ASPECTS OF BUDDHISM

PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR ON BUDDHIST STUDIES

LIW, 25 JUNE 1994

Edited by Agata Bareja-Starzy nska and Marek Mejor Oriental Institute Warsaw University 1997

ISSN 1232-4663

c 1997 Instytut Orientalistyczny, Uniwersytet Warszawski Krakowskie Przedmie scie 26/28, 00-927 Warszawa, Poland
A This book has been typeset by TEX system. L TEX style designed by Jacek Starzy nski.

Printed by Zaklad Graczny Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego Zam. nr 630/97

Aspects of Buddhism

Contents
Foreword Abbreviations ii iii

1 Agata Bareja-Starzy nska The Essentials of Buddhism in the Ciqula 1 keregleg ci , a 16th Century Mongolian Buddhist Treatise 1 2 Jens Braarvig Bhavya on Mantras: Apologetic Endeavours on Behalf of the Mah ay ana 31 3 David P. Jackson Buddhacarita2 On the Date of the Tibetan Translation of A svaghos . as 39

4 Helmut Krasser rNgog lots aba on the sahopalambhaniyama proof in Dharmak rtis Pram an avini s caya 59 . 5 Per Kvrne Discovering Buddhist Art of Kinnaur Bhavya on M m am a . s 83 85 117

6 Christian Lindtner 7 Marek Mejor

A Note on Buddhist Studies in Poland

8 Marek Mejor On the Formulation of the Prat tyasamutp ada: Some Observations from Vasubandhus Prat tyasamutp adavy akhy a 125 9 Marek Mejor On Vasubandhus Prat tyasamutp adavy akhy a3 Much 139

10 Michael Torsten in Dign aga, Uddyotakara and Dharmak rti 11 Tom J.F. Tillemans

S am an adhikaran . ya 149 161

Dharmak rti on prasiddha and yogyat a4

12 Vladimir L. Uspensky Some Rare Oirat Manuscripts in the Collection of the St. Petersburg University Library 177

ii

Aspects of Buddhism

Foreword
In the romantic scenery of a small medieval castle in Liw, some 70 km east from Warsaw, we had the pleasure to host a group of eminent Buddhologists from leading University centres in Europe who made their contributions at the International Seminar Aspects of Buddhism, June 25, 1994. It is for the rst time in the history of Polish Indology and Buddhology that an international seminar on Buddhist studies was organized by the Oriental Institute, Warsaw University. The main purpose of the seminar was, however, to revive our Buddhist studies which after a period of ourishing activity (S. Schayer, C. Regamey, A. Kunst, J. Jaworski) came into decline. The presence of the group of eminent scholars with their learned contributions at the Seminar has had an immediate impact on the growing interest in Buddhist studies (see below in this volume). The papers oered by the participants of the Seminar are now edited in a volume which is a special issue of Studia Indologiczne, the rst Polish academic journal devoted to Indological and related research, founded in 1994 and published by the Oriental Institute, Warsaw University. The organizers of the Seminar would like to thank the participants (J. Braarvig, D. Jackson, P. Kvrne, H. Krasser, M.T. Much, T. Tillemans) and contributors (Ch. Lindtner, V. Uspensky) for their kind acceptance of our invitation. We also thank Dr Jacek Starzy nski for a nice computer layout. Special thanks are due to Ms Anna Ambro z, the director of the Liw Castle Museum, for her hospitality and making accessible the castle for the Seminar.

Marek Mejor

Agata Bareja-Starzy nska

Editors and organizers

Aspects of Buddhism

iii

Abbreviations
ALB BHSD The Adyar Library Bulletin Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary, by Franklin Edgerton, vol. II: Dictionary, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, First Edition 1953, Reprint 1985 sDe dge edition of Tibetan canon Indo-Iranian Jurnal Journal of the American Oriental Society Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland Journal of Indian Philosophy Peking edition of Tibetan canon Taish o Shinsh u Daiz oky o, The Tripit . aka in Chinese Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde Wiener Zeitschrift f ur die Kunde S ud- (und Ost)asiens Zeitschrift Gesellschaft der Deutschen Morgenl andischen

D IIJ JAOS JIABS JRAS JIPH P T WSTB WZKS(O) ZDMG

Aspects of Buddhism, Liw, Poland, June 25, 1994

The Essentials of Buddhism in the Ciqula keregleg ci , 1 a 16th Century Mongolian Buddhist Treatise
Agata Bareja-Starzy nska (Warsaw) The aim of the present paper is to oer a preliminary study of the third chap ter, which contains the Buddhist terminology, from the Ciqula keregleg ci , a 16th century Mongolian treatise on Buddhism. Its author was Sireget u g uu si cor i, an eminent translator of Tibetan Buddhist writings into Mongolian, a personal pupil of the Third Dalai Lama. The text was compiled in the 16th century, during the second propagation of Buddhism in Mongolia, most probably between 1587 and 1607 (Heissig 88, p. 225). The Ciqula keregleg ci circulated only in manuscripts, unlike other translations by Sireget u g uu si cor i, which, however, were years later printed as xylographs. Twenty three manuscripts in all of the Ciqula keregleg ci 2 are known to exist in European and Asian libraries today .
1 The present paper is an enlarged version of my paper read in Liw, 1994. It has been prepared on the basis of the research carried at the Department of History of Religion at the University of Oslo in 1993, thanks to the scholarship granted by the NAVF. I would like to express my sincere thanks to Prof. Per Kvaerne for his kind assistance, as well as to Dr. Jens Braarvig for his scholarly guidance. Further study on my Ph.D. project was carried with a help of a research grant of the DAAD at the Seminar f ur Sprach- und Kulturwissenschaft Zentralasiens at the University of Bonn in 1995. I am very thankful to Prof. Klaus Sagaster and Rev. Loden Sherab Dagyab Rinpoche for their sholarly support and valuable remarks. The present paper and myself beneted a lot from the consultations with Prof. Per S orensen from Leipzig and Dr. Marek Mejor from Warsaw, whom I would like to thank. 2 In W. Heissig, Ein Quellenbezug der Altan Khan Biographie, Studia Historica ska, AdMongolica, 1, 1985 14 manuscripts are mentioned; in A. Bareja-Starzyn ditional Notes on the Manuscripts of the Ciqula keregleg ci, Acta Orientalia Belgica, Leuven 1991 18 manuscripts; one more ms has been discovered by V.L. Uspensky at the Sankt Petersburg University Library (D 172); three more copies are preserved in Tuva, A.G. Sazykin, Sobranie mongolskich rukopisej i ksilografov iz fondov tuvinskogo respublikanskogo kraeved ceskego muzea im. 60 bogatyrej (Kyzyl), Tiurskie i mongolskie pismennye pamiatniki, Moskva 1992, pp. 54-55 (I am thankful V.L. Uspensky for calling my attention to this article); and one more ms is found in the Library of the Cultural Palace of National Minorities in Beijing [Minzu Wenhua gong tushuguan] (I am indebted for this information to K. Sagaster).

Aspects of Buddhism

Before turning to the actual topic of the present paper, a few words of in troduction about the Ciqula keregleg ci should be given. The Western scholarship (O.M. Kovalevskij and his followers) regarded the Ciqula keregleg ci as a Mongolian version of the Shes bya rab tu gsal ba , although its title is never mentioned in the Mongolian text.3 However, it seems that this statement was based on wrong assumption that the Ciqula keregleg ci was a translation of the Phags pa bla mas work. Some dierences between the texts have been already commented by the scholars: L.S. Pu ckovskij, W. Heissig, C. Hoog and the author of the present article.4 Sh. Bira suggested that the Ciqula keregleg ci could be a compilation written by Sireget u g uu si cor i (Bira p. 189). He also stated that the Ciqula kere gleg ci may be related to the Tibetan work Ner mkho mthong ba don yod5 . On the basis of the recent research carried by the present author6 , it was claried now that only the second chapter of the Ciqula keregleg ci is based on the Shes bya rab tu gsal ba . It is also possible to put forth a hypothesis that the whole work as such has been translated from the Tibetan. The Tibetan original itself could have been a compilation based on dierent sources. There are two main arguments for such a hypothesis: 1. The author of the Mongolian version, Sireget u g uu si cor i, was a well known Buddhist translator, whose no own composition was ever found, or men tioned. In the colophon of the Ciqula keregleg ci the author states that the translation was done under the repeated request of two persons Makata bodisung, probably a noble lady, and Sisrab sengge, most probably a Buddhist monk. Unfortunately, the patrons have not been yet identied.7 2. Another argument for the Ciqula keregleg ci as a translation from a Tibetan source is that there exists still another Mongolian work, an Oirat (Western Mongolian) treatise entitled Uzeqs er tusatai cuxula keregt u kem ek u8 written
3 Kovalevskij, Buddijskaja kosmologia, Kaza n 1837, Heissig pp. 26-34, facs. pp. 2783, f. 1-55. 4 kovskij, Nekotorye voprosy nau L.S. Puc cnogo opisanija mongolskich rukopisej, Sovetskoe Vostokovedenie, 11, 1941, p. 264; Heissig p. 28; Bira p. 189; Hoog p. 7; Bareja 1992 p. 23; Bareja 1991 p. 5. 5 Bira pp. 190-191. I failed to nd this Tibetan text in the State Library in Ulan Bator in 1990. Also Prof. Bira was unable to trace a place where he saw it. I could not nd in the catalogues either the Tibetan title, nor the name of its author (in a corrupted form?): Blo b cang bzang poi dpal. 6 Ph.D. project of a critical edition of the Ciqula keregleg ci with a Polish translation and a commentary. 7 Ciqula keregleg ci , ms. I5 from St. Petersburg, Academy of Sciences, f. 41r or ci ul keme : ulam ulam dabtan o cigsen-d ur... 8 I am thankful to V.L. Uspensky for calling my attention to this text, see V.L. Uspensky, Some Oirat Manuscripts in the Collection of the St. Petersburg University Library in the present volume: Proceedings of the International Buddhist Seminar Aspects of Damdinsu ru ng, Mong ol uran Buddhism, Liw, 1994; C. okiyal-un dege i a un bilig orosibai, Ula anba atur, 1959, p. 328, no. 40.

A. Bareja-Starzy nska The Essentials of Buddhism. . . by Za ya pandita Nam mkha rgya mtshan (1599-1662) from Oirat.9

The Oirat Za ya Pandita was the most famous and eective translator of the Buddhist writings into Oirat language. He invented also a version of the Uighur script for the Oirat language. In his biography more than 150 translations are listed. No Buddhist works of his authorship are known. A preliminary research on the Oirat Za ya Panditas work shows, after a brief comparison with the Ciqula keregleg ci , that it is a longer treatise, however, it follows the same structure: the same paragraphs appear one after the other in both texts, although in the Oirat version there are in several places passages not found in the Ciqula keregleg ci . The actual dierences existing between these two almost similar treatises might have arisen due to the fact that: 1) either Sireget u g uu si cor i made a shorter version, omitting some paragraphs, or 2) Za ya Pandita enlarged his translation by adding fragments based on other texts. It should also be taken into consideration that 3) the translators might have had dierent copies of the Tibetan original at their disposal. The wording of both texts is dierent, so they seem to be two independent translations. Further thorough comparison of both texts is a desideratum. Both scholars lived during the second propagation of Buddhism in Mongolia, although Za ya Pandita slightly later. There are several Buddhist works that were translated into Mongolian or Oirat by both of them, such as the biography and songs of Mi la ras pa, the story of Molon toyins journey into the hell and the Man . i bka bum. The fact that they both translated the same, well known Tibetan writings, may indicate that the Tibetan original of the Ciqula keregleg ci was also a Tibetan composition, oered by the Tibetans to the Mongols during the second propagation of Buddhism in Mongolia. Unfortunately, the Tibetan original which might have served both Mongolian scholars for compiling the Ciqula keregleg ci and the Cuxula keregt u has not been so far identied. The Ciqula keregleg ci can be divided into three main parts: 1. Part I: About the Buddha and his teachings, based on the Mah ay ana s utras and commentaries from the Canon. 2. Part II: The Cosmological part, on the Worlds Origin and Destruction, includes Indian royal genealogy, brief history of Tibet and Mongolia, and is based on the Shes bya rab tu gsal ba 10 written in 1278 by Phags pa bla ma Blo gros rgyal mtshan. 3. Part III: The Glossary of Buddhist terms, following the example of Abhidharmic m atr as, without any source mentioned. . k
He should not to be mistaken with a series of incarnations of the Khalkha Za ya Panditas, among them Za ya Pandita (1642-1715), well known for his achievements as a Mongolian scholar writing in Tibetan language. 10 Shes bya rab tu gsal ba in Sa skya bka bum, ed. Toyo Bunko, Tokyo 1968, vol. 6, f. 3r3-21v5; C.k., Paris ms. f. 10r-42v12.
9

Aspects of Buddhism

The second part of the Ciqula keregleg ci , which occupies sixty percent of the text, was well studied by scholars, starting with J. Kovalevskij, who used it as a source for his Buddijskaja kosmologia (The Buddhist Cosmology). The signicance of this chapter, and the Mongolian Ciqula keregleg ci as a whole, is due to the fact, that it laid grounds for the Mongolian Buddhist historiography, similarly to the role played by the Shes bya rab tu gsal ba for the Tibetan historical writings. As it was pointed out by S. Dietz, the second chapter of the Shes bya rab tu gsal ba , about the Worlds Origin and Destruction, became a standard introduction included in the Tibetan historical works belonging to the genre of chos byung, i.e. history of the Doctrine. The same pattern was more or less followed in Bu stons History of Buddhism, in rGyal rab gsal bai me long, Deb ther dmar po, Deb ther sngon po, and was also used by dPa bo gtsug lag phreng ba, Padma dkar po, T aran atha, the Fifth Dalai Lama and Sum pa khan po.11 In Mongolia the description of the Worlds Origin and Destruction, including short histories of India, Tibet and Mongolia, served as a model for the 17th century Mongolian chronicles, namely Altan tob ci (1655) and Erdeni-yin tob ci (1662), as well as later chronicles written by the Mongols in Tibetan (Heissig pp. 60-63, 70-71.). It introduced Buddhist notions of the world and at the same timeas a means of legitimationconnected the Mongolian rulers and their legendary ancestors with the Tibetan royal house, and through them, with the Indian royal pro genitor Mah asammata. The Ciqula keregleg ci is regarded as an important and authoritative manual of Buddism in Mongolia, even at present. It served as a source for preparing the modern vademecum of Buddhist knowledge in Mongolian.12 The Shes bya rab tu gsal ba is an exposition of Abhidharmic topics to the Mongolian prince Cinggim (Jingim 1243-85) of the Y uan dynasty, the elder son of the Mongolian emperor Qubilai khan. It was translated into Mongolian already in the 13th century. The 18th century copy of this translation entitled Medegdeg un-i belgetey-e geyig ul ug ci has been found and studied recently by V.L. Uspensky.13 It is worth to mention that the Shes bya rab tu gsal ba s sources were: the Abhidharmako sa, the Smr ana, the Praj n ap aramit a-s urya-garbha and the . tyupasth Praj n apti sa stra. However, it has not been answered yet which of the three texts called Praj n apti s astra presumably is meant: the Lokapraj napti, the Karmapraj napti, 14 or the K aran apraj n apti . .
S.Dietz, Cosmogony as Presented in Tibetan Historical Literature and its Sources, Tibetan Studies, Proceedings of the 5th Seminar of the International Association of Tibetan Studies, Narita 1989, Narita 1992, pp. 435-438. 12 D.Dagvador z, Mongolyn shashin surtahuuny tailbar tol, Ulaanbaatar, 1995. 13 The edition of the Medegdeg un-i belgetey-e geyig ul ug ci by V.L. Uspensky will be published soon by the Russian Academy of Sciences, Sankt Petersburg Branch. V.L. Uspensky has already examined Medegdeg un-i belgetey-e geyig ul ug ci , nding two passages which are at variance with Phags pas treatise, namely 1. the genealogy of the legendary Indian kings, and 2. the exposition of the fty one mental functions Uspensky, Introduction to his edition of Medegdeg un-i belgetey-e geyig ul ug ci . I am very thankful to Mr. Uspensky for making the manuscript of his study available to me. 14 The Shes bya rab tu gsal ba , 35r2: dran pa n er gzhag n i mai s ning po gdags pai bstan
11

A. Bareja-Starzy nska The Essentials of Buddhism. . .

In contrast to the well studied by scholars second part of the Ciqula keregleg ci , its rst and third chapters did not receive the right attention. Both these parts are not based on the Shes bya rab tu gsal ba . A brief summary of the contents of the rst part was given by W. Heissig (Heissig p. 29-30, Teil I-III) and by Sh. Bira (Bira p. 191-194). Even less was written about the third part of the Ciqula keregleg ci , the subject of the present paper. Scholars limited themselves to observe that it contains a list of Buddhist terms.15 However, given the importance of the Ciqula keregleg ci for the Mongols, it is interesting to investigate which Buddhist concepts, besides cosmological, it contains, and how they are presented. The last part of the Ciqula keregleg ci is introduced with the actual title of the text: ciqula keregleg ci teg us udqasi eyin u g ules ugei Let us say in this way: What Is Important To Be Used.16 Here it should be understood as: What is important to be used by a Buddhist. No sources have been mentioned throughout the whole chapter.17 It contains many notions found in the Shes bya rab tu gsal ba , as well as in the Abhidharmako sa, but in a completely dierent sequence. The chapter follows the Abhidharmic system of questions and answers, which are, however, very short, usually reduced to a mere listing of items. In contrast to the Abhidharma treatises the main terms from tantra teachings are explained as well. On the whole, the idea of arrangement of entries in this chapter is not fully clear, although there is a certain connection between the topics which appear one after another. The chapter starts with the dierentiation between a Buddhist and a nonBuddhist, continues with a list of ve paths, ten stages of the Bodhisattva, four bodies of Buddha, ve thoughts of Enlightenment, further it contains explanation about tantra, enumeration of the spheres of the universe, explanation about four individuals, list of seven subjects of the Yog ac aras, explanation about dierences between the Mah ay ana and H nay ana followers, about the six peaceful paths (?), the twelve links of dependent origination, the seven qualities of higher rebirth,
bcos zhes bya dang // chos mngon mdzod. I am indebted to Per S orensen for calling my attention to this passage (note dierent interpretation in Hoog, p. 82). I would like to thank Rev. Loden Sherab Dagyab Rinpoche for his kind assistance in the identication of the titles. 15 Bira, p. 197; Heissig p. 32, with a note 1, saying, that this chapter was translated from the Chinese version (of the Shes bya rab tu gsal ba ) by Bagchi. However, although the Chinese version is close to the Tibetan, it has no correspondence to the third part of the Ciqula keregleg ci , as it has been also pointed out in the previous article Bareja 1992, because this part of the Ciqula keregleg ci was not based on the Shes bya rab tu gsal ba . A brief comparison between the third part of the Ciqula keregleg ci and the Shes bya rab tu gsal ba was presented in Bareja 1992. 16 Heissig, facsimile, p. 71, f. 42v13. 17 In the light of the existence of the Cuxula keregt u, which can be regarded as a translation of a longer version of the same Tibetan original as the Ciqula keregleg ci , the last chapter of the Ciqula keregleg ci should be compared to the relevant part of the Cuxula keregt u. This task, however, has not been undertaken for the present paper.

Aspects of Buddhism

the eight inopportunate births, the eight conditions of the world and several other Buddhist notions. The chapter, which occupies about 11 folios, presents serious diculties in interpreting due to its compact character and to its specic vocabulary. The method which has been employed in my study of this chapter is to identify Mongolian terms with their Tibetan equivalents, and wherever possible with the Sanskrit terms. The Tibetan language was assumed as the language of the original text, which was translated into Mongolian. One particular feature of the translation is its regular confusion of srid pa existence and sred pa desire.18 The Sanskrit terms were traced in order to compare them with the Mongolian terms. It is well known, that during the rst propagation of Buddhism, the Mongols used Uighur language as a means for translations. Thanks to that, many early Mongolian Bud dhist terms resemble Sanskrit forms, via Uighur. However, in the Ciqula keregleg ci it seems that only some well known Buddhist terms from the time of the rst propagation have been used.19 Most of the Buddhist notions from the Ciqula keregleg ci can be traced in the Buddhist terminological dictionaries, like the Mah avyutpatti, Merged arqu-yin oron, and Sumatiratnas dictionary, but not all of them. The Ciqula keregleg ci belongs to the very beginning period of the second propagation of Buddhism in Mongolia. The Mongolian version of the Mah avyutpatti, as well as the bilingual Tibeto-Mongolian dictionary Merged arqu-yin oron appeared only in the eigh teenth century.20 Sireget u g uu si cor is translations of Tibetan Buddhist terms might have been based on the early Mongolian Buddhist translations, or/and in vented by himself. A number of terms used by Sireget u g uu si cor i are not found in the dictionaries, as they vary from the later standard versions.21 It should be pointed out that not much research has been done on the subject of the Mongolian Buddhist terminology. For example there existed several editions of the Mongolian Mah avyutpatti itself. From Ishihama and Fukudas edition of the Mongolian Mah avyutpatti as well as from A. S ark ozis translation and study of this dictionary one can learn about variant readings from dierent versions. It is interesting to
18 For example: in the list of the Four Delements (f. 49r2), the second should be the Delement of Existence [AbhK I, 274-5], Tib. srid pai zag pa, Sanskrit bhav asrava, however, in Mongolian there is quri caqu-yin cuburil meaning the Delement of Desire. The same occurs again while listing of the Four Yokes (f. 49r7) quri caqu-yin barildu ulu ci, and of the Four Floods (f. 49r13 ) quri caqui m oren. 19 For example names like: viro cana = Vairocana, v cir saduba Vajrasattva, aksobi = Aks obhya, amokasidi = Amoghasiddhi, ratn-a sambab-a = Ratnasambhava, visnu-a = . Vis svara; terms like: siravang = Skt. sr avaka, bratikabud = Skt. .n . u, makesvari = Mahe pratyekabuddha, baramid = Skt. p aramit a, yoga = Skt. yoga, budgali = Skt. pudgala. 20 rko zi, p. vi-vii; D. Seyford Ruegg, On Translating the Buddhist Canon..., Sa Studies in Indo-Asian Art and Culture, Vol. 3, 1973, p. 243. 21 For example: in the Ck., (f. 49r24) one of the Four Nutriments, duran-dur sedkik ui-yin idegen, is in the Mvy 2286 (dac Tib. S.), St. Petersburgs version: sedkil-d ur rko zi p. 177, Ishisana san-u idegen; Tanjur version: sedkil-d ur sanaqui-yin idegen; Sa hama/Fukuda, p. 121.

A. Bareja-Starzy nska The Essentials of Buddhism. . .

observe, that terms from the Ciqula keregleg ci usually seem to be closer to the Mah avyutpatti version preserved in St. Petersburg, than to the Tanjur version.22 Several terms from the last chapter of the Ciqula keregleg ci have not been identied with their Tibetan equivalents, e.g.: the classication of the Path of Vision, the Four org uls, the Six Peaceful Paths amurling ui ir u an m or, the Three Knowledges urban medek ui, the Six onol-un nom, burqan-u k usek u oron medek u, list of k und u, the Eight Brightnesses gegen. At some places the identications are not conrmed by dictionaries, for example: the Omniscence, Mongolian qamu belge bilig, with the Tibetan thams cad mkhyen pai ye shes; the Wisdom of Quality yambar-i k u medeg ci belge bilig with the Tibetan ji ltar ba mkhyen pa etc. (All doubtful meanings and identications are indicated in Appendix by a question mark).

Abbreviations and Bibliography

AbhK Bareja 1991 Abhidharmako sa (Vasubandhu) A. Bareja, A Note on the Chapter on Tibetan His tory in Ciqula keregleg ci, Tibetan History and Language. Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde, Wien, 1991. A. Bareja, A Preliminary Note on Ciqula keregleg ci A Mongolian Treatise on Buddhism, Altaic Religious Beliefs and Practices. Proceedings of the 33rd Meeting of Permanent International Altaistic Conference in Budapest. 1990, Budapest, 1992. Sh. Bira, Mongolskaja istoriograja XIII-XVII vv. Moskva, 1978. Dr. Sukomal Chaudhuri, Analytical Study of the Abhidharmako a. Calcutta Sanskrit College Research Series No. CXIV, Calcutta, 1976. Chandra Das, Tibetan-English Dictionary. Calcutta, 1902, Reprint 1985. Dharmasamgraha. A Dictionary of Buddhist Technical ller Terms, ed. by Kenjiu Kasawara, F. Max Mu (1885). Delhi, 1984. W. Heissig, Die Familien-und Kirchengeschitsschreibung. Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, 1959.

