Nietzsche's Affirmative Morality: An Ethics of Virtue Author(s): Thomas H. Brobjer Source: Journal of Nietzsche Studies, No.

26 (AUTUMN 2003), pp. 64-78 Published by: Penn State University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20717820 . Accessed: 22/02/2014 18:36
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Nietzsche's Affirmative Morality: An Ethics ofVirtue

Thomas

H. Brobjer

In

Nietzsche's

not been realized, but that makes it much more consistent and comprehensi ble. In summary: Nietzsche's ethics, unlike almost all thinking about ethics in the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentiethwas not act-ori ented but character- or person-oriented. This kinship of Nietzsche's affirma tive ethics with ethics of virtue has not been realized, but the interest in ethics of virtue during the last twenty years now also makes it easier to grasp ethics.

this article I shall attempt to give a birds-eye view ofNietzsche's ethics, with special emphasis on its affirmativeaspect. I will also attempt to show that there exists one relatively simple aspect of Nietzsche's ethics that has

Let me begin by summarizing Nietzsche's profound critique ofmorality. One of themost common dichotomies made in respect tomoral judgments is that theymust be based on either the consequences of an act or the intentions of the acting person. Nietzsche rejects both these possibilities. We have no knowl edge of the future, and hence we can never know the consequences of an act. Perhaps we can know the immediate consequences, but the chain of causality never ends, and that which at firstappears as a good result may well in the long run turnout to have negative consequences: "any action at all, it is and remains impenetrable; thatour opinions about 'good' and 'noble' and 'great' can never be proved trueby our actions because every action is unknowable."1 Those who emphasize that morality is based on the intentions of the act are not bounded by the consequences of the act. However, Nietzsche ing person

denies thatwe can ever know the intentions of any other human being. In fact,Nietzsche emphasizes the relative unimportance of conscious thinking, "consciousness is a surface,"2 in favor of subconscious thinking and instincts. Hence, Nietzsche argues, not only can we not know themotives of other indi viduals, we cannot even know our own motives. This is a frequent theme in Nietzsche's writings, for example, "the most common lie is the lie one tells to oneself; lying to others is relatively the exception."3

Journal of Nietzsche Copyright ?

Studies,

Issue 26, 2003 Society. 64

2003 The Friedrich Nietzsche

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Nietzsche

s Affirmative

Morality

65

Furthermore, Nietzsche claims thatwe have no free will4 and hence we have no moral responsibility. Closely associated to this argument is his view man is an animal and part of the natural world inwhich there is no moral that

moral

Moral principles, even relativisticmoral principles, assume or presuppose opposites, presuppose good and evil things, thoughts and deeds. Nietzsche, however, rejects the belief inmoral opposites. "Between good and most one of degree. Good evil actions there is no difference inkind, but at the are are sublimated evil ones; evil actions actions coarsened, brutalized good ones."5 Nietzsche does not only reject moral opposites as opposites, but he

ity. In his genealogical discussions Nietzsche often attempts to show that the original reasons formany of our moral values were different (and often had a nonmoral origin) than they are today.

also claims that that which is conventionally regarded as good and evil in fact belongs together and cannot be separated. Both good and evil are necessary in the development of personality and in the development of whole cultures:
impoverishment, are as necessary to me watches, adventures, midnight . .] for are and to you as their opposites and misfortune brother [. happiness and sister, and twins, who grows tall together, or, as with you, remain small hazards and mistakes together!6 there is a personal necessity for misfortune; that terror, want,

motives behind those actions, his denial of freewill, his denial ofmoral oppo sites and his belief thatman is part of nature, and that in the natural world there is no morality. Nietzsche

I have mentioned above a number of aspects of Nietzsche's thinking that are contrary tomany of the assumptions and presuppositions ofmorality. I have we cannot know the consequences of actions, or the referred to his claim that

ises"7 and Nietzsche calls Zarathustra "the annihilator ofmorality."8 In G?tzen D?mmerung, Nietzsche summarizes much of what he has stated previously about morality:

not only rejects specific presuppositions of morality, but fre he also quently rejects thewhole concept ofmorality as being an error,a fatal error. "Thus I deny morality as I deny alchemy, that is, I deny their prem

One knows my demand of philosophers that theyplace themselvesbeyond This demand follows froman insight firstformulatedbyme: that thereare
no moral good and evil?that they have the illusion of moral has judgement beneath with them.

judgement thatitbelieves in realitieswhich do not exist.Morality is only an

interpretation of certain phenomena, more precisely a misinterpretation.9

facts

whatever.

Moral

judgement

this in common

religious

Apart from the frequent rejection of morality as such, Nietzsche himself an immor?list.10

often calls

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Thomas

H.

