets vented toward and into the IUS cavity. All gases within the IUS cavity vented to the orbiter payload bay. There was no gas flow between the spacecraft and the IUS. The thermal blankets were grounded to the IUS structure to prevent electrostatic charge buildup. Beginning with STS-26, the IUS incorporated a number of advanced features. It had the first completely redundant avionics system developed for an uncrewed space vehicle. This system could correct in-flight features within milliseconds. Other advanced features included a carbon composite nozzle throat that made possible the high-temperature, longduration firing of the IUS motor and a redundant computer system in which the second computer could take over functions from the primary computer, Payload if necessary. Assist Module

The Payload Assist Module (PAM), which was originally called the Spinning Stage Upper Stage, was developed by McDonnell Douglas at its own expense for launching smaller spacecraft to geostationary-transfer orbit. It was designed as a higher altitude booster of satellites deployed in near-Earth orbit but operationally destined for higher altitudes. The PAM-D could launch satellites weighing up to 1,247 kilograms. It was originally configured for satellites that used the Delta ELV but was used on both ELVs and the Space Shuttle. The PAM-DII (used on STS 61-B and STS 61-C) could launch satellites weighing up to 1,882 kilograms. A third PAM, the PAM-A, had been intended for satellites weighing up to 1,995 kilograms and was configured for missions using the AtlasCentaur. NASA halted its development in 1982, pending definition of spacecraft needs. Commercial users acquired the PAM-D and PAM-DII directly from the manufacturer. The PAM consisted of a deployable (expendable) stage and reusable airborne support equipment. The deployable stage consisted of a spinstabilized SRM, a payload attach fitting to mate with the unmanned spacecraft, and the necessary timing, sequencing, power, and control assemblies. The PAM's airborne support equipment consisted of the reusable hardware elements required to mount, support, control, monitor, protect, and operate the PAM's expendable hardware and untended spacecraft from liftoff to deployment from the Space Shuttle or ELV. It also provided these

50

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

functions for thesating andreturn of thestage andspacecraft in case of an aborted mission. Theairborne support equipment wasdesigned to beas self-contained aspossible. Themajorairborne support equipment elements included thecradle forstructural mounting andsupport, thespintableand drivesystem, theavionics system tocontrol andmonitor theairborne supportequipment andthePAMvehicle, andthethermal control system. ThePAMstages weresupported through thespintableatthebase of themotorandthrough restraints atthePAETheforwardrestraints were retracted beforedeployment. Thesunshield of thePAM-DandDII providedthermal protection of thePAM/untended spacecraft whentheSpace Shuttle orbiterpayload baydoorswereopen onorbit.
Transfer Orbit Stage The development of the Transfer Orbit Stage (TOS) began in April 1983 when NASA signed a Space System Development Agreement with Orbital Sciences Corporation (OSC) to develop a new upper stage. Under the agreement, OSC provided technical direction, systems engineering, mission integration, and program management of the design, production, and testing of the TOS. NASA, with participation by the Johnson and Kennedy Space Centers, provided technical assistance during TOS development and agreed to provide technical monitoring and advice during TOS development and operations to assure its acceptability for use with major national launch systems, including the STS and Titan vehicles. NASA also established a TOS Program Office at the Marshall Space Flight Center. OSC provided all funding for the development and manufacturing of TOS (Figure 2-16). In June 1985, Marshall awarded a 16-month contract to OSC for a laser initial navigation system (LINS) developed for the TOS. Marshall would use the LINS for guidance system research, testing, and other purposes related to the TOS program. Production of the TOS began in mid1986. It was scheduled to be used on the Advanced Communications Technology Satellite (ACTS) and the Planetary Observer series of scientific exploration spacecraft, beginning with the Mars Observer mission in the early 1990s. The TOS could place 2,490 to 6,080 kilograms payloads into geostationary-transfer orbit from the STS and up to 5,227 kilograms from the Titan II1 and IV and could also deliver spacecraft to planetary and other high-energy trajectories. The TOS allowed smaller satellites to be placed into geostationary-transfer orbit in groups of

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2-16. Orbit Stage

LAUNCH SYSTEMS

51

two or three. Two payloads of the Atlas class (1,136 kilograms) or three payloads of the Delta class (636 kilograms) could be launched on a single TOS mission. Besides delivery of commercial communications satellites, its primary market, the TOS would be used for NASA and DOD missions. The TOS system consisted of flight vehicle hardware and software and associated airborne and ground support equipment required for buildup. Table 3-32 lists its characteristics. Pertbrmance capabilities of the TOS included: Earth escape transfer capability Geosynchronous transfer orbit capability Orbit inclination change capability Low-altitude transfer capability Intermediate transfer orbit capability De-orbit maneuver Satellite repair and retrieval Apogee and Maneuvering System

The liquid bipropellant Apogee and Maneuvering System (AMS) was designed to be used both with and independently of the TOS. The AMS would boost the spacecraft into a circular orbit and allow on-orbit maneuvering. Martin Marietta Denver Aerospace worked to develop the AMS with Rockwell International's Rocketdyne Division, providing the AMS RS-51 bipropellant rocket engine, and Honeywell, Inc., supplied the TOS/AMS LINS avionics system. When it became operational, the TOS/AMS combination would deliver up to approximately 2,950 kilograms into geosynchronous orbit from the orbiter's parking orbit into final geosynchronous orbit. The TOS/AMS would have a delivery capability 30 percent greater than the IUS and would reduce stage and STS user costs. The main propulsion, reaction control, avionics, and airborne support equipment systems would be essentially the same as those used on the TOS. In particular, the avionics would be based on a redundant, fault-tolerant L1NS. Operating alone, the AMS would be able to place communications satellites weighing up to approximately 2,500 kilograms into geostationary-transfer orbit after deployment in the standard Space Shuttle parking orbit. Other missions would include low-orbit maneuvering between the Shuttle and the planned space station, delivery of payloads to Sunsynchronous and polar orbits, and military on-demand maneuvering capability. The AMS was planned to be available for launch in early 1989 and would provide an alternative to the PAM-DII. The avionics, reaction control system, and airborne support equipment designs of the AMS would use most of the standard TOS components. Main propulsion would be provided by the 2,650-pound thrust Rocketdyne RS-51 engine. This engine was restartable and operable over extended periods. A low-thrust engine option that provided 400 pounds of thrust would also be available for the AMS.

52

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Centaur

Upper Stage

NASA studied and began production in the early 1980s of a modified Centaur upper stage for use with the STS for planetary and heavier geosynchronous mission applications. The proposed modifications would increase the size of the propellant tanks to add about 50 percent more propellant capacity and make the stage compatible with the Space Shuttle. This wide-body version would use the same propulsion system and about 85 percent of the existing Centaur's avionics systems. Contracts were negotiated with General Dynamics, Honeywell, Pratt & Whitney, and Teledyne for the design, development, and procurement of Centaur upper stages for the Galileo and International Solar Polar missions that were scheduled [or 1986. However, following the Challenger accident, NASA determined that even with modifications, the Centaur could not comply with necessary safety requirements for use on the Shuttle. The Centaur upper stage initiative was then dropped. Advanced Programs

Advanced programs focused on future space transportation activities, including improving space transportation operations through the introduction of more advanced technologies and processes, and on servicing and protecting U.S. space assets. The following sections describe NASA's major advanced program initiatives. Several of the efforts progressed from advanced program status to operational status during this decade. Orbital Tran,_fer Vehicle

NASA's Advanced Planning/Programs Division of the Office of Space Transportation identified the need for an Orbital Transfer Vehicle (OTV) in the early 1980s, when it became obvious that a way was needed to transport payloads from the Space Shuttle's low-Earth orbit to a higher orbit and to retrieve and return payloads to the Shuttle or future space station. The Marshall Space Flight Center was designated as the lead center for the development effort, and the Lewis Research Center led the propulsion system studies. An untended OTV was proposed for a first flight in the early 1990s. NASA believed that the use of aerobraking was necessary to make the OTV affordable. Studies beginning in 1981 conducted at Marshall by definition phase contractors Boeing Aerospace Company and General Electric Reentry Systems determined that aerodynamic braking was an efficient fuel-saving technique for the OTV, perhaps doubling payload capacity. This technique would use the Earth's atmosphere as a braking mechanism for return trips, possibly supplemented by the use of a ballute, an inflatable drag device. When the transfer vehicle passed through the

LAUNCH SYSTEMS

53

atmosphere, the friction of the air against the vehiclewould provide enough dragto slowthevehicle. Otherwise, arocketengine firingwould berequired tobrake thevehicle. Aeroassist brakingwouldsave oneburn, andtheextrafuel couldbe used to transport a largerpayload to a high orbit.Theaeroassisted braking couldresultin about atwofoldincrease in theamount of payload thatcouldbeferriedtohighaltitudes. Boeing's studies emphasized low lifting-body designs--"low lift-todragratio"--designs witharelatively lowcapability of lift toenable them tofly, butones thatweighless. General ElectricReentry Systems focused onmoderate lift-to-drag ratiodesigns--relatively moderate lift capability andsomewhat heavier weight. In 1981, NASAdesignated theLewisResearch Center theleadcenterlbr OTVpropulsion technology. Thisprogram supported technology for threeadvanced engineconcepts that weredeveloped by Aerojet TechSystems, Pratt& Whitney,andRocketdyne to satisfya NASAsupplied setof goals.Theproposed engines wouldbeusedto transfer loads--both personnel andcargo--between low-Earth orbitandgeosynchronous orbit, and beyond.In addition,because OTVs would face requirements rangingfrom high-acceleration round-triptransfers for resupply to very low-acceleration one-way transfers of large,flexible structures, NASAinvestigated variable thrustpropulsion systems, which wouldprovidehighperformance overa broadthrottling range. In 1983. NASAchose thesame threecontractors to begina program leading to the design, development, test,andengineering of the OTV. Thesecontracts expiredin 1986. NASA sponsored another competitive procurement to continuethe OTV propulsionprogram.Fundingwas reduced, and only Rocketdyne and Aerojetcontinued the advanced engine technology development. Component testingbegan in 1988, and furtherinvestigations intoaerobraking continued intothe 1990s. TheOTV wouldbeusedprimarilyto place NASA,DOD,andcommercialsatellites andspace platformsinto geosynchronous orbit. The OTVcouldalsodeliverlargepayloads intootherorbitsandboostplanetary exploration spacecraft into high-velocity orbitsapproaching their mission trajectory. The vehicle was expected to use liquid oxygen-liquid
hydrogen propellants. The OTV's reusable design provided for twenty flights before it had to be refurbished or replaced. Because of its reusability, the OTV would significantly reduce payload transportation costs. At the same time, that Lewis was leading propulsion studies, Marshall initiated studies in 1984 to define OTV concepts and chose Boeing Aerospace and Martin Marietta to conduct the conceptual studies. The studies examined the possibilities of both a space-based and an Earth-based OTV. Both would initially be uncrewed upper stages. The ultimate goal, however, was to develop a crewed vehicle capable of ferrying a crew capsule to geosynchronous orbit. The vehicle would then return the crew and capsule for other missions. The development of a crew capsule for the OTV was planned for the 1990s.

54

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The Space ShuttlewouldcarrytheEarth-based OTV into space. It wouldbe launched fromtheShuttle's payload bayor fromanaft cargo carrierattached to the aft endof the Shuttle's external tank.The OTV wouldtransfer payloads froma loworbit to a higherone.It wouldalso retrieve payloads in highorbitsandreturnthemtotheShuttle. The OTV
would then return to Earth in the Shuttle's payload bay. The OTV would separate from the Shuttle's external tank at about the same time that the payload was deployed from the orbiter's cargo bay. The two components would then join together and begin to travel to a higher orbit. This Earthbased OTV offered the advantage of performing vehicle maintenance and refueling on the ground with the help of gravity, ground facilities, and workers who do not have to wear spacesuits. A space-based OTV would be based at the future space station. It would move payloads into higher orbit from the space station and then return to its home there. It would be refueled and maintained at the space station. Studies showed cost savings for space-based OTVs. This type of OTV could be assembled in orbit rather than on the ground so it could be larger than a ground-based unit and capable of carrying more payload. Initial studies of an OTV that would be based at the space station were completed in 1985. A single-stage OTV could boost payloads of up to 7,272 kilograms to high-Earth or geosynchronous orbit. A multistage OTV could provide up to 36,363 kilograms to lunar orbit with 6,818.2 kilograms returned to low-Earth orbit. After completing its delivery or servicing mission, the OTV would use its rocket engines to start a descent. Skimming through the thin upper atmosphere (above sixty kilometers), the OTV's aerobrake would slow the OTV without consuming extra propellant. Then, because of orbital dynamics, the OTV would navigate back to a low-Earth orbit. When the OTV reached the desired orbital altitude, its rocket engines would again fire, circularizing its orbit until it was retrieved by the Space Shuttle or an orbital maneuvering vehicle (OMV) dispatched from the space station. NASA Administrator James M. Beggs stated in June 1985 that the OTV would complement the proposed OMV. The OTV would transport payloads from low-Earth orbit to destinations much higher than the OMV could reach. The majority of the payloads transported by the OTV would be delivered to geostationary orbit. Beggs envisioned that most OTVs would be based at the space station, where they would be maintained, fueled, and .joined to payloads. In time, the OTV would also be used to transport people to geostationary orbit. Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle

The OMV (Figure 2-17) was designed to aid satellite servicing and retrieval. This uncrewed vehicle could be characterized as a "space tug," which would move satellites and other orbiting objects fi'om place to

LAUNCH

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55

place above the Earth. A reusable, remotely operated unmanned propulsive vehicle to increase the range of the STS, the OMV was designed to be used primarily for spacecraft delivery, retrieval, boost, deboost, and close proximity visual observation beyond the operating range of the Space Shuttle. The vehicle would extend the reach of the Shuttle up to approximately 2,400 kilometers. Concept definition studies were completed in 1983, and development began toward a flight demonstration of the ability to refuel propellant tanks of an orbiting satellite. In 1984, an in-flight demonstration of hydrazine fuel transfer took place successfully on STS 41-G. System definition studies were completed in 1985, and in June 1986, TRW was
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selected by NASA for negotiations leading to the award of a contract to develop the OMV. The Preliminary Requirements Review took place in 1987, and the Preliminary Design Review was held in 1988, with the Marshall Space Flight Center managing the effort. NASA planned for the OMV to be available tk)r its first mission in 1993, when it would be remotely controlled from Earth. In the early years of use, NASA envisioned that the OMV would be deployed from the Space Shuttle tbr each short-duration mission and returned to Earth tbr servicing, Later, the vehicle would be left parked in orbit for extended periods, for use with both the Shuttle and the space station. However, the OMV was the victim of budget cuts, and the contract with TRW was canceled in June 1990. Tethered Satellite System

Maneuvering

The Tethered Satellite System (TSS) program was a cooperative effort between the government of Italy and NASA to provide the capability to perform science in areas of space outside the reach of the Space Shuttle. The TSS would enable scientists to conduct experiments in the upper atmosphere and ionosphere while tethered to tbe Space Shuttle as its operating base. The system consisted of a satellite anchored to the Space Shuttle by a tether up to 100 kilometers long. (Tethers are long, superstrong tow lines joining orbiting objects together.) The advanced development stage of the program was completed in 1983, and management for the TSS moved to the Space Transportation

56

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

and Capability Development Division. In 1984, a study and laboratory program was initiated to define and evaluate several applications of tethers in space. Possible applications included power generation, orbit raising in the absence of propellants, artificial gravity, and space vehicle constellations. In 1986, the Critical Design and Manufacturing Reviews were conducted on the satellite and the deployer. In 1988, manufacture and qualification of the flight subsystems continued. The twelve-meter depioyer boom, reel motor, and on-board computer were all qualified and delivered. Also, manufacture of the deployer structure was initiated, and the tether control mechanisms were functionally tested. A test program was completed for the satellite structural and engineering models. The flight satellite structure was due for delivery in early 1989. The development of the scientific instruments continued, with delivery of flight satellite instruments scheduled for early 1989. The first TSS mission was scheduled for 199 I. Advanced I.xumch System

The Advanced Launch System, a joint NASA-DOD effort, was a systems definition and technology advanced development program aimed at defining a new family of launchers for use after 2000, including a new heavy-lift vehicle. President Reagan signed a report to Congress in January 1988 that officially created the program. Within this DODfunded program, NASA managed the liquid engine system and advanced development efforts. Next Manned Launch Vehicle

In 1988, attention was locused on examining various next-generation manned launch vehicle concepts. Three possible directions were considered: Space Shuttle evolution, a personnel launch system, and an advanced manned launch system. The evolution concept referred to the option of improving the current Shuttle design through the incorporation of upgraded technologies and capabilities. The personnel launch system would be a people carrier and have no capability to launch payloads into space. The advanced manned launch system represented an innovative crewed transportation system. Preliminary studies on all three possibilities progressed during 1988. Shuttle-C Shuttle-C (cargo) was a that would make maximum cargo canister in place of the vehicle would be able to lift orbit. This payload capacity Shuttle payload capability. concept for a large, uncrewed launch vehicle use of existing Space Shuttle systems with a orbiter. This proposed cargo-carrying launch 45,454.5 to 68,181.8 kilograms to low-Earth is two to three tirnes greater than the Space

LAUNCHSYSTEMS

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In October 1987, NASA selected three contractors to perform the first of a two-phase systems definition study for Shuttle-C. The efforts focused on vehicle configuration details, including the cargo element's length and diameter, the number of liquid-fueled main engines, and an operations concept evaluation that included ground and flight support systems. A major purpose of the study was to determine whether ShuttleC would be cost effective in supporting the space station. Using ShuttleC could free the Space Shuttle for STS-unique missions, such as solar system exploration, astronomy, life sciences, space station crew rotation, and logistics and materials processing experiments. Shuttle-C also would be used to launch planetary' missions and serve as a test bed for new Shuttle boosters. The results of the Shuttle-C efforts were to be coordinated with other ongoing advanced launch systems studies to enable a joint steering group. composed of DOD and NASA senior managers. The purpose of the steering group was to formulate a national heavy-lift vehicle strategy, that best accommodated both near-term requirements and longer term objectives for reducing space transportation operational costs. Advanced Upper Stages

Advanced missions in the future would require even greater capabilities to move from low- to high-Earth orbit and beyond. During 1988, activity in the advanced upper stages area lk_cused on the space transfer vehicle (STV) and the possibility of upgrading the existing Centaur upper stage. The STV concept involved a cryogenic hydrogen-oxygen vehicle that could transport payloads weighing from 909.1 to 8,636 kilograms from low-Earth orbit to geosynchronous orbit or the lunar surface, as well as for unmanned phmetary missions. The STV concept could potentially lead to a vehicle capable of supporting human exploration missions to the Moon or Mars. Advanced Solid Rocket Motor

The Advanced Solid Rocket Motor (ASRM) was an STS improvement intended to replace the RSRM that was used on STS-26. The ASRM would be based on a better design than the former rocket motor, contain more reliable safety margins, and use automated manufacturing techniques. The ASRM would also enhance Space Shuttle performance by offering a potential increase of payload mass to orbit from 5454.5 kilograms to 9090.9 kilograms for the Shuttle. In addition, a new study on liquid rocket boosters was conducted that examined the feasibility of replacing SRMs with liquid engines. In March 1988, NASA submitted the "'Space Shuttle Advanced Solid Rocket Motor Acquisition Plan'" to Congress. This plan reviewed procurement strategy for the ASRM and discussed implementation phms and schedules. Facilities in Mississippi would be used lk)r production

58

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

andtestingof the newrocketmotor.In August1988,NASAissued an request for proposals to design, develop, test,andevaluate theASRM. Contract awardwasanticipated for early1989, andthefirstflight using thenewmotorwastargeted for 1994.

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Table 2-25. Space Number of Engines Thrust Operating Life Range of Thrust Propellant Nominal Burn Time Prime Contractor Level Shuttle Main Engine Characteristics Three on each Shuttle 2,000,000 newtons each 7.5 hours and 55 starts 65%-109% LOX/LH2 522 sec. Rockwell of rated power level

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Table 2-27. Propellants Length Diameter Weight of Propellant Gross Liftoff Weight Inert Weight of Lightweight Liquid Liquid Liquid Liquid Oxygen Oxygen Oxygen Oxygen Max. Tank Tank Tank Space Shuttle External Tank Characteristics LH:, LOX 46.8 m 8.4 m 700,000 kg 750,980 kg 30, 096 kg 617,774 542,583 8.4 m 15 m kg liters

95

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Weight Volume Diameter Length

Liquid Oxygen Tank Weight Liquid Hydrogen Max. Weight Liquid Hydrogen Tank Diameter Liquid Hydrogen Tank Length Liquid Hydrogen Tank Volume Liquid Hydrogen Tank Weight (Empty) lntertank Length lntertank Diameter Intertank Weight Prime Contractor

5,454.5 kg empty 103, 257 kg 8.4 m 29.46 m 1,458,228 liters 13,181.8 kg 6.9 m 8.4 m 5,500 kg Martin Marietta Aerospace

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6,080 kg from Shuttle 5,227 kg from Titan 111and IV Orbis 21 solid rocket motor and attitude control system 1,360 k_ to 3,175 kg capacity

CHAPTER THREE

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/ HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT

CHAPTER THREE

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/ HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT

Introduction In April 1981, after a hiatus of six years, American astronauts returned to space when they left the launch pad aboard the Space Shuttle orbiter Columbia. This chapter describes the major technology used by the Space Shuttle: each Space Shuttle mission through 1988, their payloads, and the operations surrounding the missions: the events surrounding the 1986 Challenger accident and the changes that occurred as a result of the accident; and the development of the Space Station program through 1988, one of NASA's major initiatives of the decade. It also describes the budget for human spaceflight at NASA and the management of human spaceflight activities. The Last Decade Reviewed (1969-1978)

The successful culmination of three major spaceflight programs and steady progress in the Space Shuttle program highlighted NASA's second decade. The Apollo program concluded with its lunar landings; Skylab demonstrated the possibility of a space-based platform that could support human life over an extended period of time; and the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project showed that international cooperation in the space program was possible in the face of political differences. Steady progress in the human spaceflight program encouraged NASA to commit major resources to the Shuttle program. The successful Apollo lunar expeditions caught the imagination of the American public. The first lunar landing took place on July 20, 1969, and was followed by the lunar landings of Apollo 12, 14, 15, 16, and 17. (Apollo 13 experienced a major anomaly, and the mission was aborted before a lunar landing could take place.) However, by the later missions, enthusiasm over the scientific and technological advances gave way to budget concerns, which ended the program with Apollo 17. Skylab was the first American experimental space station to be built and could be considered a predecessor of the space station efforts of the 1980s. Skylab was an orbital workshop constructed from a Saturn IVB

I O7

Io8

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

stage. It waslaunched in May 1973 andvisitedby threecrewsoverthe next ninemonths, each remaining attheorbitinglaboratory for increasinglyextended periods oftime.Themission confirmed thathumans could productively functionin a spaceenvironment. It alsoprovidedsolar observations, Earthresource studies, andtestsof space manufacturing techniques. The 1975Apollo-Soyuz TestProjectinvolvedthe dockingof an American Apollovehicleanda SovietSoyuz vehicle. Joined by adockingmodule, thetwocrews conducted jointactivities ontheirdocked vehiclesfor two daysbeforeseparating. Eventhough manyhopedthatthis program wouldbethefirst of ongoing cooperative ventures between the two superpowers, thepoliticalsituation prevented furthereffortsduring thisdecade. Althougha six-year periodinterrupted human spaceflights between the 1975 Apollo-Soyuz mission andthefirst Shuttle flight in 1981, development of thenewSpace Shuttlemovedslowlybut steadily towardits inaugural launch in 1981. The major componentof the Space Transportation System (STS),the Shuttlewould performa varietyof tasksin orbit, including conducting scientific andtechnological experimentsas well as servingas NASA'sprimarylaunchvehicle.NASA received presidential approval to proceed with the program in August 1972, andRockwell International, theprimeShuttle contractor, rolledout
Enterprise, the first test orbiter, in September 1976, setting off a series of system and flight tests. The production of Columbia, the first orbiter that would actually circle the Earth, already under way, continued during this time. Even though qualifying Columbia for spaceflight took longer than anticipated, as the decade closed, NASA was eagerly awaiting its first orbital flight test scheduled for the spring of 1981. Overview of Space TransportationHuman Spaceflight (1979-1988)

The inauguration of Space Shuttle flights dominated the decade from 1979 through 1988. Twenty-seven Shuttle flights took place, and twentysix of them were successful. However, from January 28, 1986, the memory of STS 51-L dominated the thoughts of many Americans and effectively overshadowed NASA's considerable achievements. The loss of life and, in particular, the loss of individuals who were not career astronauts haunted both the public and the agency. The agency conducted a far-reaching examination of the accident and used the findings of the independent Rogers Commission and the NASA STS 51-L Data and Design Analysis Task Force to implement a series of recommendations that improved the human spaceflight program from both a technical and management perspective. Two successful Shuttle missions followed at the end of the decade, demonstrating that NASA was able to recover from its worst accident ever. The first twenty-tbur Shuttle missions and the two following the Challenger accident deployed an assortment of government and corn-

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT

109

mercialsatellites andperformed an arrayof scientificandengineering experiments. ThethreeSpacelab missions highlighted NASA'sinvestigationsaboard theShuttle, studying everything fromplantlife andmonkey nutritionto x-ray emissions fiom clusters of galaxies.
The 1980s also included a push toward the development of a permanently occupied space station. Announced by President Ronald Reagan in his 1984 State of the Union address, which directed NASA to have a permanently manned space station in place within ten years, NASA invested considerable time and money toward bringing it about. The European Space Agency (ESA), Canada, and Japan signed on as major participants in both the financial and technical areas of the Space Station program, and by the end of 1988, Space Station Freedom had completed the Definition and Preliminary Design Phase of the project and had moved into the Design and Development Phase. Management of the Space TransportationHuman Spaceflight Program

The organizational elements of the space transportation program have been addressed in Chapter 2, "Launch Systems." Briefly, Code M, at different times called the Office of Space Transportation, Office of Space Transportation Systems (Acquisition), and Office of Space Flight, managed space transportation activities for the decade from 1979 through 1988. From November 1979 to August 1982, Code M split off the operations function of the spaceflight program into Code O, Office of Space Operations. Also, in 1984, the Office of Space Station, Code S, superseded the Code M Space Station Task Force, in response to President Reagan's directive to develop and build an occupied space station within the next ten years. Space Station program management is addressed later in this section. The Space Shuttle program was the major segment of NASA's National Space Transportation System (NSTS), managed by the Office of Space Flight at NASA Headquarters. (The Space Shuttle Program Office was renamed the National Space Transportation System Program Office in March 1983.) The office was headed by an associate administrator who reported directly to the NASA administrator and was charged with proriding executive leadership, overall direction, and effective accomplishment of the Space Shuttle and associated programs, including expendable launch vehicles. The associate administrator for spaceflight exercised institutional management authority over the activities of the NASA field organizations whose primary functions were related to the NSTS program. These were the Johnson Space Center in Houston, the Kennedy Space Center at Cape Canaveral, Florida, the Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama, and the Stennis Space Center (formerly National Space Technology Laboratories) in Bay St. Louis, Mississippi. Organizational elements of the NSTS office were located at NASA Headquarters, Johnson, Kennedy, Marshall, and at the Vandenberg Launch Site in California.

110

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

l)ir_chtl I As_istanl [ He;idquarlt'rs NSTS [)ires-for I Ill'i)

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The organization of the NSTS was divided into four levels (Figure 3-1 ). The NSTS director served as the Level I manager and was responsible for the overall program requirements, budgets, and schedules. The NSTS deputy directors were Level lI managers and were responsible for the management and integration of all program elements, including integrated flight and ground system requirements, schedules, and budgets. NSTS project managers located at Johnson, Kennedy, and Marshall were classified as Level Ill managers and were responsible for managing the design, qualification, and manufacturing of Space Shuttle components, as well as all launch and landing operations. NSTS design a{lthority personnel and contractors were Level IV managers (not shown in Figure 3-1) and were responsible for the design, development, manufacturing, test, and qualification of Shuttle systems. Initially, the NSTS was based at Johnson Space Center, which was designated as the lead center for the Space Shuttle program. Johnson had management responsibility for program control and overall systems engineering and systems integration. Johnson was also responsible for the development, production, and delivery of the Shuttle orbiter and managed the contract of the orbiter manufacturer. Kennedy Space Center was responsible for the design of the launch and recovery facilities. Kennedy served as the launch and landing site for the Shuttle development flights and for most operational missions. Marshall Space Flight Center was responsible for the development, production, and delivery of the Space Shuttle main engines, solid rocket boosters, and external tank.

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT

111

Robert F.Thompson served asmanager of theSpace Shuttle Program Officeuntil 198[,whenGlynnS.Lunney assumed theposition of NSTS program manager. Hehadbeenwith NASAsince1959 andinvolvedin the Shuttleprogram since1975.Lunney held the position of manager
until his retirement in April 1985. He was replaced by Arnold D. Aldrich in July 1985, a twenty-six-year NASA veteran and head of the Space Shuttle Projects Office at Johnson Space Center. Aldrich's appointment was part of a general streamlining of the NSTS that took effect in August of that year. which reflected the maturation of the Shuttle program. In that realignment, the Level II NSTS organization at Johnson was renamed the NSTS Office and assimilated the Projects Office, consolidating all program elements under Aldrich's direction. Richard H. Kohrs, who had been acting program manager, and Lt. Col. Thomas W. Redmond, U.S. Air Force, were named deputy managers. Aldrich took charge of the integration of all Space Shuttle program elements, including flight software, orbiter, external tank, solid rocket boosters, main engines, payloads, payload carriers, and Shuttle facilities. His responsibilities also includcd directing the planning for NSTS operations and managing orbiter and government-furnished equipment projects. Post-Challenger Restructuring

The Challenger accident brought about major changes in the management and operation of the NSTS. The Rogers Commission concluded that flaws in the management structure and in communication at all levels were elements that needed to be addressed and rectified. Two of the recommendations (Recommendations lI and V, respectively) addressed the management structure and program communication. In line with these recommendations, NASA announced in November 1986 a new Space Shuttle management structure for the NSTS. These changes aimed at clarifying the focal points of authority and responsibility in the Space Shuttle program and to establish clear lines of communication in the informationtransfer and decision-making processes. Associate Administrator fbr Space Flight Admiral Richard Truly issued a detailed description of the restructured NSTS organization and operation in a memorandum released on November 5, 1986. As part of the restructuring, the position of director, NSTS, was established, with Arnold Aldrich, who had been manager, NSTS, at the Johnson Space Center since Jury 1985, assuming that position in Washington, D.C. He had full responsibility and authority for the operation and conduct of the NSTS program. This included total program control, with full responsibility for budget, schedule, and balancing program content. He was responsible for overall program requirements and performance and had the approval authority for top-level program requirements, critical hardware waivers, and budget authorization adjustments that exceeded a predetermined level. He reported directly to the associate administrator for spaceflight and had two deputies, one for the program and one for operations.

I 12

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

NASAappointed Richard H. Kohrs,whohadbeen deputy manager, NSTS,atthe Johnson Space Center, to thepositionof deputydirector, NSTSprogram. Hewasresponsible for theday-to-day management and execution of theSpace Shuttle program, including detailed program planning,direction, scheduling, andSTSsystems configuration management. Otherresponsibilities encompassed systems engineering andintegration for the STS vehicle, ground facilities, and cargoes.The NSTS Engineering Integration Office,reportingto the deputydirector,NSTS program, wasestablished anddirectlyparticipated with each NSTSprojectelement (mainengine, solidrocketbooster, external tank,orbiter, and launch andlanding system). Kohrswaslocated atJohnson, buthereporteddirectlyto theNSTSdirector. Fiveorganizational elements underthedeputydirector,NSTSprogram, werecharged with accomplishing themanagement responsibilities of theprogram. Thefirst fourwaslocated atJohnson, andthelastwasat theMarshallSpace FlightCenter. NSTSEngineering Integration NSTSManagement Integration NSTSProgram Control NSTSIntegration andOperations Shuttle Projects Office

TheShuttleProjects Officehadoverallmanagement andcoordinationresponsibility for theMarshall elements involved in theShuttle program: thesolidrocketboosters, external tank,andmainengines. NASAnamed CaptainRobert L. Crippen to thepositionof deputy director, NSTSoperations, reporting directlyto the NSTSdirectorand responsible for alloperational aspects ofSTSmissions. Thisincluded such functions asfinalvehicle preparation, mission execution, andreturn of the vehicle for processing for itsnextflight. In addition, thedeputy director, NSTSoperations, presented the Flight Readiness Review,whichwas chaired by theassociate administrator for spaceflight, managed thefinal launch decision process, andchaired theMission Management Team. Threeoperations integration officeslocated atJohnson, theKennedy Space Center, andMarshallcarried out thedutiesof theNSTSdeputy director.In additionto the dutiesof the directoranddeputydirectors described above, Admiral Truly's memorandum addressed the role of the
centers and project managers in the programmatic chain and budget procedures and control. In the programmatic chain, the managers of the project elements located at the various field centers reported to the deputy director, NSTS program. Depending on the individual center organization, this chain was either direct (such as the Orbiter Project Office at Johnson) or via an intermediate office (such as the Shuttle Projects Office at Marshall). The NSTS program budget continued to be submitted through the center directors to the director, NSTS, who had total funding authority for

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT

113

theprogram. Thedeputy directors, NSTS program andNSTS operations, eachprovidedan assessment of the budgetsubmittalto the director, NSTS, asanintegral partof thedecision process. The restructuringalso revitalizedthe Office of SpaceFlight Management Council. Thecouncilconsisted of theassociate administrator tbr spaceflight and the directors of Marshall. Kennedy, Johnson, and
the NSTS. This group met regularly to review Space Shuttle program progress and to provide an independent and objective assessment of the status of the overall program. Management relationships in the centralized NSTS organization were configured into tour basic management levels, which were designed to reduce the potential for conflict between the program organizations and the NASA institutional organizations. Office of Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance

Although not part of the Office of Space Flight, the Office of Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance (Code Q) resulted from the findings of the Rogers Commission, which recommended that NASA establish such an office with direct authority throughout the agency. NASA established this office in July 1986, with George A. Rodney, lbrmerly of Martin Marietta, named as its first associate administrator (Figure 3-2). The objectives of the office were to ensure that a NASA Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance program monitored equipment status, design validation problem analysis, and system acceptability in agencywide plans and programs.

Associate Safety, and

Administrator Maintainability Assurance

for

Reliability, Quality

Deputy

AA

Safety Space

Panel Flight

Deputy AA for Systems Assurance t

I
Support Staff ] Syatems/Trend AnalysisData Division Syatems Assessment Division

I
Reliability, Maintainability & Quality Assurance Division Safety

I
Division

1
Programs Assurance Division

:
Center Safety, RealiabiUty & Quality, Assurance Directories

Figure 3-2.

S_![_,ty. Reliability,

and Quality Assurance

O[[_ce Organization

114

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

The responsibilities of the associate administrator included the oversight of safety, reliability, and quality assurance functions related to all NASA activities and programs. In addition, he was responsible for the direction of reporting and documentation of problems, problem resolution, and trends associated with safety. Management of the Space Station Program

NASA first officially committed to a space station on May 20, 1982, when it established the Space Station Task Force under the direction of John D. Hodge, assistant for space station planning and analysis, Office of the Associate Deputy Administrator in the Office of Space Flight (Code M). Hodge reported to Philip E. Culbertson, associate deputy administrator, and drew from space station-related activities of each of the NASA program offices and field centers. The task tbrce was responsible for the development of the programmatic aspects of a space station as they evolved, including mission analysis, requirements definition, and program management. It initiated industry participation with Phase A (conceptual analysis) studies that tbcused on user requirements and their implications for design. The task force developed the space station concept that formed the basis tbr President Reagan's decision to commit to a space station. The task force remained in existence until April 6, 1984, when, in response to Reagan's January 1984 State of the Union address, NASA established an interim Space Station Program Office. Culbertson, in addition to his duties as associate deputy administrator, assumed the role of acting director of the interim office, with Hodge (former director of the Space Station Task Force) as his acting deputy. The interim office was responsible for the direction of the Space Station program and for the planning of the organizational structure of a permanent program office. Also during the first half of 1984, NASA formulated the Space Station program management structure. Associate administrators and center directors agreed to use a "work package" concept and a three-level management structure consisting of a Headquarters office, a program office at the Johnson Space Center, and project offices located at the various NASA centers. The interim office became permanent on August 1, 1984, when NASA established Code S, Office of Space Station. Culbertson became the Associate Administrator for Space Station, and Hodge served as the deputy associate administrator. Culbertson served until December 1985, when he was succeeded by Hodge, who became acting associate administrator. The Office of Space Station was responsible for developing the station and conducting advanced development and technology activities, advanced planning, and other activities required to carry out Reagan's direction to NASA to develop a permanently manned space station within a decade. The program continued using the three-tiered management structure developed earlier in the year. The Headquarters Level A office

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN

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115

encompassed Space Station

the Office of the Associate Administrator and provided overall policy and program

for the Office of direction for the

Space Station program. The Level B Space Station Program Office at Johnson in Houston reported to the Headquarters office. Space Station Level C project offices at other NASA centers also were responsible to the Office of Space Station through the Johnson program office. Johnson had been named lead center for the Space Station program in February 1984. The associate administrator was supported by a chief scientist, policy and plans and program support offices, and business management, engineering, utilization and performance requirements, and operations divisions. On June 30, 1986, Andrew J. Stofan, who had been director of NASA's Lewis Research Center in Cleveland, was appointed Associate Administrator tk)r Space Station. Along with this appointment, NASA Administrator James C. Fletcher announced several management structural actions that were designed to strengthen technical and management capabilities in preparation Space Station program. The decision to create tions made by a committee General Samuel C. Phillips. for moving the new into the development resulted from phase of the

structure

recommenda-

headed by lkwmer Apollo program manager General Phillips had conducted a review of

space station management as part of a long-range assessment of NASA's overall capabilities and requirements, including relationships between the various space centers and NASA Headquarters. His report reflected discussions with representatives from all the NASA centers and the contractors involved in the definition and preliminary design of the space station, as well as officials from other offices within NASA. His report recommended the formation of a program office, which was implemented in October 1986 when NASA Administrator Fletcher named Thomas L. Moser director of the Associate Administrator Space Stofan. Station Program Office, reporting to

Fletcher stated that the new space station management structure was consistent with recommendations of the Rogers Commission, which investigated the Space Shuttle Challenger accident. The commission had recommended that NASA reconsider management structures, lines of communication, and decision-making processes to ensure the flow of important information to proper decision levels. As part of the reconfiguration of the management structure, the Johnson Space Center was no longer designated as Level B. Instead, a Level A' was substituted, located in the Washington metropolitan area, assuming the same functions Johnson previously held (Figure 3-3). Fletcher said the program would use the services of a top-level, nonhardware support contractor. In addition to the systems engineering role, the program office would contain a strong operations function to ensure that the program adequately addressed the intensive needs of a permanent facility in space.

116

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Level NASA Headquarters,

A Washington, DC Washington, DC

Policy and overall program direction

1_

Management, administrative, office Level automation, A Suppo__._..____ documentaiton, Contractor__.ss graphics

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management content

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Figure

3.

Space

Station

Pn_gram

Management

Approach

NASA established a systems integration field office in Houston as part of the program office organization. Project managers at the Goddard Space Flight Center, Johnson, Kennedy, Lewis, and Marshall reported functionally to the associate administrator. They coordinated with their respective center directors to keep them informed of significant program matters. NASA assigned John Hodge the job of streamlining and clarifying NASA's procurement and management approach for the Space Station program and issuing instructions related to work package assignments, the procurement of hardware and services, and the selection of contractors for the development phase of the program. In addition, NASA tasked Hodge with developing a program overview document that would define the role automation and robotics would play in the Space Station program and with conducting further studies in the areas of international involvement, long-term operations, user accommodations, and servicing. At the same time, Fletcher authorized NASA to procure a Technical and Management Information System (TMIS), a computer-based information network. It would link NASA and contractor facilities together and provide engineering services, such as computer-aided design, as well as management support on items such as schedules, budgets, labor, and facilities. TMIS was implemented in 1988. The Space Station Program Office was responsible for the overall technical direction and content of the Space Station program, including systems engineering and analysis, configuration management, and the integration of all elements into an operating system that was responsive to customer needs. NASA approved a further reorganization of the Office of Space Station in December 1986.

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN

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117

Associate Adminislrator

Deputy AsSOchate Adm_nistralor fle_Jability Quality Safety, Assurance & Oepuh/AsSOCiale Admimstrator Development tof

Spec_a_

Ass_stanl

Eng,neer Senior

Scient,st Ch_el

I
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I
Adminlslral_on Oiws_on

I
D_vl$_on Operaoons Division Utillzali_n D_vhs_on & progfams Division

Figure

3-4.

Office

_?]Space

Station

Oremtization

(Decemher

1986)

In addition to the associate administrator and two deputies, the approved Space Station program organization included a chief scientist, a senior engineer, and six division directors responsible for resources and administration, policy, utilization, operations, strategic plans and programs, and information systems. There was also a position of special assistant to the associate administrator (Figure 3-4). Andrew Stofan continued in the position of associate administrator. Franklin D. Martin continued as the deputy associate administrator for space station. Previously director of space and Earth sciences at the Goddard Space Flight Center, Martin had been named to the post in September 1986. Thomas L. Moser became the deputy associate administrator for development in October 1986, a new position established by the reorganization. In this position, Moser also served as the program director for the Office of Space Station, directing the Washington area office that was responsible for overall technical direction and content of the Space Station program, including systems engineering and analysis, program planning and control, configuration management, and the integration of all the elements into an operating system. The creation of the program director position was the central element of program restructuring in response to recommendations of the committee headed by General Phillips. The Phillips Committee conducted an extensive examination of the Space Station organization. As a result of this restructuring, NASA centers performed a major portion of the systems integration through Space Station field offices that were established at Goddard, Johnson, Kennedy, Lewis, and Marshall. The space station project manager at each of the five centers headed the field office and reported directly to the program manager in Washington.

I 18

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

A program support contractor assisted the program office and field offices in systems engineering, analysis, and integration activities. Also as part of this reorganization, NASA named Daniel H. Herman senior engineer, a new staff position. The senior engineer advised the associate administrator on the policy, schedule, cost, and user implications of technical decisions. Previously, Herman was director of the engineering division, whose functions and responsibilities were absorbed by Moser's organization, and was on the original Space Station Task Force, which defined the basic architecture of the space station system. David C. Black continued to serve as chief scientist for the space station. Black, chief scientist of the Space Research Directorate at the Ames Research Center_ had served as chief scientist for the space station since the post was created in 1984. Paul G. Anderson acted as the director of the Resources and Administration Division, which combined the former business management and program support organizations. Anderson previously served as comptroller at the Lewis Research Center. Margaret Finarelli, director of the Policy Division, had functional responsibility for the former policy and plans organization. This element of the reorganization reflected the strong policy coordination role required of the Space Station Program Office in working with other elements of NASA, the international partners, and other external organizations. Prior to this assignment, Finarelli was chief of the International Planning and Programs Office in the International Affairs Division at NASA Headquarters. Richard E. Halpern became the director of the Utilization Division, which had responsibility to1 developing user requirements for the space station, including science and applications, technology development, commercial users, and the assurance that those requirements could be efficiently and economically accommodated on the space station. Halpern was the director of the Microgravity Science and Applications Division in the Office of Space Science and Applications prior to accepting this position. The Operations Division had the responsibility for developing an overall philosophy and management approach for space station system operations, including user support, prelaunch and postlanding activities, logistics support, and financial management. Granville Paules served as acting director of the Operations Division. Under the new organization, NASA formed two new divisions, Strategic Plans and Programs and Information Systems. The Information Systems Division provided a management focus for the total end-to-end information system complex for Space Station. Alphonso V. Diaz assumed the position of director of strategic plans and programs and had responsibility for ensuring that the evolution of the space station infrastructure was well planned and coordinated with other NASA offices and external elements. As part of its responsibility, this division managed and acted as the single focus for space station automa-

SPACE

TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN

SPACEFLIGHT

119

tion and robotics activities and program-focused advanced development work. The Strategic Plans and Program Division under responsible Definition Evolution

technology Mr. Diaz

and became

tbr determining requirements and managing the Transition program at Level A. The division maintained the Space Station Technical and Management Plan, which detailed evolution

planning fi)r the long-term use of the space station. The Level A' Space Station Program Office in Reston, Virginia, managed the program, including provision for the "hooks and scars," which were design features lbr the addition or update of computer software (hooks) or hardware (scars). The Langley Evolution Definition Office chaired the agencywide Evolution Working Group, which provided interagency communication and coordination of station evolution, planning, and interfaces with the baseline Work Packages (Level C). (Work Packages are addressed later in this chapter.) William P. Raney, who had served as director of the Utilization and Performance Requirements Division, served as special assistant to the associate administrator. Stofan served as Associate Administrator for Space Station until his retirement replaced by James B. Odom. Money from NASA in April 1988, when he was

for Human

Spaceflight

As with money |or launch systems, Congress funded human spaceflight entirely from the Research and Development (R&D) appropriation through FY 1983. Beginning with FY 1984, the majority of funds for human spaceflight came from the Space Flight, Control, and Data Communications (SFC&DC) appropriation. Only funds for the Space Station and Spacelab programs remained with R&D. In FY 1985, Space Station became a program office with its own budget. Spacelab remained in the Office of Space Flight. As seen in Table 3-1, appropriated funding levels lk)r human spaceflight lor most years met NASNs budget requests as submitted to Congress. The last column in the table shows the actual amounts that were programmed for the major budget items. Program funding generally increased during 1979-1988 (Table 3-2). However, the reader must note that these figures are all current year money--that is, the dollar amounts do not take into account the reduced buying power caused by inflation. In addition, the items that are included in a major budget category change from one year to the next, depending on the current goals and resources of the agency and of Congress. Thus, it is difficult to compare dollar amounts because the products or services that those dollars are intended to buy may differ from year to year. Tables 3-3 through 3-10 show funding levels for individual programs within the human spaceflight category.

120 Space Station

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

NASA's initial estimate of the U.S. investment in the Space Station program was $8 billion in 1984 dollars. By March 1988, this estimate had grown to $14.5 billion, even though, in 1987, the National Research Council had priced the Space Station program at $31.8 billion.' President Reagan strongly endorsed the program and persuaded an ambivalent Congress of its importance. Program funding reflected both his persuasive powers and the uncertainty in which members of Congress looked at the space station, who took the view that it had little real scientific or technological purpose. The congressional Office of Technology Assessment reported that Congress should not commit to building a space station until space goals were more clear and that the potential uses of the proposed station did not justify the $8 billion price tag. Congress passed the FY 1985 appropriation of $155.5 million for starting the design and development work on the space station based on NASA's initial $8 billion figure. The FY 1986 appropriation reduced the Administration's request from $230 million to $205 million. President Reagan's FY 1987 budget asked for $410 million for the Space Station program, doubling the station funds from the previous year. Congress approved this increase in August 1986, which would move space station into the development phase toward planned operation by the mid- 1990s. However, Congress placed limitations on the appropriation; it stipulated that NASA funds could not be spent to reorganize the program without congressional approval. In addition, $150 million was to be held back until NASA met several design and assembly requirements set by the House Appropriations Committee. About $260 million of the $410 million were to be spent for Phase B activities, and the other $150 million was reserved for initial hardware development. NASA must comply with the following conditions: a minimum of thirty-seven and a half kilowatts of power for initial operating capability, rather than the twenty-five kilowatts envisioned by NASA; a fully equipped materials processing laboratory by the sixth Space Shuttle flight and before crew habitat was launched; early launch of scientific payloads; and deployment of U.S. core elements before foreign station elements. 2 During the next month, NASA Administrator James Fletcher stated that the $8 billion estimated for the Space Station program was now seen to be insufficient and that the station must either receive additional funds or be scaled down. The Reagan Administration submitted a request in

'National Research Council, Report of the Committee on the Space Station c_[" the National Research Council (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, September 1987). -_Report to accompany Department of Housing and Urban Development-Independent Agencies Appropriations Budget, 1987, House of Representatives.

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January 1987 for $767 million for the Space Station program. However, after much debate, which raised the possibility of freezing the entire program. Congress appropriated only $425 million, but again, conditions were attached. In the FY 1988 Continuing Resolution that funded the program, Congress ordered NASA to provide a rescoping plan for the space station. In addition, only $200 million of the $425 million was to be available before June 1, 1988, while the rescoping was under discussion. By the time the rescoping plan had gone to Congress, the cost of the Station was up to $14.5 billion. Further talks in Congress later during the year proposed reducing funding for FY 1989 to an even lower level. The Space Transportation System

This section fk)cuses on the structure and operation of the equipment and systems used in the Space Transportation System (STS) and describes the mission and flight operations. The overview provides a brief chronology of the system's development. The next section looks at the orbiter as the prime component of STS. (The launch-related elements-that is, the external tank, solid rocket boosters, main engines, and the propulsion system in general--have been addressed previously in Chapter 2, "Launch Systems.") The last part of this section addresses STS mission operations and support. A vast quantity of data exists on the Space Shuttle, and this document presents only a subset of the available material. It is hoped that the primary subject areas have been treated adequately and that the reader will get a useful overview of this complex system. It is highly recommended that readers who wish to acquire more detailed information consult the NSTS Shuttle Refi, rence Manual (1988).: Overview The history of NASA's STS began early in the 1970s when President Richard Nixon proposed the development of a reusable space transportation system. The NASA Historical Data Book, Volume III, 1969-1978, presents an excellent account of events that took place during those early days of the program? By 1979, all major STS elements were proceeding in test and manufacture, and major ground test programs were approaching completion. NASA completed the design certification review of the overall Space Shuttle configuration in April 1979. Development testing throughout the

'NSTS Shuttle Refi, rence Manual (1988), available both through the NASA History Office and on-line through the NASA Kennedy Space Center Home Page. _Linda Neuman Ezell, NASA Historical Data Book, V_dume lll: Programs and Prgiects, 1969-1978 (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4012. 1988).

122

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK complete, test article and the program was qualifying for struc-

program was substantially flight-configured systems. The orbiter's structural

was under subcontract

tural testing and would ultimately be converted to become the second orbital vehicle, Challenge_ The development of Columbia was proceeding more slowly than anticipated, with much work remaining to be completed before the first flight, then scheduled for late [980. The main engine had accumulated more than 50,000 seconds of test time toward its goal of 80,000 seconds before the first orbital flight, and the first external tank that would be used during flight had been delivered as well as three test tanks. Three flight tanks were also being manufactured for flight in the orbital flight test program. By the end of 1979, Morton Thiokol, the solid rocket booster contractor, had completed four development firings of the solid rocket boosters, and the qualification firing program had started. Two qualification motor firings had been made, and one more was scheduled before the first flight. Most of the rocket segments for the first flight boosters had been delivered to Kennedy Space Center. All launch and landing facilities at Kennedy were complete and in place for the first orbital flight. Ground support equipment and the computerized launch-processing installations were almost complete, and software validation was progressing. All hardware for the launch processing system had been delivered, simulation support was continuing for the development of checkout procedures, and checkout software was being developed and validated. By the end of 1979, nine commercial and foreign users had reserved space on Space Shuttle flights. Together with NASA's own payloads and firm commitments from the Department of Defense (DOD) and other U.S. government agencies, the first few years of STS operations were fully booked. During 1980, testing and manufacture of all major system continued, and by the end of 1980, major ground-test programs neared completion. The first flight-configuration Space Shuttle stood on the launch pad. Additional testing of the vehicle was under way; qualification testing of flight-configured elements continued toward a rescheduled launch in the spring of 1981. In December 1980, Columbia was in final processing at the Kennedy Space Center. The main engines had surpassed their goal of 80,000 seconds of engine test time, with more than 90,000 seconds completed. Technicians had mated the orbiter with the solid rocket boosters and external tank in November and rolled it out onto the launch pad in December. Contractors had delivered the final flight hardware, which was in use for vehicle checkout. Hardware and thermal protection system certifications were nearly complete. Further manufacture and testing of the external tanks and solid rocket boosters had also been completed. The Kennedy launch site facilities were completed during 1980 in anticipation of the first launch. The computerized launch processing system had been used extensively for Space Shuttle testing and facility acti-

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vation. The high-energy grated test of the Shuttle The mission control

fuel systems had been checked out, and the intewas complete. center and Shuttle mission simulator facilities at

the Johnson Space Center were ready to support the first Shuttle flight. Both the {light crew and ground flight controllers had used these facilities extensively for training and procedure development and verification. Seven full-duration (fifly-lkmr-hour) integrated simulations had been successfully' conducted, with numerous ascent, orbit, entry, and landing runs completed. The mission flight rules and launch-commit criteria had also been completed. Follow-on orbiter production was in progress, leading to the tkmrorbiter fleet for the STS's future needs. The structural test article was being modified to a flight-configured orbiter, Challenge1: Secondary and primary structural installations were under way, and thermal protection installations had begun Ik)r vehicle delivery in June 1982. The Space Shuttle program made its orbital debut with its first two flights in 1981. All major mission objectives were met on both flights. Details of these missions and other STS missions through 1988 appear in later sections of this chapter. The following pages describe the orbiter's structure, major systems, and operations, including crew training. Because this volume concentrates on the period from 1979 through 1988, the wording reflects configurations and activities as they existed during that decade. However, most of the Space Shuttle's physical characteristics and operations have continued beyond 1988 and are still valid. Orbiter Structure

NASA designed the Space Shuttle orbiter as a space transport vehicle that could be reused for approximately 100 missions. The orbiter was about the same length and weight as a commercial DC-9 airplane. Its structure consisted of the forward fuselage (upper and lower forward fuselage and the crew module, which could accommodate up to seven crew members in normal operations and up to ten during emergency operations), the wings, the mid-fuselage, the payload bay doors, the aft fuselage, and the vertical stabilizer. Its appearance, however, differed markedly from a conventional airplane. High-performance double-delta (or triangular) wings and a large cargo bay gave the Shuttle its squat appearance (Figure 3-5 and Table 3-11). A cluster of three Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSMEs) in the aft fuselage provided the main propulsion for the orbiter vehicle. The external tank carried fuel for the orbiter's main engines. Both the solid rocket boosters and the external tank were jettisoned prior to orbital insertion. In orbit, the orbital maneuvering system (OMS), contained in two pods on the aft fuselage, maneuvered the orbiter. The OMS provided the thrust lk)r orbit insertion, orbit circularization, orbit transfer, rendezvous, deorbit, abort-to-orbit, and abort-once-around and could provide up to 453.6 kilograms of

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NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Ruddor/speed

Brake

I_

FIsd|itor

Aft

_ulkh_d

RIidll_or

Orbital

Thrusters Ol_rorvml

Focwltd Reectlc41 Control

8ody

Ftap

_'_

Payloed TrIckmr Door Side Hatch Ma_lpUl_Or ASynl_em

Landing

(e_

Orb;ter L_llgth 37.24 Milers

WInglpln 2'379 Met ers

Figure

3-5.

Space

Shuttle

Orbiter

propellant to the aft reaction control system (RCS). The RCS, contained in the two OMS pods and in a module in the nose section of the forward fuselage, provided attitude control in space and during reentry and was used during rendezvous and docking maneuvers. When it completed its orbital activities, the orbiter landed horizontally, as a glider, at a speed of about ninety-five meters per second and at a glide angle of between eighteen and twenty-two degrees. The liquid hydrogen-liquid oxygen engine was a reusable high-performance rocket engine capable of various thrust levels. Ignited on the ground prior to launch, the cluster of three main engines operated in parallel with the solid rocket boosters during the initial ascent. After the boosters separated, the main engines continued to operate for approximately eight and a half minutes. The SSMEs developed thrust by using high-energy propellants in a staged combustion cycle. The propellants were partially combusted in dual preburners to produce high-pressure hot gas to drive the turbopumps. Combustion was completed in the main combustion chamber. The SSME could be throttled over a thrust range of 65 to 109 percent, which provided for a high thrust level during iiftoffand the initial ascent phase but allowed thrust to be reduced to limit acceleration to three g's during the final ascent phase. The orbiter was constructed primarily of aluminum and was protected from reentry heat by a thermal protection system. Rigid silica tiles or some other heat-resistant material shielded every part of the Space Shuttle's external shell. Tiles covering the upper and forward fuselage sections and the tops of the wings could absorb heat as high as

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT

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650degrees Centigrade. Tilesontheunderside absorbed temperatures up to 1,260degrees Centigrade. Areasthathadto withstand temperatures greater than1,260 degrees Centigrade, such asthenose andleading edges of thewingson reentry, werecovered with blackpanels madeof reinforcedcarbon-carbon. A five-computer network configured in a redundant operating group (fouroperate atall times andoneisa backup) monitored all Space Shuttle subsystems. Theysimultaneously processed datafromeveryareaof the Shuttle, eachinteracting withtheothers andcomparing data. Duringascent, acceleration waslimitedto lessthanthreeg's.During reentry, acceleration waslessthantwo anda half g's. By comparison, Apollocrewshadto withstand asmuchaseightg's duringreentryinto the Earth'satmosphere. The Space Shuttle's relativelycomfortable ride allowedcrew otherthanspeciallytrainedastronauts to travel on the Shuttle. Whilein orbit,crewmembers inhabited a "shirtsleeve" environmerit--nospacesuits or breathing apparatus wererequired. The microgravityatmosphere remained virtuallytheonlynon-Earth-like condition thatcrewmembers hadto encounter. NASAnamed the first four orbiterspacecraft afterfamousexplorationsailingships:
Columbia (OV-102), the first operational orbiter, was named after a sailing frigate launched in 1836, one of the first Navy ships to circumnavigate the globe. Columbia also was the name of the Apollo 11 command module that carried Neil Armstrong, Michael Collins, and Edwin "Buzz" Aldrin on the first lunar landing mission in July 1969. Columbia was delivered to Rockwell's Palmdale assembly facility for modifications on January 30, 1984, and was returned to the Kennedy Space Center on July 14, 1985, for return to flight. Challenger (OV-099) was also the name of a Navy ship, one that explored the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans from 1872 to 1876. The name also was used in the Apollo program for the Apollo 17 lunar module. Challenger was delivered to Kennedy on July 5, 1982. Discovery (OV-103) was named alter two ships. One was the vessel in which Henry Hudson in 1610-11 attempted to search for a northwest passage between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and instead discovered the Hudson Bay. The other was the ship in which Captain Cook discovered the Hawaiian Islands and explored southern Alaska and western Canada. Discover3, was delivered to Kennedy on November 9, 1983. Atlantis (OV-104) was named alter a two-masted ketch operated for the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute from 1930 to 1966 that traveled more than half a million miles conducting ocean research. Atlantis was delivered to Kennedy on April 3, 1985.

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A fifth orbiter, Endeavour (OV-105), was named by Mississippi school children in a contest held by NASA. It was the ship of Lieutenant James Cook in 1769-71, on a voyage to Tahiti to observe the planet Venus passing between the Earth and the Sun. This orbiter was delivered to NASA by Rockwell International in 1991.
Major Systems Avionics Systems

The Space Shuttle avionics system controlled, or assisted in controlling, most of the Shuttle systems. Its functions included automatic determination of the vehicle's status and operational readiness; implementation sequencing and control for the solid rocket boosters and external tank during launch and ascent; performance monitoring; digital data processing; communications and tracking; payload and system management: guidance, navigation, and control; and electrical power distribution for the orbiter, external tank, and solid rocket boosters. Thermal Protection System

A passive thermal protection system helped maintain the temperature of the orbiter spacecraft, systems, and components within their temperature limits primarily during the entry phase of the mission. It consisted of various materials applied externally to the outer structural skin of the orbiter. Orbiter Purge, Vent, and Drain System The purge, vent, and drain system on the orbiter provided unpressurized compartments with gas purge lbr thermal conditioning and prevented the accumulation of hazardous gases, vented the unpressurized compartments during ascent and entry, drained trapped fluids (water and hydraulic fluid), and conditioned window cavities to maintain visibility. Orbiter Communications System

The Space Shuttle orbiter communications system transferred (1) telemetry information about orbiter operating conditions and configurations, systems, and payloads; (2) commands to the orbiter systems to make them perform some function or configuration change; (3) documentation from the ground that was printed on the orbiter's teleprinter or text and graphics system; and (4) voice communications among the flight crew members and between the fight crew and ground. This information was transferred through hardline and radio frequency links. Direct communication took place through Air Force Satellite Control Facility remote tracking station sites, also known as the Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network ground stations [br NASA missions or space-

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ground link system ground stations for military missions. Direct signals from the ground to the orbiter were referred to as uplinks, and signals from the orbiter to the ground were called downlinks. Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (TDRS) communication took place through the White Sands Ground Terminal. These indirect signals from TDRS to the orbiter were called forward links, and the signal from the orbiter to the TDRS was called the return link. Communication with a detached payload from the orbiter was also referred to as a forward link, and the signal from the payload to the orbiter was the return link. Refer to Chapter 4, "Tracking and Data Acquisition Systems," in Volume VI of the NASA Historical Databook for a more detailed description of Shuttle tracking and communications systems. Data Processing System

The data processing system, through the use of various hardware components and its self-contained computer programming (software), provided the vehicle with computerized monitoring and control. This system supported the guidance, navigation, and control of the vehicle, including calculations of trajectories, SSME thrusting data, and vehicle attitude control data; processed vehicle data for the flight crew and for transmission to the ground and allowed ground control of some vehicle systems via transmitted commands: checked data transmission errors and crew control input errors: supported the annunciation of vehicle system failures and out-of-tolerance system conditions; supported payloads with flight crew/software interlace for activation, deployment, deactivation, and retrieval; processed rendezvous, tracking, and data transmissions between payloads and the ground: and monitored and controlled vehicle subsystems. Guidance, Navigation, and Control

Guidance, navigation, and control software commanded the guidance, navigation, and control system to effect vehicle control and to provide the sensor and controller data needed to compute these commands. The process involved three steps: (I) guidance equipment and software computed the orbiter location required to satisfy mission requirements; (2) navigation tracked the vehicle's actual location; and (3) flight control transported the orbiter to the required location. A redundant set of four orbiter general purpose computers (GPCs) formed the primary avionics software system; a filth GPC was used as the backup flight system. The guidance, navigation, and control systern operated in two modes: auto and manual (control stick steering). In the automatic mode, the primary avionics software system essentially allowed the GPCs to fly the vehicle, the flight crew simply selected the various operational sequences. In the manual mode, the flight crew could control the vehicle using hand controls, such as the rotational hand controller, translational hand controller, speed brake/thrust controller, and rudder pedals. In this mode,

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flight crew commands still passed through and were issued by the GPCs. There were no direct mechanical links between the flight crew and the orbiter's various propulsion systems or aerodynamic surfaces; the orbiter was an entirely digitally controlled, fly-by-wire vehicle. Dedicated Display System

The dedicated displays provided the flight crew with information required to fly the vehicle manually or to monitor automatic flight control system performance. The dedicated displays were the attitude director indicators, horizontal situation indicators, alpha Mach indicators, altitude/vertical velocity indicators, a surface position indicator, RCS activity lights, a g-meter, and a heads-up display. Main Propulsion System main propulsion system is addressed in Chapter

The Space Shuttle's 2, "Launch Systems." Crew Escape System

The in-flight crew escape system was provided for use only when the orbiter would be in controlled gliding flight and unable to reach a runway. This condition would normally lead to ditching. The crew escape system provided the flight crew with an alternative to water ditching or to landing on terrain other than a landing site. The probability of the flight crew surviving a ditching was very slim. The hardware changes required to the orbiters following the STS 51-L (Challenger) accident enabled the flight crew to equalize the pressurized crew compartment with the outside pressure via the depressurization valve opened by pyrotechnics in the crew compartment aft bulkhead that a crew member would manually activate in the mid-deck of the crew compartment. The crew could also pyrotechnically jettison the crew ingress/egress side hatch manually in the mid-deck of the crew compartment and bail out from the mid-deck through the ingress/egress side hatch opening after manually deploying the escape pole through, outside, and down from the side hatch opening. Emergency Egress Slide. The emergency egress slide replaced the emergency egress side hatch bar. It provided the orbiter flight crew members with a rapid and safe emergency egress through the orbiter mid-deck ingress/egress side hatch after a normal opening of the side hatch or after jettisoning of the side hatch at the nominal end-of-mission landing site or at a remote or emergency landing site. The emergency egress slide supported return-to-launch-site, transatlantic-landing, abort-once-around, and normal end-of-mission landings. Secondary Emergency Egress. The lefthand flight deck overhead window provided the flight crew with a secondary emergency egress route.

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Side Hatch Jettison. The rnid-deck ingress/egress side hatch was modified to provide the capability of pyrotechnically jettisoning the side hatch for emergency egress on the ground. In addition, a crew compartment pressure equalization valve provided at the crew compartment aft bulkhead was also pyrotechnically activated to equalize cabin/outside pressure before the jettisoning of the side hatch. Crew Equipment Food System and Dining. The mid-deck of the orbiter was equipped with facilities for lbod stowage, preparation, and dining for each crew member. Three one-hour meal periods were scheduled for each day of the mission. This hour included time lot eating and cleanup. Breakfast, lunch, and dinner were scheduled as close to the usual hours as possible. Dinner was scheduled at least two to three hours before crew members began preparations for their sleep period. Shuttle Orbiter Medical System. The Shuttle orbiter medical system provided medical care in flight for minor illnesses and injuries. It also provided support lk)r stabilizing severely injured or ill crew members until they were returned to Earth. The medical system consisted of the medications and bandage kit and the emergency medical kit. Operational Bioinstrumentation System. The operational bioinstrumentation system provided an amplified electrocardiograph analog signal from either of two designated flight crew members to the orbiter avionics system, where it was converted to digital tape and transmitted to the ground in real time or stored on tape for dump at a later tirne. On-orbit use was limited to contingency situations. Radiation Equipment. The harmful biological effects of radiation must be minimized through mission planning based on calculated predictions and monitoring of dosage exposures. Preflight requirements included a projection of mission radiation dosage, an assessment of the probability of solar flares during the mission, and a radiation exposure history of flight crew members. In-flight requirements included the carrying of passive dosimeters by the flight crew members and, in the event of solar flares or other radiation contingencies, the readout and reporting of the active dosimeters. Crew Apparel. During launch and entry, crew members wore the crew altitude protection system consisting of a helmet, a communications cap, a pressure garment, an anti-exposure, anti-gravity suit, gloves, and boots. During launch and reentry, the crew wore escape equipment over the crew altitude protection system, consisting of an emergency oxygen system: parachute harness, parachute pack with automatic opener, pilot chute, drogue chute, and main canopy: a life raft; two liters of drinking water; flotation devices: and survival vest pockets containing a radio/beacon, signal mirror, shroud cutter, pen gun flare kit. sea dye marker, smoke flare, and beacon.

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Sleeping Provisions. Sleeping provisions consisted of sleeping bags, sleep restraints, or rigid sleep stations. During a mission with one shift, all crew members slept simultaneously and at least one crew member would wear a communication headset to ensure the reception of ground calls and orbiter caution and warning alarms. Personal Hygiene Provisions. Personal hygiene and grooming provisions were furnished for both male and female flight crew members. A water dispensing system provided water. Housekeeping. In addition to time scheduled for sleep periods and meals, each crew member had housekeeping tasks that required from five to fifteen minutes at intervals throughout the day. These included cleaning the waste management compartment, the dining area and equipment, floors and walls (as required), the cabin air filters, trash collection and disposal, and change-out of the crew compartment carbon dioxide (lithium hydroxide) absorber canisters. Sighting Aids. Sighting aids included all items used to aid the flight crew within and outside the crew compartment. They included the crewman optical alignment sight, binoculars, adjustable mirrors, spotlights, and eyeglasses. Microcassette Recorder. The microcassette recorder was used primarily for voice recording of data but could also be used to play prerecorded tapes. Photograph& Equipment. The flight crew used three camera systems--16mm, 35ram, and 70ram--to document activities inside and outside the orbiter. Wicket Tabs. Wicket tabs helped the crew members activate controls when vision was degraded. The tabs provided the crew members with tactile cues to the location of controls to be activated as well as a memory aid to their function, sequence of activation, and other pertinent information. Controls that were difficult to see during the ascent and entry flight phases had wicket tabs. Reach Aid. The reach aid, sometimes known as the '"swizzle stick," was a short adjustable bar with a multipurpose end effector that was used to actuate controls that were out of the reach of seated crew members. It could be used during any phase of flight, but was not recommended for use during ascent because of the attenuation and switch-cueing difficulties resulting from acceleration forces. Restraints and Mobility Aids. Restraints and mobility aids enabled the flight crew to perform all tasks safely and efficiently during ingress, egress, and orbital flight. Restraints consisted of foot loop restraints, the air/ock foot restraint platform, and the workdining table as well as temporary stowage bags, Velcro, tape, snaps, cable restraints, clips, bungees, and tethers. Mobility aids and devices consisted of handholds for ingress and egress to and from crew seats in the launch and landing configuration, handholds in the primary interdeck access opening for ingress and egress in the launch and landing configuration, a platform in the mid-deck for ingress and egress to and from the mid-deck when the orbiter is in the

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT launchconfiguration, andan interdeck

131

access ladder to enter the flight deck t?om the mid-deck in the launch configuration and go from the flight deck to the mid-deck in the launch and landing configuration. Crew Equipment Stowage. Crew equipment aboard the orbiter was stowed in lockers with two sizes of insertable trays. The trays could be adapted to accommodate a wide variety of soft goods, loose equipment, and food. The lockers were interchangeable and attached to the orbiter with crew fittings. The lockers could be removed or installed in flight by the crew members. Exercise Equipment. was a treadmill. Sound Level Meter. The only exercise The sound level equipment meter on the Shuttle on-orbit

determined

acoustical noise levels in the cabin. Depending on the requirements for each flight, the flight crew took meter readings at specified crew compartment and equipment locations. The data obtained by the flight crew were logged and/or voice recorded. Air ,Sampling System. The air sampling system consisted of air bob ties that were stowed in a modular locker. They were removed lbr sampiing and restowed for entry. On-Board Instrumentation. Orbiter operational instrumentation collected, routed, and processed information from transducers and sensors on the orbiter and its payloads. This system also interacted with the solid rocket boosters, external tank, and ground support equipment. More than 2,000 data points were monitored, and the data were routed to operational instrumentation multiplexers/demultiplexers. The instrumentation system consisted of transducers, signal conditioners, two pulse code modulation master units, encoding equipment, two operational recorders, one payload recorder, master timing equipment, and on-board checkout equipment. Payload Accommodations cate-

The Space Shuttle had three basic payload accommodation gories: dedicated, standard, and mid-deck accommodations:

Dedicated payloads took up the entire cargo-carrying capacity and services of the orbiter, such as the Spacelab and some DOD payloads. Standard payloads--usually geosynchronous communications satellites--were the primary type of cargo carried by the Space Shuttle. Normally, the payload bay could accommodate up to four standard payloads per flight. Power, command, and data services for standard payloads were provided by the avionics system through a standard mixed cargo harness. Mid-deck payloads--small, usually self-contained packages--were stored in compartments on the mid-deck. These were often manufacturing-in-space or small life sciences experiments.

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Structural attach points for payloads were located at 9.9-centimeter intervals along the tops of the two orbiter mid-fuselage main longerons. Some payloads were not attached directly to the orbiter but to payload carriers that were attached to the orbiter. The inertial upper stage, Spacelab and Spacelab pallet, and any specialized cradle for holding a payload were typical carriers. Small payloads mounted in the payload bay required a smaller range of accommodations. These payloads received a reduced level of electric power, command, and data services, and their thermal conditions were those in the payload bay thermal environment. Small payloads could be mounted in either a side-mounted or an across-the-bay configuration. The Space Shuttle could also accommodate small payloads in the mid-deck of the crew compartment. This location was ideal for payloads that required a pressurized crew cabin environment or needed to be operated directly by the crew. Payloads located in the mid-deck could also be stowed on board shortly before launch and removed quickly after landing. Space Shuttle Operations

Although each Space Shuttle mission was unique, Space Shuttle missions followed a prescribed sequence of activities that was common to all flights. The following sections describe the typical activities preceding launch, the launch and ascent activities, on-orbit events, and events surrounding mission descent events. and landing. Figure 3-6 shows the typical sequence of

Figure 3-6. Typical STS Flight Profile

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Space Shuttle components were gathered from various locations throughout the country and brought to Launch Complex 39 facilities at the Kennedy Space Center. There, technicians assembled the components-the orbiter, solid rocket booster, and external tank--into an integrated Space Shuttle vehicle, tested the vehicle, rolled it out to the launch pad, and ultimately launched it into space. Each of the components that comprised the Shuttle system underwent processing prior to launch. NASA used similar processing procedures for new and reused Shuttle flight hardware. In general, new orbiters underwent more checkouts before being installed. In addition, the main engines underwent test firing on the launch pad. Called the Flight Readiness Firing, the test verified that the main propulsion system worked properly. For orbiters that had already flown, turnaround processing procedures included various postflight deservicing and maintenance functions, which were carried out in parallel with payload removal and the installation of equipment needed for the next mission. If changes are made in external tank design, the tank usually required a tanking test in which it was loaded with liquid oxygen and hydrogen just as it was before launch. This confidence check verified the tank's ability to withstand the high pressures and super cold temperatures of the cryogenics. The processing of each major flight component consisted of independent hardware checks and servicing in an operation called standalone processing. Actual Shuttle vehicle integration started with the stacking of the solid rocket boosters on a Mobile Launcher Platform in one of the high bays of the Vehicle Assembly Building. Next, the external tank was moved from its Vehicle Assembly Building location to the Mobile Launcher Platform and was mated with the solid rocket boosters. The orbiter, having completed its prelaunch processing and after integrated payloads had been installed, was towed from Processing Facility to the Vehicle Assembly Building and position alongside the solid rocket boosters then mated to the external tank/solid rocket horizontally the Orbiter hoisted into

and the external tank. It was booster assembly. Alter mat-

ing was completed, the erection slings and load beams that had been holding the orbiter in place were removed, and the platforms and stands were positioned for orbiter/external tank/solid rocket booster access. After the orbiter had been mated to the external tank/solid rocket booster formed assembly and all umbilicals an electrical and mechanical were connected, technicians perverification of the mated interfaces

to verify all critical vehicle connections. The orbiter underwent a Space Shuttle interface test using the launch processing system to verify Shuttle vehicle interfaces and Shuttle vehicle-to-ground interfaces. After completion of interface testing, ordnance devices were installed, but not electrically connected. Final ordnance connection and flight close-out were completed at the pad.

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When the Vehicle Assembly Building prelaunch preparations were completed, the crawler transporter, an enormous tracked vehicle that NASA originally used during the Apollo and Skylab programs, lifted the assembled Space Shuttle and the Mobile Launcher Platform and rolled them slowly down a crawlerway to the launch pad at Launch Complex 39. Loaded, the vehicle moved at a speed of one mile an hour. The move took about six hours. At the pad, vertically integrated payloads were loaded into the payload bay. Then, technicians performed propellant servicing and needed ordnance tasks. After the Space Shuttle had been rolled out to the launch pad on the Mobile Launcher Platform, all prelaunch activities were controlled from the Launch Control Center using the Launch Processing System. On the launch pad, the Rotating Service Structure was placed around the Shuttle and power for the vehicle was activated. The Mobile Launcher Platform and the Shuttle were then electronically and mechanically mated with support launch pad facilities and ground support equipment. An extensive series of validation checks verified that the numerous interfaces were functioning properly. Meanwhile, in parallel with prelaunch pad activities, cargo operations began in the Rotating Service Structure's Payload Changeout Room. Vertically integrated payloads were delivered to the launch pad before the Space Shuttle was rolled out and stored in the Payload Changeout Room until the Shuttle was ready for cargo loading. Once the Rotating Service Structure was in place around the orbiter, the payload bay doors were opened and the cargo installed. Final cargo and payload bay close-outs were completed in the Payload Changeout Room, and the payload bay doors were closed for flight. Propellant Loading. Initial Shuttle propellant loading involved pumping hypergolic propellants into the orbiter's aft and forward OMS and RCS storage tanks, the orbiter's hydraulic Auxiliary Power Units, and the solid rocket booster hydraulic power units. These were hazardous operations, and while they were under way, work on the launch pad was suspended. Because these propellants were hypergolic--they ignite on contact with one another---oxidizer and fuel loading operations were carried out serially, never in parallel. Dewar tanks on the Fixed Service Structure were filled with liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen, which would be loaded into the orbiter's Power Reactant and Storage Distribution tanks during the launch countdown. Before the formal Space Shuttle launch countdown began, the vehicle was powered down while pyrotechnic devices were installed or hooked up. The extravehicular mobility units--spacesuits--were stored on board along with other items of flight crew equipment. Launch Processing System. The Launch Processing System made Space Shuttle processing, checkout, and countdown procedures more automated and streamlined than those of earlier human spaceflight programs. The countdown for the Space Shuttle took only about forty hours, compared with more than eighty hours usually needed for a

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Saturn/Apollo countdown. Moreover, the Launch Processing System called [k)r only about ninety people to work in the firing room during launch operations, compared with about 450 needed for earlier human missions. This system automatically controlled and perlkwmed much of the Shuttle processing from the arrival of individual components and their integration to launch pad operations and, ultimately, the launch itself. The system consisted of three basic subsystems: the Central Data Subsystem located on the second floor of the Launch Control Center, the Checkout, Control and Monitor Subsystem located in the firing rooms, and the Record and Playback Subsystem. Complex 39 Launch Pad Facilities. The Kennedy Space Center's Launch Complex 39 had two identical launch pads, which were originally designed and built for the Apollo lunar landing prograrn. The pads, built in the 1960s, were used lk)r all of the Apollo/Saturn V missions and the Skylab space station program. Between 1967 and 1975, twelve Apollo/Saturn V vehicles, one Skylab/Saturn V workshop, three Apollo/Saturn 1B vehicles for Skylab crews, and one Apollo/Saturn IB for the joint U.S.-Soviet Apollo Soyuz Test Project were launched from these pads. The pads underwent major modifications to accommodate the Space Shuttle vehicle. Initially, Pad A modifications were completed in mid1978, while Pad B was finished in 1985 and first used for the ill-fated STS 51-L mission in January 1986. The modifications included the construction of new hypergolic fuel and oxidizer support areas at the southwest and southeast corners of the pads, the construction of new Fixed Service Structures, the addition of a Rotating Service Structure, the addition of 1,135,620-1iter water towers and associated plumbing, and the replacement of the original flame deflectors with Shuttle-cornpatible dellectors. Following the flight schedule accident, NASA made an additional delays resulting from 105 pad modifications. the STS 51-L These includ-

ed the installation of a sophisticated laser parking system on the Mobile Launcher Platform to facilitate mounting the Shuttle on the pad and emergency escape system modifications to provide emergency egress for up to twenty-one people. The emergency shelter bunker also was modified to allow easier access from the slidewire baskets. Systems, facilities, and functions at the complex included:

Fixed Service Structure Orbiter Access Arm External Tank Hydrogen Vent Line and Access External Tank Gaseous Oxygen Vent Arm Emergency Exit System Lightning Mast Rotating Service Structure Payload Changeout Room Arm

136

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Orbiter Midbody Umbilical Unit Hypergolic Umbilical System Orbital Maneuvering System Pod Heaters Sound Suppression Water System Solid Rocket Booster Overpressure Suppression Main Engine Hydrogen Burnoff System Pad Surface Flame Detectors Pad-Propellant Storage and Distribution

System

Launch Sites. NASA used the Kennedy Space Center in Florida for launches that placed the orbiter in equatorial orbits (around the equator). The Vandenberg Air Force Base launch site in California was intended for launches that placed the orbiter in polar orbit missions, but it was never used and has been inactive since 1987. NASA's prime landing site was at Kennedy. Additional landing sites were provided at Edwards Air Force Base in Calitbrnia and White Sands, New Mexico. Contingency landing sites were also provided in the event the orbiter must return to Earth in an emergency. Kennedy Space Center launches had an allowable path no less than thirty-five degrees northeast and no greater than 120 degrees southeast. These were azimuth degree readings based on due east from Kennedy as ninety degrees. These two azimuths--thirty-five and 120 degrees--represented the launch limits from Kennedy. Any azimuth angles farther north or south would launch a spacecraft over a habitable land mass, adversely affect safety provisions for abort or vehicle separation conditions, or present the undesirable possibility that the solid rocket booster or external tank could land on foreign land or sea space. I_xmnch and Ascent At launch, the three SSMEs were ignited first. When the proper engine thrust level was verified, a signal was sent to ignite the solid rocket boosters. At the proper thrust-to-weight ratio, initiators (small explosives) at eight hold-down bolts on the solid rocket boosters were fired to release the Space Shuttle for liftoff. All this took only a few seconds. Maximum dynamic pressure was reached early in the ascent, approximately sixty seconds after liftoff. Approximately a minute later (two minutes into the ascent phase), the two solid rocket boosters had consumed their propellant and were jettisoned from the external tank at an altitude of 48.27 kilometers. This was triggered by a separation signal from the orbiter. The boosters briefly continued to ascend to an altitude of 75.6 kilometers, while small motors fired to carry them away from the Space Shuttle. The boosters then turned and descended, and at a predetermined altitude, parachutes were deployed to decelerate them for a safe splashdown in the ocean. Splashdown occurred approximately 261 kilometers from the launch site.

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Whena free-fallingboosterdescended to an altitude of about 4.8 kilometers, its nose cap was .jettisoned and the solid rocket booster
pilot parachute popped open. The pilot parachute then pulled out the 16.5-meter diameter, 499-kilogram drogue parachute. The drogue parachute stabilized and slowed the descent to the ocean. At an altitude of 1,902 meters, the frustum, a truncated cone at the top of thc solid rocket booster where it joined the nose cap, separated from the |brward skirt, causing the three main parachutes to pop out. These parachutes were thirty-five meters in diameter and had a dry weight of about 680 kilograms each, When wet with sea water, they weighed about 1,361 kilograms. At six minutes and forty-four seconds after liftoff, the spent solid rocket boosters, weighing about 7,484 kilograms, had slowed their descent speed to about 100 kilometers per hour, and splashdown took place in the predetermined area. There, a crew aboard a specially designed recovery vessel recovered the boosters and parachutes and returned them to the Kennedy Space Center lbr refurbishment. The parachutes remained attached to the boosters until they were detached by recovery personnel. Meanwhile, the orbiter and external tank continued to climb, using the thrust of the three SSMEs. Approximately eight minutes after launch and just short of orbital velocity, the three engines were shut down (main engine cutoff, or MECO), and the external tank was jettisoned on command from the orbiter. The forward and aft RCS engines provided attitude (pitch, yaw, and roll) and the translation of the orbiter away from the external tank at separation and return to attitude hold prior to the OMS thrusting maneuver. The external tank continued on a ballistic trajectory and entered the atmosphere, where it disintegrated. Its projected impact was in the Indian Ocean (except for fifty-seven-degree inclinations) for equatorial orbits. Aborts. An ascent abort might become necessary if a failure that affects vehicle performance, such as the failure of an SSME or an OMS. Other failures requiring early termination of a flight, such as a cabin leak, might also require an abort. Space Shuttle missions had two basic types of ascent abort modes: intact aborts and contingency aborts. Intact aborts were designed to provide a safe return of the orbiter to a planned landing site. Contingency aborts were designed to permit flight crew survival following more severe failures when an intact abort was not possible. A contingency abort would generally result in a ditch operation. Intact Aborts. There were four types of intact aborts: abort-to-orbit, abort-once-around, transatlantic landing, and return-to-launch-site (Figure 3-7): The abort-to-orbit (ATO) mode was designed to allow the vehicle to achieve a temporary orbit that was lower than the nominal orbit. This mode required less performance and allowed time to evaluate problems and then choose either an early deorbit maneuver or an OMS thrusting maneuver to raise the orbit and continue the mission.

138

NASA HISTORICAL

DATA BOOK

Nominal

mission

or ATO

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AOA

maneuv

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/
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.... ._ _ MECO
-% .... __ _'_" RTLS

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Inter_ac* 121 g20m '

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ii ii

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Launch

SRB impact

Exlernal Impact

tank

External impact

lank

To

landing

Figme 3-7. T)7_e.so/"Intact Aborts The abort-once-around (AOA) mode was designed to allow the vehicle to fly once around the Earth and make a normal entry and landing. This mode generally involved two OMS thrusting sequences, with the second sequence being a deorbit maneuver. The entry sequence would be similar to a normal entry. This abort mode was used on STS 51 -F and was the only abort that took place. The transatlantic landing mode was designed to permit an intact landing on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean. This mode resulted in a ballistic trajectory, which did not require an OMS maneuver. The return-to-launch-site (RTLS) mode involved flying downrange to dissipate propellant and then turning around under power to return directly to a landing at or near the launch site. A definite order of preference existed for the various abort modes. The type of failure and the time of the failure determined which type of abort is selected. In cases where pedbrmance loss was the only factor, the preferred modes would be abort-to-orbit, abort-once-around, transatlantic landing, and return-to-launch-site, in that order. The mode chosen was the highest one that could be completed with the remaining vehicle performance. In the case of some support system failures, such as cabin leaks or vehicle cooling problems, the preferred mode might be the one that would end the mission most quickly. In those cases, transatlantic landing or return-to-launch-site

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mightbepreferable to abort-once-around or abort-to-orbit. A contingency abollwasnever chosen if another abortoption existed. TheMission Control Center in Houston was'_prime" forcallingthese aborts because it hada moreprecise knowledge of theorbiter'sposition than the crew could obtain fiom on-board systems. Before MECO,
Mission Control made periodic calls to the crew to tell them which abort mode was (or was not) available. If ground communications were losl, the flight crew had on-board methods, such as cue cards, dedicated displays, and display information, to determine the current abort region. Contin_en_ 3' Aborts. Contingency aborts would occur when there was a loss of more than one main engine or other systems fail. Loss of one main engine while another was stuck at a low thrust setting might also require a contingency abort. Such an abort would maintain orbiter integrity for in-flight crew escape if a landing could not be achieved at a suitable landing field. Contingency aborts caused by system failures other than those inw)lving the main engines would normally result in an intact recovery of vehicle and crew. Loss of more than one main engine might, depending on engine failure times, result in a safe runway landing. However, in most three-engine-out cases during ascent, the orbiter would have to be ditched. The in-flight crew escape system would be used before ditching the orbiter. Orbfl Insertion. An orbit could be accomplished in two ways: the conventional OMS insertion method called "standard" (which was last used with STS-35 in December 1990) and the direct insertion method. The standard insertion method involved a brief burn of the OMS engines shortly after MECO, placing the orbiter into an elliptical orbit. A second OMS bum was initiated when the orbiter reached apogee in its elliptical orbit. This brought the orbiter into a near circular orbit. If required during a mission, the orbit could be raised or lowered by additional firings of the OMS thrusters. The direct insertion technique used the main engines to achieve the desired orbital apogee, or high point, thus saving OMS propellant. Only one OMS burn was required to circularize the orbit, and the remaining OMS fuel could then be used for frequent changes in the operational orbit, as called tk)r in the flight plan. The first direct insertion orbit took place during the STS 41-C mission in April 1984, when Challenger was placed in a 463-kilometer-high circular orbit where its flight crew successfully captured, repaired, and redeployed the Solar Maximum Satellite (Solar Max). The optimal orbital altitude of a Space Shuttle depended on the mission objectives and was determined before launch. The nominal altitude varied between 185 to 402 kilometers. During flight, however, problems, such as main engine and solid rocket booster performance loss and OMS propellant leaks or certain electrical power system failures, might prevent the vehicle from achieving the optimal orbit. In these cases, the OMS burns would be changed to compensate lk)r the failure by selecting a delayed OMS burn, abort-once-around, or abort-to-orbit option.

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NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Tables 3-12and3-13showtheevents leading uptoa typicallaunch andtheevents immediately followinglaunch?

On-Orbit Events. Once the orbiter achieved orbit, the major guidance, navigation, and control tasks included achieving the proper position, velocity, and attitude necessary to accomplish the mission objectives. To do this, the guidance, navigation, and control computer maintained an accurate state vector, targeted and initiated maneuvers to specified attitudes and positions, and pointed a specified orbiter body vector at a target. These activities were planned with fuel consumption, vehicle thermal limits, payload requirements, and rendezvous/proximity operations considerations in mind. The Mission Control Center, usually referred to as "Houston," controlled Space Shuttle flights. Maneuvering in Orbit. Once the Shuttle orbiter went into orbit, it operated in the near gravity-free vacuum of space. However, to maintain proper orbital attitude and to perform a variety of maneuvers, the Shuttle used an array of forty-six large and small rocket thrusters--the OMS and RCS that was used to place the Shuttle in orbit. Each of these thrusters burned a mixture of nitrogen tetroxide and monoethylhydrazine, a combination of fuels that ignited on contact with each other. Descent and Landing Activities

On-Orbit Checkout. The crew usually performed on-orbit checkout of the orbiter systems that were used during reentry the day before deorbit. System checkout had two parts. The first part used one auxiliary power unit/hydraulic system. It repositioned the left and right main engine nozzles for entry and cycled the aerosurfaces, hydraulic motors, and hydraulic switching valves. After the checkout was completed, the auxiliary power unit was deactivated. The second part checked all the crew-dedicated displays; self-tested the microwave scan beam landing system, tactical air navigation, accelerometer assemblies, radar altimeter, rate gyro assemblies, and air data transducer assemblies; and checked the hand controllers, rudder pedal transducer assemblies, speed brake, panel trim switches, RHC trim switches, speed brake takeover push button, and mode/sequence push button light indicators. Shuttle Landing Operations. When a mission accomplished its planned in-orbit operations, the crew began preparing the vehicle for its return to Earth. Usually, the crew devoted the last full day in orbit to activities, such as stowing equipment, cleaning up the living areas, and

_The terms "terminal count," "first stage," and "second stage" are commonly used when describing prelaunch, launch, and ascent events. The terminal phase extends from T minus twenty minutes where "T" refers to liftoff time. First-stage ascent extends from solid rocket booster ignition through solid rocket booster separation. Second-stage ascent begins at solid rocket booster separation and extends through MECO and external tank separation.

