Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) Introduction

Jeff Dagle, PE Pacific Northwest National Laboratory Grainger Lecture Series for the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign September 15, 2005

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)

CONTROL
Generator Set Points Transmission Lines Substation Equipment

DATA
Critical Operational Data Performance Metering Events and Alarms

SCADA is used extensively in the electricity sector. Other SCADA applications include gas and oil pipelines, water utilities, transportation networks, and applications requiring remote monitoring and control. Similar to real-time process controls found in buildings and factory automation.

Communication Methods Directly wired Power line carrier Microwave Radio (spread spectrum) Fiber optic

Control Center Provides network status, enables remote control, optimizes system performance, facilitates emergency operations, dispatching repair crews and coordination with other utilities.

Control Strategy
Control Center
Supervisory control and data acquisition Balance generation and demand (dispatching) Monitor flows and observe system limits Coordinate maintenance activities, emergency response functions

Localized (Power Plants, Substations)

Feedback controls (e.g., governors, voltage regulators) Protection (e.g., protective relays, circuit breakers)

Key Priorities:
1. Safety 2. Protect equipment from damage 3. Reliability 4. Economics

Control Areas

Reliability Overview
Balance generation and demand Balance reactive power supply and demand Monitor flows and observe thermal limits Observe power and voltage stability limits Operate for unplanned contingencies Plan, design and maintain a reliable system Prepare for emergencies Reliably operate the system you have!

SCADA Functions
Supervisory Control Data Acquisition Real Time Database Graphical Operator Interface Alarm Processing Data Historian/Strip Chart Trending Mapboard Interface

SCADA Principles of Operation

Interface with Physical Devices
Remote terminal unit (RTU) Intelligent electronic device (IED) Programmable logic controller (PLC)

Communications
Directly wired (typical for shorter distances) Power line carrier (less common) Microwave (very frequently used) Radio (VHF, spread spectrum) Fiber optic (gaining popularity)

Typical RTU Hardware

Typical IED Hardware

Typical PLC Hardware

Energy Management System (EMS) Functions

Control
Automatic Generation Control (AGC) Voltage Control Interchange Transaction Scheduling Load Shedding & Restoration (including special stability controls)

Analysis
State Estimation/Contingency Analysis Economic Dispatch Short Term Load Forecasting

Typical Control Room Layout

Typical Operator Interface

Operator Display and Control Functions

Display real-time network status on geographic and schematic maps Control of circuit breakers and switches Graphical user interface -pan, zoom, decluttering Dynamic coloring to show real-time changes On-line data modification for construction and maintenance Optimization functions and decision making support

One-Line Diagram

Alarm Processor

Frequency Control

Frequency Control
Actual Frequency Scheduled Frequency Actual Net Interchange Scheduled Net Interchange

Frequency Bias Area Control Error (ACE)

Frequency Regulation
64 Equipment Damage 63 62 Overfrequency Generation Trip Time Correction 61 Frequency Governor Response 60 59 58 57 Equipment Damage 56 Governor Response 59.95 Nominal Frequency Normal Frequency Deviation and AGC Corrective Action Range 60.02 Frequency 60.01 60.00 59.99 59.98 59.97 59.96 Governor Response 60.05 60.04 60.03

Underfrequency Load Shedding Underfrequency Generation Trip Contingency Response

Time Correction Normal Conditions

Typical SCADA Architecture

Main Application Processing Primary Server Central Processing LAN Secondary Server Inter-site Gateway Telemetry Server 1 Telemetry Server n Telemetry LAN Independent Control Center A Leased Lines Independent Control Center B RTU Comm Server RTU Comm Server Serial Links Modem Bridge Bridge Modem Modem Modem Modem Bridge Modem Phone Line Radio Fiber Optic

RTU RTU RTU x xx Redundant Paths

RTU RTU RTU y yy

RTU RTU RTU z zz

IED

PLC

IED

SCADA Trends
Open Protocols
Open industry standard protocols are replacing vendor-specific proprietary communication protocols

Interconnected to Other Systems

Connections to business and administrative networks to obtain productivity improvements and mandated open access information sharing

Reliance on Public Information Systems

Increasing use of public telecommunication systems and the internet for portions of the control system