Bareja 1992

Bira Chaudhuri

Das DH

Heissig
22

For example: The World of Form (f. 47r ) o ngget u yirt un cu , Mvy 3073 St. Peters rko zi p. 227, burg version: ongge-yin oron Tanjur version: d urs u-t u-yin oron in: Sa Ishihama/Fukuda p. 157 (similarly the next term, the World of Formlessness Mvy 3074). More detailed study of this subject is presented in my Ph.D. dissertation under preparation.

8 Hoog Ishihama/ Fukuda

Aspects of Buddhism C. Hoog, Prince Jin-gims Textbook of Tibetan Buddhism. Leiden, 1983. Y. Ishihama and Y. Fukuda, A New Critical Edition of the Mah avyutpatti. Sanskrit-Tibetan-Mongolian Dictionary of Buddhist Terminology, Materials for Tibetan-Mongolian Dictionaries. Vol. 1, The Toyo Bunko, 1989. schke, A Tibetan-English Dictionary. LonH.A. Ja don, 1881, Compact edition, Rinsen Book Company, Kyoto. Merged arqui-yin oron / Dag yig mkhas pai byung gnas. Mong ol tul ur bi cig- un cuburil, Mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1988. Mah avyutpatti, ed. by R. Sakaki. Kyoto, 1916-1925. D. Seyfort Ruegg La Th eorie du Tath agata garbha et du Gotra. Etudes sur la Sot eriologie et la Gnos eologie du Bouddhisme, Ecole Fran caise dExtr eme-Orient LXX, Paris, 1969. Sumatiratna, Bod hor gyi brda yig ming chig don gsum gsal bar byed pai mun sel sgron me. 2 vols, Ulaanbaatar, 1959 (Corpus Scriporum Mongolorum, 6, 7). A Buddhist Terminological Dictionary. The Mongolian rko zi in collab. with J. Mah avyutpatti, ed. by A. Sa Szerb. Harrassowitz Verlag, Wiesbaden, 1995. The Jewel Ornament of Liberation by sGam.po.pa. Translated and annotated by Herbert V. Guenther. Boston and London, 1986. Tsepak Rigzin, Tibetan-English Dictionary of Buddhist Terminology. (Revised and Enlarged Edition), Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, Dharamsala, 1993. [Tibetan-Tibetan-Chinese Dictionary.] Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo, / Zang-han da ci-dian, 3 vols., ed. Krang dByi sun / Zhang Yi-sun, Beijing, 1985.

schke Ja

Merged

Mvy Ruegg

Su

rko zi Sa

The Jewel

Ts

T-T-Ch

A. Bareja-Starzy nska The Essentials of Buddhism. . .

Appendix 1 Sources of the Ciqula keregleg ci Mah ay anottaratantra s astra Abhidharmako sa ? Bhadrakalpik a-n ama-mah ay ana-s utra a un silig-t u sudur-un ayima ? Ku salam ulaparidhara-n ama-mah ay ana-s utra Mah aparinirv an ama-mah ay ana-s utra . a-n Suvarn asottama-s utrendrar aja-n ama-mah ay ana-s utra . aprabh As tas ahasrik a-praj n ap aramit a S aratam a .. S utr alamk ara Samdhinirmocana-s utra Yog ac arabh umi-nirn . ayasamgraha Vy akhy ayukti ? Shes bya rab tu gsal ba Lokapraj napti Mah aratnak u. ta other sources ? * Tibetan Compilation Ciqula keregleg ci Oirat Cuxula keregt u

10

Aspects of Buddhism

Appendix 2 Contents of the Ciqula keregleg ci

Prayers [f. 1v1-18] I. About the Buddha and His Teaching [f. 1v19-8v22] akyamuni [f. 1v19-2r16] 1. The Twelve Deeds of the Buddha S according to the Uttaratantra 2. The Buddhas Birth on Earth as Sarv artha [f. 2r16-2v3] 3. The Explanation of the Bodhisattva and the Buddha [f. 2v3-12] according to the sang-un sudur (Abhidharmako sa?) 4. The First Sermon and the Three Turnings of the Wheel of the Law [f. 2v12-25] 5. The Buddhas Life Time [f. 2v26-3v5] according to the Bhadrakalpik a [f. 3r1-2] according to the a un silig-t u sudur-un ayima (?) [f. 3r3-9] according to the Ku salam ulaparidhara [f. 3r14-3v5] an 6. The Date of the Buddhas entering into nirv . a [f. 3v5-15] according to the Mah aparinirv an a [f. 3v5-8] . akya according to S sr (bhadra) [f. 3v9-15] 7. Explanation of which of the Buddhas bodies entered into nirv an .a [f. 3v15-24] according to the Suvarn asottama [f. 3v18-24] . aprabh 8. Explanation of four Indian (Magadha) languages and the rst phrase with prayers to the Buddha as not being His Teachings [f. 4r1-11] 9. Explanation of the Three Turnings of Wheel of the Law as for the H nay ana, Mah ay ana and Mantray ana followers [f. 4r12-22] 10. The First Buddhist Council [f. 4v1-6] 11. The Second (Middle) Buddhist Council [f. 4v6-12] 12. The Third (Last) Buddhist Council [f. 4v12-18] 13. The Four Basic Schools and the Eighteen Schools derived from them [f. 4v18-20] e (Prasenajit?) [f. 4v20-6v5] 14. Eighteen Dreams of the King Beresen 15. The Three Ways in which the Buddha transmitted the Teaching [f. 6v6-7r16]

A. Bareja-Starzy nska The Essentials of Buddhism. . .

11

16. Explanation for whom which of the Buddhas Teachings are appriopriate [f. 7r17-7v10] 17. The Twelve Divisions of the Buddhas Teaching [f. 7v10-17] according to the Naiman ming an sil ug-t u-yin tayilburi (the commentary of the As tas ahasrik a-praj n ap aramit a .. S aratam a?) 18. Explanation of the Three Baskets (tripit . aka) [f. 7v17-8r2] 19. Explanation of the Great Vehicle (mah ay ana) [f. 8r2-23] according to the Ayima sudur-un cimeg (S utr alamk ara?) 20. Explanation of the Word [f. 8r23-8v1] according to the Ta alal-i tayilu san sastri (Samdhinirmocana-s utra?) 21. Nine s astras [f. 8v1-15] according to the a ar-un ayima sudur (Yog ac arabh umi-nirn . ayasamgraha?) 22. Explanation of what is regarded to be the Buddhas Word [f. 8v15-22] according to the Uqa an-u sastar-un tayilburi (Vy akhy ayukti?) II. The Worlds Origin and Destruction [f. 8v23-42v12] based on the sang-un sudur i. e. ko sa (Abhidharmako sa?), (actually based on the Shes bya rab tu gsal ba [f. 10r3-42v12]); it includes: 1. Description of the Outer (Inanimate) World [f. 8v23-10r3] 2. Origin of the Outer (Inanimate) World [f. 10r3-19v3] 3. The Inner (Animate) World [f. 19v3-42r10] with a passage based on the Lokapraj napti [f. 12v12-24] and a passage based on the Dabqurla erdeni sudur (Mah aratnak u. ta) [f. 30v12-32v20] The chapter on Inner (Animate) World includes: Indian Royal Genealogy [f. 37v24-39r2] History of Tibet [f. 39r3-39v21] History of Mongolia [f. 40r1-41r10] The Fate of Sentient Beings [f. 41r10-42r10]

4. The Outer (Inanimate) Worlds Destruction [f. 42r10-42v13] III. What Is Important To Be Used (a chapter from the Ciqula keregleg ci containing the Essentials of Buddhist Doctrine in a form of a glossary of Buddhist terms) [f. 42v13-54r7] The Colophon [f. 54r24-55r20]

12

Aspects of Buddhism

Appendix 3 Topical outline of the 3rd chapter of the Ciqula keregleg ci, Essentials of the Buddhism P .42v13-54r17.
Sigla: P = UP = M. = * (?) [?] (m.)

Paris ms. Univ. Petersb. ms. Mongolian T. =

Pe V

= =

Peking ms. Vilno ms. S. = Sanskrit

Tibetan

indicates that a term constitutes a part of another term indicates doubts in translation and identication indicates that the identication has not been conrmed indicates the number of a term in the Mongolian version of the Mah avyutpatti edited by Ishihama/Fukuda

I. A dierence between a Buddhist and a non-Buddhist [P 42v14-43r3] M. doto adu nom-tan, T. nang pa (J aschke p. 302a), Mvy *1512 (m. 1515) M. ada adu nom-tan, T. phyi pa (J aschke p. 302a), Mvy *1512 (m. 1515) II. The Five Paths [43r4-43v8] M. m or, T. lam, S. m arga Mvy 1202 (m. 1206) 1. The Path of Accumulation M. ci ulqu-yin m or, T. tshogs lam, S. sambh aram arga 2. The Path of Preparation M. barildu ulqu-yin m or, T. sbyor lam, S. prayogam arga 3. The Path of Vision M. u ek u-yin m or, T. mthong bai lam, S. dar sanam arga Mvy *1310 (m. 1314) 4. The Path of Meditation M. bisil al-un m or, T. sgom pai lam, S. bh avan am arga Mvy *1315 (m. 1319) 5. The Path of No More Training M. u l u surqu-yin m or, T. mi slob pai lam, S. a saiks arga Mvy *1320 (m. 1324) . am 6. The Distinction between the Paths: of the Disciples M. siravang, T. n an thos pa, S. sr avaka Mvy *186 (m. 184) of the Pratyekabuddhas M. bratikabud, T. rang sangs rgyas, S. pratyekabuddha Mvy *186 (m. 184)

A. Bareja-Starzy nska The Essentials of Buddhism. . .

13

of the Mah ay ana [followers] M. yeke k olgen, T. theg pa chen po, S. mah ay ana Mvy 1250 (m. 1254) 7. The classication of the Path of Accumulation: M. ci ulqu-yin m or, T. tshogs lam, S. sambh aram arga The Limited Path of Accumulation M. o cu ken ci ulqu m or The Average Path of Accumulation M. dumda-du ci ulqu m or The Great Path of Accumulation M. yeke ci ulqu m or 8. The classication of the Path of Preparation into ve (but only four items are listed) M. barildu ulqu-yin m or, T. sbyor lam, S. prayogam arga in Mvy 1211 (m. 1215), BHSD 305 the rst item is: T. nges par byed pai cha dang mthun pa, S. nirvedhabh ag ya, here missing The Path of Preparation of Heat M. baridu ulqu-yin dula an m or, T. dro bar gyur ba, S. us . magata Mvy 1212 (m. 1216) The Path of Preparation of Peak M. baridu ulqu-yin u u g ur m or, T. rtse mo, S. m urdhan Mvy 1213 (m. 1217) The Path of Preparation of Patience M. baridu ulqu-yin k uli cengg ui m or, T. bzod pa, S. ks anti Mvy 1214 (m. 1218) . the Path of Preparation of Supreme [Wordly] Dharmas M. baridu ulqu-yin deged u nom-un m or, T. [jig rten pai] chos kyi mchog, S. laukik agradharma Mvy 1215 (m. 1219) 9. The classication of the Path of Preparation into twelve: M. barildu ulqu-yin m or, T. sbyor lam, S. prayogam arga The Limited Heat M. o cu ken dula an The Average Heat M. dumda-du dula an [missing in UP 42v6] The Great Heat M. yeke dula an [missing in UP 42v6] The Limited Peak M. o cu ken u u g ur The Average Peak M. dumda-du u u g ur The Great Peak M. yeke u u g ur The Limited Patience M. o cu ken k uli cengg ui The Average Patience M. dumda-du k uli cengg ui The Great Patience M. yeke k uli cengg ui The Limited Supreme [Wordly] Dharmas M. o cu ken deged u nom The Average Supreme [Wordly] Dharmas M. dumda-du deged u nom [correctly in Pe 52v8-9, V 126,2, but in P 43r20 and UP 42v8: du deged u nom] The Great Supreme [Wordly] Dharmas M. yeke deged u nom

10. The classication of the Path of Vision: M. u ek u-yin m or, T. mthong bai lam, S. dar sanam arga

14 M. M. M. M. t uidker u gei u ek u-yin m or (?) tegsi a ulqui u ek u-yin m or (?) da an olu san u ek u-yin m or (?) masi aldarsi san u ek u-yin m or (?)

Aspects of Buddhism

11. The Five Paths of the Great Vehicle: M. yeke k olgen, T. theg pa chen po, S. mah ay ana The Path of Accumulation M. ci ulqu-yin m or, T. tshogs lam, S. sambh aram arga The Path of Preparation M. barildu ulqu-yin m or, T. sbyor lam, S. prayogam arga The Path of Supreme Bodhisattva (?) M. erkin bodisung-nar-un m or The Path of Vision of Great Vehicle M. yeke k olgen- u u ek u-yin m or, T. mthong bai lam, S. dar sanam arga The Very First Joyous Stage M. eng terig un bayasqulang-tu a ar , T. rab tu dga ba, S. pram udita Mvy 886 (m. 888) 12. The Path of Meditation of the Great Vehicle - the stages from the second up to the tenth M. yeke k olgen- u bisil al-un m or, T. sgom pai lam, S. bh avan am arga l u surqu-yin 13. The Path of No More Training - the eleventh stage M. u m or, T. mi slob pai lam, S. a saiks am a rga . III. The Ten Stages of the Bodhisattva [P 43v11-18] M. bodisung nar-un arban a ar, T. sa bcu, S. da sa bh umi Mvy 885-895 (m. 887-897), BHSD 411a 1. The Twelve Sets of a Hundred Qualities to be obtained at the First Stage M. arban qoyar a un to -a tan erdem- ud, T. yon tan brgya phrag bcu g nis, S. dv ada sa satagun a . 2. The Perfections M. baramid , T. pha rol tu, S. p aramit a Mvy 913-923 (m. 915-925) which are considered to be important at the stages: The First the Perfection of Giving M. olangki oglige baramid, T. sbyin pai pha rol tu phyin pa, S. d anap aramit a The Second the Perfection of Morality M. si sabad baramid, T. tshul khrims kyi pha rol tu phyin pa, S. s lap aramit a The Third the Perfection of Patience M. k uli cengg ui baramid, T. bzod pai pha rol tu phyin pa, S. ks antip aramit a . The Fourth the Perfection of Vigour M. k u ciyengg ui baramid, T. brtson grus kyi pha rol tu phyin pa, S. v ryap aramit a The Fifth the Perfection of Meditation M. diyan baramid, T. bsam gtan gyi pha rol tu phyin pa, S. dhy anap aramit a The Sixth the Perfection of Wisdom M. bilig baramid, T. shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa, praj n ap aramit a

A. Bareja-Starzy nska The Essentials of Buddhism. . .

15

The Seventh the Perfection of Methods M. ar as-un baramid, T. thabs kyi pha rol tu phyin pa, S. up ayap aramit a The Eight the Perfection of Dedication M. ir uger- un baramid, T. smon lam gyi pha rol tu phyin pa, S. pran idh a nap a ramit a . The Ninth the Perfection of Power M. k u cu n- u baramid, T. stobs kyi pha rol tu phyin pa, S. balap aramit a The Tenth the Perfection of Knowledge M. olangki belge bilig- un baramid, T. ye ses kyi pha rol tu phyin pa, S. j n anap aramit a 3. Explanation of the Purity of the Three Circles according to the Act of Giving M. o u ata arilu san oglige, = T. khor gsum yongs su dag pa, S. triman suddham Mvy 2537 (m. 2545), BHSD 258a .d . ala-pari 4. Explanation of the Accumulation M. ci ul an, T. tshogs, S. sambh ara Mvy *830 (m. 832) 5. Explanation of the connection between the Accumulation and the Body M. bey-e, T. sku, S. k aya [Limited Path of Accumulation accumulation of merits] IV. The Four Bodies of a Buddha (BHSD 277): on cinar-un bey-e, T. ngo bo n id sku, S. svabh a The Truth Body M. m vak aya The Body of Dharma M. nom-un bey-e, T. chos kyi sku, S. dharmak aya Mvy 116 (m. 114) us ir alang-un bey-e, The Complete Enjoyment Body M. teg T. longs spyod rdzogs pai sku, S. sambhogak aya Mvy 117 (m. 115) The Emanation Body M. qubil an-u bey-e, T. sprul pai sku, S. nirman aya Mvy 118 (m. 116) . ak 1. Explanation of the Truth Body and the Body of Dharma as not to be seen and apprehended 2. Explanation of the Complete Enjoyment Body as accomplished by the Five Certainties M. tabun ma ad, T. nges pa lnga, S. [?] [Ts 66]: The The The The The Certainty Certainty Certainty Certainty Certainty of of of of of the the the the the Body M. ma ad bey-e , T. sku nges pa Disciples M. ma ad n ok or, T. khor nges pa Teaching M. ma ad nom, T. chos nges pa Time M. ma ad ca , T. dus nges pa Place M. ma ad oron, T. gnas nges pa

3. Explanations of each Certainty: of the Body to be adorned with 32 Marks (S. laks . an . a) and 80 Minor Characteristics (S. anuvya njana) of the Disciples to be surrounded by the Disciples of Supreme Bodhisattva of the Great Vehicle

16

Aspects of Buddhism of the Teaching to be taught the doctrines of the Great Vehicle of the Time to live until samsara will become Empty of the Place to live in Akanis t ha .. 4. Explanation of the Emanation Body M. qubil an-u bey-e, T. sprul pai sku, S. nirman aya Mvy 118 (m. 116) . ak 5. The dierences between the two Bodies, the Body of Dharma M. nomun bey-e, T. chos kyi sku, S. dharmak aya Mvy 116 (m. 114) and the Form Body M. ongge-t u bey-e, T. gzugs sku, S. r upak aya BHSD 456 n ana relying on the two Bodies [Ts 29: two kinds 6. The two Wisdoms j of knowledge]: The Wisdom of Quality (?) M. yambar-i k u medeg ci belge bilig [Ts 29 T. ji ltar ba mkhyen pa, S. yath avajj n ana, knowledge of all conventional phenomena] ui b uk ui medeg ci belge bilig The Wisdom of Quantity (?) M. ted [Ts 29 T. ji s nid pa mkhyen pa, S. y avajj n ana, knowledge of all ultimate phenomena] 7. The division of the Wisdoms into four: [usually ve wisdoms are counted, however Merged 905-906 gives 4 bodies and 4 wisdoms, according to T-T-Ch 2594-5 also 4, with an explanation, that these four come out from ve by excluding chos dbyings ye shes which covers all; in Mvy 110 (m. 109) S. dharmadh atuvi suddhi, T. chos kyi dbyings rnam par dag pa; BHSD 278b] The Mirror Like Wisdom M. toli met u belge bilig, T. me long lta bui ye shes, S. adar saj n ana Mvy 111 (m. 110) nam pa n id kyi The Wisdom of Equality M. tegsi belge bilig, T. m ye shes, S. samat aj n ana Mvy 112 (m. 111) The Wisdom through Reection M. ober-e ober-e onoqui belge bilig, T. so sor rtog pai ye shes, S pratyaveks n ana Mvy 113 (m. 112), . an . aj BHSD 376 The Wisdom of the Carrying out of Duty M. u ile-yi b ut ugeg ci belge bilig [P 45r8 bilig is missing, V 133, 3-4 belge bilig is missing, correctly in UP 44v9, Pe 55r18], T. bya ba nan tan du grub pai ye shes, S. kr th anaj n ana Mvy 114 (m. 113), BHSD 191a . tyanus .. (the fth wisdom here is missing; according to BHSD 278 b: [?] T. chos kyi dbyings rnam par dag pa, S. dharmadh atuvi suddhi, Mvy 110 (m. 109) ) 8. Explanation of the connection between the Wisdoms and the Bodies [?] [Merged 905-906 connects 4 bodies with 4 wisdoms, listing 4 bodies: M. m on cinar, T. bzhin ngo bo n id, M. teyin bolbasural, T. rnam par snim pa, M. teg us ir alang, T. longs spyod rdzogs pa, M. qubil an bey-e, T. sprul pai sku and 4 wisdoms afterwards]

A. Bareja-Starzy nska The Essentials of Buddhism. . .

17

The Mirror Like Wisdom M. toli met u belge bilig, T. me long lta bui ye shes, S. adar saj n ana Mvy 111 (m. 110) is the Body of Dharma M. nom-un bey-e, T. chos kyi sku, S. dharmak aya Mvy 116 (m. 114) nam pa n id kyi ye The Wisdom of Equality M. tegsi belge bilig, T. m shes, S. samat aj n ana Mvy 112 (m. 111) and the Wisdom through Reection M. ober-e ober-e onoqui belge bilig, T. so sor rtog pai ye shes, S. pratyaveks an n ana Mvy 113 (m. 112), BHSD 376 are the . . aj Complete Enjoyment Body M. teg us ir alang-un bey-e, T. longs spyod rdzogs pai sku, S.sambhogak aya Mvy 117 (m. 115) The Wisdom of the Carrying out of Duty M. u ile-yi b ut ugeg ci belge bilig, T. bya ba nan tan du grub pai ye shes, S. kr th anaj n ana . tyanus .. Mvy 114 (m. 113), BHSD 191 is the Emanation Body M. qubil an-u bey-e, T. sprul pai sku, S. nirman aya Mvy 118 (m. 116) . ak The Omniscense M. qamu belge bilig [?] T. thams cad mkhyen pai ye shes [T-T-Ch 1151-52 thams cad mkhyen pa 4 wisdoms and 3 bodies] and the Body of All Buddhas M. qamu burqad-un beye (?) is the Body of Dharma M. nom-un bey-e, T. chos kyi sku, S. dharmak aya Mvy 116 (m. 114) 9. Explanation that the Secret Spell tradition M. ni u ca tarni, T. gsang sngags, S. mantra Mvy 4237 (m. 4222) teaches about the Five Wisdoms V. The Five Thoughts of Enlightenment M. ile bodi cid, T. byang chub kyi sems, S. bodhicitta Mvy *2351 (m. 2362), BHSD 402a [P 45r17-45v7]: created from the Emptiness M. qo usun k u a ar created from the Earth M. debisker arli u s ug- un k or ongge created from the Capital of Speech and Writing created from the Signs of Gestures of Thought M. sedkil- un mutur-un belges created from the Complete Perfection of the Body M. bey-e-yi o u ata teg us ugsen [P 45r21 teg us gek ui, correctly Pe 55v17] 1. The Three Forms M. d urs u, T. gzugs, S. r upa by which the Buddha is established: The Speech and Writing M. arli u s ug un mutur-un belges The Signs of Gestures of Thought M. sedkil- The Complete Perfection of the Body M. bey-e-yi o u ata teg us ugsen 2. The Six Fruits which are stimulating the Buddhas [State]: The fruit of Vairocana M. viro can-a, T. rnam par snang mdzod The fruit of Vajrasattva M. v cir sadub-a, T. rdo rje sems dpa The fruit of Aks obhya M. aksobi , T. mi khrugs pa .