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making final systems configurations that would facilitate postlanding processing. The crew schedule was designed so that crew members were awake and into their "work day" six to eight hours before landing. About four hours before deorbit maneuvers were scheduled, the crew and flight controllers finished with the Crew Activity Plan for the mission. They then worked from the mission's Deorbit Prep Handbook, which covered the major deorbit events leading to touchdown. Major events included the "go" from Mission Control Center to close the payload bay doors and final permission to perform the deorbit burn, which would return the orbiter to Earth. Before the deorbit burn took place, the orbiter was turned to a tailfirst attitude--that is, the aft end of the orbiter faced the direction of travel. At a predesignated time, the OMS engines were fired to slow the orbiter and to permit deorbit. The RCS thrusters were then used to return the orbiter into a nose-first attitude. These thrusters were used during much of the reentry pitch, roll, and yaw maneuvering until the orbiter's aerodynamic, aircraft-like control surfaces encountered enough atmospheric drag to control the landing. This was called Entry Interlace and usually occurred thirty minutes before touchdown at about 122 kilometers altitude. At this time, a communications blackout occurred as the orbiter was enveloped in a sheath of plasma caused by electromagnetic forces generated from the high heat experienced during entry into the atmosphere. Guidance, navigation, and control software guided and controlled the orbiter from this state (in which aerodynamic forces were not yet felt) through the atmosphere to a precise landing on the designated runway. All of this must be accomplished without exceeding the thermal or structural limits of the orbiter. Flight control during the deorbit phase was similar to that used during orbit insertion. Orbiter Ground Turnaround. Approximately 160 Space Shuttle Launch Operations team members supported spacecraft recovery operations at the nominal end-of-mission landing site. Beginning as soon as the spacecraft stopped rolling, the ground team took sensor measurements to ensure that the atmosphere in the vicinity of the spacecraft was not explosive. In the event of propellant leaks, a wind machine truck carrying a large fan moved into the area to create a turbulent airflow that broke up gas concentrations and reduced the potential lot an explosion. A ground support equipment air-conditioning purge unit was attached to the righthand orbiter T-0 umbilical so cool air could be directed through the orbiter to dissipate the heat of entry. A second ground support equipment ground cooling unit was connected to the lefthand orbiter T-0 umbilical spacecraft Freon coolant loops to provide cooling for the flight crew and avionics during the postlanding and system checks. The flight crew then left the spacecraft, and a ground crew powered down the spacecraft. Meanwhile, at the Kennedy Space Center, the orbiter and ground support equipment convoy moved from the runway to the Orbiter Processing

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NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Facility.If the spacecraft landed at Edwards Air ForceBase, the same procedures andground support equipment applied asatKennedy afterthe orbiterhadstopped ontherunway. Theorbiterandground support equipmentconvoymovedfromthe runwayto the orbitermateanddemate facility.Afterdetailed inspection, thespacecraft wasprepared to beferriedatoptheShuttle carrieraircraftfromEdwards to Kennedy. Upon its returnto the Orbiter Processing Facilityat Kennedy, a ground crewsafed theorbiter,removed itspayload, andreconfigured the orbiterpayload bayfor thenextmission. Theorbiteralsounderwent any required maintenance andinspections while in the OrbiterProcessing Facility. Thespacecraft wasthentowedtotheVehicle Assembly Building andmated to thenewexternal tank,beginning thecycleagain.
Mission Control

The Mission Control Center at Johnson Space Center in Houston controlled all Shuttle flights. It has controlled more than sixty NASA human spaceflights since becoming operational in June 1965 for the Gemini IV mission. Two flight control rooms contained the equipment needed to monitor and control the missions. The Mission Control Center assumed mission control functions when the Space Shuttle cleared the service tower at Kennedy's Launch Complex 39. Shuttle systems data, voice communications, and television traveled almost instantaneously to the Mission Control Center through the NASA Ground and Space Networks, the latter using the orbiting TDRS. The Mission Control Center retained its mission control function until the end of a mission, when the orbiter landed and rolled to a stop. At that point, Kennedy again assumed control. Normally, sixteen major flight control consoles operated during a Space Shuttle mission. Each console was identified by a title or "call sign," which was used when communicating with other controllers or the astronaut flight crew. Teams of up to thirty flight controllers sat at the consoles directing and monitoring all aspects of each flight twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. A flight director headed each team, which typically worked an eight-hour shift. Table 3-14 lists the mission command and control positions and responsibilities. During Spacelab missions, an additional position, the command and data management systems officer, had primary responsibility for the data processing of the Spacelab's two main computers. To support Spacelab missions, the electrical, environmental, and consumables systems engineer and the data processing systems engineer both worked closely with the command and data management systems officer because the missions required monitoring additional displays involving almost 300 items and coordinating their activities with the Marshall Space Flight Center's Payload Operations Control Center (POCC). The Mission Control Center's display/control system was one of the most unusual support facilities. It consisted of a series of projected screen

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displays that showed the orbiter's real-time location, tures of crew activities, Earth views, and extravehicular

live

television picactivities. Other

displays included mission elapsed time as well as time remaining before a maneuver or other major mission event. Many decisions or recommendations made by the flight controllers were based on information shown on the display/control system displays Eventually, it was planned that modern state-of-the-art workstations with more capability to monitor and analyze vast amounts of data would replace the Apollo-era consoles. Moreover, instead of driving the consoles with a single main computer, each console would eventually have its own smaller computer, which could monitor a specific system and be linked into a network capable of sharing the data. The POCCs operated in conjunction with the Flight Control Rooms. They housed principal investigators and commercial users who monitored and controlled payloads being carried aboard the Space Shuttle. One of the most extensive POCCs was at the Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama, where Spacelab missions were coordinated with the Mission Control Center, It was the command post, communications hub, and data relay station for the principal investigators, mission managers, and support teams. Here, decisions on payload operations were made, coordinated with the Mission Control Center flight director, and sent to the Spacelab or Shuttle. The POCC at the Goddard Space Flight Center controlled free-flying spacecraft that were deployed, retrieved, or serviced by the Space Shuttle. Planetary mission spacecraft were controlled from the POCC at NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, California. Finally, private sector payload operators and foreign governments maintained their own POCCs at various locations for the control of spacecraft systems under their control. NASA Centers and Responsibilities

Several NASA centers had responsibility for particular areas of the Space Shuttle program. NASA's Kennedy Space Center in Florida was responsible for all launch, landing, and turnaround operations for STS missions requiring equatorial orbits. Kennedy had primary responsibility for prelaunch checkout, launch, ground turnaround operations, and support operations for the Shuttle and its payloads. Kennedy's Launch Operations had responsibility for all mating, prelaunch testing, and launch control ground activities until the Shuttle vehicle cleared the launch pad tower. Responsibility was then turned over to NASA's Mission Control Center at the Johnson Space Center in Houston. The Mission Control Center's responsibility included ascent, on-orbit operations, entry, approach, and landing until landing runout completion, at which time the orbiter was handed over to the postlanding operations at the landing site [or turnaround and relaunch. At the launch site, the solid rocket boosters and external tank were processed for launch and the solid rocket boosters were recycled for reuse. The Johnson Space Center was responsible for the integration of the complete Shuttle vehicle and was the central control point for Shuttle missions.

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NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama, was responsible for the SSMEs, external tanks, and solid rocket boosters. NASA's National Space Technology Laboratories at Bay St. Louis, Mississippi, was responsible for testing the SSMEs. NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland, operated a worldwide tracking station network. Crew Selection, Crew Selection NASA selected the first group of astronauts--known as the Mercury seven--in 1959. Since then, NASA has selected eleven other groups of astronaut candidates. Through the end of 1987, 172 individuals have graduated from the astronaut program. NASA selected the first thirty-five astronaut candidates for the Space Shuttle program in January 1978. They began training at the Johnson Space Center the following June. The group consisted of twenty mission specialists and fifteen pilots and included six women and four members of minority groups. They completed their one-year basic training program in August 1979. NASA accepted applications from qualified individuals--both civilian and military--on a continuing basis. Upon completing the course, successful candidates became regular members of the astronaut corps. Usually, they were eligible for a flight assignment about one year after completing the basic training program. Pilot Astronauts. Pilot astronauts served as either commanders or pilots on Shuttle flights. During flights, commanders were responsible for the vehicle, the crew, mission success, and safety. The pilots were second in command; their primary responsibility was to assist the Shuttle commander. During flights, commanders and pilots usually assisted in spacecraft deployment and retrieval operations using the Remote Manipulator System (RMS) arm or other payload-unique equipment aboard the Shuttle. To be selected as a pilot astronaut candidate, an applicant must have a bachelor's degree in engineering, biological science, physical science, or mathematics. A graduate degree was desired, although not essential. The applicant must have had at least 1,000 hours flying time in jet aircraft. Experience as a test pilot was desirable, but not required. All pilots and missions specialists must be citizens of the United States. Mission Specialist Astronauts. Mission specialist astronauts, working closely with the commander and pilot, were responsible for coordinating on-board operations involving crew activity planning, use, and monitoring of the Shuttle's consumables (fuel, water, food, and so on), as well as conducting experiment and payload activities. They must have a detailed knowledge of Shuttle systems and the operational characteristics, mission requirements and objectives, and supporting systems for each of Training, and Related Services

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the experiments to be conducted on the assigned missions. cialists performed on-board experiments, spacewalks, handling functions involving the RMS arm.

Mission speand payload-

Academically, applicants must have a bachelor's degree in engineering, biological science, physical science, or mathematics, plus at least three years of related and progressively responsible professional experience. An advanced degree could substitute for part or all of the experience requirement--one year for a master's degree and three years for a doctoral degree. Payload Specialists. This newest category of Shuttle crew member, the payload specialist, was a professional in the physical or life sciences or a technician skilled in operating Shuttle-unique equipment. The payload sponsor or customer selected a payload specialist for a particular mission. For NASA-sponsored spacecraft or experiments requiring a payload specialist, the investigator nominated the specialist who was approved by NASA. Payload specialists did not have to be U.S. citizens. However, they must meet strict NASA health and physical fitness standards. In addition to intensive training for a specific mission assignment at a company plant, a university, or government agency, the payload specialist also must take a comprehensive flight training course to become familiar with Shuttle systems, payload support equipment, crew operations, housekeeping techniques, and emergency procedures. This training was conducted at the Johnson Space Center and other locations. Payload specialist training might begin as much as two years before a flight. Astronaut Training

Astronaut training was conducted under the auspices of Johnson's Mission Operations Directorate. Initial training for new candidates consisted of a series of short courses in aircraft safety, including instruction in ejection, parachute, and survival to prepare them in the event their aircraft is disabled and they have to eject Pilot and mission specialist astronauts performance jet aircraft, which were or make an emergency landing. were trained to fly T-38 highbased at El[ington Field near

Johnson. Flying these aircraft, pilot astronauts could maintain their flying skills and mission specialists could become familiar with highperformance jets. They also took formal science and technical courses Candidates obtained basic knowledge of the Shuttle system, including payloads, through lectures, briefings, textbooks, mockups, and flight operations manuals. They also gained one-on-one experience in the single systems trainers, which contained computer databases with software allowing students to interact with controls and displays similar to those of a Shuttle crew station. Candidates learned to function in a weightless or environment using the KC-135 four-engine jet transport and in an enormous neutral buoyancy water tank called the Weightless Environment Training Facility at Johnson.

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NASA HISTORICAL DATA BO()K

Because the orbiter landed on a runway much like a highperformance aircraft, pilot astronauts used conventional and modified T-38 trainers and the KC-135 aircraft to simulate actual landings. They also used a modified Grumman Gulfstream I1, known as the Shuttle Training Aircraft, which was configured to simulate the handling characteristics of the orbiter for landing practice. Advanced training included sixteen different course curricula covering all Shuttle-related crew training requirements. The courses ranged from guidance, navigation, and control systems to payload deployment and retrieval systems. This advanced training was related to systems and phases. Systems training provided instruction in orbiter systems and was not related to a specific mission or its cargo. It was designed to familiarize the trainee with a feel for what it was like to work and live in space. Generally, systems training was completed before an astronaut is assigned to a mission. Phase-related training concentrated on the specific skills an astronaut needed to perff/rm successfully in space. This training was conducted in the Shuttle Mission Simulator. Phase-related training continued after a crew was assigned to a specific mission, normally about seven months to one year before the scheduled launch date. At that time, crew training became more structured and was directed by a training management team that was assigned to a specific Shuttle flight. The training involved carefully developed scripts and scenarios for the mission and was designed to permit the crew to operate as a closely integrated team, performing normal flight operations according to a flight timeline. About 10 weeks before a scheduled launch, the crew began "flightspecific integrated simulations, designed to provide a dynamic testing ground for mission rules and flight procedures." Simulating a real mission, the crew worked at designated stations interacting with the flight control team members, who staffed their positions in the operationally configured Mission Control Center. These final prelaunch segments of training were called integrated and .joint integrated simulations and normally included the payload users' operations control centers. Everything from extravehicular activity (EVA) operations to interaction with the tracking networks could be simulated during these training sessions. Shuttle Mission Simulator. The Shuttle Mission Simulator was the primary system for training Space Shuttle crews. It was the only highfidelity simulator capable of training crews for all phases of a mission beginning at T-minus thirty minutes, including such simulated events as launch, ascent, abort, orbit, rendezvous, docking, payload handling, undocking, deorbit, entry, approach, landing, and rollout. The unique simulator system could duplicate main engine and solid rocket booster performance, external tank and support equipment, and interface with the Mission Control Center. The Shuttle Mission Simulator's construction was completed in 1977 at a cost of about $100 million.

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Crew-Related Services

147

In support of payload missions, crew members provided unique ancillary services in three specific areas: EVA, intravehicular activity (IVA), and in-flight maintenance. EVAs, also called spacewalks, referred to activities in which crew members put on pressurized spacesuits and life support systems (spacepaks), left the orbiter cabin, and performed various payload-related activities in the vacuum of space, frequently outside the payload bay. (Each mission allowed for at least two crew members to be training for EVA.) EVA was an operational requirement when satellite repair or equipment testing was called for on a mission. However, during any mission, two crew members must be ready to perform a contingency EVA it', lbr example, the payload bay doors failed to close properly and must be closed manually, or equipment must be jettisoned fi'om the payload bay. The first Space Shuttle program contingency EVA occurred in April 1985, during STS 51-D, a Discovery mission, following deployment of the Syncom IV-3 (Leasat 3) communications satellite. The satellite's sequencer lever failed, and initiation of the antenna deployment and spinup and perigee kick motor start sequences did not take place. The flight was extended two days to give mission specialists Jeffrey Hoffman and David Griggs an opportunity to try to activate the lever during EVA operations, which involved using the RMS. The eflbrt was not successful, but was accomplished on a later mission. Table 3-15 lists all of the operational and contingency EVAs that have taken place through 1988. IVA included all activities during which crew members dressed in spacesuits and using life support systems performed hands-on operations inside a customer-supplied crew module. (1VAs performed in the Spacelab did not require crew members to dress in spacesuits with life support systems.) Finally, in-flight maintenance was any off-normal, on-orbit maintenance or repair action conducted to repair a malfunctioning payload. Inflight maintenance procedures for planned payload maintenance or repair were developed before a flight and often involved EVA. Space Shuttle Payloads

Space Shuttle payloads were classified as either "attached" or "freeflying." Attached payloads such as Spacelab remained in the cargo bay or elsewhere on the orbiter throughout the mission. Free-flying payloads were released to fly alone. Some free-flyers were meant to be serviced or retrieved by the Shuttle. Others were boosted into orbits beyond the Shuttle's reach.

148
Attached Spacelab Payloads

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Spacelab was an orbiting laboratory built by the ESA for use with the STS. It provided the scientific community with easy, economical access to space and an opportunity for scientists worldwide to conduct experiments in space concerning astronomy, solar physics, space plasma physics, atmospheric physics, Earth observations, life sciences, and materials sciences. Spacelab was constructed from self-contained segments or modules. It had two major subsections: cylindrical, pressurized crew modules and U-shaped unpressurized instrument-carrying pallets. The crew modules provided a "shirtsleeve" environment where payload specials worked as they would in a ground-based laboratory. Pallets accommodated experiments for direct exposure to space. They could be combined with another small structure called an igloo. Crew modules and pallets were completely reusable; they were designed for multi-use applications and could be stacked or fitted together in a variety of configurations to provide for completely enclosed, completely exposed, or a combination of both enclosed-exposed facilities. The Spacelab components got all their electric, cooling, and other service requirements from the orbiter. An instrument pointing system, also part of the Spacelab, provided pointing for the various Spacelab experiment telescopes and cameras. The crew module maintained an oxygen-nitrogen atmosphere identical to that in the orbiter crew compartment. Depending on mission requirements, crew modules consisted of either one segment (short module) or two segments (long module). The short module was four and two-tenths meters long; the long module measured seven meters. All crew modules were tbur meters in diameter. Most of the equipment housed in the short module controlled the pallet-mounted experiments. Spacelab missions used the long module when more room was needed for laboratory-type investigations. Equipment inside the crew modules was mounted in fiftycentimeter-wide racks. These racks were easily removed between flights so module-mounted experiments could be changed quickly. The U-shaped pallet structure accommodated experiment equipment for direct exposure to the space environment when the payload bay doors were opened. It provided hardpoints for mounting heavy experiments and inserts for supporting light payloads. Individual payload segments were three meters long and four meters wide. The orbiter keel attachment fitting provided lateral restraint for the pallet when installed in the orbiter (Figure 3-8). The igloo was a pressurized cylindrical canister 1,120 millimeters in diameter and 2,384 millimeters in height and with a volume of two and two-tenths cubic meters (Figure 3-9). It consisted of a primary structure, a secondary structure, a removable cover, and an igloo mounting structure and housed the following components:

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Subf rltme 2A primary Attachment FlttJn* Hard Point (Typlcal) Hmrd Point (Typical)

Inboard

Outboard Longeron

Forward

Figure 3 8, Pallet Structure und Panel,_

Bursl Pol_ve Prl_sure _e_6e( Valve Disc

Covet

Plate (Power)

-_

plate (Signal)

Figure 3-9. Spacelah lglmJ Structure

150

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Three computers (subsystem, experiment, and backup) Two input-output units (subsystem and experiment) One mass memory unit Two subsystem remote acquisition units Eleven interconnect stations One One One One One emergency box power control box subsystem power distribution box remote amplification and advisory box high-rate multiplexer

An international agreement between the United States and Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom formally established the Spacelab program. Ten European nations, of which nine were members of ESA, participated in the program. NASA and ESA each bore their respective program costs. ESA responsibilities included the design, development, production, and delivery of the first Spacelab and associated ground support equipment to NASA, as well as the capability to produce additional Spacelabs. NASA responsibilities included the development of flight and ground support equipment not provided by ESA, the development of Spacelab operational capability, and the procurement of additional hardware needed to support NASA's missions. ESA designed, developed, produced, and delivered the first Spacelab. It consisted of a pressurized module and unpressurized pallet segments, command and data management, environmental control, power distribution systems, an instrument pointing system, and much of the ground support equipment and software for both flight and ground operations. NASA provided the remaining hardware, including the crew transfer tunnel, verification flight instrumentation, certain ground support equipment, and a training simulator. Support software and procedures development, testing, and training activities not provided by ESA, which were needed to demonstrate the operational capability of Spacelab, were also NASA's responsibility. NASA also developed two principal versions of the Spacelab pallet system. One supported missions requiring the igloo and pallet in a mixed cargo configuration; the other version supported missions that did not require the igloo. Scientific Experiments

In addition to the dedicated Spacelab missions, nearly all STS missions had some scientific experiments on board. They used the unique microgravity environment found on the Space Shuttle or the environment surrounding the Shuttle. These experiments were in diverse disciplines and required varying degrees of crew involvement. Details of the scientific experiments performed on the various Shuttle missions are found in the "mission characteristics" tables for each mission.

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151

The Get-Away Specials were small self-contained payloads. Fiftythree Get-Away Special payloads had flown on Space Shuttle missions through 1988. The idea for the program arose in the mid-1970s when NASA began assigning major payloads to various Shuttle missions. It soon became apparent that most missions would have a small amount of space available after installing the major payloads. NASA's discussion of how best to use this space led to the Small Self-Contained Payloads program, later known as the Get-Away Special program. This program gave anyone, including domestic and international organizations, an opportunity to perform a small space experiment. NASA hoped that by opening Get-Away Specials to the broadest community possible, it could further the goals of encouraging the use of space by all, enhancing education with hands-on space research opportunities, inexpensively testing ideas that could later grow into major space experiments, and generating new activities unique to space. In October 1976, NASA's Associate Administrator tor Space Flight, John Yardley, announced the beginning of the Get-Away Special program. Immediately, R. Gilbert Moore purchased the first Get-Away Special payload reservation. Over the next few months, NASA defined the program's boundaries. Only payloads of a scientific research and development nature thai met NASA's safety regulations were acceptable. Payloads were to be self-contained, supplying their own power, means of data collection, and event sequencing. Keeping safety in mind and the varying technical expertise of Get-Away Special customers, NASA designed a container that could contain potential hazards. Three payload options evolved: A 0.07-cubic-meter container for payloads up to twenty-seven kilograms costing $3,000 A 0.07-cubic-meter container for payloads weighing twenty-eight to lbrty-five kilograms for $5,000 A 0.14-cubic-meter container for payloads up to ninety kilograms costing $ I0,000

Early in 1977, NASA assigned the Get-Away Special program to the Sounding Rocket Division, later renamed the Special Payloads Division, at the Goddard Space Flight Center. Meanwhile, news of the Get-Away Special program had passed in|ormally throughout the aerospace community. With no publicity since Yardley's initial announcement the previous year, NASA had already issued more than 100 payload reservation numbers. The Get-Away Special team did not anticipate flying a Get-Away Special payload before STS-5. However, the weight of a Get-Away Special container and its adapter beam was needed as ballast lbr STS-3"s afi cargo bay. Thus, the Get-Away Special program and the Flight Verification Payload received an early go-ahead lot the STS-3 flight in

152 March 1982.

NASA The first

HISTORICAL Get-Away

DATA BOOK Special, a group of experiments

official

developed by Utah State University this Get-Away Special and the other be lkmnd in the detailed STS mission Shuttle Student lnvoh,ement Program

students, flew on STS-4. Details of Get-Away Special experiments can tables thal follow.

The Shuttle Student Involvement of NASA and the National Science designed secondary solicited

Program (SSIP) was a joint venture Teachers Association (NSTA). It was

to stimulate the study of science and technology in the nation's schools. To broaden participation in the program, NASA industrial firms and other groups to sponsor the development of

the student experiments. Sponsors were asked to assign a company scientist to work with the student: fund the development of the experiment, including the necessary hardware; provide travel funds to take the student to appropriate NASA installations during experiment development: and provide assistance in analyzing postflight data and preparing a final report. Students proposed and designed the payloads associated with the program. NASA and the NSTA held contests to determine which student exper-

iments would fly on Space Shuttle missions. Following the mission, NASA returned experiment data to the student for analysis. Most Shuttle missions had at least one SSIP experiment: some missions had several experiments on board. Hardware developed to support the student experiments was located in the mid-deck of the orbiter. As a general rule, no more than one hour of crew time was to be devoted to the student experiment. The first SSIP project took place during the 1981-82 school year as a joint venture of NASA's Academic Affairs Division and the NSTA. The NSTA announced the program, which resulted in the submission of 1,500 proposals and the selection of 191 winners from ten regions. Ten national winners were selected in May 1991. NASA then matched the finalists with industrial or other non-NASA sponsors who would support the development and postflight analysis of their experiments. Winners who were not matched with a sponsor had Iheir experiments supported by NASA. Details of individual SSIP experimenls can be found in the detailed STS mission tables that follow. Free-Flying Free-flying satellites Payloads payloads that were are released from the Space Shuttle. Most have boosted into a particular orbit with the help of a

been

inertial upper stage or payload assist module. Most free-flying payloads had lifetimes of several years, with many performing long past their anticipated life span. Some free-flying payloads sent and received communications data. These communications satellites usually belonged to companies free-flying thal were payloads involved contained in the communications industry. Other sensors or other instruments to read

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atmospheric conditions. The data gathered by the sensors was transmitted to Earth either directly to a ground station or by way of a TDRS. Scientists on Earth interpreted the data gathered by the instruments. Examples of this kind of satellite were meteorological satellites and planetary probes. These satellites frequently were owned and operated by NASA or another government agency, although private industry could participate in this type of venture. Other free-flying payloads were meant to fly for only a short time period. They were then retrieved by a robot arm and returned to the Shuttle's cargo bay. Individual free-flying payload missions are discussed in Chapter 4, "Space Science," in this volume and Chapter 2, "Space Applications, +`in Volume VI of the NASA Historical Data Book. Payload Integration Process

The payload integration process began with the submission of a Request for Flight Assignment form by the user organization--a private or governmental organization--to NASA Headquarters. If NASA approved the request, a series of actions began that ultimately led to spaceflight. These actions included signing a launch services agreement+ developing a payload integration plan, and preparing engineering designs and analyses, safety analysis, and a flight readiness plan. An important consideration was the weight of the payload. For orbiters Discovery (OV-103), Atlantis (OV-104), and Endeavour (OV-105), the abort landing weight constraints could not exceed 22,906 kilograms of allowable cargo on the so-called simple satellite deployment missions. For longer duration flights with attached payloads, the allowable cargo weight for end-of-mission or abort situations was limited to 11,340 kilograms. For Columbia (OV-102), however, these allowable cargo weights were reduced by 3,810.2 kilograms. In November 1987, NASA announced that the allowable end-of-mission total landing weight for Space Shuttle orbiters had been increased from the earlier limit of 95,709.6 kilograms to 104,328 kilograms. The higher limit was attributed to an ongoing structural analysis and additional review of forces encountered by the orbiter during maneuvers just before touchdown. This new capability increased the performance capability between lift capacity to orbit and the allowable return weight during reentry and landing. Thus, the Shuttle would be able to carry a cumulative weight in excess of 45,360 kilograms of additional cargo through 1993. This additional capability was expected to be an important factor in delivering materials for construction of the space station. Moreover, the new allowable landing weights were expected to aid in relieving the payload backlog that resulted from the STS 51-L Challenger accident. Space Shuttle Missions

The following sections describe each STS mission beginning with the first tour test missions. Information on Space Shuttle missions is

154

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

extremely well documented. The pre- and postflight Mission Operations Reports (MORs) that NASA was required to submit for each mission provided the majority of data. At a minimum, these reports listed the mission objectives, described mission events and the payload in varying degrees of detail, listed program/project management, and profiled the crew. NASA usually issued the preflight MOR a few weeks prior to the scheduled launch date. The postflight MOR was issued following the flight. It assessed the mission's success in reaching its objectives and discussed anomalies and unexpected events. It was signed by the individuals who had responsibility lbr meeting the mission objectives. NASA also issued press kits prior to launch. These documents included information of special interest to the media, the information from the prelaunch MORs, and significant background of the mission. Other sources included NASA Daily Activity Reports, NASA News, NASA Fact Sheets, and other STS mission summaries issued by NASA. Information was also available on-line through NASA Headquarters and various NASA center home pages. Mission Objectives

Mission objectives may seem to the reader to be rather general and broad. These objectives usually focused on what the vehicle and its components were to accomplish rather than on what the payload was to accomplish. Because one main use of the Space Shuttle was as a launch vehicle, deployment of any satellites on board was usually a primary mission objective. A description of the satellite's objectives (beyond a top level) and a detailed treatment of its configuration would be found in the MOR for that satellite's mission. For instance, the mission objectives for the Earth Radiation Budget Satellite would be found in the MOR for that mission rather than in the MOR for STS 41-G, the launch vehicle for the satellite. In addition, missions with special attached payloads, such as Spacelab or OSTA-l, issued individual MORs. These described the scientific and other objectives of these payloads and on-board experiments or "firsts" to be accomplished in considerable detail. The Test Missions: Overview Until the launch of STS-I in April 1981, NASA had no proof of the Space Shuttle as an integrated Space Transportation System that could reach Earth orbit, perform useful work there, and return safely to the ground. Thus, the purpose of the Orbital Flight Test (OFF) program was to verify the Shuttle's performance under real spaceflight conditions and to establish its readiness for operational duty. The test program would expand the Shuttle's operational range toward the limits of its design in STS-1 Through STS-4

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careful increments. During four flights of Columbia, conducted from April 1981 to July 1982, NASA tested the Shuttle in its capacities as a launch vehicle, habitat for crew members, freight handler, instrument platform, and aircraft. NASA also evaluated ground operations before, during, and after each launch. Each flight increased the various structural and thermal stresses on the vehicle, both in space and in the atmosphere, by a planned amount. The OFF phase of the STS program demonstrated the flight system's ability to safely perform launch orbital operations, payload/scientific operations, entry, approach, landing, and turnaround operations. Table 3-16 provides a summary of STS- 1 through STS-4. Following the landing of STS-4 on July 4, 1982, NASA declared the OFF program a success, even though further testing and expansion of the Shuttle's capabilities were planned on operational flights. The OFT program consisted of more than 1,100 tests and data collections. NASA tested many components by having them function as planned--if an engine valve or an insulating tile worked normally, then its design was verified. Other components, such as the RMS arm, went through validation runs to check out their different capabilities. Final documentation of Shuttle performance during OFT considered the reports from astronaut crews, ground observations and measurements, and data from orbiter instruments and special developmental flight instrumentation that collected and recorded temperatures and accelerations at various points around the vehicle and motion from points around the Shuttle. The first OFT flights were designed to maximize crew and vehicle safety by reducing ascent and entry aerodynamic loads on the vehicle as much as possible. The missions used two-person crews, and the orbiter was equipped with two ejection seats until satisfactory performance, reliability, and safety of the Space Shuttle had been demonstrated. Launch operations were controlled from the Kennedy Space Center and flight operations from the Johnson Space Center. At the end of OFF, Columbia's main engines had been demonstrated successfully up to 100 percent of their rated power level (upgraded engines throttled to 109 percent of this level on later flights) and down to 65 percent. Designed to provide 1.67 million newtons of thrust each at sea level for an estimated fifty-five missions, the engines were on target to meeting these guidelines at the end of the test program. They met all requirements for start and cutoff timing, thrust direction control, and the flow of propellants. Launch Phase NASA tested the Space Shuttle in its launch phase by planning increasingly more demanding ascent conditions for each test flight, and then by comparing predicted flight characteristics with data returned from Aerodynamic Coefficient Identification Package and developmental flight instrumentation instruments and ground tracking. Columbia lifted slightly heavier payloads into space on each mission. The altitudes and speeds at

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NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

which thesolidrocket boosters andexternal tankseparated werevaried, as wasthesteepness of thevehicle's climbandmainengine throttling times. All of these changes corresponded to a gradual increasing duringthetest program in themaximum dynamic pressure, or peakaerodynamic stress, inflictedonthevehicle. At no timedid Columbia experience any significant problems with the aerodynamic or heat stresses of ascent. A major milestone in the test program was the shift (after STS-2) from using wind tunnel data for computing Columbia's ascent path to using aerodynamic data derived from the first two flights. On STS- 1 and STS-2, the Shuttle showed a slight lofting--about 3,000 meters at main engine cutoff--above its planned trajectory. This was caused by the inability of wind tunnel models to simulate the afterburning of hot exhaust gasses in the real atmosphere. Beginning with the third flight, the thrust of the booster rockets was reoriented slightly to reduce this lofting. On STS-3 and STS-4, however, the trajectory was considered too shallow, in part because of a slower than predicted burn rate for the solid rocket boosters that had also been observed on the first two flights. Engineers continued to use OFT data after STS-4 to refine their predictions of this solid propellant burn rate so that ascent trajectories could be planned as accurately as possible on future missions. In all cases, the combined propulsion of main engines, solid boosters, and OMS engines delivered the Shuttle to its desired orbit. STS-4 was the first mission to orbit at a twenty-eight-and-a-haifdegree inclination to the equator. The first flights flew more steeply inclined orbits (thirty-eight to forty degrees) that took them over more ground tracking stations. The more equatorial STS-4 inclination was favored because it gave the vehicle a greater boost from the rotating Earth at launch. The first two flights also verified that the vehicle had enough energy for an emergency landing in Spain or Senegal, as abort options, should two main engines fail during ascent. After STS-5, the crew ejection seats were removed from Columbia, eliminating the option to eject and ending the need for astronauts to wear pressure suits during launch, Solid Rocket Boosters. On each test flight, the twin solid rocket boosters provided evenly matched thrust, shut off at the same times, and separated as planned from the external tank, then parachuted down to their designated recovery area in the Atlantic Ocean for towing back to the mainland and reloading with solid propellant. Each booster had three main parachutes that inflated fully about twenty seconds before water impact. Prior to the test flights, these parachutes were designed to separate automatically from the boosters by means of explosive bolts when the rockets hit the water, because it was thought that recovery would be easier if the chutes were not still attached. On the first and third flights, however, some parachutes sank before recovery. Then, on STS-4, the separation bolts fired prematurely because of strong vibrations, the parachutes detached from the rockets before water impact, and the rockets hit the water at too great a speed and sank. They were not recovered. As a result of these problems, NASA changed

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therecovery hardware andprocedures beginning with STS-5. Instead of

separating automatically with explosives, the parachutes remained attached to the boosters through water impact, and were detached by the recovery team. Sections of the boosters were also strengthened as a result of water impact damage seen on the test flights. External Tank. The Space Shuttle's external fuel tank met all performance standards for OFT. Heat sensors showed ascent temperatures to be moderate enough to allow for planned reductions in the thickness and weight of the tank's insulation. Beginning with STS-3, white paint on the outside of the tank was left off to save another 243 kilograms of weight, leaving the tank the brown color of its spray-on foam insulation. Onboard cameras showed flawless separation of the tank from the orbiter after the main engines cut off on each flight, and Shuttle crews reported that this separation was so smooth that they could not feel it happening. To assist its breakup in the atmosphere, the tank had a pyrotechnic device that set it tumbling after separation rather than skipping along the atmosphere like a stone. This tumble device failed on STS-1, but it worked perfectly on all subsequent missions. On all the test flights, radar tracking of the tank debris showed that the pieces fell well within the planned impact area in the Indian Ocean. Orbital Maneuvering System. Shortly after it separated from the fuel tank, the orbiter fired its two aft-mounted OMS engines for additional boosts to higher and more circularized orbits. At the end of orbital operations, these engines decelerated the vehicle, beginning the orbiter's fall to Earth. The engines performed these basic functions during OFT with normal levels of fuel consumption and engine wear. Further testing included startups after long periods of idleness in vacuum and low gravity (STS- 1 and STS-2), exposure to cold (STS-3), and exposure to the Sun (STS-4). Different methods of distributing the system's propellants were also demonstrated. Fuel from the left tank was fed to the right tank, and vice versa, and from the OMS tanks to the smaller RCS thrusters. On STS-2, the engine cross-feed was performed in the middle of an engine burn to simulate engine failure. Orbital Operations Once in space, opening the two large payload bay doors with their attached heat radiators was an early priority. If the doors did not open in orbit, the Shuttle could not deploy payloads or shed its waste heat. If they failed to close at mission's end, reentry through the atmosphere would be impossible. The STS-1 crew tested the payload bay doors during Columbia's first few hours in space. The crew members first unlatched the doors from the bulkheads and from each other. One at a time, they were opened in the manual drive mode. The movement of the doors was slightly more jerky and hesitant in space than in Earth-gravity simulations, but this was expected and did not affect their successful opening and closing. The

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NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

crewmembers closedandreopened the doorsagainoneday into the STS1mission asafurthertest,thenclosed them for goodbefore reentry. Thecrewverifiednormal alignment andlatching of thedoors, asdidthe STS-2crewduringtheirdoorcyclingtests, includingoneseries in the automatic mode. Thecrewalsotested doorcyclingafterprolonged exposure to heat andcold.Thedoorsweremade of a graphite-epoxy composite material, whiletheorbiteritselfwasmade of aluminum. It wastherefore important to understand howtheywouldfit together afterthealuminum expanded or contracted in thetemperature extremes of space. At thebeginning of STS-3 orbitaloperations, thedoors opened asusual. Thepayload baywas thenexposed tocoldshadow for aperiod of twenty-three hours. When the crewclosed the port-side doorat the endof this "coldsoak," the door failed to latchproperly, asit did aftera similarcold exposure on the STS-4mission. Apparently, theorbiterwarpedvery slightlywith nose andtail bentupward toward each other,accounting in partfor thedoors' inabilitytocleartheaft bulkhead. Thecrewsolved theproblem by holdingtheorbiterin a top-to-Sun positionfor fifteenminutes to warmthecargobay,thenundergoing a short "barbecue roll" toeven outvehicle temperatures, allowingthedoors to closeandlatchnormally. In addition,hardware changes to thedoors andto theaft bulkhead improved theirclearance.
Thermal Tests. Thermal tests accounted for hundreds of hours of OFT mission time. The temperatures of spacecraft structures changed dramatically in space, depending on their exposure to the Sun. Temperatures on the surface of payload bay insulation on STS-3, for example, went from a low of-96 C to a peak of 127 C. The Space Shuttle kept its components within their designed temperature limits through its active thermal control system, which included two coolant loops that transported waste heat from the orbiter and payload electronics to the door-mounted radiator panels for dumping into space, and through the use of insulation and heaters. Figure 3-10 shows the insulating materials used on the orbiter. The OFT program tested the orbiter's ability to keep cool and keep warm under conditions much more extreme than that of the average mission. STS-3 and STS-4 featured extended thermal "soaks," where parts of the orbiter were deliberately heated up or cooled down by holding certain attitudes relative to the Sun for extended time periods. These long thermal soaks were separated by shorter periods of "barbecue roll" for even heating. On STS-4, the thermal soak tests continued with long tail-to-Sun and bottom-to-Sun exposures. Overall, these hot and cold soak tests showed that the Shuttle had a better than predicted thermal stability. STS-3 readings showed that the orbiter's skin kept considerably warmer during coldsoaks than had been expected and that many critical systems, such as the orbital maneuvering engines, were also warmer. Most vehicle structures also tended to heat up or cool down more slowly than expected. The active thermal control sys-

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Low-Temperature }nsulal_3n (White

Reusable Surface Tiles} (371-848 ')

Flexibqe Insulation Metal or

Reusable (Below GLass

Surface 37_ C)

Figure

3-10.

Insuhztine

Materhzls

tern, with its coolant loops and space radiators, proved capable of handling Shuttle heat loads in orbit, even under extreme conditions. The crew tested the space radiators with all eight panels deployed, and they proved capable of shedding most heat loads with only four panels deployed. During ascent, another part of the thermal control system, the Shuttle's flash evaporators, transferred heat from circulating coolant to water, beginning about two minutes into the ascent when the vehicle first required active cooling. These flash evaporators normally worked until the space radiators were opened in orbit. Then, during reentry, the flash evaporators were reactivated and used down to an altitude of approximately 36,000 meters. From that altitude down to the ground, the Shuttle shed heat by boiling ammonia rather than water. During OFT, the crew members successfully tested these methods of cooling as backups to each other. Subsystems. All crews for the flight test program tested and retested the Space Shuttle's main subsystems under varying conditions. On the four OFT flights, virtually every system--hydraulic, electrical, navigation and guidance, communications, and environmental control-performed up to design standards or better. The hydraulic subsystem that controlled the movement of the Shuttle's engine nozzles, its airplane-like control flaps, and its landing

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NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

gearfunctioned well duringOFTlaunches andreentries. Thecrewtested thehydraulic system successfully onSTS-2 bycyclingtheeleven control surfaces whilein orbit.OnSTS-4, thehydraulics wereevaluated aftera longcoldsoak, andthecrewfoundthatthecirculation pumps needed to operate atonly minimallevels to keepthehydraulic fluidsabove critical temperatures, thussaving onelectric powerusage. Althoughanoil filter clogin thehydraulic system's auxiliarypower unitsdelayed thelaunch of STS-2 by morethana week,theproblem did notrecur. Tighterseals wereused to prevent theoil frombeingcontaminated by theunits'hydrazine fuel. TheSTS-2 mission wasalsocutshortbecause of thefailureof oneof thethreeShuttle fuelcellsthatconverted cryogenic hydrogen andoxygen to electricity. A clogin thecell'swaterflow linescaused thefailure,and thisproblem wasremedied duringOFTbyadding filterstothepipes. This failureallowedan unscheduled testof thevehicleusingonly two fuel cellsinstead of three,whichwereenough to handle all electrical needs. Partlyasa resultoftheShuttle's thermal stability, electricity consumption by theorbiterproved to belowerthanexpected, ranging fromfourteen to seventeen kilowattsperhourin orbitasopposed to thepredicted fifteen to twentykilowatts. The Shuttle's computers successfully demonstrated theirability to controlvirtually everyphase of eachmission,from final countdown sequencing to reentry, with only minorprogramming changes needed duringthe testprogram. The crewchecked out the on-orbitnavigation andguidance aidsthoroughly. Theorbiter"sensed" itspositionin space by meansof threeinertial measurement units, whoseaccuracy was checked andperiodically updated by a startrackerlocated on thesame navigation base in theflight deck. Thecrewtested thisstartracker/inertial measurement unit alignment on thefirst Shuttlemission, including oncewhenthevehiclewasrolling.Thestartracker couldfind its guide starsin bothdarkness anddaylight.Its accuracy wasbetterthanexpected, andthe entirenavigation instrument baseshowedstabilityunder extreme thermal conditions. Radio andtelevisioncommunication was successful on all four flights,with only minimalhardware andsignalacquisition problems at groundstations. Specifictestschecked differenttransmission modes, radiovoicethrough theShuttle's rocket exhaust duringascent, andUHF transmission as a backupto the primaryradiolink duringlaunchand operations in space. All weresuccessful. TestsonSTS-4alsoevaluated howdifferentorbiterattitudes affected radioreception in space. Theclosed-circuit television system insidetheorbiterandoutin the cargobaygavehigh-quality videoimages of operations in orbit.In sunlight andin artificialfloodlighting of thepayload bay,theyshowed the necessary sensitivity, range of vision,remote control,andvideo-recordingcapabilities.
Attitude Control. When in orbit, the Shuttle used its RCS to control its attitude and to make small-scale movements in space. The thrusting

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161

powerandpropellant usage of bothtypes of RCSjets wereasexpected, withthesmaller verniers morefuel-efficient thanexpected. Two of the four
vernier jets in Columbia's tail area had a problem with the downward direction of their thrust. The exhaust hit the aft body flap and eroded some of its protective tiles, which also reduced the power of the jets. One possible solution considered was to reorient these jets slightly on future orbiters. The orbiter demonstrated its ability to come to rest after a maneuver. At faster rates, it proved nearly impossible to stop the vehicle's motion without overshooting, then coming back to the required "stop" position, particularly with the large primary engines. Both types of thrusters were used to keep the orbiter steady in "attitude hold" postures. The small thrusters were particularly successful and fuel-efficient, holding the vehicle steady down to one-third of a degree of drift at normal rates of fuel use, which was three times their required sensitivity. Further tests of the RCS assessed how well Columbia could hold steady without firing its jets when differential forces of gravity tended to tug the vehicle out of position. The results of these tests looked promising for the use of "passive gravity gradient" attitudes for future missions where steadiness for short periods of time was required without jet firings. Remote Manipulator System. Ground simulators could not practice three-dimensional maneuvers because the remote manipulator system (RMS) arm was too fragile to support its own weight in Earth gravity. Therefore, one of the most important as well as most time-consuming of all OFT test series involved the fifteen-meter mechanical arm. This Canadian-built device, jointed as a human arm at the shoulder, elbow, and wrist, attached to the orbiter at various cradle points running the length of the inside of the cargo bay. In place of a hand, the arm had a cylindrical end effector that grappled a payload and held it rigid with wire snares. A crew member controlled the ann from inside the orbiter. The arm could be moved freely around the vehicle in a number of modes, with or without help from the Shuttle's computers. The crew tested all manual and automatic drive modes during OFT. They also tested the arm's ability to grab a payload firmly, remove it from a stowed position, then reberth it precisely and securely. Lighting and television cameras also were verified--the crew relied on sensitive elbow and wrist cameras as well as cameras mounted in the payload bay to monitor operations. For the test program, special data acquisition cameras in the cargo bay documented arm motion. STS-2 was the first mission to carry the arm. Although the crew did not pick up a payload with the arm, the astronauts performed manual approaches to a grapple fixture in the cargo bay, and they found the arm to control smoothly. The crew also began tests to see how the arm's movement interacted with orbiter motions. The crew reported that firings of the small vernier thrusters did not influence arm position, nor did arm motions necessitate attitude adjustment firings by the orbiter. STS-3 tests evaluated the arm with a payload. The end effector grappled the 186-kilogram Plasma Diagnostics Package (PDP), removed it

162

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

manually fromits berthin thecargo bay,andmaneuvered it automatically around theorbiterin support of OFTspace environment studies. Pilot GordonFuilerton deployed andreberthed the package. Beforeonesuch deployment, thearmautomatically founditswayto within 3.8centimetersof the grapple pointin accordance with preflightpredictions. The
crew also verified the computer's ability to automatically stop an arm joint from rotating past the limit of its mobility. The third crew completed forty-eight hours of arm tests, including one unplanned demonstration of the elbow camera's ability to photograph Columbia's nose area during an on-orbit search for missing tiles. Television cameras provided excellent views of arm operations in both sunshine and darkness, and the STS-4 crew reported that nighttime operations, although marginal, were still possible after three of the six payload bay cameras failed. The third and fourth crews continued evaluating vehicle interactions with arm motion by performing roll maneuvers as the arm held payloads straight up from the cargo bay. This was done with the PDP on STS-3 and with the Induced Environment Contamination Monitor on STS-4, which weighed twice as much. In both cases, the crew noted a slight swaying of the arm when the vehicle stopped, which was expected. The RMS was designed to move a payload of 29,250 kilograms, but it was tested only with masses under 450 kilograms during OFT. Future arm tests would graduate to heavier payloads, some with grapple points fixed to simulate the inertias of even more massive objects. The Shuttle Environment. In addition to these hardware checkouts, the test program also assessed the Space Shuttle environment. This was important for planning future missions that would carry instruments sensitive to noise, vibration, radiation, or contamination. During OFT, Columbia carried two sensor packages for examining the cargo bay environment. The Dynamic, Acoustic and Thermal Environment experiment--a group of accelerometers, microphones, and heat and strain gauges---established that noise and stress levels inside the bay were generally lower than predicted. The Induced Environment Contamination Monitor, normally secured in the cargo bay, was also moved around by the manipulator arm to perform an environmental survey outside the orbiter on STS-4. The Contamination Monitor and the Shuttle-Spacelab Induced Atmosphere Experiment and postlanding inspections of the cargo bay backed up the Induced Environment Contamination Monitor's survey of polluting particles and gasses. These inspections revealed minor deposits and some discoloration of films and painted surfaces in the bay, which were still being studied after OFT. A new payload bay lining was added after STS-4. The PDP measured energy fields around the orbiter on STS-3. The PDP, used in conjunction with the Vehicle Charging and Potential Experiment, mapped the distribution of charged particles around the spacecraft. These readings showed a vehicle that was relatively "quiet"

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN

SPACEFLIGHT

163

electrically--it levels much

moved through the Earth's energy fields with interference lower than the acceptable limits. The crew also discovered a

soft glow around some of the Shuttle's surfaces that appeared in several nighttime photographs. An experiment added to STS-4 to identify the glow's spectrum supported a tentative explanation that the phenomenon resulted from the interaction with atomic oxygen in the thin upper atmosphere. Inside the Shuttle, the cabin and mid-deck areas proved to be livable and practical working environments for the crew members. The test flight crews noise monitored cabin levels and filmed air quality, pressure, temperature, radiation, and their chores and activities in space to document

the Shuttle's "habitability." The crews reported that their mobility inside Columbia was excellent, and they found that anchoring themselves in low gravity was easier than expected. There was almost no need for special foot restraints, and the crew members could improvise with ordinary duct tape attached to their shoes to hold themselves in place. Descent and Landing

At the end of its time in orbit, the Space Shuttle's payload bay doors were closed, and the vehicle assumed a tail-first, upside-down posture and retrofired its OMS engines to drop out of orbit. It then flipped to a nose-up attitude and began its descent through the atmosphere back to Earth. Figure 3-11 shows the STS-1 entry flight profile. The Shuttle's insulation needed to survive intact the burning friction of reentry to fly on the next mission. Columbia's aluminum surface was covered with several different types of insulation during the test program, with their distribution based on predicted heating patterns. These included

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164

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

more than 30,000 rigid silica tiles of two types (black for high temperatures, white for lower) that accounted for over 70 percent of the orbiter's surface area. Television cameras viewing the outside of the Shuttle clearly revealed that several tiles had shaken loose during the vehicle's ascent and were missing from the aft engine pods. These tiles had not been densified--a process that strengthened the bond between tile and orbiter--as had all the tiles in critical areas and every tile installed after October 1979. No densified tiles were lost during the test flights. On each flight, there was some damage to tile surfaces during launch and reentry. Vehicle inspection revealed hundreds of pits and gouges after STS-1 and STS-2. While the damage was not critical, many tiles needed to be replaced. Crew reports, launch pad cameras, and cockpit films recorded chunks of ice and/or insulation falling from the external tank; during ascent and launch, pad debris flew up and hit the orbiter, and these impacts were blamed for most of the tile damage. During the test program, NASA instituted a general cleanup of the pad before launch, and the removal of a particular insulation that had come loose from the booster rockets reduced debris significantly. On the external tank, certain pieces of ice-forming hardware were removed. As a result, impact damage to the tiles was greatly reduced. While some 300 tiles needed to be replaced after STS- i, fewer than forty were replaced after STS-4. Weather also damaged some tiles during the test program. Factory waterproofing of new tiles did not survive the heat of reentry, and Columbia had to be sprayed with a commercial waterproofing agent after each mission so as not to absorb rainwater on the pad. The waterproofing agent was found to loosen tile bonds where it formed puddles, though, and STS-3 lost some tiles as a result. Then, while STS-4 sat on the pad awaiting launch, a heavy hail and rainstorm allowed an estimated 540 kilograms of rainwater to be absorbed into the porous tiles through pits made by hailstones. This water added unwanted weight during ascent and later caused motion disturbances to the vehicle when the water evaporated into space. Shuttle engineers planned to use an injection procedure to waterproof the interior of the tiles for future missions. As a whole, the thermal protection system kept the orbiter's skin within required limits during the OFF flights, even during the hottest periods of reentry. For the test program's last three flights, the crews performed shortduration maneuver changes in the vehicle's pitch angle that tested the effects of different attitudes on heating. Heating on the control surfaces was increased over the four flights, and on STS-3 and STS-4, the angle of entry into the atmosphere was flown more steeply to collect data under even more demanding conditions. Sensors on the orbiter reported temperatures consistent with preflight predictions. Notable exceptions were the aft engine pods, where some low-temperature flexible insulation was replaced with high-temperature black tiles after STS- 1 showed high temperatures and scorching.

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT

Aerodynamic Tests

165

The major objective of aerodynamic testing was to verify controlled flight over a wide range of altitudes (beginning at 120,000 meters where the air is very thin) and velocities, from hypersonic to subsonic. In both manual and automatic control modes, the vehicle flew very reliably and agreed with wind tunnel predictions. Each flight crew also conducted a number of maneuvers either as programmed inputs by the guidance computer or as control stick commands by the crew in which the vehicles f/aps and rudder were positioned to bring about more demanding flight conditions or to fill data gaps where wind tunnel testing was not adequate. These corrections were executed perfectly. In the thin upper atmosphere, the Space Shuttle used its reaction control thrusters to help maintain its attitude. Over the four test flights, these thrusters showed a greater-than-expected influence on the vehicle's motion. The orbiter's navigation and guidance equipment also performed well during reentry. Probes that monitored air speeds were successfully deployed at speeds below approximately Mach 3, and navigational aids by which the orbiter checks its position relative to the ground worked well with only minor adjustments. Unlike returning Apollo capsules, the Space Shuttle had some crossrange capability--it could deviate from a purely ballistic path by gliding right or left of its aim point and so, even though it had no powered thrust during final approach, it did have a degree of control over where it landed. The largest cross-range demonstrated during the test program was 930 kilometers on STS-4. The Space Shuttle could return to Earth under full computer control from atmospheric entry to the runway. During the test program, however, Columbia's approach and landing were partly manual. The STS-I approach and landing was fully manual. On STS-2, the auto-land control was engaged at 1,500 meters altitude, and the crew took over at ninety meters. Similarly, STS-3 flew on auto-land from 3,000 meters down to thirty-nine meters before the commander took stick control. It was decided after an error in nose attitude during the STS-3 landing that the crew should not take control of the vehicle so short a time before touchdown. The STS-4 crew therefore took control from the auto-land as Columbia moved into its final shallow glide slope at 600 meters. Full auto-land capability remained to be demonstrated after STS-5, as did a landing with a runway cross-wind. Stress gauges on the landing gear and crew reports indicated that a Shuttle landing was smoother than most commercial airplanes. Rollout on the runway after touchdown fell well within the 4,500-meter design limit on each landing, but the actual touchdown points were all considerably beyond the planned touchdown points. This was because the Shuttle had a higher ratio of lift to drag near the ground than was expected, and it "floated" farther down the runway.

166
Ground Work

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

The OFT program verified thousands of ground procedures, from mating the vehicle before launch to refurbishing the solid rocket boosters and ferrying the orbiter from landing site to launch pad. As the test program progressed, many ground operations were changed or streamlined. Certain tasks that had been necessary for an untried vehicle before STS-1 could be eliminated altogether. As a result of this learning, the "turnaround" time between missions was shortened dramatically--from 188 days for STS-2 to seventy-five days between STS-4 and STS-5. Major time-saving steps included: Leaving cryogenic fuels in their on-board storage tanks between flights rather than removing them after landing Alternating the use of primary and backup systems on each flight rather than checking out both sets of redundant hardware on the ground before each launch Reducing the number of tests of critical systems as they proved flightworthy from mission to mission

The OFT program verified the soundness of the STS and its readiness for future scientific, commercial, and defense applications. Orbiter Experiments Program

Many of the experiments that flew on the first four Shuttle missions were sponsored by the Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology (Code R) through its Orbiter Experiments Program. NASA used the data gathered from these experiments to verify the accuracy of wind tunnel and other ground-based simulations made prior to flight, ground-to-flight extrapolation methods, and theoretical computational methods. The prime objective of these experiments was to increase the technology reservoir for the development of future (twenty-first century) space transportation systems, such as single-stage-to-orbit, heavy-lift launch vehicles and orbital transfer vehicles that could deploy and service large, automated, person-tended, multifunctional satellite platforms and a staffed, permanent facility in Earth orbit. The Orbiter Experiments Program experiments included: Aerodynamic Coefficient Identification Package Shuttle Entry Air Data System Shuttle Upper Atmospheric Mass Spectrometer Data Flight Instrumentation Package Dynamic, Acoustic and Thermal Environment Experiment Infrared Imagery of Shuttle Shuttle Infrared Leeside Temperature Sensing Tile Gap Heating Effects Experiment Catalytic Surface Effects

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT

167

Each of these experiments, plustheothers listedinTable 3-16,isdiscussed aspartof theindividual"mission characteristics" tables(Tables 3-17through 3-20).
Mission STS- I Objective. The mission objective and return of the orbiter and crew. was to demonstrate a sale ascent Characteristics of the Test Missions (STS-I Through STS-4)

Overview. Columbia reported on spacecraft performance and the stresses encountered during launch, flight, and landing. The flight successfully demonstrated two systems: the payload bay doors with their attached heat radiators and the RCS thrusters used for attitude control in orbit. John W. Young and Robert L. Crippen tested all systems and conducted many engineering tests, including opening and closing the cargo bay doors. Opening these doors is critical to deploy the radiators that release the heat that builds up in the crew compartment. Closing them is necessary for the return to Earth. Young and Crippen also documented their flight in still and motion pictures. One view of the cargo bay that they telecast to Earth indicated that all or part of sixteen heat shielding tiles were lost. The loss was not considered critical as these pods were not subjected to intense heat, which could reach 1,650 C while entering the atmosphere. More than 30,000 tiles did adhere. A detailed inspection of the tiles, carried out later, however, revealed minor damage to approximately 400 tiles. About 200 would require replacement, 100 as a result of flight damage and 100 identified prior to STS-1 as suitable for only one flight. Observations revealed that the water deluge system designed to suppress the powerful acoustic pressures of liftoff needed to be revised, after the shock from the booster rockets was seen to be much larger than anticipated. In the seconds before and after liftoff, a "rainbird" deluge system had poured tens of thousands of gallons of water onto the launch platform and into flame trenches beneath the rockets to absorb sound energy that might otherwise damage the orbiter or its cargo. Strain gauges and microphones measured the acoustic shock, and they showed up to four times the predicted values in parts of the vehicle closest to the launch pad. Although Columbia suffered no critical damage, the sound suppression system was modified before the launch of STS-2. Rather than dumping into the bottom of the flame trenches, water was injected directly into the exhaust plumes of the booster rockets at a point just below the exhaust nozzles at the time of ignition. In addition, energy-absorbing water troughs were placed over the exhaust openings. The changes were enough to reduce acoustic pressures to 20 to 30 percent of STS-1 levels for the second launch.

168
STS-2 Objectives.

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

NASA's

mission objectives

for STS-2 were to:

Demonstrate the reusability of the orbiter vehicle Demonstrate launch, on-orbit, and entry performance under conditions more demanding than STS-! Demonstrate orbiter capability to support scientific and applications research with an attached payload Conduct RMS tests

Overview. Originally scheduled for five days, the mission was cut short because one of Columbia's three fuel cells that converted supercoid (cryogenic) hydrogen and oxygen to electricity failed shortly after the vehicle reached orbit. Milestones were the first tests of the RMS's fifteenmeter arm and the successful operation of Earth-viewing instruments in the cargo bay. The mission also proved the Space Shuttle's reusability. In spite of the shortened mission, approximately 90 percent of the major test objectives were successfully accomplished, and 60 percent of the tests requiring on-orbit crew involvement were completed. The pertbrmance of lower priority tests were consistent with the shortened mission, and 36 percent of these tasks were achieved. The mission's medical objectives were to provide routine and contingency medical support and to assure the health and well-being of flight personnel during all phases of the STS missions. This objective was achieved through the careful planning, development, training, and implementation of biomedical tests and procedures compatible with STS operations and the application of principles of general preventive medicine. It was also discovered that shortened sleep periods, heavy work loads, inadequate time allocation for food preparation and consumption, and estimated lower water intake were just sufficient for a fifty-four-hour mission. A plan was therefore developed to restructure in-flight timelines and institute corrective health maintenance procedures for longer periods of flight. OSTA-1 was the major on-board mission payload. Sponsored by the Office of Space and Terrestrial Applications, it is addressed in Chapter 2, "Space Applications," in Volume VI of the NASA Historical Data Book. STS-3 Objectives. The NASA mission objectives for STS-3 were to:

Demonstrate ascent, on-orbit, and entry performance under conditions more demanding than STS-2 conditions Extend orbital flight duration Conduct long-duration thermal soak tests Conduct scientific and applications research with an attached payload

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT

169

Overview. NASA designated OSS-i as the attached payload on STS-3. The Office of Space Science sponsored the mission. This mission is discussed in Chapter 4, "Space Science." The crew performed tests of the robot arm and extensive thermal testing of Columbia itself during this flight. Thermal testing involved exposing the tail, nose, and tip to the Sun tbr varying periods of time, rolling it ("barbecue roll") in between tests to stabilize temperatures over the entire body. The robot arm tested satisfactorily, moving the PDP experiment around the orbiter. STS-4 Objectives. The NASA mission objectives for STS-4 were to:

Demonstrate ascent, on-orbit, and entry performance under conditions more demanding than STS-3 conditions Conduct long-duration thermal soak tests Conduct scientific and applications research with attached payloads

Overview. This was the first Space Shuttle launch that took place on time and with no schedule delays. The mission tested the flying, handling, and operating characteristics of the orbiter, performed more exercises with the robot arm, conducted several scientific experiments in orbit, and landed at Edwards Air Force Base for the first time on a concrete runway of the same length as the Shuttle Landing Facility at the Kennedy Space Center. Columbia also planned to conduct more thermal tests by exposing itself to the Sun in selected altitudes, but these plans were changed because of damage caused by hail, which fell while Columbia was on the pad. The hail cut through the protective coating on the tiles and let rainwater inside. In space, the affected area on the underside of the orbiter was turned to the Sun. The heat of the Sun vaporized the water and prevented further possible tile damage from freezing. The only major problem on this mission was the loss of the two solid rocket booster casings. The main parachutes failed to function properly, and the two casings hit the water at too high a velocity and sank. They were later found and examined by remote camera, but not recovered. During the mission, the crew members repeated an STS-2 experiment that required the robot arm to move an instrument called the Induced Environmental Contamination Monitor around the orbiter to gather data on any gases or panicles being released by the orbiter. They also conducted the Continuous Flow Electrophoresis System experiment, which marked the first use of the Shuttle by a commercial concern, McDonnell Douglas (Figure 3-12). In addition to a classified Air Force payload in the cargo bay, STS-4 carried the first Get-Away Special--a series of nine experiments prepared by students from Utah State University. The payload bay was exposed to cold shadow for several hours after opening of the doors. When the port-side door was closed at the end of

170
Fluid Systems Module

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

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the "coldsoak," it failed to latch properly, as it did during the STS-3 mission. The solution on both flights was the same and was adopted as the standard procedure for closing the doors following a long cold exposure: the orbiter would hold a top-to-Sun position for fifteen minutes to warm the cargo bay, then undergo a short "barbecue roll" to even out vehicle temperatures, allowing the doors to close normally. Mission STS-27) Characteristics of the Operational Missions (STS-5 Through

The Space Transportation System became operational in 1982, after completing the last of four orbital flight tests. These flights had demonstrated that the Space Shuttle could provide flexible, efficient transportation into space and back for crew members, equipment, scientific experiments, and payloads. From this point, payload requirements would take precedence over spacecraft testing. Table 3-21 summarizes Shuttle mission characteristics. The narrative and tables that follow (Tables 3-22 through 3-44) provide more detailed information on each Shuttle mission. STS-5 STS-5 was the first operational Space Shuttle mission. The crew adopted the theme "We Deliver" as it deployed two commercial communications satellites: Telesat-E (Anik C-3) for Telesat Canada and SBS-C for Satellite Business Systems. Each was equipped with the Payload Assist Module-D (PAM-D) solid rocket motor, which fired about forty-five minutes after deployment, placing each satellite into highly elliptical orbits.

SPACE The mission

TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN carried the first crew of four,

SPACEFLIGHT double the number

171 on the

previous four missions. It also carried the first mission specialists-individuals qualified in satellite deployment payload support, EVAs, and the operation of the RMS. This mission featured the first Shuttle landing on the 15,000-foot-long concrete runway at Edwards Air Force Base in California. NASA canceled the first scheduled EVA, or spacewalk, in the Shuttle program because of a malfunction in the spacesuits. Experiments on this mission were part of the Orbiter Experiments Program, managed by NASA's Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology (OAST). The primary objective of this program was to increase the technology reservoir for the development of future space transportation systems to be used by the Office of Space Flight for further certification of the Shuttle and to expand its operational capabilities. Figure 3-13 shows the STS-5 payload configuration, and Table 3-22 lists the mission's characteristics. STS-6 STS-6, carrying a crew of four, was the first flight of Challenger, NASA's second operational orbiter. The primary objective of this mission was the deployment of the first Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (TDRS-1) to provide improved tracking and data acquisition services to spacecraft in low-Earth orbit. It was to be injected into a geosynchronous transfer orbit by a two-stage inertial upper stage. The first stage fired as planned, but the second stage cut off after only seventy seconds of a
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172

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

planned 103-second burn. TDRS entered an unsatisfactory elliptical orbit. Excess propellant was used over the next several months to gradually circularize the orbit, using the spacecraft's own attitude control thrusters. The maneuver was successful, and TDRS-I reached geosynchronous orbit and entered normal service. This mission featured the first successful spacewalk of the Space Shuttle program, which was performed by astronauts Donald H. Peterson and F. Story Musgrave. It lasted about four hours, seventeen minutes. The astronauts worked in the cargo bay during three orbits, testing new tools and equipment-handling techniques. This mission used the first lightweight external tank and lightweight solid rocket booster casings. The lightweight external tank was almost 4,536 kilograms lighter than the external tank on STS- l, with each weighing approximately 30,391 kilograms. The lightweight solid rocket booster casings increased the Shuttle's weight-carrying capability by about 363 kilograms. Each booster's motor case used on STS-6 and future flights weighed about 44,453 kilograms, approximately 1,814 kilograms less than those flown on previous missions. Table 3-23 identifies the characteristics of STS-6. STS-7 STS-7 deployed two communications satellites, Telesat-F (Anik C-2) and Palapa-B1 into geosynchronous orbit. Also, the Ku-band antenna used with the TDRS was successfully tested. The OSTA-2 mission was also conducted on STS-7. This mission involved the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany (the former West Germany) in a cooperative materials processing research project in space. Further details of the OSTA-2 mission are in Chapter 2, "Space Applications," in Volume VI of the NASA Historical Data Book. This mission used the RMS to release the Shuttle Pallet Satellite (SPAS-01), which was mounted in the cargo bay. SPAS was the first Space Shuttle cargo commercially financed by a European company, the West German firm Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm. Operating under its own power, SPAS-01 flew alongside Challenger for several hours and took the first full photographs of a Shuttle in orbit against a background of Earth. The RMS grappled the SPAS-01 twice and then returned and locked the satellite into position in the cargo bay. STS-7 was the first Shuttle mission with a crew of five astronauts and the first flight of an American woman, Sally Ride, into space. This mission also had the first repeat crew member--Robert Crippen. Details of the mission are in Table 3-24. STS-8 STS-8's primary mission objectives were to deploy Insat 1B, complete RMS loaded arm testing using the payload flight test article (PFFAL

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT

173

Figure

3-14.

Payload

Flight

Test Article

accomplish TDRS/Ku-band communications testing, and achieve assigned experiments and test objectives. The RMS carried its heaviest loads to date, and the PFTA had several grapple points to simulate the inertias of even heavier cargoes. Figure 3-14 illustrates the PFTA configuration. STS-8 was the first Space Shuttle mission launched at night. The tracking requirements for the Indian lnsat 1B satellite, the primary payload, dictated the time of launch. STS-8 also had the first night landing. The crew performed the first tests of Shuttle-to-ground communications using TDRS. Launched into geosynchronous orbit on STS-6, TDRS was designed to improve communications between the spacecraft and the ground by relaying signals between the spacecraft and the ground, thus preventing the loss of signal that occurred when using only ground stations. This mission carried the first African-American astronaut, Guion S. Bluford, to fly in space. Details of STS-8 are listed in Table 3-25. STS-9 STS-9 carried the first Spacelab mission (Spacelab l), which was developed by ESA, and the first astronaut to represent ESA, Ulf Merbold of Germany. It successfully implemented the largest combined NASA and ESA partnership to date, with more than 100 investigators from eleven European nations, Canada, Japan, and the United States. It was the longest Space Shuttle mission up to that time in the program and was the first time six crew members were carried into space on a single vehicle. The crew included payload specialists selected by the science community. The primary mission objectives were to verify the Spacelab system and subsystem performance capability, to determine the Spacelab/orbiter

174

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

interface capability, andto measure theinduced environment. Secondary mission objectives wereto obtainvaluable scientific,applications, and technology datafroma U.S.-European multidisciplinary payload andto demonstrate to theusercommunity thebroadcapability of Spacelab for scientificresearch. ESAandNASAjointly sponsored Spacelab 1andconducted investigations on a twenty-four-hour basis,demonstrating the capabilityfor advanced research in space. Spacelab wasanorbitallaboratory with an observations platformcomposed of cylindricalpressurized modules and U-shaped unpressurized pallets,whichremained in the orbiter'scargo bayduringflight. It wasthefirst useofa large-scale space airlockforscientificexperiments. Altogether, seventy-three separate investigations werecarried out in astronomy andphysics, atmospheric physics, Earthobservations, life sciences,materials sciences, spaceplasma physics, andtechnology--the largestnumberof disciplines represented on a singlemission.These experiments aredescribed in Chapter 4, "Space Science," in Table 4--45. Spacelab l hadunprecedented large-scale directinteraction of theflight crewwithground-based science investigators. All of themission objectives for verifyingSpacelab's modules were met,andEarth-based scientists communicated directlywith theorbiting space crewwhoperformed theirexperiments, collected dataimmediately,andoffered directions for theexperiments. Table 3-26list thecharacteristics of thismission.
STS 41-B The primary goal of STS 41-B was to deploy into orbit two commercommunications satellites--Western Union's Westar VI and the

cial

Indonesian Palapa-B2. (Failure of the PAM-D rocket motors left both satellites in radical low-Earth orbits.) The crew devoted the remainder of STS 41 -B to a series of rendezvous maneuvers using an inflatable balloon as the target, the test flights of two Manned Maneuvering Units (Figure 3-15), and the checkout of equipment and procedures in preparation for Challenger's flight (41-C) in April, which would be the Solar Maximum satellite repair mission. Commander Vance D. Brand led the five-person crew for this mission. He had previously commanded the first operational flight of the Space Shuttle, STS-5. The other crew members, pilot Robert L. "Hoot" Gibson and three mission specialists (Bruce McCandless II, Ronald E. McNair, and Robert L. Stewart), flew in space for the first time. This mission featured the first untethered spacewalks. Gas-powered backpacks were used to demonstrate spacewalk techniques important for the successful retrieval and repair of the disabled Solar Maximum spacecraft. The crew members also tested several pieces of specialized equipment during the two five-hour EVAs. The Manipulator Foot Restraint, a portable workstation, was attached to the end of and maneuvered by the

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT

175

Figure

3-15.

Manned

Maneuvering

Unit

RMS arm. Attached to the foot restraint, an astronaut could use the robot arm as a space-age "cherry picker" to reach and work on various areas of a satellite. The RMS, just over fifteen meters long and built for the Space Shuttle by the National Research Council of Canada, was to be used to deploy the SPAS as a target for Manned Maneuvering Unit-equipped astronauts to perform docking maneuvers. However, the SPAS remained in the payload bay because of an electrical problem with the RMS. SPA.S was to be used as a simulated Solar Maximum satellite. The astronauts were to replace electrical connectors attached to the SPAS during one of the spacewalks to verify procedures that astronauts would perform on the actual repair mission. The Manned Maneuvering Unit-equipped astronauts were also to attempt to dock with the pallet satellite, thereby simulating maneuvers needed to rendezvous, dock, and stabilize the So]at Maximum satellite. The crew members conducted two days of rendezvous activities using a target balloon (Integrated Rendezvous Target) to evaluate the navigational ability of Challenger's on-board systems, as well as the interaction among the spacecraft, flight crew, and ground control. The activities obtained data from Challenger's various sensors (the rendezvous radar, star tracker, and crew optical alignment sight) required for rendezvous and exercised the navigation and maneuvering capabilities of the on-board software. The rendezvous occurred by maneuvering the orbiter to within 244 meters of its target from a starting distance of approximately 193.1 kilometers. In the process, sensors gathered additional performance data.

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NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Thismission initiated thenewShuttle numbering system in whichthe first numeralstoodfor the year,the second for the launchsite (1 for Kennedy, 2 for Vandenberg Air Force Base), andtheletterfor theoriginal orderof the assignment. The mission characteristics arelistedin Table3-27.
STS 41-C STS 41-C launched Challenger into its highest orbit yet so it could rendezvous with the wobbling, solar flare-studying Solar Maximum satellite, which had been launched in February 1980. Its liftoff from Launch Complex 39's Pad A was the first to use a "direct insertion" ascent technique that put the Space Shuttle into an elliptical orbit with a high point of about 461.8 kilometers and an inclination to the equator of twenty-eight and a half degrees. On the eleventh Shuttle flight, Challenger's five-person crew successfully performed the first on-orbit repair of a crippled satellite. After failed rescue attempts early in the mission, the robot arm hauled the Solar Max into the cargo bay on the fifth day of the mission (Figure 3-16). Challenger then served as an orbiting service station for the astronauts, using the Manned Maneuvering Unit, to repair the satellite's fine-pointing system and to replace the attitude control system and coronagraph/polarimeter electronics box during two six-hour spacewalks.

MEB Changeout

FSS

Locker

Figure 3-16. Solar Max On-Orbit Berthed Configuration

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN

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The robot arm then returned the Solar Max to orbit to continue its study of the violent nature of the Sun's solar activity and its effects on Earth. The successful in-orbit repair demonstrated the STS capability of "inspace" payload processing, which would be exploited on future missions. Challenger's RMS released the Long Duration Exposure Facility into orbit on this mission (Figure 3-17). Carrying fifty-seven diverse, passive experiments on this mission, it was to be left in space for approximately one year but was left in space for almost six years before being retrieved by STS-32 in January 1990. Cinema 360 made its second flight, mounted in the cargo bay. The 35ram movie camera recorded the Solar Max rescue mission. A second film camera, 1MAX, flew on the Shuttle to record the event on 70ram film designed for projection on very large screens. Table 3-28 contains the details of this mission. STS 41-D Discovery made its inaugural flight on this mission, the twelfth flight in the Space Shuttle program. The mission included a combination cargo from some of the payloads originally manifested to fly on STS 41-D and STS 41-E The decision to remanifest followed the aborted launch of Discovery on June launch schedule. 26 and provided for a minimum disruption to the

Failures of the PAM on earlier missions prompted an exhaustive examination of production practices by the NASA-industry team. This team established new test criteria for qualifying the rocket motors. The new testing procedures proved satisfactory when the Shuttle successfully deployed two communications satellites equipped with PAMs, SBS-4 and Telstar 3-C, into precise geosynchronous transfer orbits. A third satellite, Syncom IV-2 (also called Leasat-2), was equipped with a unique upper

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178 stage. This satellite Shuttle.

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK was the first built especially for launch from the

NASA's Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology (OAST) sponsored this mission, designated OAST-1. Details of this mission are located in Chapter 3, "Aeronautics and Space Research and Technology," in Volume VI of the NASA Historical Data Book. Payload specialist Charles Walker, a McDonnell Douglas employee, was the first commercial payload specialist assigned by NASA to a Shuttle crew. At 21,319.2 kilograms, this mission had the heaviest payload to date. Details of STS 41-D are in Table 3-29. STS 41-G This mission was the first with seven crew members and featured the

first flight of a Canadian payload specialist, the first to include two women, the first spacewalk by an American woman (Sally Ride), the first crew member to fly a fourth Space Shuttle mission, the first demonstration of a satellite refueling technique in space, and the first flight with a reentry profile crossing the eastern United States. OSTA-3 was the primary payload and was the second in a series of Shuttle payloads that carried experiments to take measurements of Earth. Details of the payload can be found in Chapter 2, "Space Applications," in Volume VI of the NASA Historical Data Book. This mission deployed the Earth Radiation Budget Satellite less than nine hours into flight. This satellite was the first of three planned sets of orbiting instruments in the Earth Radiation Budget Experiment. Overall, the program aimed to measure the amount of energy received from the Sun and reradiated into space and the seasonal movement of energy from the tropics to the poles. The Orbital Refueling System experiment demonstrated the possibility of refueling satellites in orbit. This experiment required spacesuited astronauts working in the cargo bay to attach a hydrazine servicing tool, already connected to a portable fuel tank, to a simulated satellite panel. After leak checks, the astronauts returned to the orbiter cabin, and the actual movement of hydrazine from tank to tank was controlled from the flight deck. Details of this mission are in Table 3-30. STS 5 I-A This mission deployed two satellites--the Canadian communications satellite Telesat H (Anik-D2) and the Hughes Syncom IV-I (Leasat-1) communications satellite--both destined for geosynchronous orbit. The crew also retrieved two satellites, Palapa B-2 and Westar 6, deployed during STS 41-B in February 1984. Astronauts Joseph R Allen and Dale A. Gardner retrieved the two malfunctioning satellites during a spacewalk. Discovery carried the 3-M Company's Diffusive Mixing of Organic Solutions experiment in the mid-deck. This was the first attempt to grow organic crystals in a microgravity environment. Figure 3-18 shows the STS 51-A cargo configuration, and Table 3-31 lists the mission's characteristics.

SPACE

TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN

SPACEFLIG

HT

[ 79

Palapa B-2 Retrieval Pallet Manipulator Foot Restraint

Westar-VI Retrieval Manned Maneuvering Unit/Fixed Service Structure Pallet_

Radiation Monitoring Experiment Syncom Diffusive Mixing Organic _RMS of Anik-D2 IV-1

Figure

3-18.

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NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

the postdeployment sequence failed to begin, and the satellite continued to drift in a low-Earth orbit. This mission also involved the first public official, Senator Jake Garn from Utah, flying on a Space Shuttle mission; Garn carried out a number of medical experiments. The crew members conducted three mid-deck experiments as part of NASA's microgravity science and applications and space science programs: American Flight Echocardiograph, Phase Partitioning Experiment, and Protein Crystal Growth. Another payload was "Toys in Space," an examination of simple toys in a weightless environment, with the results to be made available to students. The mission's characteristics are in Table 3-33. STS 5 I-B The first operational flight of the Spacelab took place on STS 5 i-B. Spacelab 3 provided a high-quality microgravity environment for delicate materials processing and fluid experiments. (Table 4--46 describes the individual Spacelab 3 experiments.) The primary mission objective was to conduct science, application, and technology investigations (and acquire intrinsic data) that required the low-gravity environment of Earth orbit and an extended-duration, stable vehicle attitude with emphasis on materials processing. The secondary mission objective was to obtain data on research in materials sciences, life sciences, fluid mechanics, atmospheric science, and astronomy. This mission was the first in which a principal investigator flew with his experiment in space. The NUSAT Get-Away Special satellite was successfully deployed. The Global Low Orbiting Message Relay satellite failed to deploy from its Get-Away Special canister and was returned to Earth. Details of this mission are in Table 3-34. STS 51-G During this mission, NASA flew the first French and Arabian payload specialists. The mission's cargo included domestic communications satellites from the United States, Mexico, and Saudi Arabia--all successfully deployed. STS 5 I-G also deployed and retrieved the Spartan-1, using the RMS. The Spartan, a free-flyer carrier developed by NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center, could accommodate scientific instruments originally developed for the sounding rocket program. The Spartan "family" of shortduration satellites were designed to minimize operational interfaces with the orbiter and crew. All pointing sequences and satellite control commands were stored aboard the Spartan in a microcomputer controller. All data were recorded on a tape recorder. No command or telemetry link was provided. Once the Spartan satellite completed its observing sequence, it "safed" all systems and placed itself in a stable attitude to permit its retrieval and return to Earth. NASA's Astrophysics Division within the

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OfficeofSpace Science and Applications sponsored theSpartan withascientific instrument on this missionprovidedby the Naval Research Laboratory. Themissionmapped the x-rayemissions from the Perseus Cluster, thenuclear region oftheMilky Waygalaxy, andtheScorpius X-2. In addition,the missionconducted a Strategic Defense Initiative experiment calledthe High Precision Tracking Experiment. STS 51-G
included two French biomedical experiments and housed a materials processing furnace named the Automated Directional Solidification Furnace. Further details are in Table 3-35. STS 51-F STS 51-F was the third Space Shuttle flight devoted to Spacelab. Spacelab 2 was the second of two design verification test flights required by the Spacelab Verification Flight Test program, (Spacelab 1 flew on STS-9 in 1983.) Its primary mission objectives were to verify the Spacelab system and subsystem performance capabilities and to determine the Spacelab-orbiter and Spacelab-payload interface capabilities. Secondary mission objectives were to obtain scientific and applications data from a multidisciplinary payload and to demonstrate to the user community the broad capability of Spacelab for scientific research. The monitoring of mission activities and a quick-look analysis of data confirmed that the majority of Verification Flight Test functional objectives were properly performed in accordance with the timeline and flight procedures. NASA developed the Spacelab 2 payload. Its configuration included an igloo attached to a lead pallet, with the instrument point subsystem mounted on it, a two-pallet train, and an experiment special support structure. The instrument point subsystem--a gimbaled platform attached to a pallet that provides precision pointing for experiments requiring greater pointing accuracy and stability than is provided by the orbiter--flew for the first time on Spacelab 2. The Spacelab system supported and accomplished the experiment phase of the mission. The Spacelab 2 experiments are listed in Table 4-47, and the overall mission characteristics are in Table 3-36. STS 51-I STS 51-I deployed three communications satellites, ASC-1, Aussat-l, and Syncom 1V-4 (Leasat-4) . It also retrieved, repaired, and redeployed Syncom IV-3 (Leasat-3) so that it could be activated from the ground. Astronauts William F. Fisher and James D.A. van Hoften performed two EVAs totaling eleven hours, fifty-one minutes. Part of the time was spent retrieving, repairing, and redeploying the Syncom IV-3, which was originally deployed on STS 51-D. Physical Vapor Transport of Organic Solids was the second microgravity-based scientific experiment to fly aboard the Space Shuttle. (The first was the Diffusive Mixing of Organic Solutions, which flew on

182

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

STS51-A in November1984.)Physical VaporTransport of Organic Solidsconsisted of nine independent experimental cellshoused in an experimental apparatus container mounted ontheaftbulkhead in themiddeckarea. Thecrewinterface wasthrough a handheid keyboard anddisplayterminal.Usingthis terminal, the crewselected andactivated the experiment cells,monitored celltemperatures andpower levels, andperformeddiagnostic tests. Table3-37includes thedetails of STS51-I.
STS 51-J STS 51-J was the second Space Shuttle mission dedicated to DOD. Atlantis flew for the first time on this mission. Details are in Table 3-38. STS 61-A The "Deutschland Spacelab Mission D-1" was the first of a series of dedicated West German missions on the Space Shuttle. The Federal German Aerospace Research Establishment (DFVLR) managed Spacelab D- 1 for the German Federal Ministry of Research and Technology. DFVLR provided the payload and was responsible for payload analytical and physical integration and verification, as well as payload operation on orbit. The Spacelab payload was assembled by MBB/ERNO over a five-year period at a cost of about $175 million. The D-I was used by German and other European universities, research institutes, and industrial enterprises, and it was dedicated to experimental scientific and technological research. This mission included 75 experiments, most performed more than once (see Chapter 4). These included basic and applied microgravity research in the fields of materials science, life sciences and technology, and communications and navigation. Weightlessness was the common denominator of the experiments carried out aboard Spacelab D-I. Scientific operations were controlled from the German Space Operations Center at Oberpfaffenhofen near Munich. The mission was conducted in the long module configuration, which featured the Vestibular Sled designed to provide scientists with data on the functional organization of human vestibular and orientation systems. The Global Low Orbiting Message Relay satellite was also deployed from a Get-Away Special canister. Figure 3-19 shows the STS 61-A cargo configuration, and Table 3-39 lists the mission's characteristics. STS 61-B Three communications satellites were deployed on this mission: Morelos-B, AUSSAT-2 and Satcom KU-2. The crew members conducted two experiments to test the assembling of erectable structures in space: Experimental Assembly of Structures in Extravehicular Activity and Assembly Concept for Construction of Erectable Space Structure (EASE/ACCESS), shown in Figure 3-20. These experiments required two

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT

183

Materials

Experiment

Assembl

Scientific

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Antenna

Spacelab Mobal Low Orbiting Message Relay Satellite

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61-A

Cargo

Cot figuration

spacewalks by Astronauts Sherwood C. Spring and Jerry L. Ross lasting five hours, thirty-two minutes and six hours, thirty-eight minutes, respectively. This flight featured the first Mexican payload specialist, the first flight of the PAM-D2, the heaviest PAM payload yet (on the Satcom), and the first assembly of a structure in space. Table 3-40 contains STS 61-B's characteristics. STS 61-C This mission used the Hitchhiker, a new payload carrier system in the Space Shuttle's payload bay, for the first time. This Hitchhiker flight carrier contained three experiments in the Small Payload Accommodation program: particle analysis cameras to study particle distribution within the Shuttle bay environment, coated mirrors to test the effect of the Shuttle's environment, and a capillary pumped loop heat acquisition and transport system. Columbia successfully deployed the Satcom KU-I satellite/PAM-D. However, the Comet Halley Active Monitoring Program experiment, a 35ram camera that was to photograph Comet Halley, did not function properly because of battery problems. This mission also carried Materials Science Laboratory-2 (MSL-2), whose configuration is shown in Figure 3-2 I. Franklin R. Chang-Diaz was the first Hispanic American to journey into space. He produced a videotape in Spanish for live distribution to

184

NASA

HISTORICAL

DATA BOOK

Starboard _ _

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Figure 3-20. EASEACCESS audiences television STS 51-L in the circuit.

Cotz/_guration Select

United States and Latin America via the NASA Details of this mission are in Table 3-4 I.

The planned objectives of STS 51-L were the deployment of TDRS-2 and the flying of Shuttle-Pointed Tool for Astronomy (SPARTAN-203)/Halley's Comet Experiment Deployable, a free-flying module designed to observe the tail and coma of Halley's comet with two ultraviolet spectrometers and two cameras. Other cargo included the Fluid Dynamics Experiment, the Comet Halley Active Monitoring Program experiment, the Phase Partitioning Experiment, three SSIP experiments, and a set of lessons for the Teacher in Space Project.

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT

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Figure 3 21. Inteq,rated MSL-2 Payload See the following major section on the Challenger accident detailed information about this mission. STS 51-L's characteristics listed in Table 3-42. STS-26 This mission marked the resumption of Space Shuttle flights after the 1986 STS 5 I-L accident. The primary objective was to deliver TDRS-3 to orbit (Figure 3-22). Meeting this objective, the satellite was boosted to geosynchronous orbit by its inertial upper stage. TDRS-3 was the third TDRS advanced communications spacecraft to be launched from the Shuttle. (TDRS-1 was launched during Challenger's first flight in April 1983. The second, TDRS-2, was lost during the 1986 Challenger accident.) Secondary payloads on Discover 3, included the Physical Vapor Transport of Organic Solids, the Protein Crystal Growth Experiment, the Infrared Communications Flight Experiment, the Aggregation of Red Blood Cells Experiment, the Isoelectric Focusing Experiment, the Mesoscale Lightning Experiment, the Phase Partitioning Experiment, the Earth-Limb Radiance Experiment, the Automated Directional Solidification Furnace, and two SSIP experiments. Special instrumentation was also mounted in the payload bay to record the environment experienced by Discovery during the mission. The Orbiter Experiments Autonomous Supporting Instrumentation System-1 (OASIS-I) collected and recorded a variety of environmental measurements during the orbiter's in-flight phases. The data were used to study the effects on the for are

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NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

TDRS Single

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3-22.

Tracking

and

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orbiter of temperature, and strain. See the section

pressure, below on the

vibration, Challenger

sound,

acceleration, and

stress,

accident

subsequent

return to space for information on changes to the Space Shuttle implemented for this mission. STS-26's characteristics are listed in Table 3-43. STS-27 This was the third STS mission are listed in Table 344. The Challenger dedicated to DOD. Details of STS-27

Accident

and

Return

to Flight

Until the explosion that ended the STS 51-L mission on January 28, 1986, few had been aware of the flaws in the various systems and operations connected with the Space Shuttle. The investigations that followed the accident, which interrupted the program for more than two years, disclosed that long-standing conditions and practices had caused the accident. The following section focuses on the activities of the commission that investigated the explosion, the findings of the various investigations that revealed problems with the Shuttle system in general and with Challenger in particular, and the changes that took place in the Shuttle program as a result of the investigations.

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Thefollowingdocuments have provided most of thedatafor thissection, andtheyprovidea fascinating lookat the events surrounding the accident. Thereader mightconsult themfor additional insightaboutthis partof NASAhistory.
STS 51-L Data and Design Analysis Task Force--Historical Summar3', June 1986 Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Vol. I-IV, June 6, 1986 Report to the President--Actions to Implement the Recommendations of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, July 14, 1986 "Statement by Dr. James Fletcher," NASA administrator, regarding revised Shuttle manifest, October 3, 1986 Report to the President--hnplementation the Presidential Commission on Accident, June 30, 1987 the of the Recommendations of Space Shuttle Challenger

Immediately after the Challenger that occupied NASA for the next two of Discover_' on the STS-26 mission. ties that took place from January 28, the Shuttle's return to flight. Presidential Formation On Commission and Activities February 3, 1986, of the Rogers President

explosion, a series of events began years, culminating with the launch Table 3-45 summarizes the activi1986, through September 29, 1988,

Commission Ronald Reagan appointed an inde-

pendent commission chaired by William E Rogers, former secretary of state and attorney general, and composed of persons not connected with the mission to investigate the accident. The commission's mandate was to: 1. 2. Review the circumstances surrounding the accident to establish action based the upon

probable cause or causes of the accident Develop recommendations for corrective or other the commission's findings and determinations"

Immediately after its establishment, the commission tigation and, with the full support of the White House, ings on the facts leading up to the accident.

began its invesheld public hear-

_Report at a Glance, Report to the President by the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), Preface (no page number).

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NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

recommendations

Thecommission construed its mandate to include

on safety matters that were not necessarily involved in this accident but required attention to make future flights safer. Careful attention was given to concerns expressed by astronauts. However, the commission felt that its mandate did not require a detailed investigation of all aspects of the Space Shuttle program nor a review of budgetary matters. Nor did the commission wish to interfere with or displace Congress in the performance of its duties. Rather, the commission focused its attention on the safety aspects of future flights based on the lessons learned from the investigation, with the objective of returning to safe flight. Congress recognized the desirability of having a single investigation of this accident and agreed to await the commission's findings before deciding what further action it might find necessary. For the first several days after the accident--possibly because of the trauma resulting from the accident--NASA seemed to be withholding information about the accident from the public. After the commission began its work, and at its suggestion, NASA began releasing much information that helped to reassure the public that all aspects of the accident were being investigated and that the full story was being told in an orderly and thorough manner. Following the suggestion of the commission, NASA also established several teams of persons not involved with the 51-L launch process to supported the commission and its panels. These NASA teams cooperated with the commission and contributed to what was a comprehensive and complete investigation. Following their swearing in on February 6, 1986, commission members immediately began a series of hearings during which NASA officials outlined agency procedures covering the Space Shuttle program and the status of NASA's investigation of the accident. On February 10, Dr. Alton G. Keel, Jr., associate director of the Office of Management and Budget, was appointed executive director. Dr. Keel gathered a staff of fifteen experienced investigators from various government agencies and the military services, as well as administrative personnel to support commission activities. Testimony began on February 10 in a closed session, when the commission began to learn of the troubled history of the solid rocket motor joint and seals. Commission members discovered the first indication that the contractor, Morton Thiokol, initially recommended against January 27, 1986, the night before the launch of STS 5 l-L, cerns regarding the effects of low temperature on the the launch on because of conjoint and seal.