Key Technology Drivers

Open architectures and protocols Microprocessor-based field equipment
smart sensors and controls

Convergence of operating systems Ubiquitous communications

cheaper, better, faster

Interconnections with SCADA Networks

Business and Engineering Networks
The IT link between engineering and business services is crucial for business operation How the link is made is crucial for security

Market Systems
Interconnection into market systems is relatively new Some disagree this should be done Few agree on how it should be done securely

Sharing of Telecommunication Bandwidth

It is no longer true that utilities have stand-alone isolated systems for their SCADA communications networks, under the sole control and jurisdiction of the utility. In some cases, utilities have purchased bandwidth from telecommunications providers. In other cases, utilities sell excess bandwidth to others (either other business units within the enterprise, or outside entities). In many cases, there are multiple communication technologies (e.g., fiber optic, microwave, spread spectrum, twisted pair, etc.) and/or bandwidth owners/operators for a single SCADA system (particularly for larger utilities).
Mixture of legacy communication systems with other solutions

Major SCADA/EMS Vendors

Asea Brown Boveri (ABB) Areva (formerly ESCA) GE Harris Siemens Advanced Control Systems (ACS) Open Systems International (OSI)

SCADA Protocols (Partial List!)

ANSI X3.28 BBC 7200 CDC Types 1 and 2 Conitel 2020/2000/3000 DCP 1 DNP 3.0 Gedac 7020 IBM 3707 Landis & Gyr 8979 Pert PG&E QEI Micro II Redac 70H Rockwell SES 91 Tejas 3 and 5 TRW 9550 Vancomm

Protocol Background
International Standards Organization Open System Interconnection Reference Model ISO OSI Reference Model (protocol stack)

7 Application 6 5 4 3 2 1 Presentation Session Transport Network Data Link Physical

Provides interface to application services Data representation Starts, maintains, and ends each logical session End-to-end reliable communications stream Routing and segmentation/reassembly of packets Transmit chunks of information across a link Transmit unstructured bits across a link

Device #1

Data Transmission Associated with the 7-Layer Protocol Stack

Device #2 Application Presentation Session Transport Network Data Link Physical Physical Data Link Physical Network Data Link Physical

Application Presentation Session Transport Network Data Link Physical

REPEATER

BRIDGE

ROUTER

Simplified Protocol Stack

International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) Enhanced Performance Architecture (EPA)

3 Application

Provides interface to application services

Data Link

Routing and segmentation/reassembly of packets

Physical

Transmit bits of information across a link

SCADA Protocol Example

Distributed Network Protocol (DNP) 3.0 SCADA/EMS applications
RTU to IED communications Master to remote communications Peer-to-peer instances and network applications

Object-based application layer protocol Emerging open architecture standard

Distributed Network Protocol (DNP) 3.0 Data Link Layer

Interface with the physical layer
Packing data into the defined frame format and transmitting the data to the physical layer Unpacking frames received from physical layer Controlling all aspects of the physical layer

Data validity and integrity

Collision avoidance/detection Perform message retries

Establish connection, disconnection in dial-up environment

DNP 3.0 Data Link Layer

BLOCK 0 START LENGTH CONTROL DESTINATION SOURE CRC FIXED LENGTH HEADER (10 OCTETS) BLOCK 1 USER CRC DATA ... BODY BLOCK n USER CRC DATA

START LENGTH CONTROL DESTINATION SOURCE CRC USER DATA

2 starting octets of the header 1 octet count of USER DATA in the header and body 1 octet Frame Control 2 octet destination address 2 octet source address 2 octet Cyclic Redundancy Check Each block following the header has 16 octets of User defined data

DNP 3.0 Transport Function

Supports advanced RTU functions and messages larger than the maximum frame length in the data link layer Additional data integrity verification Packs user data into multiple frames of the data link frame format for transmitting the data Unpacks multiple frames that are received from the data link layer Controls data link layer

DNP 3.0 Transport Function

TRANSPORT HEADER 1 OCTET USER DATA 1 to 249 OCTETS IN LENGTH

FIN FIR

SEQUENCE

FIN

0 = More frames follow 1 = Final frame of a sequence

FIR

1 = First frame of a sequence 0 = Not the first frame of a sequence

SEQUENCE Number between 0 and 63 to ensure frames are being received in sequence

DNP 3.0 Application Layer

Communications Interface with Application Software Designed for SCADA and Distributed Automation Systems Supported functions include
send request accept response confirmation, time-outs, error recovery, etc.