18

Aspects of Buddhism The fruit of Amit abha M. abidu, T. od dpag med The fruit of Amoghasiddhi M. amokasidi, T. don yod grub pa The fruit of Ratnasambhava M. ratn-a sambab-a, T. rin chen byung gnas

VI. Explanation of Tantra [45v8-47r7]: The kr ya tantra M. u iles- un u nd us un, T. bya rgyud The c arya tantra M. yabudal-un u nd us un, T. spyod rgyud The yoga tantra M. yoga-yin u nd us un, T. rnal byor rgyud The anuttarayoga tantra M. tengsel u gei u nd us un, T. rnal byor bla med rgyud 1. The preachers [M. nomla ci] of Tantra: The Buddha S akyamuni transmitted the kr ya tantra and majority of the c arya tantra The Buddha Vairocana the yoga tantra The Cakrasamvara (M. manadal-un erkin T. bde mchog) [?] the anuttarayoga tantra (M. degere u gei ni u ca-yin u nd us un [note that previously the anuttarayoga tantra was rendered in Mongolian as tengsel u gei u nd us un]) The Father and Mother Vajradhara M. v cir-a dara e cige eke the Vajra [?] cakrasamvara M. v cir-a cakr-a sambar-a; Guhyasam aja M. ni u ca quriyang ui, T. gsang dus; K alacakra M. ca -un k urd un, T. dus kyi khor lo and others 2. The division into four tantras: preached in the World of Desire M. amarma -un yirtin cu , T. dod pai khams, S. k amadh atu [Mvy 3072 (m. 3069)] like the Rule of Four Attachements M. ta ciyang ui, T. chags pa, S. r aga preached for four disciples, stupid or bright M. bida u qur ca oyutan, T. [?] dbang po rtul ba; dbang po shin tu rno ba, S. [?] mr . dvindriya, tiks . nendriya preached for people of four origins M. d orben i a ur-tu k um un (S. varn . a) preached for four people, followers of the Heretics M. ters nom tan-dur da an olu si 3. The four tantras preached similarly to the Attachement of Desire: M. amarma -un ta ciyang ui The kr ya tantra to satisfy the Attachement of Seeing back and forth (M. cina si ina si u eged ta ciyang ui, T. bltas pai dod chags [?] Ts 144) of the gods of Paranirmitava savartin [class] M. busud-un qubil an-u erke-ber u iled ug ci, T. gzhan phrul dbang byed Mvy 3083 (m. 3080), BHSD 319

A. Bareja-Starzy nska The Essentials of Buddhism. . .

19

The c arya tantra to satisfy the Attachement of Laughing back and forth (M. cina si ina si inigeged sa ca ta ciyang ui, T. rgod pai dod chags [?] Ts 144) of the gods of Nirm an arati [class] M. qubil an-dur . bayasu ci, T. phrul dga Mvy 3082 (m. 3079), BHSD 302 The yoga tantra to satisfy the Attachement of Touching each other (M. ar ar-iyan baril ca ad sa ca ta ciyang ui, T. [?] lag pa bcangs pai dod chags Ts 144) of the gods of Tus us . ita [class] M. teg bayasqulang-tu, T. dga ldan Mvy 3081 (m. 3078), BHSD 255 The anuttarayoga tantra to satisfy the Attachement of Embracing each other (M. doro si qoyar b uri eb u celd un qamtudqa san-iyar ta ciyang ui, T. [?] g nis g nis khyud pai dod chags Ts 144) of the gods of Tr ay astrim sa [class] M. u cin urban, T. sum cu rtsa gsum pa Mvy 3079 (m. 3076), BHSD 257 4. The four tantras preached to convert stupid and bright disciples: for stupid and lower class students the kr ya tantra M. u iles- un u nd us un, T. bya rgyud for better students the c arya tantra M. yabudal-un u nd us un, T. spyod rgyud for students better from them the yoga tantra M. yoga-yin u nd us un, T. rnal byor rgyud for even better students the anuttarayoga tantra is preached M. tengsel u gei u nd us un, T. rnal byor bla med rgyud 5. The four tantras for the people of four origins M. d orben i a ur-tu k um un, who are called [Merged 515-516 lists 6]: the thinkers (M. sedkig ci) (?) [Merged 515 M. u k uk ui-e sedkig ci nom tan, T. chi bar sems pai chos tan, ] who come to the end by ascetism M. qata u il berke yabudal the wishers (M. k useg cid) (?), who end by falling down M. qalturma iyar (?) [Merged 515 M. ba uraqu nom tan, T. n ams pai chos tan] for people of brahmin origin M. baraman i a ur-tu k um un the kr ya tantra M. u iles- un u nd us un, T. bya rgyud for people of princely origin M. noyali i a ur-tu k um un the c arya tantra M. yabudal-un u nd us un, T. spyod rgyud for people of royal origin M. qan i a ur-tu k um un the yoga tantra M. yoga-yin u nd us un, T. rnal byor rgyud for people of common origin M. qara cus i a ur-tu the anuttarayoga tantra is preached M. tengsel u gei u nd us un, T. rnal byor bla med rgyud 6. The four tantras preached to convert the followers of the Heretics: M. ters nom -tan-u da a ci for the followers of Brahma M. esru-a-yi da a ci T. tshangs pa Mvy *3115 (m. 3112) the kr ya tantra M. u iles- un u nd us un, T. bya rgyud

20

Aspects of Buddhism for the followers of Vis ci, T. kyab jug .n . u M. visnu-a-yi da a Mvy 3130 (m. 3127) the c arya tantra M. yabudal-un u nd us un, T. spyod rgyud for the followers of Mahe svara M. makesvari-yi burqan kemen barimtala u n ok or, T. dbang phyug chen po Mvy 3118 (m. 3115) the anuttarayoga tantra M. tengsel u gei u nd us un, T. rnal byor bla med rgyud is preached to convert these three groups of followers the yoga tantra M. yogayin u nd us un, T. rnal byor rgyud is preached

VII. The Three Spheres of the World [P 47r7-48r22] M. urban yirtin cu , T. khams gsum, S. traidh atuka Mvy 3071 (m. 3068), BHSD 259b The World of Desire M. amarma -un yirtin cu , T. dod pai khams , S. k amadh atu Mvy 3072 (m. 3069), BHSD 177a The World of Form M. ongget u yirtin cu , T. gzugs kyi khams, S. r upadh atu Mvy 3073 (m. 3070), BHSD 456b ongge u gei yirtin cu , T. gzugs med pai The World of Formlessness M. khams, S. ar upadh atu Mvy 3074 (m. 3071), BHSD 104a 1. The Twenty Places of Desire M. amarma -un oron [not yirtin cu ] [AbhK III, Chaudhuri 47-48] The Ten Places of Bad Fate M. ma ui aya an, T. ngan gro [Ts 66 ngan song gi gnas bcu, Mvy 4747 (m. 4748) S. ap aya], S. durgati Mvy 47476 (m. 4747) The Ten Places of Higher Rebirths M. deged u t or ol maybe: T. mtho ris Su I 960, or Su 127 skyes mchog. [One expects here S. sugati, T. bde gro Mvy 5372 (m. 5360) M. amur yabu ci. It seems that M. deged u t or ol is used instead of T. bde gro.] 2. The Ten Places of Bad Fate M. ma ui aya an, T. ngan gro, S. durgati Mvy 4746 (m. 4747) The Eight Hot Hells M. naiman qala un tamu, T. tsha bai dmyal Mvy *4919 (m. 4918) The Eight Cold Hells M. naiman k uiten tamu, T. grang bai dmyal Mvy *4928 (m. 4927) The Hungry Ghosts M. berid, T. yi dags, S. preta Mvy 4753 (m. 4754) The Animals M. ada usun, T. dud gro, S. tiryak Mvy *4752 (m. 4753) 3. The Ten Places of Higher Rebirths M. deged u t or ol [See note on VII, 1.] The Four Continents M. d orben dib, T. gling bzhi, S. *dv pa Mvy 3045 (m. 3042)

A. Bareja-Starzy nska The Essentials of Buddhism. . .

21

4. 5.

6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

The Six Places of Gods of Desire M. amarma un tengri ner- un ir u an oron, T. dod pai khams kyi lha, S. k am avac aradeva The Four Continents M. d orben dib, T. gling bzhi, S. *dv pa Mvy 3045 (m. 3042) The Six Places of the Gods of Desire M. amarma un tengri ner- un ir u an oron, T. dod pai khams kyi lha, S. k am avac aradeva Mvy 3075 (m. 3072), BHSD 177a The Three Stages of the rst dhy ana M. niged uger diyan-u oron, T. bsam gtan dang poi sa Mvy 3084-3088 (m. 3081-3085) The Three Stages of the second dhy ana M. qoyadu ar diyan-u oron, T. bsam gtan g nis pai sa Mvy 3089 (m. 3086) The Three Stages of the third dhy ana M. utu ar diyan-u oron, T. bsam gtan gsum pai sa Mvy 3093 (m. 3090) The Eight Stages of the Fourth dhy ana M. d ot uger diyan-u oron, T. bsam gtan bzhi pai sa Mvy 3097 (m. 3094) The Four Spheres of the World of Formlessness M. ongge u gei yirt un cu yin oron, T. gnas gtsang mai sa Mvy 3109 (m. 3106), BHSD 270b The Nine Levels of the Three Spheres of the World M. urban yirtin cu deki yis un a ar (?) The Level of Desire M. amarma -un a ar, T. [?] dod pai sa, S. [?] k amadh atu The Level of the rst dhy ana M. niged uger diyan-u a ar, T. bsam gtan dang poi sa [?] ana M. qoyadu ar diyan-u a ar, The Level of the second dhy T. bsam gtan g nis pai sa [?] The Level of the third dhy ana M. utu ar diyan-u a ar, T. bsam gtan gsum pai sa [?] The Level of the fourth dhy ana M. d ot uger diyan-u a ar, T. bsam gtan bzhi pai sa [?] (The rst sphere of the World of Formlessness) M. ki a alal u gei ao tar ui-yin a ar, T. nam mkha mtha yas s noms jug, S. Ak s ananty ayatana BHSD 101 (The second sphere of the World of Formlessness) M. ki a alal u gei o tar ui-yin a ar, T. rnam shes mtha yas s noms jug, S. Vij n an ananty ayatana BHSD 101 (The third sphere of the World of Formlessness) M. ya un ber u gei mcany yin a ar, T. ci yang med pai s noms jug, S. Aki ayatana BHSD 101 (The fourth sphere of the World of Formlessness) M. sansar-un u u g ur- un a ar ( = T. srid rtse = du shes med du shes med ming gyi s noms jug, S. Naivasamj n an asamj n ayatana BHSD 101, Bhav agra)

22

Aspects of Buddhism 12. The Eight Levels of the Lower Vehicle M. door-a-du k olge-yin naiman a ar, T. theg dman sa brgyad Ts 125a, [S. h nay ana] a ur-un a ar, T. rigs kyi sa, S. Gotrabh umi M. i M. naimadu ar a ar, T. brgyad pai sa, S. As tamakabh umi .. ca an-a u ek u-yin a ar, T. dkar po rnam par mthong bai M. masi sa, S. Suklavidar san abh umi M. nimgeregsen a ar, T. bsrabs pai sa, S. Tanubh umi M. ta ciyang ui-a ca anggi ira san a ar, T. dod chags dang bral bai sa, S. Vigatar agabh umi M. u iled ugsen-i u aqui-yin a ar, T. byas pa rtogs pai sa, S. Kr t a.. vibh umi The Level of the Disciple M. siravang-un a ar, T. [?] The Level of the Pratyekabuddha M. bradikabud-un a ar, T. [?]

VIII. The Four Persons pudgala: [P 48r23-49v1] The stream-enterer M. u rg ul ide oru san, T. rgyun-du zhugs pa, S. srota apanna Mvy 1009 (m. 1011) The once-returner M. nigen-te qarin ireg ci, T. lan cig phyir ong ba, S. sakr ag amin Mvy 1012 (m. 1014) . d l u ireg ci, T. phyir mi ong ba, S. an ag amin The non-returner M. qarin u Mvy 1014 (m. 1016) The Holy one M. dayin daru san, T. dgra bcom pa, S. arhat Mvy 4 (m. 5) 1. The Five Sins Without Interval Intermediation M. tabun absar u gei nig ul, T. mtshams med pa lnga, S. pa nc anantarya Mvy 2323 (m. 2333), The Jewel 89 having killed own mother having killed own father having killed the Arhat shedding the blood of the Tath agata body by many bad thoughts causing divisions among the priesthood

2. The Five which are Nearly Ones (like the above) M. tabun oyiradu san, T. n e bai mtshams med lnga, S. [?] Mvy 2329-2334 (m. 2339-2344) [with small dierences Ts 95a] having scared a nun (should be female arhat) by wrong passion having assassinated in anger (the expression in anger dose not appear in standard expositions) bodhisattvas who are surely to become Buddha

A. Bareja-Starzy nska The Essentials of Buddhism. . .

23

having assassinated srota apanna (in standard versions: the teacher T. slob-pa) having robbed property of the palace [here: M. qarsi means palace, however in the standard Tibetan expositions there is: congregation T. dge dun] having destroyed a stupa 3. The Four Evil Ones M. d orben simnus, T. bdud bzhi, S. [?] m ara BHSD 430b, DH LXXX The Evil One of the Lord of Death, M. u k ul- un e en- u simnus, [AbhK III, 69 S. Maran a-m a ra , T. chi bdag gi bdud ] . on mongs The Evil One of Delusion M. nisvanis-un simnus, T. n pai bdud, S. Kle sa-m ara The Evil of Body M. bey-e-yin simnus [?] [should be of S. skandha, T. phung poi bdud, S. Skandha-m ara] The Evil of Gods M. tengri-yin simnus, should be the Evil of Sons of Gods T. lhai bui bdud, S. Devaputra-m ara 4. The Nine Fetters M. yis un sansar-dur qamu -a barildu ulu ci, T. [?] kun tu sbyor ba, S. samyojana of Cyclic Existence BHSD 538-9: The Fetter caused by Desire M. ta ciyang ui-bar qamu -a barildu ulu ci The Fetter caused by Anger M. kiling-iyer qamu -a barildu ulu ci ci The Fetter caused by Pride M. omo -iyar qamu -a barildu ulu The Fetter caused by Ignorance M. mungqa -iyar qamu -a barildu ulu ci The Fetter caused by Distrust M. se ing-iyer qamu -a barildu ulu ci el-iyer qamu -a barildu u The Fetter caused by [False] View M. u lu ci The Fetter caused by Sinful Thoughts M. qarakis sedkil-iyer qamu a barildu ulu ci The Fetter caused by Greed M. qaram-iyar qamu -a barildu ulu ci The Fetter caused by s lavratapar amar sa [?] clinging to practices and observances M. sa sibad ba t or u yabudal-i erileg ci-ber qamu -a barildu ulu ci 5. The Four Delements M. d orben cuburil, T. zag pa, S. asrava BHSD 111 The Delement of Craving M. k usek u-yin cuburil, S. k am asrava The Delement of Lust M. quri caqu-yin cuburil [should be the Delement of Existence T. srid pai zag pa, S. bhav asrava The Delement of Ignorance M. mungqa -un cuburil, S. avidy asrava el- un cuburil, S. dr s. ty asrava The Delement of View M. u ..

24 6. The Four M. org ul (?) : of of of of skandha M. co cis-un org ul kle sa M. nisvanis-un org ul samaya M. tang ari -un org ul v rya M. ki ciyengg ui-yin org ul

Aspects of Buddhism

7. The Four Yokes M. barildu ulu ci, T. sbyor ba, S. yoga Mvy 2143 (m. 2153) 8. The Four Clingings M. oir-a abqui, T. n e bar len pa, S. Mvy 2154 (m. 2154) up ad ana

9. The Four Torrents M. m ured, T. chu bo, S. ogha Mvy 2142 (m. 2152) 10. The Four Knots M. anggiy-a, T. [?] mdud pa, S. [?] grantha [T-T-Ch 1379a T. mdud pa bzhi, Merged 417] : The Knot of Desire M. k usek u-yin anggiy-a The Knot of View M. u el- un anggiy-a or u yabudal-i The Knot of Morality and Practices M. sa sibad ba t erileg ci-yin anggiy-a The Knot of Clinging (?) M. barimtala ci-yin oira abqui anggiy-a ci, T. phyin ci log pa, 11. The Four Wrong Thoughts M. buru u sedkig S. vipary asa BHSD 493, Ts 174-5 taking taking taking taking for for for for eternal what is not eternal pleasant what is suering a self what is not a self pure what is not pure

12. The Four Nutriments M. idegen, T. zas, S. ah ara Mvy 2283-87 (m. 2291-95) a ur-un idegen, T. kham gyi zas, The Food formed in lumps M. i S. kavad k a r a h a ra . The touch-Food M. k ur ul cegsen idegen, T. reg pai zas, S. spar s ah ara ui-yin idegen, The Food of mental thought M. duran-dur sedkik T. yid la sems pai zas, S. manah ah ara . samcetan The Food for Consciousness M. medek u-yin idegen, T. rnam par shes pai zas, vij n an ah ara IX. The Seven Subjects of the Yog ac aras [P 49v5-50r10]: M. yoga cari-yin dolo an The Four Application of Mindfulness M. duradqui oir-a a ulu san, T. dran pa n e bar bzhag pa, S. smr ana Mvy 952-956 . tyupasth (m. 954-958)

A. Bareja-Starzy nska The Essentials of Buddhism. . .

25

The Four Abandonments M. u neker teb cik ui, T. yang dag par spong ba, S. prah an a Mvy 957-961 (m. 959-963) . The Four Supernatural Powers M. ridi k ol, T. rdzu phrul gyi rkang pa, S. r ddhip a da Mvyu 966-970 (m. 968-972) . The Five Faculties M. erketen, T. dbang po, S. indriya Mvy 976-981 (m. 978-983) The Five Powers M. k u cu n, T. stobs, S. bala Mvy 982-987 (m. 984-987) The Seven Members of Enlightenment M. bodi m o cin, T. byang chub yan lag, S. bodhyangga Mvy 988-995 (m. 990-997) The Noble Eightfold Path M. qutu tan-u naiman gesig un- u m or, T. phags pai lam yan lag brgyad, S. ary a. s. t angam arga Mvy 996-1004 (m. 9981006) 1. X. The Dierences in practice between the Mah ay ana and H nay ana followers [P 50r10-50v9]: (a) In the Great Vehicle there are: The Path of Limited Accumulation, in which the Four Application of Mindfulness are practiced The Path of Average Accumulation, in which the Four Abandonings are practiced The Path of Great Accumulation, in which the Four Supernatural Powers are practiced The Path of Preparation of Heat and the Path of Peak, in which the Five Faculties are practiced The Path of Preparation of Patience and the Path of Supreme [Worldly] Dharmas, in which the Five Powers are practiced The Path of Vision, in which the Seven Members of Enlightenment are practiced The Path of Meditation, in which the Noble Eighfold Path is practiced (b) in the Lower Vehicle there are: The Path of Accumulation, in which the Four Application of Mindfulness are practiced The Path of Preparation of Heat, in which the Four Abandonings are practiced The Path of Praparation of Peaks, in which the Four Supernatural Powers are practiced The Path of Preparation of Patience, in which the Five Faculties are practiced The Path of Supreme [Worldly] Dharmas, in which the Five Powers are practiced

26

Aspects of Buddhism The Path of Vision, in which the Seven Members of Enlightenment are practiced The Path of Meditation, in which the Noble Eighfold Path is practiced

XI. The Six Peaceful Paths [P 50v9-51r18]: M. amurling ui ir u an m or (?) The Four Truths M. u nen, T. bden pa , S. satya The Four Concentrations M. diyan, T. bsam gtan, S. dhy ana The Four Innitude M. ca lasi u gei, S. apram an . a, T. tshad med Ts 217 The Four Formless Equanimities M. ongge u gei-yin tegsi oroldu san, S. sam apatti, T. s noms jug Ts 103a The Eight Deliverances M. masida tonilu san, S. vimoks . a, T. rnam thar Ts 157b The Nine Gradual States of Equanimity M. erge-ber a san yis un tegsi orolduqun, S. anup urvavih arasam apatti, T. mthar gyis gnas pai s noms par jug pa Mvy 1498 (m. 1502), Ts 126a Su. I, 954 XII. Miscellaneous (?) [51r18-52v7] 1. The Three Direct Insights M. u lem i u ek u-yin [ urban masi tonilu san qa al a, T. *lhag mthong, S. *vipa syan a BHSD 491, Mvy 1678 (m. 1684) 2. The Three Dierences of the Superior Qualities (?) M. u lem i erdem- un urban il al The Six Higher Spiritual Powers M. ong bilig, T. mngon par shes pa, S. abhij n a BHSD 50, Mvy 201-207 The Concentrations M. samadis, T. ting nge dzin, S. sam adhi BHSD 568-9, The Four Doors of Dh aran or u to to al-un qa al -a, T. gzungs . i M. t kyi sgo BHSD 284, Ts 242, Su II 769 u cu n, T. stobs, S. bala Mvy 120-129 (m. 118-127), 3. The Ten Powers M. k BHSD 397b 4. The Four Fearlessnesses M. ayul u gei, T. mi jogs pa, S. vai s aradya Mvy [?130-134, 781-785] 5. The Four Perfect Understandings M. obere obere u neker udqaqui, T. so so yang dag par rig pa, S. pratisamvit Mvy 196-200, BHSD 370b, Ts 287b 6. The Buddhas Eighteen Special Virtues M. burqan-u arban naiman nom-ud, T. sangs rgyas kyi chos ma dres pa bcu brgyad, S. as t ada s aven .. . ikabuddhadharma Mvy 135-153 (m. 133-151)

A. Bareja-Starzy nska The Essentials of Buddhism. . . 7. The Five Persons M. budgali, T. gang zag, S. pudgala

27

The stream-enterer M. u rg ul ide oru san, T. rgyun-du jugs pa, S. srota apanna Mvy 1009 (m. 1011) The once-returner M. nigen-te qarin ireg ci, T. lan cig phyir ong ba, S. sakr d a g a min Mvy 1012 (m. 1014) . l u ireg ci, T. phyir mi ong ba, S. an a The non-returner M. qarin u g amin Mvy 1014 (m. 1016) The Holy one M. dayin daru san, T. dgra bcom pa, S. arhat Mvy 4 (m. ) The Pratyekabuddha M. bradikabud, T. rang sangs rgyas 8. The three Knowledges M. urban medek ui (?) uk ui-yi medek ui, S. [?] sarv ak araj nat a Knowing All M. b Knowing the Path M. m or-i medek ui, S. [?] m argaj nat a Knowing All Things M. qamu u il medek ui, S. [?] sarvaj nat a [about trisarvaj nat avis aya Ruegg , p. 128] . XIII. The Twelve Links of Dependent Origination M. sit un barildu san, T. rten cing brel par byung bai yan lag bcu g nis, S. prat tyasamutp ada [P 52v7-11] XIV. Miscellaneous [P 52v11-53v10] 1. The Twelve Persons Remaining/Dying (?) M. u iledk ui/ uk uk u-yin t or olkiten [terms to be found in Mvy. 4668-4683] The Individual Soul M. bi, T. bdag, S. atman The Being M. amitan, T. sems can, S. sattva The Feeder M. te iyeg ci, T. gso ba, S. pos .a The Man M. t or olkiten, T. skyes bu. S. purus .a The Individual M. budgali, T. gang zag, S. pudgala The (?) M. k u cu ten maybe for: T. shed las skyes pa, S. manuja, because T. shed=strenght like M. k u cu ( n) The Ruler M. k u cu n u e en, T. shed bu [?] -bdag, S. m anava The Doer M. u iled ug ci, T. byed pa po, S. k araka The One who feels M. serik ui, T. tshor ba po, S. vedaka The Wise M. medeg ci, T. shes pa po, S. j anaka The Seer M. u eg ci, T. mthong ba po, S. pa syaka (one is missing)

2. The Six (?) M. onol-un nom [onol = Mvy *7470 T. rtog pa, S. *preks . ate [?]] of Heat M. dula an onol-un nom of Peak M. u eg ur- un onol-un nom of Patience M. k uli cengg ui onol-un nom

28

Aspects of Buddhism of Supreme [Worldly] Dharmas M. deged u onol-un nom of Path of Vision M. u ek ui m or- un onol-un nom of Path of Meditation M. bisil al-un onol-un nom 3. The Five Knowledges of (?) M. burqan-u k usek u oron medek u The Self Created Knowledge M. obes uben b ut ugsen The [Knowledge] of Passions Annihilated M. ta ciyang ui-yi usadqa san The Unhindered Knowledge M. d urbel u gei The Eternal Knowledge M. nasuda a ci The Knowledge of Giving Answers to the Questions M. o cigsen-i qari u u g uleg ci 4. The Four [Kinds of] Pure M. ari un, T. dag pa, S. pari suddha Mvy. 197-200 5. The Ten Sovereign Powers M. erke olu san, T. (byang chub sems dpai) dbang, S. (bodhisattva) va sit a Mvy 770-780, BHSD 474a 6. The Three Not to Be Guarded M. urban sakiqu u gei, T. bsrung ba med pa, S. araks ya Mvy. 191-195 [in the Mvy four items are listed], . BHSD 64b 7. The Explanation on the Four Application of Mindfulness M. duradqui oir-a a ulu san, T. dran pa n e bar jog pa, S. smr ana . tyupasth BHSD 614b 8. The Five Eyes M. nid un, T. spyan, S. caks . us BHSD 221a, Ts168a 9. The Ten [Kinds of] Recollection M. da an duradqui, T. rjes su dran pa, S. anusmr . ti Mvy 1148-1154 (6), BHSD 36b, Ts 91a 10. The Two Benets M. tusa, T. don, S. artha T-T-Ch 1302b, BHSD 66, Ts 134b 11. The Two Accumulations M. ci ul an, T. tshogs, S. sambh ara BHSD 580a, Ts 219b 12. The Two [Kinds of] Truth M. u nen, T. bden po, S. satya Mvy 6544-45 (m. 6520-21), BHSD 541b, Ts 141b uidker, T. sgrib pa, S. avaran 13. The Two Hindrances M. t . a BHSD 107a, Ts 61a 14. The Seven [Spiritual] Treasures of the Aryas M. qutu -tan-u dolo an ed, T. phags pai nor bdun, S. dhana Mvy 1565-1572 (m. 1569-1576), BHSD 275a 15. The Seven Qualities of Higher Rebirths M. qutu tan-u dolo an ed, T. mtho ris kyi yon tan bdun, S. sapta svargagun ah . . 16. M. k und u T. lci ba [?] [53v10-54r7] und u M. sintara ula ci d orben k und u The Four Discouraging (?) k