Additional evidence supplied to the commission on February 13 and 14 provided the first evidence that the solid rocket motor joint and seal might have malfunctioned, initiating the accident. The session on February 14 included NASA and contractor participants who had been involved in the discussion on January 27 about whether to launch Challenger. Following that session, Chairman Rogers issued a statement noting that "the process [leading to the launch of Challenger] may have been flawed" and that NASA's Acting

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN Administrator Dr. William Graham

SPACEFLIGHT

189

had been asked "not to include on the and

investigating teams at NASA, persons involved in that process. "'7 The commission itself thus assumed the role of investigators divided itself into four investigative panels: I. 2. 3.

Development and Production, responsible for investigating the acquisition and test and evaluation processes for Space Shuttle elements Pre-Launch Activities, responsible for assessing the Shuttle system processing, launch readiness process, and prelaunch security Mission Planning and Operations, responsible for investigating mission planning and operations, schedule pressures, and crew safety
areas

4.

Accident Analysis, charged developing both an anomaly

with analyzing the accident tree and accident scenarios

data

and

Alter the panels were finalized and the new approach described before Congress, the working groups went to the Marshall Space Flight Center, the Kennedy Space Center, and Morton Tbiokol to begin analyzing data relating to the accident. A series of public hearings on February 25, 26, and 27 presented additional information about the launch decision obtained from testimony by Thiokol, Rockwell, and NASA officials. At that time, details about the history of problems with the then-suspect solid rocket motor joints and seals also began emerging and focused the commission's attention on the need to document fully the extent of knowledge and awareness about the problems within both Thiokol and NASA. Following these hearings, separate panels conducted much of the commission's investigative efforts in parallel with full commission hearings. Panel members made numerous trips to Kennedy, Marshall, the Johnson Space Center, and Thiokol facilities in Utah to hold interviews and gather and analyze data relating to their panels' respective responsibilities. At the same time, a general investigative staff held a series of individual interviews to document fully the teleconference between NASA and Thiokol officials the night before the launch: the history of joint design and O-ring problems; NASA safety, reliability, and quality assurance functions: and the assembly of the right solid rocket booster for STS 51-L. Subsequent investigations by this group were directed toward the effectiveness of NASA's organizational structure, particularly the Shuttle program structure, and allegations that there had been external pressure on NASA to launch on January 28. Members of the commission and its staff interviewed more than 160 individuals and held more than thirty-five formal panel investigations, which generated almost 12,000 pages of transcript. Almost 6,300 documents, totaling more than 122,000 pages, and hundreds of

7hid.. Appendix A, Commission Activities, p. 206.

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NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

the commission's permanent data base and archives. These sessions and all the data gathered added to the 2,800 pages of hearing transcripts generated by the commission in both closed and open sessions. In addition to the work of the commission and its staff, more than !,300 employees from all NASA facilities were involved in the investigation and were supported by more than 1,600 people from other government agencies and more than 3,100 from NASA's contractor organizations. Particularly significant were the activities of the military, the Coast Guard, and the National Transportation Safety Board in the salvage and analysis of the Shuttle wreckage. Description of the Accident

photographs wereexamined andbecame partof

The flight of Challenger on STS 51-L began at 11:38 a.m., Eastern Standard Time, on January 28, 1986. It ended 73 seconds later with the explosion and breakup of the vehicle. All seven members of the crew were killed. They were Francis R. Scobee, commander; Michael J. Smith, pilot; mission specialists Judith A. Resnik, Ellison Onizuka, and Ronald E. McNair; and payload specialists Gregory Jarvis of Hughes Aircraft and S. Christa McAuliffe, a New Hampshire teacher--the first Space Shuttle passenger/observer participating in the NASA Teacher in Space Program. She had planned to teach lessons during live television transmissions. The primary cargo was the second TDRS. Also on board was a SPARTAN free-flying module that was to observe Halley's comet. The commission determined the sequence of flight events during the 73 seconds before the explosion and 37 seconds following the explosion based on visual examination and image enhancement of film from NASA-operated cameras and telemetry data transmitted by the Shuttle to ground stations. Table 3-46 lists this sequence of events. The launch had been the first from Pad B at Kennedy's Launch Complex 39. The flight had been scheduled six times earlier but had been delayed because of technical problems and bad weather. Investigation and Findings of the Cause of the Accident the commission focused on three criti-

Throughout cal questions: 1.

the investigation,

2. 3.

What circumstances surrounding mission 51-L contributed to the catastrophic termination of that flight in contrast to twenty-four successful flights preceding it? What evidence pointed to the right solid rocket booster as the source of the accident as opposed to other elements of the Space Shuttle? Finally, what was the mechanism of failure?

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191

Usingmission data, subsequently completed testsandanalyses, and recovered wreckage, the commission identifiedall possible faultsthat couldoriginate in therespective flightelements of theSpace Shuttle that might haveled to lossof Challenger: The commission examined the
launch pad, the external tank, the Space Shuttle main engines, the orbiter and related equipment, payload/orbiter interfaces, the payload, the solid rocket boosters, and the solid rocket motors. They also examined the possibility of and ruled out sabotage. The commission eliminated all elements except the right solid rocket motor as a cause of the accident. Four areas related to the functioning of that motor received detailed analysis to determine their part in the accident: 1. Structural loads were evaluated, and the commission determined that these loads were well below the design limit loads and were not considered the cause of the accident. Failure of the case wall (case membrane) was considered, with the conclusion that the assessments did not support a failure that started in the membrane and progressed slowly to the joint or one that started in the membrane and grew rapidly the length of the solid rocket motor segment. Propellant anomalies were considered, with the conclusion that it was improbable that propellant anomalies contributed to the STS 51-L accident. The remaining area relating to the functioning of the right solid rocket motor, the loss of the pressure seal at the case joint, was determined to be the cause of the accident.

2.

3.

4.

The commission released its report and findings on the cause of the accident on June 9, 1986. The consensus of the commission and participating investigative agencies was that the loss of Challenger was caused by a failure in the joint between the two lower segments of the right solid rocket motor. The specific failure was the destruction of the seals that were intended to prevent hot gases from leaking through the joint during the propellant burn of the rocket motor. The evidence assembled by the commission indicated that no other element of the Space Shuttle system contributed to this failure. In arriving at this conclusion, the commission reviewed in detail all available data, reports, and records, directed and supervised numerous tests, analyses, and experiments by NASA, civilian contractors, and various government agencies, and then developed specific scenarios and the range of most probable causative factors. The commission released the following sixteen findings:
.

A combustion gas leak through the right solid rocket motor aftfield joint initiated at or shortly after ignition eventually weakened andor penetrated the external tank initiating vehicle structural breaktq_ and loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger during STS mission 51-L.

192 2. The evidence

NASA shows

HISTORICAL that no other

DATA BOOK STS 51-L Shuttle element or the

3.

4.

5.

payload contributed to the causes of the right solid rocket motor aft field joint combustion gas leak. Sabotage was not a factor. Evidence examined in the review of Space Shuttle material, manufacturing, assembly, quality control, and processing on nonconformance reports found no flight hardware shipped to the launch site that fell outside the limits of Shuttle design .specifications. Ixlunch site activities, including assembly and preparation, from receipt of the flight hardware to launch were generally in accord with established procedures and were not considered a factor in the accident. l_umch site records show that the right solid rocket motor segments were assembled using approved procedures. Howevet; significant out-of-round conditions existed between the two segments joined at the right solid twcket motor aft field joint (the joint that failed). a. While the assembly conditions had the potential of generating debris or damage that could cause O-ring seal _lilure, these were not considered factors in this accident. b. The diameters of the two solid rocket motor segments had grown as a result of prior use. c. The growth resulted in a condition at time of launch wherein the maximum gap bem,een the tang and clevis in the region of the joint _ O-rings was no more than 0.008 inch (0.2032 millimeter) and the average gap would have been 0.004 inch (0.1016 millimeter). With a tang-to-clevis gap o[ 0.004 inch (0.1016 millimeter), the O-ring in the joint would be compressed to the extent that it pressed against all three walls of the O-ring retaining channel. The lack of roundness of the segments was such that the smallest

d.

e.

6.

7.

tang-to-clevis clearance occurred at the initiation of the assembly operation at positions of 120 degrees and 300 degrees around the circumference of the aft field joint. It is uncertain if this tight condition attd the resultant greater compression of the O-tqngs at these points persisted to the time of launch. The ambient temperature at time of launch was 36 degrees F, or 15 degrees lower than the next coldest previous launch. a. The temperature at the 300-degree position on the right aft field joint circumference was estimated to be 28 degrees plus or minus 5 degrees F. This was the coldest point on the joint. b. Temperature on the opposite side of the right solid rocket booster facing the sun was estimated to be about 50 degrees F. Other joints on the left and right solid rocket boosters experienced similar combinations of tang-to-clevis gap clearance and temperature. It is not known whether these joints experienced distress during the.[light of 51-L.

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8.

Experimental evidence indicates that due to several effects associated with the solid rocket booster's ignition and combustion pressures and associated vehicle motions, the gap between the tang and the clevis will open as much as 0.017 and 0.029 inches (0.4318 and O. 7366 millhneters) at the secondar3., and prhnar3: O-rings, respectively. a. This opening begins upon ignition, reaches its maximum rate of opening at about 200-300 millisecomls, and is essentially complete at 600 milliseconds when the solid rocket booster reaches its operating pressure. b. The external tank and right solM rocket booster are connected by several struts, including one at 310 degrees near the aft field joint that failed. This strut _' effect on the joint dynamics is to enhance the opening of the gap between the tang and clevis by about 10-20 pelz'ent in the pegion of 300-320 degrees. O-ring resilie,_ T is directly related to its temperature. a. A warm O-ring that has been compressed will return to its original shape much quicker than will a tom O-ring when compression is relieved. Thus, a watTn O-ring will Jbllow the opening of the tang-to-clevis gap. A cold O-ring ma_" not. b. A compressed O-Hng at 75 degrees F is five times more pc.wonsire in returning to its uncompressed shape than a cold O-ring at 30 degrees F. c. As a result it is probable that the O-rings in the right solid booster aft field joint were not following the opening of the gap between the tang and clevis at time qf ignition. Experiments indicate that the primary mechanisnt that actuates O-ring sealing is the application of gas pressure to the ttpstream (high-pressure) side of the O-ring as it sits in its groove or channel. a. For this pressure actuation to work most effectively, a space between the O-ring and its upstream channel wall should exist during pressurization. b. A rang-to-clevis gap of O.O04 inch (0.1016 millimeter), as probably existed in the failed joint, would have initially compressed the O-ring to the degree that no clearance existed between the O-ring and its upstream channel wall and the other two surfaces of the channel. At the cold launch temperature experienced, the O-ring would be very slow in returning to its normal rounded shape. It would not follow the opening of the tang-to-clevis gap. It would remain in its compressed position in the O-ring channel and not provide a space between itself and the upstream channel wall. Thus, it is probable the O-ring would not be pressule actuated to seal the gap in time to prechtde joint failure due to blow-by and erosion from hot combustion gases.

9.

10.

c.

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11.

The sealing characteristics of the solid rocket booster O-rings are enhanced by timely application of motor pressure. a. Ideally, motor pressure should be applied to actuate the O-ring and seal the joint prior to significant opening of the tang-toclevis gap (100 to 200 milliseconds after motor ignition). b. Experimental evidence indicates that temperature, humidit3; and other variables in the putty compound used to seal the joint can delay pressure application to the joint by 500 milliseconds or more. c. This delay in pressure could be a factor in initial joint failure.

12. Of 21 launches with ambient temperatures of 61 degrees F or greater, only four showed signs of O-ring thermal distress; i.e., erosion or blow-by and soot. Each of the launches below 61 degrees F resulted in one or more O-rings showing signs of thermal distress. a. Of these improper joint sealing actions, one-half occurred in the aft field joints, 20 percent in the center field joints, and 30 percent in the upper field joints. The division between left and right solid rocket boosters was roughly equal. b. Each instance of thermal O-ring distress was accompanied by a leak path in the insulating putty. The leak path connects the rocket's combustion chamber with the O-ring region of the tang and clevis. Joints that actuated without incident may also have had these leak paths. 13. There is a possibility that there was water in the clevis of the STS 51-L johTts since water was found in the STS-9joints during a destack operation after exposure to less rainfidl than STS 51-L. At time of launch, it was cold enough that water present in the joint would freeze. Tests show that ice in the joint can inhibit proper secondary seal performance. 14. A series of puffs of smoke were observed emanating from the 51-L aft field joint area of the right solid rocket booster between 0.678 and 2.500 seconds after ignition of the Shuttle solid rocket motors. a. The puff_ appeared at a frequency of about three puffs per second. This roughly matches the natural structural frequency of the solids at lift off and is reflected in slight cyclic changes of the tang-to-clevis gap opening. b. The puff_ were seen to be moving upward along the surface of the booster above the aft field joint. c. The smoke was estimated to originate at a circumferential position of between 270 degrees and 315 degrees on the booster aft field joint, emerging from the top of the joint. 15. This smoke from the aft field joint at Shuttle lift off was the first sign of the failure of the solid rocket booster O-ring seals on STS 51-L. 16. The leak was again clearly evident as a flame at approximately 58 seconds into the flight. It is possible that the leak was continuous but unobsetwable or non-existent in portions of the intervening period. It is possible in either case that thrust vectoring and normal vehicle response to wind shear as well as planned maneuvers reinitiated

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or magnified the leakage from a degraded seal in the period preceding the obsen,ed flames. The estimated position of the flame, centered at a point 307 degrees around the circumference of the aft fieM joint, was confirmed by the recove O, of m,o fragments of the right solid rocket booster. a. A small leak could have been present that may have grown to breach the joint in flame at a time on the order of 58 to 60 seconds after lift off Alternatively, the O-ring gap could have been resealed by deposition ,f a fragile buildup of aluminum oxide and other combustion debtqs. This resealed section of the joint could have been disturbed bv thrust vectoring, Space Shuttle motion and ,[light loads inducted by changing winds aloft. The winds aloft caused contpvl actions in the time interval of 32 seconds to 62 seconds into the .[light that were typical of the largest values experienced on previous missions.

b.

c.

Conclusion. hz view of the findings, the commission concluded that the cause of the Challenger accident was the failure of the pressure seal in the aft .field joint of the right solid rocket booster. The failure was due to a ._tulty design unacceptably sensitive to a number of factors. These factors were the effects of temperature, physical dimensions, the character of materials, the effects of reusabilit 3. processing and the reaction of the joint to dynamic loading? Contributing Causes of the Accident

In addition to the failure of the pressure seal as the primary cause of the accident, the commission identified a contributing cause of the accident having to do with the decision to launch. The commission concluded that the decision-making process was flawed in several ways. The testimony revealed failures in communication, which resulted in a decision to launch based on incomplete and sometimes misleading information, a conflict between engineering data and management judgments, and a NASA management structure that permitted internal flight safety problems to bypass key Shuttle managers. The decision to launch concerned two problem areas. One was the low temperature and its effect on the O-ring. The second was the ice that formed on the launch pad. The commission concluded that concerns regarding these issues had either not been communicated adequately to senior management or had not been given sufficient weight by those who made the decision to launch. O-Ring Level 1 Flight Concerns. Readiness Formal Review preparations for launch, consisting of the to and Certification of Flight Readiness

*lbid., Findings,

pp. 70-72.

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NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

the Level II program manager at the Johnson Space Center, were followed in a procedural sense for STS 51-L. However, the commission concluded that relevant concerns of Level III NASA personnel and element contractors had not been, in critical areas, adequately communicated to the NASA Levels I and II management responsible for the launch. In particular, objections to the launch voiced by Morton Thiokol engineers about the detrimental effect of cold temperatures on the performance of the solid rocket motor joint seal and the degree of concern of Thiokol and the Marshall Space Flight Center about the erosion of the joint seals in prior Shuttle flights, notably STS 51-C and 51-B, were not communicated sufficiently. Since December 1982, the O-rings had been designated a "Criticality 1" feature of the solid rocket booster design, meaning that component failure without backup could cause a loss of life or vehicle. In July 1985, after a nozzle joint on STS 51-B showed secondary O-ring erosion, indicating that the primary seal failed, a launch constraint was placed on flight STS 51-F and subsequent launches. These constraints had been imposed and regularly waived by the solid rocket booster project manager at Marshall, Lawrence B. Mulloy. Neither the launch constraint, the reason for it, nor the six consecutive waivers prior to STS 51-L were known to Associate Administrator for Space Flight Jesse W. Moore (Level I), Aldrich Arnold, the manager of space transportation programs at the Johnson Space Center (Level II), or James Thomas, the deputy director of launch and landing operations at the Kennedy Sl_ace Center at the time of the Flight Readiness Review process for STS 51-L. In addition, no mention of the O-ring problems appeared in the Certification of Flight Readiness for the solid rocket booster set designated BI026 signed for Thiokol on January 9, 1986, by Joseph Kilminster. Similarly, no mention appeared in the certification endorsement, signed on January 15, 1986, by Kilminster and Mulloy. No mention appeared in the entire chain of readiness reviews for STS 5 I-L, contrary to testimony by Mulloy, who claimed that concern about the O-ring was "in the Flight Readiness Review record that went all the way to the L-| review. TM On January 27 and through the night to January 28, NASA and contractor personnel debated the wisdom of launching on January 28, in light of the O-ring performance under low temperatures. Table 3-47 presents the chronology of discussions relating to temperature and the decision to launch. Information is based on testimony and documents provided to the commission through February 24, 1986. Except for the time of launch, all times are approximate. According to the commission, the decision to launch Challenger was flawed. Those who made that decision were unaware of the recent history of problems concerning the O-rings and the joints and were unaware

"Ibid., p. 85, from Commission pp. 2610-1 I.

Hearing

Transcript,

May 2,

1986,

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT

197

of theinitial writtenrecommendation of thecontractor advising against thelaunch attemperatures below53degrees F andthecontinuing oppositionof theengineers atThiokolaftermanagement reversed itsposition. If thedecision makers hadknown all ofthefacts,it is highlyunlikelythat theywouldhavedecided to launch STS51-LonJanuary 28, 1986. The commission revealed thefollowingfour findings: 1. Thecommission concluded thattherewasa serious flaw in thedecision-making process leading upto thelaunch of flight 5I-L. A wellstructured and managed systememphasizing safetywould have flagged therisingdoubts about thesolidrocket booster jointseal.Had these matters been clearlystated andemphasized in theflight readinessprocess in termsreflecting the viewsof mostof the Thiokol engineers andatleastsomeof theMarshall engineers, it seems likely thatthelaunch of 51-Lmightnothaveoccurred whenit did. 2. Thewaivingof launch constraints seems to have been attheexpense of flight safety. Therewasnosystem thatmandated thatlaunch constraints andwaivers of launch constraints beconsidered by all levels of management. 3. Thecommission notedwhatseemed to bea propensity of management at Marshall to contain potentially serious problems and to attempt to resolve them internally rather than communicate them forward. This tendency, the commission stated, was contrary to the need for Marshall to function as part of a system working toward successful flight missions, interfacing and communicating with the other parts of the system that worked to the same end. The commission concluded that Thiokol management reversed its position and recommended the launch of 51-L at the urging of Marshall and contrary to the views of its engineers in order to accommodate a major customer.

4.

Ice on the Launch Pad. The commission also found that decision makers did not clearly understand Rockwell's concern that launching was unsafe because of ice on the launch pad and whether Rockwell had indeed recommended the launch. They expressed concern about three aspects of this issue: 1. An analysis of all of the testimony and interviews established that Rockwell's recommendation on launch was ambiguous. The commission found it difficult, as did Aldrich, to conclude that there was a no-launch recommendation. Moreover, all parties were asked specifically to contact Aldrich or other NASA officials after the 9:00 a.m. Mission Management Team meeting and subsequent to the resumption of the countdown. The commission was also concerned about NASA+s response to Rockwell's position at the 9:00 a.m. meeting. The commission was not convinced Levels [ and II appropriately considered Rockwell's

2.

198

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

concern about the ice. However ambiguous as Rockwell's position was, it was clear that Rockwell did tell NASA that the ice was an unknown condition. Given the extent of the ice on the pad, the admitted unknown effect of the solid rocket motor and Space Shuttle main engines' ignition on the ice, as well as the fact that debris striking the orbiter was a potential flight safety hazard, the commission found the decision to launch questionable. In this situation, NASA seemed to be requiring a contractor to prove that it was not safe to launch, rather than proving it was safe. Nevertheless, the commission determined that the ice was not a cause of the 5 I-L accident and did not conclude that NASA's decision to launch specifically overrode a no-launch recommendation by an element contractor. The commission concluded that the freeze protection plan for Launch Pad 39-B was inadequate. The commission believed that the severe cold and presence of so much ice on the fixed service structure made it inadvisable to launch and that margins of safety were whittled down too far. Additionally, access to the crew emergency slide wire baskets was hazardous due to icy conditions. Had the crew been required to evacuate the orbiter on the launch pad, they would have been running on an icy surface. The commission believed that the crew should have been told of the condition and that greater consideration should have been given to delaying the launch. to the Accident

Precursor

Earlier events helped set the stage for the conditions that caused the STS 51-L accident. The commission stated that the Space Shuttle's solid rocket booster problem began with the faulty design of its joint and increased as both NASA and contractor management first failed to recognize the problem, then failed to fix it, and finally treated it as an acceptable flight risk. Morton Thiokol did not accept the implication of tests early in the program that the design had a serious and unanticipated flaw. NASA did not accept the judgment of its engineers that the design was unacceptable, and as the joint problems grew in number and severity, NASA minimized them in management briefings and reports. Thiokol's stated position was that "the condition is not desirable but is acceptable. ''_ Neither Thiokol nor NASA expected the rubber O-rings sealing the joints to be touched by hot gases of motor ignition, much less to be partially burned. However, as tests and then flights confirmed damage to the sealing rings, the reaction by both NASA and Thiokol was to increase the amount of damage considered "acceptable." At no time, the commission found, did management either recommend a redesign of the joint or call for the Shuttle's grounding until the problem was solved. '"Ibid., p. 120, from Report, "STS-3 Through Reviews to Level III Center Board." NASA. STS-25 Flight Readiness

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Thecommission stated thatthegenesis of theChallenger accident-the failure of the joint of the right solid rocket motor--began with decisions made in the design of the joint and in the failure by both Thiokoi and NASA's solid rocket booster project office to understand and respond to facts obtained during testing. The commission concluded that neither Thiokol nor NASA responded adequately to internal warnings about the faulty seal design. Furthermore, Thiokol and NASA did not make a timely attempt to develop and verify a new seal after the initial design was shown to be deficient. Neither organization developed a solution to the unexpected occurrences of O-ring erosion and blow-by, even though this problem was experienced frequently during the Shuttle's flight history. Instead, Thiokol and NASA management came to accept erosion and blow-by as unavoidable and an acceptable flight risk. Specifically, the commission found that:
1. The joint test and certification program was inadequate. There was no requirement to configure the qualifications test motor as it would be in flight, and the motors were static-tested in a horizontal position, not in the vertical flight position. Prior to the accident, neither NASA nor Thiokol fully understood the mechanism by which the joint sealing action took place. NASA and Thiokol accepted escalating risk apparently because they "got away with it last time." As Commissioner Richard Feynman observed, the decision making was "a kind of Russian roulette .... [The Shuttle] flies [with O-ring erosion] and nothing happens. Then it is suggested, theretbre, that the risk is no longer so high for the next flights. We can lower our standards a little bit because we got away with it last time .... You got away with it, but it shouldn't be done over and over again like that.'"' NASA's system for tracking anomalies for Flight Readiness Reviews failed in that, despite a history of persistent O-ring erosion and blowby, flight was still permitted. It failed again in the sequence of six consecutive launch constraint waivers prior to 5 I-L, permitting it to fly without any record of a waiver, or even of an explicit constraint. Tracking and continuing only anomalies that are "outside the data base" of prior flight allowed major problems to be removed from and lost by the reporting system. The O-ring erosion history presented to Level I at NASA Headquarters in August 1985 was sufficiently detailed to require corrective action prior to the next flight. A careful analysis of the flight history of O-ring performance would have revealed the correlation of O-ring damage and low temperature. Neither NASA nor Thiokol carried out such an analysis; consequently, they were unprepared to properly evaluate the risks of launching

2. 3.

4.

5.

6.

"Ibid., p. 148, from Commission Hearing Testimony, April 3, 1986, p. 2469.

200

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

the51-Lmission in conditions moreextreme thantheyhadencounteredbefore.

NASA _ Safety Program The commission found surprising and disturbing the lack of reference to NASA's safety staff. Individuals who testified before the commission did not mention the quality assurance staff, and no reliability and quality assurance engineer had been asked to participate in the discussions that took place prior to launch. The commission concluded that "the extensive and redundant safety assurance functions" that had existed "during and after the lunar program to discover any safety problems" had become ineffective between that period and 1986. This loss of effectiveness seriously degraded the checks and balances essential for maintaining flight safety..2 Although NASA had a safety program in place, communications failures relating to safety procedures did not operate properly during STS 5 I-L. On April 3, 1986, Arnold Aldrich, the Space Shuttle program manager, appeared before the commission at a public hearing in Washington, D.C. He described five different communications or organizational failures that affected the launch decision on January 28, 1986. Four of those failures related directly to faults within the safety program: lack of problem reporting requirements, inadequate trend analysis, misrepresentation of criticality, and lack of involvement in critical discussions. A properly staffed, supported, and robust safety organization, he stated, might well have avoided these faults and thus eliminated the communications failures. The commission found that: I. Reductions in the safety, reliability and quality assurance work force at the Marshall and NASA Headquarters seriously limited capability in those vital functions. Organizational structures at Kennedy and Marshall placed safety, reliability, and quality assurance offices under the supervision of the very organizations and activities whose efforts they are to check. Problem reporting requirements were not concise and failed to get critical information to the proper levels of management. Little or no trend analysis was performed on O-ring erosion and blow-by problems. As the flight rate increased, the Marshall safety, reliability, and quality assurance work force was decreasing, which adversely affected mission safety. Five weeks after the 5 I-L accident, the criticality of the solid rocket motor field joint had still not been properly documented in the problem reporting system at Marshall.

2.

3. 4. 5.

6.

121bid.,p. 152.

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT

Pressures on the System

201

From the Space Shuttle's inception, NASA had advertised that the Shuttle would make space operations "routine and economical." The implication was that the greater annual number of flights, the more routine Shuttle flights would become. Thus, NASA placed heavy emphasis on the schedule. However, one effect of the agency's determination to meet an accelerated flight rate was the dilution of resources available for any one mission. In addition, NASA had difficulty evolving from its single-flight focus to a system that could support an ongoing schedule of flights. Managers forgot in their insistence on proving it operational, the commission stated, that the Shuttle system was still in its early phase. There might not have been enough preparation for what "operational" entailed. For instance, routine and regular postflight maintenance and inspections, spare parts production or acquisition, and software tools and training facilities developed during a test program were not suitable for the high volume of work required in an operational environment. The challenge was to streamline the processes to provide the needed support without compromising quality. Mission planning requires establishing the manifest, defining the objectives, constraints, and capabilities of the mission, and translating those into hardware, software, and flight procedures. Within each of these major goals is a series of milestones in which managers decide whether to proceed to the next step. Once a decision has been made to go ahead and the activity begun, if a substantial change occurs, it may be necessary to go back and repeat the preceding process. In addition, if one group fails to meet its due date, the delay cascades throughout the system. The ambitious flight rate meant that less and less time was available for completing each of the steps in the mission planning and preparation process. In addition, a lack of efficient production processing and manifest changes disrupted the production system. In particular, the commission found that manifest changes, which forced repeating certain steps in the production cycle, sometimes severely affected the entire cycle and placed impossible demands on the system. The commission found that pressures on the STS to launch at an overambitious rate contributed to severe strains on the system. The flight rate did not seem to be based on an assessment of available resources and capabilities and was not modified to accommodate the capacity of the work force. The commission stated that NASA had not provided adequate resources to support its launch schedule and that the system had been strained by the modest nine missions that had launched in 1985. After the accident, rumors appeared that persons who made the decision to launch might have been subjected to outside pressures to launch. The commission examined these rumors and concluded that the decision to launch was made solely by the appropriate NASA officials without any outside intervention or pressure? _The commission listed the following findings: ' 7bid., p. 176.

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NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

1. Thecapabilities of thesystem werestretched to thelimit to support the flight ratein thewinterof 1985-86. Projections into thespring andsummer of 1986showed thatthe system, as it existed, would havebeenunable to delivercrewtrainingsoftware for scheduled flightsby thedesignated dates. Theresultwouldhavebeen anunacceptable compression of thetimeavailable for thecrewsto accomplishtheirrequired training. 2. Spare parts were in criticallyshort supply. TheSpace Shuttle program madea conscious decision to postpone spare partsprocurements in favorof budget itemsof perceived higherpriority.Thelackof spare parts wouldlikely havelimitedflight operations in 1986. 3. The stated manifesting policies were not enforced. Numerous late
manifest changes (after the cargo integration review) were made to both major payloads and minor payloads throughout the Shuttle program. These changes required additional resources and used existing resources more rapidly. They also adversely affected crew training and the development of procedures for subsequent missions. The scheduled flight rate did not accurately reflect the capabilities and resources. The flight rate was not reduced to accommodate periods of adjustment in the capacity of the work force. No margin existed in the system to accommodate unforeseen hardware problems. Resources were primarily directed toward supporting the flights and thus were inadequate to improve and expand facilities needed to support a higher flight rate. Training simulators may be the limiting factor on the flight rate; the two current simulators cannot train crews for more than twelve to fifteen flights per year. When flights come in rapid succession, current requirements do not ensure that critical anomalies occurring during one flight are identified and addressed appropriately before the next flight. Considerations

4.

5.

6.

Other Safety

During its investigation, the commission examined other safetyrelated issues that had played no part in the STS 51 -L accident but nonetheless might lead to safety problems in the future. These safety-related areas were ascent (including abort capabilities and crew escape options), landing (including weather considerations, orbiter tires and brakes, and choice of a landing site), Shuttle elements other than the solid rocket booster, processing and assembly (including record keeping and inspections), capabilities of Launch Pad 39-B, and involvement of the development contractors. Ascent. The events of flight 51 -L illustrated the dangers of the first stage of a Space Shuttle ascent. The accident also focused attention on orbiter abort capabilities and crew escape. The current abort capabilities, options to improve those capabilities, options for crew escape, and the performance of the range safety system were of particular concern to the commission.

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT

21)3

TheShuttle's designcapabilities allowedfor successful intactmissionabort(a survivable landing) on a runway aftera singlemainengine failure. TheShuttle's design specifications didnotrequire thattheorbiter beableto manage anintactabortif a second mainengine should fail. If twoor three mainengines failed,theShuttle wouldlandin waterina contingency abortor ditching. Thismaneuver wasnotbelieved to besurvivablebecause of damage incurred atwaterimpact. In addition, theShuttle system wasnotdesigned tosurviveafailureof thesolidrocketboosters. Furthermore, although technically theorbiterhadthecapability to separatefromtheexternal tankduringthefirststage, analysis hadshown that if it wereattempted whilethe solidrocketboosters werestill thrusting, theorbiterwould"hangup" on its aft attach pointsandpitchviolently, with probable lossof theorbiterandcrew.This"fastseparation" would providea usefulmeans of escape duringfirst stageonlyif solidrocket booster thrustcouldbeterminated first.'_ Studies identifiednoviablemeans of crewescape duringfirst-stage ascent. The commission supported the furtherstudyof escape options. However, it concluded thatnocorrective actions couldhavebeen taken thatwouldhavesaved theChallenger's flight crew.
Landing. The Space Shuttle's entry and landing formed another risky and complicated part of a mission. Because the crew could not divert to an alternate landing site after entry, the landing decision must be both timely and accurate. In addition, the landing gear, including the wheels, tires, and brakes, must function properly. Although the orbiter tires were designed to support a landing up to 108,864 kilograms at 416.7 kilometers per hour with thirty-seven kilometers per hour of crosswind and have successfully passed testing programs, they had shown excessive wear during landings at Kennedy, especially when crosswinds were involved. The tires were rated as Criticality 1 because the loss of a single tire could cause a loss of control and a subsequent loss of the vehicle and crew. Because actual wear on a runway did not correspond to test results, NASA directed testing to examine actual tire, wheel, and strut failure to better understand this failure case. The commission found that the brakes used on the orbiter were known to have little or no margin, because they were designed based on the orbiter's design weight. As the actual orbiter's weight grew, the brakes were not redesigned; rather, the runway length was extended. Actual flight experience had shown brake damage on most flights, which required that special crew procedures be developed to ensure successful braking. The original Shuttle plan called for routine landings at Kennedy to minimize turnaround time and cost per flight and to provide efficient operations for both the Shuttle system and the cargo elements. While those considerations remained important, concerns such as the performance of the orbiter tires and brakes and the difficulty of accurate weather prediction in Florida had called the plan into question. 17bid., p. 180.

204

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK landed at Edwards Air Force Base, approximately

When the Shuttle

six days are added to the turnaround time. The commission stated that although there were valid programmatic reasons for landing the Shuttle routinely at Kennedy, the demanding nature of landing and the impact of weather conditions might dictate the prudence of using Edwards on a regular basis for landing. The cost associated with regular scheduled landing and turnaround operations at Edwards was thus a necessary program cost. Decisions governing Shuttle operations, the commission stated, must coincide with the philosophy that unnecessary risks have to be eliminated. Shuttle Elements. The Space Shuttle main engine teams at Marshall and Rocketdyne had developed engines that achieved their performance goals and performed extremely well. Nevertheless, according to the commission, the main engines continued to be highly complex and critical components of the Shuttle, with an element of risk principally because important components of the engines degraded more rapidly with flight use than anticipated. Both NASA and Rocketdyne took steps to contain that risk. An important aspect of the main engine program was the extensive "hot fire" ground tests. Unfortunately, the vitality of the test program, the commission found, was reduced because of budgetary constraints. The number of engine test firings per month had decreased over the two years prior to STS 5 I-L. Yet this test program had not demonstrated the limits of engine operation parameters or included tests over the full operating envelope to show full engine capability. In addition, tests had not yet been deliberately conducted to the point of failure to determine actual engine operating margins. The commission also identified one serious potential failure mode related to the disconnect valves between the orbiter and the external tank. Processing and Assembly. During the processing and assembly of the elements of flight 51-L, the commission found various problems that could bear on the safety of future flights. These involved structural inspections in which waivers were granted on sixty of the 146 required orbiter structural inspections, errors in the recordkeeping for the Space Shuttle main engine/main propulsion system and the orbiter, areas in which items called for by the Operational Maintenance Requirements and Specifications Document were not met and were not formally waived or excepted, the Shuttle processing contractor's policy of using "designated verifiers" to supplement quality assurance personnel, and the lack of accidental damage reporting because technicians were concerned about losing their jobs. Launch Pad 39-B. The damage to the launch pad from the explosion was considered to be normal or minor, with three exceptions: the loss of the springs and plungers of the booster hold-down posts, the failure of the gaseous hydrogen vent ann to latch, and the loss of bricks from the flame trench. Involvement of Development Contractors. The commission determined that, although NASA considered the Shuttle program to be operational, it was "clearly a developmental program and must be treated as

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN

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such by NASA. '''_ Using procedures accepted by the transportation industry was only partly valid because each mission expanded system and performance requirements. The Shuttle's developmental status demanded that both NASA and all its contractors maintain a high level of in-house experience and technical ability. The demands of the developmental aspects of the program required: 1. Maintaining a significant engineering design and development capability among the Shuttle contractors and an ongoing engineering capability within NASA Maintaining an active analytical capability so that the evolving capabilities of the Shuttle can be matched to the demands on the Shuttle of the Presidential C)mmission

2.

Recommendations

The commission unanimously adopted nine recommendations, which they submitted to President Reagan. They also urged NASA's administrator to submit a report to the president on the progress NASA made in implementing the recommendations. These recommendations are restated below.

Design. The faulty solid rocket motor joint and seal must be changed. This could be a new design eliminating the joint or a redesign of the current joint and seal. No design options should be prematurely precluded because of schedule, cost or reliance on existing hardware. All solid rocket motor joints should satis._ 2 the following requirements: The The not The The joints shouM be fully understood, tested and verified. integrity of the structure and of the seals gf all joints should be less than that of the case walls throughout the design envelope. integrity of the joints shouM be insensitive to: Dimensional tolerances. Transportation and handling. Assembly procedures. Inspection and test procedures. Environmental effects. Internal case operating pressure. Recover3._ and reuse effects. Flight and water impact loads. certification of the new design should include: Tests which duplicate the actual launch con_guration as possible.

as closely

'TbM., p. 194.

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NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

temof the

Tests over the full range of operating conditions, including perature. Full consideration shouM be given to conducting static firings exact flight configuration in a vertical attitude.

Independent Oversight. The administrator of NASA should request the National Research Council to form an independent solid rocket motor design oversight committee to implement the commission _ design recommendations and oversee the design effort. This committee should." Review and evaluate certification requirements. Provide technical oversight of the design, test program and certification. Report to the administrator of NASA on the adequacy of the design and make appropriate recommendations. H Shuttle Management Structure. The Shuttle Program Structure should be reviewed. The project managers for the various elements of the Shuttle program felt more accountable to their center management than to the Shuttle program organization. Shuttle element funding, work package definition, and vital program information frequently bypass the National STS (Shuttle) Program Manager. A redefinition of the Program Manager's responsibility is essential. This redefinition should give the Program Manager the requisite authority for all ongoing STS operations. Program funding and all Shuttle Program work at the centers should be placed clearly under the Program Manager _" authori_. Astronauts in Management. The commission observes that there appears to be a departure from the philosophy of the 1960s and 1970s relating to the use of astronauts in management positions. These individuals brought to their positions flight experience and a keen appreciation of operations and flight safety. NASA should encourage the transition of qualified agency management positions. The function of the Flight Crew Operations director vated in the NASA organization structure. astronauts should bin) be ele-

Shuttle Safety Panel. NASA should establish an STS Safe_. Advisor 3' Panel reporting to the STS Program Manager. The Charter of this panel should include Shuttle operational issues, launch commit criteria, flight rules, flight readiness and risk management. The panel should include representation .from the safety organization, mission operations, and the astronaut office.

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Criticality Review and Hazard Analysis. NASA and the primat3' Shuttle contractors should review all Criticality 1, IR, 2, and 2R items and hazard analyses. This review should identif3, those items that must be improved prior to flight to ensure mission sqfety. An Audit Panel, appointed by the National Research Council, should verif3' the adequacy of the eff'ort atzd repot:t directly m the adntinistrator of NASA. IV Safety Organization. NASA should establish an Office of Safet 3, Reliability and Quali_' Assurance to be headed by an associate administratop; reporting directly to the NASA administrator. It would have direct authority for safet3; reliabilio; and quality assurance throughout the agency. The office should be assigned the work force to ensure adequate oversight of its fimctions and should he independent of other NASA functional and program responsibilities. The responsibilities of this oflTce should include: The sql'et),, reliability and quality assurance functions to all NASA activities and programs. Direction of reporting and documentation of problems, olution atzd trends associated with.flight safeo'. V Improved Communications. The commission found that Marshall Space Flight Center project managers, because of a tendency at Marshall to management isolation, failed to provide full and timely information bearing on the safety of flight 51-L to other vital elements of Shuttle progrant management. NASA should take energetic steps to eliminate this tendency at Marshall Space Flight Center, whether by changes of personnel, organization, indoctrination or all three. A policy should be developed which governs the imposition and removal of Shuttle launch constraints. Flight Readiness Reviews and Mission Management Team meetings should be recorded. The .[light crew commander; or a designated representative, shouM attend the Flight Readiness Review, participate in acceptance of the vehicle for flight, and cert(f3, that the crew is properly prepared for .flight. as they problem relate res-

208

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

V/

Landing

Safety.

NASA

must

take actions

to improve

landing

safety:

The tire, brake and nose wheel steering systems must be improved. These systems do not have sufficient safety margin, particularly at abort landing sites. The ,specific conditions under which planned landings at Kennedy would be acceptable should be determined. Criteria must be established for tires, brakes and nose wheel steerb_g. Until the systems meet those criteria in high fidelity testing that is verified at Edwards, landing at Kennedy should not be planned. Committing to a specific landing site requires that landing area weather be forecast more than an hour in advance. During unpredictable weather periods at Kennedy, program officials should plan on Edwards landings, hwreased landings at Edwards may necessitate a dual ferry capabili_.'. VII

Launch Abort and Crew Escape. The Shuttle program management considered first-stage abort options and crew escape options several times during the histo' of the program, but because of limited utilits; technical unfeasibilio; or program cost and schedule, no systems were implemented. The commission recommends that NASA." Make trolled Make which in the all efforts to provide a crew escape system for use during congliding flight. every effort to increase the range of flight conditions under an emergency runway landing can be successfully conducted event that two or three main engines fail early in ascent. VIII Flight Rate. The nation's reliance on the Shuttle as its principal space launch capability created a relentless pressure on NASA to increase the .flight rate. Such reliance on a single launch capability should be avoided in the future. NASA must establish a flight rate that is consistent with its resources. A firm payload assignment policy should be established. The policy should include rigorous controls on eargo manifest changes to limit the pressures such changes exert on schedules and crew training. IX Maintenance dures must be Safeguards. Installation, test, and maintenance proceespecially rigorous .for Space Shuttle items designated

SPACE

TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN

SPACEFLIGHT

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Criticali O, 1. NASA should establish a system of analyzing and reporting petfotvnance trends of such items. Maintenance procedures for such items should be specified in the Critical Items List, especially for those such as the liquid-fueled main engines, which require unstinting maintenance and overhaul. With regard to the orbiters, NASA shmdd: Develop and execute a comprehensive Perform periodic structural inspections mit them to be waived. Restore and support and stop the practice another. _ Thought maintenance inspection plan. when scheduled and not perparts programs, orbiter to supply

the maintenance and spare of removing parts from one

Concluding

The commission urged that NASA continue to receive the support of the administration and the nation. The agency constitutes a national resource that plays a critical role in space exploration and development. It also provides a symbol of national pride and technological leadership. The commission applauded NASA's spectacular achievements of the past and anticipated impressive achievements in the future. The findings and recommendations presented in this report were intended to contribute to future NASA successes that the nation both expects and requires as the 21 st century approaches. STS Safely 51-L Investigations and Actions to Flight by NASA Status

Returning

the Shuttle

While the Presidential Commission investigated the accident, NASA also conducted an investigation to determine strategies and major actions for safely returning to flight status. In a March 24, 1986, memorandum, Associate Administrator for Space Flight Richard H. Truly defined NASA's comprehensive strategy and major actions that would allow for resuming the Space Shuttle's schedule. He stated that NASA Headquarters (particularly the Office of Space Flight), the Office of Space Flight centers, the NSTS program organization, and its various contractors would use the guidance supplied in the memo to proceed with "the realistic, practical actions necessary to return to the NSTS flight schedule with emphasis on flight safety. '''_ In his memo, Truly focused on three areas: actions required prior to the next flight, first flight/first year operations, and development of sustainable safe flight rate.

'"Ibid., p. 196. '_Richard H. Truly, NASA Memorandum, "Strategy Space Shuttle to Flight Status," March 24, 1986.

for Safely Returning

the

210

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK NASA to

Actions Required Prior to the Next Flight. Truly directed take the following steps before the return to flight:

Reassess the entire program management structure and operation Redesign the solid rocket motor joint (A dedicated solid rocket motor joint design group would be established at Marshall to recommend a program plan to quantify the solid rocket motor joints problem and to accomplish the solid rocket motor joints redesign.) Reverify design requirements Complete Critical Item List (CIL)/Operations and Maintenance Instructions reviews (NASA would review all Category 1 and 1R critical items and implement a complete reapproval process. Any items not revalidated by this review would be redesigned, certified, and qualified for flight.) Complete Operations and Maintenance Requirements and Specifications Document review Reassess launch and abort rules and philosophy Year Operations. The first flight mission design

First FlightFirst would incorporate:

Daylight Kennedy launch Conservative flight design to minimize transatlantic-abort-launch exposure Repeat payload (not a new payload class) No waiver on landing weight Conservative launch/launch abort/landing weather NASA-only flight crew Engine thrust within the experience base No active ascent/entry Developmental Test Objectives Conservative mission rules Early, stable flight plan with supporting load Daylight Edwards Air Force Base landing flight software and training

The planning for the flight schedule for the first year of operation would reflect a conservative launch rate. The first year of operation would be maintained within the current flight experience base, and any expansion of the base, including new classes of payloads, would be approved only after a very thorough safety review. Development of Sustainable Safe Flight Rate. This flight rate would be developed using a "bottoms-up" approach in which all required work was identified and that work was optimized, keeping in mind the available work force. Factors with the potential for disrupting schedules as well as the availability of resources would be considered when developing the flight rate.

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN

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21 1

Design

and Development

Task Force

Also while the Presidential Commission was meeting, NASA formed the 51-L Data and Design Analysis Task Force. This group supported the Presidential Commission and was responsible for: 1. 2. Determining, reviewing, and analyzing the facts and circumstances surrounding the STS 5 I-L launch Reviewing all factors relating to the accident determined to be relevant, including studies, findings, recommendations, and other actions that were or might be undertaken by the program offices, field centers, and contractors involved Examining all other factors that could relate to the accident, including design issues, procedures, organization, and management factors Using the full required technical and scientific expertise and resources available within NASA and those available to NASA Documenting task force findings and determinations and conclusions derived from the findings. Providing information and documentation to the commission regarding task force activities.

3. 4. 5. 6.

The task force, which was chaired by Truly, established teams to examine development and production; prelaunch activities; accident analysis; mission planning and operations; and search, recovery, and reconstruction; and a photo and TV support team. Figure 3-23 shows the task force organization. Each task force team submitted Presidential Commission, which included multivolume descriptions reports to of the accident the as

STS

51 -L Anlyllis

Dl_a

told

Design Force Jay Honeycuff I

Talk

R)chard Truly Chairmen Jlnles Vice Ro_rt R.Thompson Chairman Crlppon (JSC) USAF) (JSC) {HQl) and Deputies

Staff

[KSC)

Nathan Lindlmy Joseph Kerlv;n Wmlt Williams Analysis Team Laadenl

Public

Lsg_ Counl_l - Ed Perry Secrotarlat - Bert Jpxt_on Admln * Jack Martin Staff (HOe) Afllirs - Chuck Hollin,_head Relourcat Report - Jack Urnstead

_ Jay Wortman

I
P ....... OeVmlopment & product ion Team Jlck Lee (MSFC) - Lead {JSC) Haroid I I Accident A!atysls Team Mieslon OperaSons Tommy

[
PIsnnln YMrn & Hollow_/(JSC_ Lud Drl_o_yon (J$C)

C_By McCullough Deputy

I
Search, Recover_ Reconstruction Team PhOto Daniel Ed O'Connor Ed W_r (USAF) - Lead (KSC) - Deputy } Thorn,s & TV Germeny Redmond

I
Support (JSC) (JSC} Teem Lead - D_I_ I

George McDonough Charles John EdckJlon Stevenson

* MSFC Rep - JSC - KSCRep Rep

Figure 3-23. STS 51-L Data and Design Analysis Task Farve

212

NASA HISTORICAL

DATA BOOK

well

as

numerous

corrective

measures

needed

to

be

taken.

Called

"Lessons Learned and Collateral Findings," this report contained eight lessons learned and twenty-nine collateral findings, all addressing virtually every aspect of Shuttle planning, processing, launch, and recovery? _ The task force also briefed members of Congress on its findings. Actions to Implement Recommendations

After the report of the Presidential Commission was published (on June 9, 1986), President Reagan directed NASA Administrator James Fletcher on June 13 to report to him within 30 days on how and when the commission's recommendations would be implemented. The president said that "this report should include milestones by which progress in the implementation process can be measured. '''_ NASA's Report to the President: Actions to hnplement the Recommendations of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, submitted to the president on July 14, 1986, responded to each of the commission's recommendations and included a key milestone schedule that illustrated the planned implementation (Figure 3-24). The proposed actions and the steps that NASA had already taken when the report was issued follow in the narrative below. Table 3-48 presents an implementation timetable. -_'' Recommendation 1

Solid Rocket Motor Design. At NASA's direction, the Marshall Space Flight Center formed a solid rocket motor joint redesign team to include participants from Marshall and other NASA centers and individuals from outside NASA. The Marshall team evaluated several design alternatives and began analysis and testing to determine the preferred approaches that minimized hardware redesign. To ensure adequate program contingency, the redesign team would also develop, at least through concept definition, a totally new design that did not use existing hardware. The design verification and certification program would be emphasized and would include tests that duplicated the actual launch loads as closely as feasible and provided for tests over the full range of operating conditions. The verification effort included a trade study to determine the preferred test orientation (vertical or horizontal) of the full-scale motor firings. The

_STS 51-L Data and Design Analysis Task Force, Historical Summar), (Washington. DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1986), p. 3-90. '*Ronald Reagan, Letter to James C. Fletcher, NASA Administrator, June [ 3, 1986. 2"Report to the President: Actions to hnplement the Recommendations of the PresMential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 14, 1986), Executive Summary.

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT

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214

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

solid rocket motor redesign and certification schedule was under review to fully understand and plan for the implementation of the design solutions. The schedule would be reassessed after the solid rocket motor Preliminary Design Review in September 1986. Independent Oversight. In accordance with the commission's recommendation, the National Research Council (NRC) established an Independent Oversight Group chaired by Dr. H. Guyford Stever and reporting to the NASA administrator. The NRC Independent Oversight Group was briefed on Shuttle system requirements, implementation, and control; solid rocket motor background; and candidate modifications. The group established a near-term plan, which included briefings and visits to review inflight loads, assembly processing, redesign status, and other solid rocket motor designs, including participation in the solid rocket motor Preliminary Design Review in September 1986. Recommendation H

Shuttle Management Structure. The NASA administrator appointed General Samuel C. Phillips to study how NASA managed its programs, including relationships between various field centers and NASA Headquarters and emphasizing the Space Shuttle management structure. On June 25, 1986, the administrator directed Astronaut Robert L. Crippen to form a fact-finding group to assess the Space Shuttle management structure. The group would report recommendations to the associate administrator for spaceflight by August 15, 1986. Specifically, this group will address the roles and responsibilities of the Space Shuttle program manager to assure that the position had the authority commensurate with its responsibilities. General Phillips and the administrator would review the results of this study with a decision on implementation of the recommendations by October 1, 1986. Astronauts in Management. The Crippen group would also address ways to stimulate the transition of astronauts into management positions. It would also determine the appropriate position for the flight crew operations directorate within the NASA. Shuttle SafeO, Panel. The associate administrator for spaceflight would establish a Shuttle Safety Panel by September l, 1986, with direct access to the Space Shuttle program manager. Recommendation IIl Critical Item Review and Hazard Analysis. On March 13, 1986, NASA initiated a complete review of all Space Shuttle program failure modes and effects analyses and associated Critical Item Lists. Each Space Shuttle project element and associated prime contractor was conducting separate comprehensive reviews which would culminate in a programwide review with the Space Shuttle program manager at Johnson Space Center later in 1986. Technical specialists outside the Space Shuttle program were assigned as formal members of each of these review teams. All Criticality 1 and IR critical item waivers were canceled. The teams

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT

215

reassessed andresubmitted waivers in categories recommended for continued program applicability. Itemswhichcouldnotberevalidated would beredesigned, qualified,andcertifiedfor flight. All Criticality 2 and 3
Critical Item Lists were being reviewed for reacceptance and proper categorization. This activity would culminate in a comprehensive final review with NASA Headquarters beginning in March 1987. As recommended by the commission, the National Research Council agreed to form an Independent Audit Panel, reporting to the NASA administrator, to verify the adequacy of this effort. Recommendation IV

Safety Organization. The NASA administrator announced the appointment of George A. Rodney to the position of associate administrator for safety, reliability, maintainability, and quality assurance (SRM&QA) on July 8, 1986. This office would oversee the safety, reliability, and quality assurance functions related to all NASA activities and programs and the implementation system for anomaly documentation and resolution, including a trend analysis program. One of Rodney's first actions would be to assess the available resources, including the work force required to ensure adequate execution of the safety organization functions. In addition, he would assure appropriate interfaces between the functions of the new safety organization and the Shuttle Safety Panel, which would be established in response to the commission Recommendation 11. Recommendation V hnproved Communications. Astronaut Robert Crippen's team (formed as part of Recommendation I1) developed plans and recommended policies tbr the following: Implementation of effective management communications at all Standardization of the imposition and removal of STS launch straints and other operational constraints Conduct of Flight Readiness Review and Mission Management meetings, including requirements for documentation and flight participation This review of effective communications would consider levels conTeam crew

the activi-

ties and information flow at NASA Headquarters and the field centers that supported the Shuttle program. The study team would present findings and recommendations to the associate administrator for spaceflight by August 15, 1986. Recommendation V1

Landing Safety'. A Landing Safety Team was established to review and implement the commission's findings and recommendations on landing safety. All Shuttle hardware and systems were undergoing design

216

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

reviews toensure compliance withthespecifications andsafety concerns. Thetires,brakes, andnose wheelsteering system wereincluded in this activity,andfundingfor a newcarbonbrakessystemwasapproved. Ongoing runwaysurface testsandlanding aidrequirement reviews were continuing. Landingaid implementation would be complete by July 1987. Theinterimbrakesystem wouldbedelivered byAugust1987. Improved methods of localweather forecasting andweather-related support werebeingdeveloped. Until theShuttleprogram demonstrated satisfactory safety margins through highfidelitytestingandduringactual landings atEdwards Air ForceBase, theKennedy Space Center landingsitewouldnotbeused for nominal end-of-mission landings.
Recommendation VII Launch Abort and Crew Escape. On April 7, 1986, NASA initiated a Shuttle Crew Egress and Escape review. The analysis focused on egress and escape capabilities from launch through landing and would analyze concepts, feasibility assessments, cost, and schedules for pad abort, bailout, ejection systems, water landings, and powered flight separation. This review would specifically assess options for crew escape during controlled gliding flight and options for extending the intact abort flight envelope to include failure of two or three main engines during the early ascent phase. In conjunction with this activity, NASA established a Launch Abort Reassessment Team to review all launch and launch abort rules to ensure that launch commit criteria, flight rules, range safety systems and procedures, landing aids, runway configurations and lengths, performance versus abort exposure, abort and end-of-mission landing weights, runway surfaces, and other landing-related capabilities provided the proper margin of safety to the vehicle and crew. Crew escape and launch abort studies would be complete on October 1, 1986, with an implementation decision in December 1986. Recommendation VIII Flight Rate. In March 1986, NASA Capability Working Group that studied: I. 2.

established

a Flight

Rate

The capabilities and constraints that governed the Shuttle processing flows at the Kennedy Space Center The impact of flight specific crew training and software delivery/certification on flight rates

The working group would present flight rate recommendations to the Office of Space Flight by August 15, 1986. Other collateral studies in progress addressed commission recommendations related to spares provisioning, maintenance, and structural inspection. This effort would also consider the NRC independent review of flight rate, which a congressional subcommittee had requested.

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The reportemphasized NASA'sstrongsupport for a mixedfleetto satisfylaunchrequirements andactions to revitalizethe UnitedStates expendable launch vehicle capabilities. Additionally, NASA Headquarters wasformulating a newcargo manifest policy,whichwould establish manifest ground rulesandimpose constraints to latechanges. Manifest control policy recommendations would be completedill November 1986.
Recommendation IX Maintenance Safeguards. A Maintenance Safeguards Team was established to develop a comprehensive plan for defining and implementing actions to comply with the commission recommendations concerning maintenance activities. The team was preparing a Maintenance Plan to ensure that uniform maintenance requirements were imposed on all elements of the Space Shuttle program. The plan would also define organizational responsibilities, reporting, and control requirements for Space Shuttle maintenance activities. The Maintenance Plan would be completed by September 30, 1986. In addition to the actions described above, a Space Shuttle Design Requirements Review Team headed by the Space Shuttle Systems Integration Office at the Johnson Space Center was reviewing all Shuttle design requirements and associated technical verification. The team focused on each Shuttle project element and on total Space Shuttle system design requirements. This activity was to culminate in a Space Shuttle Incremental Design Certification Review approximately three months before the next Space Shuttle launch. Because of the number, complexity, and interrelationships among the many activities leading to the next flight, the Space Shuttle program manager at the Johnson Space Center initiated a series of formal Program Management Reviews for the Space Shuttle program. These reviews were to be regular face-to-face discussions among the managers of all major Space Shuttle program activities. Each meeting would focus on progress, schedules, and actions associated with each of the major program review activities and would be tailored directly to current program activity for the time period involved. The first of these meetings was held at the Marshall Space Flight Center on May 5-6. 1986, with the second at the Kennedy Space Center on June 25, 1986. Follow-on reviews will occur approximately every six weeks. Results of these reviews will be reported to the associate administrator for spaceflight and to the NASA administrator. On June 19, 1986, the NASA administrator announced the termination of the development of the Centaur upper stage for use aboard the Space Shuttle. NASA had planned to use the Centaur upper stage for NASA planetary spacecraft launches as well as for certain national security satellite launches. Major safety reviews of the Centaur system were under way at the time of the Challenger accident, and these reviews were intensified to determine whether the program should be continued. NASA decided to terminate because, even with certain modifications identified

218

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

by theongoing reviews, theresultant stage wouldnotmeet safety criteria beingapplied to othercargoor elements of theSpace Shuttle system.
Revised Manifest

On October 3, 1986, NASA Administrator James C. Fletcher announced NASA's plan to resume Space Shuttle flights on February 18, 1988. He also announced a revised manifest for the thirty-nine months following the resumption of Shuttle flights (Table 3-49). (The manifest was revised several times prior to the resumption of Shuttle flights. Most flights did not launch on the dates listed here.) Fletcher stated that the manifest was based on a reduced flight rate goal that was "acceptable and prudent" and that complied with presidential policy that limited use of the Shuttle for commercial and foreign payloads to those that were Shuttle-unique or those with national security or foreign policy implications. Prior to the Challenger accident, roughly onethird of the Shuttle manifest was devoted to DOD missions, another third to scientific missions, and the remainder to commercial satellites and foreign government missions. Fletcher said that for the seven-year period following resumption of Shuttle flights (through 1994), NASA would use 40 percent of the Shuttle's capability for DOD needs, 47 percent for NASA needs, and 12 percent to accommodate commercial, foreign government, and U.S. government civil space requirements. This reflected the priorities for payload assignments with national security at the top, STS operational capability (TDRS) and dedicated science payloads next, and other science and foreign and commercial needs last. He stated that at the beginning of this seven-year period, DOD would use considerable Shuttle capability to reduce its payload backlog, but for the remaining years, DOD's use would even out at approximately one-third of Shuttle capability. Fletcher stated that the revised manifest placed a high priority on major NASA science payloads. The Hubble Space Telescope, Ulysses, and Galileo, which had been scheduled for a 1986 launch, would be launched "as expeditiously as possible."-" hnplementing the Commission _ Recommendations

Approximately one year alter NASA addressed how it would implement the recommendations of the Presidential Commission, NASA issued a report to the president that described the actions taken by NASA in response to the commission's recommendations on how to return to safe, reliable spaceflight. _-_ This report and the accompanying milestone -"Statement by Dr. James C. Fletcher, Press Briefing, NASA Headquarters, October 3, 1986. 2"-Report to the President: hnplementation of the Recommendations of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1987).

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT

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chart(Figure 3-25)showed thesignificant progress NASAmade in meetingits implementation milestones. Therecovery activity,asdescribed in the report,focusedon threekey aspects: the technicalengineering changes being selected and implemented; the new procedures, saleguards, andinternalcommunication processes thathadbeenor were beingput in place;andthechanges in personnel, organizations, andattitudes thatoccurred. Responding to thecommission's findingsastothecause of theaccident,NASAchanged thedesign of thesolidrocket motor. Thenewdesign eliminated theweakness thathadledto theaccident andincorporated of a number of improvements. Thenewrocketmotors weretobetested in a seriesof full-scalefirings beforethe next Shuttleflight. In addition, NASAreviewed every element of theShuttle system andadded improved hardware andsoftware toenhance safety. Improved or modified itemsor systems included thelanding system, themainliquid-fueled engines, and theflight andground systems. NASA implementednew proceduresto provide independent SRM&QAfunctions.A completely new organization, the SRM&QA office,whichreported directlyto theNASAadministrator, nowprovided independent oversight of all criticalflight safety matters. Thenewoffice worked directlywiththeresponsible program organization to solvetechnicalproblems whilestill retaining itsseparate identityasfinal arbiter of safety andrelated matters. NASA completed personnel and organizational changes that had begunimmediately afterthe accident. A new,streamlined management team wasputin place atNASAHeadquarters, withnewpeople welldown withinthefieldcenters. Special attention wasgiventothecriticalissues of management isolationandthe tendency towardtechnical complacency, which,combined withschedule pressure, ledtoanerosion in flightsafety. Thisawareness of the riskof spaceflight operations, alongwith NASA's responsibility to controlandcontain thatrisk withoutclaimingits elimination, became thecontrolling philosophy theSpace Shuttle program. The report addressed the nine recommendations madeby the Presidential Commission andotherrelated concerns.
Recommendation I The commission recommended that the design of the solid rocket motor be changed, that the testing of the new design reflect the operational environment, and that the National Research Council (NRC) form a committee to ppvvide technical oversight of the redesign effort. NASA thoroughly evaluated the solid rocket motor design. As well as the solid rocket motor field joint, this evaluation resulted in design changes to many components of the motor. The field joint was redesigned to provide high confidence in its ability to seal under all operating conditions (Figure 3-26). In addition, the redesign included a new tang capture latch that controlled movement between the tang and clevis in the joint, a third O-ring seal, insulation design improvements, and an external heater

220

NASA HISTORICAL

DATA BOOK

&

i]:.'

"

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN

SPACEFLIGHT

221

__ _-] , J_'i

I )

O-ring

material % f_ ,_2---_-__i_', _?1/// _ _tlx _ In erfere capture fit latch

_:::J I
J.. |Ui

'111 .oovo=0 ,
lift_
_

size and

Filled
Zinc

_-.Z_]_J_., t__._._ ",_' _].' . ,_

deflection relief flap

putty

_1_/_

"_ insulation

....

: -

_"--

_"

chromate

Original

design Figure 3-26. Field Joint

New design

Redesign

with integral weather seals. The nozzle-to-case joint, the case parts, insulation, and seals were redesigned to preclude seal leakage observed in prior flights. The nozzle metal parts, ablative components, and seals were redesigned to improve redundancy and to provide pressure verification of seals. Other nozzle modifications included improvements to the inlet, cowl/boot, and aft exit assemblies. Modifications were incorporated into the igniter case chamber and into the factory joints to improve their margins of safety. The igniter case chamber wall thickness was being increased. Additional internal insulation and an external weather seal were added to the factory joint. Ground support equipment was redesigned to minimize case distortion during storage and handling, to improve case measurement and rounding techniques for assembly, and to improve leak testing capabilities. Component laboratory tests, combined with subscale simulation tests and full-scale tests, were being conducted to meet verification requirements. Several small-scale and full-scale joint tests were successfully completed, confirming insulation designs and joint deflection analyses. One engineering test, two developmental tests, and three qualification full-scale motor test firings were to be completed before STS-26. The engineering test motor was fired on May 27, 1987, and early analysis of the data indicated that the test met its objectives. static loads NASA selected the horizontal attitude as the optimum position for firing, and a second test stand, which could introduce dynamic at the external tank/solid rocket motor aft attach struts, was conImproved nondestructive evaluation techniques were being in conjunction and mechanical with the Air Force, to perform testing of propellant and insulation ultrasonic bonding

structed. developed, inspection

222

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

surfaces. Complete x-ray testing of all segments were reinstated for nearterm flights. Contingency planning included development of alternate designs, which did not utilize existing hardware, for the field and nozzle-to-case joints and for the rocket motor nozzle. An NRC Solid Rocket Motor Independent Oversight Panel, chaired by Dr. H. Guyford Stever, was actively reviewing the solid rocket motor design, verification analyses, and test planning and was participating in the major program reviews, including the preliminary requirements and the preliminary design reviews. A separate technical advisory group, consisting of twelve senior engineers from NASA and the aerospace industry and a separate group of representatives from four major solid motor manufacturers, worked directly with the solid rocket motor design team to review the redesign status and provide suggestions and recommendations to NASA and Morton Thiokol. The solid rocket motor manufacturers--Aerojet Strategic Propulsion Company, Atlantic Research Corporation, Hercules Inc., and United Technologies Corporation (Chemical Systems Division)--were reviewing and commenting on the present design approach and proposing alternate approaches that they felt would enhance the design. As a result of these and other studies, NASA initiated a definition study for a new advanced solid rocket motor. Additional details of the redesigned solid rocket motor can be found in Chapter 2 as part of the discussion of the Shuttle's propulsion system. Recommendations lI and V

The commission recommended [II] that the Space Shuttle Program management structure be reviewed, that astronauts be encouraged to make the transition into management positions, and that a flight safety panel be established. The commission recommended [V] that the tendenc:vfi)r management isolation be eliminated, that a policy on launch constraints" be developed, and that critical launch readiness reviews be recorded. In March 1986, Associate Administrator for Space Flight Rear Admiral Richard Truly initiated a review of the Shuttle program management structure and communications. After the commission report was issued, he assigned Captain Robert L. Crippen responsibility for developing the response to commission recommendations II and V. This effort resulted in the establishment of a director, NSTS, reporting directly to the associate administrator for spaceflight, and other changes necessary to strengthen the Shuttle program management structure and improve lines of authority and communication (see Figure 3-1) at the beginning of this chapter. The NSTS funding process was revised, and the director, NSTS, now was given control over program funding at the centers. Additionally, the flight readiness review and mission management team processes were strengthened. The director of flight crew operations would participate in both of these activities, and the flight crew comman-

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT

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der,or a representative, wouldattend theflight readiness review.These meetings wouldberecorded andformalminutes published. Sincethe accident,severalcurrentand former astronauts were assigned to top management positions. Theseincluded:the associate administrator for spaceflight; the associate administrator for external affairs;the acting assistant administrator, office of exploration: chief.
Headquarters operational safety branch: the deputy director, NSTS operations; the Johnson Space Center deputy center director; the chairman of the Space Flight Safety Panel; and the former chief of the astronaut office as special assistant to the Johnson director for engineering, operations, and safety. A Space Flight Safety Panel, chaired by astronaut Bryan O'Connor, was established. The panel reported to the associate administrator [or SRM&QA. The panel's charter was to promote flight safety for all NASA spaceflight programs involving flight crews, including the Space Shuttle and Space Station programs. Recommendation 1H The Commission recommended that the critical items and hazard analyses be reviewed to identif3, items requiring improvement prior to flight m ensure safe O, and that the NRC verify the adequacy of this e[fort. The NSTS uses failure modes and effects analyses, critical item lists, and hazard analyses as techniques to identify the potential for failure of critical flight hardware, to determine the effect of the failure on the crew, vehicle, or mission, and to ensure that the criticality of the item is reflected in the program documentation. Several reviews were initiated by program management in March 1986 to reevaluate failure analyses of critical hardware items and hazards. These reviews provided improved analyses and identified hardware designs requiring improvement prior to flight to ensure mission success and enhance flight safety. A review of critical items, failure modes and effects analyses, and hazard analyses for all Space Shuttle systems was under way. NASA developed detailed instructions for the preparation of these items to ensure that common ground rules were applied to each project element analysis. Each NASA element project office and its prime contractor, as well as the astronaut office and mission operations directorate, were reviewing their systems to identify any areas in which the design did not meet program requirements, to verify the assigned criticality of items, to identify new items, and to update the documentation. An independent contractor was conducting a parallel review for each element. Upon completion of this effort, each element would submit those items with failure modes that could not meet full design objectives to the Program Requirements Control Board, chaired by the director, NSTS. The board would review the documentation, concur with the proposed rationale for safely accepting the item, and issue a waiver to the design requirement, if appropriate. The NRC Committee on Shuttle Criticality Review and Hazard Analysis Audit, chaired by retired U.S. Air Force General Alton Slay, was

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responsible forverifyingtheadequacy of theproposed actions for returningtheSpace Shuttle to flight status. In its interimreportof January 13, 1987, thecommittee expressed concern thatcriticalitemswerenot adequately prioritized tohighlightitems thatmaybe most significant. NASA
was implementing a critical items prioritization program to alleviate the committee's concerns. Recommendation IV system for the Shuttle

The commission recommended that NASA establish an Office of Sql'ety, Reliability. and Quali O, Assurance, reporting to the NASA administrator, with responsibility for related functions in all NASA activities and programs. The NASA administrator established a new NASA Headquarters organization, the Office of Safety, Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality Assurance (SRM&QA), and appointed George Rodney as associate administrator. The Operational Safety Branch of that office was headed by astronaut Frederick Gregory. The new organization centralized agency policy in its areas of responsibility, provided for NASA-wide standards and procedures, and established an independent reporting line to top management for critical problem identification and analysis. The new office exercised functional management responsibility and authority over the related organizations at all NASA field centers and major contractors. The new organization was participating in specific NSTS activities, such as the hardware redesign, failure modes and effects analysis, critical item identification, hazard analysis, risk assessment, and spaceflight system assurance. This approach allowed the NSTS program line management at Headquarters and in the field to benefit from the professional safety contributions of an independent office without interrupting the two different reporting lines to top management. Additional safeguards were added by both the line project management and the SRM&QA organization to ensure free, open, rapid communication upward and downward within all agency activities responsible for flight safety. Such robust multiple communications pathways were expected to eliminate the possibility of serious issues not rising to the attention of senior management. Recommendation I,'1

The commission recommended that NASA take action to improve landing system safe_, margin and to determine the criteria under which planned landings at Kennedy would be acceptable. Several orbiter landing system modifications to improve landing system safety margins would be incorporated for the first flight. These included a tire pressure monitoring system, a thick-stator beryllium brake to increase brake energy margin, a change to the flow rates in the brake hydraulic system, a stiffer main gear axle, and a balanced brake pressure application feature that would decrease brake wear upon landing and provide additional safety margin.

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Several otherchanges werebeingevaluated to support longerterm upgrading of the landingsystem. A newstructural carbonbrake,with increased energy capacity, wasapproved andwouldbeavailable in 1989.
A fail-operational/fail-safe nose wheel steering design, including redundant nose wheel hydraulics capability, was being reviewed by the orbiter project office for later implementation. The initial Shuttle flights were scheduled to land at the Edwards Air Force Base complex. A total understanding of landing performance data, the successful resolution of significant landing system anomalies, and increased confidence in weather prediction capabilities were preconditions to resuming planned end-of-mission landings at the Kennedy Space Center. Recommendation VII The commission recommended that NASA make eveta" effort to increase the capability for an emergency runway landing following the loss of two or three engines during early ascent and to provide a crew escape system for use during controlled gliding .[light. Launch and launch abort mode definition, flight and ground procedures, range safety, weather, flight and ground software, flight rules, and launch commit criteria were reviewed. Changes resulting from this review were being incorporated into the appropriate documentation, including ground operating procedures, and the on-board flight data file. NASA reviewed abort trajectories, vehicle performance, weather requirements, abort site locations, support software, ground and on-board procedures, and abort decision criteria to ensure that the requirements provided for maximum crew safety in the event an abort was required. The review resulted in three actions: the landing field at Ben Guerir, Morocco, was selected as an additional transatlantic abort landing site; ground rules for managing nominal and abort performance were established and the ascent data base was validated and documented; and a permanent Launch Abort Panel was established to coordinate all operational and engineering aspects of ascent-phase contingencies. Representatives from NASA and the Air Force were reviewing the external tank range safety system. This review readdressed the issue of whether the range safety system is required to ensure propellant dispersal capability in the event of an abort during the critical first minutes of flight. The results of this analysis would be available in early 1988. Flight rules (which define the response to specific vehicle anomalies that might occur during flight) were being reviewed and updated. The Flight Rules Document was being reformatted to include both the technical and operational rationales for each rule. Launch commit criteria (which define responses to specific vehicle and ground support system anomalies that might occur during launch countdown) were being reviewed and updated. These criteria were being modified to include the technical and operational rationale and to document any procedural workarounds that would allow the countdown to proceed in the event one of the criteria was violated.

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Although a final decision to implement a Space Shuttle crew escape capability was not made, the requirements for a system to provide crew egress during controlled gliding flight were established. The requirements for safe egress of up to eight crew members were determined through a review of escape routes, time lines, escape scenarios, and proposed orbiter modifications. The options for crew egress involved manual and powered extraction techniques. Design activities and wind tunnel assessments for each were initiated. The manual egress design would ensure that the crew member did not contact the vehicle immediately after exiting the crew module. Several approaches being assessed for reducing potential contact included a deployable side hatch tunnel that provided sufficient initial velocity to prevent crew/vehicle contact and an extendable rod and/or rope that placed the crew release point in a region of safe exit (Figure 3-27). Both approaches provided for crew egress through the orbiter side hatch. The director, NSTS, authorized the development of a rocket-powered extraction capability for use in a crew egress/escape system. Crew escape would be initiated during controlled gliding flight at an altitude of 6,096 meters and a velocity of 321.8 kilometers per hour. The system consisted of a jettisonable crew hatch (which has been approved for installation and also applied to the manual bail-out mode) and individual rockets to extract the crew from the vehicle before it reached an altitude of 3,048 meters. Ground egress procedures and support systems were being reviewed to determine their capability to ensure safe emergency evacuation from the orbiter at the pad or following a non-nominal landing. An egress slide,

Position3. Slidin

Leave Rod

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opening.

a lanyard and

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release or water

at the landing.)

of the rod,

to a ground

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similar to that used on commercial aircraft, was being designed for use should an emergency escape be required after a runway landing. A study was initiated to evaluate future escape systems that would potentially expand the crew survival potential to include first-stage (solid rocket boosters thrusting) flight. Recommendation VIII

The commission recommended that the nation not rely on a single launch vehicle capability for the future and that NASA establish a .flight rate that is consistent with its resources. Several major actions reduced the overall requirements for NSTS launches and provided for a mixed fleet of expendable launch vehicles and the Space Shuttle to ensure that the nation did not rely on a single launch vehicle for access to space. NASA and DOD worked together to identify DOD payloads for launch on expendable launch vehicles and to replan the overall launch strategy to reflect their launches on expendable launch vehicles. The presidential decision to limit the use of the NSTS for the launch of communications satellites to those with national security or foreign policy implications resulted in many commercial communications satellites, previously scheduled for launch on the NSTS, being reassigned to commercial expendable launch vehicles. In March 1986, Admiral Truly directed that a "bottoms-up" Shuttle flight rate capability assessment be conducted. NASA established a flight rate capability working group with representatives from each Shuttle program element that affects flight rate. The working group developed ground rules to ensure that projected flight rates were realistic. These ground rules addressed such items as overall staffing of the work force, work shifts, overtime, crew training, and maintenance requirements for the orbiter, main engine, solid rocket motor, and other critical systems. The group identified enhancements required in the Shuttle mission simulator, the Orbiter Processing Facility, the Mission Control Center, and other areas, such as training aircraft and provisioning of spares. With these enhancements and the replacement orbiter, NASA projected a maximum flight rate capability of fourteen per year with four orbiters. This capacity, considering lead time constraints, "learning curves," and budget limitations, could be achieved no earlier than 1994 (Figure 3-28). Controls were implemented to ensure that the Shuttle program elements were protected from pressures resulting from late manifest changes. While the manifest projects the payload assignments several years into the future, missions within eighteen months of launch were placed under the control of a formal change process controlled by the director, NSTS. Any manifest change not consistent with the defined capabilities of the Shuttle system would result in the rescheduling of the payload to another mission.

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I
Fourth 16 Flight Orbiter Availability_ i i

0) >rl o_

g,
U_

8-

I I

1988

1992

1996

Figure 3-28. Availability _["Fourth Orbiter (With a fimrth orbiter available, fourteen flights pet" year would be possible in 1994. )

Recommendation

IX

The commission recommended that NASA develop and execute a maintenance hlspection plan, perform structural inspections when scheduled, and restore the maintenance and spare parts program. NASA updated the overall maintenance and flight readiness philosophy of the NSTS program to ensure that it was a rigorous and prominent part of the safety-of-flight process. A System Integrity Assurance Program was developed that encompassed the overall maintenance strategy, procedures, and test requirements for each element of flight hardware and software to ensure that each item was properly maintained and tested and was ready for launch. Figure 3-29 reflects the major capabilities of the System Integrity Assurance Program. NASA alleviated the requirement for the routine removal of parts from one vehicle to supply another by expanding and accelerating various aspects of the NSTS logistics program. Procedures were being instituted to ensure that a sufficient rationale supported any future requirement for such removal of parts and that a decision to remove them underwent a formal review and approval process. A vehicle checkout philosophy was defined that ensured that systems remain within performance limits and that their design redundancy features functioned properly before each launch. Requirements were established for identifying critical hardware items in the Operational Maintenance Requirements Specification Document (defines the work to be performed on the vehicle during each turnaround flow) and the Operations and Maintenance Instruction (lists procedures used in performing the work).

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT

Trainln Logistics SRM & QA Requirements 9 I_nd

229

Certification Requirements

__ _,?o, .......
Flight Operations Off-Line [ Requlremerlta Spares and

ClosedLoop

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._

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arid

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Raquiremanta Accounting Status

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;
Compliance Decision

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Syatem Trend Analysis Critical Status History FMEA/CIL Data tlem and

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3-29.

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inspection, was

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teazle' forJlight,

Related

Return-to-Flight

Actions was engaged in that were not

At the time of the Rogers Commission report, NASA several tasks in support of the return-to-flight activities directly related to commission recommendations: A new launch tified. target date and flight crew

for the first flight

were

iden-

The program requirements for flight and ground system hardware and software were being updated to provide a clear definition of the criteria that the project element designs must satisfy. The NSTS system designs were reviewed, and items requiring modification prior to flight were identified. Existing and modified hardware and software designs were being verified to ensure that they complied with the design requirements. The program and project documents, which implemented the redefined program requirements, were being reviewed and updated.

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Majortesting, training, andlaunch preparation activities werecontinuingor wereplanned.

Orbiter Operational Improvements and Modifications. The NSTS program initiated the System Design Review process to ensure the review of all hardware and software systems and to identify items requiring redesign, analysis, or test prior to flight. The review included a complete description of the system issue, its potential consequences, recommended correction action, and alternatives. The orbiter System Design Review identified approximately sixty Category 1 system or component changes out of a total of 226 identified changes. -_3 (Category 1 changes are those required prior to the next flight because the current design may not contain a sufficient safety margin.) Figure 3-30 illustrates the major improvements or modifications made to the orbiter. Space Shuttle Main Engine. Improvements made to the Shuttle's main engines are addressed in Chapter 2 as part of the discussion of the Shuttle's propulsion system. Orbital Maneuvering System/Reaction Control System AC-MotorOperated Valves. :4 The sixty-four valves operated by AC motors in the OMS and RCS were modified to incorporate a "sniff' line for each valve to permit the monitoring of nitrogen tetroxide or monomethyl hydrazine in the electrical portion of the valves during ground operations. This new line reduced the probability of floating particles in the electrical microswitch portion of each valve, which could affect the operation of the

Figure 3-30. Major Orbiter Modoqcations

2_Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, 1988 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989) p. 24. :_The information regarding additional changes presented from this point onward came from the NSTS Shuttle Reference Manual (1988), on-line from the Kennedy Space Center Home Page.

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microswitch position indicators for on-board displays and telemetry. It also reduces the probability of nitrogen tetroxide or monomethyl hydrazine leakage into the bellows of each AC-motor-operated valve. Primary RCS Modifications. The wiring of the fuel and oxidizer injector solenoid valves was wrapped around each of the thirty-eight primary RCS thrust chambers to remove electrical power from these valves in the event of a primary RCS thruster instability. Fuel Cell Modifications. Modifications to the fuel cell included the deletion of end-cell heaters on each fuel cell power plant because of potential electrical failures and replacement with Freon coolant loop passages to maintain uniform temperature throughout the power plants; the improvement of the hydrogen pump and water separator of each fuel cell power plant to minimize excessive hydrogen gas entrained in the power plant product water; the addition of a current measurement detector to monitor the hydrogen pump of each fuel cell power plant and provide an early indication of hydrogen pump overload; the modification of the starting and sustaining heater system for each fuel cell power plant to prevent overheating and the loss of heater elements; and the addition of a stack inlet temperature measurement to each fuel cell power plant for full visibility of thermal conditions. Other improvements included the modification of the product water lines from all three fuel cell power plants to incorporate a parallel (redundant) path of product water to the Environmental Control and Life Support System's potable water tank B in the event of a freezeup in the single water relief panel and the addition of a water purity sensor (pH) at the common product water outlet of the water relief panel to provide a redundant measurement of water purity. Auxiliary Power Unit Modifications. The auxiliary power units that were used to date had a limited life. Each unit was refurbished after twenty-five hours of operation because of cracks in the turbine housing, degradation of the gas generator catalyst (which varied up to approximately thirty hours of operation), and operation of the gas generator valve module (which also varied up to approximately thirty hours of operation). The remaining parts of the auxiliary power unit were qualified for forty hours of operation. Improved auxiliary power units were scheduled for delivery in late 1988. A new turbine housing would increase the life of the housing to seventy-five hours of operation (fifty missions); a new gas generator increased its fife to seventy-five hours; a new standoff design of the gas generator valve module and fuel pump deleted the requirement for a water spray system that was required previously for each auxiliary power unit upon shutdown after the first OMS thrusting period or orbital checkout; and the addition of a third seal in the middle of the two existing seals for the shaft of the fuel pump/lube oil system (previously only two seals were located on the shaft, one on the fuel pump side and one on the gearbox lube oil side) reduced the probability of hydrazine leaking into the lube oil system. The deletion of the water spray system for the gas generator valve module and fuel pump for each auxiliary power unit resulted

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in a weightreduction of approximately sixty-eightkilograms for each orbiter. Uponthedelivery of theimproved units, thelife-limited auxiliary power unitswouldberefurbished totheupgraded design.
Main Landing Gear. The following modifications were improve the performance of the main landing gear elements: i. made to

An increase in the thickness of the main landing gear axle to provide a stiffer configuration that reduces brake-to-axle deflections, precludes brake damage experienced in previous landings, and minimizes tire wear The addition of orifices to hydraulic passages in the brake's piston housing to prevent pressure surges and brake damage caused by a wobble/pump effect The modification of the electronic brake control boxes to balance hydraulic pressure between adjacent brakes and equalize energy applications, with the removal of the anti-skid circuitry previously used to reduce brake pressure to the opposite wheel if a flat tire was detected The replacement of the carbon-lined beryllium stator discs in each main landing gear brake with thicker discs to increase braking energy significantly A long-term structural carbon brake program to replace the carbonlined beryllium stator discs with a carbon configuration that provides higher braking capacity by increasing maximum energy absorption The addition of strain gauges to each nose and main landing gear wheel to monitor tire pressure before launch, deorbit, and landing Other studies involving arresting barriers at the end of landing site runways (except lake bed runways), the installation of a skid on the landing gear that could preclude the potential for a second blown tire on the same gear after the first tire has blown, the provision of "roll on rim" for a predictable roll if both tires are lost on a single or multiple gear, and the addition of a drag chute

2.

3.

4.

5.

6. 7.

Studies of landing gear tire improvements were conducted to determine how best to decrease tire wear observed after previous Kennedy Space Center landings and how to improve crosswind landing capability. Modifications were made to the Kennedy Space Center's Shuttle landing facility runway. The primary purpose of the modifications was to enhance safety by reducing tire wear during landing. Nose Wheel Steering Modifications. The nose wheel steering system was modified on Columbia (OV-102) for the 61-C mission, and Discoveo' (OV-103) and Atlantis (OV-104) were being similarly modified before their return to flight. The modification allowed for a safe highspeed engagement of the nose wheel steering system and provided positive lateral directional control of the orbiter during rollout in the presence of high crosswinds and blown tires.

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Thermal Protection System Modifications. The area aft of the reinforced carbon-carbon nose cap to the nose landing gear doors were damaged (tile slumping) during flight operations from impact during ascent and overheating during reentry. This area, which previously was covered with high-temperature reusable surface insulation tiles, would now be covered with reinforced carbon-carbon. The low-temperature thermal protection system tiles on O_lumbia's mid-body, payload bay doors, and vertical tail were replaced with advanced flexible reusable surface insulation blankets. Because of evidence of plasma flow on the lower wing trailing edge and elevon landing edge tiles (wing/elevon cove) at the outboard elevon tip and inboard elevon, the low-temperature tiles were being replaced with fibrous refractory composite insulation and high-temperature tiles along with gap fillers on Discoveo, and Atlantis. On Columbia, only gap fillers were installed in this area. Wing Modification. Before the wings for Discovery and Atlantis were manufactured, NASA instituted a weight reduction program that resulted in a redesign of certain areas of the wing structure. An assessment of wing air loads frorn actual flight data indicated greater loads on the wing structure than predicted. To maintain positive margins of safety during ascent, structural modifications were made. Mid-Fuselage Modifications. Because of additional detailed analysis of actual flight data concerning descent-stress thermal-gradient loads, torsional straps were added to tie all the lower mid-fuselage stringers in bays 1 through 11 together in a manner similar to a box section. This eliminated rotational (torsional) capabilities to provide positive margins of safely. Also, because of the detailed analysis of actual descent flight data, roomtemperature vulcanizing silicone rubber material was bonded to the lower mid-fuselage from bays 4 through 11 to act as a heat sink, distributing temperatures evenly across the bottom of the mid-fuselage, reducing thermal gradients, and ensuring positive margins of safety. General Purpose Computers. NASA was to replace the existing general purpose computers aboard the Space Shuttle orbiters with new upgraded general purpose computers in late 1988 or early 1989. The upgraded computers allowed NASA to incorporate more capabilities into the orbiters and apply advanced computer technologies that were not available when the orbiter was first designed. The upgraded general purpose computers would provide two and a half times the existing memory capacity and up to three times the existing processor speed, with minimum impact on flight software. They would be half the size, weigh approximately half as much, and require less power to operate. Inertial Measurement Unit Modifications. The new high-accuracy inertial navigation system were to be phased in to augment the KT-70 inertial measurement units in 1988-89. These new inertial measurement units would result in lower program costs over the next decade, ongoing production support, improved performance, lower failure rates, and reduced size and weight. The HAINS inertial measurement units also would contain an internal dedicated microprocessor with memory for

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processing andstoring compensation andscale factordatafromthevendor'scalibration, thereby reducing theneed for extensive initial loaddata for theorbiter'scomputers.
Crew Escape System. Hardware changes were made to the orbiter and to the software system to accommodate the crew escape system addressed in Recommendation VII. Seventeen-Inch OrbiterExternal Tank Disconnects. Each mated pair of seventeen-inch disconnects contained two flapper valves: one on the orbiter side and one on the external tank side. Both valves in each disconnect pair were opened to permit propellant flow between the orbiter and the external tank. Prior to separation from the external tank, both valves in each mated pair of disconnects were commanded closed by pneumatic (helium) pressure from the main propulsion system. The closure of both valves in each disconnect pair prevented propellant discharge from the external tank or orbiter at external tank separation. Valve closure on the orbiter side of each disconnect also prevented contamination of the orbiter main propulsion system during landing and ground operations. Inadvertent closure of either valve in a seventeen-inch disconnect during main engine thrusting would stop propellant flow from the external tank to all three main engines. Catastrophic failure of the main engines and external tank feed lines would result. To prevent the inadvertent closure of the seventeen-inch disconnect valves during the Space Shuttle main engine thrusting period, a latch mechanism was added in each orbiter half of the disconnect. The latch mechanism provided a mechanical backup to the normal fluid-induced-open forces. The latch was mounted on a shaft in the flow stream so that it overlapped both flappers and obstructed closure for any reason. In preparation for external tank separation, both valves in each seventeen-inch disconnect were commanded closed. Pneumatic pressure from the main propulsion system caused the latch actuator to rotate the shaft in each orbiter seventeen-inch disconnect ninety degrees, thus freeing the flapper valves to close as required for external tank separation. A backup mechanical separation capability was provided in case a latch pneumatic actuator malfunctioned. When the orbiter umbilical initially moved away from the external tank umbilical, the mechanical latch disengaged from the external tank flapper valve and permitted the orbiter disconnect flapper to toggle the latch. This action permitted both flappers to close. Changes made to the Space Shuttle main engines as part of the Margin Improvement Program and solid rocket motor redesign were addressed in Chapter 2 as part of the discussion of launch systems. Return to Flight Preparation for STS-26

NASA selected Discover3.' as the Space Shuttle for the STS-26 mission in 1986. At the time of the STS 51-L accident, Discove_ was in tern-

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porary storagein the KennedySpaceCenter'sVehicleAssembly Building,awaiting transfer totheOrbiter Processing Facilityfor preparation for the first Shuttleflight from Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, scheduled for laterthatyear.Discover3' last flew in August
1985 on STS 51-1, the orbiter's November 1983. sixth flight since it joined the fleet in In January 1986, Atlantis was in the Orbiter Processing Facility, prepared for the Galileo mission and ready to be mated to the boosters and tank in the Vehicle Assembly Building. Columbia had just completed the STS 61-C mission a few weeks prior to the Challenger accident and was also in the Orbiter Processing Facility undergoing postflight deconfiguration. NASA was considering various Shuttle manifest options, and it was determined that Atlantis would be rolled out to Launch Pad 39-B for fit checks of new weather protection modifications and for an emergency egress exercise and a countdown demonstration test. During that year, NASA also decided that Columbia would be flown to Vandenberg for fit checks. Discovery was then selected for the STS-26 mission. Discoveo, was moved from the Vehicle Assembly Building High Bay 2, where it was in temporary storage, into the Orbiter Processing Facility the last week of June 1986. Power-up modifications were active on the orbiter's systems until mid-September 1986, when Discovera, was transferred to the Vehicle Assembly Building while technicians performed facility modifications in Bay 1 of Orbiter Processing Facility. Discovery was moved back into the Orbiter Processing Facility's Bay 1 on October 30, 1987, a milestone that initiated an extensive modification and processing flow to ready the vehicle for flight. The hiatus in launching offered an opportunity to "tune up" and fully check out all of the orbiter's systems and treat the orbiter as if it was a new vehicle. Technicians removed most of the orbiter's major systems and components and sent them to the respective vendors for modifications or rebuilding. Alter an extensive powered-down period of six months, which began in February 1987, Discovery's systems were awakened when power surged through its electrical systems on August 3, 1987. Discovery remained in the Orbiter Processing Facility while workers implemented more than 200 modifications and outfitted the payload bay for the TDRS. Flight processing began in mid-September with the reinstallation and checkout of the major components of the vehicle, including the main engines, the right- and lefthand OMS pods, and the forward RCS. In January 1988, Discoveo,'s three main engines arrived at the Kennedy Space Center and were installed. Engine 2019 arrived on January 6, 1988, and was installed in the number one position on January 10. Engine 2022 arrived on January 15 and was installed in the number two position on January 24. Engine 2028 arrived on January 21 and was installed in the number three position also on January 24. The redesigned solid rocket motor segments began arriving at Kennedy on March 1, and the first segment, the left aft booster, was stacked on Mobile Launcher 2 in the Vehicle Assembly Building's High

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started with the left aft booster and continued stacking the four iefthand segments before beginning the righthand segments on May 5. They attached the forward assemblies/nose cones on May 27 and 28. The solid rocket boosters' field joints were closed out prior to mating the external tank to the boosters on June 10. An interface test between the boosters and tank was conducted a few days later to verify the connections. The OASIS payload was installed in Discovery's payload bay on April 19. TDRS arrived at the Orbiter Processing Facility on May 16, and its inertial upper stage arrived on May 24. The TDRS/inertial upper stage mechanical mating took place on May 3 I. Discoveo' was moved from the Orbiter Processing Facility to the Vehicle Assembly Building on June 21, where it was mated to the external tank and solid rocket boosters. A Shuttle interface test conducted shortly after the mate checked out the mechanical and electrical connections among the various elements of the Shuttle vehicle and the function of the on-board flight systems. The assembled Space Shuttle vehicle aboard its mobile launcher platform was rolled out of the Vehicle Assembly Building on July 4. It traveled just over four miles to Launch Pad 39-B for a few major tests and final launch preparations. A few days after Discoveo,'s OMS system pods were loaded with hypergolic propellants, a tiny leak was detected in the left pod (June 14). Through the use of a small, snake-like, fiber optics television camera, called a Cobra borescope, workers pinpointed the leak to a dynatube fitting in the vent line for the RCS nitrogen tetroxide storage tank, located in the top of the OMS pod. The tiny leak was stabilized and controlled by "pulse-purging" the tank with helium--an inert gas. Pulse-purge is an automated method of maintaining a certain amount of helium in the tank. In addition, console operators in the Launch Control Center firing room monitored the tank for any change that may have required immediate attention. It was determined that the leak would not affect the scheduled Wet Countdown Demonstration Test and the Flight Readiness Firing, and repair was delayed until after these tests. The Wet Countdown Demonstration Test, in which the external tank was loaded with liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen, was conducted on August 1. A few problems with ground support equipment resulted in unplanned holds during the course of the countdown. A leak in the hydrogen umbilical connection at the Shuttle tail service mast developed while liquid hydrogen was being loaded into the external tank. Engineers traced the leak to a pressure monitoring connector. During the Wet Countdown Demonstration Test, the leak developed again. The test was completed with the liquid hydrogen tank partially full, and the special tanking tests were deleted. Seals in the eight-inch fill line in the tail service mast were replaced and leak-checked prior to the Flight Readiness Firing. In addition, the loading pumps in the liquid oxygen storage farm were not functioning properly. The pumps and their associated motors were repaired.