Natural Gas Example

(i.e., SCADA is used in many other industries)

Remote Terminal Unit (RTU)

SCADA Security Case Studies

Jeff Dagle, PE Pacific Northwest National Laboratory Grainger Lecture Series for the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign September 15, 2005

Roosevelt Dam
As reported by the Washington Post June 27, 2002: Bureau of Reclamation facility in Arizona SCADA system controlling dam floodgates accessed by a 12-year old hacker in 1998 Hacker had complete command of the SCADA system controlling the dams massive floodgates Motivation: exploring on a lark

What really happened

The SCADA system at Roosevelt Dam is used to manage only Salt River Projects (SRP) canal system, not the floodgates at the dam. The hacking incident actually occurred in 1994 involving an 18 yearold. The hacker gained entry through a modem connected to a backup computer via a low level account, but security at the application and database level prevented the hacker from controlling any structures on the canal system. At no time was the hacker in a position to compromise the operation or safety of the SRP canal system. SRP participated with law enforcement agencies to catch the hacker. Law enforcement monitored phone lines while SRP installed equipment to monitor every keystroke that the hacker made. SRP went to the extent of setting up a separate fake network solely connected to the one phone line being used by the hacker. After several weeks of monitoring, the phone line was shut down, computers were rebuilt, and additional security measures were implemented. The evidence SRP acquired led to the arrest and conviction of the hacker.

Queensland, Australia
April 23, 2000: Vitek Boden, 48, caught with stolen computer, radio transmitter. During his 46th successful intrusion. Until then, utility managers didnt know why the system was leaking hundreds of thousands of gallons of sewage into parks, rivers, and the Hyatt Regency hotel grounds. Attack method: software on his laptop identified itself as pumping station 4. He then suppressed alarms, and became the central control system with unlimited command of 300 SCADA nodes. Disgruntled former employee convicted and sentenced to two years in prison.

Bellingham, Washington
June 10, 1999: 237,000 gallons of gasoline leak from 16 pipeline, ignited 1.5 hours later. Three deaths, 8 injuries, extensive property damage. Immediately prior to and during the incident, the SCADA system exhibited poor performance that inhibited the pipeline controllers from seeing and reacting to the development of an abnormal pipeline operation. Warning issued to other pipeline operators by the Office of Pipeline Safety July 1999 NTSB report issued October 2002 Key recommendation:
Utilize an off-line development system for implementing and testing changes to the SCADA database

Olympic Pipe Line Co. filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy March 27, 2003

Computer Failures that Occurred in the Electric Power Industry August 14, 2003
First Energy
2:14 pm alarm function fails
No audible or visual indications of failures are presented to power system operators

While technicians were working the problem, control room operators were not fully aware of the failures By 2:54 pm, other failures of the energy management system caused both primary and backup servers to stop functioning Warm reboot completed at 3:08 pm, technicians believed that they corrected the problem
Alarm processor still in failed condition

Midwest Independent System Operator

Problems with the state estimator started at 12:15 pm, and were not fully resolved until 4:04 pm
This prevented the regional reliability coordinator from performing adequate contingency analyses

Major North American Blackouts

Date November 9, 1965 July 13, 1977 December 22, 1982 January 17, 1994 December 14, 1994 July 2, 1996 August 10, 1996 June 25, 1998 August 14, 2003 Location Northeast New York West Coast California Wyoming, Idaho Wyoming, Idaho Western Interconnection Midwest Northeast
Load Interrupted

20,000 MW 6,000 MW 12,350 MW 7,500 MW 9,336 MW 11,743 MW 30,489 MW 950 MW 61,800 MW

From 3:05 to 4:05 pm, several key 345kV transmission lines in Northern Ohio trip due to contact with trees in their right of way. This eventually initiates a cascading overloads of additional 345 kV and 138 kV lines, leading to an uncontrolled cascading failure of the grid.

By 4:10 pm Northern Ohio & eastern Michigan are collapsing, many units have tripped, only connection remaining is with Ontario.