A. Bareja-Starzy nska The Essentials of Buddhism. . .

29

The Four Great (?) k und u M. yeke d orben k und u The Insulting (?) M. k und u M. dorom ilaqui k und u The Four (?) M. k und u of non-Buddhist M. ada adu d orben k und u The Four (?) M. k und u of Buddhist M. doto adu d orben k und u

17. The Eight Inopportunate [Births] (actually in Mongolian: Faults) M. naiman buru u, T. mi khom pa brgyad, S. as t avaks a Mvy 2298 .. . an . (m. 2307), BHSD 2-3, Das 956b, however, the last two items are dierent: to be born in the Hell because of the sins done from Vajray ana to be born among Animals because of previously done sins to be born among Pretas because of the wrong ideas to be born among Evils because of wrong deeds to be born among Heretics because of wrong objects of oerings to have obstacles caused by harm because of wrong objects of vows to harm because of wrong understanding of truth

18. The Eight Conditions of the World (literary in Mongolian: the eight dharmas of the world) M. yirtin cu -yin naiman nom, T. jig rten gyi chos brgyad, S. as t alokadharma Mvy 2341-2348, BHSD 464, Das 455b .. 19. The Eight Brightnesses (?) M. gegen of Mind M. duran-u gegen of Intelect M. oyun-u gegen of Understanding M. onol-un gegen of Knowledge M. bilig- un gegen of Supernatural Knowledge M. ong bilig- un gegen of Meditation M. bisil al-un gegen (missing) (missing)

30

Aspects of Buddhism

Aspects of Buddhism, Liw, Poland, June 25, 1994

Bhavya on Mantras: Apologetic Endeavours on Behalf of the Mah ay ana

Jens Braarvig (Oslo) Bhavyas Tarkajv al a is important for the historical study of the Mah ay ana, and also for the study of the dierent Indian schools of philosophy, because of its comprehensive, even encyclopaedic nature. It is thus hoped that this work soon will be published in a complete edition including the Sanskrit fragments as well as the Tibetan versions, and with indices. At present the various fragments are included in a number of separate publications.1 Bhavyas philosophical standpoint of svatantra is also important in the history of Madhyamaka philosophy as an interpretation of the early Madhyamaka tradition. In accordance with his paks . a, or position, Bhavyas works are full of apologetic endeavours on behalf of the Mah ay ana, the philosophical viewpoints and ethics of which he extolls as correct avakay and superior to those of the Sr ana, the M m am a, the Ved anta, the S am . s . khya avakay etc. One of the main accusations of the Sr ana was that the Mah ay ana writings were fake: from the earliest Mah ay ana s utras, such as the Vimalak rtinirde sa, through the s astras of the Yog ac ara such as the Mah ay anas utr alam k a ra , and right . up to Bhavyas Tarkajv al a, great pains were taken to refute such insults from the avakay Sr ana.2 Thus defending the saddharma Bhavya strives to safeguard the integrity of the Mah ay ana canon, and in the process provides much valuable historical information on the origin of the sects and of the Mah ay ana at least if we judge his work according to the standards of Indian historiography, if such a term may be used at all. In his apologetic endeavours Bhavya also struggles to defend the mantras, the meaningless strings of syllables of which the Mah ay ana s utras are overouring, and which, as Xuanzang states in his Account of the journey to the West, 3 were also included in the canonical collections of the Mah as am . ghikas. But, even though such mantras were part of the canonical collections of the Sr avakay ana, as
m (ed. & tr.), Hindu Philosophy in Buddhist Perspective: Vide Olle Qvarnstro The Ved antatattvavini scaya Chapter of Bhavyas Madhyamakahr arik a, Lund, 1989, . dayak for a bibliography. 2 Vimalak rtinirde sa (Tr. Etienne Lamotte, Louvain 1962) ch. XII, 18, p. 389; Mah ay anas utr alam k a ra p. 3 : ay anam 3f f naivedam . . mah . buddhavacanam . etc., and p. 425 - 56 . 3 Xuanzang, Datang xiyu ji, Taish o no. 2087, p. 923a.
1

32

Aspects of Buddhism

is also documented by other H nay ana scriptures, there were in Bhavyas milieu people who held such absurd strings of syllables to be unworthy of inclusion into the proper Buddhist teachings. And indeed, many modern researchers have also related such abracadabra to the more dubious Tantric parts of Buddhism as a degenerate form of Buddhism the presence of such formulae has been taken as evidence of the late origin of s utras, see for example Paul Demi eville.4 This, however, does not seem to be the case, as such formulae go far back in Indian history. Elsewhere I have suggested that the syllables may have been intended as aidesm emoire, related to the m atr as, the lists of abhidharma concepts summarizing . k the teachings.5 Thus the word dh aran originally means memory, and is dened . as such in several central scriptures of the Mah ay ana. The dh aran mantra, then, . may originally have been designed as an expression to help remember the basic teachings indeed many of these mantras in the Mah ay ana s utras do in fact contain key concepts of the Buddhist teachings in addition to the meaningless strings of syllables. The presence of these syllables may also possibly be explained as mnemonic in contexts such syllables may have carried certain meanings like the otherwise meaningless syllables used both in classical Sanskrit grammar and musicology. The arapacana alphabet, which is treated as a dh aran in several s utras, . is thought to contain the whole of the dharma encrypted in the syllables the syllables, apart from being the so-called essence of language, are even interpreted as dened parts of the teachings. But, be the origin of the dh aran mantras as . it may, they certainly quite soon changed into formulae by which both worldly and spiritual advantages could be attained quickly and easily by merely reciting them - without study or any other kind of eort. This of course also has a long tradition in Indian religion as far back as in Vedic times mantras were designed for all kinds of magical use. The Bodhisattvabh umi treats all the connotations of the word dh aran , both those concerned with memory and those concerned with . the meaningless syllable part of the mantras, and does his best to protect the rationality of the Buddhist teachings by dividing dh aran into four types. Firstly, . dharmadh aran is remembering the teachings, and, secondly, arthadh aran is the . . rememberance of the meaning of the teachings, while, thirdly, mantradh aran is . retaining the magical formulae in the thoughts and by means of them attaining the power of concentration, sam adhiva sit a. As the fourth type comes the dh aran to . attain the tolerance, ks a nti , of all bodhisattvas, namely tolerance of the fact that . all words really are bereft of denite meaning in the same way as the strings of syllables in the meaningless mantra. The meaninglessness of the mantra is supposed to produce an understanding of the meaninglessness of existence by way of analogy if the mantra is recited again and again and the tolerance of unbornness, emptiness etc., is realized concomitantly.6
ville, Choix dEtudes Paul Demie bouddhiques, Leiden, 1973, p. 196. Jens Braarvig, Dh aran and Pratibh ana: Memory and Eloquence of the Bodhi. sattvas, JIABS, vol. 8, no. 1, 1985, p. 17-29. 6 ibid., p. 19f.; Bodhisattvabh umi p. 27212f f .
4 5

J. Braarvig Bhavya on Mantras: Apologetic Endeavours ...

33

In Bhavyas times, however, it seems that the memory part of the dh aran mantras . had almost been lost. Indeed, Bhavya, in his apologetic eorts on behalf of the Mah ay ana s utras, is mainly concerned with giving the mantras a rational explanation as props to aid concentration, foci or forms of meditation, bh avan ak ara, and as such the origin of insight, praj na . But he still contends that the mantras contain the secrets and the teachings of the Buddha hidden in the more or less meaningless syllables, secrets which meditation on the mantras will reveal. Thus Bhavya tried to defend a part of the Mah ay ana texts which was only reluctantly accepted by the intellectual elite of his time, as is also the case today: Buddhism has been appreciated as a great intellectual tradition, but it has been dicult for many people to reconcile the belief in the ecacy of mantras and magical rituals with its great intellectual achievements. So Bhavyas solution to the problem in the face of religiously authoritative texts which claimed the mantras to be the Words of the Buddha was to try to justify the mantras as foci of concentration, which, of course, was very much in accordance with the various traditions of yoga. In so doing he tried to remove the irrational part of his religion keeping the primitive magical aspects of religion at a distance. The emergence of the Tantric aspects of Buddhism and other traditions from about the time when Bhavya lived must have accentuated the problems related to mantras. Bhavyas understanding of the mantras is also one which seems to be part of at least some of the Tantric traditions. There is, however, as is well known, also a strong magical aspect to the Tantras, which indeed accepts the magical eciency of mantras. Although the line between the magical aspect and the concentrational aspect of the mantras seems not to be a sharp one, and the two aspects are seldom made explicit in the Tantric literature, Bhavya stresses that the magical use of mantras, as for placing curses on people, inducing fear, etc., was not an explicit item on the Mah ay ana agenda. As mentioned, the accusations of belief in a fake canonical collection comes avakay from the Sr ana: thus Bhavyas apology for the mantras is part of the chap avakay avakatattvani ter rejecting the Sr ana arguments, i.e., the Sr scay avat ara,7 the fourth chapter of the Madhyamakahr arik a Tarkajv al a, which has as its ex. dayak plicit purpose to show that the Mah ay ana contains the True Words of the Buddha. avaka argument against him, in Bhavyas own words, is that the three types The Sr of mantras listed, namely dh aran mantras, the guhyamantras and vidy amantras, . found in the Mah ay ana, are conducive to knowledge of neither the letter (aks . ara ) nor the meaning (artha ) of the Buddhas teaching. Even though they are highly praised, the teachings concerning them are only able to fool people of inferior intelligence, and as such the vidy amantras are akin to the Vedic tradition and not in accordance with the Buddhas teachings. Furthermore, since the dh aran mantras . really have nothing to do with meditation, bh avan a, they are also not able to remove even the smallest vice, or kle sa. And if the kle sas are still there, as well as their causes, then there will be no cessation of sinful action, p apa. Thus the
Derge Tanjur dbu ma dza fol. 144a7 ., the section on mantras 183a6 -184b4 is transliterated in the Appendix.
7

34

Aspects of Buddhism

dh aran mantras are not able to abolish the sins, and, since they have no ability to . counteract the cause of the sins, the teachings concerning them are similar to that vikas and other sects presumably sects not concerned with uprooting of the Aj the vices. Similarly, the secret mantras, the guhyamantras, are also of no avail in getting rid of sinful actions, even though they are in another language, namely that of the Mlecchas. This last assertion of the sr avakapaks . a seems to refer to a historical fact: As shown by Franz Bernhard,8 the words of the much quoted mantra ne m ne dapphe dad . apphe may have a Dravidian origin and may contain the four truths in such a language. But Bhavyas opponents did not seem to be impressed by this outlandish display of words. Such were the opponents objections to the presence of such sentences among the True Words of the Buddha. Bhavya, however, has the following to say in defence of the dh aran mantras and the two other types of mantras. Firstly, with . regard to the dh aran mantras , they evidently have to do with meditation, with . bh avan a, since indeed they are, as mentioned, foci of meditation, bh avan ak ara. To support this Bhavya quotes as his authority the Anantamukhas adhakadh aran ,9 a Mah ay ana s utra, which states that the bodhisattva practising bh avan a does . not construct, grasp for, stay with, cling to or make into conventional concepts neither the conditioned nor the unconditioned, he only cultivates, bh avayati, the recollection of the Buddha by means of the dh aran . Bhavya also quotes the S a. 10 garan agar ajaparipr cch a to show that the Mah a y a na type of dh a ran mantra has . . nothing to do with cursing people or inciting fear, rather it deals with knowledge and true Buddhist practices. It is then quite clear that Bhavya wishes to disassociate himself from the irrational, or darker, sides of the mantras. The aks aran , the dh aran of the never emptying basket in the s utra . ayakaran .d . adh . . is described as being the origin of knowledge (pratisam vid, j n a na, praj n a ) as well . as of eloquence (pratibh ana ) and other virtues of the Mah ay ana such as v rya, etc. Moreover, since insight, praj n a, is the basis of meditation, bh avan a, Bhavya claims to have refuted the above mentioned contention of the sr avakapaks . a that the mantras produce no praj n a or bh avan a again by quoting a Mah ay ana s utra as his authority. His argument is not very convincing, however, since it merely states the opposite of his critics thesis: by merely quoting his own authoritative sources which are not accepted by his opponents, he claims to have rejected his opponents contentions. On the same basis he also rejects the sr avaka contention that the cause of vices is not eliminated by the dh aran mantra : Bhavya says that . bewilderment (moha ) disappears when there is praj n a. This, of course, would be accepted by the sr avakas, but they would not accept that the mantradh aran . produces praj n a, as Bhavya asserts. So Bhavyas argument is in fact rather weak. Bhavya also claims that the dh aran mantra is in opposition to the non-Buddhist . Sophists, whereas the sr avakapaks a contends it is not. The dh aran mantra, namely, . .
Zur Entstehung einer Dh aran , ZDMG vol. 117, 1967, pp. 148-68. . Tibetan and Chinese versions, L.R. Lancaster, The Korean Buddhist Canon: A Descriptive Catalogue, Berkeley, 1979, nos. 324-331, 1279 for references. 10 Tibetan and Chinese versions, ibid. nos. 377, 495, 1140.
9 8

J. Braarvig Bhavya on Mantras: Apologetic Endeavours ...

35

according to Bhavya, is in opposition to the cause of vice (kle sa ) by virtue of being a focus of meditation, bh avan ak ara, in the same way as meditation on the ugly, a subhabh avan a, eliminates the cause of vice. This last argument could possibly have been accepted by Bhavyas sr avaka opponents, who might have accepted that concentration on meaningless syllables is a form of concentration, and since they would agree that meditative states counteract vice. After the treatment of the dh aran mantra Bhavya directs his apologetic eorts . towards the guhyamantra, i. e. the secret formulae, and the vidy amantra, but his arguments here are even less convincing: The essence of these sentences is the secrets of the Tath agatas wisdom when they are used in meditation. Thus the guhyamantras full whatever one wishes they are in accordance with ones wishes, yath a saya in producing bh avan a, and they are like the kalpavr . ks . a, the wish-fullling tree, in granting personal strength. The vidy amantras, knowledge mantras, are concerned with (the knowledge of?) the p aramit as, the four truths, etc., and, in teaching these basic elements of Buddhism, they are indeed able to appease the vices, says Bhavya. As an example he quotes a mantra typical of the vidy a class: samaya samaya d ante s ante dharmar aja bh a. site mahe mah avidy a sarvas adhana.11 Next a mantra well-known from its use in the Tantras and in Tibetan Buddhism is given as an example, viz. the ten-syllable mantra of T ar a: om are tutt are . t ture sv ah a. The syllable t are is explained as uttaradh armika, originated from the superior reality, tuttare as prathamadh armika, originated from the original reality, and ture as anabhil apyadh armika, originated from the ineable reality. Understanding the mantra in this way one is released from ignorance (avidy a ), and, having achieved this, one is able to produce knowledge (vidy a ) in others, and, accordingly, it is rhetorically asked: How can the four kinds of sin avoid being appeased if this mantra is recited? In this capacity the mantra is also related to friendliness, etc.12 Commenting on the vidy amantra, Bhavya states that the reason why the
Cf. the Tibetan text, some evident misspellings have been corrected. Or, were these in the original mantra? Many Tantric mantras are not too accurate with respect to spelling and grammar. 12 It is generally accepted that Bhavya lived in the early 6th century. An interesting question in this respect is whether T ar a, and also the main mantra by which she is invoked in later Tantric religion, was already in existence at the time of Bhavya. If so, then this is the earliest reference to T ar a and the mantra. The rst epigraphical evidence is a Javanese inscription from 778, but there is good reason to suppose that the T ar a cult existed in the early 7th century by the evidence connected to the Nepalese princess of king Srong brtsan sGam po, Xuanzangs descriptions and the Sanskrit author Subandhu. See Stephan Beyer, The Cult of T ar a, Berkeley, 1973, pp. 6-8 and his references to further literature on the subject of the age of the Indian T ar a cult. The Tarkajv al a, however, contains a few anachronisms which may have been inserted by the great At sa who in the beginning of the 11th century played a role in the process of translating the work into Tibetan. See V.V. Gokhale, Madhyamakahr arik a Tarkajv al a, Chapter I in . dayak Miscellanea Buddhica, Indiske Studier, vol. 5, ed. Christian Lindtner, Copenhagen, 1985, p. 76f. It would not be surprising if At sa, who, according to the documentation,
11

36

Aspects of Buddhism

words of wisdom (vidy a sabda ) are not understood, is that they are in a language beyond this world (lokottarav akya), or in the language of Devas, N agas, Yaks . as, etc. As for the strange words in the mantras, he also quotes the Guhyamatis utra13 as evidence that the mantra ne m ne dapphe dad . apphe refers to the four truths not in the language of the Mlecchas as the sr avakapaks . a probably rightly contended, but in that of the caturmah ar aja, the four divine protector kings of the world. To the contention of the sr avaka that the mantras do not teach the true dharma, Bhavya responds that the mantras are within the eld of knowledge of vows (samaya ) and of attaining memory (dh aran ). The two last types of mantra, . the guhya- and vidy a-, are not properly distinguished in Bhavyas treatment, and it is not in fact certain that the distinction between them was clear to Bhavya. So the sr avaka is wrong, according to Bhavya: the three types of mantras are in accordance with the True Way as described by the Buddha, the Way which brings about the cessation of the vices. One cannot help, however, but be left with the impression that Bhavyas arguments in casu do not have the required strength to establish his position. He still chooses to defend what seems to be the position of orthodox Mah ay ana of his time, that mantras should be part of the True Religion. To this end he employs arguments that the mantras are conducive to meditation, trying to present a case in accordance with Buddhist scholastic reason, in order to defend the irrational parts which are prescribed by scriptual authority. The arguments that the mantras are the secret language of the gods, etc., were met with little sympathy, evidently, by the sr avakapaks . a, and they can scarcely be called rational arguments. Certainly such arguments would nd little sympathy even today when Buddhism is regarded as one of the most rational forms of religion.

Appendix
Derge Kanjur dbu ma, dza, 183a6-184b4: | theg pa chen po las yi ge dang don shes par mi rung bai gzungs sngags dang | gsang sngags dang | rig sngags la sogs pa phan yon mang po can byis pai skye bo slu bar byed pa bstan pa de rnams ni gzhan gyi rig byed dang drao || bsgom pa med pa ni skyon phra rab tsam yang zad par byed nus pa ma yin te | n on mongs pa bsags pa dang dei rtsa ba yod na sdig pa zad pa ga la byung bar gyur | gzungs sngags kyis kyang sdig pa zhi bar byed pa ma yin (183b) te | dei rgyu dang mi gal ba n id kyi phyir tshe ba la sogs pa bzhin no || de bzhin du gsang sngags kyis kyang sdig pa zad par byed pa ma yin te | skad gzhan gyis brjod pai phyir kla klo la sogs pai skad bzhin no zhes kyang smra bar nus so zhe na | gang yang theg pa chen poi gzungs sngags la sogs pa yi ge sbyar ba tsam du dod pa di la brjod par byao || re zhig gzungs sngags ni bsgom pai rnam pa n id yin te | ji skad du sgo mtha yas pa
was a fervent devotee of T ar a, thought that this mantra above any other should be mentioned as an imporant example of a guhyamantra, vide Stephan Beyer, op. cit., pp. 11-15. 13 Reconstruction from gsang ba blo gros kyi mdo, not identied.

J. Braarvig Bhavya on Mantras: Apologetic Endeavours ...

37

sgrub pai gzungs las | gzungs di sgom par byed pai byang chub sems dpa ni dus byas dang dus ma byas kyi chos rtogs (read rtog) par yang mi byed | len par yang mi byed | gnas par yang mi byed | mngon par zhen par mi byed | tha s nad dogs par yang mi byed | sangs rgyas rjes su dran pa ba zhig sgom par byed do zhes bya ba la sogs pa gsungs pa dang || || dbu mai s ning poi grel pa rtog ge bar ba | bam po bcu drug pa | de bzhin du klui rgyal po rgya mtshos zhus pai mdo las kyang | klui rgyal po gang yang bstan pa thams cad ni mi zad pa ste | di ni mi zad pai za ma tog ces bya bai gzungs yin no || so so yang dag par rig pa dang | ye shes dang | shes rab dang | spobs pa bzhi yang mi zad par rjes su byung ba dang | de bzhin du shin tu rtogs par dka ba dang | ngoms pa med pai brtson grus bar ba dang | mthar thug pa med pa dang | mthong ba med pa dang | rton pa med pa dang | dmod pa med pa dang | jigs pa med pa bzhi po rnams dang | s ning po dang | nges par byed pa dang | snang ba dang | stobs kyi gter bzhi byung ba dang | de bzhin du gang yi gei lugs dang | ming dang | brda dang | chos kyi brdai rjes su jug pa de dag thams cad kyang mi zad pai za ma tog gi gzungs dii rjes su zhugs pai byang chub sems dpas shes te | di lta ste | chos thams cad ni gdod ma nas dag pao zhes bya ba la sogs pa dang | de bzhin du gzungs sngags di la gnas pai byang chub sems dpa ni yi ge kho (184a) na las byang chub tshol bar byed | rjes su jug par byed de | yi ge ni stobs so || dgod pa ni lus so || chos kyi sgo la dzud pai mgo bo blta ba ni dpral bao || shes rab ni mig go zhes bya ba la sogs pas bsgom pai rtsa ba ni shes rab yin la | shes rab yod pai phyir gti mug med par gyur ro || rtsa ba med na dod chags dang zhe sdang byung bar mi gyur te | rtsa ba dang gal ba yod pai phyir ro || des na rtsa ba dang gal ba med pai phyir zhes bya bai don ma grub pa yin no || phyir rgol bai rtog ges kyang bsgrub par bya ba la gnod pa n id de | gzungs sngags kyis ni sdig pa zhi bar gyur ba n id yin te | bsgom pai rnam pa yod pa n id kyi phyir dei rtsa ba dang gal bar gyur pa n id kyi mi sdig pa la sogs pa bsgom pa bzhin no || de bzhin du gsang sngags kyang de bzhin gshegs pai ye shes kyi gsang ba ston par byed pai sbas pai yi ge sbyor ba ngo bos bsgom pa la rab tu jug pa rgyud la gnas pas ji ltar dod pai bsam pa yang dag par sgrub par nus pa yin te | mthu chen poi bdag n id yin pai phyir dpag bsam gyi shing bzhin no || rig sngags kyang phal cher pha rol tu phyin pa drug dang | phags pai bden pa dang | byang chub kyi phyogs kyi chos ston par byed pai yi ge dang don gyis n on mongs pa zad par byed pa ston par byed pa n id yin te | ji ltar sa ma ya sa ma ya | dante sa nte dharma r a dza | bha . si te ma te ma h a b dya | sarb artha s a dha na ni | zhes bya ba lta bu dang | de bzhin du chos kyi mchog las byung ba ni t a re | dang poi chos las byung ba ni tutt a re | brjod du med pai chos las byung ba ni tu re zhes bya ba lta bu ni mngon par rtogs pa gsal bar byed pa ste | bdag ma rig pa dang bral bar gyur pas gzhan dag gi rig pa yang bskyed par nus pa yin na de bsten par gyur na cii phyir sdig pa bzhi dang bcas pa zhi bar mi gyur te | dei nus pa dang ldan pai phyir byams pa la sogs pa bzhin no || rig pai tshig gang dag gi don rtogs par ma gyur pa ni de dag jig rten las das pai skad kyis bstan pai phyir dang | lha dang | klu dang | gnod sbyin la sogs pai skad kyis (184b) bstan pai phyir ro || chos n id ston par mi byed pa yang ma yin pas dam tshig rig pa dang | gzungs thob par gyur pa rnams kyi spyod yul yang yin te | ji skad du gsang ba blo gros kyi mdo las | gang di na sdug bsngal dang | kun byung dang | gog pa dang | lam zhes bya ba

38

Aspects of Buddhism

rnams la rgyal chen bzhii ris kyi lha rnams kyi ni e ne dang | me ne dang | dam po dang | da dam po zhes bya ba la sogs par brjod do zhes byung bas jig rten pai don ston par byed pa bzod par dka bai n on mongs pa bdo bas khrigs pa tsa mun .d .a la sogs pai rig pa dag dang | sgrol ma la sogs pai don dam pai rig pa rnams dra ba lta ga la yin | des na dpe ma grub pa yin te | bsgrub par bya bai chos dang mi ldan pai phyir ro || di skad brjod par yang nus te | gzungs sngags dang | gsang sngags dang | rig sngags rnams de bzhin gshegs pai man ngag bzhin du ngag tu brjod pa dang | bsams pa dang | bsgoms pas sdig pa rgyu dang bcas pa zhi bar byed pa yin te | lam dang rjes su mthun pa yin pai phyir mdo sde la sogs pai gsung rab bzhin no ||