Bay3 on March29.Technicians

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After an abortedfirst attempt,the twenty-two-second Flight Readiness Firingof Discovery's main engines took place on August 10.
The first Flight Readiness Firing attempt was halted inside the T-tensecond mark because of a sluggish fuel bleed valve on the number two main engine. Technicians replaced this valve prior to the Flight Readiness Firing. This firing verified that the entire Shuttle system, including launch equipment, flight hardware, and the launch team, were ready for flight. With more than 700 pieces of instrumentation installed on the vehicle elements and launch pad. the test provided engineers with valuable data, including characteristics of the redesigned solid rocker boosters. After the test, a team of Rockwell technicians began repairs to the OMS pod leak. They cut four holes into two bulkheads with an airpowered router on August 17 and bolted a metal "clamshell" device around the leaking dynatube fitting. The clamshell was filled with Furmanite--a dark thick material consisting of graphite, silicon, heavy grease, and glass fiber. After performing a successful initial leak check, covers were bolted over the holes on August 19, and the tank was pressurized to monitor any decay. No leakage or decay in pressure was noted, and the fix was deemed a success. TDRS-C and its inertial upper stage were transferred from the Orbiter Processing Facility to Launch Pad 39-B on August 15. The payload was installed into Discoveo_'s payload bay on August 29. Then a Countdown Demonstration Test was conducted on September 8. Other launch preparations held prior to launch countdown included final vehicle ordinance activities, such as power-on stray-voltage checks and resistance checks of firing circuits, the loading of the fuel cell storage tanks, the pressurization of the hypergolic propellant tanks aboard the vehicle, final payload closeouts, and a final functional check of the range safety and solid rocket booster ignition, safe, and arm devices. STS-26 Mission Overview

The Space Shuttle program returned to flight with the successful launch of Discoveo_ on September 29, 1988. The Shuttle successfully deployed the TDRS, a 2,225-kilogram communications satellite attached to a 14,943-kilogram rocket. In addition, eleven scheduled scientific and technological experiments were carried out during the flight. The STS-26 crew consisted of only experienced astronauts. Twenty months of preflight training emphasized crew safety. The crew members prepared for every conceivable mishap or malfunction. Among the changes made in the Shuttle orbiter was a crew escape system for use if an engine should malfunction during ascent to orbit or if a controlled landing was risky or impossible. As part of this escape system, the crew wore newly designed partially pressurized flight suits during ascent, reentry, and landing. Each suit contained oxygen supplies, a parachute, a rat), and other survival equipment. The new escape system

238

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

wouldpermitastronauts to bail out of the spacecraft in anemergency duringcertain segments of theirascent toward orbit.Toescape, theastronauts wouldblowoff a hatchin thespacecraft cabinwail,extend a telescoping pole3.65meters beyond thespacecraft, andslidealongthepole. Fromthepole,theywouldparachute to Earth. Theimproved mainengines weretest-fired fora totalof 100,000 seconds, whichis equaltotheirusetimein sixty-fiveShuttle launches. The solidrocket boosters weretested withfourteen different flawsdeliberately etched intocriticalcomponents. The launchwas delayedfor one hour and thirty-eightminutes because of unsuitable weather conditions in theupper atmosphere. Winds ataltitudes between 9,144and12,192 meters werelighterthanusual for thattimeof the year,andlaunchwasprohibited because this condition hadnotbeen programmed intothespacecraft's computer. However, after specialists analyzed thesituation, they judgedthatDiscove o, could withstand these upper-air conditions. Shuttle managers approved a waiver of the established flight rule and allowed the launch to proceed under the existing light wind conditions. Upon the conclusion of the mission, Discovery began its return to Earth at I 1:35 a.m., Eastern Daylight Time, on October 3. Discovery was traveling at about twenty-five times the speed of sound over the Indian Ocean when the astronauts fired the deorbit engines and started the hour-long descent. Touchdown was on a dry lake bed at Edwards Air Force Base. Space Station Overview and Background

The notion of a space station was not new or revolutionary when, in his State of the Union message of January 25, 1984, President Ronaid Reagan directed NASA to develop a permanently occupied space station within the next ten years. Even before the idea of a Space Shuttle had been conceived in the late 1960s, NASA had envisioned a space station as a way to support high-priority science missions. Once the Shuttle's development was under way, a space station was considered as its natural complement--a destination for the orbiter and a base for its trip back to Earth. By 1984, NASA had already conducted preliminary planning efforts that sought the best space station concept to satisfy the requirements of potential users. Reagan's space station directive underscored a national commitment to maintaining U.S. leadership in space. A space station would, NASA claimed, stimulate technology resulting in "spinoffs" that would improve the quality of life, create jobs, and maintain the U.S. skilled industrial base. It would improve the nation's competitive stance at a time when more and more high-technology products were being purchased in other countries. It offered the opportunity to add significantly to knowledge of

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Earthandtheuniverse.-" Thepresident followeduphis directive with a request for $150millionfor space stationeffortsin FY 1985. Congress approved this request andadded $5.5million in earlieryearappropriationstototal$155.5 millionfor thespace station in FY 1985. -'_ Fromitsstart,international participation wasamajorobjective of the Space Station program. Othergovernments wouldconduct theirowndefinition and preliminary designprograms in parallelwith NASA and wouldprovidefunding.NASAanticipated international station partners whodefinedmissions andusedstationcapabilities, participated in the definitionanddevelopment activities andwhocontributed tothe station capabilities, andsupported theoperational activities of thestation. Events movedahead, andon September 14, 1984,NASAissued a request for proposal (RFP)to U.S.industry for thestation's preliminary designanddefinition.The RFPsolicitedproposals for four separate "work packages" thatcovered thedefinitionandpreliminary designof stationelements: 1. Pressurized "common" modules withappropriate systems for useas laboratories, living areas, andlogistics transport; environmental control andpropulsive systems; plans forequipping onemodule asalaboratory and others as logistics modules; and plans for accommodations fororbitalmaneuvering andorbitaltransfer systems Thestructural framework to whichthevarious elements of thestation would be attached; interfacebetween the stationand the Space Shuttle; mechanisms suchastheRMSandattitudecontrol,thermal control,communications, anddatamanagement systems; plansfor equipping a modulewith sleeping quarters, wardroom, andgalley; andplans for EVA Automated free-flying platforms andprovisions to service andrepair theplatforms andotherfree-flying spacecraft; provisions for instruments andpayloads to beattached externally tothestation; andplans for equipping a module fora laboratory 4. Electrical power generation, conducting, andstorage systems. -'7
, .

Proposals from industry were received in November 1984. Also in 1984, NASA designated the Johnson Space Center as the lead center for the Space Station program. In addition, NASA established seven inter-

-_"Space Station." NASA Information Summaries, December 1986, p. 2. :"U.S. Congress, Conference Report, June 16, 1984, Chronological History, Fiscal Year 1985 Budget Submission authorized the initial $150 million. The Conference Committee authorized the additional $5 million from fiscal year 1984 appropriations as part of a supplemental appropriations bill, approved August 15, 1985. -'TSpace Station Definition and Preliminary Design, Request tbr Proposal, September 15, 1984.

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NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

centerteamsto conductadvanced development activitiesfor highpotential technologies to beusedin station design anddevelopment, and theagency assigned definitionandpreliminary design responsibilities to four field centers:the MarshallSpaceFlight Center,Johnson, the GoddardSpaceFlight Center,and the Lewis Research Center.The agency alsoestablished a Headquarters-based Space StationProgram Officetoprovideoverallpolicyandprogram direction. Response toproposals foraspace station wasnotuniformly favorable. Inparticular, theNew York Times criticized the usefulness of the project. It
called the proposed space station "an expensive yawn in space" (January 29, 1984) and "the ultimate junket" (November 9, 1984). 2" The Times claimed that unoccupied space platforms could accomplish anything that an occupied space platform could. Nevertheless, Reagan remained an enthusiastic proponent of the project, and NASA moved ahead. NASA defined three categories of missions as the basis for space station design. Science and applications missions included astrophysics, Earth science and applications, solar system exploration, life sciences, materials science, and communications. Commercial missions included materials processing in space, Earth and ocean observations, communications, and industrial services. Technology development missions included materials and structures, energy conversion, computer science and electronics, propulsion, controls and human factors, station systems/operations, fluid and thermal physics, and automation and robotics. NASA's 1984 plans called for the station to be operational in the early 1990s, with an original estimated U.S. investment of $8.0 billion (1984 dollars). 29The station would he capable of growth both in size and capability and was intended to operate for several decades. It would be assembled at an altitude of about 500 kilometers at an inclination to the equator of twenty-eight and a half degrees. All elements of the station would be launched and tended by the Space Shuttle. e'' On April 19, 1985, NASA's Space Station Program Office Manager Neil Hutchinson authorized the start of the definition phase contracts. Marshall, Johnson, Goddard, and Lewis each awarded competitive contracts on one of four work packages to eight industry teams (Table 3-50). These contracts extended for twenty-one months and defined the system requirements, developed supporting technologies and technology development plans, performed supporting systems and trade studies, developed preliminary designs and defined system interfaces, and developed plans, cost estimates, and schedules for the Phase C/D (design and development)

'-Wew York Times, January 29, 1984; New York Times, November 9, 1984. -"Philip E. Culbertson, "Space Station: A Cooperative Endeavor," paper to 25th International Meeting on Space, Rome, Italy, March 26-28, 1985, p. 4, NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC. 3_'LeonardDavid, Space Station Freedom--A Foothold on the Future, NASA pamphlet, Office of Space Science, 1986.

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activities.

In addition

to the

lead

centers

for

each

work

package,

the

Kennedy Space Center was responsible for preflight and launch operations and would participate in logistics support activities. Other NASA centers would also support the definition and preliminary design activities. Also during 1985, NASA signed memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with Canada, ESA, and Japan. The agreements provided a framework for cooperation during the definition and preliminary design phase (Phase B) of the program. Under the MOUs, the United States and its international partners would conduct and coordinate simultaneous Phase B studies. NASA also signed an MOU with Space Industries. Inc., of Houston, a privately funded venture to exchange information during Phase B. Space Industries planned to develop a pressurized laboratory that would be launched by the Space Shuttle and could be serviced from the station. Progress on the station continued through 1986. 3_ NASA issued a Technical and Management Information System (TMIS) RFP in July. The TMIS would be a computer-based system that would support the technical and management functions of the overall Space Station program. NASA also issued a Software Support Environment RFP for the "environment" that would be used for all computer software developed for the program. was also April for A draft RFP for the issued in November station's development phase (Phase C/D) 1986, with the definitive RFP released on in the Authorization cost plan spanning Act three

24, 1987. `= In 1987, in accordance with a requirement FY 1988, NASA began preparing a total

years. Called the Capital Development Plan, it included the estimated cost of all direct research and development, spaceflight, control and data communications, construction of facilities, and resource and program management. This plan complemented the Space Station Development Plan submitted to Congress in November 1987. Also during 1987, NASA awarded several station development contracts: 1. 2. Boeing Computer the TMIS. Lockheed Missiles op the Software Services Company Company was selected was chosen contract. in May in June to develop to devel-

and Space Support

Environment

"It is interesting to note that by 1986, the Soviet Union had already operated several versions of a space station. In February 1986, it placed into orbit a new space station called Mil; the Russian word for peace. The Soviets indicated they intended to occupy Mir permanently and make it the core of a busy complex of space-based factories, construction and repair facilities, and laboratories. _:"NASA Issues Requests for Proposals for Space Station Development," NASA News, Release 87-65, April 24, 1987.

242
.

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Grumman Aerospace Corporation was picked in July to provide the Space Station Program Office with systems engineering and integration, in addition to a broad base of management support.

In addition, Grumman and Martin Marietta Astronautics Company were selected in November for definition and preliminary design of the Flight Telerobotic System, a space robot that would perform station assembly and spacecraft servicing tasks. In December 1987, NASA selected the four work package contractors. These four aerospace firms were to design and build the orbital research base. Boeing Aerospace was selected to build the pressurized modules where the crews would work and live (Work Package 1). NASA chose McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company to develop the structural framework for the station, as well as most of the major subsystems required to operate the facility (Work Package 2). GE Astro-Space Division was picked to develop the scientific platform that would operate above Earth's poles and the mounting points for instruments placed on the occupied base (Work Package 3). NASA selected the Rocketdyne Division of Rockwell International to develop the system that would furnish and distribute electricity throughout the station (Work Package 4). The contracts included two program phases. Phase I covered the approximately ten-year period from contract start through one year after completion of station assembly. Phase II was a priced option that, if exercised, would enhance the capabilities of the station by adding an upper and lower truss structure, additional external payload attachment points, a solar dynamic power system, a free-flying co-orbiting platform, and a servicing facility. Contract negotiations with Boeing, McDonnell Douglas, GE Astro-Space, and Rocketdyne to design and build Freedom's occupied base and polar platform were completed in September 1988. With these contracts in place, the definition and preliminary design (Phase B) ended and detailed design and development (Phase C/D) began. The award of these contracts followed approval by Congress and President Reagan of the overall federal funding bill that made available more than $500 million in FY 1988 for station development activities. This amount included funds remaining from the FY 1987 station appropriation as well as the new funding provided under the FY 1988 bill. > In February 1988, the associate administrator for space station signed the Program Requirements Document. This top-level document contained requirements for station design, assembly, utilization, schedule, safety, evolution, management, and cost. In May, the Program Requirements Review began at the NASA Headquarters program office and was completed at the four work package centers by the end of the year. The Program Requirements Review provided a foundation to begin the ..... NASA Awards Contracts to Space Station Contractors," Release 87-187, December 23, 1987. NASA News,

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detailed designanddevelopment process by verifyingprogram requirements andensuring thatthose requirements couldbetraced across all levelsof theprogram andbemetwithin the available technical andfiscal
resources.

In July 1988, President Reagan named the international station Freedom. The U.S. international partners signed agreements to cooperate with the United States in developing, using, and operating the station. Government-level agreements between the United States and nine European nations, Japan, and Canada, and MOUs between NASA and ESA and between NASA and Canada were signed in September. The NASA-industry team proceeded to develop detailed requirements to guide design work beginning early in 1989. Proposed Configurations

For the purpose of the 1984 RFP, NASA selected the "power tower" as the reference configuration for the station. NASA anticipated that this configuration could evolve over time. The power tower would consist of a girder 136 meters in length that would circle Earth in a gravity-gradient attitude. Pressurized laboratory modules, service sheds, and docking ports would be placed on the end always pointing downward; instruments for celestial observation would be mounted skyward; and the solar power arrays would be mounted on a perpendicular boom halfway up the tower. After intensive reviews, NASA replaced the power tower configuration in 1985 with the "dual keel" configuration (Figure 3-31). This configuration featured two parallel 22.6-meter vertical keels, crossed by a single horizontal beam, which supported the solar-powered energy system by a double truss, rectangular-shaped arrangement that shortened the height of the station to ninety-one meters. This configuration made a stronger frame, thus better dampening the oscillations expected during operations. The design also moved the laboratory modules to the station's center of gravity to allow scientists and materials processing researchers to work near the quality microgravity zone within the station. Finally, the dual keel offered a far larger area for positioning facilities, attaching payloads, and storing supplies and parts. NASA formally adopted this design at its May 1986 Systems Requirements Review. Its Critical Evaluation Task Force modified the design in the fall of 1986 to increase the size of the nodes to accommodate avionics packages slated for attachment to the truss, thereby increasing pressurized volume available as well as decreasing the requirement for EVA. In 1987, NASA and the administration, responding to significant increases in program costs, decided to take a phased approach to station development, In April 1987, the Space Station program was divided into Block I and Block lI. Block I, the Revised Baseline Configuration, included the U.S. laboratory and habitat modules, the accommodation of attached payloads, polar platform(s), seventy-five kilowatts of photovoltaic power, European and Japanese modules, the Canadian Mobile

244

NASA HISTORICAL

DATA BOOK

TDRSS A ntenna Upper Boom

Photovoltaic Array

Radiator Solar Dynamic Power Unit

Lower Boom

Figure (adopted

3-3

I. Dual at May

Keel 1986

Final Systems

Assembly

Configuration Review)

Requirement._

Servicing System, and provisions for evolution (Figure 3-32). The modules would be attached to a l l0-meter boom. Block II, an Enhanced Configuration, would have an additional fifty kilowatts of power via a solar dynamic system, additional accommodation of attached payloads on dual keels and upper and lower booms, a servicing bay, and co-orbiting platforms (Figure 3-33). Operations and Utilization Planning

NASA first formulated an operations concept for the space station in 1985 that considered preliminary launch, orbit, and logistics operational requirements, objectives such as reduced life-cycle costs, and international operations. It was determined that the station elements fulfill user requirements affordably and that NASA be able to afford the overall system infrastructure and logistics. In 1985, the Space Station Utilization Data Base (later called the Mission Requirements Data Base) included more than 300 potential payloads from the commercial sector and from technology development, science, and applications communities. The information in this data base was used to evaluate potential designs of the station and associated platforms. Besides NASA, user sponsors included ESA, Canada, Japan, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. In addition, a large number of private-sector users had requested accommodations on the station. Considerable interest was also expressed in using polar

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Figure (This configuration

3-32. would

Revised include

Baseline the polar Japanese and U.S.

Configuration laboratot T and

(1987), habitat

Block

1 accom_f phot_Servicing

modules, kilowatts Mobile

modation voltaic

<)f attached power,

l_O,Ioads, and

platform(s), modules, for

seven(v-[_ve the Canadian

Europea_

System,

provisions

evolution.)

Figure (TTzis would additional have

3-33.

Enhanced fifo_

Configuration, of power on dual

Block via

II dynamic upper and 'stem, lower

an additional

kilowatts payloads bay, and

a solar and

accommodation booms,

of attached a servicing

keels

co-orbiting

plath>rms.)

246

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

platforms for solar-terrestrial physics, life sciences, astronomy, and Earth observation investigations. Polar platforms could support many related instruments, provide operational flexibility because of their modular design, and have indefinitely long lifetimes because they could be serviced while in orbit. In 1986, NASA formulated an Operations Management Concept that outlined the philosophy and management approaches to station operations. Using the concept as a point of departure, an Operations Task Force was established to perform a functional analysis of future station operations. In 1987, the Operations Task Force developed an operations concept and concluded its formal report in April. NASA also implemented an operations plan, carried out further study of cost management, and conducted a study on science operations management that was completed in August. NASA issued a preliminary draft of a Space Station User's Handbook that would be a guide to the station for commercial and government users. Pricing policy studies were also initiated, and NASA also revised the Mission Requirements Data Base. Part of the utilization effort was aimed at defining the user environment. The "Space Station Microgravity Environment" report submitted to Congress in July 1988 described the microgravity characteristics expected to be achieved in the U.S. Laboratory and compared these characteristics to baseline program operations and utilization requirements. Evolution Planning

The station was designed to evolve as new requirements emerged and new capabilities became available. The design featured "hooks" and "scars," which were electronic and mechanical interfaces that would allow station designers to expand its capability. In this way, new and upgraded components, such as computer hardware, data management software, and power systems, could be installed easily. The Enhanced Configuration was an example of evolution planning. In this version, two 103-meter-long vertical spines connected to the horizontal cross boom. With a near-rectangle shape comparable in size to a football field, the frame would be much stiffer and allow ample room for additional payloads. In 1987, NASA established an Evolution Management Council. The Langley Research Center was designated as responsible for station evolution to meet future requirements. This responsibility included conducting mission, systems, and operations analyses, providing systems-level planning of options/configurations, coordinating and integrating study results by others, chairing the evolution working group, and supporting advanced development program planning. A presidential directive of February 11, 1988, on "National Space Policy" stated that the "Space Station would allow evolution in keeping

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN

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with the needs of station users and the long-term goals of the U.S."_ This directive reaffirmed NASA's objective to design and build a station that could expand capabilities and incorporate improved technologies. Planning for evolution would occur in parallel with the design and development of the baseline station. To support initiatives such as the Humans to Mars and Lunar Base projects, the station would serve as a facility for life science research and technology development and eventually as a transportation node for vehicle assembly and servicing. Another evolutionary path involved growth of the station as a multipurpose research and development facility. For these options, Langley conducted mission and systems analyses to determine primary resource requirements such as power, crew, and volume. NASA Marshall Center Space Involvement Flight Center

The Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama, was designated as the Work Package 1 Center. Work Package 1 included the design and manufacture of the astronauts' living quarters, known as the habitation module (Figure 3-34); the U.S. Laboratory module; logistics elements, used for resupply and storage; node structures connecting the modules; the Environmental Control and Life Support System; and the thermal control and audio/video systems located within the pressurized modules.

Figure

3-34.

Habitation

Module

_Office of the Press Secretary, "Fact National Space Policy," February' 11, 1988.

Sheet:

Presidential

Directive

on

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NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Marshall established the Space Station Freedom Projects Office to manage and direct the various design, development, and operational activities needed to successfully complete the Work Package 1 assignment, as well as several facilities to support its work package activities. These included the Payload Operations Integration Center, the Engineering Support Center, and the Payload Training Facility. Johnson Space Center

The Johnson Space Center near Houston was responsible for the design, development, verification, assembly, and delivery of Work Package 2 flight elements and systems. This included the integrated truss assembly, propulsion assembly, mobile transporter, resource node design and outfitting, external thermal control, data management, operations management, communications and tracking, extravehicular systems, guidance, navigation, and control systems, and airlocks. Johnson was also responsible for the attachment systems, the STS for its periodic visits, the flight crews, crew training and crew emergency return definition, and operational capability development associated with operations planning. Johnson provided technical direction to the Work Package 1 contractor for the design and development of all station subsystems. Johnson set up the Space Station Freedom Projects Office with the responsibility of managing and directing the various design, development, assembly, and training activities. This office reported to the Space Station Program Office in Reston, Virginia. The projects office at Johnson was to develop the capability to conduct all career flight crew training. The integrated training architecture would include the Space Station Control Center and ultimately the Payload Operations Integration Center when the station became permanently occupied. Johnson established several facilities in support of its various responsibilities: the Space Station Control Center, the Space Systems Automated Integration and Assembly Facility, the Space Station Training Facility, and the Neutral Buoyancy Laboratory. Goddard Space Flight Center

The Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland, had responsibility for the Work Package 3 portion of the Space Station program. It was responsible for developing the free-flying platforms and attached payload accommodations, as well as for planning NASA's role in servicing accommodations in support of the user payloads and satellites. Goddard was also responsible for developing the Flight Telerobotic Servicer (Figure 3-35), which had been mandated by Congress in the conference report accompanying NASA's FY 1986 appropriations bill. The Flight Telerobotic Servicer was an outgrowth of the automation and robotics initiative of the station's definition and preliminary design phase.

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Figure

3-35.

Flight

Telerobotic

Sel3,icer

Lewis

Research

Cenler

The Lewis Research Center was responsible for the Work Package 4 portion of the Space Station program. Its station systems directorate was responsible for designing and developing the electric power system. This included responsibility for systems engineering and analysis for the overall electrical power system; all activities associated with the design, development, test, and implementation of the photovoltaic systems (Figure 3-36); hooks and scars activities in solar dynamics and in support of Work Package 2 in resistojet propulsion technology; power management and distribution system development; and activities associated with

Truss Solar Array Wing #1

Beta Gimbals I

Solar Array

Wing #2

Integrated Equipment Assembly

Alpha

Glmbal

Radiator

Figure 3-36. Photovoltaic Module

250

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK and in planning electric power

the Lewis station power system facilities system mission operations. International
Cancid(i

Cooperation

In March 1986, Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and President Reagan agreed to Canadian participation in the Space Station program. Canada intended to commit $1.2 billion to the program through the year 2000. Canada planned to provide the Mobile Servicing Center for Space Station Freedom. Together with a U.S.-provided, rail-mounted, mobile transporter, which would move along the truss, the Mobile Servicing Center and the transporter would comprise the Mobile Servicing System. The Mobile Servicing System was to play the main role in the accomplishing the station's assembly and maintenance, moving equipment and supplies around the station, releasing and capturing satellites, supporting EVAs, and servicing instruments and other payloads attached to the station. It would also be used for docking the Space Shuttle orbiter to the station and then loading and unloading materials from its cargo bay. NASA considered the Mobile Servicing Center as part of the station's critical path: an indispensable component in the assembly, performance, and operation of the station. In space, Canada would supply the RMS, the Mobile Servicing Center and Maintenance Depot, the special purpose dexterous manipulator, Mobile Servicing System work and control stations, a power management and distribution system, and a data management system (Figure 3-37). On the ground, Canada would build a manipulator development and simulation facility and a mission operations facility. The Canadian Space Agency would provide project management.

Figure

3-37.

Mobile

Servicing

System

and

Special

Purpose

Dexterous

Manipulator

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN European Space Agency

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ESA gave the name "Columbus" to its program to develop the three elements that Europe was to contribute to the station: the Columbus Attached Laboratory, the Columbus Free-Flying Laboratory, and the Columbus Polar Platform. Columbus would provide an in-orbit and ground infrastructure compatible with European and international user needs from the mid-1990s onward. The program would also provide Europe with expertise in human, human-assisted, and fully automatic space operations as a basis for future autonomous missions. The program aimed to ensure that Europe establish the key technologies required for these various types of spaceflight. The concept of Columbus was studied in the early 1980s as a followup to the Spacelab. The design, definition, and technology preparation phase was completed at the end of 1987. The development phase was planned to cover 1988-98 and would be completed by the initial launch of Columbus's three elements Columbus Attached Laboratory. This laboratory would be permanently attached to the station's base. It would have a diameter of approximately four meters and would be used primarily for materials sciences, fluid physics, and compatible life sciences missions (Figure 3-38). The attached laboratory would be launched from the Kennedy Space Center on a dedicated Space Shuttle flight, removed from the Shuttle's payload bay, and berthed at the station's base.

Figure

3-38.

Columbus

Attached

Ix_borator),

252

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Figure

3-39.

Columbus

Free-Flying

Laboratoo'

Columbus Free-Flying Laboratory. This free-flying laboratory (the "Free Flyer") would operate in a microgravity optimized orbit with a twenty-eight-and-a-hatf-degree inclination, centered on the altitude of the station (Figure 3-39). It would accommodate automatic and remotely controlled payloads, primarily from the materials sciences and technology disciplines, together with its initial payload, and would be launched by an Ariane 5 from the Centre Spatial Guyanais in Kourou, French Guiana. The laboratory would be routinely serviced in orbit by a Hermes at approximately six-month intervals. Initially, this servicing would be performed at Space Station Freedom, which the Free Flyer would also visit every three to four years for major external maintenance events. Columbus Polar Platform. This platform would be stationed in a highly inclined Sun-synchronous polar orbit with a morning descending node (Figure 3-40). It would be used primarily for Earth observation missions. The platform was planned to operate in conjunction with one or more additional platforms provided by NASA and/or other international partners and would accommodate European and internationally provided payloads. The platform would not be serviceable and would be designed to operate for a minimum of four years. The platform would accommodate between 1,700 and 2,300 kilograms of ESA and internationally provided payloads. Japan Japan initiated its space program in 1985 in response to the U.S. invitation to join the Space Station program. The Space Activities Commission's Ad Hoc Committee on the Space Station concluded that Japan should participate in the Phase B (definition) study of the program with its own experimental module. On the basis of the committee's conclusion, the Science and Technology Agency concluded a Phase B MOU with NASA. Under the supervision of the Science and Technology Agency, the National Space Development Agency of Japan, a quasi-

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Figure 3-40. Columbus Polar Pla_)rm governmental organization responsible for developing and implementing Japanese space activities, began the detailed definition and the preliminary design of the Japanese Experiment Module (JEM), which is shown in Figure 3-41 and would be attached to the Space Station. The JEM would be a multipurpose laboratory consisting of a pressurized module, an exposed facility, and an experiment logistics module (Table 3-51 ). The JEM would be launched on two Space Shuttle flights. The first flight

Figure 3--41. Japanese Experiment Module

254

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

would transport the pressurized module and the first exposed facility. The second flight would transport the second exposed facility and the experiment logistics module. Commercial Participation

From its inception, one of the prime goals of the Space Station program was to encourage private-sector, space-based commercial activity. President Reagan's 1984 State of the Union message stated the objective of promoting private-sector investment in space through enhanced U.S. space-based operational capabilities. The station was planned to be highly conducive to commercial space activities by providing extended time in orbit, facilities for research and testing, and the presence of a trained crew for the periodic tending, repair, and handling of unexpected occurrences. NASA's 1985 "Commercial Space Policy" set forth guidelines for the use of space for commercial enterprises relating to the station and other NASA activities. The guidelines stated that NASA welcomed and encouraged participation in station development and operations by companies that sought to develop station systems and services with private funds. NASA would provide incentives and technical assistance, including access to NASA data and facilities, where appropriate. NASA would protect proprietary rights and would request privately owned data only when necessary to carry outs its responsibilities, t' NASA expected the private sector to be a principal user of station capabilities. It also expected the private sector to participate in the program by providing services, both on the ground and in orbit. The private sector would participate in the program through procurements to design and build elements of the station and its related systems. In 1986, NASA's Commercial Advocacy Group conducted workshops to identify and encourage potential commercial use of the station, particularly in the areas of materials processing, Earth and ocean remote sensing, communications satellite delivery, and industrial services. In August 1986, NASA established "Guidelines for United States Commercial Enterprises for Space Station Development and Operations." These guidelines were to encourage U.S. private-sector investment and involvement in developing and operating station systems and services. In November 1987, NASA issued a series of new program initiatives designed to expand the opportunities for pioneering commercial ventures in space. The initiatives built on earlier commercial development policies and provided for the continued encouragement of private space activities. The 1988 National Space Policy mandated the provision for commercial participation in the Space Station program. Commercial participation would be possible through commercial utilization and commercial _"'NASA Guidelines for United States Commercial Enterprises for Space Station Development and Operations," Office of Space Station, NASA, 1985, NASA Historical Reference Collection, Washington, DC.

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT

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infrastructure activities. Commercial utilizationactivities wouldinvolve commercial users of thestation whowouldconduct space-based research anddevelopment activities. Commercial infrastructure activitieswould involveprovisions for selected station-related systems andservices ona commercial basis to NASAandstation users. In October 1988, NASApublished revised policyguidelines for proposals fromcommercial entities to provide theinfrastructure for thestation. Theseguidelines,revised in response to PresidentReagan's Commercial Space Initiatives, issued in February 1988, wereintended to providea frameworkto encourage U.S. commercialinvestment and involvement in thedevelopment andoperation of Space Station Freedom.
NASA would use these guidelines to evaluate proposals participating in the Space Station program. _" from industry for

_"NASA Issues Draft Guidelines on Station Commercial NASA News, Release 88-144, October 25, 1988.

Infrastructure,"

256

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Table Component Length Height Vertical Wingspan Body Flap Area (sq m} Width Aft Fuselage Length Width Height Mid-Fuselage Length Width Height Airlock Icml Inside Diameter Length Minimum Opening Forward Clearance Capacity Crew Cabin Stabilizer

3-11.

Orbiter

Characteristics

Characteristics 37.24 17.25 8.01 23.79 12.6 6. I 5.5 6.7 6. I 18.3 5.2 4.0 160 21 t 91.4 46 x 46 x 127 (cu m) 71.5 18.3 4.6 148.6 1,480 1g.3 1.5 4.2 and 3.8 6.91 Semimonocoque Aluminum Variable Variable 74,844 3 Thrust Burn Time 1.67M newtons 2.10M newtons 522 seconds at sea level in vacuum Type Material Weight Weight Ikg) (approx.)

Fuselage

Payload Bay Doors Length Diamete, Surface Weight Wing Length Maximmn Elevons Tread Width Structure Structure Gross Thickness Area Isq m) (kg)

Gross Takeoff Landing Inert Weight Main Engines Number Average Nominal

270

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-11 continued

Component OMS Engines Number Average Propellant RCS Engines Number Average Propellant Major Systems Thrust Thrust (kgt Dry Weight

Characteristics 2 26,688 117.9 Monomethyl hydrazine and nitrogen tetroxide newtons

38 primary (4 forward, 12 per aft pod) 6 vernier 12 forward, 4 aft) 3.870 newtons I 11.2 newtons Monomethyl Propulsion: in each primary in each vernier engine engine

hydrazine and nitrogen tetroxide Power Generation; Environmental Protection: Navigation, Crew Escape Avionics; Data Processing;

Control and Life Support; Thermal Communications; and Control:

All measuremenls are ill meters unless otherwise holed.

Purge, Vent, and Drain: Dedicated

Guidance. Display;

SPACE

TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN

SPACEFLIGHT

27 1

Table Time T-II hr

3-12.

T37?ical Event

l_utnch

ProcessingTerminal of rotating service structure by clearing of liquid tank tank

Count (completed of pad

Sequence by T-7 hr

Start retraction 30 rain)

T-5 hr 30 rain T-5 hr T-4 hr 30 rain T-2 hr 50 rain "I"-2 hr 4 rain T-I hr 5 rain T-30 rain T-25 nlin

Enter 6-hr buih-in

hold, followed

Start countdown, begin chill down hydrogen transfer system Begin liquid oxygen hydrogen fill of external Begin liquid I-hr built-in

oxygen/liquid

fill of external

hold, followed

by crew entry operations start cabin leak check area by T-10 rain: update

Crew entry complete: cabin hatch closed: (completed by' "I"-25 min) Secure white room: ground range safety activation/Mission Mission Control Center/crew landing weather infl_rmation or abort once around Load tlight [0-rain program: built-in hold (also Control

crow retires to fallback Center communications for contingencies of terminal

guidance

checks: crew given of return-to-abort count between T-9 and T-2 rain and T-27 sec) ground launch

I"-20 rain T-9 rain T-O rain T-7 rain T-5 rain T-4 min 30 sec T-3 ,nin %2 rain 55 sec %1 rain 57 sec T-31 sec T-30 sec T-27 sec T-25 sec

beginning

a 5-rain

hold capability

T-2 rain and a 2-rain hold capability between Go for launch/start launch processing system sequencer {automatic sequence) Start crew access arm retraction Activate Orbiler Gimbal External External orbiter hydraulic auxiliary power

units (APUs)

goes to internal power main engines to start position tank oxygen tank hydrogen to flight pressure to flight pressure software enabled automatic latmch sequence system command (fi)llowing

Onboard computers" by, launch processing Last opportunity Latest hold point

for crew to exit by slidewire if needed any hold below the T-2 mm will be automatically recycled to T-9 min) booster hydraulic power units: initiative for sequence assumed by' onboard comput-

mark, the countdown Activate solid rocket management

of countdown

T-18 sec T-3.6 sec T-3.46 %O T+2.64 sec T+3 sec secm

ers: ground launch sequencer remains on line Solid rocket booster nozzle profile conducted Main propulsion GPCs Main engines Main engines Solid rocket LIFTOFF system start at 9(1 percent booster thrust bohs triggered start commands issued by the onhoard

3.22 sec fire command/holddown

272

NASA

HISTORICAL

DATA BOOK

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SPACE

TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN

SPACEFLIGHT

273

TaMe Position Flight

3-14.

Mission

Cormnand Function

and

Control

Positions

and

Responsihilities

Director

Leads

the flight and

control

team.

The

Flight

Director and

is responsirelating and flight tra-

ble fc_r mission to safety Spacecraft Communicator Primary Control Plans jectory Guidance Officer ance Data Processing Systems Keeps including flight-critical system, Flight Surgeon Monitors flight crew. mass crew control

and payload flight conduct.

operations Mission

decisions

communicator and the Shuttle orbiter ahmg maneuvers with l_r

between crew. and

Command

Flight

Dynamics

Office

follows

the Shuttle's

the Guidance

Officer. navigation systems. computers, the display and guid-

Responsible computer track

monitoring software.

the orbiter data

of the orbiter's

processing purpose

Engineer

the five on-board and launch memories, activities team. and and and

general data lines, systems is for medical

the malfunction software. the medical Direclor

operations with infl_rmed the

providing keeping

consultations

as required,

the Flight

on the slate Booster Systems Engineer Respcmsible solid ktunch Propulsion Systems Engineer Monitors and orbital rocket and

of the crew's for monitoring booster, during

health, and evaluating tank phases the main engine, before control phases and

and external the ascent perfc_rmance systems

performance of the reaction

of a mission.

and evaluates maneuvering

during

all flight

is charged ables for Guidance. Control Navigation, S,,stems and Monitors tems. sible Electrical, and Environmental. Systems Also abort

with management of propellants various orbiter maneuvers. all Shuttle kecps situations, problems. for monitoring cells, avionics distribution, monitors in-flight the cryogenic and cabin cabin pressure, guidance, and keeps navigation, Director and the crew

and other and control crew notified ini"onned

consumsysof pos-

Engineer

the Flight

of any

guidance Responsible Consumables (EECONI and Syslems

supplies and

available orbiter lighting

for the fuel and electrical systerns. Plans and

cooling

systems,

Engineer

Instrumentation Comrtltmication Engineer Ground Control

communications

and

instrumentation Responsible Command lies, Also Gc_ddard

s} stems. for maintenance and Control Flight trey, and operation software, and data of Mission and support with facilithe ,'rod

hardware, tracking Center,

coordinates Space supports

activities Maryland.

Greenbelt,

Flight

Activities

Officer

Plans and schedules. Coordinates between monitors faces with

activities, and on-board team upper

checklists, system

pr{_cedures. interfaces user, their arm and May and also maintenance. explains Also inter-

Payloads

Officer

the ground the flight Spacelab payloads. operation structural hardware control and

and the payload systems manipulator systems. equipment and

stage

Maintenance, Arm. and Crew

Mechanical Systems Officer

Monitors the orbiter's observe Provides

of the remote and and in-flight

mechanical

Engineer Public Affairs

crew

mission

commentary and

and augments t]ight control

air-to-ground the news media

conversations and public.

operations

lk_r

274

NASA HISTORICAL

DATA BOOK

Mission STS-6 STS 4 I-B STS 41-C STS 41-G STS 51-A STS 51 -D STS 51-1 STS 61-B

Table 3-15. Date

Shuttle

Extravehicular Astronaut Musgrave Peterson McCandless Stewart Nelson van Hoften Leestma Sullivan Allen Gardner Griggs Hoffman van Hoflen W. Fisher Spring Ross

Activity Duration

(Hr: Min) 3:54 3:54 l 1:37 11:37 10:06 1(/:06 3:29 3:29 12:14 12:14 3:10 3:10 4:31 4:3 I 12:12 12:12

April 8, 1983 February April October November April 8, 1984 11, 1984 12, 1984 21, 1984 17, 1985 1, 1985 30, 1985 1, 1985

September November December

SPACE

TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN

SPACEFLIGHT

275

Table Mission STS-I Dates Apr. 12-14. 1981

3-16. Clew Cmdr:

STS-I-STS-4

Mission

Summary Payload and Aerod_ namic Identification Experiments Coefficient Package

John W. Young L. Crippen

Pilot: Robert

Data Flight Instrunrentation Package Passive Optical Sample Assembly STS-2 Nov. 1981 12-14, Cmdr: Joe H. Engle H. Truly Pilot: Richard Aerodynamic Identification Catalytic Coefficient Package Experiment

Surface

l)ata Flight Instrumentation Dynamic, Acoustic and Thermal Experiment Induced Environment Monitor Tile Gap Heating OSTA- I Pavload Effects {Office Experiment of Space Contamination

and Terrestrial Applications) Feature Identification and Location Experiment Hellex Bioengineering Test Measurement of Air Pollution From STS-3 Mar. 22-30, 1982 Cmdr: Jack R. Lousma Pilot: C. Gordon Fullerton Satellites Optical Survey of

Night-Day Lightning

Ocean Color Experiment Shuttle hnagmg Radar-A Shuttle Multispeclral Radiometer Infrared

Data Flight

Instrumentation

Aerod,, namic Coefficient Identification Package Induced Envmmment Contamination Monitor Tile Gap Catalytic Dynamic, Heating Efli_cts Experiment

Surface Experiment Acoustic and Thermal Latex Reactor Test

Experiment Monodisperse

Electrophoresis Test Heflex Bioengineering

Infrared hnagery of Shuttle OSS-1 Payload/Office of Space Science) Contamination Monitor Microahrasion Phmt Growth Plasma Foil Experiment Unit Package

Diagnostics

Shuttle-Spacelah Induced Atmosphere Sohtr Flare X-Ray Polarhneter Solar Ultraviolet Spectral lrradiance Monitor Thermal Canister Vehicle Charging Experiment Experhncnt and Potential

276

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-16 continued
Payload and Experiments Get-Away Special Canister Flight Verification Shuttle Student Involvement Project Insects in Flight Aerodynamic Coefficient Identification Package Experiment Electrophoresis Catalytic Surface Continuous Flow System Data Flight Department DOD-82-1

Mission Dates STS-3 continued

Crew

S'FS-4

June

27,

1982-

Cmdr:

Thomas

K. Mattingly

July 4, 1982

Pilot: Henry W, Hartsfield, Jr.

Instrumentation of Defense Payload

Dynamic. Acoustic and Thermal Experinlent Induced Environment Contamination Monitor Infrared Imagery of Shuttle

Monodisperse Latex Reactor Night/Day Optical Survey of Lightning Tile Gap Get-Away Heating Effects Special Experiment

G-001 Utah State University Shuttle Student Involvement Project EfIects of Diet. Exercise, Zero Gravity on Lipopmtein Profiles Effects of Space Travel on Trivalent Chromium in the Body

SPACE

TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN

SPACEFLIGHT

277

Table Crew Launch

3-17.

STS-I Cmdr:

Mission

Characteristics

John W. Young 12, 198 I, Kennedy, attempt Space Center 10. The

Pilot Robert L. Crippen 7:00:03 a.m., EST, April The launch followed

a scrubbed

on April

countdown on April 10 proceeded minutes when the orbiter general (GPCs) were scheduled

normally tmtil T-20 purpose computers from the vehicle

for transition

checkout mode to the vehicle flight configuration mode. The launch was held for the maximum time and scrubbed when the four primary GPCs would not provide the correct timing of the backup flight system GPC. Analysis and testing indicated the primary set of GPCs provided incorrect timing caused to the backup scrub. flight system The problem at initialization resulted fronl a and the launch

Primary Ascent Software System (PASS) skew during initialization. The PASS GPCs were reinitialized and dumped to verify the second system Shuttle Orbital Altitude & that the timing skew problem attempt had cleared. During flight final countdown set of orbiter on April 12, transition

of the primary

GPCs and the backup

GPC occurred normally at T-20 minutes. The cleared its 106-meter launch tower in six seconds Earth orbit in about 12 minutes. elliptical sys-

and reached Inclination

237 km/40 degrees The crew changed their orbit from its original 106 km x 245 km by firing tem on apogee. their orbital

maneuvering

Total Weight Payload Landing landing Rollout Rollout Mission Landed Mission Deployed Get-Away Experiments

in 4.870 kg 10:27:57 a.m., Runway PST, April AFB to Kennedy April 28, 1981. 14, 1981, Dry Lakebed

Bay & PostOperations Distance Time Duration Revolution Support Satellites Specials No.

23, Edwards

Orbiter was returned 2,741 m 60 seconds 2 days, 6 hours, 37 Spacecraft None None Data Flight

20 minutes,

and 53 seconds (STDN)

Tracking

and Data Network

Instrumentation

(DFI).

This subsystem

includ-

ed special-purpose sensors conditions and performance ered by critical operational signal sisted of transducers,

required to monitor spacecraft parameters not already covsystems. The subsystem equipment. conconditioning

pulse-code modulation {PCMI encoding equipment, frequency mt, ltiplex equipment, PCM recorders, analog recorders, timing equipment, and checkout equipment.

278

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table Passive surfaces 3-17 Optical exposed contimted Sample Assembly. samples This assembly with various phases. consistof

ed of an array of passive was mounted Ground-based constraints missions. Aerodynamic This package three angular conditioning

types

to all STS- I mission

The array

on the DF! pallet in the orbiter payload bay. assessments were to evaluate contamination to sensitive payloads to be flown on future

Coefficient Identification Package {ACIP). consisted of three linear accelerometers, accelerometers, structure three rate gyros, mounted and signal centerand PCM equipment on the wing

box carry-through

near the longitudinal

of-gravity. The instruments flight from entry initiation for postflight Mission Success aerocoefficient Successful determination derivatives,

sensed vehicle motions during to touchdown to provide data of aerodynamic coefficients, qualities. and vehicle-handling

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT

Table
Crew

279

3-18.

STS-2

Mission

Characteristics

Cmdr: Joe H. Engle Pilot: Richard H. Truly EST, Nov. 12, 1981, Kennedy loading Space Center reaction 9 was rescheduled during when a nitrogen 10:09:59 Launch tetroxide a.m.,

Launch

set for October spill occurred

of forward

control system. Launch on November 4 was delayed and then scrubbed when countdown computer called for a hold in count because of an apparent low reading on fuel cell oxygen tank pressures. During hold, high oil pressures were discovered in two of three auxiliary power units {APUs) that operated hydraulic system. forcing APU gear boxes launch reschedand addistatus. solid rocket 2 hours, were flushed ale. Launch and filters replaced, on November

12 was delayed

40 minutes to replace multiplexer/demultiplexer tional 9 minutes, 59 seconds to review systems Modifications booster Orbital Altitude in 8,900 kg & 222 x 230 kin/38 Bay & PostOperations Distance Time Duration degrees Inclination Total Weight Payload Landing landing Rollout Rollout Mission to launch platform to overcome overpressurc problem were effective.

8:40 a.m., PST, November 14, 1981, Dry' Lakebed Runway 23, Edwards AFB Orbiter was returned 2,350 m 53 seconds to Kennedy November 25, 1981.

2 days, 6 hours, 13 minutes, 12 seconds Mission was shortened by approximately of number one fuel cell failure. No. 36 Spacecraft None None Data Flight Instrumentation Aerodynamic t see STS- 1) Induced monitor gaseous Coefficient (see STS-I) Identification Tracking and Data Network

3 days because

Landed

Revolution

Mission Support Deployed Satellites Get-Away Specials Experiments

(STDN)

Package

Environment measured and particulate

Contamination contamination

Monitor

(IECM), levels of

This bay

and recorded

concentration

near the payload

during flight. During ascent and entry, the IECM obtained data on relative humidity and temperature, dewpoint temperature, trace qt, antities of various concentration. compounds, and airborne paniculate

280

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-18 continued Effects Experiment. Analysis and

Tile Gap Heating

ground tests have indicated that the gap between thermal protection system (TPS) tiles will generate turbulent airflow, resulting in increased heating during entry. Analysis and ground tests also showed that this may be reduced significantly by reconfiguring the tries with a larger edge radius. To test this effect under actual orbiter entry conditions, a panel with various tile gaps and edge radii was carried. Catalytic Surface Experiment. coated with a highly efficient ing was applied iment provided reaction catalytic to standard a better Various orbiter tiles were catalytic overlay. The coatinstrumented tiles. This experof the effects perhaps orbiters of per-

understanding

on convective

heat transfer,

mitting a weight reduction and other reentry vehicles. Dynamic, Acoustic

in the TPS of future

and Thermal

Experiment

(DATE).

The

DATE program was to develop improved techniques for predicting the dynamic, acoustic, and thermal environments and associated reusable payload response in cargo areas of large baseline data sensors and data vehicles. The first step was to obtain using existing

of the orbiter environment

systems. These data served as the basis for developing better prediction methods, which would be confirmed and refined on subsequent flights and used to develop payload design criteria and assess flight performance. and Terrestrial

Mission

Success

OSTA-I Payload (Office of Space Applications) (see Table 5-55) Successful

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT

Table Crew Launch 3-19. STS-3 Cmdr: I1:00 Mission Characteristics

281

Jack R. Lousma Fullerlon 22. 1982, Kennedy by I hour because gas ground support Space line. Center of the failure a.m., EST, March was delayed

Pilot: C. Gordon The launch Orbital Altitude in 10,22{) kg & 208 km/38 Bay & PostOperations degrees

of a heater on a nitrogen Inclination Total Weight Payload Landing landing

9:04:46 a.m., MST. March 30, White Sands, New Mexico Landing site was changed Sands landing because site. High winds of wet conditions

1982, Northrup

Strip,

from Edwards at White

AFB to White dry lakcbed in a l-day

on Edwards

Sands resulted

extension of mission. Some brake damage upon landing and dust storm caused extensive contamination of orbiter. Orbiter Rollout Distance Rollout Time Mission Duration Landed Mission Deployed Get-Away Revolution Support Satellites Specials No. was returned to Kennedy April 6. 1982. 4,186 m 83 seconds 8 days, 0 hours, 4 minutes. 130 Spacecraft None Get-Away Tracking Special 465 seconds (STDN) This test payload, a

and Data Network Verification Payload.

cylindrical canister 61 centimeters in diameter and 91 centimeters deep, measured the environment in the canister during the flight. Those data were recorded Special experimenters (see STS-I) Identification Package and analyzed on future for use by' Get-Away Shuttle missions. Experiments Data Flight Aerodynamic (see STS-1_ Induced Environment Contamination Monitor

Instrumentation Coefficient

(see STS-2) Tile Gap Heating Catalytic Surface Effects Experiment (see STS-2)

Experiment and Thermal

(see STS-2) Experiment

Dynamic, Acoustic (see STS-2) Monodisperse studied sized) major Latex

Reactor

(MLRI.

This experiment (identically may have which

the feasibility polystyrene medical

of rnaking

monodisperse

latex microspheres, research

and industrial

applications.

282

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-19 continued Test. This test evaluated the feasibility of

Electrophoresis separating

cells according

to their surface electrical

charge.

It was a forerunner to planned experiments with other equipment that would purify biological materials in the low gravity environment of space. Test. This preliminary test supported an

Heflex Bioengineering

experiment called Heflex, part of the Spacelab 1 mission. The Heflex experiment would depend on plants grown to a particul_u"height range. The relationship to maximize between initial soil moisture mission. content and final height of the plants needed to be determined the plant growth during the Spacelab

Infrared Imagery of Shuttle. This experiment obtained high-resolution infrared imagery of the orbiter lower and side surfaces tares imagery during reentry from which surface heating temperaThe mounted and hence aerodynamic may be inferred.

was obtained using a 91.5 cm telescope

in the NASA C- 141 Gerard P. Kuiper Airborne Observatory positioned at an altitude of 13,700 m along the entry ground track of the orbiter.

OSS- I Payload (see Table 4_-_-9) Shuttle Insects insects pressure, Mission Success space. Successlul Student Involvement Project

in Flight Motion Study. Investigated two species of under uniform conditions of light, temperature, and the variable being the absence of gravity in

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT

Table Crew Launch 3-20. STS-4 Mission Characteristics

283

Cmdr: Thomas K. Mattingly Pilot: Henry W. Hartsfield, Jr. June 27, 1982, Kennedy This was the first Shuttle Space Center launch with no delays in sched-

ule. Two solid rocket booster casings were lost when main parachutes failed and they hit the water and sank. Some rainwater penetrated the protective coating of several tiles while the orbiter was on the pad. On orbit, the affected preventwater. area turned toward the Sun and water evaporation ed filrther tile damage from freezing Orbital Altitude in 11,021 kg July 4, 1982, Runway 22. Edwards AFB This _'as the first landing on the 15.00t)-fi)ot-long runway Rollout Rollout Mission Landed Mission Deployed Get-Away Distance Time Duration Revolution Support Satellites Specials No. at Edwards AFB. Orbiter was returned July 15, 1982. 3,(11 I m 73 seconds 7 days, 113 I hour, 9 minutes, Tracking 31 seconds t STDN ) concrete to Kennedy & 258 km/28.5 Bay & PostOperations degrees Inclination Total Weight Payload Landing landing

Spacecraft None O-001 Customer: Moore,

and Data Network

R. Gilbert

Moore Corporation executive, donated

a Morton

Thiokol

this Get-Away Special to Utah Stale University. It consisted of lO experiments dealing with the effects of microgravity on various Experiments Aerodynamic (see STS- 1 ) Catalytic processes. Coefficient Identification Package

Surface

Experiment

(see STS-2)

Data Flight

Investigation

(see STS-I) Experiment

Dynamic, Acoustic (see STS-2J Induced Environment

and Thermal

Contamination

Monitor

(see STS-21 Infrared hnagery of Shuttle Reactor Survey (see STS-3) Isee STS-3) (see STS-2)

Monodisperse Night/Day

Latex Optical

of Lightning

Tile Gap Heating

Experiment

(see STS-2)

284

NASA

HISTORICAL

DATA

BOOK

Table Continuous

3-20

continued System. This experiment

Flow Electrophoresis

obtained flight data on system performance. During operation, a sample of biological material was continuously injected through into a flowing a separating medium, column which carried the sample where it was under the influby the field septypes at the point of were collected. (Classified)

ence of an electric

field. The force exerted

arated the sample into its constituent exit from the column where samples Department Shuttle of Defense DOD-82-1 Project

Student

Involvement

Effects of Diet, Exercise, and Zero Gravity on Lipoprotein Profiles, This project documented the diet and exercise postflight. whether during program for the astronauts occurred preflight and The goal of the research any changes spaceflight. of Space Travel on Trivalent Chromium whether in the any during was to determine profiles

in lipoprotein

Effects

Body. This project changes occurred spaceflight. Successful

was to determine in chromium

metabolism

Mission

Success

SPACE

TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN

SPACEFLIGHT

285

Table Mission/ Orbi!er STS-5 ('./umhia Dates Nov. 1982 11-16,

3-2

I.

STS-5-STS-2

7 Mission

Summa

rv

Crew Cmdr: Vance D. Brand Pit: Robert E Overmyer

Payload and Experiments Commercial Payloads Satellite Business ISBS-C)/PAM-I) Tetesat-E (Anik and Systems C-31/PAM Equipmenl Effects Effects Satellite D

MS: Joseph P Allen, Willmm B. l.enoir

Experiments

Tile Gap Heating Experiment Catalytic Surface Experiment

Dynamic. Acoustic and Thermal Environment Experiment t DATE I Oxygen Atom Interaction Materials Test Amlospherie l.uminosities With

hwestigation {GhBv Expefimentl Development Flight Instrnn]enlation ( DF1} Aerodynamic Identification Coefficient Package (ACIP) West Germany) Program

Gel-Away G-026

Special {DFVLR.

Shutlle Studenl lnvoh,ement Formation of Crystals in STS-6 Challenger Apr. 4-9, 1983 Cmdr: Paul J. Weitz Pit: Karol J. Bobko MS: E Story Musgrave, Peterson Donald H.

Weightlessness Growth of Porifera in Zero-Gravity Convection in Zero-Gravity

NASA Payload Tracking and Data Relay' Satellite {TDRS- I )/IUS Experiments Continuous System and Equipment Flow Electrophoresis

Monodisperse Lalex Reactor Nighttime/Daytime Optical SuBey of Lightning ACIP Specials (Asahi Shimbun. (Air Force Japan)

{;el-Away G-O05 STS-7 ('haNt,n,ger June 18-24, 1983 Cmdr: Robert Pit: Frederick MS: John L. Crippen H. Hauck G-049

Academy) Company.

G-381 (Park Seed South Carolina)

Commercial Tclesat-F Palapa-B

Payloads {Anik C-2WPAM-I} I/EAM-D of Space and

M. Fabian. Norman

Sally' K. Ride. E. Thagard

NASA Payload OSTA-2 {Office Terrestrial - Mission -

Applications ) Peculiar Equipment

Support Structure { MPESS} Materials Experiment Assembly _MEA) l.iquid Phase Materials Vapor Growth Semiconductor Miscibility Gap

of Alloy-Type Crystals

286

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-21 continued

Mission/ Orbiter Dates STS-7 continued Crew Payload and Experiments - Conlainerless Processing Glass Forming Melts Stability Particles Interface

of

of Metallic Dispersions at a Solid/Liquid

Detachable Shuttle

Payload Pallet Satellite

_SPAS)-(II

Experiments Continuous System

and Equipment Flow Electrophoresis

ICFES)

Monodisperse Latex Reactor Get-Away Specials G-002 (Kayser Threde, West Germany) G-O09 (Purdue University) New Jersey. of

G-012 IRCA/Camden. Schools) G-033 _California

lnstittlle

Technology. Ste,,cn Spielberg) G-088 (Edsyn. lnc. I G-305 (Air Force/Naval Research Laboratory (NRLI. Department of Defense Space Test Program G-345 (Goddard Space Flight Center/NRL)

STS-8 Challenger Aug. Sept. 305, 1983 Cmdr: Richard H. Truly Pit: Daniel C. Brandenstein MS: Dale A. Gardner, Ouion S. Bluford, Jr., William E, Thornton

International Payload Insat IB/PAMD Detachable Payload Experiments Payload Flight Test Article and Equipment

Radiation Monitoring Experiment Development Flight lnstrtnnentation Pallet Heat Pipe

- Oxygen Interaction on Materials Investigation of STS Atmospheric Luminosities Animal Enclosure Flow Auxiliary Electrophoresis Data System

Continuous System Modular {MADS) ACIP

Get-Away G-346 G-347 G-348

Specials (GSFC/Neupert_ (GSFC/Adolphsen) (GSFC/Mclntosh)

G-475 (Asahi/Shimbun, Japan) Shuttle Student Involvement Program SESI I iBiofeedbackMediated Behavioral Training in Physiological Sell" Regulator: Application Environment) Other Postal Covers in a Near Zero Gravity

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT

Table Mission/ Orbiter STS-O Columbia 3-21 contimted

287

Dates Nov. 28Dec, 8, 1983

Crew Cmdr: John W. _kmng Pit: Brewster H, Shaw MS: Owen K. Garriott, Rober! A,R, Parker

Pa_ioad and Experiments International Payload (NASA/ESAt Spacelab-I --ESA) Spacelab Misc. (hmg module Attach ttardware. and pallet TK. set.

PS: Byron K Lichtenherg, UIf MerNHd (ESA) STS 41-B Challenger Feb. 3-11 1984 Cmdr: Vance D. Brand Pit: Robert L. Gibson MS: Robert L, Stewart, Bruce McCandlcss. It, Ronald E. McNair

Commercial Payloads Westar VI/PAM-D Palapa-B2/PAM-D Attached Payload Shuttle Pallel Satellite Experiments hllegrated Acoustic System Isoelectrie

(SPAS)-OIA

and Equipment Rendezvous Target Containerless Focusing Experiment

Radiation Monitoring Experiment Monodisperse Latex Reactor Cinema 360 Manned Maneuvering [lllJt (MMt;) 5 Manipulation Fo(}t Restraint Cargo Bay Storage Assembl Specials (L'tah State

Get-Away G-004 Univ.)

Unix./Aberdeen State l!niv./ Inc.) Test Flight Pn_gram Weber-

G-()(18 (AIAA/Utah

Brighton High School) G-I)51 {GTE Laboratories. G-300 (Air Force Space Space Program ) (;-349 (Goddard Cenlerl

Shuttle Student Invoh'ement SE 81-40 (Arthritis, Dan Pfizer/GD) STS 41-C (Ttallenger April 6-13, 1984 Cmdr: Robert L. Crippen Pit: Francis R. Scobee MS: Terry' J. Hart, James DA, van Hoften. George D. Nelson NASA Payloads Exposure Flight L(mg Duration (I_I)EF) Solar Max System

Facility Support

Mission

Experiments and Equipment: Manned Maneuvering Unit Flight Support Manned IMAX System Foot Restraint 360

Cinema

Radiation Monitoring Experiment Shuttle Student Involvement Program STS 41-D Aug. 30Cmdr: Henry W. Hartsfield, Jr. Pit: Michael L. Coats MS: Richard M, Mullane, Slexen A. Hawley, Honeycomb conxtructior_ by bee colony Commercial Payload SBS-4/PAM-D Syncom IV-2/Unique ( Leasat-2 I Telstar 3-C/PAM-D Upper Stage

l)i_'coverv

Sept. 5, 1984

288

NASA HISTORICAL Table 3-21

DATA BOOK continued

Pa_load and Experiments NASA Payload OAST- I/MPESS Experiments CFES Ill IMAX Radiation Monitoring Experiment Clouds Logic to Optimize Use of Defense Systems (CLOUDSI Vehicle Glow Experiment and Equipment

Mission/ Orbiter

Dates

Crew Judith A, Rcsnik PS: Charles D. Walker

STS 41-D continued

Shuttle Student lnvoh'ement Program SE 82-14 (Purification and Growth _ff Single Crystal Gallium by the Float Zone Technique in a Zero STS41-G Challenger Oct. 5-13, 1984 Cmdr: Robert L Crippen Pit: Jon A. McBride MS: Sally K. Ride. Kathryn D. Sullivan, David C. Leestma PS: Marc D. Garneau. Paul D. Scully-Power Gravity Environment, Shawn j Murphy/Rockwell NASA Payloads Earth Radiation (ERBS) International Budget Satellite

Experiments and OSTA-3/Pallet Large Format MPESS 1MAX Radiation

Equipment: Camera (LFC)/CRS/

Monitoring

Experiment

Auroral Photography Experiment Thermoluminescent Dosimeter Canadian Experiment (CANEX) Radio Alabama

Get-Away Specials G-(XI7 (Student

Experiment,

Transmission Experiment, Space and Rocket Center)

G-013 (Halogen Lamp Experiment (HALEX), Kayser-Threde/ESA) G-032 {Physics of Solids and Liquids, International Space Corp., Asahi Nat. Broadcasting Corp., Japan) G-038 (Vapor Deposition, McShane/Marshall Center) Space Test, Flight MDAC_

STS 51-A Discovery Nov. 8-16, 1984 Cmdr: Hauck Frederick H

G-074

(Fuel

System

G-306 (Trapped NRL/Navy) G-469 (Cosmic

lons in Space, Ray Upset

Experiment, NASA/Goddard/iBM) G-518 (Physics and Materials

Processing, Utah State Univ.) Commercial Payloads Telesat-H/PAM-D (Anik D2) Syncom IV-l/Unique (Leasat-1 Satellite (Palapa Retrieval B-2, Westar-6) Upper Stage Pallets (2)

Pit: David

M. Walker

MS: Joseph P. Allen, Anna L, Fisher, Dale A. Gardner

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT

Table 3-21
Mission/ Orbiter Dates STS 51 -A continued Crew Payload and Experiments Experiments and Equipment MMU/Fixed Service Structure (FSS) STS 5 I-C l)iscuverv Jan. 24-27, 1985 Cmdr: Thon'las K. Diffuse (2) Mixing of Organic

289

continued

Solids

Radiation Monilormg Manual Fool Restraint

Experinlent

Mattingly. 11 Pit: Loren J. Shriver MS: Ellison S. Onizuka, James E Buchli

NASA Payloads I)OD 85-1/1US Experiments and Equipment Aggregation of Red Blood Cells, Middeck Experiment--University of Sydney Commercial Payloads Telesat-l/E,XM-l) IAnik Syncom IV-3/Unique (UUS) (Leasat-3) and C-I) Stage

STS 51 -D l)ivcoverx

April

12-19,

PS: Gary E. Payton 1985 Cmdr: Karol J. Bobko PIl: Donald g. Willmrns MS: M. Rhea Seddon,

Upper

S. David Griggs. Jeffrey A. Hoffnlan PS: Charles l). Walker, Sen. E.J. Garn

Experiments

Equipment

OMce of Space Science and Applications Middeck Experiments: - American Flight Echocardiograph Phase Partitioning Experiment

- Protein Crystal CFES Ill hnage Inlensifier hlfornlal Science Space)

Growth

IPCG)

Investigation Study (To.,,s in

Medical Experiments Get Away Specials G-(135 (Physics of Solids and Loop Flight Liquids, Asahi, Japan1 G-471 (Capillary Pumped Experiment, Center) Goddard

Space

Shuttle Student lnvolvemen! Program SE 82-03 (Statoliths in Corn Root Caps-Amberg/Martin Marietta) SE 83-{13 {Effect of Weightlessness on Aging USC/Los Hospilal) Other Statue of Liberty Replicas 12) International Payload (NAS?dESA) Spacelab 3 (long module and MPESS) Get-Away NUSAT GLOMR Specials IDeployable) of Brain Cells-A. Fras/ Angeles Orthopedic

STS 51 -B Challenger

April 29May 6, 1985

Cmdr: R.F. Overmyer Pit: FD. Gregory MS: Don L, Lind. Norman William E Thagard, Thornton van den Berg, BrandensWin

PS: Lodewijk STS 51 -G Discovery June 17-24. 1985 Ta,Aor Wang Cmdr: Daniel

(not deployed) Payloads

Commercial

Pit: John O. Creighton ,",,,IS:John M. Fabian. Steven R. Nagel, Shannon W. Lucid

Morelos-A/PAM-D Arabsat-A/PAM-D Telstar 3-D/PAM-I)

290

NASA

HISTORICAL

DATA

BOOK

Table 3-21
Mission/ Orbiter Dates

continued
Pa_4oad and Experiments Deployable Spartan- I/MPESS Experiments and Equipment * French Echocardiograph Experiment French Postural Experiment Automated Directional Solidification Furnace High-Precision Experiment Get-Away Tracking

STS 5 [-G continued

Crew PS: Patrick Baudry (CNES), Prince Sultan Salman AI-Saud

Specials of West

G-025 (Dynamic Behavior Liquid Properties, ERNO, Germany) G-027 (Slipcasting Microgravity, Germany) Under

DFVLR,

West

G-028 MnBi, G-034

(Functional Study of DFVLR, West Germany) {Biological/Physical

Science Experiment, E1 Paso/ Dickshire Coors, Ysleta, Texas) G-3t4 ISpace Ultraviolet Radiation Environment (SUREL Air Force/NRLI G-471 (Capillary Pumped Experiment, Goddard I Payload 2 and Equipment Radio Experiment Loop

STS 5 I-F Challenger July 29Aug. 6, 1985 Cmdr: C. Gordon Fullerton Pit: Roy Bridges. Jr. MS: IE Story Musgrave, Anthony W. England, Karl G. Henize PS: Loren W. Aclon, John-David Bartoe

International * Spacelab Experiments * * Shuttle

(NASA/ESA)

Amateur

Protein Crystal Growlh in a Microgravity Environment Plasma Diagnostics of Spacelab 2) Package (part

Deployable

STS 51-1 Discovery

Aug. 27Sept. 3, 1985

Cmdr: Joe H. Engle Ptt: Richard O. Covey MS: James D.A. van Hoflen, John M. Lounge, William E Fisher

Commercial Payload Aussat-I/PAM-D ASC-1/PAM-D Syncom IV-4/Unique (Leasat-4) and Solids Equipment Physical Organic Upper Stage

Experiments

Equipment

Vapor Transport of

STS 51-J Athmtis

Oct. 3-7,

1985

Cmdr: Karl Bobko Pit: Ronald J. Grabe MS: Robert L. Stewart. David C. Hihners PS: William A. Pailes

S vncom IV-3 Repair DOD Mission

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT

Table
Mission/ Orbiter STS 61-A Chalh,t_ger Dates Oct, 30Nov. 6. 1985 Crew Cmdr: Henry Harlsfield, Jr. Pit: Steven Nagel MS: Bonnie Dunbar. James Buchli. Guion Btutbrd PS: Ernst Messerschmid. Reinhard STS 61-B AthmtiY Nov. 26Furrer. (ESA) H. Shaw, Jr. Wubbo Ockels Cmdr: Brewster Payload and Experiments International Payload (Germany) Gemlan Spacelab Module + Unique Structure) D-1 (Long Support

291

3-21

continued

Get-Away G-308 Experiments MEA

Special (Deployed) (GLOMR--DODI and Equipment

Dec. 3, 1985

Pit: Bryan D. O'Connt_r MS: Mary L. Cleave, Sherwood C Spring, Jerry L Ross PS: Rodoli'o Neri Charles Walker Vela,

Commercial Payloads Morelos B/PAM-I) Aussat-2/PAM-l) Satcom KU-2/PAM-DII

Experiments and Equipment EASE/ACCESS/MPESS IMAX Payload CFES II1 Diffusive Solutions Protein Mixing Crystal Bay Camera of Organic (PCG)

Growth

Morelos Pa.,,Ioad Experiments Special

Specialist

Get-Away

G-479 (Primary Surface Mirrors and Metallic Crystals, Telesat, Canada) Payloads KU-I/PAM-D2 and Equipment Science Lab (MSL-2) G- I

STS 6I-C C(dumhia

Jan.

12-18,

1986

Cmdr:Robertl..Gibson Pit: C.F. Boldcn, Jr,

Commercial Saloon1 Experiments Materials Hitchhiker

MS: ER. Chang-Diaz, George D. Nelson, Steven A. Hawley PS: Robert J. Cenker. Congressman Bill Nelson

Infrared hnaging Expcrimem Initial Blood Storage Experiment Ctnllet Halley Active Monituring (includes Program GAS Bridge Assembly 12 GAS cans) Specials Space and Rocket Univ./ Div,) G-O07 (Alabama Center)

Get-Away

G-062 (Pennsylvania State General Electric Co. Space G-310(Air Space G-332 High Force Test Program) iBooker T. Washington School, Houston.

Academy/l)OD

Texas)

G-446 lHigh Performance Liquid Chromatography/AIItcch Associates Inc.) G-449 (Joint Utilization c,f Laser [ntegrated Hospital. Experiments/St. Milwaukee) Mar,,'s

292

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-21 continued
Payload and Experiments Experiment, NASA OSSA) G-470 (Dept. Goddard) G-481 (Vertical of Agriculture/ Horizons)

Mission/ Orbiter STS 61-C Dates continued Crew

G-494 (Photometric Thermospheric Oxygen Nightglow Study/National Research Council of Canada) Unnumbered (Environmental

Monitoring Package, Goddard) Shuttle Student Involvement Program STS 5 I-L Jan. 28-28, 1986 Cmdr: Francis R. Scobee Ph: Michael J. Smith MS: Judith A. Resnik, Ellison S. Onizuka, Ronald E. McNair Argon Injection as an Ahernative to Honeycombing Formation of Paper in Microgravity Measurement Starch Challenger Grains of Auxin in Plant Levels Roots and

NASA Payload (Planned) TDRS-B/IUS-NASA/Spacecom Experiments (Planned) and Equipment

Spartan-Halley/MPESS Cornet Halley Program Active Monitoring

PS: Gregory Jarvis, S. Christa McAuliffe

Fluid Dynamics Experiment Radiation Monitoring Experiment Phase Partitioning Experiment

Teacher in Space Project Shuttle Student Involvement Program Utilizing Membrane Grov,,th ', STS-26 DiscovetT Sept. 29Cmdr: Frederick H. Hauck (Planned) a Semi-Permeable Io Direct Crystal

Effects of Weightlessness on Grain Formation and Strength in Metals Chicken Embryo Development in Space

Oct. 3, 1988

Pit: Richard O. Covey MS: John M. Lounge, David C. Hitmers, George D. Nelson

NASA Payload TDRS-3/1US Experiments Orbiter Supporting (OASIS) Automated Solidification Aggregation and Equipment Experiments Autonomous System Instrumentation Directional Furnace of Red Blood Cells

Earth Limb Radiance Experiment lsoelectric Focusing Experiment Infrared Experiment Mesoscale Protein Communication Lightning Growth Flight Experiment (PCG)

Crystal

Phased Partitioning Experiment Physical Vapor Transport of Organic Solids

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT

Table
Mission/ Orbiter STS-26 Dates continued Crew

293

3-21

continued
Pa_'load and Experiments Shuttle Student Involvement Program 82-4 (Utilizing a Semi-Permeable Membrane to Direc! Crystal Growth. MDAC/Lloyd Brucel 82-5 {Effects c,f Weightlessness Grain Formation and Strengthening College/R. Metals, Caboli) Union on

STS-27 ,4 thmlis

Dec. 2-6,

1988

Cmdr:

Robert

L. Gibson

DOD

Payload

Ph: Guy S. Gardner MS: Jerry L. Ross, Richard M. Mullane, William M. Shepherd

294

NASA

HISTORICAL

DATA

BOOK

Table Vehicle Crew

3-22.

STS-5

Mission

Characteristics

Columbia (OV- 102) Cmdr: Vance D. Brand Pilot: Robert MS: Joseph F. Overmyer P. Allen, William B. Lenoir a.m., EST, Kennedy with no delays. Space Center 11, 1982, 7:19:00

Launch Orbital Launch Altitude Weight a &

November

The launch proceeded as scheduled 298.172 km/28.5 degrees 112,090.4 November kg 16, 1982, 6:33:26

Inclination Landing & Postlanding Operations Rollout Distance Rollout Time Mission Landed Mission Deployed Get-Away Duration Revolution Support Satellites Specials am PST, Runway November 22, Edwards 22, 1982. AFB

Orbiter was returned 2,911.8 m 63 seconds 5 days, 2 hours, No. 82

to Kennedy

14 minutes,

26 seconds (STDN)

Spaceflight Tracking SBS-C/PAM-D Telesat-E G-026 3/PAM-D

and Data Network (Anik C-3) the German

Customer: DFVLR, Establishment This GAS aged by DFVLR.

Aerospace

Research manscience

was the first in a series

of 25 GAS payloads material

It was part of the German

program, Project MAUS. that several combinations together

Investigators used their knowledge of two metals can be dissolved a certain temperature (conThey used the dissorecord-

in their liquid state above

solute temperature), but not below this temperature. a combination of gallium and mercury to investigate lution process above the consolute temperature. ings provided real-time experiment sequence. Experiments Tile Gap Heating heat generated tion system Catalytic chemical the Shuttle Effects data of the different Experiment.

X-ray

states of the the protec-

This investigated

by gaps between

the tiles of the thermal

on the Shuttle. Effects caused Experiment. system, This investigated of atomic would which the oxygen on with at the

Surface reaction thermal

by impingement

protection

was designed recombine

the assumption that the atomic oxygen thermal protection system wall. Dynamic, Acoustic and Thermal

Environment

(DATE)

Experiment. This collected data for use in making credible predictions of cargo bay environments. These environments were neither constant nor consistent throughout the bay and were influenced by interactions between cargo elements.

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT

Table Atmospheric STS-induced scientific Oxygen ducted oxygen obtained 3-22 continued Investigation luminosities aspects [Glow Experiment). content operations. of the

295

I,uminosities atmospheric

This experiment

was to determine

the spectral of payload

that had relevance

for

and engineering Atom to obtain atoms Interaction quantitative through with various

With Materials reaction materials 4 indicated

Test. This was conorbit Data

rates of low-Earth used on payloads. that some

on STS-2

payloads

might be severely limited in life becat,se of oxygen effect. The STS-5 test provided data for assessment of oxygen effects and possible fixes. Flight Instrumentation. This was a data collection

Development

and recording package, located in the aft areas of the payload buy, consisting of three magnetic tape recorders, wideband frequency division multiplexers, a pulse code modulation master unit, and signal conditioners. Aerodynamic Coefficiem Identification Package (ACIP). package, which has flown on STS-1 through 4. continued collect phases aerodynamic of the Shuttle; data( during establish the launch, an extensive aerodynamic This to data-

entry, and landing

base for verification and the verification including provide assessments

of the Shuttle's and correlation

aerodynamic performance with ground-based data, of such data: and of other technology dynamics,

of the uncertainties data in support and structural Program:

flight dynamics

areas, such us aerothernlal Shuttle Student Involvement

1, Growth

of Porifera

in Zero-Gravity

studied

the effect

of zero

gravity on sponge, Porifera, in relation structure, shape, and spicule formation of the sponge. 2. Convection in Zero-Gravity studied

to its regeneration of following separation tension convec-

surface

tion in zero gravity and the effects of boundary tions and geometries on the onset and character convection, 3. Formation of Crystals in Weightlessness

layer condiof the crystal

compared

growth in zero gravity to that in one-g to determine whether weightlessness eliminates the causes of malformation of Mission
a

Success
inch,des all

crystals. Successful
carg[) bul does not include consumables.

Weighl

296

NASA

HISTORICAL

DATA

BOOK

Table Vehicle Crew

3-23.

STS-6

Mission

Characteristics

Challenger _OV-[)99) Cmdr: Paul J. Weitz Pilot: Karol MS: Donald J. Bobko H. Peterson, E Story Musgrave of

Launch

April 4, 1983, 1:30:00 p,m., EST, Kennedy Space Center The launch set for January 20, 1983, was postponed because a hydrogen ment, leak into the number one main engine the 20-second aft compartFlight which was discovered during

Readiness Firing (FRF) on December 18, Cracks in the number one main engine were confirmed to be the cause of the leak during the second FRF performed were repaired. January 25, 1983. All three was on the pad, two and three main engines were removed while the Shuttle

and fuel line cracks

Main engines

were reinstalled following extensive failure analysis and testing. Tbe number one main engine was replaced. An additional delay was caused by contamination to the Tracking a severe storm. and Data on Relay Satellite (TDRS- 11 during April 4 proceeded as scheduled. Orbital Altitude & 284.5 km/28.45 116,459 kg AFB degrees Inclination Launch Weight Landing & Postlanding Rollout Roliout Mission Landed Operations Distance Time Duration Revolution The launch

April 9, 1983, 10:53:42 a.m., PST, Runway 22, Edwards Orbiter was returned to Kennedy April 16, 1983. 2,208 m 49 seconds 5 days, 0 hours, 23 minutes, No.81 42 seconds (STDN)

Mission Support Deployed Satellites Get-Away Specials

Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network Tracking and Data Relay Satellite-l/1US G-005 Customer: The Asahi Shimbun was proposed

This experiment

by two Japanese high school of

students to make artificial snowflakes in the weightlessness space. The experiment was to contribute to crystallography, especially the crystal growth of semiconductors rials from a vapor source.

or other mate-

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT

Table G-049 Customer: Air Force Academy of beams Academy cadets conducted six experiments: I. Metal Beam Joiner demonstrated that soldering can be accomplished 2. Metal Alloy determined more uniformly in space. whether tin and lead will combine environment. 3-23 continued

297

in a zero-gravity

3. Foam Melal generated foam metal in zero-gravity forming a metallic sponge. 4, Metal Purification tested the effectiveness of the zone-refining methods 5. Electroplating plated radiation G-381 Customer: George W. Park Seed Company, Inc. This payload consisted etable seeds. It studied vacuum, gravity forces, of 46 varieties of flower, herb, and vegthe impact of temperature fluctuations, and radiation on germination rate, seed 6. Microbiology of purification determined tested in a zero-gravity how evenly environment. the effects of weightlessness and space development. environment. rod can be a copper

in a zero-gravity

on microorganisnl

vigor, induced dormancy, and varietal purity. An ol_jcctive was to determine how needs should be packaged to withstand spaceflight. Experiments Continuous biological Flow Electrophoresis material was continuously System (CFES). A sample of injected into a flov, ing

medium, which carried the sample through a separating colmnn where it was under the influences of an electric field. The force exerted by the field separated the sample into its constituent where samples were types at the point of exit from the column collected. Monodisperse ment continued Latex Reactor, This materials of uniforndy

processing

experithe The appli-

the development

sized (monodis-

perse) latex beads in a low-gravity environment, where effects of buoyancy and sedimentation were minimized, particles cations. may have major medical and industrial research

Night/Day Optical and thunderstorms evolution

Survey of Lightning. This studied lightning from orbit for a better understanding of the in severe storms. Package {ACIP) Isee

of lightning

Mission

Success

Aerodynamic STS-5) Successful

Coefficient

Identification

298
Table Vehicle Crew

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

3-24. STS7 Mission Characteristics

Challenger

_OV-099)

Cmdr: Robert L. Crippen Pilot: Frederick H. Hauck MS: John M. Fabian, Sally K. Ride, Norman E. Thagard Space Center June 18, 1983, 7:33:00 a.m., EDT, Kennedy The launch proceeded as scheduled. Altitude Weight & 296.3 km/28.45 degrees

Launch Orbital Launch

Inclination Landing & Postlanding Operations I 13,027.1 kg June 24, 1983, 6:56:59 a.m., PDT, Runway 15, Edwards AFB

The planned landing at Kennedy was scrubbed because of poor weather conditions, and the mission was extended two revolutions to facilitate landing Kennedy June 29, 1983. 3,185 m 75 seconds 6 days, No. 98 at Edwards. Orbiter was returned to

Rollout Rollout Mission Landed Mission Deployed Get-Away

Distance Time Duration Revolution Support Satellites Specials

2 hours, 23 minutes,

59 seconds (STDN) I/PAM-D

Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network TeIesat-F/PAM-D (Anik C-2), Palapa-B G-O02 Customer: German Kayser-Threde high school GMBH provided students

the experiments

lbr this

GAS. Their five experiments studied crystal alysts, plant contamination by heavy metals, controlled cosmic G-305 Customer: The Space Department Ultraviolet of Defense Radiation Space sequencers, and a biostack studying radiation on plant seeds.

growth, nickel catmicroprocessor the influence of

Test Program (SURE) Laboratory instruINRL)

Environment Research

ment, developed

by the U,S. Naval

Space Science Division, marked the debut of the GAS motorized door assembly (MDA). The MDA allowed the payload's spectrometer to measure the natural radiation in the upper atmosphere at extreme ultraviolet wavelengths. SURE was the first in a series mately would G-033 Customer: Steven Speilberg Speilberg donated this GAS to the Movie director Steven of experiments provide global planned pictures by the NRL that ultiof "'ionospheric weather."

California Institute of Technology after receiving the payload as a gift. Caltech students designed and built one experiment, which examined second, oil and water separation radish seeds, testing in microgravity, the theory structures and a (amywhich grew that roots

grow downward because gravity forces dense loplasts) to settle to the bottom of root cells.

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT

Table G-O09 Customer: Purdue University students Detection particles conducted three experiments: on a spinning in microgravity Experiment encountered measured Purdue University 2. Nuclear
space

299

3-24

continued

1. Seeds were germinated Particle the paths of nuclear

environnlent.

disk.

traced and recorded m the near-Earth the hulk oscillations liquid.

3. Fluid Dynamics

Experiment immersed

of a drop of mercury G-088 Customer: Edsyn dering

vacuum.

in a clear

Edsyn, equipment.

Inc. on soldering Powered and dehow soland a Passive function experiments in space. determined

ran more than 60 experiments gear would

soldering investigated

experiments

the physics

of soldering

in microgravity

G-345 Customer: Goddard Space Flight Center exposed film samThe Ultraviolet Photographic ples to lhe space environment. G-012 Customer: High school whether Detachable Payload Test Package

RCA students from Camden, and Temple would affect (SPAS)-01. research New Jersey,, with the backUniversity. investigated the social strt, cture of an mounted on

ing of RCA Corporation weightlessness Satellite ant colony. Shuttle Pallet SPAS-01

Ten experiments metal alloys

performed

in forming

in micro-

gravity and using a remote-sensing scanner. The orbiter's small control rockets fired while SPAS-01 was held by the RMS to test movement on the extended arm. Experiments OSTA-2 Continuous Monodisperse Successful Payload tsee Chapter 5, "Space System (see STS-6) Applications") (CFES)(see STS-6)

Flow Electrophoresis Latex Reaction

Mission

Success

300
Table Vehicle Crew

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

3-25. Challenger STS-8 Mission Characteristics

(OV-99)

Cmdr: Richard H. Truly Pilot: Daniel C. Brandenstein MS: Dale A. Gardner, Thornton Guion S. Bluford, Jr., William Space E. Center

Launch Orbital Launch Landing landing Rollout Roliout Mission Landed Mission Deployed Get-Away Altitude Weight & PostOperations Distance Time Duration Revolution Support Satellites Specials &

August

30, 1983, 2:32:00

a,m., EDT, Kennedy because

Launch was delayed 17 minutes 296.3 km/28.45 degrees 110,107.8 September Orbiter 2,856.3 6 days, No. 98 kg

of weather.

Inclination 5, [983, 12:4(1:43 a.m. PDT, Runway 22, Edwards to Kennedy September 9, 1983, AFB

was returned m

50 seconds 1 hour, 8 minutes, 43 seconds (STDN)

Spacellight Tracking Insat 1B/PAM-D G-346 Customer: The Cosmic An upset, Goddard

and Data Network

Space Flight upsets

Center attempted caused to resolve many by single particles. a sensi-

Ray Upset Experiment concerning in logic state,

of the questions

or change

of a memory, cell can result passing through

from a single, highly' energetic tive volume in a memory cell. G-347 Customer: evaluated Goddard Space

particle

Flight

Center Emulsion Experiment on gaseous emulsions. environment

The Ultraviolet-Sensitive ultraviolet-sensitive G-475 Customer:

Photographic

the effect of the orbiter's photographic

The Asahi Shimbun

The Japanese Snow Crystal Experiment attempted to create the first snowflakes in space, which had been attempted unsuccessfully on STS-6. G-348 Customer: Goddard Space Monitor Flight blanket Center measured the changes on the Shuttle in that coverings The Contamination outer coatings were caused Experiments Package erosion.

and thermal

by atomic oxygen

Development Flight Instrumentation Pallet (DFI Pallet): High Capacity Heat Pipe Demonstration (DSO 0101) provided an in-orbit demonstration of the thermal perfi_rmance of a high-capacity heat pipe designed heat rejection systems. Evaluation materials of Oxygen Interaction 0301 ) obtained quantitative for future spacecraft (DSO with

with Materials

rates of oxygen and advanced

interaction payloads.

used on the orbiter

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT

Table Biofeedback 3-25 continued Six rats were flown in the Animal

301

Experiments.

Enclosure Module to observe animal reactions in space and to dentonstrate that the module was capable of supporting six healthy' rats m orbit without compromising the health and comfort of either the astronaut crew or the rats. Continuous Aerodynamic STS-5} Radiation ground devices Flow Electrophoresis Coefficient System (CFES_ Package (see STS-61 {ACIP) (see

Identification

Monitoring radiation

Experiment. at various

This consisted

of hand-held

and pocket-sized

monitors, present

which measured and powered

the level of backby 9-voh batteries. A_ of

times in orbit. The two measurements

were self-contained

appointed times, the crew took and recorded any radiation that penetrated the cabin. Investigation of STS Atmospheric Luminosities

Isee STS-5)

Shuttle Student Involvement Program: Biofeedback Mediated Behavioral Training Self Regulator: in a one-g Mission Success zero-g. Successful Application This aimed to determine environment whether biofeedback

in Physiological Environment. learned at training implemented

in Near Zero Gravity

can be successfully

302
Table Vehicle Crew

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

3-26. Columbia STS-9 Mission Characteristics

(OV- 1(12)

Cmdr: John W. Young Pilot: Brewster H, Shaw MS: Owen PS: Byron K. Garriott, K. Lichtenberg, Robert A.R. Parker Ulf Merbold (ESA)

Launch

November 28, 1983, 11:00:00 a.m., EST, Kennedy Space Center Launch set for September 30, 1983, was delayed 28 days because of a suspect exhaust nozzle on the right solid rocket booster, The problem was discovered while the Shuttle was on the launch pad. The Shuttle was returned to the Vehicle Assembly replaced, November Building and demated. The suspect During nozzle was on and launch and the vehicle 28 proceeded was restacked. as scheduled. The countdown

ascent, verification flight instrumentation (VFI) operated the Spacelab and the Spacelab interfaces with the orbiter. This instrumentation monitored Spacelab interfaces. subsystem performance during and Spacelab-to-orbiter Data were recorded

launch and ascent on the VFI tape recorder and played back to receiving stations on Earth during acquisition of signal periods Orbital Launch Landing landing Altitude Weight & PostOperations & using the Tracking and Data Relay 287.1 km/57.0 degrees 112,320 December kg 8, t983, 3:47:24 p,m., PST, Runway 17, Edwards AFB Satellite System (TDRSS).