Brobjer

denies the applicability of general principles, abstrac Nietzsche furthermore unconditional. General principles are necessarily, like con and the tions, sciousness and rationality,merely surface interpretations and abstractions. Nietzsche's interestand emphasis goes deeper, to the instinctual and the non intentional and nonrational. Hence, much of Nietzsche's critique of moral itygoes outside what is conventionally regarded as morality and he questions even the possibility of generalizations. After such an extreme critique and rejection of morality and the presup positions of morality, can Nietzsche be anything other than a nihilist? Can

he possibly have an affirmativemorality? However, Nietzsche rejects nihilism,11 and he emphasizes the importance of values. He regards values and evaluating as the ultimate nature of man: "the problems of morality [. . .] there seems to be nothing more worth tak . ing seriously"12 and "no people could live without evaluating [. .] 'Man,'

that is: the evaluator. Evaluation is creation: hear it,you creativemen! Valuating is itself the value and jewel of all valued things.Only through evaluation is there value: and without evaluation the nut of existence would be hollow."13

Nietzsche's demand of the philosophers of the future is not that they should destroy values but that they create new values. Nietzsche's project is not thatof a nihilist, not a rejection of all values, but rather a revaluation of all values. Much of this revaluation is concerned with a rejection of Christian values, and of unconditional values, and with an affir
mation of ancient Greek values.

also be called an ethics of virtue.We will see below how this central tenet of ethics to a large degree is able to bring together the different Nietzsche's aspects of Nietzsche's morality to some sort of consistent whole. Ethics in general refers to a set of standards by which a particular group or community decides to regulate its behavior. In a more philosophical sense, ethics or moral philosophy is the discipline that concerns itselfwith judg

does have an alternative affirmativemorality, but itdiffers pro thatof conventional morality as ithas been understood during from foundly the past two hundred years, in being almost indifferent to acts and instead emphasizing persons. The fundamental aspect of Nietzsche's moral judgment and thinking is his concern and emphasis of personality and character. Not principles, butpersonality and character are thedetermining criteria of value morality. I call this aspect an ethics of character, but itcould according to this Nietzsche

ments of approval and disapproval, judgments of the Tightness and wrong ness, goodness or badness, virtue or vice of actions, dispositions, ends, or objects. The word "ethics" comes from theGreek ta ethika (or ethikos), which was originally comes from theword ethos, which means character. Nietzsche for aware the word. of of this He, example, original meaning undoubtedly states: "Personal distinction?that is antique virtue"14 and it is not surprising

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Morality

67

that he with his high regard forGreek thinkingwould connect back to this ancient sense of theword. In the not quite finished and never published book Die Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen, which Nietzsche worked on at about the same time as Die Geburt der Trag?die, he writes: "For us [modern men], even themost personal is sublimated back into an abstraction; for them [the ancient Greeks], the greatest abstraction kept running back into a person."15

Although he does not here state this explicitly, I think that there can be little doubt that Nietzsche's sympathy iswith the ancient practice, as I will try to show below. This is somewhat clearer in a section called "The un-Hellenic inChristianity" in Menschliches,
The Greeks did not see

Allzumenschliches:

or the Homeric them as masters, gods as set above saw as it the gods as servants, as the Jews did. They were only the reflection of the most successful of their own caste, examplars that is to say an ideal, not an antithesis of their own nature.16 themselves set beneath

Nietzsche, like theGreeks, wanted to set up personality, character, or "the most successful examplars" as ideals and these ideals were to him much more important and related to life than any abstract principles. This ismade clear in a note from 1886:
"You seem tome to have bad to go intentions under?"?I for the future, one once said could believe that

you wanted

mankind

the god, "but so that something answered "Perhaps," "What then?" I asked curiously.?"Who then?, you Dionysos.17

to the god Dionysos. for it comes out of it."? should ask." Thus spoke

and other nihilists."18 These mensch actually merge into one.

It follows naturally from this ethics of character-perspective that one sense a Nietzsche's the in of is modern version ?bermensch concept of theGreek gods and in another sense ismerely an example and an ideal, i.e., a natural extension of his ethics of character. This can be seen in use of "the word '?bermensch' to designate a type that has Nietzsche's turned out supremely well, in antithesis to 'modern' men, to 'good' men, to Christians two senses of the word ?ber

I want first to show the close connection thatNietzsche sees between cre ative work and man; between the philosophy and the philosopher, between

to indicate that the concept of the?bermensch aspect of this.

thebooks and the author, and between the music and the composer. Thereafter I will demonstrate the importance of personality and character forNietzsche. man (the character) above theworks, and I hope I will show thathe places the is a natural consequence and

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Brobjer

In a letter to Lou Salom?, Nietzsche writes in 1882:

Your idea of reducing philosophical of their authors is a veritable "twin systems brain" to the status of personal records In Basel I was the teaching

idea.

my students: historyof ancient philosophy in just this sense, and liked to tell "This systemhas been disproved and it is dead; but you cannot disprove the
person behind it?the person cannot be killed." Plato, for example.19