7 seconds later, the Northeast portion of the interconnected power system separates, which then breaks into multiple islands. 61,800 MW load is lost as 508 generating units at 265 power plants trip.

Generator Trips to 4:10:38pm

Generator Trips Next 7 Seconds

Generator Trips After 4:10:44pm

Investigation Process
Joint U.S. - Canada Power System Outage Task Force Electric System Working Group Nuclear Working Group Security Working Group

Investigate the cascading electrical failure.

Review performance of plants and assess possibility of damage.

Determine if failures were caused with malicious intent.

Phase I
Investigate the outage to determine its causes and why it was not contained Interim report released 11/19/03

Phase II
Develop recommendations to reduce the possibility of future outages and minimize the scope of any that occur Final report released 4/5/04 Report available at: http://electricity.doe.gov (Blackout link)

Electric System Working Group

Steering Group Investigation Team Lead
Project Planning and Support Root Cause Analysis Cooper Systems Investigation Process Review Vegetation/ROW Management

U.S Canada Task Force

MAAC/ECAR/NPCC Coordinating Group

NERC & Regional Standards/Procedures & Compliance

Sequence of Events

Transmission System Performance, Protection, Control Maintenance & Damage Generator Performance, Protection, Controls Maintenance & Damage

MAAC Restoration ECAR Data Requests and Management

Operations - Tools, SCADA/EMS Communications Op Planning

Frequency/ACE

NPCC

MEN Study Group

System Modeling and Simulation Analysis

System Planning, Design, & Studies

Initial Data Request Letters

Issued the week after the blackout Disseminated broadly to the reliability coordinators in the affected area Information requested included:
SCADA alarm logs, and SCADA data at the highest available sample rate Data from digital fault recorders and other equipment in substations Circuit breaker settings and targets (transmission lines, generators) State estimator snapshots and saved contingency cases Operator logs and transcripts Load shedding (automatic or manual) Voltage control equipment, special protection schemes, etc.

Follow-up Data Request Letters

Targeted to specific organizations Topics driven by the investigation team requirements
System studies (voltage support, transfer capabilities) Standards and compliance team System planning, design, and studies team Root cause team Generation performance team Other specific questions directed to utilities based upon the investigation team requirements

Building the Sequence of Events

SCADA/EMS alarm logs
Inaccurate timing due to communication latency, time skew, buffering issues

Substation instrumentation
Digital fault recorders, digital protective relays, synchronized phasor measurement units Some instrument clocks were not synchronized to an established time standard Data format issues

Creating a Data Warehouse

Established at NERC
Dedicated server on a segmented network Accessible by all members of the blackout investigation team VPN access enabled for off-site members of the investigation team

Stored data received from the utilities

Read-only access to the investigation team Over 20 GB of information, 10,000+ files Wide variety (documents, spreadsheets, special data formats, audio, ) Received via email, FTP, mail (CDs and hardcopy reports)

Working data, draft report materials, etc.

Read access to investigation team, write-access specified by team leaders

Data entry and tracking procedures SQL-server data base developed to provide inventory and querying capabilities
Challenge: Database developed in parallel with the investigation process

The Blackout of August 14, 2003 Root causes associated with SCADA
Failure of the alarm processor in First Energys SCADA system prevented operators from having adequate situational awareness of critical operational changes to the electrical grid Effective reliability oversight was prevented when the state estimator at the Midwest Independent System Operator failed due to incomplete information on topology changes
Prevented contingency analysis

SCADA Security: Threats, Vulnerabilities and Consequences

Jeff Dagle, PE Pacific Northwest National Laboratory Grainger Lecture Series for the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign September 15, 2005

Vulnerability Assessment Background

DOE Program Initiated in 1997 Voluntary Assessments
Includes cyber and physical security
Energy Infrastructures

Post-September 11 Activities
Top 50 Energy Assets Identified (subsequently grew to 100+ assets) Quick assessment surveys initiated on priority ranking, encompassing a range of assessment options

Electric power

Oil

Outreach Activities
Industry engagement (NERC, EPRI, etc.) Federal agency liaison (NIST, NSA, etc.)
Natural Gas

The threat is real!