Inclination

Landing was delayed approximately 8 hours to analyze problems when general purpose computers one and two failed and inertial measurement auxiliary unit one failed. During units caught landing, two of the three and landing, power fire. During descent

the VFI continued to monitor and record selected Spacelab parameters within the payload bay. One hour after touchdown, power to the induced environment contamination monitor was Rollout Rollout Mission Landed Mission Deployed Distance Time Duration Revolution Support Satellites removed. Orbiter was returned 2,577.4 m 53 seconds 10 days, No. 167 7 hours, 47 minutes, to Kennedy December 15, 1983.

24 seconds (STDN)/Tracking and

Spaceflight Data Relay

Tracking and Data Network Satellite System (TDRSS)

INSAT- 1B/PAM-D None See Table 4-45, Successful Spacelab 1 Experiments

Get-Away Specials Experiments Mission Success

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT

Table Vehicle Crew 3-2 7. STS 4 I-B Mission Characteristics

3O3

Challenger {OV-099) Cmdr: Vance D. Brand Pilot: Robert MS: Bruce Stewart L. Gibson McCandless II, Ronald E. McNair, Robert L.

Launch

February 3, 1984, 8:00:00 The launch, set lk_r January changeout ary measure

a.m., EST, Kennedy Space Center 29, was postponed for 5 days while Processing Facility to allow a precautionpower units (APUs),

the orbiter was still in the Orbiter of all three auxiliary in response degrees

to APU failures on the STS-9 mission.

Orbital Launch Landing landing Rollout Rollout Mission Landed Mission

Altitude Weight & PostOperations Distance Time Duration Revolution Support Satellites Specials

&

350 km/28.5 I I 3,605 kg February If,

Inclination 1984, 7:15:55 a.m., EST, Runway landing 15, Kennedy

This was the first end-of-mission 3,294 m 67 seconds 7 day's, 23 hours, No. 128 Spaceflight Westar-Vl/PAM-D. G-004 Customer: Utah State's experiments motion, 15 minutes,

at Kennedy.

55 seconds ISTDN)

Tracking

and Data Network Palapa-B2/PAM-D

Deployed Get-Away

Utah State University of Aberdeen in Scotland used one of flew spacepaks on this payload. Aberdeen students on spore growth, three-dimensional Brownian stability. Two other spacepaks on capillary action in the absence

Students at the University

and dimensional

conof gravity.

tained experiments G-008 Customer:

Utah State University

This payload was purchased by the Utah Section of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics and donated to Utah State University: 1. In the experiment conducted by students from Brighton High School, Salt Lake City, radish seeds sprouted in a zerog environment. flown earlier 2. Students About one-half of the germinated attempted environment of proteins sceds had in an STS-6 experiment. to crystallize under was neces-

from Utah State University

proteins in a controlled-temperature zero-g conditions. The crystallization sary for studies

in x-ray crystallography.

3. Two Utah State students devised this payload. The first experiment reran a soldering experiment flown on GAS G-001. The second tested an experimental fl_r electophoresis concept for creating a flow system experiments.

3O4

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table G-349 Customer: Goddard Space Flight Center (flown on STS-8) measured Contamination Monitor Package 3-27 continued

the flow of atomic oxygen by determining the mass loss of carbon and osmium, known to readily oxidize. The mass loss indicated the atomic oxygen flux as a function and direction. of time, which was This experiment blanket covercorrelated to altitude, attitude,

exposed the Shuttle's outer coatings ings to normal orbit conditions. G-05 I Customer: Arc" Lamp gravity-tree efficient G-309 Customer: Cosmic initially GTE Laboratories, Inc.

and thermal

Research studied the configuration of an arc lamp in surroundings. Scientists hoped the experiment of a more energycommercial lamp.

would pave the way for the development

U.S. Air Force Ray Upset Experiment (CRUX) was a repeat of G-346 investicell a flown by Goddard or changes on STS-8. This experiment passing

gated upsets

in the logic state of a memory

caused by highly sensitive volume Experiments Acoustic

active energetic particles in the memory celt. Experiment (ACES).

through

Containerless

This materials

processing furnace experiment was enclosed in two airtight canisters in the orbiter middeck. Activated at 23 hours mission elapsed time, ACES ran a preprogrammed tions and shut itself off after 2 hours. Monodisperse Radiation Isoelectric Latex Reaction (see STS-6) (see STS-8) This self-contained experisequence of opera-

Monitoring Focusing

Experiment Experiment.

ment package in the middeck lockers was activated by the crew at the same time as ACES. It evaluated the effect of electroosmosis on an array of eight columns DC power was applied and pH levels odes increased. of electrolyte solutions as between anodes and cath-

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT

Table Cinema on board 3-27 continued Two Cinema 360 cameras picture were carried

305

360 Camera. to provide

a test for motion

photography

in a

unique format designed especially for planetarium viewing. One camera was located in the crew cabin area and the other in a GAS canister in the payload bay. The primary Film footage objective was to test the equipment and concept. taken by the

two systems was also of considerable value. Arriflex 35ram Type 3 motion picture cameras with an 8mm/12.8 "'fisheye" lens were used. The Cinema ry handle 360 camera, weighed including an accessoand lens guard/suppork about 5 kilograms. 7.7 kilograms. on the ]'light canister in the including

A system power supply weighed an additional Fihning inside the orbiter focused on activities deck. The camera payload system located in the GAS bay provided film on exterior activities,

EVA/MMU operations, satellite deployment, and RMS operations. Lens focus, diaphragm setting, and tYame speed were preset, lations azine. thus requiring Filming no light level readings or exposure missions the Space calcuwas by the crew. Each camera of a motion carried picture a 122-meter about film mag-

done on this flight and subsequent

used in the production Shuttle program.

Shuttle Student Involvement Program: This experiment tested the hypothesis Mission Success affected by ,gravity. Successful

that

arthritis

may

be

306
Table Vehicle Crew

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

3-28. STS 41-C Mission Characteristics

Challenger

(OV-099)

Cmdr: Robert L. Crippen Pilot: Francis R. Scobee MS: George D. Nelson, James D. A. van Hoften, Terry J. Hart April Altitude Weight & PostOperations & 6, 1984 8:58:00 a.m., EST, Kennedy Space Center

Launch Orbital Launch Landing landing

The launch proceeded as scheduled 579.7 km/28.5 degrees 115.329.6 kg April 13, 1984, 5:38:07 The mission unable The planned to grapple

with no delays.

Inclination a.m., PST, Runway Maximum 17, Edwards spacecraft. and the mission AFB

was extended the Solar landing

1 day when astronauts Mission was scrubbed

were initially

at Kennedy

Rollout Rollont Mission Landed

Distance Time Duration Revolution

extended one revolution to facilitate landing at Edwards. Orbiter was returned to Kennedy April 18, 1984. 2,656.6 m 49 seconds 6 days, 23 hours, 40 minutes, No. 108 7 seconds

Mission Support Deployed Satellites Get-Away Experiments Specials

Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network (STDN) Long Duration Exposure Facility- 1 (LDEF- 1) None The experiments four major groups: carried aboard the reusable power LDEF fell into material structures, and propulsion,

electronics and optics, and science. The 57 separate experiments involved more that 200 investigators from the United States mcnt and eight other countries laboratories, private in Chapter Monitoring 4, "Space Experiment and wcre Science." (see STS-8) furnished by governThey are companies, and universities.

described Radiation Cinema IMAX.

360 (see STS 41-B) The IMAX camera made the first of three scheduled from the flight was Is Alive. The IMAX

trips into space on this mission. Footage assembled into a film called The Dream

camera was part of a joint project among NASA, the National Air and Space Museum, IMAX Systems Corporation of Toronto, Shuttle Canada, Student and the Lockheed Involvement studied compared Corporation.

Program: structure built by bees to the structure built by' bees on

This experiment in zero gravity, Earth. Mission Success Successful

the honeycomb

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT

Table Vehicle Crew 3-29. STS 41-D Mission Characteristics

307

Discovery (OV- 103) Cmdr: Henry W. Hartsfield, Pilot: Michael L. Coats MS: Judith A. Resnik, PS: Charles D. Walker

Jr. M. Mullane, Steven A. Hawley

Richard

Launch

August 30, 1984, 8:41:50 a.m., EDT, Kenned',, Space Center The launch attempt on June 25 was scrubbed during a T-9 minute hold because of failure of the orbiter's back-up general purpose computer ed at T-4 seconds orbiter's number the Orbiter (GPC). The launch attempt on June 26 abortwhen the GPC detected an anomaly in the three main engine. Facility Discovery was returned three main to and the number

Processing

engine replaced. (To preserve the launch schedule of future missions, the 41-D cargo was remanifested to include payload elements mission Shuttle attempt from both the 41-D and 41-F flights, was canceled.t was restacked on August After replacement and returned and the 41-F the was of the engine,

to the pad. The third launch when a discrepancy

29 was delayed

noted in flight software of Discover3."s master events controller relating to solid rocket booster fire commands. A software patch was verified and implemented to assure all three booster fire commands were issued in the proper time inter_al, The launch on August 30 was delayed 6 minutes, 50 seconds when a private Orbital Launch Landing landing Rollout Rollout Mission Landed Mission Deployed Altitude Weight & PostOperations Distance Time Duration Revolution Support Satellites & aircraft intruded into the warning area off the coast of Cape Canaveral. 340.8 km/28.5 degrees 119,513.2 September kg 5, 1984, 6:37:54

Inclination a.m. PDT, Runway September 17, Edwards 10, 1984. AFB

Orbiter was returned 3,131.8 m 60 seconds 6 days, 0 hours, No.97 Spaceflight SBS-4/PAM-D, 3-C/PAM-D None Cloud

to Kennedy

56 minutes,

4 seconds (STDN) and Telstar

Tracking

and Data Network IV-2/UUS

Syncom

(Leasat-2),

Get-Away Specials Experiments

Logic to Optimize

Use of Defense

Systems

(CLOUDS).

Sponsored by the Air Force, this payload consisted of two 250-exposure camera assemblies with battery-powered motor drives, which were used at the aft flight deck station for cloud photngraphy data collection.

308

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table Vehicle attached Glow 3-29 continued This experiment characterized sur-

Experiment. vehicle

face-originated

glow

on strips of material

that were previous

to the robot

arm. Observations

made during

Shuttle flights indicated that optical emissions originated on spacecraft surfaces facing the direction of orbital motion. These emissions showed differing spectral distribution and intensity of the glow tbr different materials and spacecraft altitude. These results had significance for observations made from the space telescope CFES-Ill Radiation and space station.

(see STS-6t Monitoring Experiment (see STS-8)

1MAX (see STS 41-C) Shuttle Student Involvement Program: Crystal Gallium by the Float Shawn a Environment,

Purification

and Growth

of Single

Zone Technique

in a Zero Gravity

Murphy/Rockwell International. This experiment compared crystal grown by the "Flat Zone" technique in a low-gravity Mission Success environment Successful with one grown in an identical manner

on Earth.

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT

Table Vehicle Crew 3-30. STS 41-G tOV-099 Mission Chc,'acteristics

309

Challenger

Cmdr: Robert L. Crippen Pilot: Jon A. McBride MS: David C. Leestma, PS: Paul D. Scully-Power, Agency t October 5, 1984 7:03:00 Altitude Weight & PostOperations Distance Time Duration Revolution Support Satellites Specials & Sally K. Ride, Marc a.m.. Kathryn D. Sullivan Spacc Centcr Garneau (Canadian Space

Launch Orbital Inclination Launch Landing landing Rollout Rollout Mission Landed Mission Deployed Get-Away

EDT, Kennedy with no delays.

Launch proceeded as scheduled 403.7 kin/57.0 degrees 11O, 125 kg October 3,220 m 23 minutes, 13, 1984, 12:26:38

p.m., EDT, Runway

33, Kennedy

54 seconds 8 days. 5 hours. No, 133 Spaceflight 38 seconds lSTDN)/Tracking and

Tracking

and Data Network System (TDRSSt (ERBSI Satellite GMBH IHALEX) periods

Data Relay Satellite Earth Radiation G-013 Customer: mance

Budget

Kayser-Threde Lamp lamps

The Halogen

Experiment during by ESA,

tested

the perforThe

of halogen

of microgravity,

Flight was financed G-007 Customer: Alabama

Space

and Rocket

Center radio-frequency around Space Flight of a rnea-

Project Explorer Payload: 1. This experiment attempted surements to ground-based This experiment Center Amateur 2. Alabama complex properties, properties, in space. The payload STS 6 I-C. G-(132 Customer: International Space did not operate, inorganic

to transmit radio hams

the world.

was built by the Marshall Radio Club. students compound investigated

university

the growth

with exceptional

conductive

the solidification of an alloy with superplastic and the germination and growth of radish seeds and a reflight was scheduled for

Corp.

This experiment studied the strength of surface tension in the absence of gravity by firing BBs at free-standing spheres of water in microgravity. A second furnaces experiment on this GAS used five small electrical to produce new' materials.

310

NASA

HISTORICAL

DATA

BOOK

Table G-306 Customer: The Trapped

3-30

contintted

Department

of Defense

Space

Test Program the tiny radia-

Ions in Space

experiment

recorded

tion damage tracks left by heavy ions as they passed through a stack of track-detecting plastic sheets during flight. Upon return to Earth, shaped the tracks pits where were etched particles chemically, revealing direction conethen studof the had passed. Investigators

ied the pits to deduce the energies and arrival different types of ions that were collected. G-038 Customer: glass MarshalI--McShane used vacuum deposition The investigator spheres

techniques

to coat

with gold, platinum,

and other

metals to create

lustrous space sculptures. The process was similar to that used on Earth to coat lenses, glass, and mirrors, but the vacuum and weightlessness of space allowed a highly uniform coating only a few microns thick. A control sphere was evacuated to the natural vacuum level of space and sealed, Back on Earth, the investigator took measurements of it to determine had occurred. the vacuum level at which the depositions G-518 Customer: iments Utah State University flown on STS 4 l-B were reflown. basic physical processes The experin a micmgravity Four experiments explored

enviromnent: capillary waves caused when water is excited, separation of flux and solder, thermucapillary convection, and a fluid flow system G-(}74 Customer: McDonnell Douglas Astronautics This experiment demonstrated two methods Co. of delivering parin a beat pipe.

tially full tanks of liquid fuel, free of gas bubbles, that control and direct orbiting spacecraft. G-469 Customer: Goddard Space Flight Center The Cosmic Ray Upset Experiment (CRUX) experiments of advanced, 12 megabytes. llown on STS-8 and STS 41-B. microcircuits, than lot previous state-of-the-art

to engines

Ill evolved totaling CRUX

from

It tested fur types more than was harshpayloads

This environment

for this experiment

er by orders of magnitude carried at lower latitudes.

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT

Table Experiments 3-30 continued Experiment. This was conducted

311

Aurora Photography U.S. Air Force. Orbital orbit. Refueling

for the

Systern.

This developed for refueling during controlled

and demonstrated existing satellites in addition in

the equipment the crew cabin, to a spacewalk that simulated orbit refueling. Radiation IMAX Canadian

and techniques were perlbrmed

Four fuel transfers,

by the crew from within the mission, tool to valves designed for on-

designed to connect a servicing existing satellites not originally

Monitoring

Experiment

(see STS-8)

(see STS 41-C) Experiment (CANEXt. Mark Garneau, the Canadian

payload specialist, Research Council space technology,

conducted of Canada.

ten experiments for the National They fell into the categories {/1 and life sciences. [TLD). The Central Research

space science, Dosimeter

Thermoluminescent Institute portable received parison Mission Success

for Physics in Budapest, Hungary, dosimetry system that was carried doses of cosmic with the currently radiation during used dosimetry

developed a small m a cabin locker. It spacellight systems. for com-

Successful, vdth the exception of the Shuttle hnaging Radar ISIRI-B. Challen_,,er's Ku-band antenna problems severely affected the SIR-B. A reflight of SIR-B was requested and manifested on STS 72-A, at that time scheduled for launch February 1987. m

312
Table Vehicle Crew

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

3-31. STS 51-A Mission Chap_tcteristics

Discoveo' (OV- 103) Cmdr: Frederick H. Hauck Pilot: David M. Walker MS: Anna L. Fisher, Dale A. Gardner, Joseph P. Allen Space Center

Launch

November

8, 1984. 7:15:00

a.m.. EST, Kennedy

Launch attempt on November hold at T-20 minutes because atmosphere. scheduled. Orbital Altitude Inclination Launch Landing landing Rollout Rollout Mission Landed Mission Deployed Get-Away Experiments Weight & PostOperations Distance Time Duration Revolution Support Satellites Specials & 342.6 The countdown degrees

7 was scrubbed during a built-in of wind shears in the upper on November 8 proceeded as

km/28.5 kg

I19,443.7 November 2,881.6 in 58 seconds

16, 1984, 6:59:56

a.m., EST, Runway

15, Kennedy

7 days, 23 hours, 44 minutes, No. 127

56 seconds (STDN)/Tracking IV-1/PAM-D and

Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) Telesat-H/PAM-D None (Anik D2), Syncom

(Leasat-l)

The Diffusive Mixing of Organic Solutions (DMOS) experiment, a collaboration between 3M and NASA, was the first attempt to grow organic crystals in the microgravity environment of the orbiter. duce commercially and polymer processes The program's ultimate goal was to provaluable products in the fields of organic The experiment the crystal growth studied the physical the difand evaluated

chemistry.

that govern

fusive mixing method of crystal growth. It also evaluated the type of apparatus used for its suitability for crystal growth in the weightless Radiation Successful environment of low-Earth orbit.

Monitoring

Experiment

(see STS-8)

Mission

Success

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPA('EFLIGHT

Table Vehicle Crew 3-32. STS 51-C Mission Characteristics

313

Disc'overv

(OV- I(}3) I1 S. Onizuka Space Center

Cmdr: Thomas K. Mattingly Pilot: Loren J. Shriver MS: James PS: Gary F. Buchli, E. Pay'ton Ellison

Launch

January

24, 1985, 2:50:0f} p.m., EST, Kennedy

The January 23 launch was scrubbed because of freezing weather conditions. (Challenger was scheduled for STS 5 l-C, but thermal Di,_col'et3. ) Orbital Launch Landing landing Rollout Rollout Mission Landed Mission Deployed Get-Away Experiments Altitude Weight & PostOperations Distance Time Duration Revolution Support Satellites Specials & 4fl7.4 km/28.5 113,804.2 January 2,240.9 3 days, No.49 kg 27, 1985, 4:23:23 m 1 hour, 33 minutes, Tracking 23 seconds and p.m., EST, Rtmway 15, Kennedy degrees Inclination tile problems (orced the substitution of

50 seconds

Spaceflight

and Data Network (STDN)/Tracking System (TDRSS)

Data Relay, Satellite DOD 85- I/IUS None Aggregation the apparatus characteristics dependencies.

of Red Blood Cells. This tested the capability' of to study in weightlessness some of the various of blood, Preliminary to obtain such as viscosity, results perfect indicated and their disease that: of blood to patseem zero

It was possible

microphotographs

cells in space under conditions of heavy vibration. Cells form aggregates that grow with time, analogous terns on Earth. The internal organization and structure to be different under zero gravity. Individual gravity: notwithstanding the origin of aggregates shapes

red cells do not sho;v ahnorrnal

under samples.

of the blood

they' looked normal, Because there was no sludging under weightlessness, on interactions between cells should be much easier. Changes in shape of red cells m astronauts (as reported Johnson Space um metabolism. Centert must be caused by' a change

studies by

of calci-

Mission

Success

Successful

314
Table Vehicle Crew

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

3-33. Cmdr: STS Karol 51-D (0% Mission 103) E. Williams Jeffrey A. Hoffman Characteristics

Discovery

J. Bobko

Pilot: Donald

MS: M. Rhea Seddon, S. David Griggs, PS: Charles D. Walker, Sen. E.J. Garn Launch

April 12, 1985, 8:59:05 a.m., EST, Kennedy The launch set for March 19 was rescheduled

Space Center to March 28

because of remanifesting of payloads from canceled mission 5 I-E. The launch was delayed further because of damage to the orbiter's dropped. Orbital Launch Landing landing Altitude Weight & PostOperations & payhmd bay door when the facility 12 launch was delayed solid rocket access platform when a area. The April 55 minutes recovery

ship entered the restricted 527.8 km/28.5 degrees I13,8(14.2 Extensive prompted kg

booster

Inclination April 19, 1985, 8:54:28 a,m, EST. Runway 33, Kennedy

brake damage and a blown tire during landing the landing of future flights at Edwards AFB until the of nose wheel steering.

Rollout Rollout Mission Landed Mission Deployed Get-Away

Distance Time Duration Revolutinn Support Satellites Specials

implementation 3,138.8 m 63 seconds 6 days, 23 hours, No. 110 Spaceflight Data Relay G-035 Customer: Physics determine allowed

55 minutes.

23 seconds (STDN)/Tracking IV-3/UUS (Leasat-3) and

Tracking and Data Network Satellite System (TDRSS) (Anik C-I), Syncom

Telesat-I/PAM-D

The Asahi Shimbun of Solids and Liquids what happened m collide in Zero Gravity was designed (solid) was to when a metal or plastic

with a water ball (liquid)

in weightlessness.

The behavior after collision G-47 I

of the metal or plastic ball and the water ball was observed on video systems.

Customer: Goddard Space Flight Center Capillary Pump Loop Experiment investigated lary pump system could transfer waste

whether

a capilpump that of

heat from a spacecraft

out into space. The experiment consisted of two capillary evaporators with heaters and was designed to demonstrate such a system spaceflight advanced can be used under zero-gravity thermal control spacecraft, and space station conditions to provide orbiting of scientific

instruments,

components.

SPACt_

TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN

SPACEFLIGHT

315

Table Experiments Phase yet ical phase

3-33

continued Experinmnt. Phase technique and partitioning used is a selective, biomeda twosolution phase higher reso-

Partitioning and

gentle

inexpensive such as cells

to separate It establishes to a water Theoretically,

materials, system tile

proteins. polymers separated. with

by adding materials

various to be

containing partitioning Mion than

should was

separate

cells obtained

significantly laboratory. are

presently thai

in the the tluid phases

Investigators Earth, the They tioning

believed

when

emulsified occurrit_g

on as

the rapid, coalesce

gravity-driven tended

movements the

phases

to randomize

separation of phase

process. parti-

expected s vstems

that

the theoretical be more

capabilities closely approached where were

could

in the

weightlessness effects

of orbital and

spaceflight, sedimentation

grax itational minimized.

of buoyancy

American effects nauts, safety flight optimal ticularly ple living of

Flight Echocardiograph. This experiment studied the ',, - s ,less on the cardiovascular system of astroweLhllcs was importan! newly effects for both available during to crew and personal instrument space adaptation and operational in-

which reasons. data on

The these

gathered

to develop changes safety (parto peo-

countermeasures during reentry)

cardiovascular long-term

to ensure

in weightlessness.

Protein

Crystal and

Growth structure

(PCG).

This

experiment extremely chemistry

studied important and

the to

composition the

of proteins, nature medical not been and

understanding

of their them for

the ability for on most

to manufacture complex crystals analyses proteins, large

purposes. possible

However, to grow,

it had

Earth.

enough this was

to permit information. to enable

x-ray

or neutron A key objective

diffraction of the the over-

to obtain

at[ PCG program empirical approach

drug

design

without and the

present

to enzyme agents.

engineering

manufacture

of chemotherapeutic

Toys toys

in Space.

The

crew

demonstrated The

tile behavior results, package recorded

of simple and

in a weightless became

environment. part

videotaped,

of a curriculum

for elemenof

tary and junior high students through Natural Science. Sludies showed that physics concepts by watching

the Houston Museum students could learn systems field varied in action. has greatly frames,

mechanical the gravitational

In

an Earth-based value ot, t the could mg of I-g.

classroom, Although and

a constant thmughsit, dents The filnl-

the gravity in noninerlial in a constant toys how

force

universe only

reference I-g

experiment

environment.

of simple students work

generic-motion to discover without gravity.

in the zero-g the diflE-rent

environment toy mechanical

enabled systems

316

NASA

HISTORICAL

DATA

BOOK

Table

3-33

continued

Image Intensifier Investigation. This tested low-light-level photographic equipment, in preparation for the visit by Halley's Comet. Astronaut Hoffman examined an image intensifier coupled with a Nikon camera, a combination that intensified usable light by a factor of about 10,000. It was believed that the equipment interest Comet. could be used to observe objects of astronomical through the Shuttle's window, including Halley's Hoffman photographed objects at various distances similar to lighting

from the Sun when it was below the horizon, conditions when the comet appeared. Continuous Shuttle Flow Electrophoresis Involvement System Program:

tCFES)

111(see STS-8)

Student

1. Statoliths in Corn Root Caps examined the effect of weightlessness on the formation of statoliths (gravity-sensing organs) in plants and was tested by exposing plants with capped and uncapped roots to spaceflight. The root caps of the flight and control plants were examined postflight by an electron microscope for statolith changes. 2. Effect of Weightlessness on the Aging of Brain Cells used houseflies and was expected to show accelerated aging in their brain cells based on an increased accumulation pigment in, and deterioration of, the neurons. Medical Experiments Utah Senator E.J. ".lake" Garn of age to

was the first public official

fly aboard the Space Shuttle. Garn was a payload specialist and congressional observer. As payload specialist, he conducted medical physiological tests and measurements. Tests on Garn detected lessness, fourth and recorded changes the body underwent in weightan ongoing program that began with astronauts on the flight. Garn accomplished the following:

Shuttle

During launch, Garn wore a waist belt with two stethoscope microphones fastened to an elastic bandage. At main engine cutoff, plugged about 8.5 minutes into a portable into the flight, tape recorder bowel sounds mobility. recorded sickness electrical in orbit. the belt was in the seat flight early inin the to evaluate stored

bag and began recording flight changes in gastric An electrocardiogram event of space motion Garn was wore

heart rhythm stocking

a leg plethysmography

to measure

leg volume. It recorded the shitting of fluids during adaptation to weightlessness. Blood pressure and heart rate were recorded in orbit and during Another determine reentry. test measured the amount Garn's height and girth in space to of growth and change in body shape may grow on Earth was saliva was

associated with weightlessness. up to 2 inches while weightless. Tests determined whether adequate collected Successful

Space travelers dosage Garn's

a medication

Mission

Success

in space with acetaminophen. for analysis alter each dose.

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT

Table Vehicle Crew 3-34. STS 51-B Mission Characteristics

317

Challenq, er (OS-099) Cmdr: Robert F. Overmyer William E. Thornton Space Center back Pilot: Frederick D. Gregory MS: Don L. Lind, Norman E. Thagard,

Launch

PS: Lodewijk van den Berg, Taylor G. Wang April 29, 1985, 12:02:18 p.m., EDT, Kennedy This flight was first manifested as 51-E.

It was rolled

l'ronl the pad because of a timing problem with the TDRS-B payload. Mission 5 I-E was canceled, and the orbiter was renlanifcsted delayed Orbital Launch Landing landing Rollout Rollout Mission Landed Mission Deployed Get-Away Altitude Weight & PostOperations Distance Time Duration Revolution Support Satellites Specials & with 5 I-B payloads. 18 seconds The launch on April 29 was processing 2 minutes, because of a launch

system failure. 41 I. 1 kin/57.0 degrees 1II ,984.8 kg a.m. PDT, Runway to Kennedy May 17, Edwards AFB 11, 1985.

Inclination May 6, 1985, 9:11:04 Orbiter ,,,,'as returned 2,535 m 59 seconds

7 days, 0 hours, 8 minutes, No. 111

46 seconds (STDN)/Tracking was scheduled for and

Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) NUSAT G-OI 0 Customer: Northern among tGet-Away Special); GLOMR deployment but was rescheduled R. Gilbert Utah Satellite the Federal Moore (NUSATt

on STS 61-A

was a cooperative (FAA),

effort Weber State

Aviation

Administration

College, Utah State University, New Mexico State University, Goddard, the U.S. Air Force, and more than 26 private corporalions. It was deployed into a 20-month orbit. It was an air traffic control radar calibration system that measured antenna patterns for ground-based and in member countries Organization. G-308 Customer: Department of Defense Space Test Program The Global Low Orbiting Message Relay IGLOMR) satellite was planned to pick up digital data streams from ground users, store the data, and deliver the messages in these data streams to customers' to remain computer terminals upon command. because GLOMR It was designed of a malfuncwas not in orbit for I year. However, Door Assembly, 3 Experiments radar operated in the United States of the International Civil Aviation

tion in the Motorized Experiments Mission Success

deployed on this mission. See Table 4-46, Spacelab Successful

318
Table Vehicle Crew

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

3-35. STS 51-G Mission Characteristics

Discovery (OV- 103) Cmdr: Daniel C. Brandenstein Pilot: John O. Creighton MS: Shannon W. Lucid, Steven PS: Patrick Baudry (CNES), R. Nagel, Salman John M. Fabian AI-Saud Space Center

Sultan

Launch Orbital Launch Landing landing Rollout Rollout Mission Landed Mission Deployed Get-Away Altitude Weight & PostOperations Distance Time Duration Revolution Support Satellites Specials &

June

17, 1985, 7:33:00

a.m., EDT, Kennedy

The launch proceeded as scheduled 405.6 km/28.5 degrees 116,363.8 Orbiter 2,265.6 7 day's, No. l 12 kg a.m.,

with no delays.

Inclination June 24. 1985.6:11:52 was returned m PDT, Runway 23, Edwards AFB

to Kennedy

June 28, 1985.

42 seconds 1 hour, 38 minutes, Tracking 52 seconds (STDN)/Tracking Arabsat-A/PAM-D. and

Spaceflight

and Data Network System (TDRSS) Telstar-3D/PAM-D,

Data Relay Satellite Morelos-A/PAM-D,

Spartan- 1 (deployed and retrieved) G-025 Customer: ERNO-Raumfahrttechnik

GMBH

Liquid Sloshing Behavior in Microgravily examined the behavior of liquid in a tank in microgravity. It was representative of phenomena The results models occurring in satellite tanks with liquid propellants. and retine mathematical of tank-fluid of future managesyscharacteristics were expected to validate support

describing

the dynamic

tems. This in turn would

the development

spacecraft tanks, in particular the design ment devices l_)r surface-tension tanks. G-027 Customer: Slipcasting Germany's demonstrate DFVLR Under Microgravity Conditions

of propellan_

was performed

by

material research project. MAUS. Its goal was to with model materials the possibility of slipcasting even with unstabilized with different density, suspensions grain using mixsize, and

in microgravity, lures of powders concentration. G-028 Customer: Fundamental

DFVLR Studies in Manganese-Bismuth produced manprop-

ganese-bismuth specimens with possibly better magnetic erties than currently was possible under Earth gravity.

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT

Table G-034 Customer: Texas Dickshire Coors featured t,_elve different Student Experiments 3-35 continued

319

biological

and physical science experiments designed by high school students 17ore El Paso alld Ysleta, Texas. The microgra',ity experiments seeds, studied the grow,,h of lettuce the growth seeds, barley seed of turnip of of the wicking the growth germination, of brine shrimp, of antibiotics germination

the regeneration

of the flat work planeria, on bacteria,

fuels, the effectiveness

soil mold, crystallization in zero gravity, the s,,mbiotic of the unicellular algae chlorella and the milk product operation dom access G-314 Customer: Space natural DOD Space Test Program Radiation Environment Ultraviolet radiation of liquid memory lasers, and the effectiveness chips v,'ithoul computer ozone

growth kefir, the ran-

of dynamic

protection.

(SURE)measured at extreme

the ultra-

field m the upper

atmosphere

violet wavelengths, between 50 and 100 nanomelers. These measurements provided a way of remotely sensing the ionosphere and upper atmosphere. G-47 I Customer: Capillary Goddard Space Flight Center Pumped Loop investigated the thermal system under use in k, rge scientific instruments, control capacondiadvanced

bility of a capillary-pumped tions for ultinmle Experiments orbiting Spartan sounding

zero-gravity

spacecraft, and space station components. 1. This was the first m a series of Shuttle-launched. fiec-l13 ers designed class experiments. to extend Its primary tlle capabilities mission of rocket was to

short-duration

perform n_editn_>resohflion mapping of the x-ray emission from extended sources and regions, specifically the hot 110.000 degrees Celsius) gas pervading a large ch, ster of galaxies in the constellation Perseus and in the galactic center and Scorpius-X-2. the nuclear In addition, region it mapped the x-ray emissions from of the Milky Way galaxy.

French Echocardiograph Experiment. This measured and studied the evolution of lhe fundamental parameters that characterized cardiac function, blood vessel circulation, and cardiovascular adaptation. After reviewing the data. the principal investigator observed a decrease volume, and left ventricular diastolic of cardiac volume, stroke volume, a dec.ease in

cerebral circulatory resistance, and noted variations in peripheral resistance and vascular stiffness of the lower limbs.

320

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table French Posture 3-35 continued This had five general objectives: a

Experiment.

study of the adaptive mechanisms of postural control, the influence of vision in adaptations, the role of the otoliths in the oculomotor stabilization reflexes, their role in the coordination of eye and head movements, After reviewing and mental representation investigator of space. observed a the data, the principal

change in vertical optokinetic nystagmus, which included an asymmetry reversal and a downward shift in beating field of the nystagmus, as well as a decrease lar ocular reflex. in the gain of the vestibu-

Automated Directional Solidification Furnace. Experiments carried out in the furnace demonstrated the capability of the furnace equipment and provided preliminary scientific results on magnetic composites. Future missions would demonstrate the feasibility of producing improved magnetic composite materials for commercial use. These materials could eventually lead to smaller, lighter, stronger and longer lasting magnets for electrical motors used in aircraft and guidance systems, surgical instruments, High-Precision and transponders. Tracking Experiment. Flown by the Strategic

Defense Initiative Organization, this tested the ability of a ground laser beam director to accurately track an object in lowEarth orbit. Mission Success Successful

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT

Table Vehicle Crew 3-36. STS 51-F Mission Characteristics

321

Challenger (OV-099) Cmdr: C. Gordon Fullerton Pilot: Roy D. Bridges, Jr. W. England Center coolant Launch MS: E Story Musgrave, Karl G. Henize, Anthony PS: Loren W. Acton, John-David E Bartoe

Launch

July 29, 1985, 5:00:00 The launch countdown when a malfunction valve caused a shutdown

p.m., EDT, Kennedy on July 12 was halted

Space

at T-3 seconds

of the number of all three

two main engine main engines.

countdown was initiated on July 27 and continued to about T-9 minutes on July 29. At that time, launch was delayed I hour, 37 minutes because of a problem with the table maintenance block update uplink. In addition, ascent was hampered when at 5 minutes, 45 seconds into ascent, the number one main engine shut down prematurely, resulting in an abort-to-orbit The abort-to-orbit trajectory resulted in the orbiter's trajectory. insertion

orbit altitude being approximately 108 x 143 nautical miles. A final orbit if 314.84 x 316.69 kilometers was achieved to meet science payload requirements. During launch and ascent, verifi-

cation flight instrumentation (VFI) operated. The VF1 was strategically located throughout Spacelab and at the Spacelab interfaces with the orbiter. The VFI monitored Spacelab subsystem performance and Spacelab/orbiter interfaces. Data were recorded during launch and ascent on the VFI tape recorder and played signal System Orbital Launch Landing landing Altitude Weight & PostOperations & 314.84 114,695 Inclination kg August 6, 1985, 12:45:26 p.m., PDT, Runway 23, Edwards AFB The VFI continued to monitor and record selected Spacelab parameters recorder on the VFI tape recorder during descent and the orbiter payload 25 minutes and landing. Approximately back to ground periods km/49.5 utilizing degrees (TDRSS). receiving stations during acquisition Satellite of the Tracking and Data Relay

after landing, orbiter power was removed from Spacelab. The mission was extended 17 revolutions for additional payload activities because of the abort-to-orbit. Orbiter was returned to Rollout Rollout Mission Landed Mission Deployed Get-Away Distance Time Duration Revolution Support Satellites Specials Kennedy August 2,611.8 m 55 seconds 7 days, 22 hours, No. 127 Spaceflight 45 minutes, 26 seconds (STDN)/Tracking below) and 11, 1985.

Tracking

and Data Network

Data Relay Satellite Plasma Diagnostics None

System (TDRSS) Package (PDP) (see experiments

322

NASA

HISTORICAL

DATA

BOOK

Table Experiments Spacelab

3-36

continued 4-47, Spacelab 2 Experiments)

2 (see Table

Plasma Diagnostics Package. The instrument package was extended and released by the RMS to take measurements after the orbiter surements, maneuvered to selected attitudes. After taking the PDP and meathe manipulator arm recaptured

returned it to the vicinity of the payload bay. Before landing, it was locked back in place on the aft pallet. Instruments mounted within electric the PDP included differential field dipole a quadrispherical analyzer, search a plasma flux-gate low-energy wave proton and cura and electron rent electric analyzer a direct

and magnetic

coil sensors,

meter, a triaxial

magnetometer,

Langmuir probe, a retarding potential analyzer and differential flux analyzer, an ion mass spectrometer, and a cold cathode vacuum gauge. (See Chapter Growth 4 for further data on the PDE) Environment. The pur-

Protein Crystal

in a Microgravity

pose was to develop hardware and procedures for growing proteins and other organic crystals by two methods in the orbiter during showed the low-gravity that minor portion worked of the mission. as planned. Generally, hardwas needcrysware for both methods ed and a means Postflight analysis

modification

in the flight hardware

of holding

the hardware

during activation,

tal growth, deactivation, and photography was desirable. The dialysis method produced three large tetragonal lysozyme crystals with average The solution dimensions methods of 1.3 mm x 0.65 mmx produced small crystals purine 0.65 mm. of growth

lysozyme, alpha-2 interferon, and bacterial phosphorylase. (See also STS 51-D.) Gravity-lnfluenced Unit. Mung beans Lignification in Higher

nucleoside

Plants/Plant

Growth

and pine seedlings,

planted

in the Plant

Growth Unit before flight, were flown to monitor the production of lignin, a structural rigidity tissue found in plants. Shuttle Amateur Radio Experiment (SAREX). Astronauts with amateur

Mission

Success

England and Bartoe conversed from Challenger radio operators through a handheld radio. Successful

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT

Table Vehicle Crew 3-37. STS 51-I Mission Characteristics

323

Discovery Cmdr:

(OV- 103) H. Engle O. Covey

Joseph

Pilot: Richard Launch

MS: James D.A. van Hoften, John M. Lounge, William E Fisher August 27, 1985, 6:58:01 a.m., EDT, Kennedy Space Center The August thunderstorms delayed 24 launch was scrubbed number at T-5 minutes on August five on-board because 25 was purgeneral of in the vicinity. The launch

when the orbiter's

pose computer failed. The launch on August 27 was delayed 3 minutes, I second because of a combination of weather and an unauthorized rec_wery Orbital Altitude Inclination Launch Landing landing Weight & PostOperations & 514.9 area. degrees km/28.5 kg 3, 1985, 6:15:43 was shortened a.m., PDT, Runway 23, Edwards sunshield AFB I day when the Aussat ship entering the restricted solid rocket booster

118,983.4 September The mission

hung up on the Remote Manipulator had to be deployed before scheduled. Rollout Rollout Mission Landed Mission Deployed Distance Time Duration Revolution Support Satellites Kennedy September 1,859.3 m 47 seconds 7 days, 2 hours. No. I 12 Spaceflight Data Relay 8, 1985.

System camera and Aussat Orbiter was returned to

17 minutes.

42 seconds (STDN)/Tracking IV-4/UUS after reaching corand

Tracking Satellite

and Data Network System (TDRSS)

ASC-I/PAM-D;

Aussat-l/PAM-D, IV-4 failed orbit Organic

Syncom to function

Get-Away Experiments

Specials

(Leasat-4); Syncom rect geosynchronous None Physical

Vapor Transport

Solid Experiment

(PVTOS). into sub-

In this second of some 70 experiments the 3M Corporation planned to conduct by 1995, solid materials were vaporized a gaseous state to form thick crystalline films on selected

strates of sublimable organics. 3M researchers studied the crystals produced by PVTOS for their optical properties and other characteristics that might ultimately have important applications and to 3M's businesses health care. Mission Success Successful in the areas of electronics, imaging,

324

NASA

HISTORICAL

DATA

BOOK

Table Vehicle Crew

3-38.

STS

51-J

Mission

Characteristics

Atlantis (OV- 104) Cmdr: Karol J. Bobko Pilot: Ronald MS: Robert PS: William J. Grabe L. Stewart, A. Pailes a.m., EDT, Kennedy 22 minutes, prevalve indication. 30 seconds Space Center of the conwas delayed because power David C. Hilmers

Launch

October

3, 1985, 11:15:30 liquid hydrogen

The launch main engine Orbital Altitude & 590.8

close remote

troller showing km/28.5 Inclination Launch Weight Landing & Postlanding Rollout Rollout Mission Landed Mission Deployed Operations Distance Time Duration Revolution Support Satellites classified October Orbiter

a faulty "on" degrees

7, 1985, 10:00:08 returned

a.m., PDT, Runway October 11, 1985.

23, Edwards

AFB

to Kennedy

2,455.5 m 65 seconds 4 days, No.64 1 hour, 44 minutes, Tracking 38 seconds (STDN)

Spaceflight Not available None Not available Successful

and Data Network

Get-Away Specials Experiments Mission Success

SPACE

TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN

SPACEFLIGHT

325

Table Vehicle Crew

3-39.

STS

61-A

Mission

Characteristics

Challenger Cmdr: Henry

(OV-099) W. Hartsfield, Jr.

Pilot: Steven R. Nagel MS: James E Buchli, Guion S. Bluford, Jr., Bonnie J. Dunbar PS: Reinhard Furrer, Ernst Messerschmid, Wubbo J. Ockels (ESA) Launch Orbital Inclination Launch Landing landing Rollout Rollout Mission Lauded Mission Deployed Get-Away Weight & PostOperations Distance Time Duration Revolution Support Satellites Specials 110,570.4 Orbiter 2,531.1 kg a.m., PST, Runway November 17, Edwards 11, 1985. AFB to Kennedy Altitude & October 30, 1985, 12:00:00 noon, EST, Kennedy with no delays. Space Center Launch proceeded as scheduled 383.4 km/57.0 degrees

November 6, 1985, 9:44:53 was returned m

45 seconds 7 days, 0 hours, No. 112 44 minutes, 53 seconds (STDN)/Tracking deployed and from

Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) Global G-308 G-308 Customer: GLOMR, successfully GLOMR data-relay, demonstrate Low Orbiting Message

Relay (GLOMR)

Department of Defense Space Test Program originally planned tbr deployment on STS 5 I-B, was deployed and remained spacecraft. in orbit for 14 months. polyhedron, Its purpose and command was to oceanoThe satellite, a 68-kilogram, 62-side was a

communications the ability

to read signals

graphic sensors, locate oceanographic and other ground sensors, and relay data from them to customers. The satellite could pick up digital and deliver command. Experiments Mission Success data streams from ground users, store the data, terminals upon the streams to customers" computer

Spacelab D- 1 (see Table 4--48, Spacelab Successful

D- 1 Experiments)

326
Table Vehicle Crew

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

3-40. Atlantis Cmdr: STS 61-B Mission Characteristics

(OV- 104) Brewster H. Shaw, Jr. C. Spring, D. Walker Jerry L. Ross Space Center

Pilot: Bryan D. O'Connor MS: Mary L. Cleave, Sherwood PS: Rodolfo Neri Vela, Charles Launch Orbital Launch Landing landing Altitude Weight & PostOperations & November The launch Inclination 26, 1985, 7:29:00 proceeded degrees

p.m., EST, Kennedy with no delays.

as scheduled

416.7 km/28.5

118,596 kg December 3, 1985, 1:33:49 p.m., PST, Runway

22, Edwards

AFB

The mission was shortened one revolution because of lightning conditions at Edwards. Atlantis landed on a concrete runway because December the lakebed 7, 1985. m 4 minutes, 49 seconds (STDN)/Tracking and was wet. Orbiter was returned to Kennedy

Rollout Rollout Mission Landed Mission Deployed

Distance Time Duration Revolution Support Satellites Specials

3,279.3

78 seconds 6 days, 21 hours, No. 109 Spaceflight Data Relay G-479 Customer: Telesat,

Tracking and Data Network Satellite System (TDRSS) AUSSAT-2/PAM-D, Canada satellite

Morelos-B/PAM-D, Telesat

Satcom Ku-2/PAM-DII

Get-Away

Canada's domestic soliciting

carrier, sponsored

a nation-

al competition

science

experiments

from Canadian called Towards in space that mirrors made digital

high school students. The selected experiment, a Better Mirror, proposed to fabricate mirrors would provide on Earth. Experiments Orbiter higher performance than similar

Experiments

(OEX). An onboard experimental

autopilot software package was tested. The autopilot software could be used with the orbiter, another space vehicle, such as the Orbital Transfer Vehicle, which was under development, or the space station. OEX was designed to provide precise stationkeeping capabilities between various vehicles operating in space. Protein Crystal Growth Experiment (PCG). This experiment studied the possibility of crystallizing biological materials, such as hormones, enzymes, and other proteins. Successful crystallization of these materials, which were very difficult to crystallize on Earth, would allow their three-dimensional atomic structure IMAX to be determined Cargo Bay Camera. by x-ray crystallography. The IMAX camera was used to

document payload bay activities associated with the EASE/ACCESS assembly during the two spacewalks. Experimental (EASE). factors Assembly of Structures studied of structures in Extravehicular in space. Activity

This experiment in the construction

EVA dynamics

and human

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT

Table Assembly Structures timelines Marshall members to evaluate 3-40 continued for Construction of Erectable validated Space

327

Concept based Space

(ACCESS).

This experiment

ground-based

on the neutral Flight Center, assembled

buoyancy water simulator at the Huntsville, Alabama. Crew and disassembled a 45-foot truss larger structures in space. Neff Vela and took and

manually concepts

for assembling

Morelos Payload Specialist Experiments. Rodolfo performed a series of mid-deck cabin experiments photographs 1. Effects Growing of Mexico: of Spatial Environment Cultures

on the Reproduction of Escherichia

of Bacteria.

t'oli B-strain

were mixed in orbit with different bacteriophages that attack the E. coli and were observed for possible changes and photographed as required. of Nutrients in a Weightless Environment. that allowed were planted in containers 2. Transportation

Ten plant specimens

a radioactive tracer to be released in orbit for absorption by the plants. At selected intervals, each plant was sectioned and the segments 3. Electropuncture ment validated disequilibrium monitored retained for postflight of absorption. analysis to determine the rate and extent

and Biocybernetics in Space. This experielectropuncture theories, which stated that in the behavior of human organs direct could current be in using electric

and stimulated

specified zones. The experiment ing the conductance of electricity If a disequilibrium would be applied conductance

was performed by measurin a predetermined zone.

was detected, exercises or stimulus for a certain period until the value of the range.

fell into the normal

4. Effects of Weightlessness and Light on Seed Germination. Seed specimens of amaranth, lentil, and wheat were planted in orbit in two identical containers. One container was exposed to illumination and the other to constant darkness. Photographs of the resulting sprouts were taken every 24 hours. One day prior to landing, to a metabolical cal examination localization 5. Photography of Mexico detection process the sprouts were submitted histologiand for subsequent the presence photos

on Earth to determine

of starch granules. of Mexico. Postearthquake and Mexico City.

were taken

Diffusive Mixing of Organic Solutions. This experiment grew organic crystals in near-zero gravity. 3M scientists hoped to produce single crystals that are more pure and larger than those available Continuous Successful on Earth to study their optical Flow Etectrophoresis and electrical (CFES) properties.

System

(see STS-6)

Mission

Success

328
Table Vehicle Crew

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

3-41. STS 61-C Mission Characteristics

Columbia (OV- 102) Cmdr: Robert L. Gibson Pilot: Charles MS: Franklin Nelson PS: Robert E Bolden, Jr. Steven A. Hawley, Bill Nelson George D.

R. Chang-Diaz, J. Cenker,

Congressman

Launch

January 12, 1986, 6:55:00 a.m, EST, Kennedy Space Center The launch set for December 18, 1985, was delayed 1 day when additional time was needed to close out the orbiter aft compartment. at T-14 seconds The December because 19 launch attempt was scrubbed of an indication that the right solid

rocket booster hydraulic power unit was exceeding RPM redline speed limits. (This was later determined to be a false reading.) After an 18-day delay, a launch attempt on January 6, 1986, was halted at T-31 seconds because of the accidental draining of liquid oxygen from the external tank. The January launch attempt was scrubbed at T-9 minutes because of bad weather at both transoceanic landing sites (Moron, Spain, and Dakar, Senegal). After a 2-day delay, the launch set for January 9 was delayed because of a launch pad liquid oxygen sensor breaking prevalve. off and lodging The launch in the number two main engine for 2 days 12 on January set for January 10 was delayed countdown 7

because of heavy rains. The launch proceeded with no delays. Orbital Altitude Inclination Launch Landing landing Weight & PostOperations & 392.6 km/28.5 116,123 January January around abandoned kg 18, 1986, 5:58:51 landing 17, was moved time. The landing because degrees

a.m. PST, Runway originally on January weather

22, Edwards scheduled for turnA

AFB

The planned

at Kennedy, to January attempts

16 to save orbiter

16 and 17 were at Kennedy.

of unacceptable

landing was set for January 18 at Kennedy, but persisting bad weather forced a one-revolution extension of mission and landing at Edwards AFB. Orbiter January 23, 1986. 3,110 m 59 seconds 6 days, 2 hours, 3 minutes, No.98 51 seconds (STDN)/Tracking and was returned to Kennedy

Rollout Rollout Mission Landed Mission Deployed Get-Away

Distance Time Duration Revolution Support Satellites Specials

Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) Satcom KU-1/PAM-DII The Environmental Monitoring Package

was contributed

by

Goddard to measure the effects of launch and landing forces on the bridge and, hence, on the internal environment of the GAS containers. Sound levels, vibrations, and temperature were measured by attaching acoustical pickups, accelerometers, strain gauges, and thermocouples to the bridge. These instruthat ments were connected to a GAS container with equipment controlled the instruments and recorded their data.

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT

Table 3-41 continued

329

The GAS Bridge Assembly was flown for the first time on this mission. It contained the 12 GAS canisters. G-310 The objective was to measure environment, G-463, G-464, of this Air Force Academy-sponsored the dynamics of a vibrating payload beam in a zero-g

G-462 Office of Space was a group ultraviolet Science and Applications specials radiation. of get-away background

Customer: Ultraviolet designed

NASA

Experiment to measure

diffuse

The two ultraviolet spectrometers space to observe the high-energy ciated stars. with the origin galaxies, gets included dust areas,

were to look into distant spectrum thought to be assoOther observational Comet, tarHalley's and selected

of the universe.

It was the only set of GAS experiments interconnected containers.

to fly as a group

of three electrically G-062 Customer: Four student General

Electric

Company

Space

Division State University

experiments

from Pennsylvania

and sponsored by the General Electric Co, made up this payload. The liquid droplet heat radiator experiment tested an alternative moving method droplets of heat transfer, which investigated how experitension can radiate heat into space. The second on the surface

ment studied

the effect

of microgravity

of a fluid. The third experiment studied the effect of convection on heat flow in a liquid by submersing a heat source in a container of liquid. G-332 Customer: Booker T. Washington High School This canister contained two contributions from Houston, The Brine Shrimp Artemia experiment from Booker T. Texas.

Washington High School determined the behavioral and physiological effects of microgravity on eggs hatched in space. The High School for Engineering provided the Fluid Physics of fluid when heated Experiment, which examined in microgravity. G-446 Customer: persion Alltech Associates, investigated material Inc. the effect of gravity in high-performance The investigators column would on particle liquid chroexpected that be produced. disThis experiment of packing gravity, matography by reducing the behavior

analytical

columns.

a more efficient

33O

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table G-470 Customer: A joint Agriculture Goddard examined Space Flight Center and the U.S. Department of weightlessness of on gypsy investigation by Goddard the effects 3-41 continued

moth eggs and engorged female American dog ticks. It was hoped that the data obtained would lead to new means of controlling G-007 Customer: Alabama Space and Rocket Center This canister housed four specific payloads that were originally scheduled to fly on STS 41-G. However, it was not turned on during that mission. Postflight investigation determined that the experiments were not at fault, and they were rescheduled for STS 61-C. The experiment minum-copper 2. A comparative primary 3. Examination included: of lead-antimony and anatomical of metallic-appearing of potassium and alustudy of the needle crys1. A study of the solidification alloys morphological of the growth solution these insect pests.

root system

of radish seeds tetracyanoplatinate

tals in an aqueous

4. A half-wave dipole antenna installed on the canister's top cover plate that was sponsored by the Marshall Amateur Radio Club G-449 Customer: sponsored St. Mary's this four-part Hospital, Milwaukee Hospital in Milwaukee effects of The Laser Laboratory I. The BMJ experiment at St. Mary's experiment: studied the biological

neodymium and helium-neon laser light upon desiccated human tissue undergoing cosmic ray bombardment, Medications also were exposed to laser light and cosmic radiation. 2. LEDAJO was to determine cosmic radiation effects on medications 3. BLOTY and medical/surgical analyzed contingencies materials using Lexan detectors. because blood eyewear of typing, materials that develop

zero-gravity in blood typing. In Earth-bound gravity was essential to produce clumping. 4. CROLO following G-481 Customer: Vertical Horizons samples of painted This payload other artistic transported materials evaluated exposure laser optical to cosmic protective radiation.

linen canvases evaluated and portions

and of

into space. The investigators

how unprimed canvas, prepared linen canvas, oil painted canvas reacted to space travel.

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT

Table G -494 Customer: National Research Council of Canada 3-41 continued

331

This payload was co-sponsored by the Canada Centre for Space Science and the National Research Council of Canada. The experiment night glow Experiments Materials objectives load carrier Secondary consisted of seven filtered photometers emissions that measured oxygen, oxide, and continuum in the terrestrial

and in the Shuttle Science Laboratory-2 were the engineering and of the three objectives

night glow. (MSL-2). Primary mission verification of the MSL payprocessing evaluation. facilities. specimens The MSL-2 studied the of flight

materials

were the acquisition

and experimental data for scientific held the following experiments: I. Electromagnetic effects material of material Levitator. flow during

This experiment solidification environment.

of a melted This experiprocess of were

in the microgravity Directional the melting

2. Automated

Solidification

Furnace.

ment investigated four materials. 3. Three-Axis suspended in sound

and solidification Twelve waves,

Acoustic

Levitator. pressure

liquid samples

and rotated

and oscillat-

ed in a low-gravity, nitrogen atmosphere. studied the degree of sphericity attainable migration Comet Halley similar Active

Investigators and small bubble of glass.

to that found in the refining Monitoring Program.

This was supposed

to investigate the chemical because Infrared

the dynamical/morphological structure of Comet Halley. Comet Halley problems. Experiment. of selected

behavior as well as The 35mm camera that properly

was to photograph of battery Imaging

did not function

This acquired terrestrial

radiometric

pic-

lures/information Initial

and celestial

targets.

Blood Storage

Experiment.

This experiment

investigated

the factors that limit the storage of human blood. The experiment attempted to isolate factors such as sedimentation that occurred under standard of changes blood bank conditions. A comparison was made that had expestored in whole blood and blood components

rienced weightless conditions in orbit with similar samples in otherwise comparable conditions on the ground.

332

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table Hitchhiker 3-41 G- I.This continued was the first of a generic class of small

payloads under the Small Payload Accommodation program. These payloads were located in the orbiter bay on the starboard side and used specially existing GAS designed carriers, which three attached to the attach fittings. This supported instruments:

1. Particle Analysis Cameras for the Shuttle provided film images of panicle contamination around the Shuttle in support of future 2. Capillary transport 3. Shuttle DOD infrared telescope a zero-g operations. test of a new heat Mirrors was a pasPump Loop system. Environment Effects on Coated experiment that determined the and atomic oxygen on ultraviolet provided

sive witness mirror-type effects of contamination optics Shuttle material. Student Involvement

Program: to Honeycombing that examined structure studied superior was a to to the of the ability

1. Argon material produce

Injection

as an Alternative experiment honeycomb

processing a lightweight,

Earth-produced structures. 2. Formation of Paper in Microgravity

the formation

cellulose fibers in a fiber mat under weightless conditions. 3. Measurement of Auxin Levels and Starch Grains in Plant Roots investigated the geotropism of a corn root growth in microgravity and determined whether starch grains in the root cap were actually Mission Success transport. Successful involved with auxin production and

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT

Table Vehicle Crew 3-42. STS 51-L Mission Characteristics

333

Challenger (OV-099) Cmdr: Francis R. Scobee Pilot: Michael PS: Gregory J. Smith Ellison S. Onizuka, Ronald E. McNair B. Jarvis MS: Judith A. Resnik, Teacher January

Launch

in Space Project: Sharon Christa McAuliffe 28, 1986, 11:38:00, EST, Kennedy Space Center liftoff scheduled for January 22 was slipped to

The first Shuttle

January 23, then January 24, because of delays in STS 61-C. The launch was reset for January 25 because of bad weather at the transoceanic Casablanca transoceanic abort landing (not equipped abort landing site in Dakar, Senegal. for night landings) was postponed To use as an alternate pro-

site, T-zero was moved to a morning I day when launch

liftoff time. The launch

cessing was unable to meet the new morning liftoff time. A prediction of unacceptable weather at Kennedy led to the launch being rescheduled was delayed for 9:37 a.m., EST, January 27. The launch equipment 24 hours when the ground-servicing

hatch-closing fixture could not be removed from the orbiter hatch, The fixture was sawed off and the attaching bolt drilled out before exceeded closeout was completed. During the delay, cross winds Shuttle return-to-launch-site limits at Kennedy's

Landing Facility. The January 28 launch was delayed 2 hours when the hardware interface module in the launch processing system, which monitors the fire detection system, failed during liquid hydrogen tanking procedures. An explosion after liftoff claimed the crew and vehicle. Orbital Launch Altitude Weight & 2,778.8 km (planned)28.5 degrees (planned) Inclination Landing & Postlanding Operations Rollout Distance Roilout Time Mission Duration Landed Mission Deployed Get-Away Revolution Support Satellites Specials 121,778.4 kg No landing N/A N/A 73 seconds No.N/A Spaceflight None None None Unsuccessful Tracking and Data Network System (TDRSS) (STDN)/Tracking and Data Relay Satellite 73 seconds

Experiments Mission Success

334
Table Vehicle Crew

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

3-43. STS-26 Mission Characteristics

Discovery (OV- 103) Cmdr: Frederick H. Hauck Pilot: Richard O. Covey David C. Hilmers, 11:37:00 1 hour, 38 minutes of two of the crew's than expected upper George D. Nelson Space Center the fuses a.m., EDT, Kennedy MS: John M. Lounge,

Launch

September The launch

29, 1988,

was delayed

to replace

in the cooling systems and because of lighter

flight pressure suits atmospheric winds. continued after

Suit repairs were successful, a waiver of a wind condition Orbital Launch Landing landing Rollout Rollout Mission Landed Mission Deployed Get-Away Experiments Altitude Weight & PostOperations Distance Time Duration Revolution Support Satellites Specials & 376 km/28.5 degrees Inclination 115,489.3 kg October 3, 1988, 9:37:11 Orbiter 2,271.1 4 days, No.64 was returned m

and the countdown constraint.

a.m.,

PDT, Runway October

17, Edwards

AFB

to Kennedy

8, 1988.

46 seconds 1 hour, 0 minutes, Tracking Satellite 11 seconds (STDN)/Tracking and

Spaceflight Data Relay TDRS-3/IUS None Physical talline

and Data Network System (TDRSS)

Vapor Transport produced structures

of Organic organic

Solids.

This experiment crysand chemical

by 3M scientists

thin films with ordered electrical,

to study their optical,

properties. The results could eventually be applied to the production of specialized thin films on Earth or in space. Protein Crystal Growth (PCG) experiments. A team of industry,

university, and government research investigators explored the potential advantages of using protein crystals grown in space to determine the complex, three-dimensional protein molecules. Knowing the precise plex molecules function the function would aid in understanding and could lead to methods structure of specific structure of these comtheir biological or controlling

of altering

in ways that may result

in new drugs. Using the same home TV sets and

Infrared Communications Flight Experiment. kind of invisible light that remotely controls VCRs, mission communications standard experiment transmission

specialist Nelson conducted experimental voice with his crewmates via infrared, rather than waves. One major objective the feasibility light. Unlike of the radioof the secure

radio-frequency, of information

was to demonstrate

via infrared

frequency signals, orbiter's windows; created if infrared

infrared waves will not pass through the thus, a secure voice environment would be waves were used as the sole means of com-

munications within the orbiter. Infrared waves can also carry data as well as voice (such as biomedical information).

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT Table 3-43

Automated space furnace Flight Center stronger, Directional continued Solidification Furnace. This special

335

developed and managed by Marshall Space demonstrated the possibility of producing lighter, performing environment. magnetic composite materials

and better

in a microgravity

Aggregation of Red Blood Cells. Blood samples from donors with such medial conditions as heart disease, hypertension, diabetes, and cancer Australia information flew in this experiment by Marshall developed by provided cell and managed The experiment

on the formation

rate, structure,

and organization

of red cell clumps

and on the thickness

of whole blood

aggregates at high and low flow rates. It helped determine whether microgravity could play a beneficial role in new and existing clinical research and medical diagnostic environment tests. Results were comobtained in the Shuttle microgravity

pared with results from a ground-based experiment to determine what effects gravity had on the kinetics and morphology of the sampled Isoelectric blood. This was a type of electrophoresis field according experito

Focusing.

ment that separated proteins in an electric their surface electrical charge. Mesoscale images Lightning Experiment. to better

This obtained

nighttime of lightning

of lightning

understand

the effects

discharges on each other, on nearby storm systems, and on storm microbursts and wind patterns and to determine interrelationships over an extremely Experiment. forces substances large area. This investigated played between the role graviis, partiliquid

Phase Partitioning tioning-biological phases. OASIS

ty and other physical

in separating--that two umnixable

Instrumentation.

This collected

and recorded

a variety

of environmental measurements of the orbiter. The information the orbiter future of temperature, and upper tion, stress, and strain. payloads

during various in-flight phases was used to study the effects on vibration, sound, acceleraof in the design

pressure, stages.

It also was used to assist

Earth-Limb Engineering glow"

Radiance

Experiment.

Developed

by the Barnes provided pho-

Co., this photographed and sunset.

Earth+s "+horizon twilight

near sunrise

The experiment

tographs of Earth's horizon the radiance of the twilight tion below the horizon.

that allowed scientists to measure sky as a function of the Sun's posiallowed sensors designers to for geosynchro-

This information

develop better, more accurate horizon nous communications satellites.

336

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table Shuttle Student 3-43 continued Program:

Involvement

1. Utilizing a Semi-Permeable Membrane to Direct Crystal Growth attempted to control crystal growth through the use of a semi-permeable lbrmed as a result membrane. of a double Lead iodide replacement crystals were Lead reaction.

acetate and potassium iodide reacted to form insoluble lead iodide crystals, potassium ions, and acetate ions. As the ions traveled iodide 2. Effects across a semi-permeable forming on Grain membrane, the lead iodide Formation the lead and crystal. and ions collided,

of Weightlessness

Strengthening Metals heated a titanium alloy metal filament to near the melting point to observe the effect of weightlessness on crystal expected reorganization within the metal. It was would produce larger of strength that heating in microgravity increase

Mission

Success

crystal grains and thereby the metal filament. Successful

the inherent

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT

Table Vehicle Crew 3-44. STS-27 Mission Characteristics

337

Atlantis (OV- 104) Cmdr: Robert L. Gibson Pilot: Guy S. Gardner MS: Richard M. Mullane, Jerry L. Ross, William M. Shepherd December 2, 1988, 9:30:34 a.m., EST, Kennedy Space Center The launch, set for December a launch because 1, 1988, during between of unacceptable a classified cloud cover period on winand dow lying within wind conditions December 2. period 6:32 a.m. and 9:32

Launch

a.m., was postponed

and reset for the same launch degrees

Orbital Launch

Altitude Weight

&

Altitude Classified

classified/57.0

Inclination Landing & Postlanding Operations Rollout Distance Rollout Mission Landed Mission Deployed Time Duration Revolution Support Satellites December 6, 1988, 3:36:11 p.m., PST, Runway 17, Edwards Orbiter was returned to Kennedy December 13, 1988 2,171.1 m 43 seconds 4 days, 9 hours. No.Not available Spaceflight Not available None Not available Successful 5 minutes, 37 seconds _STDN)/Tracking and AFB

Tracking

and Data Network System (TDRSS)

Data Relay Satellite Get-Away Specials Experiments Mission Success

338
Table Date January 28, 1986

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

3--45. Return to Flight Event Moments after the Challenger (STS 51-L) explosion, all mission data, flight records, and launch facilities are impounded. Within an hour, Associate an expert Administrator Investigation for Space Flight Board is named Jesse Moore and approved names by panel to investigate. Mishap Chronology

January February

29 3

Interim

NASA Acting Administrator William R. Graham. President Ronald Reagan announces the formation commission to investigate the Challenger accident.

of a presidential Commission is

February

to be headed by former Secretary of State William Rogers. Acting Administrator Graham establishes the 51-L Data and Design Analysis Task Force to assist the Rogers Commission, designating the Associate Administrator for Space Flight as chairperson. U.S. Senate holds first of a series of hearings on the Challenger accident. Rear Admiral for Space Administrator Richard James H. Truly is appointed M. Beggs, Associate Administrator 4, 1985, Flight. on leave since December of indictment, resigns. Indictment is later disreceives apology from Attorney General Edwin Review for Space Shuttle program are planned for every 6 weeks. Modes Effects Office Analysis of Space is

February February February

18 20 25

pending disposition missed, and Beggs Meese. March March March 5 13 24

First Program Management held at Marshall. Reviews NASA begins Items Lists. Admiral Truly, review

of Failure

and Critical Flight mem-

in NASA

Headquarters

orandum "Strategy for Safely Returning Space Shuttle to Flight Status," outlines actions required prior to next flight, first flight/first year operations, directs Marshall National Research of National Space structure. March March April 7 May 12 June 6 28 and development of sustainable motor joint flight rate. Truly redesign team with to form solid rocket

Council (NRC) oversight. Truly initiates review Transportation System (NSTS) management design review is conducted initiates Group to identify of all items

First system

changes to improve flight safety. Arnold D. Aldrich, manager of NSTS, on Critical Items List. NASA Flight Rate Capability Working

review

is established.

NASA initiates Shuttle crew egress and escape review. James C. Fletcher is sworn in as NASA Administrator. Report to the President by the Presidential Accident seal (either redesign (Rogers eliminate Commission Commission) joint on the is seal Space Shuttle Challenger released. It recommends: Redesign Provide Review faulty joint independent Shuttle to more stringent

or redesign

standards) oversight to redefine by NRC the program manager's and positions, management

responsibility, place astronauts in management establish an STS Safety Advisory Panel Improve criticality review and hazard verity the adequacy analysis from NRC should

(An audit panel

of the effort.)

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT

Table 3-45 continued

339

Date
June 6 cont. Establish a safety tor to oversee

Event
office headed by a NASA associate maintainability, reporting, administrasafety, reliability, and quality documentadevelop Review crew (Flight

assurance functions tion, and resolution Improve launch constraints

with viable problem especially

communication,

from Marshall, Flight Team meetings

policy, and record Management attend FRR.)

Readiness

(FRR) and Mission commander should

Improve landing safety, including tire brake and nosewheel steering, and conditions for Kennedy landing, with landing area weather forecasts more than an hour in advance, and create crew escape system for controlled gliding flight and launch abort posand 1 and sibilities in case of main engine failures early in ascent Establish flight rate to be consistent with NASA resources, create firm payload assignment policy especially for Criticality on Science Commission overall by astronaut of Implement items maintenance safeguards,

June II

Admiral Truly testifies before the House Committee Technology on status of work in response to Rogers recommendations Space Robert Shuttle L. Crippen. and announces program management, to be headed

small group to examine

June June

13 19

President Reagan writes to NASA requesting Rogers Commission recommendations. Centaur Astronaut upper stage is terminated L. Crippen because Robert is directed

the implementation of safety concerns.

June 25

to form a fact-finding and implement Administrator effective

group

to assess Shuttle management structure management and communications. June 30 Andrew J. Stofan is appointed Associate

of the Office

July 8

of Space Station at NASA Headquarters. NASA establishes an Office of Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance Administrator. and appoints George

Maintainability, Associate

A. Rodney

July

11

NASA Report to the President, Actions to hnplement Recommendations of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger, states announces return to flight for first quarter favorably area and promises concept of 1988. Fletcher NASA has responded in every to the Rogers another

Commission recommendations report in l year. July 24 August 15 NASA announces station. abandonment

of lead center

Ibr space

President Reagan issues statement announcing intent to build a fourth Shuttle orbiter as a replacement and that NASA will no longer launch Panel. is appointed Director is appointed of Marshall Director Space Flight private satellites. is appointed chair of the Space Flight 10 29 Astronaut Safety Brian D. O'Connor

September September October I

James R. Thompson Center. Lt. Gen. Forrest Space Center.

S. McCartney

of Kennedy

340

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3--45 continued Event 3 Revised policy NASA manifest is published incorporating president's in priorities of NASA. Space Center. Chief, Operational Reliability, new for

Date October

on commercialization

of space and changes Deputy Director Administrator of Johnson

October October October

6 12 14

flying on the Shuttle. Dale D. Myers is appointed Aaron Safety Cohen Branch, is appointed Safety Astronaut Frederick

D. Gregory Division,

is appointed Office

of Safety,

October

29

Maintainability, and Quality Assurance at NASA Headquarters. U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Science and Technology Accident. releases its report: Investigation of the Challenger Aldrich Flight is

November

11

Shuttle appointed

management Director

is reorganized.

NSTS manager of Space

of NSTS in the Office

at NASA

Headquarters. Two NSTS deputy director positions are established: Richard H, Kohrs as Deputy Director for NSTS program and Robert project director December January January 30 7, 1987 9 L. Crippen as Deputy Director of NSTS operations. Shuttle office manager at Marshall is to report directly to the deputy

for NSTS program.

Former Apollo program manager Brig. Gen. Samuel C. Phillip's study of NASA management is presented to the NASA administrator. Administrator Fletcher issues "State of NASA" memorandum and reestablishes Project Approval Document as a management tool. Flight crew is selected for first Space Shuttle mission (STS-26, Discoveo') Richard George after accident: commander--Frederick O. Covey; D. Nelson, and mission and David specialists--John C. Himmers. The Impact of the Challenger the Space Program: A Report Findings strong include: pride in the Shuttle astroexpecof the for posithe of the Challenger with universal as a result federal funds national H. Hauck; M. Lounge, pilot--

January25

Public Opinion Laboratory publishes Accident on Public Attitudes Toward to the National Accident Science Foundation. an already increased

program. Public responded to the deaths nauts with a sense of personal loss. February25 Public viewed accident as a minor tation of a return to flight. Cost-benefit assessment increased accident. There was a willingness to support

setback,

significantly increased

space. Rogers Commission discussion and criticism tive views of NASA held by public. Net effect of accident was a more positive space program.

did not erode toward

attitude

NASA publishes Responses Representatives Committee Investigation of activities investigation. undertaken

to the Recommendations of the House of on Science and Technology Report of the Accident, which includes a summary to the Rogers Commission

of the Challenger

in response

February March 9

Crew begins training for STS-26 Former NASA Deputy Associate H. Shapley is appointed Associate

mission. Administrator Deputy

(1965-1975)

Willis

Administrator

(Policy).

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN
Table 3--45 continued

SPACEFLIGHT

341

Date
May 29 June 22 June 22

Event
John M. Klineberg is appointed Director of Lewis Research Center. Noel W. Hinners is appointed Associate Deputy Administrator (Institution). John W. Townsend Center. Administrator NASA's Report structure details is appointed submits Director report of Goddard Space Flight

June 30

Fletcher changes

to the president motor design,

on status of management analy-

work to implement and communications,

Rogers

Commission review

recommendations. and hazards

to solid rocket

criticality

sis, safety organization, landing safety, launch abort and crew escape, flight rate maintenance safeguards, and related return to flight safeguards. July 22 July 31 August August August August October October November February 22 29 19 11,1988 4 17 30 Second interim progress report of NRC's Committee on Shuttle Criticality Review and Hazard Analysis Audit is issued. Replacement orbiter contract is awarded to Rockwell International, and production STS-26 begins Leadership of OV-105 power-up. _ Future in Space (Ride Report) is released. solid rocket motor. and definition study contracts for Space pledges Shuttle missions is initiated.

and America

First major test occurs on redesigned Advanced solid rocket motor design are awarded NASA issues and expendable Vice President the National Testing begins to five aerospace first mixed

firms by Marshall.

fleet manifest

launch vehicles. Bush, in speech at Marshall, Council if elected on escape system that could Space

to reestablish during and policy to and activicon-

Space

president. be activated Policy

trolled gliding flight. White House issues the President_ Commercial establisb Space Initiative, long-range goals to expand

Directive presence

declaring

it is the president's the human

ty beyond Earth orbit into the solar system, to create opportunities tbr U.S. commerce in space, and to continue the national commitSeptember 29 ment to a permanently manned space station. Successful launch of STS-26, Discovery, signals flight." Mission launches TDRS-C, and orbits Earth 64 times. lasts 4 days, NASA's "return to

1 hour, 57 seconds,

342
Table Mission (GMT, hr:min:sec) 16:37:53.444 37:53.564 37:53.684 38:00.010 38:00.018 38:00.260 38:00.688 38:00.846 38:02.743 3-46. Time in

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Sequence of Major Events of the Challenger Time Source GPC GPC GPC GPC E8 Camera E9 Camera E60 Camera E63 Camera CZR-1 Camera Accident

Elapsed Event ME 3 Ignition ME 2 Ignition ME 1 Ignition SRM Ignition Command Command Command Command (T=0) (sec.) 6.566 6.446 6.326 0.000 0.008 0.250 0.678 0.836 2.733

Holddown Post 2 PIC firing First continuous vertical motion Confirmed smoke above field joint on RH solid rocket motor Eight puffs of smoke (from 0.836 through 2.500 sec MET) Last positive evidence of smoke above right aft solid rocket booster/ of smoke external tank attach ring Last positive visual indication SSME 104% Command RH solid rocket 11.8 psi above Roll maneuver SSME motor nominal initiated pressure

38:03.385 38:04.349 38:05.684 38:07.734 38:19.869 38:21.134 38:35.389 38:37.000 38:51.870 38:58.798 38:59.010 38:59.272 38:59.763

3.375 4.339 5.674 7.724 19.859 2 I. 124 35.379

E60 Camera E41 M2076D B47P2302C V90R5301C E41M2076D VPOR5301C E41M2076D V95H352nC E41M2076D E207 Camera BET E207 Camera E204 Camera

94% Command

Roll maneuver completed SSME 65% Command Roll and yaw attitude response wind (36.990 to 62.990 sec) SSME 104% Command First evidence of flame on RH solid rocket motor Reconstructed Max Q (720 psf) plume on Continuous well-defined RH solid rocket motor Flame in +Z direction of vehicle) (seen to

36.990 51.860 58.788 59.000 59.262 59.753

from RH solid rocket

motor side

from south

39:00.014 39:00.248 39:00.258

SRM pressure First evidence intermittent First evidence plume attaching ring frame

divergence of plume

(RH vs. LH) deflection, booster tank

60.004 60.238 60.248

B47P2302 E207 Camera E203 Camera

of solid rocket to external of plume

39:00.998 39:(tl.734 39:02.094 39:02.414 39:02.494 39:03.934 39:03.974

First evidence continuous

deflection,

60.988 61.724 62.084 62.404 62.484 63.924 63.964

E207 Camera V90R5301C B58H 1150C V90R5341C V 58P0966C V58P0966C V90R5321C

Peak roll rate response to wind Peak TVC response to wind Peak yaw response RH outboard elevon moment spike RH outboard elevon pressure change pitch rate maneuver Start of planned to wind actuator actuator hinge delta

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN
Table Mission (GMT, Time in Event Change in anomalous plume shape (LH_ tank leak near 2058 ring frame) 39:04.715 39:04.947 39:05.174 39:06.774 39:12.214 39:12.294 39:12.488 39:12.507 39:12.535 39:12.574 39:12.574 39:12.634 39:12.974 39:13.020 39:13.054 39:13.055 39:13.134 39:13.134 39:13.147 39:13.153 39:13.172 39:13.201 39:13.221 39:13.223 Bright sustained external tank Start of SSME pitch variations Beginning of transient motion from glow on sides of gimbal angle large 3-46 continued

SPACEFLIGHT

343

Elapsed (see.) 64.660 64.705 64.937 65.164 66.764 72.204 72.284 72.478 72.497 72.525 72.564 72.564 72.624 72.964 data 73.010 73.044 73.045

Time Source E204 E204 Camera Camera

hr:min:see) 39:04.670

V58H 1100A V90R5321C T41PI700C V90R2528C V90R2525C V79H2111A V58HI100A V98A 1581C B58H I 151C T41P1700C Data reduction V41PI330C Data reduction V41P1100C V98A 1581C E204 Camera B47P2302C E207 SSME E207 E204 Camera team Camera Camera

changes in aero forces due to plume Start of external tank LH: ullage pressure deviations Start of divergent yaw rates (RH vs. LH solid rocket booster) Start of divergent pitch rates tRH vs. LH solid rocket booster) SRB major high rate actuator command SSME roll gimbal rate 5 deg/sec Vehicle max +Y lateral acceleration (+.227 g) SRB major high rate actuator valves open downlinked motion with

Start of H! tank pressure two flow control Last state vector

decrease

Start of sharp MPS LOX inlet pressure drop Last full computer frame of TDRS Start of sharp MPS LH: inlet pressure drop Vehicle max; Y lateral acceleration

(.254 g) Circumferential white pattern on 73.124 external tank aft dome (LH2 tank failure) RH solid rocket motor pressure 19 psi lower than LH solid rocket motor First hint of vapor at intertank All engine systems start responding to loss of fuel and LOX inlet pressure Sudden cloud along external tank between intertank and aft dome Flash between orbiter and LHz tank SSME telemetry data interference from 73.211 to 73.303 Flash near solid rocket booster forward attach and brightening of flash between orbiter and external tank First indication of intense white flash at solid rocket point booster forward attach 73.124 73.137 73. 143 73.162 73.191 73.211 73.213

E204 Camera

39:13.292

73.282

E204 Camera

344

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-46 continued

Mission (GMT,

Time in Event Greatly increased white flash intensity of pressure HPFT limits B73.482 MEC data Elapsed (see.) 73.327 73.377 73.383 Time Source E204 Camera V42P1552A E41Tn010D

hr:min:sec) 39:13.337 39:13.387 39:13.393 39:13.492

Start of RCS jet chamber fluctuations All engines discharge approaching temp redline

ME 2 HPFT discharge temp Chan. A vote for shutdown; two strikes on Chan. ME 2 controller last time word update ME 3 in shutdown from HPFT discharge temperature exceedance redline

39:13.492 39:13.513

73.482 73.503

MEC data MEC data

39:13.513 39:13.533

ME 3 controller last time word update ME 1 in shutdown from HPFT discharge temperature exceedance redline data point telemetry data frame and frame

73.503 73.523

MEC data Calculation

39:13.553 39:13.628 39:13.641

ME 1 last telemetered Last validated measurement orbiter

73.543 73.618 73.631

Calculation V46P0120A Data reduction

End of last reconstructed with valid synchronization count

39:14.140 39:14.597 39:16.447 39:50.260 39:50.262

Last radio-frequency signal from orbiter Bright flash in vicinity of orbiter nose RH solid rocket separation/chute RH solid rocket LH solid rocket booster nose cap deployment booster RSS destruct booster RSS destruct

74.130 74.587 76.437 110.250 110.252

Data reduction E204 Camera E207 Camera E202 Camera E230 Camera

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT

Table 3-47. Chronology (STS Date and Time (EST) Jan. 27, 1986 12:36 p.m. NASA project contractor (including managers and Launch Scrub. Decision 51-L) of Events Related Prior to Launch of Challenger

345

to Temperature

Concerns Event made

Key Participants

support Morton

personnel Thiokol )

to scrub because of high crosswinds at launch site. Postscrub appropriate polled launch Discussion. personnel All are to

Jan. 27 1:00 p.m.

Same as above

as to feasibility

again with 24-hour

cycle. Result in no solid rocket booster constraints for launch at 9:38 a.m., January Request ticipants straints. Jan. 27 1:00 p.m. At Kennedy Space Center: manager, space Conversation. Brinton concerns to report 28: any conis made for all par-

Wear asks had any

Boyd C. Brinton,

if Thiokol

booster project, Thiokol; Lawrence O. Wear, manager, solid rocket motor Space project Flight office, Marshall Center Thiokol. cases; Utah: supervisor, Robert ignition system solid rocket

about predicted

low temperatures and above what Thiokol had said about cold temperature following January telephones flight 5 l-C: Brinton Thompson and other Thiokol personnel to ask them to determine whether there were concerns weather and other and effects 1985

At Morton Arnold rocket Ebeling,

R. Thompson, motor manager,

and final assembly, motor project

based on predicted conditions. Ebeling

engineers are notified asked for evaluation. Jan. 27 2:00 p.m. NASA Level I and Level H Mission Meeting. temperature facility D. Management Discussion and weather

Team includes conditions

management. At Kennedy: Jesse W. Moore, associate administrator for space flight, Arnold

at the launch

NASA Headquarters;

Aldrich, manager, space transportation programs, Johnson Space Center; Larry Mulloy, manager, solid rocket booster projects office. Marshall: William Lucas, director, Marshall

predicted for launch at 9:38 a.m. on Jan. 28, 1986.

346

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-47 continued Event Boisjoty meeting learns of cold at Cape at by Ebeling. convened

Date

and Time

Key Participants At Thiokol, Utah; Robert ignition solid rocket Utah: R. Boisjoly, Morton Ebeling, motor Thiokol, manager,

(EST) Jan. 27 2:30 p.m.

seal task lorce, system

temperatures

and final assembly, project Telephone McDonald Ebeling about rocket Conversation. receives call from expressing perlormance booster concern of solid

Jan. 27 4:00 p.m.

At Kennedy: manager, project, services, Thiokol

A.J. McDonald, motor Carver space Thiokol;

solid rocket Morton

Kennedy, vice president, at Kennedy

for Morton

field joints

at low temperature: McDonald indicates Utah: Robert Ebeling, motor project he will call back latest temperature up to launch Carver Launch predictions time. solid rocket

At Thiokol, manager

office, igniter and final assembly, Thiokol, Utah

Kennedy calls Operations Center

and receives latest temperature information. McDonald transmits data to he will Utah and indicates set up telecon engineering Jan. 27 5:15 p.m. At Kenned)': manager, project, AI McDonald, motor Thiokol; Telephone McDonald informing Thiokol concerns

and asks to prepare.

solid rocket Morton

Conversion. calls Houston him that Morton engineering regarding had O-ring he

Cecil Houston, manager, Marshall resident office at Kennedy

temperatures: Houston indicates

will set up teleconference with Marshall and Morton Thiokol.

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT

Table Date and Time (EST) Jan. 27 5:25 p.m. Key Participants At Kennedy: manager, office Cecil Houston, resident Telephone Houston informing A. Lovingood, 3-47 continued Event Conversation: calls Lovingood

347

Marshall

at Kennedy Judson

him of the concerns effects on

about temperature At Marshall. deputy projects manager, office, Shuttle at Marshall

the O-rings and asks him to establish a telecon with: Stanley R. Reinartz, manager, Marshall B. at

Shuttle projects office, at Kennedy: Lawrence Mulloy, booster Kennedy; director, engineering, and Thiokol Jan. 27 5:30 p.m. At Kennedy: manager, office, Stanley R. Reinartz, Telephone Lovingood manager, project, George science Marshall and

solid rocket Hardy, deputy

at Marshall; personnel. Conversation. calls Reinartz to

Shuttle Marshall

projects

inform him of planned 5:45 p.m. teleconference. Lovingood Kingsbury participate proposes (director that of science

At Marshall:

Jud Lovingood, Shuttle projects

deputy manager, office, Marshall

and engineering,

Marshall)

in teleconference.

Jan. 27 5:45 p.m.

At Kennedy: manager, Marshall

Stan Reinartz. projects,

Shuttle

Teleconference. The discussion addresses Thiokol concerns regarding effects the temperature seals: is of the opinion on the O-ring

At Marshall: deputy projects

Jud Lovingood, Shuttle Marshall

Thiokol

manager, office,

launch should be delayed until noon or afternoon. A decision was made to data to transmit the relevant

Plus Thiokol personnel

and other

all of the parties and set up another teleconference for 8:15 p.m. Lovingood recommends to Reinartz to include Lucas, director, Kingsbury conference go to Level recommends Marshall, and in 8:45 p.m. and to plan to II if Thiokol not launching.

348

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-47 continued Event Telephone Conversation.

Date and Time (EST) Jan. 27 6:30 p.m.

Key Participants At Marshall: deputy projects Jud Lovingood, Shuttle Marshall

manager, office,

Lovingood calls Reinartz and tells him that if Thiokol persists, they should not launch: Lovingood also suggests office, advising NSTS conference for Level inform mendation Aldrich, (Level manager, him to recomll), of tele-

At Kennedy: manager, Marshall

Stan Reinartz, projects

Shuttle

to prepare I meeting to delay. Reinartz and

of possible

Jan. 27 7:00 p.m.

At Kennedy: manager, projects

Larry Mulloy, booster Stan Marshall;

Conversion. Mulloy

solid rocket office,

visit Lucas and

Reinartz, manager, Shuttle projects office, Marshall; William Lucas, director, director Jan. 27 8:45 p.m. At Kenned.v: manager, Marshall; Stan Reinartz, Shuttle projects office, Larry Mulloy, manager, Marshall; Vim Kingsbury, Marshall of engineering,

Kingsbury in their motel rooms to inform them of Thiokol concern teleconference. and planned

Teleconference

Participants:

Teleconference.

Telefaxes

of for

charts presenting history of O-ring erosion and blow-by the primary seal in the solid

solid rocket booster projects office, Marshall; A1 McDonald, manager, project, solid rocket Morton motor Thiokol

rocket booster field joints from previous flights, as well as results of subscale tests and static motors: The data show that the timing function of the O-rings would be slower from lower temperatures and that the worst blow-by occurred on solid rocket motor 15 (STS 51-C) in January 1985 with O-ring temperatures of 53 degrees F. Recommendation by Thiokol was not to launch Challenger (STS 51-L) of the E until the temperature tests of solid rocket

At Marshall: deputy office, deputy

Jud Lovingood, Shuttle George science project Hardy, and

manager, Marshall; director,

engineering, At Thiokol, senior Wasatch;

Marshall Utah: Jerry Joe Kilminster, Mason, Thiokol, vice

vice president,

president/manager, Thiokol, Wasatch; vice president,

Shuttle projects, Robert Lund,

engineering,

Thiokol; Roger Boisjoly, seal task force--structures, Thiokol; Arnie Thompson, Thiokol supervisor, structures,

O-ring reached 53 degrees which was the lowest O-ring previous temperature flight. of any

Plus other personnel

SPACE

TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN

SPACEFLIGHT

349

Table and Time (EST) Jan. 27 8:45 p.m. cont. Date Key Participants

3-47

continued Event Mulloy asks tor recommendation from Kilminster. Kilminster states that based upon the recommendation, he can not recommend launch. Hardy is reported by both to

McDonald by Thiokol's tion. Reinartz is under

and Boisjoly recommenda-

have said he is "appalled"

comments

that he that F to

the impression motor F.

solid rocket 90 degrees

is quali-

fied from 40 degrees

NASA personnel challenge conclusions and recommendations. Kilminster 5 minutes asks for off-line to caucus personnel, Caucus at Utah: and

with Thiokol Jan. 27 10:30 p.m. Thiokol personnel: Jerry Joe Cal Mason, Thiokol Thiokol, Caucus. Wasatch,

senior vice president;

lasts for about 30 minutes Major issues ature effects (2) erosion Thompson

Kilminster, vice president manager, Shuttle projects: Wiggins, Division; president, Thompson,

are (1) temperon O-ring of the O-ring.

vice president, Space Robert Lurid, vice engineering; supervisor, Arnie structures;

and Boisjoly

Roger Boisjoly, structures

seal task force--

voice objections to launch, and indication is that Lurid also is reluctant to launch. review A final management

Plus other personnel

is conducted with only Mason. Lund, Kilminster, and Wiggins, Lund is asked to put on hat" by Mason. is: (I) there "management Final agreement

is a substantial margin to erode the primary O-ring by a factor of three times the previous O-ring worst case, and (2) even if the primary does not seal, the is in position and secondary will.

350

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-47 continued Event Conversation. tinues to argue McDonald for delay: con-

Date and Time (EST) Jan. 27 10:30-1 I:00 p.m.

Key Participants At Kennedy." Allan J. McDonald,

manager, space booster project Morton Thiokol; Lawrence B. Mulloy, booster projects, manager, projects, Marshall; solid rocket Marshall; manager, shuttle Jack Buchanan,

McDonald Reinartz's solid rocket 90 degrees explanation are within

challenges rationale that motor is qualiF to

Start Reinartz,

fied at 40 degrees

F and Mulloy's that propellant specifications.

manager, Kennedy operations, for Thiokol; Cecil Houston, Marshall Kennedy resident manager at

mean bulk temperatures

Jan. 27 I 1:00 p.m.

Same Kennedy; Thiokol

Marshall,

and

participants

as earlier

Teleconference. Thiokol cates it had reassessed:

indi-

8:45 p.m. teleeonference

temperature effects are a concern, but data are inconclusive: Kilminster rationale launch. Thiokol Hardy writing reads the for recommending recommends requests launch.

that Thiokol in

puts its recommendation both Kennedy Jan. 27 11:15-11:30 p.m. At Kennedy: manager, Lawrence manager, projects projects Buchanan, Allan J. McDonald, Conversation:

and send it by fax to and Marshall. McDonald

space booster project, Mulloy, Thiokol; solid rocket manager, Marshall; booster shuttle Jack office, Marshall; office,

argues again for delay, asking how NASA could rationalize launching temperature: McDonald indicates if anynot thing happens, he would below qualification

Stan Reinartz,

manager,

Kennedy

operations, for Thiokol; Cecil Houston, manager, Marshall resident office at Kennedy

want to have to explain it to a board of inquiry. McDonald indicates be would because problem tures, cancel launch of the ( I) O-ring at low temperarecovery (2) booster

ships heading into wind toward shore because of high seas, and (3) icing conditions on the launch pad. o McDonald is told it is not his concern and that his will be passed capacity. stated concerns

on in an advisory

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT

Table Date and Time (EST) Jan. 27 I 1:30 p.m. 3-47 continued Event Teleccmference. centers around Stan Discussion the recovery

351

Key Participants At Kennedy: manager, projects Reinartz, projects, Arnold Larry Mulloy, booster Marshall; Shuttle at Kennedy; manager, office, Johnson

solid rocket office, manager. Marshall Aldrich,

hips" activities and brief discussion of the ice condition at the launch complex area: Discussion does not include concerns effects about temperature place fax to office at part not on O-rings.