About

he may appear to himself?ultimately he carries away with him nothing but his own biography."22Nietzsche pointed at the close connection between the man and theworks, and he strongly emphasized the importance of character or personality (as I will shortly show) throughout thewhole of his adult life. It isNietzsche's belief that "assuming that one is a person, one necessar ily also has the philosophy thatbelongs to thatperson,"23which is the cause not only of his many references to other thinkers but also of the often ad than at the principles) nature of so hominem (directed at theman?rather statements of his about them. These ad hominem statements have often many been regarded by commentators as unjustified and unfair attacks on other

tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen and in the Unzeitgem?sse Betrachtungen, where he claims: "To understand the picture one must divine the painter."21 Similar statements can also be found in theworks of themiddle period: "However far a man may extend himself with knowledge, however objective

which the entire plant has grown."20 As Nietzsche indicates in the letter, this belief that theworks are only a reflection of the character of theman was not new to him. It can clearly be seen in both prefaces toDie Philosophie im

three years later,Nietzsche writes in Jenseits von Gut und B?se: "It has gradually become clear tome what every great philosophy has hitherto been: a confession on the part of its author and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir; moreover, that themoral (or immoral) intentions in every philosophy have every time constituted the real germ of life out of

means

that is, by his character. According to theChristian and the "modern" view, man has an inherentvalue, more or less independent of his character, his abil ity,his values, and his deeds. Nietzsche uses persons, examples, and ad hominem arguments because he does not accept philosophy as an essentially abstract field of inquiry. This that forNietzsche ad hominem arguments are the strongest possible form of argument.Most other forms of arguments are merely abstractions? effective forwinning dialectical debates but in the end not very convincing? since they only involve part, and the smaller part, of the disputants.

persons. However, forNietzsche, to carry an argument back to the person is the essence of philosophy and morality, while most modern thinkersbelieve that theman should be kept separate from his belief and philosophy. For Nietzsche, the value of a man is determined by the order of rank of his drives,

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Nietzsches

Affirmative

Morality

69

use of ad hominem arguments is not a minor aberration but a consistent strategy or approach that reflects what he thinksmorality is and ought to be. The close connection between man and works is a themeNietzsche stresses Nietzsche's again and again. Why is this theme so important for him? Because philoso phy and other "works" are, likemorality, really only symptoms of the under lying character?"moralities too are only a sign-language of the emotions"24? which isNietzsche's true interest.Character, personality, or "theman" is one of the fundamental units of Nietzsche's philosophy, and he repeatedly claims that he goes through theworks to theman, to the character. "This sensitiv

ity furnishesme with psychological antennae with which I feel and get hold of every secret: the abundant hidden dirt at the bottom ofmany a character? perhaps the result of bad blood, but glossed over by education?enters my consciousness almost at the first contact."25 This general approach can be

exemplified with, for example, Nietzsche's statement: "Quite apart from the value of such assertions as 'there exists in us a categorical imperative' one can still ask: what does such an assertion say of theman who asserts it?"26 and instead of asking forwhat is truthand what is thewill to truth, Nietzsche asks: "What really is it in us thatwants 'the truth'?" He continues and asks for "the value of thiswill"27 and the answer reconnects it to a personality, to
a character.

Nietzsche's interest in the character behind thework is also clearly stated in both the early prefaces toDie Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen: On theotherhand,whoever rejoices in great human beings will also rejoice

erroneous. They always have one in philosophical systems, even if completely incontrovertible colour. [. . .]The task is to bring wholly point: personal mood, to light what we must ever love and honour and what no subsequent enlight enment can take away: great individual human beings. [. . .]But I have selected those doctrines philosopher.28 which sound most clearly the personality of the individual

This continues to be Nietzsche's method for the rest of his life. It is well known thatNietzsche rejects the idea of philosophical systems as being in any sense true or valuable per se. Hence he rejects all attempts at systematization.291 will not dispute this claim as such, but Nietzsche does nonetheless, in a sense, believe in the existence of "systems." In Jenseits von

Gut und B?se, Nietzsche claims that philosophical concepts are related to one another and he argues for the existence of a sort of "Zeitgeist."30More important formy argument is thatNietzsche also believes in another sort of "system": the human being. That our thoughts and values are all connected

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H.

Brobjer

and constitute a whole, a character, that forms a sort of "system," though not
a conscious one:

isolated errors or hit upon isolated truths. Rather any kind: we may not make our yeas and nays, our ifs and buts, grow out of us do our ideas, our values, a tree bears fruit?related with the necessity with which and each with an affinity to each, and evidence of one will, one health, one soil, one sun.31

For thisalone is fittingfora philosopher. We have no rightto isolated acts of

Not only does Nietzsche emphasize the close connection between man and works (which leads him toward an interest in, and use of, psychology), but he also clearly means that it isman who is themore fundamental and inter esting and the one he holds highest in value. "If one is something one really does not need tomake anything?and one nonetheless does very much."32

Not only is theman of higher interest and value than theworks, the value of theman is (or rather,can be) independent of his actions and his works. "The value of a human being [. ..] does not lie in his usefulness: for itwould con tinue to exist even if therewere nobody towhom he could be useful."33Here itcan clearly be seen that Nietzsche is not emphasizing utility,but something

a full and overflowing personality.