Unstructured adversaries
Cracker, hacker, script-kiddie Competitors Criminals

Structured adversaries
Terrorists, hactivists Organized crime Foreign nations

Insiders
Witting Unwitting Half-witting

Anecdotes
2003 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey
Overall financial losses from 530 survey respondents totaled $201,797,340. This is down significantly from 503 respondents reporting $455,848,000 last year. (75 percent of organizations acknowledged financial loss, though only 47% could quantify them.) The overall number of significant incidents remained roughly the same as last year, despite the drop in financial losses. Losses reported for financial fraud were drastically lower, at $9,171,400. This compares to nearly $116 million reported last year. As in prior years, theft of proprietary information caused the greatest financial loss ($70,195,900 was lost, with the average reported loss being approximately $2.7 million). In a shift from previous years, the second-most expensive computer crime among survey respondents was denial of service, with a cost of $65,643,300--up 250 percent from last year's losses of $18,370,500.

Anecdotes (Contd)
Carnegie-Mellon CERT
120000 100000 Incidents 80000 60000 40000 20000 0
88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 20 20 20 20

*Q1-Q3

One utility reported over 100,000 scans/month

Vulnerability Concerns
Confidentiality
Protecting information from unauthorized access Important for deregulation, competitive intelligence

Integrity
Assuring valid data and control actions Most critical for real-time control applications

Availability
Continuity of operations Important for real-time control applications Historically addressed with redundancy

Vulnerable Points
SCADA IED Modem Remote Control IED Local Control Substation Controller LAN 1 Network Interface Network Interface Remote Access Remote Access

Modem Router to WAN Remote Monitoring Remote Access

Graphic courtesy of Paul Oman, Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, Pullman Washington

Sources of Vulnerabilities
Exploits at the application, platform, or network level Remote trusted access by
Other enterprise elements (e.g., front office, support functions, etc.) Vendors, customers, business partners Security coordinators, neighboring control areas, etc.

Unencrypted communications, lack of authentication Improper privilege escalation

Password cracking Insider threat

Lack of physical access control

Critical facilities Remote locations (e.g., substations, communication facilities)

Vulnerability Trends
Much more interconnectivity
Internal and external networks merging Functional, organization interconnection

Increased reliance on information systems

Information becoming inseparable from the core business

Increased standardization
Open protocols, common operating systems and platforms

Industry in transition
Deregulation, mergers, new systems and procedures Driven to do more with less

Other Vulnerability Challenges

Configuration management is not practiced beyond systems directly affecting physical operations Interconnectivity and interdependencies not widely understood Boundaries of systems and authorities (particularly
information systems) are becoming blurred Level of trust granted is frequently unwarranted Partitioning logical systems to control access and limit influence is not widely practiced No explicit vendor security validation

Limited incident detection, reporting, recovery, and forensics capability

Other Vulnerability Challenges (cont)

Tenuous balance between public information and security needs

FERC disclosure requirements (market sensitive information) Public franchise issues Public-access web sites
Generally vulnerabilities are greater in:

Small organizations Organizations experiencing major culture or mission changes

Need to cultivate security awareness and permeate throughout organization General observation wide variation within industry

Need exists to adopt common protection standards

Typical Vulnerabilities Observed

Ports and services open to outside Operating systems not patched with current releases Dial-up modems Improperly configured equipment (firewall does not guarantee protection) Improperly installed/configured software (e.g., default passwords) Inadequate physical protection Vulnerabilities related to systems of systems (component integration)

We Just Lost SCADA So What?

Failures within SCADA may not cause any problems on the power system
Impact may be limited to loss of visibility into infrastructure operations

Redundant systems may compensate for SCADA system failures Consequences are a function of
Expected SCADA system restoration time When the failure occurs (impact to power schedules) System stress at time of failure Whether or not redundant controls exist

Effects vs. Restoration Time

Weeks + Restoration Time Hours
No Physical Damage -----No Blackout Physical Damage

Grid Collapse ---No Physical Damage

Minutes Low Level of Physical Damage High

Scenario 1: Gaming the Power System

Undercover employees planted at various firms that market wholesale power. Create a targeting list for deciding which cyber systems to compromise. Compromise these systems through either sniffer software or with manual downloads. Profit by using this illegally gained information in power system market trading. Consequences
Unfair profiting Erosion of investor confidence Disruption of capital investments Inadequate supply and bottlenecks within the power grid