NSTS program Space Center

Reinartz and Mulloy call to Aldrich. McDonald delivers Jack Buchanan's

Kennedy and overhears of conversation. Aldrich informed concerns. Jan. 27 I 1:45 p.m. is apparently of the O-ring

Telefi_'. Kilminster telefaxes Thiokol's recommendation to launch: Fax is signed by Kilminster, McDonald retrieves fax at Kennedy.

Jan. 28 12:01 a.m. Jan. 28 1:30-3:00

a.m.

Kennedy

meeting

breaks

up.

At Kennedy:

Charles

Stevenson,

Ice Crew Inspection

of Launch

supervisor of ice crew, Kennedy; B,K. Davis, ice team member, Marshall

Pad B. Ice crew finds large quantity of ice on fixed service structure, mobile launch platform, and pad apron and reports conditions.

Jan. 28 5:00 a.m.

At Kennedy: manager, projects William

Larry Mulloy, booster

solid rocket

Conversation. Mulloy tells Lucas of Thiokol's concerns over temperature O-rings Lucas is shown Thiokol tax. effects on and final resolution: copy of

office, Marshall; Lucas, director, Marshall; director Marshall of

Jim Kingsbury, engineering,

352

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 3-47 continued Event Stevenson, Ice Crew Inspection of Launch

Date and Time (EST) Jan. 28 7:00-9:00 a.m.

Key Participants At Kennedy: supervisor B.K. David, Kennedy Charles

of ice crew, Kennedy; ice crew member,

Pad B. Ice crew inspects Launch Pad B and Challenger for ice formation: Davis measures temperature on solid rocket boosters, external tank, orbiter, pad with and launch

infrared pyrometer. Left-hand solid rocket booster seems to be about 25 degrees F, and right-hand solid rocket booster seems to be about 8 degrees F near the aft region. Ice crew is not concerned because Commit report. Crew reports patches of sheet ice on lower segment and skirt of left solid rocket booster. Jan. 28 8:00a.m. At Marshall: deputy Jud Lovingood, shuttle Conversation: Lovingood night's there is no Launch Criteria on surface and does not

temperatures

manager,

projects office, Marshall; Jack Lee, deputy director, Marshall

informs Lee of previous discussions: He indicates

that Thiokol

had at first recommended not launching and, then after Wasatch conference, recom mended launching. He also informs Lee that Thiokol is providing in writfor ing its recommendation launch.

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT

Table Date and Time (EST) Jan. 28 9:00 a.m. Key Participants Nominally NASA Level I and Level 11 Management 3-4 7 continued Event Mission Management Meeting. Discussion conditions at launch Team of ice

353

complex.

There is no apparent discussion of temperature effects on O-ring Jan. 28 10:30 a.m. At Kennedy: Charles Stevenson, seal. of Launch

Ice Crew btspection

supervisor of ice crew: B.K. Davis, ice team member

Pad B. lce crew inspects Launch Pad B for third time: Crew removes ice from water troughs, returns to Launch Control Center at 1"-20 minutes, and reports conditions to Mission Management Team, including fact that ice remains on left solid rocket booster.

Jan. 28 11:38 a.m.

Launch. 51-L)

Challenger is launched.

(STS

354
Table 3-48.

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Schedule for (as Implementation of July 14, 1986) Recommendation of Recommendations

Date of Action/ Tar[_et Date March 1986 March March 1986 13, 1986

Action

Maintenance is established.

Safeguards a Flight

Team Rate

IX - Maintenance VIII - Flight Ill - Critical Hazard Rate

Safeguards

NASA establishes

Capability Working Group. NASA initiates review of all Shuttle program Failure Modes and Effects

Item Review

and

Analysis

Analyses and associated Critical Items Lists. March 24, 1986 Marshall is directed to form a solid I - Solid Rocket VII - Launch Escape Related Motor rocket motor joint redesign team. NASA initiates a Shuttle crew egress May 5-6, 1986 and escape review.

April 7, 1986

Abort and Crew

Formal Program Management Review for Space Shuttle program with managers gram activities of all Shuttle of Centaur Program for Space activities upper ManageShuttle of all is held at is directed to prois held at Marshall.

investigation

June June

19,1986 25, 1986

Termination Second program Shuttle Kennedy.

Related Related

investigation investigation

stage development formal ment Review

is announced.

with managers program

June 25,1986

Astronaut

Robert Crippen

II & IV - Shuttle Structure

Management

to form a fact-finding

group

and Communications

assess the Space Shuttle management structure and communications procedures. July 8, 1986 George Rodney is appointed Associate Administrator for Safety, Aug. 15,1986 Flight Group Aug. 15,1986 Reliability, Maintainability, Working are due II & IV - Shuttle Management Structure and Communications VIII - Flight Rate IV - Safety Organization

and Quality

Assurance.

Rate Capability recommendations

to the Office Management fact-finding associate flight.

of Space Flight. and communications group is to report to the for space Preliminary

administrator Motor

Sept. 1986 Sept. 1, 1986 Sept. 30, 1986

Solid Rocket

l - Solid

Rocket

Motor

Design Review is conducted. Deadline arrives for establishment of a Shuttle Maintenance Safety Panel. plan is completed.

II - Shuttle Structure

Management Safeguards

IX - Maintenance

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT

Table Date of Action/ Target Date Oct. 1, 1986 Decision fact-finding Oct. 1,1986 Crew escape studies Dec. 1986 Decision Action on implementation group is due. abort on VIILaunch Abo_ Aboa of 3-48 continued Recommendation I1 - Shuttle Structure Management

355

recommendations

of management

and launch

and Crew and Crew

are to be completed. on implementation and launch occurs aborts

Escape Vll- Launch Escape III - Critical Hazard

crew escape is due. March 1987 Final review Headquarters

with NASA Modes and Critical

Item Review

and

of Failure

Analysis

and Effects Analyses Items Lists. July Aug. 1987 1987 Landing Interim is completed. brake system

aid implementation is delivered.

VI - Landing V1 - Landin_

Safety Safety

356
Table Date Feb. 18, 1988 May 30, 1988 July Sept. Nov. 15, 1988 15, 1988 15, 1988 3-49.

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Revised Shuttle Manifest (as of October 3, 1986) Vehicle Discoveo, Atlantis Columbia and satellite to observe Discover 3, Atlantis

Mission STS-26/TDRS-C STS-27/DOD STS-28/DOD STS-29/TDRS/D STS-30/HST

Purpose NASA tracking communications Classified Classified NASA tracking communications NASA program the universe information evolution,

and satellite

to gain about its origin, and disposition etc., serviceable Columbia of

stars, galaxies,

dedicated mission, on later missions Jan, 15, 1989 STS-31/Astro Three-mission

NASA

program designed to obtain ultraviolet data on astronomical objects; March May 1, 1989 1, 1989 STS-32/DOD STS-33/Magellan Classified NASA mission to acquire probe for Initiative Columbia Discoveo_ radar map of the surface of Venus; using IUS June July 1, 1989 1, 1989 STS-34/DOD STS-35/MSL-3, GPS-I, GPS-2 Spacelab Spacelab Strategic mission Defense planetary igloo plus two pallets Discover3, Atlantis

MSL--NASA

mission

performs materials processing experiments in low gravity; cross-bay; GPS--DOD and position uses PAM-D2 Classified Classified See STS-35 Assignments and Ulysses determined; for Galileo to be use IUS module the and Discover 3, approximately uses MPESS 3,175 navigation system; upper stage Atlantis Discoveo, Columbia Atlantis kilograms weighs

July Aug.

15, 1989 30, 1989

STS-36/DOD STS-37/DOD STS-38/GPS-3, GPS-4, MSL-4 STS-39/Planetary

Sept. 15, 1989 Oct. 15, 1989

Dec.

1, 1989

STS-40/SLS-

NASA mission effects exposure animal

Spacelab

to investigate of weightlessness using human specimens

SPACE

TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN

SPACEFLIGHT

357

Table Date Jan. 15. 1990 Mission STS-41/GRO

3-49

continued Purpose NASA mission ray sources: mounts Vehicle Columbia

to invesgammafittings

tigate extraterrestrial free-flyer to Shuttle

and provides own propulsion; an ELV candidate Feb. 1, 1990 April 1, 1990 STS-42/DOD STS-43/IML Classified Commercial communications April 15, 1990 STS-44/GPS-5, EOS- 1, SHARE uses PAM-D EOS_Commercial to produce maritime services: mission Columbia to Atlantis Discover3'

pharmaceuticals tests leading and commercial crossbay approximately mission thermal to perspecial weighs

for large-scale FDA approval production: structure:

2,722 kilograms SHARE--NASA evaluate on-orbit

forrnance of a heat pipe radiator element designed for Space Station heat rejection 50-foot system elements Atlantis Discovery Kingdom Columbia communications uses PAM-D2 Atlantis for Galileo to be determined; communiColumbia Discover3, application: May 30, 1990 July 1, 1990 July 15, 1990 STS-45/DOD STS-46/DOD STS-47/GPS-6, Skynet-4, MSL-5

mounts on longeron Classified Classified Skynet--United military satellite;

Aug.

15, 1990

STS-48/DOD STS-49/Planetary

upper stage Classified Assignments and Ulysses uses IUS

Sept. 3[), 1990

Oct.

15, 1990

STS-50/GPS-7, INSAT- 1D, TSS- 1

1NSAT

Indian

cations and meteorological satellite; uses PAM-D TSS--NASA/IIaly cooperative mission to demonstrate syslem capabilities retrieving by deploying tethered satellite data pallet engineering on satellite: and

and measuring from payload

358

NASA

HISTORICAL

DATA

BOOK

Table Date Nov. Mission STS-51/ LDEF RETR,

3-49

continued Purpose LDEF RETR--NASA Vehicle Atlantis

15, 1990

Syncom

mission to retrieve and return the LDEF to Earth so results may be analyzed; avoid uncontrolled will occupy payload approximately bay; weighs 9,980 kilograms purpose reentry; to

about half of

Syncom_Commercial mission to provide communications services under lease to the U.S. Navy (Leasat); 7,711 kilograms perigee stage ATLAS--NASA COFS-I to measure variability weighs with own mission Discover3'

Jan. 15,1991

STS-52, ATLAS-I,

long-term in the total energy

radiated by the Sun and determine the variability in the solar spectrum; plus two pallets COFS--NASA mission to demonstrate integrity retraction, through structural deployment, and for and methods: Columbia igloo

and restowage

develop techniques distributed control adaptive Feb. l,1991 STS-53/GPS-8, GPS-9, SSBUV-I MSL-6, control

pallet SSBUV--NASA mission to measure ozone characteristics of the atmosphere; mounts on longeron; 453.6 weighs kilograms approximately Classified EURECA--ESA placed offering

March March

1,1991 30, 1991

STS-54/DOD STS-55/EURECA, Skynet-4, GPS- 10

OV- 105 platform services Atlantis

in orbit for 6 months conventional

to experiments; releasable, retrievable cross-bay structure, 3.856 weighs approximately kilograms

SPACE TRANSPORTATION/HUMAN

SPACEFLIGHT

359

360

NASA

HISTORICAL

DATA

BOOK

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CHAPTER FOUR

SPACE SCIENCE

CHAPTER FOUR

SPACE SCIENCE

Introduction NASA's Space Science and Applications program was responsible for planning, directing, executing, and evaluating NASA projects focused on using the unique characteristics of the space environment for scientific study of the universe, solving practical problems on Earth, and providing the scientific research foundation for expanding human presence into the solar system. The space science part of these responsibilities (the subject of this chapter) aimed to increase scientific understanding through observing the distant universe, exploring the near universe, and understanding Earth's space environment. The Office of Space Science (OSS) and the Office of Space Science and Applications (OSSA) formed the interface among the scientific community, the president, and Congress. These offices evaluated ideas for new science of sources and pursued those thought most appropriate for conceptual study.' They represented the aspirations of the scientific community, proposed and defended programs before the Office of Management and Budget and Congress, and conducted the programs that Congress authorized and funded. NASNs science missions went through definable phases. In the early stages of a scientific mission, the project scientist, study scientist, or principal investigator would take the lead in specifying the science that the proposed mission intended to achieve and determined its feasibility. Once the mission was approved and preparations were under way, the mission element requirements, such as schedule and cost, took priority. However, once the mission was launched and the data began to be transmitted, received, and analyzed, science again became dominant. From 1979 to 1988, NASA had science missions that

'The ideas for new science came from a variety of sources, among them the various divisions within the science offices, the NASA field installations, the National Academy of Sciences, industry and academia, other U.S. government agencies, international organizations, NASA advisory committees, and the demand caused by shifting national priorities.

363

364

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

werein eachof thesestages--some in theearlyconceptual andmission analysisstages, othersin the definition,development, and execution stages, andstill others in theoperational stage, with thedatabeingused by thescientificcommunity. Thus,although NASAlaunched onlyseventeen dedicated space sciencemissions andconducted four science missions aboardthe Space Shuttlefrom 1979 to 1988, compared to theprevious decade whenthe agency flewapproximately sixty-fivespace science missions, theagency alsocontinuedto receiveand analyzeimpressive datafrom earlier launches andprepared for futuremissions, somedelayed followingthe
Challenger accident. In addition to the delays caused by the Challenger accident, level funding also contributed to the smaller number of missions. NASA chose to invest its resources in more complex and costly missions that investigated a range of phenomena rather than fly a series of missions that investigated similar phenomena. In addition to those managed by NASA, some NASA-launched missions were for other U.S. government or commercial organizations and some were in partnerships with space agencies or commercial entities from other countries. The following sections identify those scientific missions in which NASA provided only launch-related services or other limited services. In spite of the small number of missions, NASA's OSS and OSSA were very visible. Almost every Space Shuttle mission had space science experiments aboard in addition to the dedicated Spacelab missions. Furthermore, scientists received spectacular and unprecedented data from the missions that had been launched in the previous decade, particularly the planetary probes. This chapter describes each space science mission launched during these years as well as those conducted aboard the Space Shuttle. An overview of findings from missions launched during the previous decade is also presented. The Last Decade Reviewed (1969-1978)

From 1969 to 1978, NASA managed space science missions in the broad areas of physics and astronomy, bioscience, and lunar and planetary science. The majority of NASA's science programs were in the physics and astronomy area, with fifty-three payloads launched. Explorer and Explorer-class satellites comprised forty-two of these investigative missions, which provided scientists with data on gamma rays, x-rays, energetic particles, the solar wind, meteoroids, radio signals from celestial sources, solar ultraviolet radiation, and other phenomena. Many of these missions were conducted jointly with other countries. NASA launched four observatory-class physics and astronomy spacecraft programs between 1969 and 1978. These provided flexible orbiting platforms for scientific experiments. Participants in the Orbiting Geophysical Observatories gathered information on atmospheric compo-

SPACE SCIENCE

365

sition.TheOrbitingAstronomical Observatory returned volumes of data on thecomposition, density, andphysicalstateof matterin interstellar space to scientists on Earth.It wasthe mostcomplex automated spacecraft yetin the space science program. It took thefirst ultravioletphotographs of thestars andproduced thefirsthardevidence of theexistence of black holesin space. The High EnergyAstronomyObservatories (HEAO)provided high-quality dataonx-ray,gamma ray,andcosmic ray sources.HEAO-I was the heaviest scientificsatelliteto date. The OrbitingSolarObservatory missions tookmeasurements of theSunand werethe first satellites to capture on film thebeginning of a solarflare andtheconsequent streamers of hotgases thatextended out 10.6million kilometers. It alsodiscovered "polarice caps"on the Sun(darkareas thought tobeseveral milliondegrees cooler thanthenormal surface temperatures). NASAlaunched several otherExplorer-class satellites in cooperative projectswith other countriesor other government agencies. Uhuru, launched fromtheSanMarcolaunchplatformin 1970,scanned 95 percentofthecelestial sphere for sources of x-rays anddiscovered threenew pulsars. The bioscience program sponsored only Biosatellite 3, whose objective wasto determine theeffects of weightlessness ona monkey. In addition,NASA'slife scientists designed manyof the experiments that wereconducted on Skylab. NASA'sOfficeof Planetary Programs explored thenearplanets with thePioneer andMariner probes. NASAconducted threeMariner projects duringthe 1970s, whichinvestigated Mars,Mercury, andVenus. Mariner 9 became thefirst American spacecraft to go into orbitaroundanother planet;it mapped 95percent of theMartiansurface. Thetwo Vikinglandersbecame thefirst spacecraft to soft-land onanother planet whenthey landed on Marsandconducted extended mission operations therewhile twoorbiters circledtheplanet andmapped thesurface. WiththePioneer program, NASAextended itssearch for information totheouterplanets of thesolarsystem. Pioneer 10(traveling atthehighestvelocityeverachieved bya spacecraft) andPioneer l I leftEarth in the early1970s, reaching Jupiterin 1973 andSaturn in 1979. Eventually, in 1987, Pioneer 10wouldcross theorbitof Plutoandbecome thefirstmanufactured objectto traveloutside oursolarsystem. NASAalsosenttwo Voyager spacecraft tothefarplanets. These excursions produced impressivehigh-resolution images of Jupiter andSaturn. Detailed information relatingto space science missions from 1969 through1978canbefoundin Chapter 3 of theNASA Historical Data
Book, Volume 111.2

'Linda Neuman Ezell, NASA Historical Data Book, Volume 111: Programs and Projects, 196%1978 (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4012, 1988).

366
Space Science

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

(1979-1988)

During the ten-year period from 1979 to 1988, NASA launched seventeen space science missions. These included missions sponsored by OSS or OSSA (after its establishment in 1981), missions launched for other U.S. government agencies, and missions that were part of an international effort. The science missions were primarily in the disciplines of Earth and planetary exploration, astrophysics, and solar terrestrial studies. The Life Sciences Division, while not launching any dedicated missions, participated heavily in the Spacelab missions and other scientific investigations that took place during the decade. The decade began with the "year of the planets" in space exploration. During 1979, scientists received their first high-resolution pictures of Jupiter and five of its satellites from Voyagers 1 and 2. Pioneer 11 transmitted the first close-up pictures of Saturn and its moon Titan. Both of these encounters revealed previously unknown information about the planets and their moons. Pioneer Venus went into orbit around Venus in December 1978, and it returned new data about that planet throughout 1979. Also, one Viking orbiter on Mars continued to transmit pictures back to Earth, as did one lander on the planet's surface. Spectacular planetary revelations continued in 1980 with Voyager 1's flyby of Saturn. Dr. Bradford Smith of the University of Arizona, the leader of the Voyager imaging team, stated that investigators "learned more about Saturn in one week than in the entire span of human history. ''3 Thousands of high-resolution images revealed that the planet had hundreds, and perhaps thousands, of rings, not the six or so previously observed. The images also showed three previously unknown satellites circling the planet and confirmed the existence of several others. Scientists also continued receiving excellent data from NASA's two Earth-orbiting HEAOs (launched in 1977 and 1978, respectively). HEAO-2 (also referred to as the Einstein Observatory) returned the first high-resolution images of x-ray sources and detected x-ray sources 1,000 times fainter than any previously observed and 10 million times fainter than the first x-ray stars observed. Scientists studying HEAO data also confirmed the emission of x-rays from Jupiter--the only planet other than Earth known to produce x-rays. Mission operations ceased in 1981, but more than 100 scientific papers per year were still being published using HEAO data in the mid-1990s. The Solar Maximum Mission, launched in 1980, gathered significant new data on solar flares and detected changes in the Sun's energy output. Scientists stated that a cause-and-effect relationship may exist between sustained changes in the Sun's energy output and changes in Earth's weather and climate. The satellite's observations were part of NASA's

3"Highlights of December 24, 1980.

1980

Activities,"

NASA

News,

Release

80-199,

SPACE SCIENCE

367

solarmonitoring program, whichfocused on studying theSunduringa nineteen-month periodwhensunspot activitywasata peakof itselevenyearcycleof activity. During1981,OSSmerged with the Officeof Space andTerrestrial Applications to formOSSA. OSSAparticipated in theSpace Shuttle programwith itsinclusion of theOSTA-Ipayload aboard STS-2. Thiswas thefirst scientificpayload to fly ontheSTS. Exploration of thesolarsystem continued with Voyager 2'ssuccessful encounter with Saturn in August 1981. Building on the knowledge
gained by the Voyager 1 encounter, Voyager 2 provided information relating to the ring structure in detail comparable to a street map and enabled scientists to revise their theories of the ring structure. After leaving Saturn's surroundings, Voyager 2 embarked on a trajectory that would bring it to Uranus in 1986. Pioneer 6 continued to return interplanetary and solar science information while on the lengthiest interplanetary mission to date. Pioneer 10 reached more than 25 thousand million miles from the Sun. Pioneer missions to Venus and Mars also continued transmitting illuminating information about these planets. Beginning in 1982, an increasing number of space science experiments were flown aboard the Space Shuttle. The Shuttle enabled scientists to conduct a wide variety of experiments without the commitment required of a dedicated mission. _ Instruments on satellites deployed from the Shuttle also investigated the Sun's ultraviolet energy output, measured the nature of the solar wind, and detected frozen methane on Pluto and Neptune's moon Triton. In addition, the Pioneer and the Viking spacecraft continued to record and transmit data about the planets each was examining. The Infrared Astronomical Satellite, a 1983 joint venture among NASA, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, revealed a number of intriguing discoveries in its ten-month-long life. These included the possibility of a second solar system forming around the star Vega, five undiscovered comets, a possible tenth planet in our solar system, and a solar dust cloud surrounding our solar system. During 1983, the Space Telescope, then scheduled for launch in 1986, was renamed the Edwin R Hubble Space Telescope. Hubble was a member of the Carnegie Institute, whose studies of galaxies and discoveries of the expanding universe and Hubble's Constant made him one of America's foremost astronomers. In 1984, the Smithsonian Institution's National Air and Space Museum became the new owner of the Viking 1 lander, which was parked 4Tables in Chapter 3 describe many of the experiments conducted aboard the Space Shuttle. Spacelab experiments and OSS and Spacelab missions are described in this chapter. The Office of Space and Terrestrial Applications missions are addressed in Chapter 2, "Space Applications," and OAST-1 is described in Chapter 3, "Aeronautics and Space Research and Technology," both in Volume VI of the NASA Historical Data Book.

368

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

on the surface of Mars. The transfer marked the first time an object on another planet was owned by a United States museum. Also in 1984, the Hubble Space Telescope's five scientific instruments underwent acceptance testing at the Goddard Space Flight Center in preparation for an anticipated 1986 launch. The acceptance testing represented the completion of the most critical element of the final checkout steps for the instruments before their assembly aboard the observatory. NASA announced the start of the Extreme Ultraviolet Explorer, a new satellite planned for launch from the Space Shuttle in 1988 that eventually was launched in 1992 by a Delta launch vehicle. The mission would make the first all-sky survey in the extreme ultraviolet band of the electromagnetic spectrum. An encounter with the Comet Giacobini-Zinner by the International Cometary Explorer highlighted NASA's 1985 science achievements. This was the first spacecraft to carry out the on-site investigation of a comet. Also during 1985, Spacelab 3 carried a series of microgravity experiments aboard the Shuttle, and astronauts on Spacelab 2 conducted a series of astronomy and astrophysics experiments. An instrument pointing system on Spacelab 2, developed by the European Space Agency, operated for the first time and provided a stable platform for highly sensitive astronomical instruments. The Challenger accident in January 1986 temporarily halted science that relied on the Shuttle for deploying scientific satellites and for providing a setting for on-board experiments. Four major scientific missions planned for 1986 were postponed, including Astro-l, the Hubble Space Telescope, and two planetary missions--Galileo and Ulysses. The Spartan Halley spacecraft, to be deployed from Challenger, was destroyed. However, other science activities still took place. Also, the Space and Earth Science Advisory Committee of the NASA Advisory Council issued a report on the status of space science within NASA. The two-year study, titled "The Crisis in Space and Earth Science, A Time for New Commitment," called for greater attention and higher priority for science programs. The most notable 1986 achievement was Voyager 2's encounter with Uranus in January. This encounter provided data on a planetary body never before examined at such close range. From Uranus, the Voyager continued traveling toward a 1989 rendezvous with Neptune. In October t987, NASA issued a revised manifest that reflected the "mixed fleet" concept. This dictated that NASA use the Shuttle only for missions that required human participation or its special capabilities. Some science missions, which had been scheduled for the Shuttle, could be transferred to an expendable launch vehicle with no change in mission objectives. No science missions were launched in 1987. Only one expendable launch vehicle space science launch took place in 1988, but with the resumption of Space Shuttle flights that spring, NASA prepared for the 1989 launches of several delayed space science missions. This included the Hubble Space Telescope, scheduled for launch in December 1989 (but not deployed until April 1990), which underwent comprehensive ground system tests in June 1988. The

SPACE

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369

Magellan spacecraft was delivered to the Kennedy Space Center in October 1988. This spacecraft, scheduled for launch in April 1989, would map the surface of Venus. Galileo, scheduled for launch in October 1989, underwent additional minor modifications associated with its most recent Venus-Earth-Earth Management gravity of the Space assist trajectory. Program from a A 1971 and the

Science

NASA managed its space science and applications program single office, OSSA, from November 1963 to December 1971. reorganization split the office into two organizations: the OSS Office Office of Space of Space and Terrestrial Science Applications.

NASA managed its space science programs from a single office from December 1971 until November 9, 1981 (Figure 4-1). Noel W. Hinners led OSS until his departure from NASA in February 1979. (He returned as director of the Goddard Space Flight Center in 1982.) Thomas A. Mutch led the office from July 1979 through the fall of 1980, when Andrew Stofan became acting associate administrator.
Office of Space Science

Associate

Administrator

for

Space Science Deputy Space Committee Science Steering ]-Associate

Administrator for Space Science Assistant Associate Science Administrator (Science)

for Space

Division Program Analysis

Life Sciences Division

]
Planetary Division 1 .I L (disestablished ate 1980

I
Astrophysics Division I I

I
Solar Terrestrial Division

I
combined

Integration Division Spacelab Mission (est. mid-19791

I
Solar Terrestrial

late 1980

Spacelab Flight Division (est. late 1980)

Solar System Exploration Division (est. late 1980) (became Planetary Earth and Exploration

&

Astrophysics Division (became Astrophysics Div. Nov. 1981)

Div. Nov. 1981)

Figure

4-1.

Office

of

Space

Science

(Through

November

1981)

370

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

In 1979, OSS included divisions for astrophysics, life sciences, planetary science, solar terrestrial science, and program analysis. The Planetary Division was renamed the Solar System Exploration Division in late 1980. This division was disestablished at the time of the reorganization in 1981 and re-formed as the new Earth and Planetary Exploration Division, existing with this title until 1984, when it regained its former title of the Solar System Exploration Division. The Spacelab Mission Integration Division, which was established in mid-1979, evolved into the Space Flight Division in late 1980. Also in late 1980, the Astrophysics Division and the Solar Terrestrial Division combined into the Solar Terrestrial and Astrophysics Division. This division existed until the reorganization in November 1981, when it reformed as the Astrophysics Division. Office of Space Science and Applications

In November 1981, NASA combined OSS and the Office of Space and Terrestrial Applications (OSTA) into the single OSSA (Figure 4-2). NASA Administrator James E. Beggs stated that the consolidation was done because of the program reductions that had occurred in the preceding years and because of the similarity of the technologies that both OSS and OSTA pursued. When the consolidation took place, OSSA consisted of divisions for communications, life sciences, astrophysics, Earth and

Office

of

Space (est.

Science Nov.

and 9,1981)

Applications

i-.:;:;::.o:,:,:,-1
Administrator j Asst. Asst. Asst, Assoc. Assoc. Assoc. Admln. Admln. Adm n. (_ Science nstltutlon) & Applications) I I

o...j

m i
i0 ..... --j
and Information Systems

---F
Mlcrogravlly Science and Al_icaUons lit. Jan Division 1984) I Shuttle Payload [ F__elv _lgUlce ] EngtneeringDivislon (aid. Jan.

1984)

renamed

Sept

1987 _ Appllcmtlons Science

Flight

Systems _

[_

Both

Science

and missions

Applications

Figure 4-2. Office of Space Science and Applications (Established November 1981)

SPACE SCIENCE

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planetary exploration, Spacelab flight, environmental observation, and administration and resources management; it also had materials processing and information systems offices. The reorganization also placed the Goddard Space Flight Center and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory under the administrative management of OSSA. Andrew Stofan led OSSA as acting associate administrator until the appointment of Burton I. Edelson on February 14, 1982. Lennard A. Fisk succeeded Dr. Edelson in April 1987. The Earth and Planetary Exploration Division, the Spacelab Flight Division, the Environmental Observation Division, and the Materials Processing Office were disestablished in January 1984. At that time, the Earth and Planetary Exploration Division became the Solar System Exploration Division, and the Spacelab Flight Division became the Shuttle Payload Engineering Division. NASA also established a new Microgravity Sciences and Applications Division and a new Earth Science and Applications Division. In September 1987, the Communications Division and the Information Systems Office merged into the Communications and Information Systems Division. NASA also promoted the Space Plasma Physics Branch and the Solar and Heliospheric Branch to the Space Physics Division. The Space Plasma Physics Branch had been part of the Earth Science and Applications Division, and the Solar and Heliospheric Branch came from the Astrophysics Division. The Space Telescope Development Division, which had been established in mid- 1983, became part of the Astrophysics Division. At the same time, the Shuttle Payload Engineering Division was renamed the Flight Systems Division. Of these divisions, life sciences, astrophysics, Earth and planetary exploration, space physics, solar system exploration, and space telescope development were considered science divisions rather than applications. This chapter covers missions that are managed by these science divisions. The Life Sciences Division was led by Gerald Soften through 1983, when he was succeeded by Arnauld Nicogossian. Astrophysics programs were led by Theodrick B. Norris through mid-1979, when Franklin D. Martin assumed the role of director. He remained in place when the division combined with the Solar, Terrestrial Division in 1980 (which had been headed by Harold Glaser) through early 1983. At that time, C.J. Pellerin was named to the post. Angeio Guastaferro led the Planetary Division until it was disestablished in late 1980. Guastaferro moved to the new Solar System Exploration Division, where he remained through early 1981, when he moved to the Ames Research Center. Daniel Herman served as director of this division until the OSSA reorganization in November 1981, when the division was eliminated. When the Solar Systems Exploration Division was reestablished in 1984, Geoffrey Briggs headed it. Jesse W. Moore led the Spacelab Mission Integration Division, which became the Spacelab Flight Division, until the November 1981 reorganization. Michael Sander assumed the leadership post at that time and held it until the division was disestablished in 1983. James C. Welch headed

372

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

the Space Telescope Development Divisionuntil it waseliminated in September 1987. TheSpace Physics Division,whichwasestablished in September 1987, wasledby Stanley Shawhan.
Office of Chief Scientist The Office of Chief Scientist was also integral to NASA's science activities. NASA formed this office in 1977 as "a revised role for the [agency's] associate administrator. ''_ Its purpose was to "promote acrossthe-board agency cognizance over scientific affairs and interaction with the scientific community." The chief scientist was responsible for "advising the Administrator on the technical content of the agency's total program from the viewpoint of scientific objectives" and "will serve as a focal point for integrating the agency's programs [and] plans and for the use of scientific advisory committees. ''_ John E. Naugle served as chief scientist through June 1979. The position was vacant until he returned as acting chief scientist in December 1980, remaining until mid-1981. The position was vacant again until the appointment of Frank B. McDonald in September 1982. McDonald served as chief scientist until the appointment of Noel Hinners in 1987, who held that role concurrently with his position as NASA associate deputy administrator-institution. Office of Exploration In June 1987, the NASA administrator established the Office of Exploration. Also related to NASA's science activities, this office was to meet the need for specific activities supporting the long-term goal to "expand human presence and activity beyond Earth orbit into the Solar System. ''7 The office was responsible for coordinating NASA planning activities, particularly to the Moon and Mars. Major responsibilities were to analyze and define missions proposed to achieve the goal of human expansion of Earth, provide central coordination of technical planning studies that involved the entire agency, focus on studies of potential lunar and Martian initiatives, and identify the prerequisite investments in science and advance technology that must be initiated in the near term to achieve the initiatives. Primary concentrations of the Office of Exploration included mission concepts and scenarios, science opportunities, prerequisite technologies and research, precursor missions, infrastructure support requirements, and exploration programmatic

'"NASA Reorganization," NASA Special Announcement, October 25, 1977. 6Additional responsibilities are listed in NASA Management Instruction 1103.36, "Roles and Responsibilities--Chief Scientist," May 17, 1984. 7Office of the Press Secretary, "Presidential Directive on National Space Policy," January 5, 1988.

SPACE SCIENCE

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requirements of resources andschedules. JohnAaronserved as acting assistant administrator until the appointment of FranklinD. Martin as assistant administrator in December 1988.
Money for Space Science Although NASA manages its space science missions through divisions that correspond to scientific disciplines, Congress generally allocates funds through broader categories. From 1979 to 1988, NASA submitted its science budget requests and Congress allocated funds through three categories: physics and astronomy, lunar and planetary (called planetary exploration beginning in FY 1980), and life sciences. Each of these broad categories contained several line items that corresponded either to missions such as the space telescope or to activities such as research and analysis. Some budget category titles exactly match mission names. Other missions that do not appear in the budget under their own names were reimbursable-that is, NASA was reimbursed by another agency for its services and expended minimal funds (relatively speaking) or no funds of its own. These minimal expenses were generally included in other budget categories, such as launch support or ground system support. Still other missions were in-house projects--the work was done primarily by civil servants funded by the Research and Program Management appropriation rather than the Research and Development appropriation. Other science missions could be found in the detailed budget data and the accompanying narratives that NASA's budget office issued. For instance, the FY 1983 Explorer Development budget category under the larger Physics and Astronomy category included the Dynamics Explorer, the Solar Mesosphere Explorer, the Infrared Astronomical Satellite, the Active Magnetospheric Particle Tracer Explorer, the Cosmic Background Explorer, and a category titled "Other Explorers." NASA described the Explorer program as a way of conducting missions with limited, specific objectives that did not require major observatories. During the period addressed in this chapter, all the launched missions were included under the broad budget category of Physics and Astronomy. The Planetary Exploration budget category funded both the ongoing activities relating to missions launched prior to 1979 and those that would be launched beginning in 1989. The Life Sciences budget category funded many of the experiments that took place on the Space Shuttle and also funded NASA-sponsored experiments on the Spacelab missions. This budget category also paid for efforts directed at maintaining the health of Space Shuttle crews, increasing understanding of the effects of microgravity, and investigating the biosphere of Earth. Funds designated for life sciences programs also contributed heavily to the Space Station program effort. Over this ten-year period, funding for space science roughly doubled. This almost kept pace with the increase in the total Research and

374

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Development (R&D) and Space Flight, Control and Data Communications (SFC&DC) budgets, whichslightlymorethandoubled. (TheR&D appropriation wassplit into R&D andSFC&DCin 1984.) Thus,eventhough therewerefewermissions overthis ten-year period thanin theprior tenyears, if relativefundingis a guide, NASAplaced roughlythe same importance on space science at thebeginning of the decade thatit did atitsconclusion. Thefiguresin thetables followingthischapter (Tables 4-1 through 4-23)showdollarsthathavenotbeen inflated. If oneconsiders inflation andrealbuyingability,thenfundingfor space science remained fairly leveloverthedecade.
Space Science Missions

Prior to the merger of NASA's OSS and OSTA in November 1981, missions could clearly be considered either space science or space applications. However, once the two organizations merged, a clear distinction was not always possible. This chapter includes activities formulated by NASA as space science missions and funded that way by Congress. It also includes science missions managed by other organizations for which NASA provided only launch services or some other nonscientific service. The first subsection describes physics and astronomy missions, beginning with missions that were launched from 1979 to 1988. The next subsection covers on-board Shuttle missions during the decade. The third subsection contains physics and astronomy missions that were launched during the previous decade but continued to operate in these years and the missions that were under development during this decade but would not be launched until after 1988. The final subsection describes planetary missions--first those that were launched during the previous decade but continued to return data and then those being developed from 1979 to 1988 in preparation for launch after 1988. Table 4-24 lists each science mission that NASA either managed or had some other support role (indicated with an "*") and its corresponding discipline or management area. Physics and Astronomy Program

The goal of NASA's Physics and Astronomy program was to add to what was already known about the origin and evolution of the universe, the fundamental laws of physics, and the formation of stars and planets. NASA conducted space-based research that investigated the structure and dynamics of the Sun and its long- and short-term variations; cosmic ray, x-ray, ultraviolet, optical, infrared, and radio emissions from stars, interstellar gas and dust, pulsars, neutron stars, quasars, black holes, and other celestial sources; and the laws governing the interactions and processes occurring in the universe. Many of the phenomena being investigated were not detectable from ground-based observatories because of the obscuring or distorting effects of Earth's atmosphere. NASA accom-

SPACE SCIENCE plished theobjectives

375

of the program with a mix of large, complex, freeflying space missions, less complex Explorer spacecraft, Shuttle and Spacelab flights, and suborbital activities. Spacecraft Charging at High Altitudes

The Spacecraft Charging at High Altitudes mission was part of a U.S. Air Force program seeking to prevent anomalous behavior associated with satellites orbiting Earth at or near geosynchronous altitudes of 37,000 kilometers. NASA provided the launch vehicle and launch vehicle support as part of a 1975 agreement between OSS (representing NASA) and the Space and Missile Systems Organization (representing the Air Force). OSS also provided three scientific experiments. Each experiment investigated electrical static discharges that affected satellites in geostationary orbit. The experiments measured electrons, protons, and alpha particles, the surface charging and discharging of the satellite, and anomalous currents flowing through the spacecraft's wires at any given time. This mission's characteristics are listed in Table 4-25. UK-6 The launch of UK-6 (also called Ariel) marked the one hundredth Scout launch. This was a fully reimbursable mission under the terms of a March 16, 1976, contract between NASA and the United Kingdom Science Research Council. NASA provided the launching and tracking services required for the mission. The project provided scientists with a large body of information about heavy nuclei. These invisible cosmic bullets supplied clues to the nature and origin of the universe. The experiments aboard the satellite examined cosmic rays and x-rays emitted by quasars, supernovas, and pulsars in deep space. UK-6's characteristics are in Table 4-26. High Energy Astronomy Observatory-3

HEAO-3 was the third in a series of three Atlas-Centaur-launched satellites to survey the entire sky for x-ray sources and background of about one millionth of the intensity of the brightest known source, SCO X1. It also measured the gamma ray flux, determined source locations and line spectra, and examined the composition and synthesis of cosmic ray nuclei. HEAO-3 carried three instruments that performed an all-sky survey of cosmic rays and gamma rays, similar to the earlier HEAO missions except at a higher orbital inclination. This higher orbital inclination allowed instruments to take advantage of the greater cosmic ray flux near Earth's magnetic poles. One objective was to measure the spectrum and intensity of both diffuse and discrete sources of x-ray and gamma ray radiation. In addition, HEAO-3 carried an instrument that observed high atomic number relativistic nuclei in the cosmic rays and measured the

376

NASA HISTORICAL

DATA BOOK

elemental abundance

composition and energy spectra of the individual elements.

of these

nuclei

to determine

the

HEAO-3 operated until May 30, 1981, when it expended the last of its supply of thruster gases used for attitude control and was powered down. With twenty months of operating time in orbit, HEAO-3 became the third HEAO spacecraft to perform for more than twice its intended design life. Its characteristics are in Table 4-27; Figures 4-3 through 4-5 show diagrams of three HEAO instruments.

Figure 4-3. HEAO High-Spectral Resolution Gamma RgO,Spectrometer

Neon (Typic.,

Fl|ah \

Tube _

A;'PI_

_ _ _._ _

Glllm Counter

Radiator Box Aerogel/_llca Counter

__
PhotomultlpllW _

\\
_

Power n.d_t_

_1)

Figure 4-4. HEAO Isotopic Composition of Primaly Cosmic Rays

SPACE

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Ion

Chamber Module

.._

Detector (ICDM)

Ion Chamber Detector Module (ICDM)

_ Photomul_tpller Ammmbly (PMA)

S/C

Interlace

Fitting

Hodoscope

Ammmbly

Honeycomb W_ndow _,

Charge

Oetector

Assembly

Figure

4-5.

HEAO

Heavy

Nuclei

Experiment

Solar

Maximum

Mission

The Solar Maximum Mission (also known as Solar Max) observatory was an Earth-orbiting satellite that continued NASA's solar observatory research program, which had begun in 1962. The satellite was a three-axis inertially stabilized platform that provided precise stable pointing to any region on the Sun to within five seconds of arc. The mission studied a specific set of solar phenomena: the impulsive, energetic events known as solar flares and the active regions that were the sites of flares, sunspots, and other manifestations of solar activity. Solar Max allowed detailed observation of active regions of the Sun simultaneously by instruments that covered gamma ray, hard and soft x-ray, ultraviolet, and visible spectral ranges. Table 4-28 lists the mission's characteristics, and Figure 4-6 contains a diagram of Solar Max's instruments. Solar Max was part of an international program involving a worldwide network of observatories. More than 400 scientists from approximately sixty institutions in seventeen foreign nations and the United States participated in collaborative observational and theoretical studies of solar flares. In the solar science community, 1980 was designated the "Solar Maximum Year" because it marked the peak of sunspot activity in the Sun's eleven-year cycle of activity. The first months of the mission were extremely successful. Careful

378

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

X-Rmy po(yohromllor

Herd X.Ray Imaging Spectromaor

*Theee Instrurnenli trove no aPel ure ho_d In the forward clo_eout. They view thrOUgh an opeque cloeeout plate.

Figure 4-6. Solar Maximum

Instruments

orchestration of the instruments resulted in the most detailed look at solar flares ever achieved. The instruments recorded hundreds of flares, and the cumulative new data base was unsurpassed. Solar Max instruments set new standards of accuracy and precision and led scientists to a number of firsts and new answers to old questions. However, nine months into the mission, fuses in the attitude control system failed, and the satellite lost its ability to point with fine precision at the Sun. Although a few instruments continued to send valuable data despite the loss of fine pointing, most of the instruments were useless, and those still operating lost the benefits of operating in a coordinated program. The mission was declared a success, however, because its operation, although abbreviated, fulfilled the success criteria established before launch. Nevertheless, its reduction from the expected two years to nine months meant a significant loss to solar science. NASA designed Solar Max to be serviced in space by a Space Shuttle crew. Thus, in April 1984, the crew of STS 41-C successfully repaired Solar Max. Following its repair, Solar Max operated successfully until November 1989. A description of the STS 41-C repair mission is in Chapter 3. Dynamics Explorer l and 2

The Dynamics Explorer 1 and 2 satellites provided data about the coupling of energy, electric currents, electric fields, and plasmas (ionized

SPACE SCIENCE

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atomicparticles)amongthe magnetosphere, the ionosphere, andthe atmosphere. Thetwospacecraft worked together toexamine theprocessesby whichenergy fromtheSunflowsthrough interplanetary space and entered theregionaround Earth,controlled by themagnetic forces from Earth's magnetic field,toproduce theauroras (northern lights)thataffect radiotransmissions andpossibly influence basicweather patterns. Thetwo satellites werestacked ona Deltalaunch vehicleandplaced into coplanar(in the sameplanebut at different altitudes)orbits. DynamicsExplorer i was placedin a higher elliptical orbit than Dynamics Explorer 2.Thehigherorbitallowed for globalauroralimaging,wave measurements in thecenter of themagnetosphere, andcrossing of auroralfieldlinesatseveral Earthradii.Dynamics Explorer 2'slower orbit allowedfor neutralcomposition andtemperature andwind measurements, aswell asaninitial apogee to allowmeasurements above the interaction regions forsuprathermal ionsandplasma flow measurements atthebase of themagnetosphere field lines.Thetwo satellites carried a total of fifteeninstruments, whichtook measurements in five general categories: Electricfield-induced convection Magnetosphere-ionosphere electric currents Directenergy coupling between themagnetosphere andtheionosphere Mass coupling between theionosphere andthemagnetosphere Wave, particle, andplasma interactions

TheDynamics Explorer mission complemented theworkof twoprevioussetsof satellites, theAtmosphere Explorers andthe International Sun-Earth Explorers. ThethreeAtmosphere Explorersatellites studied theeffects of theabsorption of ultraviolet lightwaves by theupper atmosphere at altitudes aslow asa satellite canorbit (about130kilometers). The threeInternational Sun-Earth Explorersatellites studied how the solarwind interacted with Earth's magnetic field to transfer energy and ionized chargedparticles into the magnetosphere. The Dynamics Explorer mission alsowasto setthestage for a fourthprogram planned for laterin the 1980s thatwouldprovidea comprehensive assessment of theenergy balance in near-Earth space. Themission's characteristics are in Table 4-29.
Solar Mesospheric Explorer

The Solar Mesospheric Explorer, launched in 1981, was part of the NASA Upper Atmospheric Research program. NASA developed this program under the congressional mandates in the FY 1976 NASA Authorization Act and the Clean Air Act Amendments of ! 977. It focused on developing a solid body of knowledge of the physics, chemistry, and dynamics of the upper atmosphere. From an initial emphasis on assessments of the impacts of chlorofluoromethane releases, Shuttle exhausts,

380

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

andaircrafteffluentson stratospheric ozone, the program evolvedinto extensive field measurements, laboratory studies, theoretical developments, dataanalysis, andflight missions. TheSolarMesospheric Explorer wasdesigned to supply dataonthe nature andmagnitude of changes in themesospheric ozone densities that resulted fromchanges in thesolarultravioletflux. It examined theinterrelationship between ozone andwatervaporandits photodissociation products in themesosphere andamong ozone, watervapor, andnitrogen dioxidein theupper stratosphere. TheUniversity of Colorado's Laboratory forAtmospheric andSpace Physics provided thescience instruments for this mission. Thelaboratory,undercontract to theJetPropulsion Laboratory, wasalsoresponsible for theobservatory module, mission operations, the Project Operations ControlCenter,andsciencedataevaluation and dissemination. Ball Aerospace's Systems Divisionprovided thespacecraft busandsatellite integration andtesting. The science teamwascomposed of seventeen members fromfour institutions. A science dataprocessing system, locatedattheLaboratory forAtmospheric andSpace Physics, featured anonline centralprocessing andanalysis system to performthemajorityof datareduction andanalysis for thescience investigations. Thespacecraft consisted oftwo sections (Figure 4-7). Thespacecraft bus carriedcommunication, electrical,and command equipment. A notable feature wasthe 1.25-meter diameter discusedfor mounting the 2,156solarcellsdirected toward theSuntofeedpowerintothetwo nickel cadmium batteries. A passive system thatusedinsulating material and a network of stripes ontheoutersurface keptinternal temperatures within limits.Thesatellite bodywasspin-stabilized.
Spin Axis

j_

_f-

Infrared

Radiometer

Shadow

Side

Ozone.r.._._n_Spectrometor Inft'ared Radiometer _ Note: High gain antenna end Ncond omnl anlmnna mounNd in centre' of solar ceil array ring on Sun ,.]de "--1,27 Micron

Bua

('_'_er_'otmd)

Spectrome_w

Figure

4-7.

Solar

Mesospheric

Explorer

Satellite

Configuration

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381

9O 8O T 7O 6O 50 40 30 20 0 Mesosphere

90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 0

--I I --'l--I ......

_1
I
_ 0 I.r'e O "_-

o N o

" O N O

(V

o_ o_

='

Figure 4-8. Altitude Regions to Be Measured by Solar Mesospheric Explorer Instruments The observatory module carried the instruments. Four limb scanning instruments measured ozone, water vapor, nitrogen dioxide, temperature, and pressure in the upper stratosphere and mesosphere at particular altitudes (Figure 4-8). Two additional instruments monitored the Sun. The Solar Mesospheric Explorer spun about its long axis at ninety degrees to its orbital plane so that on every turn, the instruments scanned the atmosphere on the horizon between twenty and eighty kilometers. Data from the rotating science instruments are gated (cycled "on") once each revolution. Table 4-30 lists the characteristics of each instrument, and Table 4-31 lists the mission's characteristics. Infrared Astronomy Satellite

The Infrared Astronomy Satellite (IRAS) was the second Netherlands-United States cooperative satellite project, the first being the Astronomical Netherlands Satellite launched in 1974. A memorandum of understanding between the Netherlands Agency for Aerospace Programs

382

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

andNASA established the projecton October4, 1977.The United Kingdom alsoparticipated in theprogram under a separate memorandum of understandingbetween the United Kingdom's Science and EngineeringResearchCouncil and the NetherlandsAgency for Aerospace Programs. Underthetermsof the memorandum of understanding, theUnited States providedthe infraredtelescope system, the taperecorders, the Deltalaunch vehicle, thescientific dataprocessing, andtheU.S.co-chair andmembers oftheJointIRASScience Working Group. TheNetherlands Agency for Aerospace Programsprovidedthe other co-chair and European members of theJointIRASScience Working Group, thespacecraft,theDutchadditional experiment (DAX),andtheintegration, testing, and launchpreparations for the flight satellite.The Netherlands Agencyfor Aerospace Programs and the Science and Engineering Research Councilprovided spacecraft command andcontrolandprimary dataacquisition with a groundstationandcontrolcenterlocatedat Chilton,England.The UnitedStatesprovidedlimited tracking,command,anddataacquisition by stations in the NASAGroundSpacecraft Tracking andDataNetwork. IRASwasthefirst infrared satellite mission. It produced anall-sky survey of discrete sources in theformof skyandsource catalogues using fourbroad photometry channels between eightand120micrometers. The mission performed theall-skysurvey, provided additional observations on themoreinteresting known anddiscovered sources, andanalyzed thedata. Thesatellite system consisted oftwomajorsystems: theinfrared telescope andthespacecraft (Figure 4-9).The infrared telescope system consisted of focal-plane the telescope, detector array. cryogenics The detector equipment, electronics, and a array consisted of a primary set

Figure

4-9.

Infrared

Astronomy

Satellite

Configuration

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of infrared detectors, a set of photodiodes for use as aspect sensors, and a DAX. The DAX comprised a low-resolution spectrometer, a chopped photometric channel, and a short wavelength channel. The spacecraft provided the support functions of electrical power, attitude control, computing, and telecommunications. During its all-sky survey, IRAS observed several important phenomena. It detected a new comet, named Comet IRAS-Araki-Alcock (1983d), which was distinguished by its very close approach to Earth, 5 million kilometers on May 11, 1983, the closest approach to Earth of a comet in 200 years. IRAS discovered a second, extremely faint comet (1983f) on May 12. This comet was a million times fainter than the first and was leaving the solar system. IRAS also discovered very young stars (protostars) no more than a million years old. It also observed two closely interacting galaxies that were being disrupted by each other's gravitational forces. IRAS made approximately 200,000 observations and transmitted more than 200 billion bits of data, which scientists have continued to examine and analyze. IRAS revolutionized our understanding of star formation, with observations of protostars and of interstellar gas in star-forming regions. It discovered the "interstellar cirrus" of wispy cool far-infrared emitting dust throughout our galaxy. It discovered infrared emissions in spiral galaxies, including a previously unknown class of"ultraluminous infrared galaxies" in which new stars were forming at a very great rate. IRAS also showed that quasars emit large amounts of far-infrared radiation, suggesting the presence of interstellar dust in the host galaxies of those objects. IRAS operated successfully until November 21, 1983, when it used the last of the super-fluid helium refrigerant that cooled the telescope. IRAS represented as great an improvement over ground-based telescopes as the Palomar 200-inch telescope was over Galileo's telescope. The unprecedented sensitivity of IRAS provided a survey of a large, unexplored gap in the electromagnetic spectrum. The international IRAS science team compiled a catalogue of nearly 250,000 sources measured at four infrared wavelengths--including approximately 20,000 new galaxies and 16,000 small extended sources--and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory's Infrared Processing and Analysis Center produced IRAS Sky Maps. IRAS successfully surveyed more than 96 percent of the sky. Its mission characteristics are in Table 4-32. The Plasma Interaction Experiment (PIX-II) also rode on the Delta launch vehicle that deployed IRAS. A Lewis Research Center investigation, PIX-II evaluated the effects of solar panel area on the interactions between the space charged-particle environment and surfaces at high potentials (+/-one keV). PIX-II was the second experiment to investigate the effects of space plasma on solar arrays, power system conductors, insulators, and other exposed spacecraft components. The experiment remained with the second stage of the Delta launch vehicle in orbit at an altitude of 640 kilometers. Data from PIX-II were transmitted to two tracking stations.

384
European

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

X-Ray Obsen,ato O, Satellite

NASA launched the European X-Ray Observatory Satellite (EXOSAT) for the European Space Agency (ESA), which reimbursed NASA for the cost of providing standard launch support in accordance with the terms of a launch services agreement signed March 25, 1983. A Delta 3914 placed the satellite in a highly elliptical orbit that required approximately four days to complete. This orbit provided maximum observation periods, up to eighty hours at a time, while keeping the spacecraft in full sunlight for most of the year, thereby keeping thermal conditions relatively stable and simplifying alignment procedures. The orbit also allowed practically continuous coverage by a single ground station. EXOSAT supplied detailed data on cosmic x-ray sources in the soft x-ray band four one-hundredths keV to eighty keV. The principal scientific objectives involved locating x-ray sources and studying their spectroscopic and temporal characteristics. The location of x-ray sources was determined by the use of x-ray imaging telescopes. The observatory also mapped diffuse extended sources such as supernova remnants and resolve sources within nearby galaxies and galaxies within clusters. The spacecraft performed broad-band spectroscopy, or "color" cataloguing of x-ray sources, and studied the time variability of sources over time scales ranging from milliseconds to days. The EXOSAT observatory was a three-axis stabilized platform with an inherent orbit correction capability. It consisted of a central body covered with super-insulating thermal blankets and a one-degree-of-freedom rotatable solar array. The platform held the four experiments, which were co-aligned with the optical axis defined by two star trackers, each mounted on an imaging telescope (Figure 4-10). Table 4-33 contains the mission's characteristics. Shuttle Pallet Satellite The Shuttle Pallet Satellite (SPAS)-01 was a reusable platform built by the German aerospace firm Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm (MBB) and carried on STS-7 as part of an agreement with MBB. The agreement provided that, in return for MBB's equipping SPAS-01 for use in testing the deployment and retrieval capabilities of the remote manipulator arm, NASA would substantially reduce the launching charge for SPAS-01. The platform contained six scientific experiments from the West German Federal Ministry of Research and Technology, two from ESA, and three from NASA along with several cameras. The first satellite designed to be recaptured by the Shuttle's robot arm, SPAS-01 operated both inside and outside the orbiter's cargo bay. In the cargo bay, the satellite demonstrated its system performance and served as a mounted platform for operating scientific experiments. Seven scientific experiments were turned on during the third day of the flight and ran continuously for about twenty-four hours.

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385

z h yx
Gas Supply for _ Low Energy Imaging _ Gas SclnUIIlUon

ov
Experiment FlectTonlcs Boxes Marked -

'___
Focal Plane /_l'_..-'ii_..L'm J _ __

2-_-_

_-p____,
_F_i_ Array

,__,

(Star

Tracker,

/--

OC_

(S-Bank

Antmnna())

_..Su.,or/
Figure 4-10. L_ph,ded

ll[l__--"
View qf the European X-Ray Observatory Satellite

In the free-flyer mode, SPAS-01 was used as a test article to demonstrate the orbiter's capability to deploy and retrieve satellites in low-Earth orbit. During this phase of the mission, crew members operated two German and three NASA experiments. MBB built the platform to demonstrate how spaceflights could be used for private enterprise purposes. The West German Federal Ministry of Research and Technology supported the SPAS-01 pilot project and contributed to mission funding. Mission characteristics are in Table 4-34. Hilat The Air Force developed Hilat to gather data on ionospheric irregularities and auroras (northern lights) in an effort to improve the effectiveness of Department of Defense communications systems. The interaction of charged particles, ionized atmospheric gases, and magnetic fields can degrade radio communications and radar system performance at high

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NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

latitudes. Four of the five experiments on board were sponsored by the Defense Nuclear Agencies. They measured turbulence caused by ionospheric irregularities and observed electron, ion, proton, and magnetic activity. The fifth experiment, sponsored by the Air Force Geophysics Laboratory at Hanscom Air Force Base, used an auroral ionospheric mapper to gather imagery of the auroras. NASA was reimbursed for launch services. Table 4-35 contains the mission's characteristics. Active Magnetospheric Particle Tracer Explorers

The Active Magnetospheric Particle Tracer Explorers (AMPTE) project investigated the transfer of mass from the solar wind to the magnetosphere and its further transport and energization within the magnetosphere. It attempted to establish how much of this immense flow from the Sun, which sometimes affected the performance of electronic systems aboard satellites, entered the magnetosphere and where it went. AMPTE mission objectives were to: Investigate the entry of solar wind ions to the magnetosphere Study the transport of magnetotail plasma from the distant tail to the inner regions of the magnetosphere Study the interaction between an artificially injected plasma and the solar wind Establish the elemental and charge composition particles in the equatorial magnetosphere of energetic charge

The scientific experiments carried aboard the three AMPTE satellites (described below) helped determine the number and energy spectrum of solar wind ions and, ultimately, how they gained their high energies. Figure 4-11 illustrates the distortion of Earth's magnetic field into the magnetosphere. AMPTE also investigated the interaction of two different flowing plasmas in space, another common astronomical phenomenon. AMPTE studied in detail the local disturbances that resulted when a cold dense plasma was injected and interacted with the hot, rapidly flowing natural plasmas of the solar wind and magnetosphere. The AMPTE spacecraft injected tracer elements into near-Earth space and then observed the motion and acceleration of those ions. One expected result was the formation of artificial comets, which were observed from aircraft and from the ground. In this respect, AMPTE's active interaction with the environment made it different from previous space probes, which had passively measured their surrounding environment. This international cooperative mission consisted of three spacecraft: (1) a German-provided Ion Release Module (IRM), which injected artificial tracer ions (lithium and barium) inside and outside Earth's magnetosphere; (2) a U.S.-provided Charge Composition Explorer (CCE), which detected and monitored these ions as they convected and diffused

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Solar

wind Magneto_here

nldllUon

belta

Figure (The pushing solar field

4-11. wind

Distortion Earth

of Earth k magnetic

k Magnetic field, back

Field in some to the eases night side. )

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of Earth

through the inner magnetosphere; and (3) a United Kingdom-provided subsatellite (UKS), which detected and monitored these ions within a few hundred kilometers of the release point. Each of the spacecraft contributed to the achievement of the mission objectives. The IRM released tracer ions in the solar wind and attempted to detect them with the CCE inside the magnetosphere. This was done wind conditions and with different tracer and The IRM observed also released their energy four times ions. under different solar sheet took

barium and lithium ions into the plasma spectrum at the CCE. Four such releases

place. In addition to the spacecraft observations, ground stations and aircraft in the Northern and Southern Hemispheres observed the artificial comet and tail releases. No tracer ions were detected in the CCE data, a surprising result, because, fluxes of tracer ions should the case of the last two Composition the capability formed two according to accepted theories, significant have been observed at the CCE. However, in tail releases, the loss of the Hot Plasma

Experiment instrument on April 4, 1985, severely restricted of the CCE to detect low-energy ions. The spacecraft also barium artificial comets. In both instances, a variety of

ground observation sites in the Northern and Southern Hemispheres obtained good images of these comets. Observations relating to the composition, charge, and energy spectra of energetic particles in the near equatorial orbit plane of the CCE

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were to occur for a period of at least six months. With the exception of the Hot Plasma Composition Experiment, the instruments on board the CCE acquired the most comprehensive and unique data set on magnetospheric ions ever collected. For the first time, the ions that made up the bulk of Earth's ring current were identified, their spectrum determined, and dynamics studied. Several major magnetic storms that occurred during the first year of operation allowed measurements to be taken over a wide range of magnetic activity indices and solar wind conditions. The three AMPTE spacecraft were launched into two different orbits. A Delta launch vehicle released the three satellites in a stacked fashion. The CCE separated first from the group of three, and the IRM and UKS remained joined. The CCE on-board thrusters fired to position the satellite in Earth's equatorial plane. About eight hours later, the IRM fired an on-board rocket to raise the IRM/UKS orbit apogee to twice its initial value. The two satellites then separated, and for the remainder of the mission, small thrusters on the UKS allowed it to fly in close formation with the IRM satellite. Tables 4-36, 4-37, and 4-38 list the specific orbit characteristics of the three satellites. Spartan 1

Spartan 1 was the first of a continuing series of low-cost free-flyers designed to extend the observing time of sounding-rocket-class experiments from a few minutes to several hours. The Astrophysics Division of NASA's OSSA sponsored the satellite. The Naval Research Laboratory provided the scientific instrument through a NASA grant. The instrument, a medium-energy x-ray scanner, had been successfully flown several times on NASA sounding rockets. It scanned the Perseus Cluster, Galactic Center, and Scorpius X-2 to provide x-ray data over the energy range of a half keV to fifteen keV (Figure 4-12). The June 1985 launch was NASA's second attempt to launch Spartan 1. It had previously been manifested on STS 41-F for an August 1984 flight, but was demanifested because of problems with the launch of Discoveo,. Researchers could use the Spartan family of reusable satellites for a large variety of astrophysics experiments. The satellites were designed to be deployed and retrieved by the Shuttle orbiter using the remote manipulator system. Once deployed, the Spartan satellite could perform scientific observations for up to forty hours. All pointing sequences and satellite control commands were stored aboard the Spartan in a microcomputer controller. A 10_-bit tape recorder recorded all data, and no command or telemetry link was provided. Once the Spartan satellite completed its observations, it "safed" all systems and placed itself in a stable attitude to allow for retrieval by the orbiter and a return to Earth for data analysis and preparation for a new mission. Table 4-39 lists Spartan l's mission characteristics.

SPACE SCIENCE
Grapple Sun Thrusters Solar Optical ._ Bench Fixture

389

/
Radiator

Bright Sensor

Sunshade Door

Radar Enhancement De_ces

Figure

4-12.

Spartan

Plasma

Diagnostic

Package

The Plasma Diagnostics Package (PDP) flew on two Shuttle missions--STS-3 as part of the OSS- 1 payload and STS 51-F as part of the Spacelab 2 mission. On its first flight, it made measurements while mounted in the Shuttle payload bay and while suspended from the remote manipulator arm. It successfully measured electromagnetic noise created by the Shuttle and detected other electrical reactions taking place between the Shuttle and the ionospheric plasma. On STS 51-F, the PDP made additional measurements near the Shuttle and was also released as a free-flyer on the third day of the mission to measure electric and magnetic fields at various distances from the orbiter. During the maneuvers away from the Shuttle, called a "flyaround," a momentum wheel spun the satellite to fix it in a stable enough position for accurate measurements. As the orbiter moved away to a distance of approximately a half kilometer, an assembly of instruments mounted on the PDP measured various plasma characteristics, such as low-energy electron and proton distribution, plasma waves, electric field strength, electron density and temperature, ion energy and direction, and pressure of unchanged atoms. This was the first time that ambient plasma was sampled so far from the Shuttle. The survey helped investigators determine how far the orbiter's effects extended. Figure 4-13 illustrates PDP experiment hardware, and Table 4-40 describes characteristics of the PDP on STS 5 I-F. PDP characteristics on STS-3 were very similar.

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Figure 4-13.

Plasma

Diagnostics

Package

Experiment

Hardware

Spartan

203 (Spartan

Halley)

Spartan 203 was one of the STS 51 -L payloads aboard Challenger that was destroyed in January 1986. Spartan Halley, the second in NASA's continuing series of low-cost free-flyers, was to photograph Halley's comet and measure its ultraviolet spectrum during its forty hours of flight in formation with the Shuttle. The spacecraft was to be deployed during the second day of the flight and retrieved on the fifth day. Both operations would use the remote manipulator system. The instruments being used had flown on sounding rockets as well as on the Mariner spacecraft. The mission was to take advantage of Comet Halley's location of less than 107.8 million kilometers from the Sun during the later part of January 1986. This period was scientifically important because of the increased rate of sublimation as the comet neared perihelion, which would occur on February 9. As Halley neared the Sun, temperatures would rise, releasing ices and clathrates, compounds trapped in ice crystals. NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center and the University of Colorado's Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics recycled several instruments and designs to produce a low-cost, high-yield spacecraft. Two spectrometers, derived from backups for a Mariner 9 instrument that studied the Martian atmosphere in 1971, were rebuilt to survey the comet in ultraviolet light from 128- to 340-nanometer wavelength. The spectrometers were not to produce images but would reveal the comet's chemistry through the ultraviolet spectral lines they recorded. From these data, scientists would have gained a better understanding of how (1) chemical structure of the comet evolved from the coma and proceeded down the tail, (2) species changed with relation to sunlight and dynamic processes within the comet, and (3) dominant atmospheric activities at perihelion related to the comet's long-term evolution. Figure 4-14 shows the Spartan Halley configuration, and Table 4-41 lists the mission's characteristics.

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ACS

Jets

lar

Radar

Reflec_rs

Figure

4-14.

Spartan

Halley

Configuration

Polar

BEAR

The Polar Beacon Experiments and Auroral Research satellite (Polar BEAR) mission, a follow-on to the 1983 Hilat mission, conducted a series of experiments for the Department of Defense that studied radio interference caused by the Aurora Borealis. Launched by NASA on a Scout launch vehicle, the satellite had hung in the Smithsonian for more than fifteen years. The retooled Oscar 17 satellite was built in the mid1960s by the Navy as a spare teristics are in Table 4-42. San Marco D/L but never launched. Polar BEAR's charac-

The San Marco D/L spacecraft, one element of a cooperative satellite project between Italy and the United States, explored the relationship between solar activity and meteorological phenomena, with emphasis on lower atmospheric winds of the equatorial thermosphere and ionosphere. This information augmented and was used with data obtained from ground-based facilities and other satellites. The San Marco D/L project was the filth mission in a series of joint research missions conducted under an agreement between NASA and the Italian Space Commission. The first memorandum of understanding (MOU) between Italy's Italian Commissione per le Ricerche Spaziali and NASA initiated the program in May 1962. The first flight under this agreement took place in March 1964

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with the successful launch by the Centro Ricerche Aerospaziali of a twostage Nike sounding rocket from the Santa Rita launch platform off Kenya's coast. This vehicle carried the basic elements of the San Marco science instrumentation, flight-qualified the components, and provided a means of checking out range instrumentation and equipment. This launch was followed by the December 1964 launch of the fully instrumented San Marco-I spacecraft from Wallops Island, Virginia. This marked the first time in NASA's international cooperative program that a satellite launch operation had been conducted by a non-U.S, team and the first use of a satellite fully designed and built in Western Europe. This launch also qualified the basic spacecraft design and confirmed the usefulness and reliability of the drag balance device for accurate determinations of air density values and satellite attitude. Implementation of the agreement continued with the launch of San Marco-II into an equatorial orbit from the San Marco platform off the coast of Kenya in April 1967. This was the first satellite to be placed into equatorial orbit. The San Marco-II carried the same instrumentation as the San Marco-I, but the equatorial orbit permitted a more detailed study of density variations versus altitude in the equatorial region. The successful launch also qualified the San Marco range as a reliable facility for future satellite launches. A second MOU between Centro Ricerche Aerospaziali and NASA signed in November 1967 provided for continued cooperation in satellite measurements of atmospheric characteristics and the establishment of the San Marco C program. The effort enhanced and continued the drag balance studies of the previous projects and initiated complementary mass spectrometer investigations of the equatorial neutral particle atmosphere. This phase enabled simultaneous measurements of atmospheric density from one satellite by three different techniques: direct particle detection, direct drag, and integrated drag. The San Marco C1 was launched on April 24, 1971, and the San Marco C2 was launched on February 18, 1974, both from the San Marco platform. The platform had also been used earlier in 1970 to launch Uhuru, an Explorer satellite that scanned 95 percent of the celestial sphere for sources of x-rays. It discovered three new pulsars that had not previously been identified. NASA and Centro Ricerche Aerospaziali signed a third MOU in August 1974, continuing and extending their cooperation in satellite measurements of atmospheric characteristics and establishing the San Marco/Atmosphere Explorer Cooperative Project. This effort measured diurnal variations of the equatorial neutral atmosphere density, composition, and temperature for correlation with the Explorer 51 data for studies of the physics and dynamics of the thermosphere. The San Marco D MOU was signed by Centro Ricerche Aerospaziali in July 1976 and by NASA in September 1976. This MOU assigned project management responsibility for the Italian portion of the project to Centro Ricerche Aerospaziali, while the Goddard Space Flight Center assumed project responsibility for the U.S. portion. There was also an

SPACE SCIENCE
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393

+Z

Figure 4-15. San Marco D/L Sp,cecraft auxiliary cooperative agreement between the University of Rome and the Deutsche Forschungs Versuchsanstat fiir Luft und Raumfahrt (DFVLR) of the Federal Republic of Germany. This activity would explore the possible relationship between solar activity and meteorological phenomena to further define the structure, dynamics, and aeronomy of the equatorial thermosphere. Although initially both a low-orbit and an upper orbit spacecraft were planned, the program was reduced to a single spacecraft program--the low-orbit San Marco D/L (Figure 4-15). In accordance with the MOU, the Centro Ricerche Aerospaziali provided the spacecraft, its subsystems, and an air drag balance system. The Deutsche Forschungs Versuchsanstat fur Luft und Raumfahrt provided an airglow solar spectrometer. NASA provided an ion velocity instrument, a wind/temperature spectrometer, and an electric field instrument. NASA also provided the Scout launch vehicle and technical and consultation support to the Italian project team. Mission characteristics of the San Marco D/L are in Table 443. Attached Shuttle Payload Bay Science Missions

Beginning with the launch of STS-I in April 1981, NASA had an additional platform available for performing scientific experiments. No longer did it have to deploy a satellite to obtain the benefits of a micro-

394

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

gravityenvironment. Now,the payload bayonthe Space Shuttle could providethis typeof environment. NASAusedthese surroundings for a varietyof smaller experiments, smallself-contained payloads, andlarge experimentalmissions.Theselarger missionswere sponsored by NASA'sOSS,OSTA,OSSA,andOffice of Aeronautics and Space Technology (OAST).This chapter addresses theOSSandOSSAmissions(the Spacelab missions). The OSTAmissionsare includedin Chapter 2,"Space Applications," andthemission sponsored by OASTis discussedin Chapter 3, "Aeronautics and SpaceResearchand Technology," bothin Volume VI of theNASA Historical Data Book.
Spacelab Missions

NASA conducted three joint U.S./ESA Spacelab missions. Spacelab 1 (STS-9) and Spacelab 2 (STS 51-G) were verification flights. Spacelab 3 (STS 51-B) was an operational flight. Spacelab 1 was the largest international cooperative space effort yet undertaken and concluded more than ten years of intensive work by some fifty industrial firms and ten nations. Spacelab 1 cost the ESA approximately $1 billion. NASA also flew the first Spacelab reimbursable flight, Deutschland-1 (D-l), on STS 61-A in 1985. Table 4-44 provides a chronology of Spacelab development prior to the first Spacelab mission. Tables 4-45 through 4-48 supply details of the experiments flown on each mission. Spacelab 1. The Spacelab 1 mission, which flew on STS-9, exemplified the versatility of the Space Shuttle. Payload specialist Ulf Merbold of ESA summed up the mission: "That was science around the clock and round the earth. TM Payload specialists conducted science and applications investigations in stratospheric and upper atmospheric physics, materials processing, space plasma physics, biology, medicine, astronomy, solar physics, Earth observations, and lubrication technology. The broad discipline areas included atmospheric physics and Earth observations, space plasma physics, astronomy and solar physics, material sciences and technology, and life sciences (Table 4-45). Atmospheric physics and Earth observations, space plasma physics, and solar physics investigators used the Spacelab 1 orbiting laboratory to study the origin and influence of turbulent forces that sweep by Earth causing visible auroral displays and disturbing radio broadcasts, civilian and military electronics, power distribution, and satellite systems. The astronomy investigations studied astronomical sources in the ultraviolet and x-ray wavelengths. These wavelengths were not observable on Earth because of absorption by the ionosphere or ozone layer. The materials science and technology investigations demonstrated the capability of Spacelab as a technological development and test facility. The experi_"Spacelab Utilization Future Tasks," MBB/ERNO Report, Vol. 9, No. 1,

April 1984, p. 8, NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC.

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ments in this group took advantage of the microgravity conditions to perform studies on materials and mechanisms that are adversely affected on Earth by gravity. The life sciences investigations studied the effects of the space environment (microgravity and high-energy radiation) on human physiology and on the growth, development, and organization of living systems. Figures 4-16, 4-17, and 4-18 show the locations of the Spacelab 1 experiments. Spacelab 3. Spacelab 3, conducted on STS 51-B, was the first operational Spacelab mission. It used several new mini-laboratories that would be used again on future flights. Investigators evaluated two crystal growth furnaces, a life support and housing facility for small animals, and two types of apparatus for the study of fluids on this flight. Most of the experiment equipment was contained inside the laboratory, but instruments that required direct exposure to space were mounted outside in the open payload bay of the Shuttle. Figure 4-19 shows the experiment module layout, and Table 4-46 lists Spacelab 3's experiments. Materials science was a major thrust of Spacelab 3. Spacelab served as a microgravity facility in which processes could be studied and materials produced without the interference of gravity. A payload specialist with special expertise in crystal growth succeeded in producing the first crystal grown in space. Studies in fluid mechanics also took advantage of the microgravity environment. Investigations proved the concept of"containerless" processing for materials science experiments with the successful operation of the Drop Dynamics Module.
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Spacelab 3 carried a contingent of animals living in the newly designed Research Animal Holding Facility. This facility maintained healthy, small mammals, although animal food and waste leaked from the containers because of inadequate seal design and higher than expected vigor of monkeys, who kicked the material into the airflow of their cages. During the mission, the crew members observed two monkeys and twenty-four rodents for the effects of weightlessness. The crew also served as experimental subjects, with investigations in the use of biofeedback techniques to control space sickness and in changes in body fluids brought about by weightlessness. Atmospheric physics and chemistry experiments provided more data than previously obtained in decades of balloon-based research. An experimental atmospheric modeling machine provided more than 46,000 images useful for solar, Jupiter, and Earth studies. In all, more than 250 billion bits of data were returned during the mission, and of the fifteen experiments conducted, fourteen were considered successful. Spacelab 2. Spacelab 2 completed the second of two planned verification flights required by the Spacelab Verification Test Flight program. Flown on STS 5 I-F, Spacelab 2 was a NASA-developed payload. Its configuration included an igloo attached to a lead pallet, with the instrument pointing subsystem mounted on it, a two-pallet train, and an experiment special support structure (Figure 4-20). The experiments were located on the instrument pointing subsystem, the pallets, the special support structure, and the middeck of the orbiter, and one was based on the ground.

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%
Key: 1, Grille 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. t0. 11. 12. 13. 14, Spectrometer With Particle 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. With With Unit With Particle Experiment Particle Dynamic Particle 27. 28. Arcjet 26. Magnetoplasma INput Spectrophotometer Microwave Scatterometer Isotopic Stack Electronics Box Electronics Scintillation Flux Sensor Active Unit Space Experiments With Particle Particle Accelerator Particle Particle Gas Plume Accelerators Charger Space Experiments With Accelerators Space Space Accelerators Experiments Flight With Accelerators Verification Equipment Active Cavity Radiometer Diagnostic Electron Experiments With Box Assembly Counter Space Experiments Accelerations Low Level Microwave Light Television Electronics

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Figure

4-18.

Spacelab

Pallet

Experiment

Locations

The pallets provided mounting and support for experiments that required an atmosphere-free environment. The special support structure was specially designed to support the Elemental Composition and Energy Spectral of Cosmic Ray Nuclei experiment. Fourteen experiments supported by seventeen principal investigators were conducted (Table 4-47). The experiments were in the fields of life sciences, plasma physics, infrared astronomy, high-energy physics, solar physics, atmospheric physics, and technology. Spacelab D-1. Spacelab D-I, the "German Spacelab," concentrated on scientific experiments on materials in a microgravity environment.

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Figure 4-19. Spacelab 3 Experiment Module Layout (Looking Down From the Top) This mission, flown on STS 61-A, was the second flight of the Materials Experiment Assembly (the first was on STS-7). Experiments included investigations of semiconductor materials, miscibility gap materials, and containerless processing of glass melts (Table 4-48). OSS-I (STS-3) observaand that

The OSS-1 mission objectives were to conduct scientific tions that demonstrated the Space Shuttle's research capabilities

Instrument

Pointing

Subsystem

Igloo

Special

SL!ort

Structure

Figure 4-20. Spacelab 2 Configuration

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were appropriate for flight on an early mission: observations of the orbiter's environment that

to conduct supplementary had specific applicability

to plasma physics and astronomical payloads; and to evaluate technology that may have application in future experiments in space. The experiments obtained data on the near-Earth space environment, including the degree of contamination (gases, dust, and outgassing particles) introduced by the orbiter itself. The OSS-I payload, also designated the "Pathfinder Mission," was a precursor to the Spacelab missions. It was developed to characterize the environment around the orbiter associated with the operation of the Shuttle and to demonstrate the Shuttle's research capability for science applications and technology in space. It verified that research measurements could be carried out successfully on future Shuttle missions and performed scientific measurements using the Shuttle's unique capabilities. The mission included scientific investigations in space plasma physics, solar physics, astronomy, life sciences, and space technology. Six of the nine experiments were designed by scientists at five American universities and one British university and were operated under their supervision during the mission. One experiment was developed by the Naval Research Laboratory, and two were developed by the Goddard Space Flight Center (Table 4-49). The OSS-I experiments being flown in the orbiter's payload bay were carried on a special U-shaped structure called an orbital flight test pallet. The three-meterby-four-meter aluminum flame and panel structure weighing 527 kilograms was a Spacelab element that would be used later in the STS program (Figure 4--21 ). Other Physics and Astronomy Missions

The following sections describe physics and astronomy missions that were launched prior to 1979 and continued operating into the 1980s, followed by a discussion of missions that underwent development from 1979 to 1988 but did not launch until later. Readers can find details of the early stages of the ongoing Historical Data Book. _ Ongoing Physics science missions in Volume III of the NASA

and Astronomy

Missions

International Ultraviolet Explorer. The International Ultraviolet Explorer (IUE) mission was a joint enterprise of NASA, ESA, and the British Science Research Council. IUE !, launched into geosynchronous orbit on January 26, 1978, on a Delta launch vehicle, allowed hundreds of users at two locations to conduct spectral studies of celestial ultraviolet sources. It was the first satellite totally dedicated to ultraviolet astron-

'*Ezell, NASA Historical

Dam Book, Volume IlL

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NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Remote Syslem

Manipulator (arm) Controls d Circuit TV Screens Command Status Panel

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Monitor

So_ar UV S

MSFC Av+on?c_ SOlar Flere X-Re Vehicle Chlrgin 9 and Pot e/nt kll Experiment Peckag Freon Pump

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Figure 4-21. OSS-} Payload Configuration omy. The IUE mission objective was to conduct spectral distribution studies of celestial ultraviolet sources. The scientific goals were to: Obtain high-resolution spectra of stars Study gas streams Observe faint stars, galaxies, and quasars Observe the spectra of planets and comets Make repeated observations that showed variable spectra Define more precisely the modifications of starlight caused by interstellar dust and gas

NASA provided the 1UE spacecraft, the optical and mechanical components of the scientific instruments, the U.S. ground observatory, and the spacecraft control software. ESA contributed the solar arrays needed as a power source and the European ground observatory in Spain. The British Science Research Council oversaw the development of the spectrograph television cameras and, with the United States, the image processing software.

Targets of IUE's investigations included faint stars, hot stars, quasars, comets, gas streams, extragalactic objects, and the interstellar medium. A forty-five-centimeter Ritchey Chretien telescope aided in the investigations. Geosynchronous orbit permitted continuous observations and real-

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time databy theinvestigators at thetwo groundobservatories. Objects observed by IUEincluded planets, stars, andgalaxies. IUEspecialized in targets of opportunity, suchascomets, novae, andsupernovae. Often,IUE allowedsimultaneous dataacquisition andwasusedin conjunction withothertelescopes fromaround theworld.In itslateryears of operation, these collaborations involved suchspacecraft astheHubble Space Telescope, theGerman Roentgen Satellite, theCompton Gamma RayObservatory, theVoyager probes, the Space Shuttle's Astro-1mission,the Extreme UltravioletExplorer, andJapan's ASCAsatellite,as well asnumerous ground-based observatories. In 1979, IUEproduced thefirst evidence confirming theexistence of agalactic halo,consisting of high-temperature, rarefied gasextending far above andbelowtheMilky Way.In 1980,it verifiedexpectations that space between isolated galaxies washighlytransparent andcontributed very little to the total mass of the universe. Extensive observation of activebinarystars demonstrated thatstellarmagnetic fieldsandrotation probably combined to cause thetremendous levelsof solar-like activity in manyclasses of such stellarsystems. Studies usingIUEdataalsoindicated aconsistent andcontinuous evolution of coronas, windcharacteristics, and mass-loss rates,varying from the hot, fast winds andlow mass-loss rateof theSunto theslow,coolwindsandhighmass-loss rate of thecoolest giantandsupergiant stars.In addition,IUE provided the firstdetailed studies of comets throughout theiractivecyclein theinner solar system,providing new clues to their internal composition. Observations alsoconfirmed thediscovery of ahothaloof gassurroundingtheMilky Way. In 1986,IUEprovided space-based observations of Halley'sComet andits tail duringthe Japanese, European, andSovietmissions to its nucleus andlaterinitiated periodic observations of Supernova 1987a. The observations provided thekeydatarequired toidentifythetrueprogenitor of thesupernova. As it continued to observe Supernova 1987a, IUEdiscovered theremnant shellfromtheredsupergiant stage of thesupernova aswell asdetermined thechanging properties of theejecta fromcontinuingobservations. Thespacecraft made thebestdetermination of thelight curveandits implications concerning thenature of theenergy source. Whenlaunched in 1978,the IUE spacecraft hada statedlifetime expectancy of threeto five years. It wasshutdownon September 30, 1996, aftermorethaneighteen years of mission elapsed time.
International Sun-Earth ExplorerInternational Explorer. The International Sun-Earth Explorer (ISEE) collaborative three-spacecraft program with ESA. ISEE into a "halo" orbit in November 1978 about the Earth-Sun from which it observed the solar wind an hour before it Cometary program was a 3 was injected libration point, reached Earth's

magnetosphere. This capability could provide advance warning of impending magnetospheric and ionosphere disturbances near Earth, which the ISEE 1 and 2 spacecraft monitored. ISEE 3 also observed electrons that carried energy from Earth's bow shock toward the Sun.

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AlthoughEarth'smagnetic field diverted mostof the solarwind,some interacted, producing plasma waves; sometransferred energy insidethe magnetosphere; andsome washurledbacktoward theSun. ISEE3 completed itsoriginalmission of monitoring thesolarwindin 1983 andwasmaneuvered intoanorbitswinging through Earth's magnetic tail andbehind theMoon,using theMoon'sgravityto boost thespacecrafttoward rendezvous withacomet. ISEE3 obtained thefirst in situ field
and particle measurements in Earth's magnetotail. Also in 1983, NASA renamed ISEE 3 the International Cometary Explorer (ICE). It left its Earth orbit on December 22, 1983, to encounter the Comet Giacobini-Zinner on September 11, 1985. ICE passed within 8,000 kilometers of the comet's nucleus and through the comet's tail. It provided the first spacecraft data on a comet's magnetic field, plasma environment, and dust content. Orbiting Astronomical Observatories. The Orbiting Astronomical Observatory-3, named Copernicus, continued to furnish information on an apparent black hole detected in the constellation Scorpius until its operations were shut down on December 31 1980, because of degradation in the experiment's detection system. Its work also included discoveries of clumpy structures and shocked million-degree gas in the interstellar medium and measurements of the ultraviolet spectra of the chromospheres and coronas of stars other than the Sun. Physics and Astronomy Missions Under Development From 1979 to 1988

Hubble Space Telescope. The history of the Hubble Space Telescope can be traced back as far as 1962, when the National Academy of Sciences published a report recommending the construction of a large space telescope. In 1973, NASA established a small scientific and engineering steering committee to determine which scientific objectives would be feasible for a proposed space telescope. C. Robert O'Dell of the University of Chicago headed the team. He viewed the project as an opportunity to establish a permanent orbiting observatory. In 1978, responsibility for the design, development, and construction of the space telescope went to the Marshall Space Flight Center. The Goddard Space Flight Center was chosen to lead the development of the scientific instruments and the ground control center. Marshall selected Perkin-Elmer of Danbury, Connecticut, over Itek and Kodak to develop the optical system and guidance sensors. Lockheed Missiles and Space Company of Sunnyvale, California, was selected over Martin Marietta and Boeing to produce the protective outer shroud and the support systems module for the telescope, as well as to assemble and integrate the finished product. ESA agreed to furnish the spacecraft solar arrays, one of the scientific instruments (Faint Object Camera), and personnel to support the Space Telescope Science Institute in exchange for 15 percent of the observing time and access to the data from the other instruments. Goddard scientists were selected to develop one instrument, and scientists at the California Institute of Technology, the University of California at San Diego, and the

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University ofWisconsin were selected todevelop threeotherinstruments. Thetelescope's construction wascompleted in 1985. Because of Hubble's complexity, NASAestablished two newfacilitiesunder thedirection of Goddard thatwerededicated exclusively tothe scientific and engineering operationof the telescope. The Space Telescope Operations ControlCenterat Goddard would serveas the groundcontrolfacility for the telescope. TheSpace Telescope Science Institute, located onthecampus ofJohns Hopkins University, wouldperformthescience planning for thetelescope. Hubble wasoriginallyscheduled for a 1986 launch. Thedestruction of Challenger in 1986, however, delayed the launch for several years.
Engineers used the interim period to subject the telescope to intensive testing and evaluation. A series of end-to-end tests involving the Space Telescope Science Institute, Goddard, the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System, and the spacecraft were performed during that time, resulting in overall improvements in system reliability. The launch would finally occur on April 25, 1990. After launch, it was discovered that the telescope's primary mirror had a "spherical aberration" that caused out-of-focus images. A mirror defect only one-twenty-fifth the width of a human hair prevented Hubble from focusing all light to a single point. In addition, problems with the solar panels caused degradation in the spacecraft's pointing stability. At first many believed that that the spherical aberration, which was undetected during manufacturing because of a flawed measuring device, would cripple the telescope, but scientists quickly found a way to use computer enhancement to work around the abnormality. A repair mission aboard STS-61 in December 1993 replaced the solar panels and installed corrective lenses, which greatly improved the quality of the images. Table 4--50 outlines the development of the Hubble mission. The scientific objectives of the Hubble mission were to investigate the composition, physical characteristics, and dynamics of celestial bodies, to examine the formation, structure, and evolution of stars and galaxies, to study the history and evolution of the universe, and to provide a long-term space-based research facility for optical astronomy. In addition, the Space Telescope Advisory Committee identified three key Hubble projects: (I) determine distances to galaxies and the Hubble Constant, (2) conduct a medium-deep survey of the sky, and (3) study quasar absorption lines. The Hubble Space Telescope is a large Earth-orbiting astronomical telescope designed to observe the heavens from above the interference and turbulence of Earth's atmosphere. It is composed of a 2.4-meter Ritchey-Chretien reflector with a cluster of five scientific instruments at the focal plane of the telescope and the fine guidance sensors. Its scientific instruments can make observations in the ultraviolet, visible, and near-infrared parts of the spectrum (roughly 120-nanometer to one-millimeter wavelengths), and it can detect objects as faint as magnitude 31, with an angular resolution of about one-tenth arcsecond in the visible part

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High Gain Antenna (2)

- _oncl4mry Minor

AI)orture

Ooor

Light Primary

Shield

Fine Guidance Optical Con+Wol Son,ore

Aft Shroud

Rldlal Solar Array (2)

Figure

4-22.

Hubble

Space

Telescope

of the spectrum. The spacecraft is to provide the first images of the surfaces of Pluto and its moon Charon and, by looking back in time and space, to determine how galaxies evolved in the initial period after the Big Bang. The telescope relays data to Earth via the high-gain antennae. The Hubble Space Telescope is distinguished from ground-based observatories by its capability to observe light in the ultraviolet and near infrared. It also has an order of magnitude better resolution than is capable from within Earth's atmosphere. The telescope has a modular design, allowing on-orbit servicing via the Space Shuttle (Figure 4-22). Over the course of its anticipated fifteen-year operational lifetime, NASA plans several visits by Space Shuttle crews for the installation of new instruments, repairs, and maintenance. Hubble is about the size of a bus--it has a weight of approximately 11,000 kilograms and length of more than thirteen meters. It travels in a 611-kilometer circular orbit with an inclination of twenty-eight and a half degrees. Compton Gamma Ray Observatory. NASA initiated the Compton Gamma Ray Observatory (CGRO) mission in 1981. It would be the second of NASA's orbiting Great Observatories, following the Hubble Space Telescope. During 1984, NASA completed the critical design reviews on all the instruments, and flight instrument hardware fabrication and assembly began. Also in 1984, NASA completed the spacecraft preliminary design review. In 1985, the design was completed, and NASA conducted the observatory critical design review. Manufacturing began on the structure and mechanisms and nearly completed fabrication of all hardware for

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the four scientific instruments. Manufacturing of the mechanical components and electronic systems approached completion during 1987, and the primary structure for the observatory was fabricated and assembled. CGRO was a NASA cooperative program. The Federal Republic of Germany (the former West Germany), with co-investigator support from The Netherlands, ESA, the United Kingdom, and the United States, had principal investigator responsibility for one of the four instruments. Germany also furnished hardware elements and co-investigator support for a second instrument. NASA provided the remaining instruments and named the observatory in honor of Dr. Arthur Holly Compton, who won the Nobel Prize in physics for work on scattering of high-energy photons by electrons. This process was central to the gamma ray detection techniques of all four instruments. CGRO was launched on April 5, 1991, aboard the Space Shuttle Atlantis. Dedicated to observing the high-energy universe, it would be the heaviest astrophysical payload flown to that time, weighing 15,422 kilograms, or more than fifteen metric tons (Figure 4-23). While Hubble's instruments would operate at visible and ultraviolet wavelengths, CGRO would carry a collection of four instruments that together could detect an unprecedented broad range of gamma rays. These instruments were the Burst and Transient Source Experiment, the Oriented Scintillation Spectrometer COMPTEL), Experiment, the and the Energetic imaging Gamma Compton Telescope (known Ray Experiment Telescope. as

Imaging Compton Telescope

RMS Grapple

1
OSSE MPS Fine Sensor Sun ACAD (2)

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Figure

4-23.