It is not the works, order sense: some

that can be called character. The value of a man is determined by his attitude toward life?he must not be filled with resentment and vanity but should have

of rank here,

which may not be soughtor found and perhapsmay not be itself,something

lost either.?The noble soul has reverence for itself.?34

the is decisive it is the faith which here, which determines an old religious to employ in a new and deeper formula a noble soul possesses in regard to fundamental certainty which

Nietzsche's strong emphasis on man (or character) can furtherbe seen in the fact that Nietzsche regards culture?a very important concept for him?basi as great men and theirworks and "thus only he who has attached his cally heart to some great man is by that act consecrated to culture."35 For Nietzsche, the answer to the problem of value, like forOedipus before the Sphinx, isman!36 A large part of Nietzsche's philosophical endeavor con sists of an attempt to improveman and to increase the value ofman. The ref erences to this inNietzsche's writings are frequent.37

This concern for character led Nietzsche to an interest in themore perfect man who can justifymankind: "This man of the future [. . .] he must come one day?."38 It is not ideas and principles that justify our existence and improve it and us, but human beings, the best human beings, who by their mere existence both justify and improveman because they are examples who show man what man really can be. It is not a coincidence thatNietzsche

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Nietzsche"s

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speaks of thephilosophers of the future, not philosophies of the future.The purpose of philosophy is, according toNietzsche, not primarily the con struction of new philosophies but the production of "new Platos" as he says

fact thatGod does not exist, but because the belief in such a god as the men' to hell, Christian God makes man smaller.40"The church sends all 'great itfights against all 'greatness of man.'"41 A consequence of Nietzsche's ethics of character is thathis references to and opinions of othermen are not merely scattered and vague statements of lit tle importance. The opposite is the case. In Nietzsche's discussion of other

early in his development, or "new philosophers" as he says later.39 not Nietzsche sees himself as fighting for the improvement of man?but so much the abstract concept of man as of individual men and of man's per sonality and character. This can be seen as much inwhat he attacks as inwhat he praises. His critique of God and Christianity is not due primarily to the

men, such as Goethe, Napoleon, Plato, and Rousseau, we are perhaps closer to theArchimedian point of his philosophy than at any other time.When Nietzsche inG?tzen-D?mmerung, in the longest chapter, "Expeditions of an

Untimely Man," expounds his opinions of different thinkersand men in short disconnected statements, this is not idle prejudice. Nietzsche is, in fact, here expressing his morality, his values, more clearly than at almost any other time. He is here illuminating not ideas or principles but the kinds of men (character or personality) he finds worthy of veneration and numerous exam

ples of the opposite to this.42

For the past ten or twenty years, the view that threemain ethical traditions can be regarded as constituting the larger part ofWestern ethical thinkinghas become standard: the ethics of virtue, utilitarian ethics, and deontological ethics. In a simplified form, one can say that the ethics of virtue is charac while the two other forms are act-oriented. Utilitarianism is act ter-oriented, and goal-oriented, in the sense that it ismainly concerned with acts leading to, or resulting in, a certain goal, and is therefore often referred to as conse

which increases goal (for example, pleasure) determines what is right (as that actethics is and pleasure). Deontological right-oriented. In this ethical tra dition, right is primary, and rightdetermines the good. This tradition is con cerned with acting according to rules, duty, and themoral law, and hence morality, is seen as being autonomous. law. The moral

quentialism. In this ethical theory, the goal is primary, and themost frequent goal has been pleasure or happiness, but others have also been suggested. In utilitarianism "the goal" or "the good" comes before "the right," in that the

According to the utilitarian tradition, morality is not autonomous. The moral content of an act depends on how the good is defined?and themost as a to definition the of is it define natural frequent good quality, usually as

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pleasure or happiness. Hence, an act that increases pleasure or happiness is moral, while one that decreases it is immoral. Thinkers in this tradition set the consequences of acts at the center of their interest, and, in one form or another, they stress thatone will have to calculate the consequences of alter native acts and sequences of acts to determine which acts are most moral and

useful.

thinking,which emphasizes "the right" and hence rules and Deontological moral laws, including "natural law," is based on intuition, rationality, and obedience. This tradition strongly emphasizes the distinction between facts and values and claims that morality is autonomous, i.e., that morality can in no sense be determined by, or depend on, nonmoral aspects. The moral con tent of an act, or of a human being, is independent of any consequences or

which is less act-oriented, is also normative in a much vaguer sense, basing its "prescriptions" mostly on mutual values, persuasion, and example. Modern ethics, independent of whether it is goal- or rule-oriented, attempts to inform us about how we should act in certain situations. It is essentially is the correct way problem-oriented and tries to solve moral queries?"What to act in these or those circumstances?" Ethics of virtue is a response to a

physical properties. Both utilitarianism and deontological ethics are normative in the sense that theyattempt to show us which acts should and should not be done. Virtue ethics,