Aspects of Buddhism, Liw, Poland, June 25, 1994

On the Date of the Tibetan Translation of 1 A svaghos . as Buddhacarita

David P. Jackson (Hamburg) The Buddhacarita of A svaghos . a (. 1st century C.E.) is important in Indian literature as one of the earliest examples of Sanskrit ornate poetry (k avya).2 The poem tells the life story of the Buddha S akyamuni, and it is quite long, running as it does to some twenty-eight chapters or sargas. Yet only about the rst half of the poem survives in the original Sanskrit.3 For the remaining half, one must rely on the Chinese or Tibetan translation. As is well known, a Tibetan translation such as this can often be a very valuable aid for understanding the original Indian Buddhist text. The translators typically tried to follow a literal, calque style of rendering the Sanskrit into Tibetan, and thus their translations sometimes closely mirror even the phraseology of the original.4 But in the case of the Buddhacarita, the quality of the Tibetan
This paper was originally written some years ago for the Tibet Journal special issue in memory of Barmiok Athing, which has yet to appear. In the meantime I have been able to correct and expand it on several points. I would like to acknowledge here my debt to Prof. M. Hahn for several useful suggestions. 2 On A svaghos avya . as poetical writings, see for instance A.K. Warder, Indian K Literature (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1974), vol. 2, pp. 142-181. 3 For the partial Sanskrit text (edited from a Nepalese manuscript tradition) and a full English translation, see E.H. Johnston, The Buddhacarita or Acts of the Buddha (Lahore: 1936) (reprinted Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1972), and The Buddhas Mission and Last Journey: Buddhacarita, XV to XXVIII, Acta Orientalia, vol. 15 (1937), pp. 26-111 and 231-292. Other editions, translations and studies of the Buddhacarita include: F. Weller, Das Leben des Buddha von A svaghos . a (Leipzig: Eduard Pfeier, 1926-1928), Tibetan text and German translation of I-XVII, v. 41, in 2 vols.; Zwei zentralasiatische Fragmente des Buddhacarita (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1953), Sanskrit fragments of III, 16-29, and XIV, 20-36; Untersuchung u ber die textgeschichtliche Entwicklung des tibetischen Buddhacarita (Berlin: 1980); C. Vogel, On the First Canto of A svaghos . as Buddhacarita, Indo-Iranian Journal, vol. 9 (1966), pp. 266-290; and M. Hahn, Buddhacarita I, 1-7 und 25-40, Indo-Iranian Journal, vol. 17 (1975), pp. 77-96. 4 But see Seyfort Ruegg 1992, pp. 382-385, who cites examples from diering parallel translations from Sanskrit into Tibetan, showing that translation for the Tibetans was not a purely mechanical or absolutely regular exercise.
1

40

Aspects of Buddhism

translation is uneven and in places disappointingly poor.5 From the fteenth chapter on, where there is no Sanskrit to compare it with, the sense of the Tibetan is highly obscure in many places. What could account for the poor quality of that translation? This question cannot yet be answered in any detail, but there do exist a few clues at least about how and when the Tibetan translation was executed. The present paper is therefore an attempt to determine more precisely the chronology and circumstances of that translation. The basic source for dating the translation is the colophon to the translation that is preserved in all four printed editions of the Tanjur. This is what it says:6 By order of the Noble Guru, King of Religion, highest lord of the Doctrine [everywhere] on the earth, as far as the ends of the ocean, matchless in virtues of wisdom, great treasure of numerous perfections, guru of scholars, glorious wealth of all beings, [and] Because of the pure intention to attain the realization of enlightened activities of that best of men, matchless in all the world, and because of the patronage of the noble religious ones, such as the lord of men,
Cf. Weller 1980, p. 45, and the comments of Johnston in Johnston 1937, p. 27. See for example Sangs rgyas kyi spyod pa zhes bya bai s nan ngag chen po, Tibetan Tripit . aka, Peking Edition (P no. 5656), bsTan gyur, mDo grel, sKyes rabs II, vol. 129, p. 172.1 (nge 124b):
6 5

sa stengs rgya mtshoi mthar thugs [sic] bstan pai bdag poi mchog || yon tan mtshungs med phul byung du mai gter chen po || mkhas pa rnams kyi bla ma skye dgu rnams kyi dpal || bla ma dam pa chos kyi rgyal poi bka lung gis || jig rten kun na zla bral skyes mchog de n id kyi || phrin las sgrub pa br nes pai thugs dgongs rnam dag dang || mi rje lha sras gung thang rgyal mo yum sras dang || chos la gcig tu dkar bai lha cig kun dga bum || mang yul skyi rong bzo mo yon tan skyid la sogs || chos ldan dam pa rnams kyis sby[i]n bdag bgyid pai ngor || phags pa rta dbyangs kyis mdzad thub pai mdzad pa di || sa dbang bzang po dang ni blo gros rgyal pos bsgyur || di bsgyur bsod nams rgyal po gang des pha ma dang || gro rnams lam gyi rgyal po [dam pa] dir zhugs te || n es tshogs tshang tshing kun dang bdud bzhii rgyal po rnams || bcom nas chos kyi rgyal po [dam pa] thob par shog || dg[e] des thub bstan yun du gnas par shog || A critical edition of the Tibetan text by Professors Y. Kajiyama and K. Mimaki based on all four editions of the Tanjur is forthcoming from the International Institute for Buddhist Studies, Tokyo. I am indebted to both scholars for showing me their typescript, which enabled me to verify several readings in the colophon to the Peking edition.

D. Jackson On the Date of the Tibetan Translation... the divine [royal] son, queen [and prince] of Gung-thangmother and sonthe princess Kun-dga-bum, who is single[-minded]ly devoted to Dharma, and bZo-mo Yon-tan-skyed of Mang-yul sKyi-rong, this Ca reer of the Sage composed by Arya A svaghos . a was translated by Sadbang-bzang-po and Blo-gros-rgyal-po. By that king of merit [resulting from] translating this, may father, mother, and [all] beings enter into this [noble] king of paths, and having vanquished all wrongs and evils, and also the King of the four M aras, may they become [noble] kings of religion! By that virtue may the Doctrine of the Sage long endure!

41

Patronage

The colophon of course does not specify the date of translation, but it does reveal some details about its patronage, and it also mentions the names of the translators. Though almost none of the people mentioned are well known, more can be learned about them if one searches through the available historical sources. The main geographical focus indicated by the colophon is Mang-yul, a principality in the western Tibetan borderlands between gTsang and mNga-ris whose capital was Gung-thang rDzong-dkar and which was the Tibetan region closest to the Kathmandu Valley. This region is also indicated by the mention of one of the patrons, a certain bZo-mo (or bZang-mo?) Yon-tan- skyid of Mang-yul sKyi[d]grong. Mang-yul sKyid-grong, the location of the Phags-pa Wa-ti Jo-bo statue, was incidentally also the cite of another important k avya translation project, namely the translation of Ks emendras Bodhisattv a vad a nakalpalat a in 1270.7 . A precise dating of the Buddhacarita translation is more dicult because in order to determine it, one must also be able to identify the patrons and translators. Still, one can establish at least a preliminary terminus ad quem for the translation based on external evidence. It must have been completed before ca. 1322 because Bu-ston Rin-chen-grub (1290-1364) lists this translation of the Buddhacarita in the catalogue section of his great history of Buddhism (completed 1322) as the last item in the J ataka (sKyes rabs) section.8 He also listed the work in his later
See Mejor 1992, pp. 53-4. Here Phags-pa refers not to the great bla-ma Chosrgyal Phags-pa Blo-gros-rgyal-mtshan but rather to the sacred Phags-pa Wa-ti image. 8 Bu-ston Rin-chen-grub, bDe bar gshegs pai bstan pai gsal byed chos kyi byung gnas gsung rab rin po chei mdzod, Collected Works (Satapit . aka Series, New Delhi, 1971, vol. 64), vol. 17 (ya), p. 964.2 (166b). See also the edition by S. Nishioka, Index to the Catalogue Section of Bu-stons History of Buddhism (II), Annual Report of the Institute for the Study of Cultural Exchange, The University of Tokyo, no. 5 (1981), p. 63, no. 885: slob dpon rta dbyangs kyis mdzad pai sangs rgyas kyi spyod pa ston pai s nan dngags chen po khams pa dge long blo gros rgyal poi gyur. Bu-ston may have been a younger contemporary of Blo-gros-rgyal-po; in any case his characterization of Blo-grosrgyal-po as being a monk of Khams was based on some other source of knowledge about him besides the colophon. On the date of Bu-stons composition of his history, see Szerb 1990, p. xi. G. Tucci
7

42

Aspects of Buddhism

catalogue to the Tanjur, which is dated 1335.9 The earliest possible date of translation cannot be so easily arrived at. For although the major introduction of k avya studies and translation in Tibet took place under the patronage of Phags-pa Blo-gros-rgyal-mtshan (1235-1280), i.e. not before the 1260s, this does not guarantee that a given poetical work was not translated before then. The systematic, formal teaching and learning of Sanskrit poetics is usually said to have begun in Tibet with Phags-pas uncle, Sa-skya Pan .d . ita (1182-1251), who began his studies in ca. 1205 and who about twenty-ve or thirty years later presented a partial translation of Dan avy adar sa in the .d . ins K rst chapter of his mKhas jug treatise. But a full translation and transmission of the basic texts such as the K avy adar sa had to wait for the contributions of Phags-pas contemporary Shong rDo-rje-rgyal- mtshan. 10

1.1

Gung-thang rgyal-mo yum-sras

According to the colophon, the main patrons who provided material support seem to have been a queen of Gung-thang and her son (gung thang rgyal mo yum sras). The line mentioning them begins ruler, divine prince (mi rje lha sras)titles that together normally applied only to male descendants of the old Yar-klung dynasty. But here they seem to refer collectively to the queen and crown prince, and the word yum (mother) apparently refers again to the queen in her capacity as mother.

1.2

The Princess Kun-dga-bum

The colophon itself does not give the personal names of this queen and prince. But with the next person mentioned we are perhaps luckier. A princess with the name Kun-dga-bum is known from other sources, and if she is the one mentioned in the colophon, this helps narrow down the possibilities of who the others were.
[Tucci 1949, p. 141], recorded seeing a colophon dating the work to the khrag skyug year (1323, not 1347). D. Seyfort Ruegg, [Seyfort Ruegg 1966, pp. xvii] corrected the date to 1322 (according to Szerb, this mistake had also been noticed by Stein). On this see also Hadano 1963, p. 47, as was indicated to me by Mr. S. Onoda. 9 Bu-ston, dkar-chag, p. 615 (108a.4): nge pa la | sangs rgyas kyi spyod pa zhes bya bai s nan dngags chen po slob dpon rta dbyangs kyis mdzad pa | pan .d . ita sa dbang bzang po dang | lo ts a ba blo gros rgyal poi gyur |. On the composition of this, the catalogue to the Zhwa-lu Tanjur, see also Seyfort Ruegg 1966, p. 114, and Hadano 1963, p. 58. Incidentally, Ngor-chen Kun-dga-bzang-po in his catalogue to the Glo-bo Tanjur, Collected Works, vol. a, f. 302a.5 (=94a.5; T oy o Bunko reprint, vol. 10, p. 365.4.5), lists neither translator nor pan d ita, though the Buddhacarita is one of his s nan ngag gi .. gzhung gsum. 10 On the early history of Sanskrit poetical studies in Tibet, see the preliminary remarks of E. G. Smith, introduction to Encyclopedia Tibetica [Bo-dong Pan id dus . -chens De n pa] (New Delhi: Tibet House, 1970), vol. 6, p. 1. Smith had previously written a related study which was never published, namely his paper The Tradition of Philology & Literary Theory in Tibetan Scholasticism, Unpublished paper presented to the Inner Asia Colloquium, University of Washington, on February 6, 1964. U. W. Archives, acc. no. 85-42, box 6. See now also Mejor 1992, pp. 88-90.

D. Jackson On the Date of the Tibetan Translation...

43

At least two Tibetan historical sources mention a princess by this name: she was a daughter of the Sa-skya-pa hierarch bDag- nid-chen-po bZang-po-dpal (12621324), being the second of three children given birth to by his sixth wife, Lha-cig 11 Ni-ma-rin-chen. Kun-dga-bum was born sometime between the time of her fathers return to Sa-skya in 1298 and the birth in 1308 of her younger brother Kun-dga-legs-pai-byung-gnas (1308-1336). According to the detailed genealogical history of the Sa-skya Khon family (Sa skya gdung rabs chen mo) by A-mes-zhabs Ngag-dbang-kun-dga-bsod- nams (1597-1659), Kun-dga-bum was a female religious teacher (slob dpon ma ) from the Khon lineage.12 She was born at Khabs-so bKra-shis. When she was young, she became the consort of the mNga-ris Gung-thang ruler who had the Mongol rank tu-dben-sha (regional commander).13 She is said by this source to have given birth to two sons: one the royal monk and religious master Slob-dpon Lha-btsun Phun-tshogs-dpal and the other the ruler mNga-bdag bZang-po-lde. The former is said to have given religious teachings at Sa-skya for many years.14 At a later period in her life, Kun-dga-bum reportedly returned to Sa-skya, where the chief administrators (dpon chen) gZhon-dbang-pa and his son oered her the religious palace Bla-brang Seng-ge-sgang.15 She is said to have died there, immersed in her
A-mes-zhabs, p. 449 (225a). For the full text of the passage on Kun-dga-bum, see below, Appendix A. 12 Ibid. 13 Kun-dga-bums son bKra-shis-lde (alias bZang-po-lde?) begot his son Khri Phuntshogs-lde-dpal-bzang-po in 1337 or 1338. If he was young at the timesay about 16 years oldhe would have been born in ca. 1321. If his mother too was of that age when she gave birth to him, she would have been born in ca. 1305, which ts the known chronology. In any case, she probably went to Gung-thang as a young bride sometime between 1315 and 1320. On the rank tu-dben-sha, see Petech 1990, pp. 39-40. 14 This mention of a Lha-btsun Phun-tshogs-dpal is probably a confusion on A-meszhabss part with Kun-dga-bums grandson Khri Phun-tshogs-lde-dpal-bzang-po (13381370), whose mother according to the history of the Gung-thang kings was another Saskya princess, bSod-nams-bum. Kah . -thog rig-dzin Tshe-dbang-nor-bu [Tshe-dbangnor-bu f. 11b] gives very few details about his life, but does mention his staying at Sa-skya when he conceived his son Khri mChog-grub-lde, whose mother was a lady of Red-mda. His younger son Khri-rgyal bSod-nams-lde (b. 1371) was the son of his ocial consort Nam-mkha-bum, the daughter of the Byang Ta-dben. I am indebted to Barmiok Athing Densapa for preserving this genealogy and to Mr. E. Gene Smith for letting me consult his hand-written copy of it. This history has been recently published from the original manuscript in a compilation of historical rGyal rabs phyogs sdebs by the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives. See also the new edition that appeared in the Gangs can rig mdzod series (Bod ljongs bod yig dpe r ning dpe skrun khang, 1990), vol. 9, pp. 87-150. 15 This reference to gZhon-dbang-pa may be anachronistic. He was chief administrator before and immediately after Ang-len or Ag-len, who was ruling in the year 1290. I am not sure, however, which later administrator was his son. On gZhon-dbang-pa, see Tucci 1949, pp. 628, 652, and Genealogical Table A (between pp. 705 and 707); and Tucci 1971, pp. 186f.
11

44

Aspects of Buddhism

profound meditative practices. The same Kun-dga-bum is mentioned not only in the Sa skya gdung rabs chen mo but also in the genealogical history of the Gung-thang kings compiled by Tshe-dbang-nor-bu (1698-1755), for as stated above, she married one of the kings of Gung-thang. The account about her in the latter source is shorter. There only one son is mentioned, and he is called by a dierent name. But this source does specify the name and death date of her husband: he was the king Chos-skyong-lde, who reportedly died in the water-dragon year (1352).16 He and Kun-dga-bum are said not to have enjoyed harmonious relations at rst, but their dierences were smoothed out through the intervention of her father bDag- nid-chen-po (bZang-po-dpal, 1262-1324) and his son (her younger halfbrother bSod-nams-rgyal-mtshan?). If this information is accurate, the marriage thus must have taken place before the death of bZang-po-dpal in 1324. The son who resulted from their union is said to have been the ruler Khri bKra-shis-lde. He married his cousin bSod-nams-bum, the daughter of dBang Kun-dga-legs-pa. bKra-shis-lde himself is said to have died in the wood-snake year (1365). Now, if the patrons included a queen of Gung-thang, her son, and the abovementioned princess Kun-dga-bum, then this queen of Gung-thang was probably the consort of Khri Rin-chen-bzang-po, and her son was probably Chos-skyong-lde, husband of the princess Kun-dga-bum. A possible problem with this identication is that the mother of Chos-skyong-lde, the lady Lha-mo-bum of the Shar-pa bla-brang in Sa-skya, is not recorded to have acted as queen in Gung-thang. She is said to have conceived Chos-skyong-lde in Sa-skya during a brief union with Khri Rin-chen-bzang-po just before his departure for China where he died soon
Tshe-dbang-nor-bu f. 10a. In an earlier article The Early History of Lo (Mustang) and Ngari, Contributions to Nepalese Studies, vol. 4, no. 1 (Dec. 1976), p. 46, I confused the succession of these generations as well as their relation to Kun-dga-bum. The correct genealogy as given by Tshe-dbang-nor-bu, . 9a-11b, is: Bum-lde-mgon (1253-1280)
16

Khri Rin-chen-bzang-po

Khri-lde-bum

bSam-lde (b. 1268)

Chos-skyong-lde (d. 1352) = Kun-dga-bum bKra-shis-lde (d. 1365) = bSod-nams-bum Khri Phun-tshogs-lde-dpal-bzang-po (1338-1370)

Khri mChog-grub-lde

Khri-rgyal bSod-nams-lde (b. 1371)

D. Jackson On the Date of the Tibetan Translation...

45

afterward.17 I have not yet found any reference to another queen of Gung-thang in the early 1300s who had a son. Chos-skyong-ldes uncle Khri-lde-bum (b. 1268), who was the main ruler in his generation, apparently died without male issue, so his consort could not have been this queen. But whoever these patrons may have been, they were no doubt members of the Gung-thang royalty who lived in the late-13th or early-14th century. The last patron who contributed material support seems to have been a lady of wealth and perhaps of nobility: bZo-mo Yon-tan-skyid of Mang-yul sKyi[d]-rong, but she is otherwise unknown to me, as is her name or title bZo mo (Female Crafts-worker?), which some texts give as bZang mo (Kind Lady?).

1.3

Bla-ma-dam-pa Chos-kyi-rgyal-po

The one remaining major patron in the colophon who requires discussion is the Noble Guru, King of Religion (bla ma dam pa chos kyi rgyal po), who is mentioned very prominently at the beginning of the colophon. He was a crucial gure in the project; he is said to have been the ultimate sponsor, for he is the one who ordered the others to undertake it. G. Tucci in his Tibetan Painted Scrolls identied this main patron as Phags-pa [Blo-gros-rgyal-mtshan] (1235-1280),18 probably because King of Religion (chos kyi rgyal po) is one of Phags-pas standard titles and because Phags-pa was the rst major patron of k avya translations in Tibet, supporting as he did the activities of Shong-ston rDo-rje-rgyal-mtshan. Tucci may have based himself on Cordiers Tanjur catalogue (part 3, 1915), where the bla-ma dam-pa chos-kyi-rgyal-po of the colophons had already been identied as Matidhvaja cr bhadra de Sa-skya.19 But in light of the possible identity of the princess Kun-dga-bum suggested above, that would now seem to require further verication. Can it be conrmed, for instance, by the more detailed historical sources of Sa-skya and Gung-thang? There was indeed another Sa-skya-pa teacher who was a prominent political and religious leader of the mid-14th century and who had the xed epithet Noble Guru (bla ma dam pa). He was Kun-dga-bums half-brother, the outstanding teacher Bla-ma-dam-pa bSod-nams-rgyal-mtshan (1312-1375).20 But this master
17 According to Tshe-dbang-nor-bu, p. 9b: thog mar sa skyar phebs te cung zad bzhugs pa na mdza bai bshes shar pa kun dga rin chen pas na re | mnga bdag pa khyed yul thag rings su gshegs pa dug pas sku tshe yun pa yang dka | de tshe gdung rgyud chad par phangs pas nga yi khyim bdag mo di la sras tshol zhes mtshams sbyar bzhin ma gcig lha mo bum dang rtsen pas rings por ma thogs par bud med de yang sbrum par gyur te lha rin chen bzang po gshegs pai lor sras sgro spangs su byung ba mtshan chos skyong lder btags |. 18 Tucci 1949, p. 104. 19 See Cordier 1915, pp. 421 and 459. The Tibetan corresponding to Matidhvaja cr bhadra is Blo-gros-rgyal-mtshan-dpal-bzang-po, Phags-pas monastic ordination name. This same identication was made by de Jong 1972, p. 509. 20 Bla-ma dam-pa bSod-nams-rgyal-mtshan reportedly served as the 15th Sa-skya khripa, between the rules of his brother Jam-dbyangs-don-yod-rgyal-mtshan (1310-1344) and Ta-dben Blo-gros-rgyal-mtshan (1332-1364). The latter is said (in A-mes-zhabs, p.