Scenario 2: Denial of Service

In most SCADA/EMS systems, there is a gateway connecting the SCADA/EMS host with the corporate network. While the gateway includes access control lists and firewalls to prevent unauthorized access to the SCADA/EMS subnetwork, it has open ports that allow ping requests to pass through. A ping of death attack shuts down the SCADA/EMS host and backup systems. If an adversary simultaneously compromises multiple control area systems, the impact could exceed the utilities capabilities to respond to changing system conditions, and a cascading grid failure could occur.

Scenario 3: Exploiting Open Protocols

Control Center Microwave Channel
Modem
SCADA Master

Substation
Connected to Network as Node 10
RTU TEST SET

Modem
Intruder Spare Spare Node 10 Node 6 Node 7

Node 2

Node 3

Node 4

Node 5

PLC

PLC

Power Power Meter Meter

Protective Relay

Protective Relay

SCADA R&D at PNNL Bench-Scale Vulnerability Demonstrations

SCADA Protocol (DNP 3.0)

Operator Interface Field Device

Scenarios Denial of service Operator spoofing Direct manipulation of field devices Combinations of above Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) Intelligent Electronic Device (IED) Programmable Logic Controller (PLC)

Protocol Analyzer (Intruder)

Vulnerability implications vary significantly depending on the scenario and application

SCADA Message Strings

Repeating easily decipherable format Captured by the ASE Protocol Analyzer

Wireless SCADA Access at Substations

Security firm Rainbow Mykotronx in Torrance, Calif., assessed a large southwestern utility that serves about four million customers. Evaluators drove to a remote substation. Without leaving their vehicle, they noticed a wireless network antenna. They plugged in their wireless LAN cards, fired up their notebook computers, and connected to the system within five minutes because it wasn't using passwords. Within 10 minutes, they had mapped every piece of equipment in the facility. Within 15 minutes, they mapped every piece of equipment in the operational control network. Within 20 minutes, they were talking to the business network and had pulled off several business reports. They never even left the vehicle.

Countermeasures to enhance security of SCADA systems

Jeff Dagle, PE Pacific Northwest National Laboratory Grainger Lecture Series for the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign September 15, 2005

Critical Infrastructure Protection

July 1996 - Presidents Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) October 1997 Critical Foundations: Protecting Americas Infrastructures
Waiting for disaster is a dangerous strategy. Now is the time to act to protect our future.

May 1998 - Presidential Decision Directive 63: Policy on Critical Infrastructure Protection

Certain national infrastructures are so vital that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating impact on the defense or economic security of the United States

October 2001 - Executive Order 13231 Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Information Age November 2002 Homeland Security Act of 2002: Formation of Dept Homeland Security

Presidential Homeland Security Documents

National Strategy for Homeland Security
July 2002

National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets
February 2003

The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace

February 2003

Homeland Security Presidential Directives

HSPD-7: Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection
This directive establishes a national policy for Federal departments and agencies to identify and prioritize United States critical infrastructure and key resources and to protect them from terrorist attacks.

HSPD-8: National Preparedness

This directive establishes policies to strengthen the preparedness of the United States to prevent and respond to threatened or actual domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies by requiring a national domestic allhazards preparedness goal, establishing mechanisms for improved delivery of Federal preparedness assistance to State and local governments, and outlining actions to strengthen preparedness capabilities of Federal, State, and local entities.

HSPD-7 Sector-Specific Agencies

Sector
Agriculture, Food Water Public Health Energy Banking and Finance National Monuments and Icons Defense Industrial Base

Lead Agency
Department of Agriculture Environmental Protection Agency Health and Human Services Department of Energy Department of Treasury Department of Interior Department of Defense

National Infrastructure Protection Plan

Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC)

Link between government and private entities operating elements of critical infrastructures Operational ISACs
Chemical Electricity Emergency Management and Response Energy (Oil and Gas) Financial Services Health Care Highway

Information Technology Multi-State Public Transit Research and Education Network Surface Transportation Telecommunications Water