What sort of per very different question: "How should one live one's life? son should I be and become?" An ethics of virtue is hence not act-oriented (or rule-oriented) but agent-oriented or character-oriented. It follows that in this tradition one judges persons or character traits rather than acts. An ethics of character will seem alien tomany modern readers because it fundamen tally and primarily judges character and character traits and only secondar ily acts. Acts will not so much be regarded as good or evil, or rightor wrong,

damental importance inNietzsche's thinking. During the nineteenth century, therewas no awareness of ethics of virtue. was done in terms When ethicswas discussed or systematizedmore generally, it of utilitarianism and deontology. For example, Nietzsche read and heavily anno William Edward Hartpole Lecky's History of European Morality in a tated German translation (Sittengeschichte Europas, 1879, 2 volumes), where this dichotomy ofmorality is very explicit?but this is also true for essentially all the books about ethics Nietzsche read. Thus it is not altogether surprising that Nietzsche regarded himself as an immor?list and destroyer ofmorals.

act "immorally" because it is unworthy,because itdecreases one's self-respect, and because often it is cowardly.43 In other words, the criteria of action are We can note that these are also of fun flourishing, esteem, and self-esteem.44

but will be judged rather as worthy or unworthy, or sometimes more directly related to character traits (virtues), for example, as brave, dishonest, or unjust. According to an ethics-of-virtue perspective, one does not, or should not,

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Nietzsche

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Almost all philosophers have primarily been concerned with the questions: "What is truth?" "What is to be done?" "What actions are to be condoned or condemned?" etc. For Nietzsche the questions are consistently rephrased as: "Who is to be created?" "Whose actions are to be condoned?" "Who ismost strongly person-oriented approach to evaluations and is different from thatofmodern moral philosophy. His atti morality radically seems to tude go against the grain of objectivity. Most ofmodern moral phi we must judge the deeds that losophy?not to speak of jurisprudence?claims valuable?" Nietzsche's

independently of the performer and this is reflected in such proclamations as: "it is wrong to steal" or "thou shalt not murder," which is often seen as being special cases of the golden rule: "Do not to others what you would not wish them to do to you." Nietzsche, to the contrary, claims that "an action in

of the person behind the philosophy. The character behind the philosophy is more interesting?and relevant?than his philosophy.48With this inmind, Nietzsche's use of ad hominem arguments becomes understandable; they are merely a special case of his character-oriented perspective. There are a number of reasons why Nietzsche both can and does use this psychological ad hominem approach to philosophy. It becomes especially important to bring forward the reasons for this since so few other philoso phers have chosen to use it,or accept it as a valid approach.
Two factors are of foremost

It follows naturally from this person-centered view thatnot only differently.46 is all morality merely symptoms but so also is all philosophizing.47 Symptoms

itself is perfectly devoid of value: itall depends on who performs it.One and the same 'crime' can be in one the greatest privilege, in another a stigma,"45 and he denies the golden rule because men are differentand should be treated

acter, i.e., his belief that individual human beings or characters are the ulti mate telos or value, rather than truthor actions or beliefs or social reforms. This leads Nietzsche to analyze, for example, a book not primarily in terms of truth,actions, beliefs, but in terms of character. This could be done within the framework of the text, i.e., to analyze and discuss what the text actually says, if it is consistent and without self-contradictions and what effect it might
on character?and to some extent Nietzsche does this, often, for exam

importance.

First,

Nietzsche's

ethics

of char

have

ple, when referring to the Bible?but more frequently he choses to use the text as symptom (of the author's character or of the time inwhich it was writ ten) and thusmakes a diagnosis rather than an analysis. The reason for this is his belief in the limited nature and importance of reason and conscious ness. These are only surface phenomena and symptoms and ought not to con stitute the end of analysis. The second factor that explains why Nietzsche uses the ad hominem approach to philosophy can be summarized as Heraclitus's famous saying: "Man's character is his fate" or "Character for man is destiny."49 More specifically, in the case of Nietzsche, this factor can be broken down into several beliefs:

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74 (i)

Thomas H. Brobjer that human nature or human character on the fundamental level is

difficult to change.50 (ii) thathuman character constitutes a sort of (consistent) system.51 (iii) that there is a close connection between character and the beliefs and
values that it encompasses.52

(iv)

the philosophy) than in the reverse direction.53This last point follows from, or is consistent with, thefirst point.

that the direction of influence between character and the philosophy associated with that character is stronger upward (from character to