Compton

Gamma

Ray

Observator3,

Configuration

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NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

These four instruments would be much larger and more sensitive than any gamma ray telescopes previously flown in space. The large size was necessary because the number of gamma ray interactions that could be recorded was directly related to the mass of the detector. Because the number of gamma ray photons from celestial sources was very small when compared to the number of optical photons, large instruments were needed to detect a significant number of gamma rays in a reasonable amount of time. The combination of these instruments would detect photon energies from 20,000 electron volts to more than 30 billion electron volts. For each of the instruments, an improvement in sensitivity of better than a factor of ten was realized over previous missions. CGRO mission objectives were to measure gamma radiation from the universe and to explore the fundamental physical processes powering it. The observational objectives of CGRO were to search for direct evidence of the synthesis of the chemical elements, to observe high-energy astrophysical processes occurring in supernovae, neutron stars, and black holes, to locate gamma ray burst sources, to measure the diffuse gamma ray radiation for cosmological evidence of its origin, and to search for unique gamma ray emitting objects. The observatory had a diverse scientific agenda, including studies of very energetic celestial phenomena: solar flares, cosmic gamma ray bursts, pulsars, nova and supernova explosions, accreting black holes of stellar dimensions, quasar emission, and interactions of cosmic rays with the interstellar medium. Extreme Ultraviolet Explorer. The Extreme Ultraviolet Explorer (EUVE) was an Earth-orbiting sky survey and spectroscopy mission. Its primary objectives were to produce a definitive sky map and catalogue of sources covering the extreme ultraviolet portion of the electromagnetic spectrum and to conduct pointed spectroscopy studies of selected extreme ultraviolet targets. Scientists from the University of California at Berkeley proposed the sky survey experiment for EUVE in 1975 in response to two NASA Announcements of Opportunity. NASA conditionally accepted the Berkeley concept in 1977, pending receipt of adequate funding and completion of implementation studies. In 1981, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory assumed project management responsibilities. NASA transferred this responsibility to the Goddard Space Flight Center in 1986, following a decision to retrieve the Multimission Modular Spacecraft from the Solar Maximum Mission and refurbish it for use with EUVE. In 1986, when it became evident that the Solar Maximum Mission would reenter Earth's atmosphere before a retrieval mission could be mounted, NASA exercised its option to procure a new spacecraft from Fairchild Space. The resulting Explorer Platform was an upgraded version of the Multimission Modular Spacecraft. Initially, this spacecraft bus would have a dual-launch capability--that is, it could use both Shuttle and Delta launch vehicles. In 1988, NASA decided to launch EUVE on a Delta. Figure 4-24 shows the major elements of the EUVE observatory. EUVE would conduct the first detailed all-sky survey of extreme ultraviolet radiation between 100 and 900 angstroms, a previously unex-

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PayloadModule encePayload

Solar ArrayPanel

ExplorerPlatformSpacecraft PlatformEquipmentDeck Modular Power Subsystem ModularAttitudeControlSubsystem CommunicationsandDataHandlingSubsystem ModularAntenna PointingSystem Solar ArraySystem

"-_

Figure 4-24. Extreme Ultraviolet Explorer Observator3.' plored portion of the electromagnetic spectrum. EUVE would be a twophase mission, with the first six months devoted to scanning the sky to locate and map sources emitting radiation in the extreme ultraviolet range and the remainder of the mission (about twenty-four months) devoted to detailed spectroscopy of sources located during the first phase (Figure 4-25). NASA launched EUVE on a Delta launch vehicle in June 1992. Upon completion of the EUVE mission, plans were to have the Shuttle rendezvous with the Explorer Platform and replace the EUVE payload with the X-ray Timing Explorer (XTE), which would monitor changes in the x-ray luminosity of black holes, quasars, and x-ray pulsars and would investigate physical processes under extreme conditions.'" Roentgen Satellite. The Roentgen Satellite (ROSAT) was a cooperative project of the West Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States to perform high-resolution imaging studies of the x-ray sky. The mission's objectives were to study coronal x-ray emissions from stars of all spectral types, to detect and map x-ray emissions from galactic supernova remnants, to evaluate the overall spatial and source count distributions for various x-ray sources, to perform a detailed study of various populations of active galaxy sources, to perform a morphological study of the x-ray emitting clusters of galaxies, and to

"q'he Shuttle was not used to launch the X-ray Timing launched on a Delta rocket in December 1995.

Explorer,

which was

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Sky Surveys

Spectroscopy

Figure

4-25.

Two Phases

of the Extreme

Ultravio{et

Explorer

Mission

perform detailed mapping of the local interstellar medium by the extreme ultraviolet survey. The United States would provide a high-resolution imaging instrument and launch services. West Germany would contribute the spacecraft and the main telescope, and the United Kingdom would provide the widefield camera. The ROSAT project originated from a 1975 proposal to the Bundeministerium fur Forschungs und Technologie (BMFT) from scientists at the Max Planck Institut fuer Extraterrestrische Physik (MPE). The original objective was to conduct an all-sky survey with an imaging x-ray telescope of moderate angular resolution. Between 1977 and 1982, German space companies carried out extensive advance studies and preliminary analyses. Simultaneously, the Carl Zeiss Company in Germany initiated the development of a large x-ray mirror system, and MPE began to develop the focal plane instrumentation. In 1979, following the regulations of ESA convention, BMFT announced the opportunity for ESA member states to participate by offering the possibility of flying a small, autonomous experiment together with the large x-ray telescope. In response to this announcement, a consortium of United Kingdom institutes led by Leicester University proposed an extreme ultraviolet wide-field camera to extend the spectral band measured by the x-ray telescope to longer wavelengths. The British Science and Engineering Research Council approved this experiment, and in 1983, BMFT and the council signed an MOU. In 1981 and 1982, NASA and BMFT conducted negotiations for U.S. participation in the ROSAT mission, with the resulting MOU signed in 1982. Under this MOU, NASA agreed to provide the ROSAT launch with the Space Shuttle and a focal-point high-resolution imager detector.

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BMFT's responsibilities included the design, fabrication, test, and integration of the spacecraft; mission control, tracking, and data acquisition after separation from the Shuttle; and the initial reduction and distribution of data. NASA would provide, at minimal charge, a flight model copy of the high-resolution imager previously flown on the 1978 High Energy Astronomy Observatories mission (HEAO-2). In 1983, NASA Headquarters issued a sole-source contract to the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory to build flight and engineering model highresolution imagers and provide integration and launch support. In May 1985, NASA transferred this contract to the Goddard Space Flight Center for administration and implementation. The Challenger accident led to a reconsideration launch vehicle. In 1987, NASA and BMFT decided launch vehicle. Germany United States developed section to accommodate ROSAT was launched on the ROSAT Cosmic of schedules and the to launch with a Delta

redesigned the spacecraft appropriately, and the a new three-meter fairing for the Delta II nose ROSAT's maximum cross-sectional dimension. a Delta rocket in June 1990. Figure 4-26 shows The development of the Cosmic

flight configuration. Background Explorer.

Background Explorer (COBE) began during fiscal year 1982. Developed by NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center, COBE would measure the diffuse infrared and microwave radiation from the early universe, to the limits set by our astrophysical environment. The spacecraft would carry out a definitive, all-sky exploration of the infrared background radiation of the universe between the wavelengths of one micrometer and 9.6 millimeters. The detailed information that COBE was to provide on the spectral and

Gyro

Packag_,____

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11

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Figure

4-26.

ROSAT

Flight

Configuration

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spatial distribution of low-energy background radiation was expected to yield significant insight into the basic cosmological questions of the origin and evolution of the universe. COBE would measure the residual three-Kelvin background radiation believed to be a remnant of the "Big Bang" origin of the universe. COBE, as initially proposed, was to have been launched by a Delta rocket. However, once the design was under way, the Shuttle was adopted as the NASA standard launch vehicle. After the Challenger accident occurred in 1986, ending plans for Shuttle launches from the west coast, NASA redesigned the spacecraft to fit within the weight and size constraints of the Delta. Three of the subsystems that on the Shuttle would have been launched as fixed components--the solar arrays, radiofrequency/thermal shield, and antenna--had to be replaced by deployable systems. The final COBE satellite had a total mass of 2,270 kilograms, a length of 5.49 meters, and a diameter of 2.44 meters with Sun-Earth shield and solar panels folded (8.53 meters with the solar panels deployed) rather than the 4,990 kilograms in weight and 4.3 meters in diameter allowed with a Shuttle launch. (Figure 4-27 shows the COBE observatory.) In 1988, instrument development was completed, the flight hardware delivered, and the observatory integration completed. COBE was launched aboard a Delta rocket on November 18, 1989, from the Western Space and Missile Center at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, into a Sun-synchronous orbit. Its orbital alignments are shown in Figure 4-28. COBE carried three instruments: a far-infrared absolute spectrophotometer to compare the spectrum of the cosmic microwave background radiation with a precise blackbody, a differential microwave radiometer to map the cosmic radiation precisely, and a diffuse infrared background experiment to search for the cosmic infrared background radiation. COBE has transmitted impressive data that strongly supports the Big Bang theory of the origin of the universe. Planetary Exploration Program

NASA launched no new planetary exploration missions from 1979 to 1988. However, missions that had been launched earlier continued returning outstanding data to scientists on the ground. Details of the early years of these missions can be found in Volume II! of the NASA Historical Data Book. '_ NASA also continued preparing for missions that had originally been scheduled for launch during this decade but were delayed by the Challenger accident. The Planetary Exploration program encompassed the scientific exploration of the solar system, including the planets and their satellites, comets and asteroids, and the interplanetary medium. The program objectives were to: "Ezell, NASA Historical Data Book, Volume 111.

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Cover

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4-27,

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Background

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Determine the nature of planets, comets, and asteroids as a means for understanding the origin and evolution of the solar system Understand Earth better through comparative studies with the other planets Understand how the appearance of life in the solar system was related to the chemical history of the solar system Provide a scientific basis for the future use of resources available in near-Earth space

NASA's strategy emphasized equally the Earth-like inner planets, the giant gaseous outer planets, and the small bodies (comets and asteroids). Missions to these planetary bodies began with reconnaissance and exploration to achieve the most fundamental characterization of the bodies and proceeded to detailed study. In general, the reconnaissance phase of inner planet exploration began in the 1960s and was completed by the late 1970s. Most activities that occurred in the 1980s involved more detailed study of the inner planetary bodies or the early stages of study about the outer planets and small bodies.

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Sun

Figure

4-28.

Cosmic

Background

Explorer

Orbital

Alignments

Voyager

Program

The objectives of the Voyager missions were to conduct comparative studies of the Jupiter and Saturn planetary systems, including the satellites and Saturn's rings, and to study the interplanetary medium between Earth and Saturn. Voyager 1 encountered both planets, using Jupiter's gravity to go on to Saturn in 1980, scanned Saturn's primary moon Titan, and was flung by Saturn's gravity up out of the ecliptic plane. Voyager 2 followed Voyager 1 to Jupiter and Saturn, and it then proceeded to Uranus and Neptune, using the gravity of each previous planet to go on to the next one. This outer planet "grand tour" required a planetary alignment that repeats only once every 176 years. '2 NASA launched Voyager 1 on September 5, 1977. It began its measurements of the Jovian system on January 6, 1979, with its closest

_-_"Handy Facts," The Voyager Neptune Travel Guide, Laboratory, JPL Publication 89-24, June 1, 1989.

NASA Jet Propulsion

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approach occurring on March 5, 1979, when it reached within 277,400 kilometers of the surface. During that year, the spacecraft returned more than 18,000 images of Jupiter and its four Galilean planets and mapped the accessible portion of Jupiter's complex magnetosphere. Voyager discovered the presence of active volcanoes on the Galilean moon Io. Volcanic eruptions had never before been observed on a world other than Earth. The Voyager cameras identified at least nine active volcanoes on Io, with plumes of ejected material extending as far as 280 kilometers above the moon's surface. Io's orange and yellow terrain probably resulted from the sulfur-rich materials brought to the surface by volcanic activity that resulted from tidal flexing caused by the gravitational pull among Io, Jupiter, and the other three Galilean moons. The spacecraft encountered Saturn in November 1980, approaching within 123,910 kilometers of the surface. Voyager 1 found hundreds, and perhaps thousands, of elliptical rings and one that appeared to be seven twisted or braided ringlets. It passed close to its ring system and to Titan, and it also provided a first close-up view of several of its other moons. Voyager 1 determined that Titan had a nitrogen-based atmosphere with methane and argon--one more similar to Earth's in composition than the carbon dioxide atmosphere of Mars and Venus. Titan's surface temperature of-179 degrees Celsius implied that there might be water-ice islands rising above oceans of ethane-methane liquid or sludge. However, Voyager l's cameras could not penetrate the moon's dense clouds. Following this encounter, the satellite began to travel out of the solar system as its instruments studied the interplanetary environment. A Titan-Centaur launched Voyager 2 on August 20, 1977. Its closest approach to Jupiter occurred on July 9, 1979, when it reached 277,400 kilometers from Jupiter's surface. The spacecraft provided patterns of Jupiter's atmosphere and high-resolution views of volcanoes erupting on Io and views of other Galilean satellites and clear pictures of Jupiter's ring. Voyager 2 came closest to Saturn on August 25, 1981, approaching 100,830 kilometers, and returned thousands of high-resolution images and extensive data. It obtained new data on the planets, satellites, and rings, which revolutionized concepts about the formation and evolution of the solar system. Additional scientific detail on the planet returned by the spacecraft suggested that the rings around Saturn were alternating bands of material at increased and decreased densities. Saturn's eighteenth moon was discovered in 1990 from images taken by Voyager 2 in 1981. Leaving Saturn's neighborhood, the spacecraft continued on its trip and approached Uranus on January 24, 1986, at a distance of 81,440 kilometers. It was the first spacecraft to look at this giant outer planet. From Uranus, Voyager 2 transmitted planetary data and more than 7,000 images of the planet, its rings, and moons. Voyager 2 discovered ten new moons,

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twentynew rings,andan unusualmagnetic field aroundthe planet. Voyager 2 discovered thatUranus's magnetic field did not follow the usual north-south axisfoundon theotherplanets. Instead, thefield was tiltedsixtydegrees andoffsetfrom theplanet's center. Uranus's atmosphere consisted mainlyof hydrogen, withapproximately 12percent helium and smallamounts of ammonia, methane, and watervapor.The planet'sblue color occurredbecause the methane in its atmosphere absorbed all othercolors. OnitswayfromUranus toNeptune, Voyager 2 continued providing data on the interplanetary medium.In 1987,Voyager2 observed Supernova 1987A andcontinued intensive stellar ultraviolet astronomy in 1988. Toward theendof 1988, Voyager 2 returned its first colorimages of Neptune. Its closest approach toNeptune occurred onAugust 25, 1989, approaching within 4,850kilometers. The spacecraft thenflew to the moon Triton.DuringtheNeptune encounter, it became clearthattheplanet'satmosphere wasmoreactivethanthatof Uranus. Voyager 2 alsoprovideddataon Neptune's rings.Observations from Earthindicated that therewerearcsof material in orbit around the planet.It wasnot clear fromEarthhowNeptune couldhavearcsandhowthesecouldbekept fromspreading outintoeven,unclumped rings.Voyager 2 detected these arcs,but discovered thattheywere,in fact,partof thin,complete rings. LeavingNeptune's environment, Voyager 2 continued itsjourneyaway fromtheSun.
Viking Program The objective of Vikings 1 _ind 2 were to observe Mars from orbit and direct measurements in the atmosphere and on the surface, with emphasis on biological, chemical, and environmental data relevant to the existence of life on the planet. NASA had originally scheduled Viking 1 for an equatorial region and Viking 2 for the middle latitudes. NASA launched Viking 1 on August 20, 1975, and followed with the launch of Viking 2 on September 9. Their landings on Mars in the summer of 1976 set the stage for the next step of detailed study of the planet, the Mars Observer mission, which NASA approved in 1984. The Viking orbiters and landers exceeded their design lifetime of 120 and ninety days, respectively. Viking Orbiter 2 was the first to fail on July 24, 1978, when a leak depleted its attitude-control gas. Viking Lander 2 operated until April 12, 1980, when it was shut down because of battery degeneration. Viking Orbiter 1 quit on August 7, 1980, when the last of its attitude-control gas was used up. Viking Lander 1 ceased functioning on November 13, 1983. Pioneer Program

Pioneers 10 and 11. NASA launched Pioneers 10 and 11 in the 1972 and 1983, respectively, and the spacecraft continued to return data throughout the 1980s. Their objectives were to study interplanetary char-

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acteristics (asteroid/meteoroid flux andvelocities, solarplasma, magnetic fields,andcosmicrays)beyond two astronomical unitsandto determinecharacteristics of Jupiter(magnetic fields, atmosphere, radiation balance, temperature distribution, andphotopolarization). Pioneer 11had theadditional objective of traveling to Saturn andmaking detailed observations of theplanet anditsrings. Theflybysof Jupiterby Pioneers 10andI 1 returned excellent data, whichcontributed significantly to thesuccess of the 1979 flybysof two Voyagerspacecraft throughthe Joviansystem.The spacecraft made numerous discoveries asa resultof theseencounters, andtheydemonstrated thata safe, close passage by Saturn's ringswaspossible. Thefirst close-upexamination of Saturnoccurredin September 1979,when Pioneer 11reached within21,400 kilometers of thatplanet afterreceiving a gravity-assist atJupiter five years earlier. During1979, Pioneer 10traveled 410millionkilometers on itsway out of thesolarsystem andcontinued to returnbasicinformation about chargedparticlesand electromagnetic fields of interplanetary space wheretheSun'sinfluence wasfading.It crossed Uranus's orbit in July 1979 onitstrip outofthesolarsystem. Thespacecraft crossed Neptune's orbit in May 1983, andon June13, 1983,it became the first artificial object to leave thesolarsystem, heading forthestarAldebaran of theconstellation Taurus. During1985,it returned dataon theinterstellar medium at a distance of nearlythirty-fiveastronomical unitsfrom the Sun. Thiswaswell beyond theorbitof Neptune andin thedirectionopposite to thesolarapex, whichis thedirection of theSun's motionwith respect to nearby stars. Through 1985 and1986, it continued to returndata, aiming to detecttheheliopause, the boundary between theSun'smagnetic influence andinterstellar space, andto measure theproperties of theinterplanetary medium well outside theouterboundary of thesolarsystem. Pioneer11,launched in 1973, headed in the opposite directionand completed thefirstspacecraft journeytoSaturn in September 1979. It discovered thattheplanet radiates moreheatthanit received fromtheSun andalsodiscovered Saturn's eleventh moon,a magnetic field, andtwo new rings.The spacecraft continued to operate andreturndataas it movedoutward from the Sunduringthenext several years.By 1987, Pioneer 11wasapproaching theorbitof Neptune.
Pioneer Venus. In 1978, NASA launched two Pioneer probes to Venus. Their objectives were to jointly conduct a comprehensive investigation of the atmosphere of Venus. Pioneer Venus 1 would determine the composition of the upper atmosphere and ionosphere, observe the interaction of the solar wind with the ionosphere, and measure the planet's gravitational field. Pioneer Venus 2 would conduct its investigations with hard-impact probes--one large probe, three small probes, and the spacecraft bus would take in situ measurements of the atmosphere on their way to the surface to determine the nature and composition of clouds, the composition and structure of the atmosphere, and the general circulation patterns of the atmosphere.

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Pioneer Venus 1 wentintoorbitaround Venus in late1978 andcompleted itsprimarymission in August1979. A radioaltimeter provided the firstmeans of seeing through theplanet's dense cloud coveranddetermining surface features overalmostthe entireplanet.It alsoobserved the comets andobtained unique images of Halley's Comet in 1986, whenthe comet was behind theSunandunobservable fromEarth. Thespacecraft also measured thesolarwindinteraction, whichwasfound to becomet-like. Pioneer Venus 2 released its payload of hard-landers in November 1978. These probes weredesignated for separate landingzones so that investigators couldtakeon-site readings fromseveral areas of theplanet duringa singlemission. ThePioneer Venus mission carried thestudyoftheplanet beyond the reconnaissance stageto the pointwhere scientists wereableto makea basic characterization of themassive cloud-covered atmosphere of Venus, whichcontained largeconcentrations of sulfurcompounds in the lower atmosphere. Thischaracterization alsoprovided some fundamental data about theformation of theplanet. However, because of theopacity of the atmosphere, informationaboutthe Venussurfacecharacter remained sparse. Therefore, in 1981, NASAproposed theVenus OrbitingImaging Radar mission, whichwoulduseasynthetic aperture radarinstrument on a spacecraft in lowcircular orbittomapatleast70percent of thesurface of Venus at a resolution betterthanabout 400meters. Theradarsensor wasalsotocollect radioemission andaltimetry dataovertheimaged portionsof Venus's surface. However, the Venus OrbitingImagingRadar mission wascanceled in 1982.
Magellan In 1983, NASA replaced the Venus Orbiting Imaging Radar mission with a more focused, simpler mission, provisionally named the Venus Radar Mapper. Nonradar experiments were removed from the projected payload, but the basic science objectives of the Venus Orbiting Imaging Radar mission--investigation of the geological history of the surface and the geophysical state of the interior of Venus--were retained. NASA selected Hughes Aircraft Company as the prime contractor for the radar system, Martin Marietta Astronautics Group had responsibility for the spacecraft, and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory managed the mission. In 1986, NASA renamed the mission Magellan in honor of Ferdinand Magellan. The objective of the Magellan mission was to address fundamental questions regarding the origin and evolution of Venus through global radar imagery of the planet. Magellan was also to obtain altimetry and gravity data to accurately determine Venus's topography and gravity field, as well as internal stresses and density variations. The detailed surface morphology of Venus was to be analyzed to compare the evolutionary history of Venus with that of Earth. The spacecraft configuration is shown in Figure 4-29.

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I" Star Fq_ii;rmdent\ Module __ Scanner ...... t'ropulslon Moaule / /Rock=Engine

_ _ _X.

Antenna _

,_._.

-_--_::::::_-

Thermal Control

Low Gain _

S/a_aP_'ne/rDrpe

Antenna-" "

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Altirn-eter_US _ Antenna

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Figure 4-29. Magellan Spacecraft Configuration Originally scheduled for a 1988 launch, NASA remanifested Magellan after the Challenger accident and the elimination of the Centaur upper stage. The launch took place on May 4, 1989, on STS-30, with an inertial upper stage boosting the spacecraft into a Venus transfer orbit (Figure 4-30). Magellan would reveal a landscape dominated by volcanic features, faults, and impact craters. Huge areas of the surface would show evidence of multiple periods of lava flooding with flows lying on top of previous ones. The Magellan mission would end on October 12, 1994, when the spacecraft was commanded to drop lower into the fringes of the Venusian atmosphere during an aerodynamic experiment, and it burned up, as expected. Magellan would map 98 percent of the planet's surface with radar and compile a high-resolution gravity map of 95 percent of the planet. Project Galileo

Project Galileo had its genesis during the mid-1970s. Space scientists and NASA mission planners at that time were considering the next steps in outer planet exploration. Choosing Jupiter, which was the most readily accessible of the giant planets, as the next target, they realized that an advanced mission should incorporate a probe to descend into the atmosphere and a relatively long-lived orbiter to study the planet, its satellites, and the Jovian magnetosphere. NASA released the Announcement of Opportunity in 1976. The science payload was tentatively selected in August 1977 and confirmed in January 1979. Congress approved the Jupiter orbiter-probe mission in 1977. The program was renamed Project

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Venus at Arrival

Earth

Venus

at

_
Orblt _i \ I Ven s I" 0--_J) _

w.a,
Equinox Launch

Launch 4/28/89

Earth Arrival

at

Figure 4-30. Magellan Orbit Galileo in honor of the Italian astronomer who discovered the four large

satellites of Jupiter. Project Galileo was a cooperative effort between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany). A wide range of science experiments, chosen to make maximum progress beyond the Voyager finds, was selected. The mission was originally planned for an early 1985 launch on a Shuttle/Centaur upper stage combination but was delayed first to 1986 and then to 1989 because of the Challenger accident and the cancellation of the Centaur upper stage. Planned to operate for approximately twenty months, the Galileo spacecraft was launched October 18, 1989, on STS-34, assisted by an inertial upper stage on a trajectory using gravity assists at Venus and Earth. The orbiter would be able to make as many as ten close encounters with the Galilean satellites. Project Galileo would send a sophisticated, two-part spacecraft to Jupiter to observe the planet, its satellites, and its space environment. The objective of the mission was to conduct a comprehensive exploration of Jupiter and its atmosphere, magnetosphere, and satellites through the use of both remote sensing by an orbiter and in situ measurements by an atmospheric probe. The scientific objectives of the mission were based on recommendations by the National Academy of Sciences to provide continuity, balance, and orderly progression of the exploration of the solar system. Galileo would make three planetary gravity-assist swingbys (one at Venus and two at Earth) needed to carry it out to Jupiter in December 1995. (Figure 4-31 shows the Galileo trajectories.) There, the spacecraft would be the first to make direct measurements from a heavily instrumented probe within Jupiter's atmosphere and the first to conduct long-term observations of the planet, its magnetosphere, and its satellites from orbit. The Galileo spacecraft would have three segments to investigate the planet's atmosphere, the satellites, and the magnetosphere. The probe

SPACE SCIENCE

419

.......................... Fly-by Fly-by Feb. 1990 Dec. (2) t992

Fly-by (1) Dec, 1990

Launch Oct. 1989

Arrival Jupiter

Figure

4-31.

Galileo

Mission

would descend into the Jovian atmosphere; a nonspinning section of the orbiter carrying cameras and other aimed sensors would image the planet and its satellites; and the spinning main orbiter spacecraft that carried fixed instruments would sense and measure the environment directly as the spacecraft flew through it (Figure 4-32). Unfortunately, after launch, the high-gain antenna on the probe would fail, reducing the amount of data that could be transmitted. Even so, the Galileo orbiter continued to transmit data from the probe throughout 1996. Ulysses The International Solar Polar Mission (renamed Ulysses in 1984) was a joint mission of NASA and ESA, which provided the spacecraft and some scientific instrumentation. NASA provided the remaining scientific instrumentation, the launch vehicle and support, tracking support, and the radioisotope thermoelectric generator. The mission was designed to obtain the first view of the Sun above and below the plane in which the planets orbit the Sun. The mission would study the relationship between the Sun and its magnetic field and particle emissions (solar wind and cosmic rays) as a function of solar latitude to provide a better understanding of solar activity on Earth's weather and climate. Figure 4-33 shows the spacecraft configuration. The basis for the Ulysses project was conceived in the late 1950s by J.A. Simpson, a professor at the University of Chicago. Initially planned as a two-spacecraft mission between NASA and ESA, this mission, called "Out of Ecliptic," would allow scientists to study regions of the Sun and the surrounding space environment above the plane of the ecliptic that had never before been studied. Later, the project name was changed to the

420

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Low-Gain Antazlnm _

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:="
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Dlmpun 8ectla n Immgmg _,_mCe Clrnera i_

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: 8dld-Sblm raUSO_I_Sp

Figure

4-32.

Galileo

Spacecraft

International Solar Polar Mission. Delays in Shuttle development and concerns over the effectiveness of the inertial upper stage led to a House Appropriations Committee recommendation in the 1980 Supplemental Appropriations Bill that the International Solar Polar Mission be terminated. Later, in 1981, budget cuts led NASA to cancel the U.S. spacecraft contribution to the joint mission, which was restructured to a single ESA spacecraft mission. This was the first time that NASA had reneged on an international commitment. The ESA spacecraft completed its flight acceptance tests in early 1983 and was placed in storage. In 1984, the International Solar Polar Mission was renamed Ulysses. It was originally scheduled to launch in 1986 but was another victim of the Challenger accident and the elimination of the Centaur upper stage. The launch took place in October 1990 using the Shuttle and both an inertial upper stage and payload assist module upper stage. The launch services were contributed by NASA. Table 4-51 presents an overview of the history of the Ulysses project. Mars Geochemical-Climatology OrbiterMars Observer

The Mars Observer mission was the first in a series of planetary observer missions that used a lower cost approach to inner solar system exploration. This approach starts with a well-defined and focused set of science objectives and uses modified production-line Earth-orbital spacecraft and instruments with previous spaceflight heritage. The objectives of the Mars Observer mission were to extend and complement the data

SPACE

SCIENCE

421

Solar-Wind 2, Solar-Wind _,riqnlrnmel_f

Plasma Ion-Composition

. ------Enefoatlc-Rartlcle ........

-----a_,,..,_c Ft_da
Composition )_ I

I
m II

6. Colmic-Ral and Solar Pallicla 7. Unified Radio and Plaama-Wave 8. Solar X-Rays and Cosmic Gamma +z 9 Coronal Cosmic 10. Dual Sounding

Rays

5: at Low Energies (HI-SCALE) Spect_ral, Corn poeitlon ;,nd Anisotropy

11. Gravitational

Waves

/An
I0, 11 ----/f // I _ _| Ir ".gh'Gain t 'hI .... 1,4,9 f-(Hid_en In this tew)

r-"

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RCE Tank J 7 RTG - Rldloleol ot_er hermolhltr k: Ginefld_

S/C Radiator

\
Wire-Boom Ulysaee Ax_

Axial

Boom

Figure

4-33.

Ulysses

Spacecrq['t

Configuration

acquired by the Mariner and Viking missions by mapping the global surface composition, atmospheric structure and circulation, topography, figure, gravity, and magnetic fields of Mars to determine the location of volatile reservoirs and observe their interaction with the Martian environment over all four seasons of the Martian year. The Mars Observer was launched on September 25, 1992. It lost contact with Earth on April 21, 1993, three days before it was to enter orbit around Mars. Small Planetary Bodies

In 1985, NASA made the first close-up studies of the solar system's comets and asteroids. These objects may represent unaltered original solar system material preserved from the geological and chemical changes that took place in even smaller planetary bodies. By sampling and studying comets and asteroids, scientists could begin to inquire into the origin of the solar system itself. These efforts began with the encounter of Comet Giacobini-Zinner by the International Cometary Explorer spacecraft in September 1985 and continued with the 1986 encounters of Comet Halley by U.S. and foreign spacecraft and by intensive studies of the comet from ground-based observatories coordinated through the International Halley Watch.

422

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

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SPACE SCIENCE

423

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424

NASA

HISTORICAL

DATA BOOK

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SPACE

SCIENCE

425

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426

NASA

HISTORICAL

DATA

BOOK

Table Development Year (Fiscal) 1979 1980 a h Undistributed. Undistributed.

4-3.

High Funding

Energy

Astronomy (in

Observatories thousands Appropriation a b of dollars) Programmed (Actual) 10,647 2,100

History

Submission 11,400 4,800

Authorization 11,400 4,800

House and Senate appropriations

committees

allocated $11,400,000.

Table

4-4.

Solar

Maximum (in

Mission thousands Authorization

Development of dollars)

Funding

History

Year (Fiscal) 1979 1980 Undistributed. Undistributed.

Submission

Appropriation

Programmed (Actual)

a b

16,200 16,200 600 600 House and Senate appropriations

a 16,700 b 3,100 committees allocated $16,200,0_X1.

Table Year (Fiscal) 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 a b c d

4-5.

Space (in

Telescope thousands

Development of dollars)

Funding a Appropriation b c 119,300 119,500 137,500 165,600 195.000 127,800 95,900

History. Programmed (Actual) 79,200 112,700 119,300 t21,500 182,500 195,600 195,000 125,800 96,000 93,100

Submission 79,200 112,700 119,300 119,500 137,500 120,600 195,000 127,800 95,900 e

Authorization 79,200 112,700 119,300 119,500 137,500 165,600d 195,000 127,800 95,900

1988 98,400 98,400 93,400 Renamed Hubble Space Telescope Development in FY 1986 submission. Undistributed. House Appropriations Committee allocated $64,200,000. Senate Appropriations Committee allocated $79,200,000. Undistributed.

House Authorization Committee increased amount for development of space telescope by $47 million; Senate Authorization Committee increased amount for space telescope by $50 million to pay for cost overruns. Conference Committee reduced Senate authorization by $5 million. Amended budget submission. Original submission = $27,900.000.

SPACE SCIENCE
Table Year (Fiscal) 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 4-6. Solar Polar (in Submission 13.000 50,000 39,600 d 5,000 f 21,000 Mission thousands Authorization 13,000 50,000 39,600 5,000 21,000 28,000 6,000 Development of dollars) a Programmed (Actual) 12,500 47,900 28,000 5,000 h 6,000 Funding Histor 3,

427

Appropriation b c e g

1984 i a Renamed International h c d

See Table 4-17 Solar Polar Mission in FY 1980. Committee allocated $8,(_0,000. Senate Appropriations

Undistributed. House Appropriations Committee allocated $13,000,1300. Undistributed.

e f g h i

Amended budget submission. Initial budget submission = $82,600,000. Decrease reflects program descoping that took place in mid-1980 to contain the amount of cost growth because of change in launch date from 1983 to 1985. The change resulted from the FY 1981 budget amendment (NASA FY 1982 Budget Estimate, International Solar Polar Mission Development, Objectives and Status, pp. RD 4-12). Reflects recission. Amended budget submission. Initial budget submission = $58,000,000. Decrease reflects NASA's decision to terminate the development of the U.S. spacecraft for the mission. Undistributed. TotaJ FY 1982 R&D appr_prialion = $4,973,100,000 (basic appropriation). Programmed amount placed under Planetary Exploration funding beginning in FY 1982. Became part of Planetary Exploration program. See Table 4-7.

Table

4-7.

Gamma

Ray (in

Observatory thousands Authorization 19,100 8,000 34,500 89,800 120,2(X) 87,300 51,500 49,100

Development of dollars) Appropriation 8,200 a 8,000 34,500 89,800 120,200 87,300 51,500 49,100

Funding

Histor3,

Year (Fiscal) 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 a b

Submission 19,100 8,000 h 34,500 89,800 120,200 87,300 51,500

Programmed (Actual) 8,200 8,000 34,500 85,950 117,200 85,300 50,500 53,400

1988 49,1 (X) Reflects recission.

Amended budget submission. Initial budget submission = $52,000,000.

428

NASA

HISTORICAL

DATA

BOOK

Table

4-8.

Shuttle/Spacelab (in thousands

Payload of

Development dollars) a, b

Funding

History

Year

(Fiscal)

Submission 38,300 41,300 29,100 35,000 81,400 92,900 105,400 135,500 84,600 75+400 mission management Station House j f

Authorization 38,300 41,300 29, 100 43,000 81,400 88,400 h, i 113,400 125,500 84,100 75,400 beginning Payload FY 1981.

Appropriation c d 27,400 81,400 92,900 105,400 110,500 84,600 80.400 e g

Programmed (Actual) 34,900 40,600 27,400 47,556 81,000 80,900 105,400 89,400 72,800 47,800 k 1

1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 a b c d e +f g Included

Incorporated 1986. Undistributed. Undistributed. Reflects Amended

Space Both

Development appropriations

and mission committees

management allocated

beginning $38,300,000.

in FY

and Senate

recission. budget submission. Initial budget submission = $51,800,000. R&D appropriation reflectCommittee

Undistributed. ing effects allocation Committee Supplemental $40,000,000

FY 1982 R&D basic of General Provision

appropriation

= $4,973,100. House

Section

501 = $5,740,900.

Appropriations

for Shuttle/Spacetab Payload Development = $35,000,000. Senate Appropriations allocation for Shuttle/Spacelab Payload Development = $40,000,000. appropriations for Shuttle/Spacelab bill Conference Payload Committee Development. report indicates allocation of

Senate Authorization $1.6 million to offset

Committee reduced amount authorized for solar optical telescope by space telescope increases and added $5 million for space plasma laboraadded $2.5 million for space plasma for solar optical telescope. Original Original budget budget payloads submission submission laboratory and decreased by

tory. Conference Committee $7 million amount authorized i j k / Amended Amended Included budget budget submission. submission.

= $95,400,000. = $115,100,000. for space physics payloads. payloads

$5 million

for astrophysics

and $4.6 million

Additional $8.1 million for astrophysics were added to programmed amount.

payloads

and $9.9 million

for space physics

SPACE

SCIENCE

429

Table Year (Fiscal) 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 a b

4-9.

Explorer (in

Development

Funding

History Programmed (Actual) 31,288 32,300 33,300 33,300 34,300 48,700 51,900 48,200 55,700

Submission 29,800 30,400 33,000 36,600 34,300 48,700 51,900 55,200 56,700

thousands of dollars) Authorization Appropriation 29,800 30,400 33,000 36,600 34,300 48,700 51,900 55,200 56,700 33,000 36,600 34,300 48,700 51,900 55,200 56,700 a b

1988 60,300 70,300 Undistributed. Both House and Senate appropriations Explorer Development. Undistributed.

70,300 67,900 committees allocated $29,800,0D0 for

Table 4-10. Physics and Astronomy Mission Operations and Data Analysis Funding History (in thousands of dollars)
Year (Fiscal) 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 a b d d Undistributed. Undistributed. Submission 32,400 36,500 38,900 47.000 c 85.600 79,5(_) 109+100 119,900 125,700f 128,100 Authorization 32,400 36,500 38,900 47,000 86,600 80,500 109,100 119,900 t25,700 128,100 d e 38,900 47.000 85,600 79,500 109,100 119,900 125,700 128,100 Appropriation a b Programmed (Actual) 25,453 37,100 38,900 45,300 61,400 68,100 109,100 111,700 131,000 140,500

Both House and Senate appropriations

committees allocated $32,400,000.

Amended budget submission. Initial budget submission ---$53,500,000. House Authorization Committee reduced amount to be allocated for Space Shuttle/Solar Maximum Mission Spacecraft Retrieval by $9.2 million to $77,400,000 and increased amount by $1 million for data analysis for HEAO and OAO. Senate Authorization Committee increased the amount to $93,600,000 to counter '+slow progress in future programs and basic technology areas." (Footnote "d" accompanying Chronological Histoo: of the FY 1983 Budget Submission, prepared by NASA Comptroller, Budget Operations Division.) Authorization Conference Committee reduced increase to $1 million over submission. House Authorization Committee increased amount for HEAO by $1 million. Amended budget submission. Original budget submission = $172,700,000.

e mf

430
Table 4-11. Physics

NASA HISTORICAL DNI'A BOOK

and History Astronomy (in thousands Authorization 35,900 34,3f)0 42,800 basic: reflects 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 38.000 39,200 29.81X) 36,900 42.30(I 51,100 d 38,000 39.200 e 35,800 f 47,900 42,300 51,100 Research and Analysis Funding Programmed a b 42,800 Sec, 22,935 28,500 35,873 111,700 49,000 53,400 (Actual_ 44,005 33,774 37,700

of dollars) Appropriation

Year (Fiscal) 1979 1980 1981

Submission 35,9(_) 34,300 36,700 c

412:38,000 38.000 39,21X) 49.800 g 39,900 42,300 49,700

a b c d e f

1988 6(I, 100 60,100 Undistributed. Both House and Senate appropriations Research and Analysis. Undistributed.

60,100 82,900 h committees allocated $35,900,000 for

Amended budget submission. Original budget submission = $42,800.000, Amended budget submission. Original budget submission = $42,500,000. See l_s_tnote "c" in Table 4-10. House Authorization Committee in_xeascd authorization lk_r Universities Basic Research pro_ gram by $4 million and Universities Rgsearch Instrumentation by $2 million. Senate Authorization Committee increased Universities 13asic Research by $4 million, House and Senate appropriation committees increased appropriation by $20 million for Physics and Astr(momy and Planetary Exploration at NASA's discretion. Additional $10.3 million for Shuttle Test of Relativity Experiment added to programmed amount.

g h

Table

4-12.

Physics Submission 29,300 26,900 30,900 35,500c 38,200 53,31)(I 58,700 62,400 64,401)

and

Astronomy (in thousands Authorization 29,300 26,900 30,900 35,500 39,200d 53,300 58,700 62,400 64,400

Suborbital of dollars)

Programs

FutMing Programmed

History Year (Fiscal) 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 a b c d

Appropriation a b 30,900 35,500 38,200 52,31)(I 58,700 62,400 64,41)0

(Actua 0 28,207 27,226 39,900 43,842 48,100 52,477 58,700 59,900 79,100

1988 75,700 80,41X) Undistributed. 13oth House and Senate appropriations Suborbital Programs. Undistributed.

75,70(I 44,700 committees allocated $29,300,000 for

Amended budge! submission. Original budgel submission = $37,500,000, See fcK)tnote "e" in Table 4-10.

SPACE SCIENCE
Table Year (Fiscal) 1987 a a 4-13. Space (in Submission -Station thousands Planning of dollars) Appropriation -Funding History.

431

Authorization --

Programmed (Actual) 18,900

1988 20,000 b 20,000 20,000 15,500 Space Station Planning not included in budget estimates or appropriation for FY 1987 as separate budget item. Incorporated in Spacelab/Space Station Payload Development and Mission Management Budget category. Increased budget submission from $0 to $2I),000,000.

Table

4-14.

Jupiter

OrbiterProbe (in thousands

and

Galileo of dollars)

Programs a

Funding Programmed (Actual) 78,700 116,100 63,100 115,700 91,600 79,500 58,800 64,200 71,200 51,900

Histor3., Year (Fiscal) 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 a b c d Submission 78,700 116,100 63,100 108,800 92,600 79,500 56,100 39,700 77,000 d

Authorization 78,700 116,100 63,100 108,000 92,600 79,500 56,100 39,700 77,000

Appropriation b c 63,100 108,000 91,600 79,500 56, 100 39,700 77,000

1988 55,300 55,300 55,300 Renamed Galileo Development in FY 1981. Undistributed. House Appropriations Committee allocated $68,7(10,000. Senate Appropriations Committee allocated $78,7(X),000. Undistributed. Reflects budget amendment

that increased budget submission from $(l to $77,000,000

Table Year (Fiscal) 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 a

4-15.

Venus Submission 29,000 92,500 112,000 69,700 a 59,600

Radar (in

MapperMagellan of dollars) Authorization 29,000 \ 92,500 112,000 69,700 59,600

Funding Appropriation 29,000 92,500 112,000 69,700 59,600

History' Programmed (Actual) 29,000 92,500 120,300 97,300 73,000

thousands

Amended budget submission. Original budget submission = $66,700,000.

432
Table Year (Fiscal) 1988 a 4-16.

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Global (in Submission -Geospace thousands Authorization -Science of dollars) Funding a Appropriation -Programmed (Actual) 18,600 History

Global Geospace Science was previously budgeted under Environmental Observations (Applications). There was no specific budget amount for Global Geospace Science in the FY 1988 budget submission. However, the Senate report, which accompanied the FY 1988 appropriations bill (HR. 2783, September 25, 1987), indicated that NASA had requested $25,000,000 for the program for FY 1988. NASA's FY 1988 budget submission for Environmental Observations = $393,800,000, the authorization = $393,800,000, and the appropriation = $378,800,00. These figures were compiled prior to the OSSA reorganization. For the FY 1988 budget year that coincided with the OSSA reorganization, Global Geospace Science was moved to Physics and Astronomy.

Table

4-1

7. International

Solar

Polar

MissionUlysses

Development

Year (Fiscal) 1984 c 1985 1986 1987 a b c d

Funding History (in thousands Submission Authorization 8,000 9,000 5,600 24,000 d 8,000 9,000 5,600 24,000

of dollars) a, b Appropriation Programmed (Actual) 8,000 9,000 5,600 24,000 10,800 6,000 9,000 8,800 10,300 7,800

1988 10,800 10,800 Renamed International Solar Polar Mission in FY 1980.

Renamed Ulysses in FY 1986 submission. Moved from Physics and Astronomy Management (see Table 4_). Reflects budget amendment that increased budget submission from $0 to 24,000,000.

Table

4-18.

Mars

Geoscience/Climatology History (in thousands Authorization 16,000 38,800 62,900

Orbiter of dollars)

Program a

Funding Programmed (Actual) 13,000 33,800 35,800 53,900

Year (Fiscal) 1985 1986 1987 a

Submission 16,000 43,800 62,900

Appropriation 16,000 38,800 62,900 54,300

1988 29,300 42,300 Renamed Mars Observer in FY 1986 submission.

SPACE SCIENCE
Table 4-19. Analysis Year (Fiscal) 1979 1980 1981 Lunar and Planetar3., Histoo,. Mission (in thousands Operations and Data

433

Funding

of dollars) Programmed (Actual) 59,300 58,800 61,800

Submission 84,400 59,000 60.500 c

Authorization 84,400 59,000 64,800

Appropriation a b basic: 64,800 reflects Sec. 412:61,800

1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 a b c d e

45,800 26,500 43,400 58.800 95,000 77,200 77,000

45,800 38,500 43,400 58,800 95,000

45,800 26,500 43,400 58,800 95,000 77,200 77,000

42,600 38,500 43,400 56,100 67,000 75,100 73,792 Senate Appropriations

77,200 77,000

Undistributed. House Appropriations Committee allocated $84,400.000. Committee allocated $78,700,000. Undistributed. Amended budget submission. Initial budget submission = $64,800,(X)0. Amended budget submission. Initial budget submission = $50,900,000. Amended budget submission. Initial budget submission = $130,200,000.

Table

4-20.

Lunar

and Histoo:

Planetar (in

3, Research

and

Analysis

Funding Programmed (Actual) 44.400 45,000 50,700

thousands

of dollars) Appropriation a b basic: 51,700 reflects Sec. d 37,300 45,500 61,500 62,900 63,500 46,700 50,300 59,500 61,500 59,50t) 69,500 412:50,700

Year (Fiscal) 1979 1980 1981

Submission 24,000 45,100 51,700

Authorization 24,000 45,100 51,700

1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987

51,500 35,500 45,500 54,500 62,900

51,500 46,500 60,500 64,500 62,900 63,500

63.501)

1988 75,300 75,300 Undistributed. Both House and Senate appropriations Undislributed.

75,300 67,308 committees allocated $24,000,_X).

Amended budget submission. Original budget submission = $57,200,000. Undistributed. Total R&D [basic appropriation) = $4,973,10flJXX). R&D appropriation reflecting Sec. 501 = $4,740,900,000.

434
Table Year 4-21. (Fiscal) 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 a b c d e 1988 Undistributed. Undistributed. Life

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Sciences (in Submission 12,400 12,900 12,700 c 14,000 d 24,000 23,000 27,100 33,400 31,700 e Flight Experiments of dollars) Appropriation a b 12,700 14,000 24,000 23,000 27,100 33,400 31,700 Programmed (Actual) 15,700 16,600 12,700 14,000 24,000 23,000 27,100 32,100 30,000 Program Funding History

thousands Authorization 14,400 12,900 14,700 14,000 24,000 23,000 27,100 33,400 36,700

32,900 32,900 Both House and Senate appropriations

32,900 33,800 committees allocated $12,400,000.

Amended budget submission. Amended budget submission. Amended budget submission.

Initial budget submission = $19,200,000. Initial budget submission = $16,500,000. Initial budget submission = $36,7)0,(11XI.

Table

4-22.

Life

SciencesVestibular Histoo, (in thousands Authorization 3,800

Function of dollars)

Research

Funding Programmed (Actual) a

Year (Fiscal) 1979 a ,b c

Submission 3,800

Appropriation b

--

1980 3,700 3,700 c -No amount programmed specifically for Vestibular Function Research. Included in Space Biology Research to be conducted on the orbital flight test or Spacelab 1 mission. Undistributed. Both House and Senate appropriations committees allocated $3,800,000. Undistributed.

SPACE SCIENCE
Table 4-23. Life Sciences (in Year (Fiscal) 1979 1980 1981 Submission 24,400 27,300 26,400 c Research thousands Authorization 24,400 27,300 30,50(I basic: reflects 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 a b c d 1988 Undistributed. Undistributed. 29,500 d 31_700 36,000 36,200 38,600 63,500 29,500 31,700 36,000 36,20(I 38,600 63,500 30,500 29,488 29,500 31,700 36,000 36,200 38,600 63,500 25,50(I 31,700 35,000 35,200 34,000 41,800 and Analysis Funding Histor

435
3,

of dollars) Appropriation a b Sect. 412: Programmed (Actual) 24,400 27,200 29,488

41,700 41,700 Both House and Senate appropriations

41,700 38,400 committees allocated $24,400.000. = $3I),500,000. = $32,700,000.

Amended budget submission. Initial budget submission Amended budget submission. Initial budget submission

436
Table Date Jan. 30, 1979 June Aug. 2, 1979 10, 1979

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

4-24. Science Mission Charging Missions at High (1979-1988) Discipline/Pro[_ram Solar Terrestrial/U.S. Sponsor Air Force

Spacecraft Altitudes UK-6

(Ariel)* Astronomy

Astrophysics/U.K. Research Council Astrophysics Solar Terrestrial Solar Terrestrial Astrophysics Solar Terrestrial Astrophysics Spacelab Satellite Astrophysics Astrophysics/European Agency Platform for science

Science

High Energy

Feb. 14, 1980 Aug. 3, I981 Oct. 6, 1981 March 22, 1982

Observatory-3 (HEAO) Solar Maximum Mission Dynamics Solar OSS-I Infrared (IRAS) European Satellite Shuttle Hilat* Spacelab Active Tracer Spacelab Spartan-I Spacelab Plasma Spacelab 2 (STS 51-F) Diagnostic D-I Package (PDP) (STS 61-A) 1 (STS-9) Magnetospheric Explorers 3 (STS 51-B) Particle (AMPTE) Explorer 1 and 2 Explorer

and and

Mesosphere (STS-3) Astronomy X-Ray Pallet

Jan. 25, 1983 May 26, 1983 June 22, 1983 June Aug. 27, 1983 16, 1984

Observatory (SPAS)-01

Space

(EXOSAT)* Satellite

experiments/Germany Astrophysics/U.S, Spacelab Astrophysics Spacelab Spacelab German (multidiscipline) (multidiscipline) and Applications Spacelab Air Force Nov. 28, 1983 (multidiscipline)

April 29, 1985 June 17, 1985 July 29, 1985 July 29, 1985 Oct. 30, 1985 Jan. 23, 1986 Nov. March * NASA 13, 1986 25, 1988 provided

Astrophysics Earth Sciences (multidiscipline)

Spartan 203 (Spartan-Halley) (failed to reach orbit) Polar launch Bear* service or other nonscience San Marco D/L

Astrophysics Astrophysics/U.S. Astrophysics role. Air Force

SPACE SCIENCE
Table Launch 4-25. Date/Range Spacecraft Charging January at High Altitudes Test Range Characteristics

437

30, 1979/Eastern 28, 1991

Date of Reentry Launch Vehicle NASA Mission Role (Lead) Center Objectives Responsible

Turned offMay Delta 2914 Launch Goddard sufficient services Space

for U.S. Air Force Flight Center satellite

and three

experiments orbit of its

Place the Air Force accuracy final elliptical

into a highly

elliptical

to allow the spacecraft

to achieve

orbit while retaining

sufficient

stationkeep-

Instruments Experiments (NASA

and

ing propulsion to meet the mission lifetime requirements 1. Satellite Surface Potential Monitor measured the potential of a sample relative surface Electrical as a result Sheath surface to vehicle of various ground compositions or to the measured in the phenomena. the the the and aspects reference 2. Charging spacecraft 3. Spacecraft asymmetric effects probe 4.

experiments Ion

were the Light

by command. Effect Analyzer induced Fields of the charging background Electric

Mass Spectrometer, the Electric Field Detector, Magnetic Monitor) and the Field

electromagnetic

measured

sheath-electric

field of the spacecraft, trajectories of to the spherical at distances

of this electric surfaces mounted

field on particle and the current on booms measured surface.

near the spacecraft, 3 meters Energetic proton

from the spacecraft Proton Detector environment

the energetic particles at spaceflux in the

of the trapped channels,

craft altitudes the range from 5. High Energy flux, spectra, getic electron to >3000

with energies 1 to 2 MeV.

of 20 to 1,000 keV. in six plus an integral measured range

or more differential Particle plasma

Spectrometer in the energy environment

and pitch angle distribution

of the enerof 100 keV at energies

keV, the proton

between 1 MeV and 100 MeV, and the alpha particle environment between 6 MeV and 60 MeV during the 6. solar particle events. Satellite Electron Beam System rectly heated, oxide-coated grid. It controlled spacecraft. 7. Satellite Penning spacecraft. 8. Rapid Scan Particle temporal Detector measured the proton from 50eV to and electron flux variations Positive discharge Ion Beam System chamber the ejection consisted of a ion source and a control the ejection consisted of electrons of an indifrom the

cathode

and a control

grid. It controlled

of ions from the

60 keV for protons and 50 eV to l0 MeV for electrons, with an ultimate time resolution of milliseconds.

438

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 9. 4-25 continued Plasma analysis, electron Analyzer densities measured, by retarding photo and secin the for

Thermal potential ondary

the environmental

and temperatures,

range of 10 _ to 10 ' electrons 10.

per cubic centimeter,

electrons of energies in the range 0 eV to 100 eV. Light Ion Mass Spectrometer used magnetic mass analysis and retarding potential analysis for temperaand ture determination, it measured the ion density

temperature in the energy range of 0.01 to 100 eV and in the density range of 0.01 to 1,000 ions/cm _. 11. Energetic momentum energies 12. electrons 64 discrete lon Composition and energy Experiment determined ions with and per charge eV. measured protons 1 eV to 80,000 measured charge eV in the partiand measured

in the mass range San Diego Particles

of 1 to 150 AMU per charge Detectors range

of 100 eV to 20,000 in the energy

steps. This experiment overall charge

cle flux to the spacecraft, craft, differential and charge oscillations, 13. It also measured accumulated enabling

of the spacesamples.

on parts of the spacecraft, on selected plasma predictions material and detected of magnetos-

the ambient better

phere dynamics. Electric Field Detector fields in the tenuous netosphere.

measured

AC and DC electric of the outer mag-

plasma

region

14.

Magnetic Field Monitor measured density in the range _+5 milligauss 0.004 milligauss. Thermal took place Coatings samples monitored

the magnetic flux with a resolution of of insulatthat

15.

temperatures

ed material characteristics 16. Quartz

to determine

the changes in space.

in their solar absorptive with time exposure Microbalance (mass) directions,

and emissive the deposition of energy in

Crystal

measured as a function

rate of contaminants the axial and radial Orbit Characteristics: (km) (kin) 43,251 27,543 7.81 1,4t6.2 655 Diameter Cylindrical Source Contractor Solar arrays SAMSO, Martin Marietta Apogee Perigee

respectively.

Inclination (deg.) Period (min.) Weight (kg) Dimensions Shape Power Prime

of 172.7 cm; length of 174.5 cm

Aerospace

Corp.

SPACE SCIENCE
Table Launch Date/Range Date of Reentry Launch Vehicle NASA Role (Lead) Center 4-26. June UK-6 (Ariel) off March Characteristics Flight Center September Science 1982: reentered Kingdom

439

2, 1979/Wallops

Switched Scout

23, 1990

Launch services for United Research Council

Responsible Mission

Objectives

Langley Research Center Place the UK-6 satellite in an orbit that will enable successfi_l cosmic Extend achievement the charge of the payload and energy scientific spectra Measure

the

objectives:

of galactic component levels by examof intrinsiof and study the fluctuations in lati-

rays, especially

the ultraheavy to lower extend and position

the x-ray astronomy structure, sources, down

ining the spectra, cally low energy known sources low-energy diffuse

the spectra

to low energies, and aperiodic

component of low galactic being observed. the charge of on the and component emphasis above

Study the fast periodic x-ray emissions tude sources tinuum spectra spectra radiation region

from a number of the sources of the ultraheavy with particular weights of atomic

and improve

the knowledge measured

of the con-

Instruments Experiments

and

I.

Cosmic energy cosmic charge

Ray Experiment

30 (Bristol the periodic from a wide time sources sky in and

University). 2. Leicester X-Ray Experiment sources, down investigated in emissions and aperiodic range of x-ray scales 3. (Leicester X-Ray MSSL/B the range short-term (Mullar London 4. fluctuations University). Experiment studied discrete x-ray longCollege, of the low-energy of individual University). the performance mounted on a flexx-ray

to submillisecond

and extended

features

of 0.1 to 2 keV. it also studied variability Space Laboratory of University

sources

and Birmingham

Solar Cell Experiment investigated in orbit of new types of solar cells ible, lightweight Establishment). support

(Royal Aircraft metal

5.

CMOS

Experiment

was a complementary

oxide semiconductor (CMOS) electronics experiment that investigated the susceptibility of these devices to radiation in a space environment (Royal Aircraft Establishment).

440

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 4-26 continued

Orbit

Characteristics: Apogee Perigee Period (km) (kin) (deg.) (min.) 656 607 55.04 97 154.5 n/a Cylindrical Solar array and battery Marconi Space power Systems, Ltd. and Defense

Inclination Weight (kg) Dimensions Shape Power Source Prime Results Contractor

The satellite lasted beyond its 2-year design life. However, it lost at least half its data. It suffered from radio interference from Earth, which caused the high-voltage supplies and sta-

and its tape recorder to switch on and off sporadically to lose information that should have been stored. The problem station was alleviated receiving by using more NASA station in Kenya, College ground

tions, an Italian

and a portable

set up by University

in Australia.

SPACE SCIENCE
Table Launch Date/Range 4-27. HEAO-3 Characteristics Test Range

441

Date of Reentry Launch Vehicle NASA Role Center

September 20, 1979/Eastern December 7, 1981 Atlas-Centaur Project management Marshall Study resolution Space Flight Center gamma ray emission

Responsible (Lead) Mission Objectives

with high sensitivity composition

and of cosmic of

over the energy range the isotopic than iron through

of about 0.06 MeV to

10 MeV and measure rays from lithium cosmic Instruments Experiments and 1. rays heavier

iron and the composition

High-Spectra[ Resolution Gamma Ray Spectrometer (Jet Propulsion Laboratory) explored sources of x-ray and gamma ray line emissions from approximately 0.06 to 10 million electron volts. It also searched new discrete measured and gamma sources of x-rays (Figure of Primary Studies, cosmic measured and gamma 4-3). Cosmic Rays comZ and Danish the isotopic the spectrum ray albedo Composition for Nuclear Research of primary range and intensity of Earth's for x-ray

rays and

2.

Isotopic (Center Space position between

France,

Institute)

rays with atomic charge to Z=26 (iron) and in the

Z=4 (beryllium) (Figure 4-4). Nuclei Experiment

momentum nucleon 3. Heavy California Minnesota) (Z>3(I), measured

from 2 to 20 giga electron (Washington

vohs per

University, of

Institute observed relativistic

of Technology,

and University

rare, high-atomic-number nuclei in the cosmic composition rays. It also to from and energy

the elemental

spectra of these nuclei with sufficient resolution determine the abundance of individual elements chlorine These models (Figure Orbit Characteristics: Apogee Perigee Period Weight (kg) Dimensions Shape Power Prime Results Source Contractor (km) (kin) {deg,) (min.) 504.9 486,4 43.6 94.5 2,904 Diameter Cylindrical Solar arrays of 2.35 m; length of 5.49 m experiment with so_ar panels (two modules: and nickel cadmium inc. successlul; the satellite returned batteries (Z=17) through at least uranium importance (Z=92). data provided information as cosmic on nucleosynthesis of different ray sources

and on the relative 4-5).

types of stellar objects

Inclination

and equipment) TRW Systems,

Mission was highly for 20 months.

data

442

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 4-28. Solar Maximum Mission Test Range

Launch

Date/Range

February

14, 1980/Eastern

Date of Reentry Launch Vehicle NASA Mission Role (Lead) Center Objectives Responsible

December 2, 1989 Delta 3910 Project Goddard Observe Maximum narrow radiative 6 months short-term management Space Flight Center a sizable number of solar flares or other activesimultaneously experiments, instruments, accuracy by five or six of the Solar with coalignment and measure of at least and of the the total Mission output

Sun phenomena

field-of-view

of the Sun over a period of 0.2 percent measured

with an absolute precision

of 0.5 percent

Instruments Experiments

and (Figure 4--6)

1.

Gamma energy

Ray Spectrometer and Doppler

the intensity, gamma ray broadthe role

shift of narrow

radiation lines and the intensity ened lines. 2. Hard X-Ray Spectrometer electrons Imaging helped played that energetic phenomenon. 3. Hard X-Ray

of extremely determine

in the solar flare imaged the Sun in

Spectrometer

hard x-rays and provided information about the position, extension, and spectrum of the hard x-ray bursts in flares. 4. Soft X-Ray Polychromator that produced 1.5 million to 50 million 5. investigated solar activity in the

solar plasma temperatures

degree range. It also studied studied the par-

solar plasma density and temperature. Ultraviolet Spectrometer and Polarimeter ultraviolet ticularly and active radiation from active corona, imagery spectrum regions, flares,

from the solar atmosphere, prominences, and studied of the Sun's the quiet Sun. corona

6.

High Altitude returned visible

Observatory

Coronagraph/Polarimeter in parts of the of coronal the and over

as part of an investigation by solar flares. Package Monitoring

disturbances 7. Solar Constant

created

monitored

output of the Sun over most of the spectrum the entire solar surface. Orbit Characteristics: Apogee Perigee (km) (kin) 573.5 571.5 28.5 96.16 2,315.1 Diameter of 2.1 m; length of 4 m Solar arrays Goddard in-house

Inclination (deg.) Period (min.) Weight (kg) Dimensions Power Source Prime Contractor

SPACE SCIENCE
Table Results/Remarks 4-28 continued was judged with respect gathered successful based on the results prelaunch

443

This mission the mission tives. These gained energy tinuously

of

to the approved of operation,

objeccon-

For the first 9 months data represented about valuable output insight

the mission

data from seven solar flares.

experiments Project

on board. informa-

the most comprehensive into the mechanisms information

tion ever collected

scientists that trigger

solar flares and significant

about the total of instruments

from the Sun. The payload

gathered data collectively on nearly 25 flares. Alter 9 months of normal operation, the satellite's attitude control system magnetic lost its capability control mode, to point precisely was placed which permitted while coarsely at the Sun. At continued pointing designed operaat the to be that point, the spacecraft tion of three instruments in a slow spin using a

Sun. This was the first NASA satellite

retrieved and serviced by the Space Shuttle. The Solar Max Repair Mission (STS 41-C) was successful and was completed alter 7 hours, its repair, 7 minutes of extravehicular several solar activity. Following Solar Max discovered with its planned

comets as well as continuing observations.

444
Table Launch Date of Reentry Vehicle Role (Lead) 4-29.

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Dynamics August Explorer 1 and 2 Characteristics

Date/Range

3, 1981/Western

Test Range

Launch NASA Mission

Dynamics Explorer Dynamics Explorer Delta 3913 Project Center Goddard Investigate hot, tenuous, and the cooler, management Space

1 retired February 28, 1991, 2 reentered February 19, 1983

Responsible

Flight

Center interactive plasmas plasmas processes coupling the in of the magnetosphere and plasmasphere (five electrostatic distributions of

Objectives

the strong convecting denser

and gases co-rotating

Instruments Experiments

and

Earth's ionosphere, Dynamics Explorer 1. High Altitude analyzers) electrons function 2. Retarding

upper atmosphere, 1: Plasma Instrument phase-space

measured and positive

ions from 5 eV to 25 eV as a (magnetic temperature, ion mass and mode,

of pitch angle. Ion Mass Spectrometer measured density,

spectrometer) and composition altitude mode. 3. Spin-ScanAuroral

bulk flow of H+, He+, and O+ in high-altitude in the 1-64 AMU range Imager (spin-scan

in lowphoand

imaging

tometers) imaged made photometric corona. 4. Plasma

aurora at visible and ultraviolet measurements of the hydrogen antennae fields

Waves (long dipole measured

and a magnetic from 1 hertz

loop antenna)

electric

(Hz) to 2 MHz, magnetic fields from 1 Hz to 400 kHz, and the DC potential difference between the electric 5. dipole elements. Hot Plasma Composition (energetic ion mass spectrometer) measured the energy range from 0 keV to 17 keV per unit charge 1 AMU to 138 AMU 6. Magnetic ter) measured Dynamics 1. Explorer and the mass range from per unit charge. (fluxgate currents magnetomein the auroral

Field Observations field-aligned 2:

oval and over the polar cap at two altitudes. Langmuir Probe (cylindrical temperature electrostatic and electron probe) or ion (mass mea-

sured electron concentration. 2. Neutral

Atmosphere

Composition

Spectrometer

spectrometer) measured tral atmosphere. 3. Retarding velocity. 4. 5. Fabray-Periot perature Potential ture, ion composition,

the composition measured

of the neuion temperaand ion bulk drift and tem-

Analyzer

ion concentration, measured oxygen.

Interferometer

of neutral

ionic atomic bulk motions

Ion Drift measured plasma.

of ionospheric

SPACE SCIENCE
Table 6. 4-29 continued Field Instrument (triaxial antennas) altitudes electric fields at ionospheric and low-frequency Spectrometer neutral winds,

445

Vector Electric measured

and

extra-low-frequency irregularities. 7. Wind and Temperature eter) measured temperatures, 8. 9. Magnetic l above) Low Altitude measured keV. Orbit Characteristics: Apogee Perigee (km) (km) Plasma in-situ,

ionosphere (mass spectromneutral particle gases. Explorer

and the concentration

of selected

Field Observations

(see Dynamics (plasma

Instrument

instrument)

positive 1

ions and electrons

from 5 eV to 30 2

Dynamics Explorer 23,173 569.5 89.91 409 424

Dynamics Explorer 1,012.5 309 89.99 97.5 of 114.3 cm

Inclination (deg.) Period (rain.) Weight (kg) Dimensions Shape Power Source Prime Contractor Results

Width of 134.6 cm: length 16-sided polygon Solar cell arrays RCA The spacecraft achieved

a final orbit somewhat

lower than

planned because of short burn of the second stage in the Delta launch vehicle, but could still carry out the full scientific mission.

446

NASA

HISTORICAL

DATA BOOK

SPACE

SCIENCE

447

Table Launch Date of Reentry Launch Vehicle NASA Mission Role Responsible

4-31.

Solar

Mesospheric

E.wlorer

Characteristics

Date/Range

October 6, 1981/Western March 5, 1991 Delta 2310 Project management Laboratory the processes goals: the nature

Test Range

(Lead)

Center

Jet Propulsion Investigate Earth's

Objectives

that create

and destroy

ozone

in

mesosphere

and upper

stratosphere,

with the folof changes in

lowing specific Determine

and magnitude

ozone densities that result ultraviolet flux Determine ozone,

from changes among of the upper between between

in the solar the solar flux, stratosphere water vapor

the interrelationship

and the temperature the interrelationship the interrelationship (NO:) and ozone

and mesosphere Determine and ozone Determine dioxide

nitrogen

If a significant number of solar proton events occur, determine the relationship between the magnitude of the decrease in ozone and the flux and energy of the solar protons, the recovery rate of ozone following the event, and the role of water vapor in the solar proton destruction of the upper of ozone of the SME mission in a that stratosphere and mesosphere ozone between

Incorporate model

the results

Instruments Experiments

and

1. 2.

could predict the future behavior of ozone Ultraviolet Ozone Spectrometer measured between 40 km and 70 km altitude. 1.27-Micron Spectrometer measured ozone 50 km and 90 km altitude 60 km and 90 km, and hydroxyl

between NO: temper-

3. 4.

Nitrogen between ature

Dioxide Spectrometer measured 20 km and 40 km altitude. Infrared Radiometer between

Four-Channel tudes and water 65 km altitude.

measured between

and pressure

20 km and 70 km alti30 km and from the

vapor and ozone looked

5.

Ultraviolet spacecraft measured from

Solar Monitor rotation

45 degrees

axis to scan through of incoming

the Sun once

each revolution

of the spacecraft.

The instrument solar radiation and at of inte-

the amount

1,700 Angstroms

to 3,100 Angstroms monitored the amount

6. 7.

1,216 Angstroms. Proton Alarm Sensor

grated solar protons from 30 to 500 million eV. Spatial Reference Unit controlled the timing for data gating from the instruments.

448

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 4-31 continued

Orbit

Characteristics: Apogee Perigee (km) (km) 534 533 98.0 95.3 437 Diameter Cylindrical Solar cell array University of Colorado's Laboratory for Atmospheric Division by measuring and All misand Space Physics, Ball Aerospace Systems The mission objective was accomplished ozone parameters upper stratosphere occurred sion events and the processes that determined as planned of 1.25 m; length of 1.7 m

Inclination (deg.) Period (min.) Weight (kg) Dimensions Shape Power Source Prime Contractor Remarks

in the mesosphere their values.

and on schedule.

SPACE SCIENCE
Table Launch Date of Reentry Launch Vehicle NASA Role 4-32. Infrared Astronomy Satellite November Characteristics Test Range 21, 1983 launch vehicle, data

449

Date/Range

January

25, 1983/Western

Ceased operations Delta 3910 Provided processing, Science telescope, Working

tape recorders, Group

co-chairman

and members

of the Joint IRAS management;

Responsible

(Lead)

Center

Jet Propulsion Ames Research

Laboratory---overall Center--management

project

of the infrared

Mission

Objectives

telescope system until integrated with spacecraft Obtain basic scientific data about infrared emissions throughout the total sky, to reduce community and analyze available these data, and to make these data and results and the scientific
manner

to the public

in a timely detected

and orderly infrared and

Instruments Experiments

and

1.

Ritchey-Chretien radiation observed emissions

telescope

in the region

of 9 to 119 microns

of infrared Experiment:

energy as faint as one centimeter. spectra by the from

million-trillionth 2. Dutch Additional

of a watt per square Spectrometer point sources

Low-Resolution of strong infrared

acquired observed range

main telescope in the wavelength 7.4 to 23 microns.

Short-Wavelength Channel Detector obtained information on the distribution of stars in areas of high stellar density. It provided statistical on the number of infrared sources. data

3.

Long-Wavelength Photometer mapped sources that radiated in two wavelength taneously-from 114 microns. 41 to 62.5 microns

infrared bands simul-

and from 84 to

Orbit

Characteristics: Apogee Perigee (km) (km) 911 894 99.1 103 1,076 Diameter Cylindrical Source Contractor Two deployable Ball Aerospace Fokker Schipol solar panels Systems Division in the United States: in The Netherlands of 2. I m; length of 3.7 m

Inclination (deg.) Period (min.) Weight (kg) Dimensions Shape Power Prime

450

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 4-32 continued IRAS carried out the

Results

During

its 300 days of observations,

first complete survey of infrared sky. On-board instruments with ['our broad infrared photometry channels (8 to 120 microns) objects, clouds detected unidentified space, infrared cold astronomical infrared cirrus of new and a comin the form radiation from visualbands of dust in the solar system, in interstellar around galactic galaxies, and possible

ly inconspicuous solar systems gated selected mapped

beginnings sources provided sources

Vega and other stars. 1RAS investiand extragalactic The mission listing of discrete

extended

sources.

plete and systematic

of sky and source catalogs. were received from IRAS. comets.

More than 2x 1011 bits of data IRAS also discovered five new

SPACE SCIENCE
Table Launch 4-33. Date/Range European X-Ray Observatory Satellite Space Characteristics Center

451

May 26, 1983/Western May 6, 1986 Delta 3914 Launch support Space

and Missile

Date of Reentry Launch Vehicle NASA Role Responsible Mission (Leadt Center Objectives

for European Flight Center spacecraft

Space Agency into an elliptical launch vehicle polar with sufits

Goddard Launch

the EXOSAT

orbit on a three-stage

Delta 3914

ficient accuracy to allow the spacecraft scientific mission Payload Objectives and Make a detailed study of known Telescopes Proportional x-ray (2) Counter

to accomplish sources

and identify

Instruments Experiments Orbit

new x-ray sources 1. X-Ray Imaging 2. 3. Gas Scintillation

Large Area Proportional

Array Spectrometer

Counter

Characteristics: Apogee Perigee Period (km) (km) (deg.) {min.) 194,643 6,726 72.5 58,104 5 l0 Diameter Box Solar (4.035 days) of 1.35 m

Inclination Weight (kg) Dimensions Shape Power Source Prime Contractor

of 2.1 m; height

array headed by Messerschmitt-

European Cosmos Consortium Bolkow-Blohm (MBB)

452
Table Launch Date/Range 4-34.

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Shuttle Pallet Satellite-Ol Characteristics

Date of Reentry NASA Role

Released Retrieved Provided (MBB), fee

from cargo bay June 22, 1983 June 24, 1983 Shuttle launch for Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm BMFT, and European Space Agency, for reduced

Launch

Vehicle (Lead) Center

Responsible

STS-7 n/a Launch I. 2. 3. 4. 5.

(Challenger) and retrieve the reusable experiments experiments SPAS with metal alloys with heat pipes

Mission Objectives Instruments and Experiments

Microgravity Microgravity

Microgravity experiments with pneumatic conveyors An instrument that can control a spacecraft's position by observing Earth below Remote sensing "push-broom" scanner that can detect different kinds of terrain and land/water boundaries Mass spectrometer for monitoring the orbiter's gases in the cargo

6. 7. 8.

bay and around Experiment A series System Orbit Characteristics: Apogee Perigee (km) (km) 300 295 28.5 90.5 2,278 Length Battery

thrusters solar cells Manipulator

for calibrating

of tests in which the Remote arm released it and restowed

the pallet to fly in space and it in the cargo bay

then retrieved

Inclination (deg.) Period (min.) Weight (kg) Dimensions Shape Power Prime Source Contractor

of 4.8 m; height power

of 3.4 m; width orbiter;

of 1.5 m power while

Rectangular while outside orbiter in cargo bay MBB All experiment activities, planned detailed test objectives, and detailed secondary objectives were accomplished on schedule. The mission carried out successful detached and attached operations. It performed manipulator scientific experiments, tested the remote Challenger. arm, and photographed

Remarks

SPACE

SCIENCE

453

Table Launch Date/Range Date of Reentry Launch Vehicle NASA Role Responsible Mission (Lead) Center

4-35.

Hilat

Characteristics Test Range

June 27, 1983/Western n/a Scout Launch n/a Place the satellite Air Force services

for U.S. Air Force

Objectives

in orbit to permit and satellite

the achievement

of

objectives

evaluation plasmas

of certain

propagation effects of disturbed communications systems Instruments Experiments and 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Orbit Characteristics: Apogee Perigee Period Weight (kg) Dimensions Shape Power Prime Source Contractor (kin) (kin) (deg) (rain) 819 754 82 100.6 101.6 n/a n/a Solar arrays Applied Physics Laboratory, Beacon Particle measured detector signal measured mapper Magnetometer measured

on radar and

scintillation. field-aligned precipitating measured currents. electrons the visible field from in and ion

the 10+000-20,000 Auroral/ionospheric ultraviolet auroras. Drift meter

eV range.

determined

the electronic

drift measurements.

Inclination

Johns

Hopkins

University

454
Table Launch Date of Reentry Vehicle 4-36.

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Charge Composition August Stopped transmitting Explorer Canaveral data January 1989; was officially the atmosphere mission; terCharacteristics

Date/Range

16, 1984/Cape

Launch

minated July Delta 3924 Provided project

14, 1989: has not reentered ['or cooperative launch Center services

NASA Role Responsible Mission (Lead) Center

instrument management: Space Flight

international

Goddard

Objectives

Place the satellite detect "tracer" within Earth's natural Charge range. 2.

in near-equatorial

elliptical

orbit to Module the

ions released magnetosphere Composition artificially

by the ion Release Experiment injected Explorer tracer

Instruments Experiments

and

1.

Hot Plasma and detected

monitored tracer

low-energy Composition

magnetospheric

elements

ions at the

over the low-energy measured spectrum the of the

Charge-Energy-Mass composition, charge

Spectrometer

state, and energy

3.

natural particle population of the ionosphere. Medium Energy Particle Analyzer measured small fluxes of lithium range in the presence protons, taining alpha particles, as possible. measured high-frequency provided tracer of the intense and electrons

very of

ions over a wide energy background while main-

as large a geometry

factor and as low an enermagnetic first-order wave-

gy threshold 4. 5. Magnetometer fluctuations. Plasma particle equator 6. Orbit Characteristics: Apogee Perigee (km) (km) 49,618 1,174 2.9 939.5 242 correlative

Wave Spectrometer information interactions

for studies

of strong

that develop

close to the magnetic there. ray experi-

or have maximum

effectiveness

Additional magnetic field and plasma ments were conducted.

Inclination (deg.) Period (rain.) Weight (kg) Dimensions Shape Power Source

122 cm across the flat sides and 40.6 cm high Closed right octagonal prism Solar cell array, redundant redundant battery Physics charge elements Laboratory, Johns Hopkins University and conditioning nickel cadmium controllers, batteries, switching and power

Prime

Contractor

Applied

SPACE SCIENCE
Table Launch Date/Range Date of Reentry Launch Vehicle NASA Role (Lead) Center Responsible Mission 4-37. Ion Release Module Characteristics Canaveral

455

August 16, 1984/Cape November 1987 Delta 3924 See Table 4-36

Goddard Space Flight Center: Federal Republic of Germany

satellite

provided

by

Objectives

Place the satellite in a highly elliptical orbit for the study of Earth's magnetosphere and release barium and lithium atoms into the solar wind and distant Plasma Analyzer dimensional and electrons measured energy-per-charge potential magnetosphere threeof ions distributions analyzer 1. the complete

Instruments Experiments

and

over the range of I0 V to 30 keV, as for the measure(-0 eV to 25 eV) electrons.

well as a retarding 2.

ment of very low energy

Mass Separating Ion Sensor measured simultaneously the distribution functions of ions of up to 10 different masses over an energy range of 0.01 to 12 keV/q. Suprathermal Energy hmic Charge Analyzer determined the ionic charge of all major energy range of 10-300 measured stage and mass composition through iron over the keV/q. magnetic fields with a sensithe intensities waves ions from hydrogen

3.

4. 5.

Magnetometer tivity Plasma of 0. InT.

Wave Spectrometer

measured

of the electric

fields associated

with plasma

over the range of DC to 5 MHz with two long antennas and of magnetic wave fields from 30 Hz to I MHz with two boom-mounted search coils.
6.

Lithium/Bariunl 16 release mixture ignited

Release

Experiments

ejected which to

canisters

in pairs, eight with a Li-CuO mixture, away from the spacecraft gas.

and eight with a Ba-CuO about a kilometer or barium

expel hot lithium Orbit Characteristics: Apogee Perigee (km) (km) 113,818 402 27.0 2,653.4 705 (including Diameter Solar array Max Planck sponsorship the Federal Institute Republic 16 chemical apogee release

Inclination (deg.) Period (min.) Weight (kg) Dimensions Shape Power Source Prime Contractor

kick motor) motmted on cylinder Physics under the of

of 1.8 m; height of 1.3 m containers

for Extraterrestrial of Germany

of the Research

and Technology

Ministry

456
Table Launch Date of Reentry Launch Vehicle NASA Role (Lead) Responsible Mission 4-38.

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

United Kingdom Subsatellite Characteristics

Date/Range

August 16, 1984/Cape November 1988 Delta 3924 See Table 4-36 Center Goddard Britain Space Flight

Canaveral

Center;

satellite

provided

by Great dis-

Objectives

Keep station

with the IRM spacecraft

at controllable

tances of up to a few hundred miles to measure local disturbances created in the natural space plasma by the injection Instruments Experiments 2. and 1. of tracer ions by the IRM measured ion distribution over the distribution ion Analyzer

energy range of 10 eV/q to 20 keV/q. Electron Analyzer measured the electron with high time and angular range of 6 eV to 25 keV. resolution

over the energy auto correlaof electron

3.

Particle Modulation Analyzer computed tion functions and fast Fourier transform and ion time variations interactions nances tron and ion analyzers in the frequency resulting and processed raw pulses

from wave-particle from the elecreso-

to reveal any significant

range of 1 Hz to 1 MHz. fields in the range of nT, with a resolution up to measured the electric

4.

Magnetometer measured 0 to 256 nT or 0 to 9192 30 pT, from DC to 10 Hz. Plasma Wave Spectrometer

5.

component of the plasma-wave field in the range of 10 Hz to 2 MHz and the magnetic component in the range Orbit Characteristics: Apogee (km) Perigee (kin) Inclination (deg.) Period Weight (kg) Dimensions Shape Power Prime Source Contractor (rain.) 113,417 1,002 26.9 2,659.6 77 Diameter Cylindrical Solar cells Rutherford Appleton and the Mullard Space Science Laboratories under contract to the British Science and Engineering The satellite Research Council became inoperative after 5 months of operaof 1 m, height of 0.45 m of 30 Hz to 20 kHz.

Remarks

tion. During that time, it had supported three chemical releases and had met 70 percent of the United Kingdom project objectives.

SPACE SCIENCE
Table Launch Date/Range 4-39. Spartan 1 Characteristics Space Center. deployed from

457

June 17, 1985/Kennedy Shuttle June 20 Retrieved June 24, 1985 STS 5 I-G (Discovery) Project management Center Goddard Launch Space Flight

Date of Reentry Launch Vehicle NASA Role Responsible Mission (Lead) Objectives

Center Spartan 1, map the x-ray region emissions test at the nuclear concept cosmic to provide x-ray sources observations in clusters center. of x-ray data over an of the Milky engineering

and retrieve

from the Perseus Way galaxy, data to prove Instruments Experiments and The scanner rates of about energy range were used galaxies Orbit (same Characteristics as Shuttle): Apogee Perigee (kin) (kin) 391 355 28.5 92 2,05 l 320cm

Center,

and the SCO the Spartan observed

X-2, and obtain

various

20 arc-sec/sec

of 0.5 keV to 15 keV. These of emission processes of the galactic

for studies

and the exploration

Inclination (deg.) Period (rain.) Weight (kg) Dimensions Shape Power Source Prime Contractor

by 107 cm by 122 cm

Rectangular box Silver zinc batteries Built by the Attached Space Flight Center Shuttle Payloads Project at Goddard

458
Table Launch Date of Reentry 4-40.

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Plasma Diagnostics Package Characteristics away from the through-

Date/Range

July 29, 1985 Retrieved July 29 after 6 hours of operation observations on-board orbiter; continued out mission orbiter

Launch Vehicle NASA Role Responsible Mission (Lead) Center Objectives

STS 51-F (Challenger) Project management Marshall Space Flight Center (Spacelab 2) Study orbiter-magneto plasma interactions in terms of density wakes, direct current electric fields, energized plasma, instabilities * Provide engine and a variety burns of possible wave-particle radar for

in support

of the ground

observations ionospheric Measure induced Observe Assess Develop ments Instruments Experiments 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. Orbit Characteristics: Apogee Perigee (kin) (km) 321 312 49.5 90.9 407 Diameter fixture Cylindrical Source Investigator Battery Dr. Louis and 1.

of the plasma depletion experiments and radio astronomical studies and plasma and Spacelab fields, modifications subsystems in of 600 meters in the of active

fields, waves, by the orbiter natural waves,

the payload unperturbed and passive

bay and out to distances magnetosphere

and plasmas

the Spacelab the methods

system performance experiments and hardware small scientific proton

magnetospheric

to operate subsatellites and electron

instru-

at the end of the remote low-energy

manipulator

arm and

to eject and retrieve Quadrispherical differential Plasma analyzer

wave analyzer coil sensors

Electric dipole and magnetic search Direct current electric field meter Triaxial Langmuir Retarding Differential Cold cathode flux-gate probe potential analyzer flux analyzer vacuum gauge magnetometer

Ion mass spectrometer

Inclination (deg.) Period (min.) Weight (kg) Dimensions

of 106.9 cm; height with extendible A. Frank,

of 140 cm to top of grapple

Shape Power

antennas of iowa

Principal

University

SPACE SCIENCE
Table Launch Date/Range 4-41. Spartan 203 Characteristics Space Center

459

Date of Reentry Launch Vehicle NASA Mission Role (Lead_ Center Objectives Responsible

January None

28. 1986/Kennedy

STS 51 -L ((Tzallenger) Project management Goddard Determine under Space Flight heating Center of Comet Halley when it was of the and was, therelbre, most active, and the composition

greatest

look for changes in the composition comet as it drew closer to the Sun Instruments Experiments and Two ultraviolet Halley length. close spectrometers light from in ultraviolet to the perihelion

and structure
Comet

were to survey

128 nm to 340 nm wavethe comet composithis

The spectrometers

were also to observe and to look for cometary during life cycle.

tion constituents Orbit Characteristics

and their rates of change

highly active period in the cometary Did not achieve orbit 2,041 Carrier:

Weight {kg) Dimensions Shape Power Prime Source Contractor

132 cm by 109 cm by 130 cm

Rectangular box Silver zinc batteries General Although Electric-Matsco, the Spartan Physical program Sciences Laboratory during Halley at the the University of New Mexico would continue Comet this opportunity to observe

Remarks

next decade, was lost.

460
Table Launch Date/Range Date of Reentry Launch Vehicle NASA Mission Role (Lead) Responsible

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

4-42. Polar BEAR Characteristics Test Range

November ru'a Scout Launch Center n/a

13, 1986/Western

services

for U.S. Air Force

Objectives

Place the Air Force P87-1 (Polar BEAR) satellite into an orbit that will enable the successful achievement of Air Force mission several objectives experiments propagation experiment Agency photographed beacon the aurora meato study atmospheric effects Conduct 1. 2.

Payload

Objectives and

on electromagnetic Instruments Experiments Geophysics borealis. Defense

Nuclear

experiment

sured distortion Orbit Characteristics Apogee Perigee (kin) (km) 1,014 954 89.6 104.8 122.5 n/a Cylindrical Source Contractor Solar arrays Physics Applied

of the ionosphere.

Inclination (deg) Period (min.) Weight (kg) Dimensions Shape Power Prime

Laboratory,

Johns

Hopkins

University

SPACE SCIENCE
Table Launch Date/Range 4-43. San March Africa Marco D/L Characteristics Marco Equatorial Range in Kenya,

461

25, 1988/San 6, 1988

Date of Reentry Launch Vehicle NASA Role

December Provided vehicle

Scout (launch spectrometer,

was conducted electric

by an Italian

crew) launch

an ion velocity for cooperative

instrument, mission

wind/temperature and Scout Science and

field instrument, Office of Space

with Italy

Responsible Mission

(Lead)

Center

NASA Headquarters

Objectives

Applications (OSSA) and Goddard Space Flight Center Launch satellite into low-Earth orbit to explore the possible relationship phenomena atmosphere obtaining stratosphere, between solar activity through and meteorological on low by for the and determine phenomena measurements the solar influence of parameters occurring Density

the thermosphere necessary

study of dynamic Instruments Experiments 2. and 1. Neutral measured Airglow

processes

in the troposphere, (Italy) mea-

and thermosphere Atmosphere drag forces Solar Experiment on the satellite in orbit.

Spectrometer

(West Germany)

sured equatorial airglow, radiation, solar radiation from clouds, 3. and intergalactic sured neutral atmosphere. Three-Axis measured in orbit. 5. origins

solar extreme ultraviolet from Earth's surface and from interplanetary the satellite. (Goddard) temperatures, meareaching

and the radiation

Wind and Temperature winds, and concentrations

Spectrometer neutral particle

of selected Field

gases in the (Goddard) the spacecraft measur-

4.

Electric the electric

Experiment

field surrounding (University in orbit.

Ion Velocity rounding

Instrument

of Texas)

sured the plasma Orbit Characteristics: Apogee Perigee Period Weight (kg) Dimensions Shape Power Prime Source Contractor (km) (km) (deg.) (min.) 614 260 2.9 99 237 96.5 cm diameter Spherical Solar cell array Satellite was provided

concentration

and ion winds

the spacecraft

Inclination

by Centro

Ricerche

Aerospaziali

Remarks

(Italy) The wind and temperature system The remaining

spectrometer operated

instrumentation 1 week of data. satisfactorily.

failed after providing

approximately

four experiments

462
Table Date Sept. 10,1971

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

4-44. Chronology of Spacelab Event First documented Spacelab, use of the term "Sortie Headquarters Can," Space predecessor Station Task to Development

is used. NASA

Force Director Douglas R. Lord asks Marshall Space Flight Center to begin an in-house design study of a Sortie Can, a manned conduct Nov. 30-Dec. Feb. 16,1972 3,1971 system to be carried in the Shuttle of short-duration missions. Experts Group meets cargo bay for the in Washington.

The Joint Technical

NASA Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight Dale Myers investigates the Sortie Can and related activities at 1972 Marshall and issues new guidelines. A delegation from the European Space Washington European for a discussion Research with senior and Technology Conference (ESTEC) travels The is to

June

14-16,

U.S. officials. resources Science

Center

assigned the task of determining needed to develop the Sortie Module (Lab). July 31-Aug. 4, 1972 NASA Associate Naugle Space Aug. 17-18,1972 heads Administrator Shuttle for Space a Space

for Europe Dr. John E.

Sortie Workshop to review agreement between

at Goddard provisions that

Flight Center. hosts a meeting agreements in an agency-to-agency on earlier space space European Launcher agency Space ministers that was develand NASA. merge the (ESRO) (ELDO) and into

NASA Headquarters might appear oped based

Europe

Nov. 8-9,

1972

European European existing European

agree to formulate by December Research (ESA). Organization Organization

plan for a single

that would

Development

the European Dec. 20, 1972 By Jan. 1973

Space Agency

At the space ministers' official meeting, the formal ment commitment to the Sortie Lab is made. NASA and Europeans agreement. prepare first drafts

develop-

of an agency-level is

Jan. 9,1973

ESRO's format of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) discussed by Roy Gibson, ESRO's deputy of administration, and Arnold Frutkin. NASA's Associate Administrator for International Affairs. is held at ESRO's facility European Space Research 1973 A symposium Institute

Jan.

15-17,

(ESRIN)

in Frascati,

Italy, to acquaint

Jan.