46

Aspects of Buddhism

would have been only eleven years old in 1322, which was the date of Bu-stons mention of the translation in his history of Buddhism. A great religious leader who might have sponsored the project in the period ca. 1315-1322 was bSodnams-rgyal-mtshans (and Kun-dga-bums) father bDag- nid-chen-po bZang-podpal (1262-1324) who according to one source occupied the Sa-skya see from about 1298 to 1324.21 Or just possibly it might have been one of the latters older sons, such as the Ti-shri Kun-dga-blo-gros-rgyal-mtshan-dpal-bzang-po (1299-1327), an imperial preceptor at the Y uan court who received his full ordination in Central Tibet in 1322.22 Nevertheless, these later candidates seem unlikely since none of the masters after Phags-pa were normally referred to as Chos-kyi-rgyal-po. Phags-pa, moreover, is referred to in other translation colophons precisely as Bla ma dam pa chos kyi rgyal po.23 The pan kara even composed Sanskrit verses in Phags.d . ita Laks . m
660.5) to have occupied the see for 18 years, i.e. beginning in ca. 1346, but he would have been only 14 years old in 1346. In any case Bla-ma dam-pas tenure was probably from 1344, the year of his brothers death. See below, Appendix C. A modern study asserts that Bla-ma dam-pa was the last Sa-skya-pa ruler of Tibet and that his tenure was cut short in ca. 1350-1352 by the victories of Byang-chub-rgyalmtshan, the founder of the Phag-mo-gru-pa hegemony. See Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa, Tibet: A Political History (reprint New York: Potala Publications, 1984), p. 72: In 1350, during the administration of Ponchen Gawa [sic] Zangpo and the reign of the ruling lama, Sonam Gyaltsen, the province of U in central Tibet fell into the hands of the powerful myriarch, Changchub Gyaltsen of Phamo Drupa. However, in his subsequent account of Byang-chub-rgyal-mtshans rise to power, pp. 77 and 81, Shakabpa simply refers to the Sa-skya khri-pa as the Sakya Lama and does not specify his name. Cf. also Tucci 1971, p. 208: Thus in the year earth-female-ox [1349], the greatest part of dBus came into his [i.e. Byang-chub-rgyal-mtshans] hands. . . . . There is a rumor that the Ti sri Kun dga rgyal mtshan was the occupant of the [Sa-skya] see, but this is not clear from the documents. The Tibetan text, f. 72, verso, line 5: gdan sa ti shri kun dga rgyal mtshan bzhugs thang naang yi ge gsal ba ma mthong. Ti-shri Kun-dga-rgyal-mtshandpal-bzang-po (1310-1358) is not, however, to be found among any of the lists of Sa-skya khri-pas known to me. 21 The years 1298-1324 as his tenure seem to be indicated by A-mes-zhabss biography of bZang-po-dpal in A-mes-zhabs. See Khetsun Sangpo vol. 10, pp. 260-261, and 566. In the Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo [Bod rgya..., p. 2891] the dates 1304 to 1322 are given. See also below, Appendix C. 22 Another powerful and important religious master who might have had a special connection with the patrons was the Shar-pa bZhi-thog-pa Jam-pai-dbyangs Rin-chenrgyal-mtshan, who served as gdan-sa-pa of Sa-skya at least until bZang-po-dpals return to Sa-skya from China, and possibly for several years even after that. The ruler Lha Rinchen-bzang-po conceived his son Chos-skyong-lde while on his way to China, through the intervention of the Shar-pa Kun-dga-rin-chen. See Tshe-dbang-nor-bu, p. 9b, as quoted above in note 17. 23 See the colophon to Ks avad anakalpalat a as quoted in Mejor . emendras Bodhisattv 1992, p. 52 and note 1, where he is identied as Phags-pa. On this title Mejor also refers to de Jong 1972, pp. 509 and 525. See also Verhagen 1991, p. 67, note 185, who refers further to Cordier 1915, p. 459; and see now the corresponding passages

D. Jackson On the Date of the Tibetan Translation...

47

pas honor (a Tibetan translation of which is preserved in the Tanjur), the title to which referred to him with this very same epithet (Skt. sadgurudharmar aja).24

The Translators

These doubts about the identity of the great religious and noble patrons cannot be settled without turning to a detailed investigation of the translators. In the translation colophon, the names of the two persons responsible for the translation are preserved: Sa-dbang-bzang-po and Blo-gros-rgyal-po.25 Previously almost nothing was known about these two. As mentioned above, Bu-ston Rin-chen-grub (12901364) listed the Buddhacarita in the catalogue section of his history of Buddhism (1322) as the last item in the J ataka (sKyes rabs) section. There as translator he mentions only Blo-gros-rgyal-po. But he adds there the information that Blo-grosrgyal-po was a monk who was a native of Khams (khams pa dge slong).26 And in Bu-stons later catalogue to the Tanjur (1335), both the names Sa-dbang-bzang-po and Blo-gros-rgyal-po appearbut the former is listed as pan .d . ita and the latter as translator (lo ts a ba).27 That is all that is known about Blo-gros-rgyal-po. But the information that Sa-dbang-bzang-po was a pan .d . ita and not a Tibetan translator is a vital clue that must be followed further. Indeed there exists another work in the Tanjur that had been translated through the assistance of the Pan .d . ita Sa-dbang-bzang-po. This was the grammatical treatise Rab dbyei tshig leur byas pa (Vibhaktik arik a). The translation colophon as preserved in the Peking edition runs as follows:28
in Verhagen 1994. Could the Chos kyi rgyal po bzang po mentioned as the one at whose instigation an early Mongol-sponsored edition of Sa-pan . s Tshad ma rigs gter was carved also be a reference to Phags-pa? On this see van der Kuijp 1993, pp. 281 and 291. 24 This is Peking Tanjur no. 2060, Derge Tanjur no. 1172. Its text is reproduced in Mejor 1992, p. 93f. 25 See the third verse of the colophon as quoted above, note 6. 26 See above, note 8. 27 See above, note 9. The mention of the two as pan .d . ita and translator is also found in the catalogue to the Narthang Tanjur: Narthang dkar-chag vol. tso, p. 128b.5: pan a ba blo gros rgyal poi gyur |. .d . ita sa dbang bzang po dang | lo ts 28 Peking Tanjur, sGra rig pa, le, f. 82a.2 (= vol. 140, p. 35.1.2): yon tan mtha yas pa dang ldan pa bla ma dam pa chos kyi rgyal poi bka lung gis | bho . ta pan .d . i ta yis bskul ba bzhin du bal poi pan d ita dpal sa dbang bzang poi zhal snga nas | bod kyi lo ts a .. ba dge slong shong blo brtan gyis bal poi mthil du bsgyur bao ||. The pan .d . ita Sa-dbangbzang-po was not involved in the translation of any of the available versions of the sDeb sbyor rin chen byung gnas; they are the works of later translators. See for instance Narthang dkar-chag vol. tso, p. 138b.7, which records the presence of a translation by sTag-tshang lo-ts a-ba. And in the same work, another version is described. See ibid., p. 134a.5: di rtsa ba zha lu lo chen gyi gyur dang | rang grel chos ldan ra sa pas bsgyur bai phro | lo ts a ba grags pa rgyal mtshan gyis rdzogs par bsgyur ba las slar yang lo ts a ba nam mkha bzang pos bcos pai gyur |.

48

Aspects of Buddhism By order of the Noble Guru, King of Religion, who possesses innite virtues of wisdom, [and] in accordance with the urging of the Tibetan Pan .d . ita, this was translated by the Newar Pan .d . ita Sa-dbang-bzangpo [and] the Tibetan translator dGe-slong Shong Blo-brtan at Bal-po mThil [a central settlement of Nepal].

The Pan .d . ita Sa-dbang-bzang-po is here clearly identied as a Newar (bal po), and he was active in a main center of the Kathmandu valley (bal poi mthil, Patan?).29 Perhaps he had a Sanskrit name such as Mah ndrabhadra.30 He worked with the Tibetan translator dge-slong Shong Blo-gros-brtan-pa, who ourished in the late 1200s and possibly in the early 1300s.31 Shong Blo-gros-brtan-pa was the younger brother (gcung) of the famous Shong-ston rDo-rje-rgyal-mtshan, who under the encouragement and patronage of Phags-pa Blo-gros-rgyal-mtshan had introduced the study of Sanskrit grammar and poetics in Tibet in a big way. In addition, there exists still other references to Sa-dbang-bzang-po that make his importance and historical position even clearer. According to the records of teachings received (gsan yig) of the Fifth Dalai Lama (1617-1682) and Zhu29 Bal-poi mthil has been provisionally identied as Patan. See the references gathered by Verhagen 1991, p. 54, II.3.2, and notes 259 and 260. Perhaps this was short for bal poi mthil ye rang gi grong khyer. 30 See de Jong 1972, p. 509. Shagdaryn Bira and O. Sukhbaatar in their article On the Tibetan and Mongolian Translations of the Sanskrit Grammatical Works, Sanskrit and World Culture (Schriften zur Geschichte und Kultur des alten Orients 18) (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1986), p. 155, misread the pan .d . itas name as dBals-dBan bZan-po, and misidentied Shong Blo-brtan as dPang Blo-brtan. A pan .d . ita Sa-sbangrana tha bzang-po is also mentioned as an authority on the Mah abodhi legend by Ta in his rGya gar chos byung, (pp. 16, 18-20). This is cited by Per K. Srensen in his published M.A. thesis, A Fourteenth Century Tibetan Historical Work: rGyal rabs gsal bai me lon. Author, Date and Sources, A Case Study, Copenhagen, Akademisk Forlag, 1986), p. 208. Srensen suggested the possible Sanskrit reconstruction of Sa-dbangbzang-po as Ks . emendrabhadra, though it should be noted that the standard rendering of Ks emendra is dGe-bai-dbang-po. Verhagen 1991, p. 49, (=II.2.2), note 185, and p. . 168 (=App. A CG6) leaves the name in Tibetan. 31 For more details on him, see Verhagen 1991, p. 49, II.2.6, who gives his birth date as c. 1235/1245. This Blo-gros-brtan-pa is denitely not to be identied with dPang lo-ts a-ba Blo-gros-brtan-pa (1276-1342), as G. Roerich mistakenly did in a parenthetical remark in his translation of the Blue Annals, p. 786. He was correctly identied as the second great Blo-brtan, i.e. as Shong Blo-gros-brtan-pa (dPang-lo being the third) by van der Kuijp 1983, p. 289f, n. 2247, who also suggested that he ourished at the beginning of the 14th century. See also Mu-dge bSam-gtan, p. 57, and now Verhagen 1991, p. 50, II.2.8. See also the record of teachings received (gsan yig) lineages cited below in a subsequent footnote. dPang lo-ts a-ba is said to have studied under a Shong lo-ts a-ba, but the only studies recorded in the Fifth Dalai Lamas record of teachings received with anyone other than mChog-ldan-legs-pai-blo were with a nephew of Shong-ston, namely dbon-po Chos-skyong-dpal, under whom he studied Ks . emendras Bodhisattv avad anakalpalat a. See Dalai bla-ma V, Zab pa dang..., vol. 1, p. 29.6. On dPang-lo see now Verhagen 1991, p. 50, II.2.9.

D. Jackson On the Date of the Tibetan Translation...

49

chen Tshul-khrims-rin-chen (1700-1769), the Pan .d . ita Sa-dbang-bzang-po was the main teacher of Sanskrit metrics (sdeb sbyor: chandas) to the Shong brothers; in particular he taught them the basic work of Ratn akara s anti, the Chandoratn akara (sDeb sbyor rin chen byung gnas). The lineage given in those gsan yig for the study of this work begins:32 Pan .d . i-ta chen-po Rin-chen-byung-gnas Pan . -chen Sa-dbang-bzang-po Shong-lo mched-g nis [= the two Shong brothers] mChog-ldan-pa [= Lo-chen mChog-ldan-legs-pai-blo-gros-dpung-rgyan-mdzes-pai-tog] dPang-lo chen-po [Blo-gros-brtan-pa] Sa-dbang-bzang-po and Shong Blo-brtans translation of the above-mentioned grammatical work Rab dbyei tshig leur byas pa (Vibhaktik arik a) was also undertaken at the command of a Bla-ma-dam-pa Chos-kyi-rgyal-po, who in this context can hardly be anyone but Phags-pa Blo-gros-rgyal-mtshan, given the latters well-known relations with the elder Shong.33 In addition, the work was encouraged by a certain Tibetan pan ta pan .d . ita (bho . .d . i ta), probably the elder Shong himself, rDo-rje-rgyal-mtshan, since he was one of very fewif not the onlyTibetan in that period who could claim that title.

Conclusions

These references to Sa-dbang-bzang-po enable a somewhat rmer dating of the Buddhacarita translation. Two possibilities were suggested by the historical sources. The rst was that the project was undertaken during the earliest period of k avya translation, more or less contemporaneously with (though perhaps slightly later than) the work of Shong-ston rDo-rje-rgyal-mtshan, i.e. probably in the 1260s or 1270s. Phags-pa would then have been the Noble Guru, King of Religion who provided the main impetus. The poor quality of the work would have been due not only to the inferior skills of the translator, but also to the elementary level
Dalai bla-ma V, Ngag-dbang-blo-bzang-rgya-mtsho, Zab pa dang rgya che bai dam pai chos kyi thob yig gang gai chu rgyun, vol. 1, p. 31.6 (ka16a.6), and Zhu-chen Tshul-khrims-rin-chen, dPal ldan bla ma dam pa rnams las dam pai chos thos pai yi ge don g ner gdengs can rol pai chu gter (Dehra Dun, D. Gyaltsan, 1970), vol. 1, p. 93. For related lineages, see also Verhagen 1991, p. 238f, Appendix B: TransmissionLineage of Sanskrit grammatical studies in Tibet. 33 See also Verhagen 1991, p. 49 (=II.2.2), note 185, and p. 168 (=App. A CG6); and Verhagen 1992, p. 384, n. 14, where he is also identied as Phags-pa.
32

50

Aspects of Buddhism

of Sanskrit k avya studies existing among Tibetans in that period (though other factors such as a corrupt Sanskrit text and even an imperfect later transmission of the Tibetan text may also have played their parts). Perhaps a translation had been ordered by the Tibetan ruler, but the other patrons simply could not nd a translator who was equal to the task. The pan .d . ita at least can be assumed to have been competent, since he was a main transmitter of the study of Sanskrit metrics to the most eminent Tibetan scholars of the day. In this case, the queen of Gung-thang could have been the mother of the king Bum-lde-mgon (1253-1280), another Sa-skya princess Ni-ma-bum, and in this case the princess Kun-dgabum is not otherwise identiable at present, though she may have been a so-far unknown sister or aunt of that king, who had the same name. In that period, too, the Gung-thang royal line had matrimonial alliances with the Sa-skya Khon. According to Tshe-dbang-nor-bu, the de facto ruler then (i.e. in ca. the 1250s and 1260s) was the nun Lha Rin-chen-mtsho, who was Bum-lde-mgons youngest paternal great aunt. That nuns older sister Lha-cig mDzes-ma had married Sa-skya Pan .d . itas younger brother Zangs-tsha bSod-nams-rgyal-mtshan (1184-1239). The princess Ni-ma-bum was one of the ospring from this union.34 The second interpretation suggested by the sources was that Sa-dbang-bzangpo ourished considerably later than Shong-stons main teacher, the pan kara. .d . ita Laks . m This would account for Shong-stons having studied only a little with him, and with Sa-dbang-bang-pos (later) collaboration with Shong-stons younger brother as well as with the presumably later Blo-gros-rgyal-po. It is not impossible that this pan .d . ita could have been still active ca. 1310-1315. In that case his collaborator Blo-gros-rgyal-po would have been a contemporary of Shong Blo-brtan and of the latters disciple Lo-chen mChog-ldan-pa, and even of dPang-lo Blo-gros-brtanpa. Again, the inferior skills of Blo-gros-rgyal-po would have been mainly to blame for the poor work, though in this later period one might have expected better. In this second case, the princess Kun-dga-bum would be the known Sa-skya princess by that name, and her patronage could be dated to about the time of her marriage (ca. 1315-1320?) to the Gung-thang king Chos-skyong-lde. These two possibilities are, however, irreconcilable. The Sa-skya princess Kundga-bums birth cannot be pushed back much beyond 1300, and her marriage, even if it happened when she was quite young, can hardly be placed much earlier
Tshe-dbang-nor-bu . 2b.8-4a.3, gives the following succession of rulers in the 13th century: sKyob-pa-lde. (He had three daughters and one son, the latter being:) mGon-po-lde. (He was killed by the Mon army of Ye-tshe. His real consort had no son, but he had a son by [the nun] Ra-lai btsun-ma Byang-chub-dren, niece of gNos-ston mkhan-chen Byang-chub-gzungs. That son was born in the year of his fathers death.) bTsun-pa-lde. (During this period, the actual ruler was his youngest paternal aunt [ne ne], a nun named Lha Rin-chen-mtsho. Meanwhile her older sister Lha-cig mDzes-ma married Sa-skya Pan .d . itas younger brother, Zangs-tsha bSod-nams-rgyal-mtshan. She bore him two daughters, bSod-nams-bum and Ni-ma-bum, of whom bDag-mo Ni-mabum became the consort of bTsun-pa-lde.) Khri-rgyal Bum-lde-mgon. (He was born in the water-female-ox year, 1253).
34

D. Jackson On the Date of the Tibetan Translation...

51

than 1310. That would still have been thirty years after Phags-pas death. The period ca. 1315-1320, the likely time of the Sa-skya princess Kun-dga-bums coming to Gung-thang, would probably have been too late for the continuation of Phags-pas patronage, even as a sort of funeral memorial. Therefore a choice is necessary, and to me the rst possibilitywhich places the translation in the earlier periodseems much more plausible. This mainly hinges upon the association of Sa-dbang-bzang-po with both Shong brothers, and the mention of Bla-ma-dam-pa Chos-kyi-rgyal-po in both colophons of the two works that Sa-dbang-bzang-po helped translate. Taking everything into account, that Noble Guru, King of Religion in the translation colophon of the Buddhacarita was probably none other than the famous Phags-pa Blo-gros-rgyal-mtshan, just as Tucci (and even Cordier) proposed long ago, and the translation work was thus probably done in the 1260s or 1270s.

APPENDIX A
The Account on Kun-dga-bum in A-mes-zhabss Sa skya gdung rabs chen mo A-mes-zhabs Ngag-dbang-kun-dga-bsod-nams, Dzam gling byang phyogs kyi thub pai rgyal tshab chen po dpal ldan sa skya pai gdung rabs rin po che ji ltar byon pai tshul gyi rnam par thar pa ngo mtshar rin po chei bang mdzod dgos dod kun byung (New Delhi: Tashi Dorje, 1975), p. 449 (225a): bla ma bdag n id chen poi btsun mo spyi grangs kyi drug pa | gdung brgyud spel cig pai lung phud nas khab tu bzhes pai btsun mo lnga pa yul red mda ma | pha ming re mda bai rtsed po | ming lha cig n i ma rin chen zhes bya ba la sras lcam sring gsum khrungs pa dei nang nas gcen slob dpon chen po n i ma dpal zhes bya ba dus mchod bla brang du sku khrungs mod kyang gzhon nu la gshegs nas bstan pa la phan pa zhig ma byung | bar ma slob dpon ma kun dga bum zhes bya ba ste di ni khab so bkra shis su khrungs nas sku nar son pa na mnga ris gung thang du mnga bdag tu dben shai jo mo mdzad cing | sras slob dpon lha btsun phun tshogs dpal dang | mnga bdag bzang po lde g nis byung bai lha btsun phun tshogs dpal gyis gdan sa chen po dpal ldan sa skyar lo mang poi bar du chos chad mdzad ces grags shing | de nas dus phyis slob dpon ma des gdan sa chen por phebs pa na dpon chen gzhon dbang pa yab sras kyis bla brang seng ge sgang phyag tu phul nas | gnas der thugs dam zab moi ngang nas sku gshegs so |.

APPENDIX B
The Account of Kun-dga-bum in Rig-dzin Tshe-dbang-nor-bus Gung thang rgyal rabs Kah . -thog rig-dzin Tshe-dbang-nor-bu, Bod rje lha btsad poi gdung rabs mnga ri [sic] smad mang yul gung thang du ji ltar byung bai tshul deb gter dwangs shel phrul gyi me long, cursive manuscript copy (library of Mr. E. G. Smith) made from an original 22-folio manuscript in the library of Barmiok Athing, f. 10a:

52

Aspects of Buddhism

lha sras chos skyong lde yi btsun mor sa skya nas bdag n id chen po bzang po dpal bai sras mo kun dga bum zhes lha gcig red mda ma la bltams pa dbang kun dga legs pai gcen mo de khabs su bsus | bdag mo pha ming gi reg sde [?] thog mar rgyal po dang thugs mi mthun pai rnam pa byung yang bdag n id chen po yab sras thugs brling zhing byams pai zhal dang bzang pos khyab pa yis phyis thugs mdza shing gshim pai sras spyod [?] gu ru gter kha du ma dang | khyad par rig dzin rgod ldem can gyi rtsa bai chos bdag gter [10b] ston n id dang m nam par lung bstan pa khri bkra shis lde sku bltams | de yang ji skad du | khyad par mang yul sku lhai byang shar du || sa khar dung gi so mang ar ba byung || de ru rgyal rigs bong thung byang sems can || chos rgyal bkra shis lde zhes bya ba dang || gter di phrad na bod yul bstan pa ni || mi lo lnga bcu rtsa gsum bsdings [?] nus so || zhes pa mtshon mang du byung ba n id do | khri chos skyong lde chu brug gi lo la sku gshegs nas bkra shis lde la cod pan bcings nas rgyal thabs kyi bdag por mnga gsol bai btsun mo dbang kun dga legs pai sras mo bsod nams bum khabs su bsus | lo shas rings yab yum ha cang thugs gshim ma byung yang nang blon rgyam chen po dang sa gtso ba dkar po dpal sogs dzangs pa rnams kyi legs par bsdum nas shin tu mthun gshim su gyur | khri bkra shis lde yab kyi dgongs rdzogs su ston mchog sh akya sengei sku br nan dang yum gyi ched du phags ma sgrol mai sku br nan g nis mi tshad las ches mtho zhing g.yu r ning khyad par can sogs rin po chei phra rgyan gyis shin tu mdzes par byas pa dang | gzhan yang rdzong dkar gyi lcags ri . . . .

APPENDIX C
The Chronology of the Early Occupants of the Sa-skya See (I) The following is drawn from the Sa skyai gdung rabs found in A-mes-zhabs, as excerpted in Khetsun Sangpo, vol. 10, pp. 562-568. The only correction I have made is not to list Kun-dga-s ning-po twice. A preliminary study of this account can also be found in Jeffrey Schoening, The Sa-skya Throne Holder Lineage, unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of Washington, 1983, pp. 13-21. (1) Khon dKon-mchog-rgyal-po (1034-1102). Founds Sa-skya in chuglang (1073). [Tenure 1073-1102]. (2) Ba-ri lo-ts a-ba Rin-chen-grags (1040-1112). Tenure from 1102 until 1110 (lcags-stag). (3) Sa-chen Kun-dga-s ning-po (1092-1158). Tenure from lcags-yos (1111), for forty-seven years until sa-stag (1158). (4) bSod-nams-rtse-mo (1142-1182). Tenure from sa-stag (1158)? Or else he is to be omitted from the list. (5) Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan (1147-1216). Tenure from sa-yos (1159). (6) Sa-pan . Kun-dga-rgyal-mtshan (1182-1251). Tenure from me-byi (1216) until chu-yos (1243).

D. Jackson On the Date of the Tibetan Translation...

53

(7) The see held in common by Shar-pa Shes-rab-byung-gnas, Uyug-pa Rigs-pai-seng-ge (d. 1253?), and Sh akya-bzang-po? Or by Sh akya-grags alone? Tenure from shing-brug (1244) until shingbyi (1264). (8A) Phags-pa Blo-gros-rgyal-mtshan (1235-1280). First tenure shingglang to me-phag (1265-1266). (9) Rin-chen-rgyal-mtshan (1238-1279). Tenure for nine years (12671275?). (8B) Phags-pa. Second tenure, from me-byi until lcags-brug (1276-1280). (10) Dharmap ala (1268-1287). Tenure from lcags-sbrul (1281) until mephag (1287). (11) Shar-pa Jam-dbyangs-bzhi-thog-pa (1258-1306?). Tenure from sa-byi (1288) until me-bya (1297). (12) bDag- nid-chen-po bZang-po-dpal (1262-1324). Tenure from sakhyi (1298) until shing-byi (1324). (13) mKhas-btsun-chen-po [Nam-mkha-legs-pa] (1305-1343). Tenure from shing-glang (1325) until chu-lug (1343). (14) Jam-dbyangs-don-yod-rgyal-mtshan (1310-1344). Tenure for about three years (lo gsum tsam). (15) Bla-ma-dam-pa bSod-nams-rgyal-mtshan (1312-1375). Tenure from his thirty-third year (1344) for a short while (yun mi ring tsam zhig). (16) Ta-dben Blo-gros-rgyal-mtshan (1332-1364). Tenure for eighteen years (ca. 1347-1364?). (II) The following account is given by the Bod rgya..., p. 2891, in the article Sa skyai gdan rabs: (1) Khon dKon-mchog-rgyal-po (1034-1102). Founds Sa-skya in chuglang (1073). Tenure 1073-1102. (2) Ba-ri lo-ts a-ba Rin-chen-grags (1040-1112). Tenure 1102-1111? (3) Sa-chen Kun-dga-s ning-po (1092-1158). Tenure from lcags-yos (1111), for 47 years (until 1158). (4) bSod-nams-rtse-mo (1142-1182). Tenure from sa-stag (1158). (5) Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan (1147-1216). Tenure from chu-brug (1172). (6) Sa-pan . Kun-dga-rgyal-mtshan (1182-1251). Tenure from me-byi (1216). (7) Phags-pa (1235-1280). Tenure from lcags-phag (1251). (8) Younger brother (Rin-chen-rgyal-mtshan). When Phags-pa was at the capital.

54

Aspects of Buddhism (9) Dharmap ala (1268-1287). Tenure from sa-brug (1268!). [This is a mistake for his birth date. Better lcags-sbrul (1281)]. (10) Shar-pa Jam-dbyangs-bzhi-thog-pa (1258-1306?). Tenure from me-phag (1287). (11) bDag- nid-chen-po bZang-po-dpal (1262-1324). Tenure from shingbrug (1304), for 19 years. The see was vacant for three years, from chu-phag (1323) onward. (12) mKhas-btsun-chen-po [Nam-mkha-legs-pa] (1305-1343). Tenure from shing-glang (1325). [N.B.: Jam-dbyangs-don-yod-rgyalmtshan omitted from list]. (13) Bla-ma-dam-pa bSod-nams-rgyal-mtshan (1312-1375). Tenure from shing-sbrul [read: shing-sprel, 1344], for three years. (14) Ta-dben Blo-gros-rgyal-mtshan (1332-1364?). Tenure from mephag (1347). In the third year of his tenure, the Sa-skya-pas power was eclipsed.

Abbreviations and Bibliography Modern Studies

Bira/ Sukhbaatar Shagdaryn Bira and O. Sukhbaatar, On the Tibetan and Mongolian Translations of the Sanskrit Grammatical Works, Sanskrit and World Culture (Schriften zur Geschichte und Kultur des alten Orients 18). Berlin, 1986, Akademie-Verlag. P. Cordier, Catalogue du Fonds Tibetain de la Biblioth` eque Nationale, Part 3. H. Hadano, Chibetto Daizokyo Engi (1) [A History of the Compiling and Editing of the Tibetan Buddhist Scriptures, the Kanjur and Tanjur, Part 1], Suzuki Gakujutsu Zaidan Kenky o Nempo, vol. 3, 1963. M. Hahn, Buddhacarita I, 1-7 und 25-40, IndoIranian Journal, vol. 17, 1975, pp. 77-96. D. Jackson, The Early History of Lo (Mustang) and Ngari, Contributions to Nepalese Studies, vol. 4, no. 1, Dec. 1976, pp. 39-56. E. H. Johnston, The Buddhacarita or Acts of the Buddha, Lahore. Reprinted: Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1972. E.H. Johnston, The Buddhas Mission and Last Journey: Buddhacarita, xv to xxviii, Acta Orientalia, vol. 15, pp. 26-111 and 231-292.