Nietzsche also explicitly claims to be using ad homonem arguments and meth ods: "Much depends upon theirpersons: the point of my considerations of their teachings is to divine theirpersons,"54 and "from the lengthy experience afforded by such a wandering in theforbidden I learned to view the origin of moralizing

and idealizing very differently fromwhat might be desirable: the hidden history of the philosophers, the psychology of their great names came to light for me."55 A furtherexample, which also illustrates some of the reasons why Nietzsche so often refers to himself as a physiologist: "Insight into the origin of a work [bymeans of the character of its creator] concerns the physiologists and vivisectionists of the spirit."56 Furthermore, Nietzsche's as to values and beliefs references symptoms is of course also a frequent

consistent with Nietzsche's general psychological approach.59 Nietzsche's belief in the ultimate importance of character in combination with his belief that there is a strong connection between a character and the philosophy that belongs to this character leads him to the ad hominem approach: to analyze books, people, philosophies, and ideologies in terms of character. Such an analysis, however, ismore akin to a diagnosis than to a such diagnoses appear tomost read conventional philosophical analysis?and ers as invalid or irrelevant ad hominem arguments.

reflection of his application of the ad hominem method.57 A clear and rela tively typical example of this is his refusal to accept rational arguments and objective claims as such and instead to ask: "What does such a claim tell us This type of questioning is of course wholly about theman who makes it?"58

Summary Nietzsche's critique of morality has received much attention, but his affir mative ethics has received little, and ithas been badly understood. However, the prevailing interest in ethics of virtue and inAristotle's ethics during the last ten to twenty years makes it easier to comprehend Nietzsche's view of this kinship with ethics of virtue has not yet been realized, ethics?although

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where first applied to human beings and only later,derivatively, to actions."61 He wanted to set up personality, character, or "the most successful exem plars" as ideals, and these ideals constituted to him the essence of ethics. It is not ideas and principles that justify our existence and improve it and us,

"Restoration of 'nature': an action in itself is perfectly devoid of value: it all depends on who performs it."60 moral designations were every Nietzsche points out that "it is obvious that

scholars or among those interested in ethics of virtue. like the Greeks, did not regard deeds and actions (neither the Nietzsche, as the central question of intentions behind them nor their consequences) ethics as has generally been done inmodern philosophy; instead he empha sized that ethics is related to the sort of character, the sort of person one is. either among Nietzsche

mere existence both but human beings, the best human beings, who by their man are what man can be. of and because they examples justify improve men even and of the?bermensch Nietzsche's of Furthermore, concept great can be seen as a natural extension of his ethics of character.Man, the high est conception ofman, takes the place of God. For Nietzsche, the answer to the problem of value, as forOedipus before the Sphinx, is thusman!

Department of Philosophy University of Uppsala Notes

1. GS, 335. See also "we deny accountability, 77, "The Four Great Errors," 8, and D, 208. 2. EH, "Why IAm So Clever," 9. 3. A, 55. One especially clear example of Nietzsche's argument for our lack of self-knowl

edge can be found in TI, "The Four Great Errors," 4 where he argues thatwhen we hear a dis tant canon-shot while sleeping and dreaming it often happens that "the canon-shot enters [the story of the dream] in a causal way, in an apparent inversion of time. That which comes later, themotivation, is experienced first, often with a hundred details which pass like lightning, the . . . What shot follows. has happened? The ideas engendered by a certain condition have been as the cause of that condition.?We do just the same thing, in fact, when we are misunderstood awake." See also HH, 107. 4. See, for example, BGE, 18 "the hundred times refuted theory of 'free will'"; GS V 345, "the superstition of free will," and AOM, 50, "The strongest knowledge (that of the total unfree dom of the human will)." See also 77, "The Four Great Errors," 3 and 7, which includes a one page section called "The error offree will." 5. HH, 6. GS, 107. 338. For the development of whole cultures, see, for example, WS, 67. See also, for of the first part ofMorgenr?te

example, GS, 1 and 4. 7. D, 103. See also, for example, D, deals with the problem of morality. 8. EH, 9.

3, 9, 14, 563. Much 1.

Write Such Excellent Books," "Why I 1. 77, "The 'Improvers' ofMankind,"

10. For example, inEcce Homo, Nietzsche says of himself: "I am the first immor?list: I am therewith the destoyer par excellence" (EH, "Why IAm a Destiny," 2.) 11. Almost all of Nietzsche's many references to nihilism are critical, for example: "values

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of decline, nihilistic values hold sway under the holiest names" (A, 6). Other examples can be found inA, 7, 20, and 58. In Der Wille zurMacht, they abound. The first occurrence in his pub lished writings seems to be in BGE, 10 and 208. Already here it is used as a negative concept. 12. GM, Preface, 7. 13. Z.T, "Of the Thousand 14. D, 207. 15. Philosophy in the Tragic Age of theGreeks, 3, trans. Marianne Cowan (Chicago: Regnery, 1962), 41-42. See also, for example, the preface to Jenseits von Gut und B?se, where Nietzsche truth to be a woman." plays with a version of this idea when he says: "Supposing 16. HH, 114. Menschen im Schilde zu f?hren, man m?chte glauben, du wolltest den ich einmal zu dem Gotte Dionysos. 'Vielleicht, antwortete richten?'?sagte der Gott, aber so, da? dabei Etwas f?r ihn heraus kommt.'?'Was denn? fragte ich neugierig.? 17. '"Du scheint mir Schlimmes zu Grunde sprach Dionysos." KSA 12:4[4] Anfang 1886-Fr?hjahr 1886. and One Goals."