Electricity Sector ISAC (ESISAC)

Share information about real and potential threats and vulnerabilities
Received from DHS and communicated to electricity sector participants Received from electricity sector participants and communicated to DHS

Analyze information for trends, crosssector dependencies, specific targets Coordinate with other ISACs

http://www.esisac.com

North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) Critical Infrastructure Protection Committee (CIPC) Physical Security CIPC Cyber Security
Executive Committee
Manage policy matters and provide support to SCs, WGs
Operations Policy

ESISAC Subcommittee
Develop & maintain ISAC capability to respond to security threats & incidents Outreach WG Reporting Technologies WG Indications, Analysis, Warnings WG Grid Monitoring System TF IDS Pilot TF

Security Planning Subcommittee

Improve ES ability to protect critical infrastructure Standards & Guidelines WG Risk Assessment WG Control Systems Security WG Critical Spares TF PKI TF HEMP TF

Mitigation Strategies
Security through obscurity
Poor defense against structured adversary

Isolated network
Unrealistic given todays business demands

Communication encryption
Concerns over latency, reliability, interoperability Vendors waiting for customer demand

Signal authentication
May provide good defense without the concerns associated with full signal encryption

Defense in Depth Strategy

Multiple layers of defense
Strong network perimeter Perimeter intrusion detection Internal access control to mission-critical systems Internal intrusion detection Host-level hardening of mission-critical systems

Good configuration management Effective policies and procedures Security awareness, training, and management control

Response and Recovery

Contingency planning, disaster recovery drills Safety considerations Backup systems, restoration plans Preserve evidence Carefully evaluate system for changes Emphasizes the need for thorough and updated documentation, configuration management process

IEEE Standard 1402-2000

IEEE Guide for Electric Power Substation Physical and Electronic Security Provides definitions, parameters that influence threat of intrusions, and gives a criteria for substation security Cyber methods considered:
passwords dial-back verification selective access virus scans encryption and encoding

Additional Countermeasures to Consider

Implement access control with strong passwords Implement automatic reporting/intrusion detection features Create a multi-tiered access hierarchy Implement application level authentication and packet level data encryption Consider implementing public key infrastructure (PKI)
When properly implemented, PKI certificates enable authentication, encryption, and non-repudiation of data transmissions

Implement properly configured firewalls and intrusion detection systems Have a defined Enterprise-level computer network security policy
Ref: Concerns About Intrusion into Remotely Accessible Substation Controllers and SCADA Systems, Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, www.selinc.com

Overarching Security Policy

Establish high-level accountability
Spanning both physical and cyber security

Develop security policies

Address security in the context of corporate goals

Implement security procedures

Actual implementation, not just on paper

Provide adequate training

General employees, system administrators, etc.

Evaluate security in the context of an overarching risk management plan

Other Issues
Early detection is critical
Actively look for signs of malicious activity Carefully evaluate trends, patterns Notify appropriate authorities if malicious activity is detected Actively participate in NERC Indications & Warnings program Ensure effective mechanisms are in place to follow-through

Conduct periodic vulnerability assessments

Comprehensive, independent evaluation Include penetration testing, active vulnerability scanning to identify and/or validate potential vulnerabilities Engage broader elements of the organization

Steps for Enhancing SCADA Security

Establish a robust network architecture Eliminate trusted remote access points of entry Evaluate and deploy technology and approaches to enhance confidentiality, availability, and integrity Implement rigorous configuration management Provide adequate support and training Never become complacent!

21 Steps to Improve Cyber Security of SCADA Networks

Developed by the Presidents Critical Infrastructure Protection Board and the U.S. Department of Energy in 2002 as a guideline for improving the security of the Nations SCADA systems.

Conclusion: System-Level Security Should Be Built on a Strong Foundation

Physical Security
Guns, gates, and guards Force on force protection Design basis threat

Infrastructure Analysis
Physical and control domain Simulation and analysis Optimization, best practices

System-Level Security
Fault-tolerant architecture Defense in depth security strategy Inherent redundancy, resiliency

Cyber Security
Confidentiality integrity and availability Operational and enterprise systems Technologies, policies, procedures

Risk Management
Consequence based analysis Quantitative and qualitative Prioritized mitigation strategies