Cordier 1915 Hadano 1963

Hahn 1975 Jackson 1976

Johnston 1936

Johnston 1937

D. Jackson On the Date of the Tibetan Translation... de Jong 1972 van der Kuijp 1983

55

J.W. de Jong, Notes ` a propos des colophons du Kanjur, Zentralasiatische Studien, vol. 6, pp. 505-559. Leonard W.J. van der Kuijp, Contributions to the Development of Tibetan Buddhist Epistemology from the Eleventh to the Thirteenth Century, Alt- und NeuIndische Studien, No. 26, Wiesbaden, 1983, Franz Steiner Verlag. Leonard van der Kuijp, Two Mongol Xylographs (Hor par ma) of the Tibetan Text of Sa skya Pan .d . itas Work on Buddhist Logic and Epistemology, Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, vol. 16-2, 1993, pp. 279-298. Marek Mejor, Ks avad ana. emendras Bodhisattv kalpalat a: Studies and Materials, Studia Philologica Buddhica, Monograph Series VIII. Tokyo, 1992, The International Institute for Buddhist Studies. S. Nishioka, Index to the Catalogue Section of Bustons History of Buddhism (II), Annual Report of the Institute for the Study of Cultural Exchange, The University of Tokyo, no. 5, 1981, pp. 43-94. L. Petech, Central Tibet and the Mongols. The Y uan-Sa-skya Period of Tibetan History, Serie Orientale Roma, vol. 65, Rome, 1990, IsMEO. G.N. Roerich, transl. The Blue Annals, Calcutta, Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal 1949-53, Reprint: Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1976. D. Seyfort Ruegg, The Life of Bu ston Rin po che, Serie Orientale Roma, vol. 34. Rome, 1966, IsMEO. D. Seyfort Ruegg, Some Reections of Translating Buddhist Philosophical texts from Sanskrit and Tibetan, Asiatische Studien, vol. 46-1, 1992, pp. 367391. Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa, Tibet: A Political History. Yale University Press, Reprint: New York, Potala Publications, 1984. Jeffrey Schoening, The Sa-skya Throne Holder Lineage, M.A. Thesis, 1983, University of Washington. E. Gene Smith, The Tradition of Philology & Literary Theory in Tibetan Scholasticism, Unpublished paper presented to the Inner Asia Colloquium, University of Washington, on February 6, 1964. U. W. Archives, acc. no. 85-42, box 6.

van der Kuijp 1993

Mejor 1992

Nishioka 1981

Petech 1990

Roerich

Seyfort Ruegg 1966 Seyfort Ruegg 1992

Shakabpa 1967

Schoening 1983 Smith 1964

56 Smith 1970

Aspects of Buddhism E. Gene Smith, Introduction to Encyclopedia Tibetica [Bo-dong Pan id dus pa], vol. 6, New Delhi, . -chens De n 1970, Tibet House. Per K. Srensen, A Fourteenth Century Tibetan Historical Work: rGyal rabs gsal bai me lon. Author, Date and Sources. A Case Study. Copenhagen, 1986, Akademisk Forlag. [Published version of M.A. thesis of 1982, Copenhagen University.] J. Szerb, Bu stons History of Buddhism in Tibet, Wien, 1990, Verlag der Osterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. G. Tucci, Tibetan Painted Scrolls, Rome, 1949. G. Tucci, transl. and ed. Deb ter dmar po gsar ma, Serie Orientale Roma, vol. 24, Rome, 1971, IsMEO. P. Verhagen, Sanskrit grammatical literature in Tibet: A Study of the Indo-Tibetan canonical literature on Sanskrit grammar and the development of Sanskrit studies in Tibet. Doctoral dissertation, Leiden University. P. Verhagen, Royal Patronage of Sanskrit Grammatical Studies in Tibet, in A. W. van den Hoek, D. H. A. Kol and M. S. Oort, eds., Ritual, State and History in South Asia: Essays in honour of J. C. Heesterman, Memoirs of the Kern Institute, n. 5, Leiden, 1992, E. J. Brill. pp. 375-392. P. Verhagen, A History of Sanskrit Literature in Tibet. Translations of the Canonical Literature, Leiden, 1994, E.J. Brill. C. Vogel, On the First Canto of A svaghos . as Buddhacarita, Indo-Iranian Journal, vol. 9, 1966, pp. 266290. A. K. Warder. Indian K avya Literature, Vol. Delhi, 1974, Motilal Banarsidass. 2,

Srensen 1986

Szerb 1990

Tucci 1949 Tucci 1971 Verhagen 1991

Verhagen 1992

Verhagen 1994

Vogel 1966

Warder 1974 Weller 1926-28

F. Weller, Das Leben des Buddha von A svaghos . a, Leipzig: Eduard Pfeier. 2 vols., [Tibetan text and German translation of I-XVII, v. 41.] F. Weller, Untersuchung u ber die textgeschichtliche Entwicklung des tibetischen Buddhacarita, Berlin, 1980.

Weller 1980

D. Jackson On the Date of the Tibetan Translation...

57

Tibetan Sources
Tshe-dbang-nor-bu Kah . -thog rig-dzin Tshe-dbang-nor-bu, Bod rje lha btsad poi gdung rabs mnga ri [sic] smad mang yul gung thang du ji ltar byung bai tshul deb gter dwangs shel phrul gyi me long. Cursive manuscript copy of an original 22-folio manuscript in the library of Barmiok Athing Densapa. Reprinted in: rGyal rabs phyogs sdebs (sNgon gyi gtam me tog gi phreng ba), Dharamsala, Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 1985, pp. 627669. See also the modern Lhasa ed. Gangs can mig mdzod, vol. 9, (Bod ljongs bod yig dpe r ning dpe skrun khang. 1990), pp.87-150. Khetsun Sangpo (mKhas-btsun-bzang-po), Biographical Dictionary of Tibet and Tibetan Buddhism, Dharamsala, Library of Tibetan Works and Archives. Ngor-chen Kun-dga-bzang-po, bsTan bcos gyur ro tshal gyi dkar chag thub bstan rgyas pai n i od [Catalogue to the Glo-bo Tanjur], Collected Works, Sa skya pai bka bum, T oy o Bunko. vol. 10, pp. 357.4.3-366.4 (= a, f. 286a-304a).

Khetsun Sangpo

Ngor-chen Kun-dga-bzang-po

Narthang dkar-chag bsTan bcos gyur ro cog gsung par du bsgrubs pai dkar chag tshangs pai dbyangs, [Catalogue to the Narthang Tanjur], Narthang Tanjur, Tibet House Library. vol. tso. Dalai bla-ma V Dalai bla-ma V, Ngag-dbang-blo-bzang-rgyamtsho, Zab pa dang rgya che bai dam pai chos kyi thob yig gang gai chu rgyun, 4 vols., Delhi, 1971. Bu-ston, dkar-chag Bu-ston Rin-chen-grub, bsTan gyur gyi dkar chag yid bzhin nor bu dbang gi rgyal poi phreng ba, Collected Works, vol. 26 (la), Satapit . aka Series, New Delhi, 1971. Bu-ston Rin-chen-grub, bDe bar gshegs pai bstan pai gsal byed chos kyi byung gnas gsung rab rin po chei mdzod, Collected Works vol. 17 (ya), Satapit . aka Series, vol. 64, New Delhi, 1971. Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo, Beijing, Mi-rigs-dpeskrun-khang, 1985. Mu-dge bSam-gtan, Bod du rig gnas dar tshul mdor bsdus bshad pa, Chengdu, 1982. Zhu-chen Tshul-khrims-rin-chen, dPal ldan bla ma dam pa rnams las dam pai chos thos pai yi ge don g ner gdengs can rol pai chu gter, Dehra Dun, D. Gyaltsan, 1970.

Bu-ston

Bod rgya... Mu-dge bSam-gtan Zhu-chen Tshulkhrims-rin-chen

58 Sangs rgyas kyi...

Aspects of Buddhism Sangs rgyas kyi spyod pa zhes bya bai s nan ngag chen po, Tibetan Tripit aka, Peking Edition (P no. 5656), . bsTan gyur, mDo grel, sKyes rabs, vol. 129, pp. 121.1.1-172.1.8 (=nge 1a-124b). A-mes-zhabs Ngag-dbang-kundga-bsod-nams, Dzam gling byang phyogs kyi thub pai rgyal tshab chen po dpal ldan sa skya pai gdung rabs rin po che ji ltar byon pai tshul gyi rnam par thar pa ngo mtshar rin po chei bang mdzod dgos dod kun byung, New Delhi, Tashi Dorje, 1975.

A-mes-zhabs

Aspects of Buddhism, Liw, Poland, June 25, 1994

rNgog lots aba on the sahopalambhaniyama proof in Dharmak rtis Pram an scaya . avini
Helmut Krasser (Vienna) Although rNgog lots aba Blo ldan shes rab alias Blo ldan bzang po1 (1059-1109) was one of the principal exponents of the later phase of the pre-classical period of the development of tshad ma in Tibet,2 from among the huge number of his works3 only a few have come down to us. A brief topical outline or summary (bsdus don ) of the Mah ay anas utr alam ara was published in 1985; editions of his commentaries to . k the Ratnagotravibh aga and the Abhisamay alam ara4 with an introduction by David . k Jackson are now under preparation. Thus, information on rNgog lots aba and his followers, the representatives of the so called rNgog lugs, has been available only from secondary sources. Many of these materials have been collected in Leonard van der Kuijps pioneer study of the early period of Tibetan epistemology5 and have been supplemented by David Jackson.6 From among his works on tshad ma, only two seem to have survived: a commentary on the Pram an scaya (rNam . avini nges kyi . t ka ), and his Tshad ma rnam nges kyi dka gnas rnam par bshad pa, Explanation of the dicult points in the Pram an scaya.7 The publication . avini
Cf. van der Kuijp 1983 p. 31. For this periodization cf. van der Kuijp 1989 p. 8-18. 3 A list of his work is to be found in van der Kuijp 1983 pp. 34&57. 4 For references cf. Jackson 1987 p. 1488 . 5 Cf. van der Kuijp 1983, Chapter 1 Rngog lo-ts a-ba Blo-ldan shes-rab and the Rngog-lugs of epistemology. 6 Cf. Jackson 1987 pp. 127-131 & 165-169, and David Jackson, An Early Bi ography of rNog lotsaba Blo ldan ses rab. In: Tibetan Studies. Proceedings of the 6th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies. Fagernes 1992. Per Kvaerne (ed.). Vol. I. Oslo 1994, 372-392. 7 Both texts are kept in the Library of the Cultural Palace of Nationalities (CPN); cf. Ernst Steinkellner, Early Tibetan Ideas on the Ascertainment of Validity (nges byed kyi tshad ma ). In: Tibetan Studies. Proceedings of the 5th Seminar of the In ren Ihara and Zuicho ternational Association for Tibetan Studies. Narita 1989. Sho Yamaguchi (eds.). Narita 1992 [257-273] p. 26451 . The Lo chen gyi mdzad pai rnam nges . t ka (CPN no. 5139[1]) is incomplete and consists of 132 folios; the last portion is missing; cf. Leonard van der Kuijp, On Some Early Tibetan Pram an ada Texts . av of the China Nationalities Library of the Cultural Palace of Nationalities in Beijing
2 1

60

Aspects of Buddhism

of the latter text has been announced for the near future. The work consists of three chapters on pratyaks artha- and par arth anum ana and covers 124 folios . a, sv made up of 8 lines; folio no.1 is missing. The manuscript is written in a legible dbu med script sometimes preserving an old orthography, so that in most cases but not always we nd a subscribed y in front of the palatal vowels such as myed pa for med pa, or dmyigs pa for dmigs pa. Instead of snang ba, snang pa is mostly written and the term dam bca bai don also occurs in the variants dam bcas pai don, dam bcwa bai don and dam bcwa bai don. In some instances the genitive i such as in pai is separated from the preceding consonant by a tsheg so that we read pa i. Moreover, the post-post-xed d (da drag ) is used as in gyurd pa. The initial consonant of nal particles and the like is quite often omitted, e.g. thalo for thal lo, or thade for thad de. The use of abbreviations seems to be restricted to tham . d for thams cad. Finally, it should be mentioned that units of the text belonging together are separated from each other by writing two or three dots in vertical order between a double shad. Smaller units are separated by using two dots either before or after the shad. This method, however, is not consequently applied. From this manuscript I shall reproduce a small portion, namely rNgog lots abas interpretation of Dharmak rtis sahopalambhaniyama proof as propounded in his Pram an scaya, in order to gain some insight into his style, . avini into the development of textual analysis, the so called sa bcad technique, and, of course, into his way of understanding the theme and his appropriation of the ideas of his Indian predecessors. The last section in the pratyaks an scaya (PVin . apariccheda of the Pram . avini I 78,12-100,26)8 is devoted to the distinction between a means of cognition and its eect (pram an n ana ) bears two . aphala ) in order to prove that any cognition (j aspects, one grasping or subjective (gr ahaka ) and one to be grasped or objective (gr ahya ). The equivalent to this in the Pram an arttika is to be found in the . av 9 10 pratyaks a chapter vv. 301-366 and vv. 388-391 . Having rst explained what . should be known as pram an a and its phala in accordance with the doctrine that . an external object exists (b ahy arthav ada ) and that in the end it is not necessary to assume the existence of an object external to cognition (PVin I 78, 12-90, 16), Dharmak rti proceeds to establish their dierence without assuming an external object. In this context he presents two proofs according to the teaching that everything is just cognition (vij naptim atra ).11 The rst of these two proofs runs 12 as follows:
(unpublished). 8 The entire section has been translated into English in George Dreyfus & Christian Lindtner, The Yog ac ara Philosophy of Dign aga and Dharmak rti. Studies in Central & East Asian Religions 2, 1989 pp. 27-52. 9 Vetter in his edition of PVin I refers to the respective parallels. 10 Cf. Iwata I 15. 11 Cf. the introduction of this sub-section in PVin I 94, 14: di rnam par rig pa tsam n id yin na . . . 12 This proof as well as the second one (rig pa zhes bya ba yang dei bdag n id yin pai phyir de ltar gsal bao | | PVin I 98, 7f) are the subject of Iwatas study on sahopala-

H. Krasser rNgog lots aba on the sahopalambhaniyama . . .

61

sahopalambhaniyam ad abhedo n lataddhiyoh . |v.55ab (lhan cig dmigs pa nges pai phyir | sngo dang de blo gzhan ma yin |) . . . dvicandr adivat (zla ba g nis la sogs pa bzhin no). PVin I 94,22f The passage is normally translated as: Blue and its cognition are not dierent from each other, because they are necessarily perceived together . . . like the two moons (seen by one suering from a timira eye disease).13 According to rNgog lots aba who was quite familiar with this topic he not only cooperated in the translation of the Pram an scaya but also in that of . avini Dharmottaras T k a and Praj n a karaguptas Pram a n av a rttik alam ara there are . . . k two points to be dealt with in this proof: (1.) the subject of the thesis (dam bca bai don, pratij na rtha), and (2.) the faults of the reason (gtan tshigs kyi skyon, hetudos a ) as criticized by the opponents. Because with regard to the hetudos . . as rNgog lots aba does not provide us with any new information, but only disproves the criticism of Subhagupta as formulated in his B ahy arthasiddhik arik a which is refuted in the epistemological tradition of Dharmak rti with more or less the same arguments, I will not discuss them here. Concerning the subject of the thesis in this proof, rNgog lots aba distinguishes (1.1.) the locus of properties (chos can, dharmin ) and (1.2.) the property to be proved (bsgrub byai chos, s adhyadharma ). The dharmin is determined to be made up only by the objective aspect consisting of something blue etc. He stresses the point that the subjective aspect should not be regarded as dharmin, for the gr ahak ak ara in this proof is dierent from the gr ahy ak ara. This is due to the fact that the gr ahak ak ara has to be understood as being real (bden pa, satya ) while the gr ahy ak ara is said to be unreal or false (brdzun pa, al ka ). The property to be proved, i.e. abheda, is interpreted as being of the nature of a non-implicative negation (myed par dgag pa, prasajyapratis . edha ) and he dispels the assumption of its being an implicative negation (ma yin par dgag pa, paryud asapratis . edha ). This means that by the negation in the term abheda only the being dierent is negated, but it should not be understood in the sense that Dharmak rti intended the identity of the two aspects. The determination of the s adhyadharma now is a point where the dierence
mbhaniyama (cf. Iwata I, II), in which the commentators interpretations are considered as well. On Subhaguptas criticism of the sahopalambhaniyama proof in his B ahy arthasiddhik arik a together with the reaction on it in the Tattvasam s las . graha, in Kamala Pa njik a, and in Dharmottaras Pram an scayat k a and on Haribhadras uris refutation . avini . of this proof in his Anek antajayapat ak a, cf. Matsumoto 1980. 13 Apart from the interpretation of saha the various translations do not in essence differ: [Ferner] gibt es keine Verschiedenheit zwischen Blau und seiner Erkenntnis, weil sie notwendig gleichzeitig wahrgenommen werden. Vetter transl. of PVin I 95; Blue and the cognition of blue are not dierent from each other, because they are necessarily perceived together. Matsumoto 1980 p. 2; There [really] is no dierence between something blue and the idea of the [blue thing] because [the two] must be perceived simultaneously. Dreyfus/Lindtner 1989 p. 46 (cf. fn. 8); Das Blaue und die Erkenntnis davon sind nicht verschieden, weil sie ausschlielich zusammen wahrgenommen werden. Iwata I 15.

62

Aspects of Buddhism

between Dharmak rtis commentators regarding the interpretation of this proof most clearly nds expression. This in part applies to the locus of the properties as well, but the dharmin was not a theme of their discussions and thus their views can be understood only by implication. In order to see the impact of the Indian tradition on rNgog lots aba we rst have to look at the respective interpretations. In roughly presenting the commentators explanations I will make use of the results of Iwatas study on the topic and more details can be found there. Except for the akyabuddhi concepts of Dharmottara who comments on the PVin and those of S and Kamala s la who explicitly relate their statements to the passage of the PVin under consideration, the interpretations of the other commentators are comparable with those of rNgog lots aba only to a certain degree, for the contexts in which this argument is applied and explained may dier. Devendrabuddhi in his commentary on PV III 388 deduces from the reason being necessarily perceived together the identity (ekatva ) of blue and its cognition.14 Thus the dharmin consists in the subjective and objective aspect and akyabuddhi shares this opinion. He quotes the s adhyadharma is their identity. S PVin I 55ab and blames an opponent who takes the s adhyadharma to be a mere negation of the dierence (bhedapratis edham a tra ) for his ignorance regarding the . antaraks intention of Dharmak rti.15 S itas position is not clear.16 Kamala s la, . however, explicitly determines that the dharmin consists of the blue and its cognition and that the s adhyadharma is their non-dierence.17 In Praj n akaraguptas Alam ara there are several passages which indicate that he understands the term . k abheda in the meaning of identity. He explains, for example, that in the dr s. t anta used by Dharmak rti, dvicandr adivat, the two moons seen by one suer..
14 Cf. Iwata I 113 (transl.) & II 9312 : PVP [P No. 5717(b)] 276b1: sngon po la sogs pa dang de n ams su myong ba dag ni lhan cig dmigs pai phyir tha dad par snang ba can n id yin na yang gcig yin no zhes bya bai don to | | = Although blue etc. and the awareness of it appear to be dierent, they are identical because they are perceived together. 15 Cf. . . . cig car dmigs pa nges pai phyir | sngon po de blo tha dad med (PVin I 55ab) ces bya ba la sogs pa gsungs pa yin no | | tha dad pa dgag pa tsam de bsgrub par bya ba yin gyi tha dad pa med do zhes bya ba (P; D: zhes pa ) ni ma yin te | de yang bshad ) 255b1f na bstan bcos mdzad pa mi mkhas par ston par gyur ro | | PVT . P (5718 Ne ] 207a2f) = If one explains that (the property) to be proved is the mere (D [4220 Ne negation of dierence but not the non-dierence1) [as formulated by Dharmak rti] one demonstrates that the sa strak ara is not learned. Cf. Iwata I 141f & II 10775 . 1) As bhedapratis atra here probably is to be interpreted as prasajyapratis . edham . edha, the term tha dad pa med (pa) may be understood in the meaning of identity. 16 Cf. Iwata I 184. 17 Cf. dharmy atra n l ak arataddhiyau. tayor abhinnatvam adhyadharmah . s . . yathoktah . sahopalambhaniyamo hetuh dr sa ev ac ar ye sahopalambhaniyam at (PVin I v. 55ab) .. . ity adau prayoge hetvartho bhipretah . . TSP 691,23-25. = The locus of the property in this (proof) are the blue aspect and its cognition. Their not being dierent is the property antaraks to be proved. The reason, as it is stated [by S . ita], is the being necessarily perceived together. Such a meaning of the reason is intended in the formulation as applied by the teacher: because they are necessarily perceived together etc.

H. Krasser rNgog lots aba on the sahopalambhaniyama . . .

63

ing from a timira eye disease are identical (ekat a ).18 In the same way, Ravigupta 19 claims the identity of blue and its cognition. Finally, we should have a look at Dharmottaras comments in his Pram an avini s cayat k a, the text of which was . . translated by rNgog lots aba and on which he wrote a topical summary (bsdus don ).20 In the PVinT . there is no passage where Dharmottara identies the dharmin. However, as he explains that in Dharmak rtis verse abhedah . has to be construed 21 with n lataddhiyoh , meaning that blue and its cognition are not dierent from . each other, the dharmin can be understood as consisting of the blue and its cognition, as was clearly stated by Kamala s la who seems to rely on Dharmottara in this point. In determining the s adhyadharma Dharmottara does not use the terms prasajya- and paryud asapratis aba, but only speaks of a . edha applied by rNgog lots mere negation (pratis edham a tra ) of dierence. However, that prasajyapratis . . edha is intended can be seen from his denial that the property to be proved is identity.22
18 Cf. ayam eva bhedahetur yad uta bhinnayogaks a. indudvayapratibh asasya tu . emat bhinnayogaks em a bh a v a t ekataiva . PVBh 410,11f = Only the fact of having a dier. ent fate [i.e. cause and eect] is cause of a dierence. The two moons that appear, however, do not have a dierent fate. Therefore they are merely identical. Cf. also abhinnayogaks ad ekatvam arthasya j na nena durv aram . . . PVBh 430,32 = The . ematv objects identity with cognition cannot be denied, for it does not have a dierent fate. These and some other passages are referred to in Iwata I 145. 19 PVT . (P 5722) 167a3: dei phyir tha dad par snang yang lhan cig par dmigs pai phyir don dang shes pa dag gcig n id yin no | | = Although they therefore appear to be dierent, blue and its cognition are identical because they are perceived together. Cf. Iwata I147 & II 11188 . 20 Cf. van der Kuijp 1983 p. 34. 21 Cf. sngo (D: sngon P) dang dei blo dag gzhan ma yin zhes bya ba ni tha dad pa med pao | | bsgrub par bya bai cha dir bstan pai phyir gsungs pa ni | gang gi phyir (PVin I 94,20) zhes bya bao | | PVinT . P 182b6-7 (D 157a3-4) = Blue and its cognition are not dierent from each other, i.e. non-dierent. In order to show the part to be proved he said for. 22 don gzhan pai rang bzhin n id ma yin te (PVin I 94,21) zhes bya ba ni bsgrub par bya ba ston pao | | di skad du di dag gcig par ni bsgrub par bya ba ma yin gyi | on kyang tha dad bdag1) dgag pa tsam yin no zhes ston pa yin no | | cii phyir tha dad pa dgag pa tsam bsgrub par bya ba yin gyi | gcig n id du ni bsgrub pa ma yin no zhes smra | . . . P 182b8-183a2 (D 157a5-6) = [The formulation:] It is not of the nature of an other thing (na . . . arth antarar upatvam . ) shows (the property) to be proved. It shows that it is not to be proved that the two are identical, but the mere negation of the being of dierent nature [is to be proved]. [Question:] Why do you say that (the property) to be proved is the mere negation of dierence but not their identity? . . . 1) The reading of bdag is problematical. Derge reads either bdag or pa dag. Peking reads only dag. The variant tha dad (pa) dag dgag pa would be equivalent to bhinnayor pratis . edhah . which does not make sense. tha dad bdag dgag pa could translate a Sanskrit bhinn atma(tva)pratis . edha meaning negation of their being of dierent nature. Perhaps the correct reading is, as in the following p urvapaks . a, just tha dad pa dgag pa. Iwata II 122139 and Matsumoto 1980 p. 18f both interpret tha dad (pa) dag dgag pa in the sense of bhedapratis . edha.