Wer denn? solltest du fragen.' Also Compare also note 37 below. In Der Antichrist, mankind

3, Nietzsche writes: "The problem I raise is not what ought to succeed in the sequence of species (?the human being is an end?): but what type of human being one ought to breed, ought to will, as more valuable, more worthy of life,more certain of the future."

18. EH, "Why IWrite Such Excellent Books," 1. 19. Letter to Lou Salom?, September 16, 1882. 20. BGE, 6. Compare also BGE, 5: "They pose as having discovered and attained their real opinions through the self-evolution of a cold, pure, divinely unperturbed dialectic [. . .]while what happens at bottom is that a prejudice, a notion, an 'inspiration,' generally a desire of the heart sifted and made abstract, is defended by them with reasons sought after the event?they are one and all advocates who do not want to be regarded as such, and for themost part no bet ter than cunning pleaders for their prejudices, which they baptize 'truths'"; and BGE, 8: "In 'conviction' appears on the scene." every philosophy there is a point at which the philosopher's 21. UM III 3. Compare also section 2. 22. HH, 513. Compare section 198. See also D, 553: "nothing other than the intellectual cir cuitous paths of similar personal drives?" and GS, 241: "ultimately, his work nifying glass that he offers everybody that looks his way." 23. GS, Preface (1886), 2. See also section 3 of the preface. 24. BGE, 25. EH, 187. 8. See also A, 44. "Why IAm So Wise," 26. BGE, 187. 27. BGE, 23-25. 29. 30. 77, "Maxims "I mistrust all systematizers and avoid them. The will and Arrows," 26. to a system is a lack of integrity." 1. and "A Later Preface" to Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, 28. From "Preface" ismerely a mag

"That individual philosophical concepts are not something arbitrary, something growing on but the up autonomously, contrary grow up connected and related to one another; that, how ever suddenly and arbitrarily they appear to emerge in the history of thought, they none the less belong just as much to a system as do the members of the fauna of a continent" (BGE, 20). 31. GM, Preface, 2. this with a quotation that I have been unable to locate: "The errors 32. HH, 210. Compare of great men are more important than the truths of littlemen." It is not truth, objective truth, emphasizes, but man, in particular the great man, and only secondarily his rela tion to the world, his truth. See also, Z.TV, "The Greeting": "Nothing more gladdening grows on earth, O Zarathustra, than an exalted, robust will: it is the earth's fairest growth. A whole thatNietzsche

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N?ETZscHi '

s Affirmative

Morality

77

landscape

is refreshed by one such tree." 77, ist ein Ende]. [Der gro?e Mensch 33. WP, 877. 34. BGE, 287. For Nietzsche's

." 44: "The great human being is a terminus"

ity, see, for example, EH, of decline par excellence 35. 36. ?/MIII6.

rejection of moralities that deny the importance of personal "Why IAm a Destiny," 7: "The morality of unselfing is themorality

In 77, "Morality as Anti-Nature," 6, Nietzsche law of life, and he answers "?But we ourselves, we

asks what advantage could there be in the immoralists, are the answer to that."

lets Dionysos 37. For example, in BGE, 295, Nietzsche say: "I often ponder how I might advance him [man] and make him stronger,more evil and more profound than he is." Zarathustra, inZ.TV, "Of theHigher Man," teaches the same: '"Man must grow better and more evil'?thus concern for, and thewish to improve, the do 7 teach." Many other quotations about Nietzsche's health of man 38. GM, can be given: for example, BGE, 269 and 295; GM I 11 and 12, and GM III 14. II 24.

39. UM III 8, for "new Platos" and, for example, GS, 289 and BGE, 2, 44, 203, 210, and 229 for "new philosophers." 40. This is explicit inA, 47: "not merely an error but a crime against life!' 41. WP, 871. Compare also A, 5, and a note from 1875: "Christus f?rderte die Verdummung der Menschen, w?rde vielleicht humani!" KSA 42. This er hielt die Erzeugung des gro?en Intellekts auf. Consequent! Sein Gegenbild von Christus' hinderlich sein.?Fatumtristissimum der Erzeugung generis

numerous 43.