18, 1973

European users with the Sortie Lab (Spacelab) concept. The ESRO Council meets and votes to authorize a "Special Project" Spacelab. to develop receives the Sortie Lab, which the Europeans by ESRO. travel to Paris. is to work on the call

Jan. 23, 1973 Feb. 22-23, 1973

Frutkin Although

revised

MOU, prepared representatives

NASA and State Department the stated purpose agreement, agreement, the European agency-to-agency the intra-European firmly commit

of the meeting

the U.S. team gets its first look at then in draft form, which would signers to Spacelab development.

SPACE SCIENCE
Table Date March 23, 1973 The program ment, "Level Definition," directors formulated 4--44 continued Event approve the first Spacelab It addresses concept

463

docu-

I Guidelines

and Constraints by NASA.

for Program programmatics, safety, and from the for supand subsysin policies cost. Italy,

systems, operations, resources. May 1973 The expanded July the Shuttle porting schedule, May 3--4, 1973 1971 Goddard

interfaces, groups

user requirements, review identify the findings systems

working

workshop,

new requirements They also identify note changes and prepare missions. West Germany,

and sortie systems, and technology rankings

and identify needs, the Shuttle, for early France,

tems to be developed research or procedures Representatives

in each discipline.

to fully exploit from Belgium,

and priority

the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom meet at the U.S. State Department to negotiate the draft intergovernmental July 25, 1973 agreement and the related draft NASA/ESRO MOU. The Concept Verification Test (CVT) is assembled to simulate high-data-rate July 30, 1973 experiments emphasizing data compression techniques, including data interaction and on-board processing. The Interim Programme Board for the European Spacelab Programme tal agreement, July 31, 1973 Aug. 10, 1973 The ministers meets and approves the text of the intergovernmenand a draft budget. agree to a "'package and the United Certain Member and the the Spain, the countries the text of the MOU, of 11 European

deal" by the European Space Conference. Belgium, France, West Germany, Switzerland, Kingdom States European Execution Netherlands, endorse Space the "Arrangement Space Research Research Organization Program." Between of the European

Organization Concerning Subsequently,

of the Spacelab Denmark,

Italy, and later Austria Switzerland,

also sign the the United

Aug.

14, 1973

arrangement. Belgium, France, Kingdom

West Germany,

and the United States

sign the intergovernmental

agreement titled "Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and Certain Governments, Members of the European Cooperative Procurement, with the Space August Denmark Space Research Concerning System." 2 I. Organization, Laboratory, for a In Conjunction signs on 20, and Program Shuttle the Development, The Netherlands

and Use of a Space on September

18, Spain

18, Italy on September

on September

464

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 4--44 continued Event 15, 1973 This is the "magic" program, Sortie Laboratory date when NASA of a European available would have to initiate a readiin prothe in the absence undertaking, to have a

Date Aug.

for use by 1979. It states

ness, therefore, to accept a firm European commitment October and signed agreement by late October-early November, Europeans along with immediate effort, could withdraw initiation of a full-scale proviso ject definition as well as an added work indicated exceeded. Design Requirements James

that the by August

from that commitment

15, 1973, if their definition target costs would Sept. 7, 1973 The NASA-developed reviewed Fletcher. Sept. 21, 1973 is signed. Sept. 24,1973 In a U.S. Department Secretary and approved

that the projected are

be unacceptably Spacelab

by NASA Administrator and Constraints

The second

issue of the Guidelines

Document Acting

of State ceremony

in Washington,

of State Kenneth

Rush and the Honorable

Charles

Hanin, Belgian science minister and chairman Space Conference, sign a communiqu6 noting of arrangements program space cooperation. Dr. Alexander Oct. 1973 for European participation and marking Hocker,

of the European the completion Shuttle and

in the Space

the start of a new era in U.S.-European James C. Fletcher of the ESRO, director general also sign

NASA Administrator

the MOU to implement The NASA Headquarters

this international cooperative project. Sortie Lab Task Force is renamed the

Spacelab Program Office, with responsibilities for overall program planning, direction, and evaluation as well as establishing program sponsoring Oct. 9-10_ 1973 Nov. 16, 1973 and technical liaison with ESRO. recognizes its preferred The name change title for the program. the from Sortie Lab to Spacelab agency, to choose the right of ESRO, as the

Marshall reviews the preliminary design effort. NASA Administrator Fletcher directs NASA to evaluate impact missions of a Shuttle carrying docking module payloads. agrees with the recommendations missions. module, (then required crew members) more than three

on Shuttle on the misnot to

sion model and on specific Jan. 1974 The NASA purpose Early 1974 administrator module to use a docking laboratory,

on all Spacelab

A general is added discusWorking

much like a Spacelab begins

the CVT complex at Marshall. The Joint User Requirements Group sions of the real Spacelab Group (JSWG) expresses mission, its concern

informal

The Joint Spacelab

over the need to use the Document

March

5, 1974

first missions to verify Spacelab performance. The third version of the Guidelines and Constraints is signed and renamed Document." the "Level I Programme

Requirements

SPACE SCIENCE
Table Date March 19, 1974 Working Group 4-44 continued Event The JSWG meets and establishes with the thought the Critical Group is divided Working life, possibly the Operations ground HAL-S through the Spacelab that it would Design continues Operations have a limited In actuality,

465

Review.

not only beyond one focused

that on

time, but eventually operations, Group and GOAL Coordination

into two groups,

the other on flight operations. is also established; languages, which NASA proposes

The Software to

its initial focus is on the is to furnish micropro-

ESRO, but it quickly broadens gramming. program mission directors. dictate Dr. Ortner of ESRO called the Airborne (ASSESS).

its scope to include a joint Science/Spacelab under the umbrella

ESRO/NASA Experiments that a joint of the Spacelab the two program should availwould

System Simulation

By May, it is agreed of letters between and specify

could be authorized The JSWG

MOU by a simple exchange the flight configuration

states that the Spacelab It specifies

program the resources

able for experiments. kg of weight, 100-150 activities; April 23, 1974 1.5-2.5

that the first mission

have a long module and a pallet of two segments; kW of electrical hours of crew time would be available and the first mission Joint Planning Group,

3,000-4,000 for experiment that 7 days. by Dr.

power, and approximately

would be no longer co-chaired

The NASA/ESRO

Gerald Sharp of NASA and Jacques Collet of ESRO, meet to develop guidelines and procedures for selecting the first Spacelab May 17, 1974 payload. an expanded set of constraints for consideration NASA presents

at a JSWG meeting, including constraints imposed by the Shuttle, one of which is a limit of four to five crew members for the first Spacelab planned, May 20, 1974 May 29-30, 1974 First annual review After it is suggested be upgraded Preliminary Summer of 1974 mission Shuttle if it is conducted, flight. as then

on the seventh

of the Spacelab program is held. that the CVT general purpose laboratory design, a Review for the improved for mid-1976. and industry representatives Space of States. Flight are visit to the United simulator

to make it more like the Spacelab Requirements is planned both ESRO

is held. Its completion Some 60 Europeans, the Spacelab July 1-14, 1974 Fourteen Management two-segment unchanged, July 12, 1974 100 crew-hours John Thomas,

team, embark Council.

on a 2-week

points are approved

by the NASA Manned

The configuration

now states a one- or Weight and power operations. Program and '+up to"

pallet with the long module. would be available NASNs

but the crew size is to be ++minimized" for experiment chief engineer

for the Spacelab

Office at Marshall, Verification Flight parameters and weight

gives the first detailed requirements of the Instrumentation to the JSWG. He presents the type of test equipment, and summary mission power timelines.

to be measured, requirements,

466

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 4-44 continued Event

Date July 15--19, 1974 An integrated facility. life science

mission

is conducted

in the CVT Center sciprotocols, equipment

Planned

and conducted

by Ames Research

entists, this test demonstrates candidate experiment modular organism housing units, and rack-mounted plus radioisotope July 22-23, Aug. 8, 1974 1974 The Spacelab tracer techniques. Johnson Space Center team visits

for technical direcdesign

discussions of the primary Shuttle/Spacelab interfaces. A letter from Lord to Stoewer, the ESRO acting program tor, projects conclusions, experiments. a joint mission issues in 1975 to draw up Spacelab concepts, and perform Pointing an Instrument study operational Marshall

scientific System

Aug. 26, 1974

(IPS) Requirements Document. Stoewer's confirmation letter states proposal mission mission but cautions is 350,000 that ESRO's accounting

full agreement funding

with Lord's $440,000

limit for the first for the first ASSESS on consecutive Spacelab

units (approximately of five flights

at the time). days would mission. Sept. 23,1974

By the end of 1974, planning A series approximate Group

is to take shape.

the useful time of a 7-day meets. ESRO reports

The Joint Planning Spacelab which mission, joint utilization

that a call for over half of The Spacelab

ideas elicited

241 replies,

were new "customers" discuss ESRO the most important

for space experimentation. for the second that it would one being

.ISWG members payload.

the constraints

not be a

does not agree to this point.

NASA also

suggests that a DOD mission might replace the first Spacelab on the first Shuttle operational flight. ESRO objects strongly to Sept. 26,1974 1974 this proposal. The new version (Revision Oct. 21-31, After receipt of the Programme Requirements from ERNO Document 21,

1) is si_ned. of the data package on October teams are set up by ESRO at ESTEC and The teams conduct their reviews and (RIDs). The three baseline Requirements Document Volume are: the Program Requirements Payload

independent technical by NASA at Marshall. write Review documents Document (Level XIV. Nov. 7, 1974

Item Discrepancies I), the System

for this review (Level

II), and the Shuttle

Accommodations, Group

The Shuttle/Spacelab or, as it is soon called, lished by agreement

Interface

Working

on Avionics, is estab-

the Avionics

Ad Hoc Group, directors.

of the program

Dec. 1974 Dec. 11, 1974 Jan. 1975

NASA accepts ESRO's choice of the Mitra 25 computer system. The Joint Planning Group holds its final meeting; its functions would orbiter be assumed centerline by line payload tunnel so that lightweight structures above organizations. would be offset if desired. below the payloads could be mountIt is agreed that the transfer

ed on bridging

the tunnel

SPACE SCIENCE
Table Date March 1975 A second the tunnel, nel adapter, decision establishes program The Shuttle 4-44 continued Event the approach would between to the orbiter the Spacelab would

467

end of tuntunat

build a removable

which would

be placed

nel and the orbiter

cabin wall. The adapter

have doors

both ends and a third door at the top where the airlock mounted. May 29-30, 1975 The NASA Preboard "N" chaired review June 4, 1975 of the System Requirements by Jack Lee conducts Documents

could be its In

at Marshall.

the meantime, ESA conducts a parallel review. An annual review of the Spacelab program is held. Roy Gibson, director accept of ESA, and NASA Administrator the objectives for the first Spacelab Group, Fletcher payload propose to as presented dissolves.

by the Joint Planning June 7, 1975

and the group formally

A review is also presented on the status of the IPS proposal. The ASSESS simulation flights are conducted, successfully completing the program at Ames Research a f-day teams Director commit Center. The internathe CV to contional crew of five completes 990 Galileo 11. mission on board

June 9, 1975 Aug. 28-29, 1975

The combined ESA Spacelab "package deal" fund activities

ESA/NASA Programme that would between ERNO

meets in Noordwijk Deloffre

sider the 1,772 RIDs prepared

bv both asencies. and Lord draft a to develop or the agencies

and equipment

that have been in question. plans for go-ahead proposal because (subof unac5. the Dornier

Sept.

1975

By this meeting mitted through ceptable ERNO,

Lord and Deloffre,

have fallen apart. ESA has rejected schedule

as the prime contractor,) with a response Requirements ESA and prime

and cost risks. ESA has issued

RFPs to is issued. VFW

MBB, and Dornier, 2 of the Programme between is signed

due December Document contractor

Sept. Sept.

24,1975 30,1975

Revision

The main contract Fokker/ERNO

in the amount

of approximately

600 million Deutschmarks. Over the next 9 months, negotiations between ERNO and its co-contractors are concluded. Nov. 17-21, 1975 Another tively being Nov. 18--19, 1975 CVT simulation training, is conducted in orbit, could conduct contact. Committee imposed meets and reviews Level I and verstudy to determine experiments how effecexperiwhile using a team of scientists monitored with only moderate investigators

ment operations two-way preliminary constraints, ification results

on the ground Integration 11 guidelines

by principal

voice and downlink-TV management Level

The Joint Program

plans for the first mission, and payload accommodation

by the system

test requirements, and plans.

468

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 4-44 continued Event 1975-1976 The ESA team holds Programme engineering Director change with each member subsystem Bemard proposals, reviews. Deloffre recover Also, ESA Spacelab works reduce to sign contracts the backlog slips, of and meet

Date Winter

of the consortium,

schedule

with European and NASA groups to review the program. To improve NASA's visibility into the European contractor effort, Deloffre By early 1976 invites NASA program management to participate in his quarterly reviews at ERNO beginning in September 1975. ESA receives two proposals for the IPS: a joint bid on the 1PS by Dornier March 1976 and MBB and a bid from ERNO covering is obtained by NASA's to conduct Office ASSESS integramisof tion of the IPS into the Spacelab. Final approval sion sponsored Space March 4-5, 1976 Flight authorizes II as a joint Policy of Applications and Office

and by ESA. The ESA Industrial to proceed Working change Group meeting,

Committee

Deloffre

with the IPS contracts. ESA reports with proposals have been resolved

At the Joint Spacelab that 110 engineering ERNO recently approved

and only 90 are left open. The cost of the changes is 15 million accounting Mathews, units (approximateYardley, McConnell, the latest ESA and to

March

17, 1976

ly $15 million at that time). NASA's Fletcher, Low, Naugle, Calio, Culbertson, Frutkin, proposal

and Lord deliberate

on the IPS. They agree to advise ESA that NASA would requirements 2. first potential use would be on Spacelab on the program

use an ESA IPS that meets the specification that NASA's March 19, 1976 1976 Deloffre reports that his reserves

are down

March-June

only 5 million accounting units. ESA and NASA jointly conduct the Spacelab Assessment gram needs and Reduction and eliminates Review.

Requirements evaluates prointo the

This review

those items that have crept

April1976 May May 12, 1976 26, 1976

program but could be deleted with a considerable cost saving. ESA establishes a Software Audit Team to assess the software situation and make recommendations. Audit Team presents Programme issues its preliminary findings integration in developing and analytical of to conand project managers.

The Software NASA Spacelab

the ESA Spacelab (Marshall) hardware tract to secure and hands-on June 2, 1976

an RFP for a Spacelab to provide support responsibility

a contractor support

that is NASA's

in the integration

and checkout

Spacelab hardware during the system's operational lifetime. The Software Audit Team makes its final presentation to ESA, ERNO, software and co-contractors. is not in good for improving The group concludes that Spacelab shape and that there the situation. does not seem to

be a structure

SPACE SCIENCE
Table Date June 16, 1976 The third annual Fletcher) occurs that the logistics ter to Gibson development. adequate June 18, 1976 meeting 4-44 continued Event of the agency heads (Gibson totally and in Wasbington, requirements D.C, Discussed have been almost is the claim

469

neglect-

ed in the agreements

and contracts

to date. Fletcher

signs a let-

concurring with ESA's plans to proceed with IPS Fletcher urges that the delivery schedule provide of payloads and checkout of the Powell |or the planned launch date in 1980. Director's Review is held, and Luther team summarizes (PDR-A). its planned reviews with repreis a are is out for the final reviews is reigning. is inadequate, PDR-A team analyzes activities Review-A

time for integration

combined system A NASA Program of the Marshall Preliminary Design

project experts

in support of

June 24-25,

1976

The technical ESA at ESTEC between sentatives complete

and goes to Bremen I-2, chaos

ESA and ERNO. arrive on July disaster.

By the time the senior NASA schedules

Documentation

slipping, the budget cannot be held, the contractor team of control, and the team morale is at an all-time low. June 28, 1976 NASA distributes Operations purpose logistics, July July 7, 1976 15, 1976 Gibson the data packages Review is to obtain for the Preliminary for ground agreement operations. on ground ground Requirements of this review training

The operasup-

tions requirements, port equipment, at ERNO balloon Further

including of ground facilities,

integration processing

at Level personnel, control,

1, !1, and Ill, and safety. to PDR-B. ray

contamination

signs a PDR implementation for a simple simulation to employ

plan with Hans Hoffman approach a high-energy cosmic

and straightforward

A final CVT

July 30, 1976

flight experiment is conducted. changes are approved to the Programme The most important utility connectors (from

Requirements of to

Document.

ones note the addition the orbiter

NASA-furnished Aug. 1976

Spacelab) and a trace gas analyzer. At the Program Director's Review,

John Waters

of Johnson

Space Center presents a plan to procure a simulator to operate alone or with the Shuttle Mission Simulator and the Mission Control Center simulation. Sept. Nov. Early 18,1976 l, 1976 Nov. 1976 1976 Gibson Spacelab Programme. Bignier and Gibson recognize that Spacelab funding Bill Lenoir, module is out of and Joe at hand and propose NASA astronauts Kerwin ERNO. Dec. 4 and 8,1976 conduct They descoping the program. Paul Weitz, Ed Gibson, a walkthrough various needed. airlock at Houston meet Bignier to produce a high-fidelity Center mission to tackle

and Fletcher logistics. Michel

at Ames Research as director

ESA selects

of the Spacelab

Nov. 22-23,

of the Spacelab operations

simulate

and note fur-

ther improvements

ESA, ERNO, and NASA hold board meetings, resulting in agreement that PDR-B represents a major turnaround in the program.

470

NASA

HISTORICAL

DATA

BOOK

Table Date Jan. 14, 1977 NASA

4-44

continued Event

Spacelab

Deputy

Director

Jim Harrington

states that

ESA proposals could save as much as $84 million in the ESA budget but could impose on NASA an additional funding requirement of $26 million to $33 million. Fletcher and Gibson agree on the descoping Jan. 20-24, 1977 items for ESA to go to its Spacelab Programme Board

Programme Board for approval. Gibson receives approval from the Spacelab

for all the proposed changes, with one notable exception. The board refuses to accept deletion of the IPS and decides instead Feb. 23,1977 to postpone decisions on this part of the program. The Spacelab module, which is produced by the Italian Aeritalia, ultimate March 1977 After successfully pressure completes a series of limit, proof, testing. and studies decides of various options, the to proceed with the development firm and

many discussions

NASA administrator of a "hybrid" pallet test (OFT) missions Spacelab March March April 9, 1977 16, 1977 1977 integration system effort. NASA announces The ESA Spacelab

to be used on several Shuttle orbital flight and that would also be available if the the selection Programme of McDonnell Board decides Douglas for the the

is delayed.

not to cancel

IPS as part of the overall program descoping. ESA Headquarters submits a proposal for a Spacelab Utilization addresses Programme to its managing programs Review council. for European The report use of the and in three alternative

April

25-29,

1977

Spacelab. The first formal includes Gibson. NASA Working

Crew Station astronauts with NASA,

is held at ERNO Paul Weitz, design.

Bob Parker,

and Ed

ESA, and ERNO

specialists

crew habitability, May 2, 1977

they review the Spacelab

Bignier writes to Lord that only three engineering model pallets would be flightworthy, the others having been used in the test program in such a manner that they cannot be flown. NASA for initially requested OFT missions. four pallets that could and Jim Harrington options be flightworthy

May3-4,1977

The JSWG

meets,

presents

a NASA prorequire-

posal for six preliminary ment of having May 16, 1977 "Launch" planned the development of the ASSESS for Spacelab

to meet the NASA This mission

four pallets and exercise

for the OFT missions. II occurs. emphasizes from 1 of management techniques for the Spacelab for space and Aeritalia on hardware are held for

using management

participants

NASA and ESA who would be responsible mission, then scheduled for 1980. May 30June 5, 1977 John Yardley, flight, the NASA associate visits Hawker-Siddeley Dynamics,

administrator ERNO, and progress (CCDRs)

to review the status fabrication. June 1977 Co-contractor electrical

of the program

Critical Design

Reviews

and mechanical

ground

support

equipment.

SPACE SCIENCE
Table Date June 16, 1977 ESA signs a fixed-price the IPS, with a delivery be solely responsible with no subcontract June 20July July 12, 1977 1977 The Preliminary which provides conducted. CCDRs the T800 design Aug. Sept. 1-19, 1977 1977 ule structure. Requirements A Preliminary Instrumentation CCDRs systems. agement Oct. 1977 backup. Oct. 7, 1977 After touring several European ties, new NASA Administrator Gibson December Nov. 1977 Reviews structure, Nov. 15-16,1977 in Paris. The target t980 and April are conducted and the airlock. government Dr. Robert monitoring, 4-44 continued Event contract with Dornier for developing date of June 18, 1980. Dornier

471

would interface tunnel, is

for managing the IPS/Spacelah for this function. Review for the transfer to the module

Requirements crew access

from the orbiter, subsystem Integration is held,

are held for the data management The first Electrical is successfully of critical Review Review System self-test, completed. tunnel elements

and modactivity, and the Flight and

A Preliminary are initiated.

of the transfer

and development

Requirements is conducted. control, portion

for the Verification system activation

are held for crew habitability, thermal subsystem Testing is completed

and electrical of the Electrical

power

distribution and data manIntegration.

on the command

System

NASA drops

its idea of using a hybrid

pallet as a Spacelab and industry faciliFrosch meets with 1 and 2 are now the igloo compatibility poli-

dates for Spacelabs 1981, respectively.

on the life support A subsystem

system,

interface

test is also completed. ESA expresses concern cy, particularly

about the Spacelab

reimbursement

the high costs,

and that ESA is not given prefer-

Late

1977

ential treatment by NASA in view of its development role. The Spacelab payload planners, reacting to experiment proposals for the second independent mission, recommend a change that could in Spacelab use its own 2 to fly a large cosmic structural ray experiment mount

to the orbiter. the command and data manageground support The IPS are certain susceptineeds the a

Dec. 1977

A compatibility ment subsystem equipment, Preliminary

test between arrived Review

and the first set of electrical from BTM, is held. Concurrent the final phase

newly Design

is completed.

reviews

held at Marshall

and ESTEC:

is held at Dornier.

Results are encouraging, except for two discrepancies: structural elements are found to be made of materials ble to stress corrosion, better definition. Jan. 23March 10, 1978 The Software operational ground technical software agreement and [PS software Review requirements

Requirements computers.

is conducted

to define

for the Spacelab for the first time.

flight subsystems

and the

checkout

ESA, NASA,

and ERNO reach

472

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 4-44 continued Event After Center, begins evaluation a formal of the Spacelab contract to provide Simulator the scientific by Johnson airtock Space for agreement is signed, and development mockup

Date Jan. 30, 1978

with ERNO

Feb.

1978

the simulator and data support Another Crew Station Review

to Link. allows the astronauts

to review

the scientific airlock hardware at Fokker and the improvements to the module at ERNO. Senior NASA and ESA officials meet to discuss the trade of one Spacelab missions. for NASA launch services are to for European so encouraging contractual agreement. Feb. 7-8, 1978 The NASA preboard for the joint Feb. 27_ 1978 March 9, 1978 May 1978 May 8, 1978 meets, and the focus is shifted to ESTEC starting Design on February Review 17. by NASA begins in Bremen. team meetings Spacelab procurement The results of this meeting solely on a barter

that NASA terminates

work related

in favor of concentrating

The final phase of the Critical and ESA representatives. Information on the planned Spacelab exchange timetable 2 configuration NASA administrator leading Frosch to signature

A draft MOU of the barter arrangement mounting is submitted

is reviewed structure to ESA.

of the new general and a the Gibson

and ESA director of the MOU

letters that agree on a set of guidelines

to formalize

May 16, 1978

barter by the end of 1978. ESA sends an RFP to ERNO of the second Dornier Spacelab Manager testing for a similar proposal Pfeiffer

for a firm evaluation on a second reports IPS.

of the cost is sent to System test of the

flight unit. A separate

request

June

1978

ESA Project Integration involving Spacelab, having

that Electrical T004,

has been completed. McDonnell

an assembly model reports Design

the racks and floors is completed. tunnel problems

of the engineering Douglas and fabrication

that it is for the flexReview but it Critical

in both the design sections. Flight

ible transfer

The Preliminary

for the Verification Design June 12-13, 1978 Review

Instrumentation

is completed, Flight

is not until July and November is completed for Spacelab Instrumentation 1.

1979 that a two-part for the Verification

The JSWG reports on user needs for more power, heat rejection, energy, data handling, and a smaller and lighter IPS. Bignier accepts during the proposed the JSWG changes to the Spacelab 2 configuration meeting.

July-Aug. 1978 Aug. 1978

A Critical Design Review for the OFF pallet system is conducted. NASA and ESA announce the first selection of potential crew members Garriott for the early Spacelab and Robert A.R. Parker mission. missions. are named Drs. Owen as mission K. special-

ists for the first Spacelab

SPACE SCIENCE
Table Date Aug. 8, 1978 ESA and NASA payload German specialist Ockels, materials Dr. Wubbo astronomer. al candidate Lampton, Sept. 14,1978 Frutkin introduce 4-44 continued Event their final candidates for the single a to be provided specialist;

473

by each side, ESA has selected Dr. UIf Merbold, Nicollier, K. Lichtenberg, of Califi)mia Programme the second services. (from and the first OFF a Swiss a doctorat Berkeley. Board to proSpacelab

a Dutch physicist; Byron

and Dr. Claude

NASA has selected in bioengineering a physicist headed

at MIT, and Dr. Michael by John Yardley and Aruold

at the University

A NASA delegation pose the mechanism flight unit in exchange

meets with the ESA Spacelab for Shuttle flexible is accepted

for NASA to obtain launch

Oct. 1978

The newly the orbiter

developed program)

multiplexer/demultiplexer from Sperry,

Oct.

7,1978

pallet structure is accepted at British Aerospace. Frosch and Gibson meet for a formal review of the overall Spacelab Spacelab control program. program plan, review The meeting directors results in assignments a post-delivery for operational source spares. for June to the change support, The

to prepare of European

an ESA proposal

and continue

the analysis

Spacelab 1 mission is now targeted 2 for December 1981. Oct. 10-11, 1978 European at ERNO endorse news media representatives sponsored space efforts, challenge Volker

1981 and Spacelab symposium strongly for space

attend a 2-day minister remarks

by the West German Hauff. His opening Spacelab

of research

and technology, equally strong activities. Oct. 16 and 27, 1978

in particular,

and issue an

to demonstrate

Ibe payoff

ERNO and Dornier submit their proposals for a procurement contract for the second Spacelab. ESA and NASA begin their evaluations. ERNO proposes a new schedule model to ESA, which forecasts delivery of the engineering to NASA in April 1980 and deliv-

Oct. 30, 1978

ery of the flight unit in two installments: 1980. Nov. 13, 1978 A NASA team joins goal to define 1979. Dec. 41 1978 Jan. 1979 its ESA counterpart contract a procurement

July and November in Europe as early with the in

as possible

The OFT pallet arrives The oft-postponed NASA Administrator would proceed

at Kennedy Frosch

Space

Center. completed. module that NASA

module

subsystems formally

test is finally announces 25-kW power

with both a free-flying

and an orbiter-attached power extension package to provide up to 15 kW power tor a maximum of 20 days. Colin Jones presents a detailed delivery Jan. 16,1979 NASA applies progress review of the IPS to the JSWG. for July 1981. from Europe Materials of Customs of the Treasury The to Kennedy is now projected

to the Bureau

Department tbr duty-free entry of the Spacelab under the Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Importation Act of 1966.

474

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 4--44 continued Event 12, 1979 Bignier and Lord attend the program in the assembly Frosch review at Dornier and

Date March

observe progress ware elements. March 29, 1979 A meeting poses define By April 1979 between

and testing

of all major hard-

and Gibson

is held, and NASA proworking group to of the

the formation the follow-on

of a joint ESAfNASA development reported program.

Good progress

is finally

in the development

flexible toroidal sections to be placed at each end of the transfer tunnel, which would minimize the transfer of loads between the tunnel ment pleted. Space May 1979 and its adjoining structural elements. The developcomin at Johnson compotest program Center of the tunnel "flex unit" is successfully

Two sets of tests have been completed using European-supplied

development previously

nents from the Spacelab data system. Preliminary Design Review activities because of flex unit development completed. Compatibility Review satisfactorily

terminated and

problems

are resumed

June

1979

A System design NASA

is held to verify the IPS already performed. a second to operafor the procurement

qualifications long-lead

on the basis of testing items necessary system operator

July 4, 1979

and ESA agree to a letter contract

of essential Spacelab. Sept. 1979

for producing is shipped

The total hardware Johnson Space tion, an instructor tions would

of the simulator station

Center

and accepted.

This includes from which computer

the crew staequipment.

training

be controlled,

and supporting

Sept.

12,1979

Bignier writes to Lord expressing serious concern over the escalation of cost of the vertical access kit, then under design review at SENER. The ESA Spacelab approve additional of cost overruns Programme funding in the current Board indicates development its reluctance in light to

By Oct. 1979

for Spacelab

improvements program.

Nob 1979

A two-part Critical Design Review is completed for the Verification Flight Instrumentation for Spacelab I. MDTSCO has the complete Software Spacelab Development Facility operational at the IBM Huntsville, a duplication of the and also Both pallets of all the orbiter interfaces of the payload. review of the 1981 Office Spacelab utilization In particular, with of a Alabama, complex. The facility provides

system and simulates

can model the experiments Late 1979 During Space costs

that would fly on Spacelab.

are ready for Level IV integration the NASA administrator's Science budget, raise serious concern about

the consolidated

their magnitude. He calls

the administrator the concept Spacelab effective payload using Utilization

states that the costs are not in keeping laboratory. Review Committee for making to analyze

of a walk-on

for formation the costs

and to make recommendations

the Spacelab

a cost-

vehicle for science missions. The pallet for the OSS-I is transported from Kennedy to Goddard over the road, Environmental Transportation System.

the Payload

SPACE SCIENCE
Table Date Jan. 1980 A contract NASA) 4-44 continued Event is signed by Marshall $184 million. (as the procurement

475

agent for

and ESA to purchase the second

flight unit at a cost of test of the a full

approximately

The first assembly

racks, floor, and subfloor of the flight unit is completed, 2 weeks ahead of the new schedule. Feb. 1980 Work starts on the long module ing model. Spacelah Jesse Moore 2 configuration proposes integration to Lord to modify the

test of the engineerfrom a three-pallet ['or Spacelab in Paris. to 2 It

again to change

train with igloo to a single train. This is accepted unless Feb. 14,1980 Agency is noted heads later loads analyses that, despite

pallet with igloo plus a two-pallet show the need for further changes. the Spacelab progress program by both ESA and

as the new configuration

meet to review

considerable

NASA, the date for the first Spacelab December 1982. Apfil1980 Part I of the Engineering Nine teams evaluated tance data package written. Late May 1980 a major portion

flight has slipped Review notices

Model Acceptance

is held. accepare of a second in

of the deliverable

and some 800 discrepancy

ESA and NASA sign an agreement IPS for approximately the fourth quarter $20 million, of 1983.

tot procurement scheduled

for delivery

July

1980

The second

major

test of the flight unit is completed, has to be used to replace program report

ahhough

special test equipment er valve. Oct. 1980 The October monthly

a faulty diverl-

from ESA and NASA

states that the engineering model and flight unit test (including electromagnetic compatibility) was completed on October l, and with that test, the engineering program Oct. Nob 20,1980 4,1980 is completed. Model Test Review Board gives final The Engineering model system integration

approval for full disassembly of the engineering model. The Engineering Model Test Review Board gives final approval for the start of the formal Engineering acceptance review, Review giving also known as the Model Acceptance Review Part 11, Part II is successpermission to ship

Nov. 24-25,

1980

The Engineering

Model Acceptance

fully completed, with the final board the hardware to Kennedy. Nov. 28,1980 The final segment ERNO Integration major shipments. Late 1980 The first pallet is moved stand to prepare Dec. 5, 1980 to the cargo

of the engineering model is rolled out of the Hall and is transported to Kennedy in three integration test equipment

for a simulated

integration

with the orbiter.

The first shipment of the engineering model is brought to Kennedy on a C5A airplane, It contains the core segment, one pallet, and miscellaneous (EGSE) and mechanical with a total weight electrical ground ground tons. support equipment (MGSE), support equipment

of 29.9 metric

476

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK Table 4-44

continued Event The second shipment of the engineering model arrives at Kennedy via a Lufthansa 747 airplane containing two pallets, miscellaneous EGSE and MGSE, tons. model arrives at segment, with a total to is the experiment and MGSE, and documentation, with a total weight of 36.3 metric

Date Dec. 8, 1980

Dec. 13, 1980

The third shipment Kennedy two pallets,

of the engineering EGSE

via a C5A plane containing and miscellaneous

Mid-Dec. March March April

1980 4, 1981 10_ 1981

weight of 33.6 metric tons. The flight unit racks are accepted the SPICE A symbolic accomplished, A second NASA turnover facility turnover in Porz-Wahn.

by NASA and delivered to Johnson

of OSTA- 1 from Rockwell of OSTA- I to Kennedy Pfeiffer

takes place. the new him of advising

8, 1981

ESA project the April

manager

writes to John Thomas, at Marshall, concept

Spacelab

program

manager

3 selection

of a new design

for the IPS. ESA

concludes that the existing mechanical design would have failed at several critical sections from the structural loads. The basic electronics June 1981 concept, however, would be retained.

The first part of the Flight Unit 1 Acceptance Review covering EGSE servicers, flight software, and spares is successfully completed. (Flight Unit 1 contains the module.) The modified igloo is returned to ERNO for SABCA, small modifications are made to the igloo Flight support work begins on integrating Unit 2 (which and, after the preof direcShuttle. The

June

15, 1981

structure, contains

June 26, 1981

igloo). The quarterly progress sents the details recent hardware tor, summarizes testing.

meeting

at Dornier concept

is held. Dornier and the results NASA program

of its new design the successful Unit concept is received a payload

Jim Harrington, 1 hardware

first flight of the Space is shipped

July 27_ 1981 July 1981

The first set of Flight Dornier's cessful OSTA-1 Review for testing redesign completion stand, is prepared first set of EGSE equipment

to Kennedy. the suctest that

of the IPS is given a go-ahead. by Kennedy. Certification the STS-2 payload Following Review Flight and carrier

of the tests in the cargo integration to support

certifies Readiness

and that the integrated with the orbiter.

are ready readi-

This affirms

the operational

Aug. 31, 1981 Sept. 1981 Nov. 4, 1981

ness of the supporting elements of the mission. The report from Pfeiffer states that there are no outstanding technical problems A new Preliminary Orbiter launch Spacelab formance processing occurs. viewpoint, of the pallet in the first part of Flight Unit 1. Design Review is held of the IPS. proceeds normally; the second Shuttle perprovides for carrying abundant data. From the the outstanding

OSTA-1

OSTA- 1 demonstrates

experiments.

SPACE SCIENCE
Table Date Nov. 30, 1981 The second pleted, shipment 4-44 continued Event part of the Flight Unit 1 Acceptance decision A formal directors, to approve Certificate project Review

477

is comis

with the board's to Kennedy.

Flight Unit 1 for of Acceptance and accep-

signed by the program tance managers Dec. 7, 1981 Dec. 8, 1981 Dec. 15, 1981 Jan. 1982 Testing resumes The OFF Pallet Marshall. The OSS-I Marshall. A Spacelab

managers,

for the two agencies 3 weeks Program

and for the prime contractor.

late on the Flight Unit 2 systems. Manager's Review is conducted at Review is conducted at

Pallet Pre-Integration 2 Interface transfer Review tunnel

is held of the IPS. By early assemblage is delivered to for the first Spacelab mission. of the OSS-1 Pallet is held at at Johnson. up to begin tests simulating

1982, the entire Jan. 5,1982 Jan. 26-28, Feb. 1982 1982

Kennedy, ready for processing The Cargo Readiness Review Kennedy. An OSS-1 simulation model

is conducted is powered

The engineering

those to be conducted March 9, 1982 March 22, 1982 March-Oct. 1982

later with the first flight unit.

The Flight Readiness Review for OSS- 1 is completed. STS-3 is launched on its successful 7-day mission with the OSS-1 payload in the cargo bay. It is agreed that NASA would conduct Review with support to: review that design substantiating met; review manufacturing, and establish flightworthiness. the performance configurations data verifying and verification the remaining and design satisfied a Design Certification ERNO determine review had been design, action taken;

from ESA and its prime

contractor

requirements;

the requirements; during to certify

that the requirements encountered and the corrective

the major problems

effort necessary

June

10, 1982

Spacelab I faces its first operational review, the Cargo Integration Review for the STS-9 mission, conducted at Johnson. planned The board launch concludes that the hardware, would 30, 1983. has replaced Dr. software, support the flight documentation, and flight activities of September

schedule

June July

17, 1982 3, 1982

Agency heads meet in Paris. James Frosch as NASA administrator. The final Flight completed Unit Acceptance meeting.

E. Beggs

Review

for Flight

Unit 2 is

with the board

By July 7, 1982

A new cost review is presented to the administrator by Mike Sander and Jim Harrington. Their presentation focuses on three areas of Spacelab costs: instrument development. operations, mission management, and

July 8, 1982 July 29, 1982

The second Certificate of Acceptance is signed for Flight Unit 2. The final shipment of large components of Flight Unit 2 is delivered to Kennedy final three pallets, from Hanover. carried Review It contains the igloo and the of the IPS is held. by C5A. of the redesign

Aug.

1982

A Critical

Design

478

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 4-44 continued Event The Johnson Nicholson Review Mission Integration an STS-9 and orbiter Office Integration capability would launch under Leonard hardware the cargo that the conducts to verify design Hardware/Software against verify

Date Dec. 6-9, 1982

the compatibility The overall the STS-9 Review

of the integrating findings

and software requirements orbiter ments Jan. 13, 1983 1983

for STS-9.

payload

accommodations

meet the cargo requireschedule board review

and can support

The final presentations of the Design The Spacelab interfaces including 1 system

and NASA Headquarters are held. verifying test is conducted,

Certification

Jan.-March

the internal train, in a

between the pallet.

the subsystem are powered

and the experiment

March April

and 1983

The experiments mission 215-hour sequence [light,

up and total system about simulated recording

verified

test simulating with the orbiter

79 hours of the planned by ground support and playback flight tests The

equipment and the high-data-rate demonstrated. April May 1983 1983 A Design Certifcation Review

on the verification

and Verification Flight Instrumentation is completed. Subsystem integration of the new fPS system begins. transfer tunnel verified. is integrated to the module signs a blanket and Remote

and its interfaces certificate Manipulator for the System stand

May 17, 1983

The NASA administrator duty-free materials. entry of Spacelab is moved fidelity

May 18, 1983

Spacelab

to the cargo integration simulation of the orbiter system. Control integration processing Operations The cargo

test equipment interface Center During

for a higher

and use

of the Kennedy using Relay June 17, 1983 Glynn System Flight tation a domestic Satellite Lunney, program Operations through

launch satellite System. free. manager

this test, the is simulated and Data

data link to the Payload

in place of the Tracking

test equipment

test is problem

of the National issues to baseline

Space Transportation documenand at Johnson. flight

at Johnson, Review this management

the plan for the STS-9 the operations plans of the transportation

evaluation

of payload activities. June 30, 1983 Lunney operations.

requirements the Flight includes

into implementation Operations

chairs

Board meeting of the STS-9

The meeting

a "watkthrough"

SPACE SCIENCE
Table Date July 25, 1983 John Neilon, meeting verifies manager 4-44 continued Event of NASA's of Spacelab Spacelab cargo Review projects Board. verifies

479

office, chairs The review elements the readiness

of the Cargo Readiness the readiness integration to receive

I and supporting

for on-line the orbiter cargo through events systems Payload Aug. 15, 1983 Spacelab Orbiter Columbia. to-computer,

with the orbiter,

of

1, and reviews including

the Kennedy to the orbiter of any

integration mission

assessment completion, constraints,

from cargo transfer or workarounds. are reviewed, interface Center canister, during power,

identification

major problems, are accomplished

The milestone and all objectives the integrated Center and to the the

in the Spacelab

program

in three key tests at Kennedy: to the Mission Control

test, the cargo/orbiter Operations is placed Processing Control Facility, interface

test, and the closed

loop test from Spacelab

in the payload

transferred in the orbiter

and installed test verifies

Three tests are conducted hardware/software, interface

the next month: signal, tunnel sensors; interlaces: the

Spacelab/orbiter

computerlighting, and the air

and fluid/gas test verifies

Spacelab/tunnel/orbiter flow, and Verification end-to-end command/data

Flight Instrumentation link test verifies Satellite

the Spacelab/orbiter/ Sands/Domat/ Building. pad, with Building

Tracking and Data Relay Johnson/Goddard link. Sept. Sept. Sept. 23,1983 28,1983 29, 1983 The orbiter The Shuttle is moved assembly

System/White Assembly

to the Vehicle is rolled

out to the launch

launch scheduled for September 30. The Shuttle assembly returns to the Vehicle because booster. of a suspect exhaust

Assembly

nozzle on the right solid rocket Building for a

Nov. 4, 1983 Nov. 8, 1983 Nov. 28, 1983

The orbiter is moved second time. The Shuttle Spacelab is rolled

to the Vehicle Assembly out again to the pad. STS-9.

1 flies on Shuttle

mission

Source: Douglas R. Lord, Spacelah_n International Technical Division, NASA, Washington, DC. 1987.

Succe.ss Stot% NASA Scientific and

480

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Table Investigation Contamination measured Monitor

4-49.

OSS-

1 In vestigations Principal Institution

Package of molecular

Investigator J. Triolo

the buildup

Goddard Space Flight Center/U.S. Air Force

and gas contaminants in the orbiter environment to determine how molecular instrument Microabrasion measured and density encountered Earth orbit. Vehicle contamination performance. Foil Experiment chemistry, in nearE Banks Utah State University of micrometeorites by spacecraft J.A.M. McDonnell University England of Kent, the numbers, affects

Charging

and Potential

Experiment measured the electrical characteristics of the orbiter, including with the natural its interactions plasma environment

of the ionosphere and the disturbances that result from the active emission of electrons. Induced data on the and volatile or from the J. Weinberg University of Florida provided Shuttle-Spacelab Atmosphere materials orbiter

extent that dust particles evaporating produced

a local "'cloud"

"plume" in the "sky" through which astronomical observations could be made. Solar Flare X-Ray Polarimeter R. Novick Columbia University measured x-rays emitted during solar flare activities on the Sun. Solar Ultraviolet Spectral G. Brueckner Naval Research

Irradiance Monitor was designed to establish a new and more accurate base of solar ultraviolet measurements irradiance over a wide J.R. Cowles

Laboratory

wavelength region. Plant Growth Unit demonstrated the effect formation during of near weightlessness and rate of lignin plant species in different on the quantity early

University

of Houston

stages of development that, under be reduced, and lignin might

and tested the hypothesis microgravity, causing droop the plants

to lose strength

rather than stand erect.

SPACE SCIENCE
Table Investigation Thermal determined Canister Experiment of a device 4-49 continued Principal Investigator S. Ollendorf Institution Goddard Center Space Flight

517

the ability

using controllable heat pipes to maintain simulated instruments at several loads. Plasma studied orbiter temperature levels in thermal S. Shawhan University of Iowa

Diagnostics Package the interaction of the with its surrounding

environment, tested the capabilities of the Shuttle's Remote Manipulator System, and carried out experiments in conjunction with the Fast Pulse Electron Generator of the Vehicle Experiment, pallet. Charging also on The and Potential

the OSS- 1 payload

package was deployed for more than 20 hours and was maneuvered at the end of the 15.2-meter (See also Table 440.) RMS.

518
Table Date 1940 1960/1961

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

4-50. Hubble Space Telescope Event Astronomer 300-inch The requests R.S. Richardson telescope placed for proposal speculates on the Moon's (RFP) on the possibility surface. Astronomical to be instruments of a Development

for the Orbiting

Observatory spacecraft and the astronomical flown aboard them are issued. 1962 1965 The National Academy of Sciences

recommends establishes

the construca committee large space to tele-

tion of a large space telescope. The National Academy of Sciences define scope. the scientific objectives

for a proposed the Orbiting

1968 1972 1973

The first astronomical observatory, Observatory-1, is launched. The National Academy of Sciences

Astronomical a large goal. steering of be fea-

again recommends

orbiting optical telescope as a realistic and desirable NASA establishes a small scientific and engineering committee Chicago headed by Dr. C. Robert which scientific space telescope. O'Dell to determine objectives

of the University would

sible for a proposed 1975 1977 The European NASA selects participate June 17,1977 space telescope. NASA issues telescope.

Space Agency becomes a group of 60 scientists

involved in the project. from 38 institutions to of the proposed for the space and

in the design

and development

the Project Approval project

Document

The primary

objective

is to "develop

operate a large, high-quality optical telescope system in space which is unique in its usefulness to the international science community. nificant The overall scientific objectives...are to gain a sigobjects increase in our understanding of the university--past, of celestial mirror

present, and future--through and events...." Oct. 1978 April 25, 1978 19, 1977

observations

NASA awards the contract for the primary Elmer of Danbury, Connecticut. Congress telescope. Marshall appropriates Space Flight

to Perkinof the space

funds for the development Center is designated

as the lead center

for the design, development, and construction of the telescope. Goddard Space Flight Center is chosen to lead the development of the scientific Dec. 1978 1979 Jan. 20,1979 Feb. 1979 Money requests lbr space science program increase 20 percent Rough grinding Connecticut. instruments operation and ,ground control begins at Perkin-Elmer center. in Wilton,

($100 million), which includes money for the space telescope. Debate over which institute NASA should choose to develop the space telescope chosen.) takes place. (John Hopkins University is

SPACE SCIENCE
Table Date May 29, 1979 The decision Company modify 4-50 continued Event is made to have Fairchild the communications for NASA's Space & Electronics and data handling Modular

519

mod-

ule it developed June 1979

Multimission

Spacecraft

for use on the space telescope. Marshall Space Flight Center decides that the alternative sensor was receiving little management attention at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory and the space telescope a 1983 launch. July 1979 Marshall Space Flight Center was unlikely to be ready Operating overshot of the New for

compiles

its Program

Plan for fiscal year 1980; Lockheed and Perkin-Elmer the cost for the space telescope by millions of dollars original Nov. 18,1979 budgeted adjusted program's reserves. Maryland, Five states compete for the space telescope:

Jersey, Illinois, Colorado, and California. include University Research Association, Universities, Inc. (AUI), and Association Research Princeton; Dec. 14,1979 1980 Feb. 13,1980 Dr. EA. Speer, Observatory Feb. 21,1980 manager Goddard Science and Astronomy AURA Space Institute Flight (AURA). Center wants it at Johns RFP. Proposals

Competing groups Associated of Universities for at University. Telescope 3,1980.

AUI wants the project Hopkins the Space

releases

are due March

of the High Energy Space

Astronomy Center, is

program

at Marshall

Flight

named manager of the space telescope project for Marshall. NASA Associate Administrator Dr. Thomas A. Mutch informs Congress "originally development allotted that the space telescope estimated costs." costs at $530 toward million, launch can be completed space with another in December within its NASA estimates telescope million period. 1983 "continto negotiate on preliminary for the

$600

for operation

of the system

over a 17-year

Mutch says progress ues to be excellent." May 29, 1980 NASA announces a contract operations Sept. 18, 1980 for overall requirements

the selection system

of Ford Aerospace design engineering system

and the test support

space telescope. NASA officials

admit to space telescope before the House

cost and schedule Science and Technology

problems in hearing subcommittee. 1981 Jan. 6,1981 A.M. Lovelace, er, submits the estimated $750 million mate. The launch

NASA associate space period is revised

administrator/general cost and schedule is $700

managestito

a revised

telescope

to the first half of 1985, and million

development cost at launch (in 1982 dollars).

520

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 4-50 continued Event NASA establish, Institute. contractor's $24 million, and archival selects AURA operate, for final negotiation the Space Hopkins to support at Johns funds of a contract Telescope contract University. is to The

Date Jan. 16, 1981

and maintain

Science

It will be located estimate research completes Flight plus additional

of the cost of the 5-year program. polishing Center

a guest observer primary for the manto AURA. contract at Johns

April 29, 1981 April 30, 1981

Perkin-Elmer mirror Goddard agement extends Hopkins Space

of the 2.4-meter 1990). the contract Institute

(see events

dated November awards Telescope

of the Space through

Science

The period

of performance

for the $40.4 million

1986. The institute

will be located

University. telescope's "'main ring" is delivered Corp., which fabricated to Perkin-Elmer the ring over a pericoating 3 millionths

Oct. 23, 1981

Space

Corp. from Exelco od of 18 months. Dec. 1982 Jan. 26, 1982 March 1982 Congress increases $121.5 million. The Critical Design 10,1981 Perkin-Elmer

finishes

putting

an aluminum mirror.

of an inch thick on the primary space

telescope

funding by $2 million to support ready

Review

of the space telescope's and the design

systems module is completed, for manufacturing. March 28, 1982 A report the space opment. opment project from the House telescope The report

is declared

Appropriations because

Committee million of difficulties

states that in develon NASA develplan for a of the

would cost $200 blames delays

more and reach

orbit a year later than expected for understaffing the program

and cost overruns to properly difficulty

by 50 percent for failing

in its early

and on Perkin-Elmer of the technical

and manufacturing

space telescope. after 15 months its reflecting 1983 Feb. 4,1983

Also, unremovable in a Perkin-Elmer

dust on the primary mirror "clean room" had lowered

power

by 20 to 30 percent. Beggs tells the House Science and

NASA Administrator Technology Committee

that technical

problems

in developing

the electronics and guidance and pointing telescope assembly of the space telescope of the telescope March 24,1983 space telescope and increase Beggs has problems costs. tells House in a number NASA Administrator

system of the optical will delay the launch subcommittee of areas--the that the latch-

ing mechanism, the fine guidance sensor system, and the primary mirror--that are likely to result in cost overruns of $200 million or more and at least a 12- to 18-month delay. Beggs says that the primary mirror is coated with dust after sitting in a clean room for a year and may not be able to be its surface. Its capability could be limcleaned without harming ited to 70 or 80 percent.

SPACE SCIENCE
Table Date March 25, 1983 The preliminary of the House report 4-50 continued Event by the Investigations subcommittee and Survey boosting

521

Staff its

Appropriations

states that the space million,

telescope will overrun its costs by $200 overall cost to $1 billion. April April 13, 1983 26, 1983 NASA names James B. Odom as manager

of Marshall

Space

Flight Center's space telescope James Welch, NASA's director states that NASA may accept a current study indicates

project. of space telescope the dirty primary would

development, because the

mirror

that the mirror

be within

acceptable range and would meet the original specifications in the contract. Also, NASA has decided to coat the sticking latching mechanism June 15, 1983 Dr. William the House scope project Space with tungsten Marshall subcommittee $1.1 billion carbide Space rather Flight than redesign director, estimates to $400 it. tells Lucas, Center

that NASA to $1.2 billion,

that telemillion to probNASA telescope R Hubble

costs will increase

$300 million

to approximately

and it expects

be able to launch in June lems "are now understood June 15,1983 Administrator program, Oct. 5, 1983 Nov. 17, 1983

1986. He states that technical and resolution is in hand." that, in retrospect, the space the Edwin and running renamed

Beggs acknowledges

made some errors in planning but that the instrument is officially The space telescope Space Telescope. NASA submits would augment a report efforts

has not been compromised.

to Congress planned

on proposed

action that develop-

for the space

telescope

ment by $3(I.0 million above the authorized and appropriated amount, for a revised FY 1984 level of $195.6 million. Dec. 22, 1983 Space telescope officials that surfaced are cautiously optimistic that the seriover the last ous problems on the space telescope

year have been solved and that the instrument on schedule in 1986. 1984 April 2, 1984 The estimated million. cost of the space telescope Beggs states of poor

can be launched

has risen to $1.175 that Lockheed workmanship sensors have pointing will prob-

NASA Administrator

lose some of its award fees because lems. April 30, 1984 NASA reports demonstrated and tracking May 14,1984 May 31, 1984 that the telescope requirements.

that tests of the fine guidance

will meet stringent

The idea surfaces of refurbishing the space telescope in space. The five science instruments to fly on the space telescope complete acceptance resolution testing at Goddard faint-object Space Flight Center: highspectrograph, spectrograph, wide-field/

July

12, 1984

planetary camera, faint-object camera, high-speed photometer. Technicians at Perkin-Elmer clean the primary mirror. NASA states that cleaning the observatory of the primary mirror has confirmed system that possible. will have the very best optical

522

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 4-50 continued Event Goddard Center Space Flight Center's conducts Telescope command Operations and telemetry Missile assembly Control tests and and veri-

Date Dec. 6, 1984

satisfactorily

with the Hubble Space Corporation. fication tests. 1985 Jan. 17-18,1985 A workshop give scientists for key projects Feb. l, 1985 The National

Space Telescope

at Lockheed

This is the first of seven

by the Space

Telescope

Science

Institute

is held to

an opportunity Society

to present

their recommendations presents an

for the space telescope. of Professional Corp. Engineers for its development of the Hubble

award to Perkin-Elmer July 8,1985

Space Telescope's optical telescope assembly. Lockheed Missiles and Space Co. reports that it has completed assembly Telescope. of the primary Space structure for the Hubble Space

July

19, 1985

Goddard fabrication

Flight Center

releases

the RFP for design and for the space telescope.

of an Imaging

Spectrograph

Dec. 5,1985

Proposals are due September NASA selects three scientific

17. investigations

for the space telescien-

scope to lead to the development tific instruments for Hubble. 1986 Jan. 26, 1986 Feb. 27, 1986 The destruction other missions. Hubble completes of Challenger

of one or two advanced

delays

the launch of Hubble and and vibrational the launch

acoustic and dynamic

response tests. The tests indicate environment. May 2June 30, 1986 May 21, 1986 Thermal-vacuum The last elements to Lockheed for integration May 27, 1986 Aug. 7,1986 testing

that it can endure

is conducted. solar arrays--are structure. testing in delivered California)

of Hubble--the

Missiles

and Space Co. (Sunnyvale, the thermal-vacuum chamber.

into the main telescope

Hubble successfully completes the Lockheed thermal-vacuum

NASA and the Space Telescope Science Institute in Baltimore announce that 19 U.S. amateur astronomers will be allowed to make observations with Hubble. This decision is to show grati-

tude to the amateur astronomers for the last 400 years. Aug. 8,1986 1987 March 17,1987 Hubble Hubble successfully completes

for their help with telescopes 2 months of rigorous testing.

starts a 3-day ground that will be carried high-resolution photometer, Flight Science Center's

system test involving on board: spectrograph,

the five

instruments tary camera, graph, Aug. 31Sept. 4,1987 Goddard Control

wide field and planefaint object spectroOperations

high-speed Space

and faint object camera. Space Telescope conduct and the Space

Center, Marshall

Space Flight Center, Institute

Flight Telescope tion test.

a joint orbital verifica-

SPACE SCIENCE
Table Date Sept. 9, 1987 Hubble Analysis completes (FMEA). 4-50 continued Event the reevaluation This reevaluation analysis is directed of Failure

523

Mode and Effects

of the FMEA/Critical by the Space Telescope strategy to return the

Items List/hazard Development Space 1988 Feb. 10, 1988 March 31, 1988 Fred S. Wojtalik Shuttle

Division

as part of NASA's

to flight status. is appointed manager of the Hubble for Hubble project is completand the sysof Hubble. 5 1/2 days, the new at

Marshall Space Flight Center. The draft Program Approval Document ed. The draft contains plan, including the objectives the experiments

of Hubble,

the technical

and descriptions, system because

June 20, 1988

tems performance requirements. NASA begins the fourth ground This will be the longest ments ground and also the most sophisticated will be used in their

test (GST-4)

test to date, lasting operational

all of the six instrumodes:

various

July 24,1988

instrument is the fine-guidance astrometer. Hubble completes the GST-4 tests successfully, ing incompatibility between the science

except for a timand the com-

instruments

August31,1988 1989 July 19,1989

puter. The problem is to be corrected by adjusting the software. NASA delays launch of Hubble from June 1989 to February 1990. The Space Telescope of the first science using Hubble. submitted) galaxies, better trigger are plans to survey Among Science observation to search Institute proposals completes proposals its selection out (out of 556 to the

to be carried

the 162 accepted

for black holes of globular

in neighboring star clusters, to probe

the dense cores galaxies bursts.

see the most distant bizarre Telescope gamma-ray

in the universe, for neutron transports

core of the Milky Way, and to search Oct. 1989 A modified Space 1990 Jan. 19,1990 Feb. 5-7, 1990 Feb. 10, 1990 NASA delays the Hubble launch Air Force C-5A Galaxy from Lockheed Space Center

stars that may

the Hubble to its launch site

in California

at the Kennedy

in Florida. to replace O-rings. and Data

Confidence End-to-end interfaces Processing

testing is held. communications of Discoveo_ Facility,

test run using Tracking to interconnect Hubble Telescope Flight

Relay Satellite-East

is concluded and the Space

the payload

in its hangar,

in the Vertical Operations

Feb. Feb.

13,1990 15,1990

Control Center at Goddard Space The final confidence test is held. Closeout Functional operations testing begin. of Hubble's in the Space on STS-31.

Center.

Feb. 17,1990 March 29, 1990

science Shuttle

instruments orbiter

is

completed. Hubble is installed payload bay. Hubble is launched

Discover3"s

April 24,1990

524

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Table 4-50 continued Event 2 I, 1990 Hubble's project Space manager announces Optical Laboratory. project (except for the optical to is transferred releases from Marshall the telescope's Systems inability to

Date June

focus properly. July 2, 1990 The Hubble Investigation Oct. t6, 1990 Responsibility system failure Goddard. Nov. 1990 Telescope under Board of of Dr. Lew is formed the chairmanship

Allen of the Jet Propulsion questions)

for the Hubble

The Board of Investigation that a spherical device turer's aberration

findings, mirror installs

which conclude measuring at the manufacco_ective lens-

was caused

by a flawed

that was used to test the primary facility. Repair Mission on STS-61 solar panels.

Dec. 2,1993

The Hubble

es and replaces

SPACE SCIENCE
Table 4-51. Spacecraft October Project April 1978 Start 1980 1981 1981 1982 NASA spacecraft "slowdown" U.S. spacecraft canceled Launch vehicle changed changed Launch to STS/IUS July 1982 1986 (2-sta_e) 1 NASA spacecraft 1 ESA spacecraft Ulysses Historical Launch Summat Vehicle/ T Launch

525

Date

Upper Stage Single STS/IUS f3-stage launch) Split launches: 1 NASA, 1 ESA Launch vehicle to STS/Centaur changed

1983 launch Launch deferred to 1985 Launch deferred to 1986

February September January

Launch vehicle to STS/Centaur Challenger STS/Centaur canceled 1986 IUS/PAM-S procurement

January June

accident program upper stage

deferred

indefinitely 1986

November

decision Launch selected: October 1990 date

INDEX

C California A., 17. 18 Particle 373,386, 50 ASRM, 57, 58 222 Tracer 388 Institute of Technology, 402

Aaron,

John,

373 James

Abrahamson,

Active Magnetospheric Explorer, AMPTE, Advanced Satellite, Advanced Advanced Aerojet ACTS,

California, University of. 41/2, 406 Canada, 170, 173, 241,243, 244, 250 Canadian Capital Captain Space Cook, Agency. 125 367 250

Communications

Technology

Development

Plan, 241

Launch System, 56 Solid Rocket Motor, Strategic Propulsion

Carnegie Institute, Castor, II, IV. 31 Centaur, Centre Centro 375, 417, 418,420 Spatial Ricerche

Company,

16. 17, 22, 24, 26, 29, 51, 57, 217, Guyanais, 252 392 107,

Aerojet TechSystems, 53 Air Force, U.S., 17, 24, 28, 29, 169, 179, 221, 225, 375,385. Aldrich, Arnold Aldrin, Allen, Ames Edwin 386 J., 19, 111, 196, 197. 200 "Buzz," 125 118, 179

Aerospaziali,

Challenger,

3, 14, 19, 28, 41, 43, 45, 52,

108, I11, 115, 122. 171. 172, 174, 175, 188, 190, 191, 195. 218, 235. 364. 418. 4211 Chang-Diaz, Charge 388

123, 125, 128. 139, 153, 176. 177, 185, 186, 187, 196, 199, 203. 212, 217. 403,409, 410, 417,

Joseph R, 178 Research Center, Paul G., 107, 118

Anderson, Apogee Apollo. Arizona,

368,390,

and Maneuvering University

System,

AMS,

5l

108, 115. 125, 134, 135, 165 of. 366

Franklin

R., 183 Explorer, CCE, 386, 387,

Composition

Armstrong, Nell, 125 Atlantic Ocean, 33, 138, 156 Atlantic Atlantis, Atlas, Aurora, Australia, Austria, 51,375 satellite, 179 15(/ 28 Research Corporation, 222 125, 153, 182, 232, 233,235,405 13, 16, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 47,

Chicago. University of, 402,419 Clean Air Act of 1977. 379 Coast Guard, U.S., 190 Collins, Michael, 125 Colorado, Columbia, University 107, 108, of, 380, 390 122, 125, 153, 155, 156, 165, 167, 168, 169,

157, 161, Columbus, Combined

162, 163, 164,

183, 232, 233, 235 251,252 Release and Radiation Effects

Ball Aerospace, Beggs, Belgian, James 150

380 M., 54, 370

Satellite, CRRES, 29 Comet Giacobini-Zinner, Comet IRAS-Araki-Alcock, Business Arthur Gamma Telescope, Daily, Holly,

368, 402, 421 383 27 CGRO. 405 405

Commerce Compton, Compton 401,404, 52, 53,241, Compton

Big Bang, 404, 410 Black, David C., 118 Bluford, Guion S., 173 Corporation, Boeing Aerospace 242, 402 Brand, Briggs, Vance

Ray Observatory, COMPTEL,

405, 4116

D., 174 37 I Research und

Congress, U.S., 3, 4, 14, 20, 21, 22, 56, 57, 119, 120, 121, 188, 189, 212, 239, 241,242, 246, 248, Copernicus, Observatory, Cosmic 410 Crew 363,373, Orbiting 4112 Explorer, 141 COBE, 409, 374, 417 Astronomical

Geoffrey,

British Science and Engineering Council, 399, 400, 408 Bundeministerium Technologie, for Forschungs BMFT, 408,409

Background Activity Plan,

527

528

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Extravehicular activity, 174, 181. 239, 250 Extreme Ultraviolet 401, 4/)6, 407 EVA, 146, 147, 171, EUVE, 368,

Crippen, Robert L.,112, 167, 172, 214, 215, 222 Critical Design Review, 44-45, 56 Critical Item List, CIL. 210, 214, 215 Culbertson. Philip E., 18, 114 D Data and Design Analysis Task Force, 5I-L, 211 Delta. 13. 16, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 49, 51,368, 379, 382, 383, 384, 399, 406, 407,409, 41(I Denmark, 150 Department ofDefense. DOD, 19, 27, 28, 33, 48,53,56,57, 122, 131. 179, 182, 186, 218, 227, 385,391 Design Certification Review, 45 Deutsche Forschungs Versuchsanstat farLuft und Raumfahrt, DFVLR, 393 (see German Aerospace Research Establishment) Diaz, Alphonso V., 118, 119
Discover..'. Douglas Drop Dutch 125, 147, Aircraft additional Explorer 153, 177, 178, 3I 395 DAX, 382, 383 185, 187, 232, 233,235, Dynamics 236, 237, 238, 388 Company, Module, experiment,

Explorer,

Feynman,

Richard,

199

Finarelli, Margaret, I 18 Fisher, William F., 181 Fisk, Lennard 17 C., 115, 116, 120, 212, 218 Firing, 133, 236. 237 Review, 112, 195. 196, 199. James A., 371 Fitts, Jerry, Fletcher, Flight Flight 207, France, Freedom, Fullerton, G

Readiness Readiness 215, 223 150

Space Station, Gordon, 162

242,

243, 250

Galaxy Galileo, Gardner, Garn, German

satellite,

27

52, 218, 368, 369, 383, 417, 418, 419 Dale A., 178 Jake, 180 Research Establishment,

Senator

Aerospace

Dynamics

l, 378, 379

DFVLR, 182 (see Deutsche Forschungs Versuchsanstat fur Luft und Raumfahrt) German Federal Ministry Technology, 182 of Research and 173,

Earth,

33, 34, 48, 52, 53, 55, 56, 107, 108, 148, 152, 157. 171, 174, 177, 252, 254, 373, 374, 399,

Germany, Gemini, General General General General 233

Federal 142 Accounting

Republic

of, 150, 172,

125, 126, 129, 141, 143, 161, 163, 165, 167, 168, 363, 375,

405, 407, 418

178, 180. 238, 239, 243, 246, 364, 366. 369, 370, 372, 379, 383, 385,388, 419, 420, 421 19 I., 371 Base,

Office.

395,396,

Dynamics, 29, 52 Electric, GE, 52, 53, 242 purpose computers, Operational GOES, GPC, 127, 128,

401,402.404, 416, 418, Eaton, Edelson, Edwards Peter,

406, 410.411,413,414,

Geostationary Satellite, California, 34, 136, 225, 238 208, 210, 216,

Environmental

Burton

25, 26, 28

Air Force

142, 169, 171,204, Ellington Field, 145 Endeavour. 126, 153 Enterprise. European 108 Space

Get-Away Special, 151, 152, 169, 180, 182 Gibson, Robert L. "Hoot," 174 Glaser, Goddard Harold, Space 371 Flight Center, 31, 116, 117,

Agency,

ESA,

26, 109, 148, 252, 368, 405,408,

143, 144, 151, 180, 240, 248, 368, 369, 371,390, 392, 399, 402,403,406. 409 Graham, Greenbelt, Gregory, Griggs, Grumman Grumman William, 189 248 224 242 II, 146

150, 173, 174, 24l, 243,244, 384, 394, 399, 400, 401,402. 419, 420 European X-Ray Observatory EXOSAT, 26, 384 Evolution Expendable Management Launch Council, Vehicles,

Maryland, Frederick, David, Corporation, Gulfstream

Satellite, 246

147, 179

ELV, 13, 14, 15,

18. 19,20,21,22,24,25,27,28,33,47, 49, 217, 368

Guastaferro, Angelo, 371 Gunn. Charles R., 15

INDEX

529

Jet Propulsion Laboratory, 383, 406, 416 Halley's 421 Halpern, Hercules Herman, Comet, Richard 183. 184, 190, 390, 401,416, Johns Hopkins University,

JPL, 403

143. 371,380,

E., 118

Johnson Space Center, JSC, 34, 50, 109, I10, 111,112, 113, 114, 115, 116,117,123,143. 144, 145, 155, 189, 240, 248 Jupiter, K Keel, Alton G., Jr., 188 365. 366. 396, 411,413, 417 196, 217, 223,239,

Inc.. 222 Daniel H., I 18.371

High Energy Astronomy Observatories. HEAO, 365, 366, 375, 376, 409 High-pressure fuel turbopump, HPFT, 36

Hilat, 385,391 Hinners, Noel W., 369, 372 Hitchhiker, Hodge, Hoffman. John 183 D., 18, 114, 116 147. 179

Kennedy Space Center. KSC, 29, 34, 37.50, 109, 110, 112, 113, [16, 117, 122, 125, 133, 135, 136, 137, 141, 210, 216, 217, 224, 142, 143, 155, 169. 225,232, 235,241. 176, 189, 190. 196, 2110, 203, 204, 208, 251,369 Kenya, 392 196

Jeffrey,

Honeywell, Inc., 51.52 Hubble, Edwin E, 367 Hubble 402, Hudson, Space Telescope, 4113. 404 Hen_', 125 218, 367, 368, 401.

Hughes Aircraft, 26, 178,416 Huntsville, Alabama, 247 Hutchinson, Neil, 240

Kilminster, Joseph, Kodak, 402 Kohrs, Kourou, Richard French

H., l 1I, 112 Guiana, 252

Indian Inertial

Ocean, Upper

33, 137, 238 Stage, IUS, Satellite. 17, 48, 49 IRAS, 26, 381,

Landsat, Langley

26 Research Center, 33,246. 247 LINS, 50, 51

Infrared Astronomy 382, 383 lnsat, 26, 172, 173 Intelsat, 26 Intercontinental 3O Intermediate International 421 International International International 402. 415 International 400, 401 lntravehicular Ion Release range

Laser initial navigation system, Launch Abort Panel, 225 Launch Control Processing 147, 177, Center.

134, 135, 236 134, 135

ballistic

missile,

ICBM,

29,

Launch Leasat,

System, 179, 181

ballistic

missile,

31 ICE, 402,

Leicester University. United Kingdom, 408 Lewis Research Center, 30, 52, 53, 115, 116, I 17, 118, 240, 249, 250, 383 Lightweight external 241,402 Exposure 29, 33 S., 111 Facility, 177 tank, LWT, 37

Cometary

Explorer,

Halley Watch, 421 Solar Polar Mission, Sun-Earth Ultraviolet Explorer, Explorer,

Lockheed, 52,419, ISLE, 420 401, Long

Duration Glynn

LTV Corporation, Lunney,

IUE, 399, M

activity, IVA, 147 Module. IRM, 386, 387, 388 per le Ricerche Spaziali,

Italian Commissione 391 Italy, 1511. 391 ltek. 402

Magellan, Magnetic Mahon, Main Main

369, 416, 417 satellite, Magsat, Joseph

24

B.. 16, 18, 19

engine cutoff. MECO. 34, 40, 137, 139 propulsion system, MPS, 34, 35 174 174, 175, 176

Manipulator Foot Restraint, Manned Maneuvering Unit, Manufacturing Review, Mariner, 365,390. 421 JEM, 253 Mars, 414, 420 56

Japan,

241,243.

244,

252, 401 Module,

Japanese Experiment Jarvis, Gregory, 190

29, 30, 247, 365, 366, 368, 372,413,

530

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Mars Observer, 50, 420, 421 National Research Council, NRC, 120, 206, 207,214, 215, 216, 219, 222, 223 Marshall Space Flight Center, MSFC, 34, 37, 44, 50, 52, 55, 109, 110, 112, 113, 116, 117, National Research Council ofCanada, 175 142, 143, 144, 189, 196, 197, 200, 204, National Science Teachers Association, NSTA, 152 207, 210, 212, 217, 240, 247, 248, 402 Martin, Franklin D.,117, 371,373 National Space Development Agency, 252 Martin Marietta Corporation, 29, 33, 34, 51, National Space Policy, 27. 246 53, 113, 242, 402, 416 National Space Technology Laboratories, 109, Max Planck lnstitut fuer Extraterrestrische 144 Physik, MPE, 408 National Space Transportation System, NSTS, McAuliffe, S. Christa, 190 109, 110, 111, 112, 113. 121,222, 223,225, McCandless, Bruce, 11, 174 228, 230 McDonald, Franklin B., 372 National Transportation Safety Board, 190 McDonnell Douglas, 29, 49, 169, 178, 242 National Weather Service, 29 McNair, Ronald E., 174. 190 Naugle, John E., 372 Memorandum ofUnderstanding. MOU, 241, Naval Research Laboratory, 180, 388, 399 243,252, 391,392, 393,408 Navy, U.S., 33. 125 Merbold, UIf. 173, 394 Neptune, 367, 368, 411,414, 415 Mercury, 29, 144, 365 Netherlands, 150, 367, 381,405 Mexico, 180 Neutral Buoyancy Laboratory, 248 New York Times, 24(1 Milky Way, 4(11 Mission Control Center, 139, 141, 142, 143. Nicogossian, Arnauld. 371 146, 227 Nixon, Richard, 121 Nobel Prize, 405 Mission Operations Reports, MOR, 154 Mobile Launcher Platform, 134, 135 Norris, Theodrick B., 371 Moon, 29, 3(1, 372,402 NOVA-II satellite. 29 Moore, Jesse W., 18, 196, 371 O Moore. R.Gilbert, 151 Morocco, Ben Guerir, 225 Moser, Thomas L.,I15, 117, 118 O'Connor, Bryan, 223 O'Dell, C. Robert, 402 Mulloy, Lawrence B., 196 Mulroney, Brian, 250 Odom, James B., 119 Musgrave, EStory, 172 Office of Management and Budget, OMB, 4, 6, 21,363 Mutch, Thomas A., 369
Office Onizuka, Orbital of Technology Ellison. Flight Test. 190 OFT, 154, 155, 156, 157, Assessment, 120

NASA Advisory Council, 20 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 164, 166 NASA Authorization Act, 379 Orbital maneuvering system, OMS, 34, 35, National Academy ofSciences, 402, 418 123, 124, 134, 137, 138, 139. 141, 156. National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, 157. 163,230, 231,235,236, 237 NACA, 3 Orbital maneuvering vehicle, OMV, 54, 55, National Aeronautics and Space Act, 3 Orbital Sciences Corporation, OSC, 50 National Aeronautics and Space Orbital Transfer Vehicle, OTV. 52, 53, 54 Administration, NASA, 3,4,5,6,19-33, Orbiter Processing Facility, 141, 142, 227, 36, 37, 41, 43, 44, 47, 48, 50-55, 58, 235, 236, 237 107-123, 134, 135, 136, 143, 144, 145, Orbiting Solar Observatory, 365 150-156, 164, 166, 171, 174, 177-19l, Oscar, satellite, 391 195, 197-201,205. 208-228, 233,235, 238, 239, 240-247, 252, 254, 255, 363-379, 388, 391,393,406, 408 Pacific Ocean, 33 National Aerospace Plane, 3 National Air and Space Museum, 367 Palapa, 172, 174, 178 Paules, Granville, 118 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, NOAA, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, Payload Assist Module, PAM, 49, 50, 51, 170, 244 174, 177, 179, 183

INDEX Payload Flight Test Article, PFTA, 172, 173 Payload Operations Control Center, POCC, 142, 143 Pellerin, Charles J.. 371 Perk.in-Elmer, 402 Peterson, Donald H.,172 Phillips, Samuel C.,115,117, 214 Pil)neer, 365,366. 367,414, 415,416 Plasma Diagnostics Package, PDP, 161, 162, 389 Pluto, 365,367, 404 Polar Beacon Experiments and Auroral Research satellite, Polar BEAR, 391 Pratt &Whitney, 52, 53 Preliminary Design Review, 44, 45, 55,214 Preliminary Requirements Review, 55 Program Requirements Review, 242 R Raney, William P., 119 RCA, 24, 25, 26 Reaction control system, RCS, 124, 128.134, 137, 140, 141,160, 161,167,230, 231, 235,236 Reagan, Ronald, 13, 26,43, 56, 109, 114, 120, 187,205,212, 238, 240, 250,254,255 Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor, RSRM, 43, 44, 45, 47, 57, 199 Redmond, Thomas W., 111 Remote Manipulator System, RMS, 144, 145, 147, 161. 168, 171,172, 175, 177,179, 239,250 Request forProposal, RFP, 239, 241,243 Research Animal Holding Facility, 396 Resnik, Judith A.,190 Reston, Virginia, 248 Return-to-launch-site, RTLS, 137, 138 Ride. Sally, 172, 178 Ritchey Chretien Telescope, 400, 403 Rocketdyne, 30, 51, 53,204. 242 Rockwell International, 31, 33, 36, 51,125, 126, 189,197,198,242 Rodney, George A., 113, 215, 224 R_ntgen Satellite, ROSAT, 401,407, 408, 409 Rogers Commission, 108, 111,113, 115, 187 Rogers. William P., 187, 188 Rome, University of,393 Ross. Jerry L.,183 Saudi Arabia, 180 SCATHA satellite, 24 Scobee, Francis R., 190 Scout, 13, 16, 22, 26. 27, 28.33,391.
Seddon, M. Rhea. 179 Simulalor, Satellite. 146, 384 Program, Senegal, 156 Shuttle Mission Shuttle Shuttle Simpson, Skylab, Pallet Student

531

393

SPAS,

Involvement

SSIP,

152, 184 J.A., 419 107, 134, 135 366 J., 190 Observatory, 409

Slay, Alton, 223 Smith, Bradford, Smith, Michael

Smithsonian Smithsonian Soften, Solar

Astrophysical Institute. 367 371 Satellite,

Gerald, Maximum

Solar

Max,

139,

174, 175, 176, 177. 366. 377, Solar Solid Mesospheric Explorer, Rocket Booster, SRB.

378,406 33, 34, 134,

379, 380 17, 22.23,

39,40,41,42,43,110, 156, 166, 236, 237 Solid Rocket Motor, SRM.

112, 123, 126,

172, 192, 193, 194, 203,227, 42, 44.45, 212,214, SSUS, 48, 49, 219,221, 17

57, 170, 192, 205,206, 222 Solid Soviet Spinning Union, Upper 29 401 Inc., 241

Stage,

SOOS-3

salellile,

Soyuz, 108, 135 Space Industries,

Space Shuttle, 13, 14,15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 28, 33, 34, 37, 38, 43, 48, 49, 52, 54, 55,56, 132,134,135, 57, 107, 108, 139,140, 109, 110,111, 141,143, 144, 112, 121,122,123,124,125,126,127.131, 145,146,147,150,152.153.154,155, 157,158,159.160,162,163.164,165, 166,169,170,172,173,174,175,176, 177,178,181,182,183,184,185,186, 187,188,189,190,191,192,195,198, 199, 200, 202, 203,204, 205, 206, 207, 211,214,215.216,217,218,219,222, 223,224,225,227,233,234,235,236, 237,238,239,240,250,251,253,364, 367,368,371,373,374,375,378,384, 389, Space 390,394,395, 410, 420 Engine, SSME, 22,23,34, ShuuleMmn 399.401,404, 406, 408,409,

35,36,39,40,123,124,127,136,137, 144,191,204,230,234

Sander. Michael, 371 Space SmOon, 107,114,115.116,117,118, 119, 120, 121,238, 239,240,241,242, Smcom, 182,183 243,244, 246, 247, 248,252, 253. Smellite Business Systems, SBS, 25 Smurn, 107,135,365,366,367,411,415

254,255

532

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

STS 51-F, STS 51-G, STS 51-I, STS 51-J, and 403 181,389. 180, 182 181,182, 396 235 181,394

Space Station Control Center, 248 Space Station Development Plan, 241 Space Station Training Facility, 249
Space Space Space Space Space Space Station Systems Telescope Telescope User's _acilily, Handbook. 248 Committee, Institute, 402 13, 14, 26, 246 Automated Advisory Science Integration Assembly

STS 51-L. 46, 47, 108, 128. 135. 184. 185, 187, 189, 190, 191, 192, 194, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 202,204, 182, 394, 398,403 49. 182, 183 49, 183,232, 235 367, 374,377, 419 390, 402, 410, 211 STS 61-A. STS 61-B, STS 61-C, Sun,

transfer vehicle, STV, 57 Transportation System, STS,

50, 51, 52, 56, 108, 177, Spacelab, 186, 201,206, 109,

112, 121, 122, 123, 166, 168, 170, 226, 218, 222, 23.24, 248, 367 162, 173, 366, 368, 399

126, 169, 177, 365,366, 150 147, 177, 179. 181 Design Review, 230

148, 152, 153, 154, 155, 227, 228, 229. 230,

378, 379, 381,386, Switzerland, Syncom. System

147, 148, 150, 154,

174, 180, 181,182,251,364, 371+ 389. 394. 395,397. Spain, Spartan, Spring, Stennis 150, 156 180, 190, 388 Sherwood Space C., 183 Center,

Teacher 36, 37, 109

in Space

Project,

184, 190 Information

Technical and Management System, TMIS, 116, 241

Stever, H+ Guyford, 214, 222 Stewart, Robert L.. 174 Stofan, Strategic Andrew Defense J., 115, 116, 119, 369, 371 Initiative, 181

Teledyne, 52 Telesat, 26, 170, 172, 178, 179 Telstar, Tethered 177 Satellite System, TSS, 55, 56 122, 188,

Stratospheric Aerosol SAGE, 24 STS-I, STS-2, 168, 172, 393

and Gas Experiment, 166, 167, 165, 166, 164, 163, 171,

Thiokol Corporation, 33, 43, 44.47. 189, 196, 197, 198, 199, 222 Thomas, James, 196 E, 111

157, 158, 163, 164, 165, 156, 157, 158, 160, 164,

Thompson, Robert Titan, 30, 48, 50

167, 168, 169, 367 STS-3,151,153, 156, 157, 158, 162, 165, 168, 169, 170, 389 STS-4, 155, 156, 165, 166, 169 STS-5, 174 STS-6, STS-8, STS-9, STS-26, STS-27, STS-30, STS-32, STS-34, 37, 171, 398 172, 173 173, 181,194, 394 36, 37, 41, 47, 49, 185, 186, 187, 186, 235 417 177 418 174, 178 139, 174, 177, 178 177, 388 55, 154, 178 178, 182 180, 196, 394, 395 179, 196 147, 179, 181 176,378 172, 173 STS-7,172, 37, 151,156, 157, 158, 160, 162,

Tracking and Data Relay Satellite, TDRS, 127, 142, 152, 171,172, 173,184, 185, 190, 218, 235,236, Transfer Transpace Orbit Carriers, 403 Stage, TOS, Inc., 27 209, 210, 211, 50, 51

157, 165, 166, 170,

Truly, Richard 227 TRW, U Inc., 55

H., 19, 111,112,

Uhuru, Ulysses, United United 150,

365 24 UK, 150, 367, 408 14, 25, 26, 27, 122, 135, 375, 222 375, 382, 218, 368, 419, 420 Kingdom, States,

221,235

UK-6/Ariel,

387, 388, 405,407, U.S.,

STS 41-B, STS 41-C, STS 41-D, STS 41-F, STS 41-G, STS 51-A, STS 51-B, STS 51-C, STS 51-D,

173, 174, 178, 241,243,252, 408, 418, 420, 421

382, 405,407,

United Technologies Corporation, Uranus, 368, 411,413, 414, 415 Utah State University, 152, 169

INDEX

533

Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, 28, 33, 34, 109, 136, 176, 235 Vanguard, 31, 33 Van Hoften, James D.A., 181 Van Renssalaer, Frank. 17 Vehicle Assembly Building, 133, 134, 142, 235,236 Venus, 29, 126, 365,367,369, 413,416, 418 Viking, 30, 365,366, 367, 414, 421 X-ray Tinting Explorer, XTE, 407 Vought Corporation, 33 Voyager, 365. 366, 367, 368. 401,411,413, 414 W Walker, Charles, 178 Wallops Flight Facility, 27, 33 Wallops Island. Virginia, 392 Weeks, L. Michael, 16
Yardley, Young, Z John John F., 15, 16, 151 W., 167

Weiss, Stanley I.,16 Welch, James C., 371 Westar satellite, 26, 174, 178 Western Union, 24, 26, 174 White House, 187 White Sands, New Mexico, 136 Wisconsin, University of,402 Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, 125

Zeiss,

Carl,

Company,

408

537

538

NASA

HISTORICAL

DATA BOOK

Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1970: Policy (NASA SP-4015, 1972). Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1971: Policy (NASA SP-4016, 1972). Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1972: Policy (NASA SP-4017, 1974). Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1973: Policy (NASA SP-4018, 1975). Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1974: Policy (NASA SP-4019, 1977). Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1975: Policy (NASA SP-4020, 1979). Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1976: Policy (NASA SP-4021, 1984). Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1977: Policy (NASA SP-4022, 1986). Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1978: Policy (NASA SP-4023, 1986).

Chronology Chronology Chronology Chronology Chronology Chronology Chronology Chronology Chronology

of Science, of Science, of Science, of Science, of Science, of Science, of Science, of Science, of Science,

Technolog._, Technology, Technology, Technology, Technology, Technology, Technology, Technology, Technology,

and and and and and and and and and

Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1979-1984: and Policy (NASA SP-4024, 1988).

Chronology

of Science,

Technology;

Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1985: Chronology of Science, Technolog3; and Policy (NASA SP-4025, 1990). Noordung, Hermann. The Problem of Space Travel: The Rocket Motor. Stuhlinger, Ernst, and Hunley, J.D., with Garland, Jennifer, editors (NASA SP-4026, 1995). Astronautics 1997). Management and Aeronautics, 1986-1990: A Chronology (NASA SP-4027,

Histories,

NASA SP-4100 (NASA 1982). for

Rosholt, Robert L. An Administrative History of NASA, 1958-1963 SP-4101, 1966). Levine, Arnold S. Managing NASA in the Apollo Era (NASA SP-4102, Roland, Alex. Aeronautics, Model Research: The National Advisory 1915-1958 (NASA SP-4103, 1985).

Committee

Fries, Sylvia D. NASA Engineers and the Age of Apollo (NASA SP-4104, 1992). Glennan, T. Keith. The Birth of NASA: The Diary of T. Keith Glennan. Hunley, J.D., editor (NASA SP-4105, 1993). Seamans, Robert C., Jr. Aiming at Targets: Seamans, Jr. (NASA SP-4106, 1996) Project Histories, NASA SP-4200 The Autobiography of Robert C.

Swenson, Loyd S., Jr., Grimwood, James M., and Alexander, Charles C. This New Ocean: A History of Project Mercury (NASA SP-4201, 1966). Green, Constance McL., and Lomask, Milton. Vanguard: A History (NASA SP-4202, 1970; rep. ed. Smithsonian Institution Press, 1971).

THENASA HISTORY SERIES Hacker, Barton C.,and Grimwood, James M. On

539

Shoulders of Titans: A History of Project Gemini (NASA SP-4203, 1977). Benson, Charles D. and Faherty, William Barnaby. Moonport: A Histoo" of Apollo Launch Facilities and Operations (NASA SP-4204, 1978). Brooks, Courtney G., Grimwood, James M., and Swenson, Loyd S., Jr. Chariots for Apollo: A Histor3.' of Manned Lunar Spacecraft (NASA SP-4205, 1979). Bilstein, Roger E. Stages to Saturn: A Technological History of the Apollo/Saturn Launch Vehicles (NASA SP-4206, 1980). SP-4207 not published. Compton, W. David, and Benson, Charles D. Living and Working in Space: A Histoo' of Sk3.'lab (NASA SP-4208, 1983). Ezell, Edward Clinton, and Ezell, Linda Neuman. The Partnership: A History of the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (NASA SP-4209, 1978). Hall, R. Cargill. Lunar Impact: A History of Project Ranger ('NASA SP-4210, 1977). Newell, Homer E. Beyond the Atmosphere: Early Years of Space Science (NASA SP-4211, 1980). Ezell, Edward Clinton, and Ezell, Linda Neuman. On Mars." Exploration of the Red Planet, 1958-1978 (NASA SP-4212, 1984). Pitts, John A. The Human Factor." Biomedicine in the Manned Space Program to 1980 (NASA SP-4213, 1985). Compton, W. David. Where No Matt Has Gone Before." A History of Apollo Lunar Exploration Missions (NASA SP-4214, 1989). Naugle, John E. First Among Equals: The Selection of NASA Space Science Experiments (NASA SP-4215, 1991). Wallace, Lane E. Airborne Trailblazer: Two Decades with NASA Langley's Boeing 737 Flying Laboratory (NASA SP-4216, 1994). Butrica, Andrew J., editor. Be_'ond the Ionosphere: Fifty Years of Satellite Communication (NASA SP-4217, 1997). Butrica, Andrews J. To See the Unseen: A Histoo, of Planetary' Radar Astronomy (NASA SP-4218, 1996). Mack, Pamela E. Editor. From Engineering Science to Big Science: The NACA and NASA Collier Trophy Research Project Winners (NASA SP-4219, 1998). Reed, R. Dale, with Lister, Darlene. Wingless Flight: The Lifting Body Story (NASA SP-4220, 1997). Heppenheimer, T.A. The Space Shuttle Decision: NASA _ Quest for a Reusable Space Vehicle (NASA SP-4221, 1999). Center Histories, NASA SP-4300

Rosenthal, Alfred. Venture into Space: Early Years of Goddard Space Flight Center (NASA SP-4301, 1985). Hartman, Edwin, P. Adventures in Research: A History of Ames Research Center, 1940-1965 (NASA SP-4302, 1970). Hallion, Richard E On the Frontier: Flight Research at Dryden, 1946-1981 (NASA SP- 4303, 1984).

54O

NASA HISTORICAL DATA BOOK

Muenger, Elizabeth A. Searching

the Horizon: A History of Ames Research Center, 1940-1976 (NASA SP-4304, 1985). Hansen, James R. Engineer in Charge: A Histor3., of the Langley Aeronautical Laborator3; 1917-1958 (NASA SP-4305, 1987). Dawson, Virginia P. Engines and hmovation: Lewis Laborator3_ and American Propulsion Technology (NASA SP-4306, 1991 ). Dethloff, Henry C. "Suddenly Tomorrow Came . . . ": Histor 3' of the Johnson Space Center (NASA SP-4307, 1993). Hansen, James R. Spaceflight Revolution: NASA Langley Research Center from Spumik to Apollo (NASA SP-4308, 1995). Wallace, Lane E. Flights of Discoveo,: 50 Years at the NASA Dryden Flight Research Center (NASA SP-4309, 1996). Herring, Mack R. Way Station to Space: A Histor3' of the John C. Stennis Space Center (NASA SP-4310, 1997). Wallace, Harold D., Jr. Wallops Station and the Creation of the American Space Program (NASA SP-4311, 1997). Wallace, Lane E. Dreams, Hopes, Realities: NASA]s" Goddard Space Flight Center_ First For_" Years (NASA SP-4312, 1999). General Histories, NASA SP.4400 Rockets, 1958-1968: A Historical Summary

Corliss, William R. NASA Sounding (NASA SP-4401, 1971).

Wells, Helen T., Whiteley, Susan H., and Karegeannes, Came. Origins of NASA Names (NASA SP-4402, 1976). Anderson, Frank W., Jr. Orders of Magnitude: A History of NACA and NASA, 1915-1980 (NASA SP-4403, 1981). Sloop, John L. Liquid Hydrogen as a Propulsion Fuel, 1945-1959 (NASA SP-4404, 1978). Roland, Alex. A Spacefaring People: Perspectives on Early Spaceflight (NASA SP-4405, 1985). Bilstein, Roger E. Orders of Magnitude: A History of the NACA and NASA, 1915-1990 (NASA SP-4406, 1989). Logsdon, John M., editor, with Lear, Linda J., Warren-Findley, Jannelle, Williamson, Ray A., and Day, Dwayne A. Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil Space Program, Volume I: Organizing for Exploration (NASA SP-4407, 1995). Logsdon, John M., editor, with Day, Dwayne A., and Launius, Roger D. Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the Histo, of the U.S. Civil Space Program, Volume H: External Relationships (NASA SP-4407, 1996). Logsdon, John M., editor, with Launius, Roger D., Onkst, David H., and Garber, Stephen J. Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History' of the U.S. Civil Space Program, Volume II1: Using Space (NASA SP-4407, ! 998).