8:5[188]. is true not only when he is discussing the highest forms, for example, Goethe in in section 48, but also in all the sections 49-51, and the lowest forms, for example, Rousseau short ad hominem (positive and negative) statements with which the chapter is filled. Ethics IV (1124b): "The high-minded man See, for example, Aristotle's Nicomachean . [megalopsychos] [. .]will also be outspoken concerning his hatreds and friendships, for secrecy is a mark of fear [. . .] he will speak and act openly, because he has contempt for secrecy and

falsity." 44. It follows from an ethics-of-virtue perspective that individuals with little self-esteem, or societies that yield such members, will be approximately morally equivalent to how egoists are regarded inmodern morality. 45. WP, 292. "Moralities must first of all be forced to bow before order of rank, [. . .] it is immoral to 'What is good for one is good for another'" (BGE, 221). Compare also "that what is fair say: for one cannot by any means for that reason alone also be fair for others; that the demand of one morality for all is detrimental for the higher men; in short, that there is an order of rank between man and man, hence also between morality and morality" (BGE, 228). For critique of the golden rule, see also KSA 13:22[1] = WP, 925 and KSA 13:11 [127] = WP, 926. 47. "Morality is merely sign-language, merely symptomatology: one must already know 46. what it is about to derive profit from it" (TI, "The 'Improvers' of Mankind," 1. mehr werth als seine Philosophie! Unsere Instinkte sind besser als ihr "Plato ist Ausdruck in Begriffen. Unser Leib istweiser als unser Geist! Wenn Plato jener B?ste inNeapel glich, so 48. alles Christenthums!" KSA 11:26[355] Summer-Autumn

haben wir da die beste Widerlegung 1884.

. 49. Diels-Krantz, Kahn, The Art and Thought fragment 22B 119. Translations by Charles ofHeraclitus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), and Kathleen Freeman, Anelila to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1948, 1983), respectively. 50. For example, Nietzsche's and states: "Learning references to "that eternal basic text homo natura" that which all nourishment (BGE, 230) does which does not

transforms us, it does

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Thomas H. Brobjer

as the physiologist knows. But at the bottom of us, 'right down deep,' there merely 'preserve'?: is, to be sure, something unteachable, a granite stratum of spiritual fate, of predetermined deci sion and answer to predetermined selected questions. [. . .] 'convictions.' Later?one sees them

only as footsteps to self-knowledge, signposts to the problem which we are?more correctly, to the great stupidity which we are, to our spiritual fate, to the unteachable 'right down deep'" {BGE, 231). 51. For example: "In a philosopher, conversely, there is nothing whatever that is impersonal: and above all, his morality bears decided and decisive witness to who he is?that is, in what

order of rank the innermost drives of his nature stand in relation to each other" {BGE, 6). Already in UM III 1,Nietzsche had written: "everything bears witness to our being?our

friendships and hatreds, the way we look, our handshake, the things we remember and forget, our books, our handwriting." 52. For example: "A human being's evaluations betray something of the structure of his soul"

{BGE, 268). 53. For example: "A philosopher [. ..] simply cannot keep from transposing his states every time into the most spiritual form and distance: this art of transfiguration is philosophy" {GS, Preface, 3), and in his claim that "all philosophers were building under the seduction of moral ity" {D, Preface, 3). 54. The Struggle between Science and Wisdom, p. 129 in Philosophy and Truth: Selections (London, 1979, from Nietzsche's Notebooks of theEarly 1870s, ed. and trans. Daniel Breazeale 1991). 55. EH, Preface, 3. Nietzsche continues by stating that error and falsehood is not an intel lectual mistake but an 'error' of character or virtue, "error is cowardice." In his notebooks {KSA 13:16[32]), Nietzsche had written almost the same words as those quoted in the text, and these have 56. GM later been published separately inWP, 1041. III 4. Further example of Nietzsche's claim to be using this approach are:

"But I had discovered him [Schopenhauer] in the form of a book, and thatwas a great deficiency. So I strove all the harder to see through the book and to imagine the living man" (t/M III 2). "Once one has trained one's eyes to recognize in a scholarly treatise the scholar's idio to catch it in the act, one will almost always scholar has one?and syncracy?every behold behind this the scholar's 'prehistory,' his family, and especially their occupa tions and crafts" {GS V 348). 57. "My attempt to understand moral judgements as symptoms" {WP, 258). Other examples of this can be found in 1, and GS, Preface, 2. WP, 254; BGE, 187; 77, "The 'Improvers' ofMankind," 187. 58. BGE, can be exemplified by statements such as: "What I am concerned with is the psy of the redeemer" {A, 29). type chological Autumn 1887. Compare also: "Es gibt also keine 60. WP, 292 = KSA 12:10[46+47] nurMenschen, nicht Dinge" sondern Lob und Tadel trifft {KSA tadelnsw?rdigen Handlungen, 59. Which 61. BGE, 260.

9:1 [69]Early 1880).

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