64

Aspects of Buddhism

Moreover, he species the subjective aspect to be real (vastu )23 and the objective aspect to be unreal (asatya )24 . As can be easily seen, from among the interpretations of the Indian commentators that of rNgog lots aba is quite close to the perception of Dharmottara. rNgog lots aba as well as Dharmottara understand the property to be proved to be of the nature of a prasajyapratis . edha and both consider the subjective aspect to be real and the objective one to be unreal or false. In determining the locus of property, however, they dier insofar as Dharmottara regards both aspects to constitute the dharmin while rNgog lots aba denies the gr ahak ak ara s being part of it. The reasons for this interpretation put forward by rNgog lots aba are that in this argument the subjective aspect must be dierent from the objective one and that the negation of dierence is an activity towards the objective aspect. But what does he mean by this? The purpose of this section of the PVin is, as already mentioned, to establish that any cognition (j n ana ) bears two aspects25 26 according to the vij naptim atrat a -theorem. It must be added that Dharmak rti 27 is still arguing on the level of s am vyavah a rikapram a n a . This means, as rNgog . . lots aba explains afterwards (1.2.1.), that on this level the subjective aspect is said to be existent (yod pa, sat ), for it is not only experienced as being illuminated but it is also reliable (mi slu ba, avisam adin ). Thus it is real (bden pa, satya ). The . v objective aspect is, although experienced as being illuminated, not reliable, for
23 rnam par shes pa mi (P: ni D) bden pa gsal (D: bsal P) bar nus pa ma rig pai bdag n id can ni dngos po yin gyi brtags (P: brtag D) pa ni ma yin no | | sc PVinT . P 177b2f (D 152b2) = The cognition which is capable of illuminating something unreal (asatya ) (and) which is of the nature of ignorance (avidy a ) is real (vastu ), but it is not imagined (kalpita ). (cf. Iwata I 179 & II 126165 ). Cf. also . . . mi bden pa gsal bar byed pai rang bzhin yang rdzun pa ni ma yin no | | PVinT . P 177b5f (D 152b6) = . . . and the aspect which illuminates something unreal is not false (al ka ). 24 gang gi phyir gang ji s ned snang ba de kho na ltar thams cad bden pa ni ma yin te | khrul pas med pa yang snang bai phyir ro | | PVinT . P 182b8 (D 157b5) = For not everything is real in just that way as it appears [in cognition], because due to an error [consisting of avidy a ]1) something non-existing also appears [in cognition]. 1) Cf. dei phyir ma rig pai nus pa dang ldan pai shes pa mi bden pai rang bzhin gsal bai byed pa yin pai phyir ma rig pai dbang gis gsal ba yin no zhes brjod pa la ni kha na ma tho ba yod pa ma yin no | | PVinT adv adaratn akara 170,17. 184b6f (D 158b5f) quoted in Sy 19 (identied in Iwata II 123144 , transl. in I 174): etena Dharmottaren . a yad abhidadhe tasm ad avidy a saktiyuktam na nam asatyar upam adar sayat ty avidy ava sa t prak a sata ity . j ucyata ity anavadyam iti = Therefore a cognition that is connected with ignorance shows an unreal form. Thus it is no fault to state that [cognition] by force of ignorance illuminates [an unreal form]. 25 Cf. des na blo ni tshul g nis pa | v. 59c dei phyir yul dang shes pai rang bzhin dag gis blo tshul g nis su grub pa yin no | | PVin I 100,4-6 = Thus, mind is two-fold. Therefore it is established that mind by way of the form of the object and that of cognition is two-fold. 26 Cf. above fn. 11. 27 Cf. s am arikasyaitat pram an upam uktam. PVin I 100,20 = What we . vyavah . asya r have explained is the nature of a valid cognition of everyday life.

H. Krasser rNgog lots aba on the sahopalambhaniyama . . .

65

its reliability is invalidated by a correct or valid cognition (tshad mas gnod pa, pram an adhita )28 and thus it is false (brdzun pa, al ka ). This constitutes the dif. ab ference between them.29 Moreover, the objective aspect cannot be real, for then neither of the two kinds of connections (brel pa, pratibandha ) would be possible. A causal connection, tadutpatti, contradicts their existence at the same time,30 and identity, t ad atmya, of two really existing entities is not possible by denition.31 These seem to be the main reasons for rNgog lots abas position. What does this explanation mean for Dharmak rtis sahopalambhaniyama proof? According to this interpretation the verse (sahopalambhaniyam ad abhedo n lataddhiyoh .| v. 55ab) should be translated as follows: Because blue and its cognition are necessarily perceived together, [blue] is not dierent [from its cognition]. If we now look at rNgog lots abas own translation of this passage lhan cig dmigs pa nges pai phyir | sngo dang de blo gzhan ma yin | such an interpretation is, as is the case with the Sanskrit version, neither supported nor contradicted, although one is inclined to understand n lataddhiyoh . as referring to both, sahopalambhaniyam ad and abhedo. However, this understanding obviously contradicts a later formulation of Dharmak rti in verse 59ab where he says that even in the case that an external object exists, blue and its cognition are not dierent from each other. This he explains as follows: By the two [reasons explained above, namely] being perceived together and consciousness it is established that the manifestation of blue and the like [in cognition] and its consciousness are not dierent from each other even in the case that an external object exists.32 In this statement the dharmin denitely is not the objective aspect alone but consists of the blue and its cognition. Did rNgog lots aba consciously deviate from Dharmak rti or is it possible that he overlooked this statement?
For the translation of the term tshad ma, pram an . a as valid cognition which I adopt in the following, cf. Tom J.F. Tillemans, Persons of Authority. The sTon pa tshad mai skyes bur sgrub pai gtam of A lag sha Ngag dbang bstan dar . . . Stuttgart 1993 pp. v-vi. 29 Cf. 1.2.1. lan ni dzin pa ni myong pa dang myi slu ba yod pas | de yod par brjod kyi | bzung pa ni gsal bar tshor yang tshad mas gnod pas myi slu ba myed de | des na gsal bar tshor bar khyad par myed kyang gang yang gnod byed myed par grub pai myi slu ba yod pa de ni bden la de myed pa ni brdzun pas na khyad par grub bo | | 30 This means that rNgog lots aba understands saha- in the sahopalambhaniyama proof as meaning at the same time. On the dierent interpretations of saha- cf. Iwata I 66-103. 31 Cf. 1.2.1. gzhan yang bzung pa bden par gsal bar thal ba yang ma yin te | bden pa dang brel pas myi thad pas ste | dus cig pa dang rang bzhin myi gcig pa la brel pa g nis ga gal bai phyir dang | gsum pa yang myi srid pai phyir ro | | 32 <1 de phyir snang don blo de dag | phyi don yod kyang tha dad min |1> v. 59ab lhan cig dmigs pa dang rig pa dag gis phyi rol gyi don yod kyang sngon po la sogs pa snang ba dang de rig pa dag tha dad med par grub bo | | PVin I 98,29-100,3. <1> Quoted in I svarapratyabhij na vivr sin III 32,14: b ahye py arthe tato bhedo . ttivimar bh asam an arthatadvidoh . |; identied in Elliot M. Stern, Additional Fragments of Pram an scaya I-II. WZKS 35, 1991 [151-168] p. 161. . avini
28

66

Aspects of Buddhism

I do not think either is the case, for rNgog lots abas interpretation exactly follows Dharmak rtis own explanation of the sahopalambhaniyama proof which says: For blue is not of the nature of a thing that is dierent from (its) awareness, although it appears to be dierent because the two are necessarily perceived together, like the two moons (seen by one suering from a timira eye disease).33 Here Dharmak rti only speaks of the non-dierence of the blue from its awareness, but not of their being mutually not dierent. Thus, in this passage, the dharmin consists of the blue and its non-dierence from its awareness is the property to be proved (s adhyadharma ). Further, in the whole following section up to the second proof by means of consciousness (rig pa ) (PVin I 97,7), there is not a single remark which could be understood in the sense that the cognitions non-dierence from the blue is intended. In the same way, in the explanation of the second proof, Dharmak rti only states that the blue is not a thing that is dierent from its awareness.34 As we now should not assume that Dharmak rti in his explanation of this verse in prose formulates a new idea dierent from that in the verse, the verse has to be understood in the very same way. The contradiction to the passage mentioned above (PVin I 98,29-100,3) can be explained in such a manner that the argument expressed in the verse has to be formulated in two dierent ways. When formulated from the standpoint of the vij naptim atrat a, only the non-dierence of the blue is intended and it is only the blue that constitutes the dharmin. And when it is applied assuming an external object (b ahy artha ), the presuppositions are dierent and the mutual non-dierence of blue and its cognition is to be proved. This also seems to be the reason why rNgog lots aba translated the verse in such a way that it may be applied according to both views. We now have seen that rNgog lots aba in his interpretation of the sahopalambhaniyama proof, with one exception, follows Dharmottaras explanation and that he ignores the comments of the other Indian predecessors. In determining the dharmin of this proof on the vij naptim atrat a level he is more precise when he regards it to consist of the gr ahy ak ara alone. At other occasions in his dKa gnas rnam bshad, however, he does not follow Dharmottara at all but refutes his akya mchog ldans account of rNgog lots views.35 These facts corroborate S abas assimilation of Dharmottaras ideas, for he reported that rNgog lots aba refuted many points in the exposition of Dharmottara that he took to be unacceptable,
33 gang gi phyir tha dad par snang ba n id yin yang sngon po ni n ams su myong ba las don gzhan pai rang bzhin n id ma yin te | de dag lhan cig dmigs pa nges pai phyir | zla ba g nis la sogs pa bzhin no | | = na hi bhinn avabh asitve py arth antarar upatvam n lasy a nubh a v at, . tayoh ad, dvicandr adivat PVin I 94,20-21. . sahopalambhaniyam 34 sngon po la sogs pa myong ba las don gzhan ma yin na ni dei bdag n id du gyur pa de ltar gsal bai phyir sngon po la sogs pa myong bar gyur ro | | PVin I 98,9-12 = anarth antaratve tu n l ader anubhav at tad atmabh utah a sate tath a n l adyanubhavah . prak . sy at. K a sik a II 100,4f; identied in Stern 1991 p. 161 (cf. fn. 32). 35 Cf. di la slob dpon chos mchog n id na re | . . . . . . zheo | di yang bden pa ma yin te | . . . dKa gnas rnam bshad 44a8 and slob dpon chos mchog na re . . . . . . zheo | | de ni ma yin te | . . . 44b1f.

H. Krasser rNgog lots aba on the sahopalambhaniyama . . .

67

having retained as they were those [passages] he thought were acceptable.36 Regarding his sa bcad technique one can see by the paragraph numbers which I added that the text was well organized according to this method, although we do not always nd the beginning of a paragraph indicated by a dang po or g nis pa. However, the text under consideration does not allow a statement as to the extent to which the imposition of a logical structure upon a text commented on by means of topical outlines was developed by rNgog lots aba, for the dKa gnas rnam bshad is, as the title already indicates, not a detailed explanation of all the points of the PVin, but only of the dicult ones. The topical outlines we nd here seem to indicate the main points that rNgog lots aba considered to be essential for his teaching of the Pram an avini s caya and the dierent opinions of . his Indian predecessors concerning some specic subjects. For he not only refers to Subhaguptas comments, although without mentioning his name (2.), or to Dharmottaras view,37 but in other parts of his rNam bshad he also refutes the antabhadra and others.38 opinions of Praj n akaragupta, S As to rNgog lots abas style, one may say that his remarks are very short and in many cases only comprehensible after having understood the detailed discussion in Dharmottaras PVinT . which he quite often summarizes in a few words. Regarding the sahopalambhaniyama proof in the Pram an scaya, he nally . avini provides us with a new interpretation that is not to be found in the Indian tradition and which accords well with Dharmak rtis formulations.

Tshad ma rnam nges kyi dka gnas rnam par bshad pa

on sahopalambhaniyama (PVin I 94,18-98,6) Additions in the manuscript are indicated by <xxx>; my additions to the ms. by (xxx); my corrections by xxx [corr. : yyy]; variant readings such as gzung bzung ba - pa, kyi - gyi, ste - te, cig - gcig and the like are not corrected. Omissions of an initial consonant of nal particles etc., e.g. thalo instead of thal lo, are indicated by thal-lo etc.; tham . d is the abbreviation used in the ms. for thams cad. It also should be noted that the tsheg before a shad never is ommitted, but always written. [45a6] lhan cig dmyigs pa nges pai (PVin I v.55a) gtan tshigs ni | 1. dam bcas pai don dang |: 2. gtan tshigs kyi skyon spang pa g nis kyis shes par byao |:
36 . . . chos mchog gi bshad pa las thugs yul du thad pa rnams thad sor bzhag nas mi akya mchog ldan, Tshad mai mdo . . . (Collected thad pa la dgag pa mang du bshad do | | S Works Vol. 19 pp. 1-137) pp. 29,3-30,4; transl. Jackson 1987 p. 167. A longer portion of this text dealing with rNgog lots aba together with a translation is given in van der Kuijp 1983 pp. 49-56. 37 Cf. above fn. 35. 38 Cf. slob dpon shes rab byung gnas sbas pa dang | zhi ba bzang po la sogs pa na re | . . . . . . zheo | | de ni myi thad de | . . . 46b4-6; . . . des na kha cig . . . thal ba dir gyur ro zheo | | de ni thal ba ma yin te | . . . 43b7f; kha cig na re . . . . . . zhes zer ro | | de ni myi thad de | . . . 44a6; gzhan na re | . . . . . . zheo | | de ang myi thad de | . . . 44a7.

68

Aspects of Buddhism

1. | de la dam bca bai don yang 1.1. chos can kyi rang bzhin dang :| 1.2. bsgrub byai chos dpyad pa [corr. : spyad pa] g nis so |: 1.1. | de la chos can ni dir sngon po la sogs pa gzung 7 pai rnam pa kho na yin gyi | dzin pa ni ma yin te | dzin pa ni gzung pa las tha dad par sgrub pai skabs yin pai phyir ro | tha dad pa ldog pa yin pas gzung pa myed pa las tha dad par thad do | des na tha dad pa dgag pa ni gzung pai rnam pa la bya ba yin gyi | dzin pa la ni ma yin no | 1.2. | bsgrub par bya bai chos ni dir myed par dgag pai rang bzhin yin gyi 8 ma yin par dgag pa ni ma yin no | | de yang 1.2.1. myed par dgag pa la gnod pa spang pa dang | 1.2.2. ma yin pa la gnod pa bsgrub pa g nis kyis nges par byao | 1.2.1. | dang po ni gal te gzung pai rnam pa gsal bar tshor ba myed na dzin pa yang yod par myi grub pas thams cad jig par thal ba dang | gzhan myed pa(r) dgag pa shes pai rang bzhin ma yin pa gsal na [45b] phyi rol gyi don nam | shes pa gzhan tha dad par yang gsal bar thal bas gzung dzin grub par thal lo | | de lta na dzin pa myi grub pa dang gzung pa gzhan bden par thal lo zhe na |: lan ni dzin pa ni myong pa dang myi slu ba yod pas | de yod par brjod kyi | bzung pa ni gsal bar tshor yang tshad mas gnod pas myi slu ba myed de | des na gsal bar tshor 2 bar khyad par myed kyang gang yang gnod byed myed par grub pai myi slu ba yod pa de ni bden la de myed pa ni brdzun pas na khyad par grub bo | | gzhan yang bzung pa bden par gsal bar thal ba yang ma yin te | bden pa dang brel pas myi thad pas ste | dus cig pa dang rang bzhin myi gcig pa la brel pa g nis ga gal bai phyir dang | gsum pa yang myi srid pai 3 phyir ro | | de ni myed pa(r) dgag pai phyogs la gnod pa spang pao |:. 1.2.2. | ma yin pa la gnod pa sgrub pa la g nis ste | 1.2.2.1. rnam pa rnams shes pa cig gi rang bzhin yin pa la gnod pa dang | 1.2.2.2. du mai rang bzhin yin pa la gnod pao | 1.2.2.1. | dang po [corr. : dang pa] ni rnam pa bzhis rig par bya ste | 1.2.2.1.1. yan lag can bzhin du shes pa yang cha du mas cig pa gal ba dang | 1.2.2.1.2. kha bsgyur ba dang ma bsgyur 4 ba yang shes pai rags pa la myi ldog pa dang | cha <tha> dad pa tsam gyis cig dgag par myi nus na kha bsgyur ba dang ma bsgyur bas kyang myi nus pa dang | 1.2.2.1.3. des cig dgag par nus kyang cha tha dad pas myi nus na yan lag can dgag par myi nus pao | 1.2.2.1.4. tha ma ni gal te cha tha dad par snang pa gog byed ma yin na dei tshe kha bsgyur ba dang ma bsgyur bai gnas skabs su 5 cig ma yin mod | gzhan gyi tshe skad cig gzhan kyi mtshan n id go ci ste cig ma yin te | des na yan lag can thad do zhes bya bao | | 1.2.2.2. | | du mai phyogs la gnod pa la rnam pa lngas shes par bya ste | 1.2.2.2.1. rdul phra rab kyi spyad pa shes pai snang pa phra rab la yang dra ba dang | snang pa thams cad bden par yod na rags pa snang ba gal (ba)

H. Krasser rNgog lots aba on the sahopalambhaniyama . . .

69

dang | 1.2.2.2.2. rags pa snang ba myi bden na rdul phra 6 rab du snang pa brtag par myi nus shing brtags pa don myed pa dang | 1.2.2.2.3. rags par snang pa rnam rtog yin na gsal bar snang pa gal ba dang | 1.2.2.2.4. rang gi rnam pa mthar thug pa g nis kyis rnam par rtog pa n id la rags par snang pa myi thad pa dang | de la rags pa snang pa khas blangs kyang myed pa gsal bar grub pao | 1.2.2.2.5. | tha ma ni gal te rnam . par rtog pa don myed pa la don du zhen pas de ltar 7 snang pa myi gal lo zhes brjod na | don myed par rang gsal ba gal ba dang | gzhan gyis gsal na rnam par shes pai myed pa gsal bai nus pa grub pa dang | ma rig pas [corr. : rang rig pas] gsal na de myed par gal ba dang | yod na shes pai myed pa gsal bai nus pa grub pa dang | myed pa gsal bai nus pa khas myi len na khrul pa myed par thal-lo | dam . bcai don to | 2. | gtan 8 tshigs kyi skyon spang pa ni 2.1. ma grub pa dang | 2.2. gal ba dang | 2.3. thun mong gi ma nges pa dang | 2.4. ldog pa la the tshom za bai n es pa ste bzhi spang pao |

2.1. | dang po ni gzhan na re | di ni ma grub ste | di ltar lhan cig dmyigs pa nges pai gtan tshigs kyi don ni shes pa ma dmyigs par shes bya dmyigs pa myed pas shes bya dmyigs pa shes pa dmyigs pas khyab pai don [46a] yin la de yang khyab byed gal ba dmyigs par dod pa yin na | zla ba dang gyad la lta ba ni shes pa ma dmyigs kyang shes bya ba zhig dmyigs pas | lhan cig dmyigs pa n id ma grub bo | 2.2. | yang na gal ba yin te | lhan cig gi sgra ni tha dad par brjod pa yin no | des na tha dad pai khyad par can du dmyigs pai phyir tha dad pa yin no zhes bya bar gyur na de ni zlog pas 2 khyab pas gal bai phyir ro |

2.3. | yang na thun mong gi ma nges pa yin te | sangs rgyas kyi thugs dang dei shes bya dag lhan cig dmyigs kyang shes bya rgyud gzhan ni shes pa dang tha myi dad pa ma yin pas sam . | sems dang sems las byung ba dag lhan cig du mtshungs par dmyigs kyang tha dad pa myed pa ma yin pas so | | yang na snang pa dang gzugs kyis ma nges so | 2.4. | gal te thun mong gi 3 ma nges pa ma yin du chug kyang ldog pa la the tshom za ba ni bzlog par myi nus ste | tha dad pa la lhan cig dmyigs pa myed pas khyab pa am | lhan cig dmyigs pa dang gal ba grub pa myed pai phyir ro zhes bya ba ni rtsod pa rnam pa bzhio | 2.1.a. | di la lan ni ma grub pa ni ma yin te | zla ba dang gyad la lta ba na yang shes pai khyad par tha dad pas de ma dmyigs kyang dei shes bya dmyigs 4 mod kyi | on kyang shes pa tsam myed pa ma dmyigs-so | de lta na ni shes pai khyad par dang don tha myi dad pa ni myi sgrub kyi on kyang spyi dang yin no | | gang las tha myi dad myed par sgrub par bya bai spyi de la ltos te ni lhan cig dmyigs pa yod pa yin te | shes pa tsam dang bral bai zla ba dang gyad ni mthong pa myed pai phyir ro | | des na ma grub pa ma yin no | [2.2.a.] [The refutation of this p urvapaks . a is lacking]

70

Aspects of Buddhism

2.3.a. | tham . d mkhyen pai shes bya yang dei mkhyen 5 pa ma dmyigs kyang rgyud gzhan la rang rig pas dmyigs pai phyir ro | rnal byor pa can gyis rgyud gzhan de ma bzung par thams cad mkhyen pa ni thugs ba zhig dzin pai phyir ro | | sems dang sems las byung pa ni lhan cig dmyigs pa tsam yang myed na nges pa la ga la yod | gzugs dang snang pa ni og nas spong ngo | des na thun mong gi ma nges pa ma yin no | 2.4.a. | ldog 6 pa la the tshom za ba ni khyab pa sgrub pai tshad ma ston pas gog par gyur ro | |

H. Krasser rNgog lots aba on the sahopalambhaniyama . . .

71

Translation39
The reason being necessarily perceived together (sahopalambhaniyama ) is to be understood through 1. [an examination of] the subject of the thesis (pratij n artha ), and 2. through the exclusion of the faults of the reason (hetudos . a ). 1. From among these [the examination of] the subject of the thesis also consists of two examinations: 1.1. that of the nature of the locus of properties (dharmin ), and 1.2. that of the property to be proved (s adhyadharma ). 1.1. From among these here [in this proof] the locus of properties is only the objective aspect (gr ahy ak ara ) consisting of blue etc., but it is not the subjective one (gr ahaka ), for [this] is the section (skabs, prast ava ) in which the dierence of the subjective (aspect) from the objective one is armed (sgrub pa, vidhi ). As [the subjective/objective aspect?] consists of the exclusion (ldog pa, vy avr . tti ) of that which is dierent, it is reasonable that it is dierent from that which is not an objective (aspect) (gzung pa myed pa, agr ahya ).40 Thus the negation of dierence is an activity towards the objective aspect, but not towards the subjective one. 1.2. The property to be proved here is of the nature of a non-implicative negation (myed par dgag pa, prasajyapratis . edha ), but not an implicative negation (ma yin par dgag pa, paryud asapratis edha ). And this is to be ascertained through . 1.2.1. the exclusion of [a valid cognition] that invalidates (b adhaka ) the nonimplicative negation, and through 1.2.2. the proof of [a valid cognition] that invalidates the implicative (negation). 1.2.1. Objection:41 If the objective aspect is not experienced as being illuminated (gsal ba, pra k a s ), the subjective one is also not established to be existent (sat ). Thus, it would follow that all (aspects) are abandoned. And if a non-implicative negation [of being something] dierent which is not of
In the following notes I quote passages of Dharmottaras PVinT . on which rNgog lots abas explanations are based. However, as these passages are often quite long and space here is limited, I shall translate only the shorter ones and of the longer ones only those parts which are necessary for understanding rNgog lots abas enigmatic formulations. Passages which are translated in Iwata I, II and Matsumoto 1980 are not translated, but are referred to in the footnotes. Finally, Sanskrit equivalents of several Tibetan terms have been supplied for the sake of convenience and easier understanding. 40 Or: As the dierence consists of an exclusion (ldog pa, vy avr . tti ), it is reasonable that [the subjective/objective aspect?] is dierent from that which is not an objective (aspect). The meaning of this argument is not clear! 41 The idea of the following objection is to be found in PVin I 96,8f: vis . ayasya j na nahetutayopanidheh pr a g upalambhah pa s c a t sam vedanam iti cet . Much parallel ma. . . terial is collected in Iwata II 15511 . In this discussion an opponent wants to establish that cognition of the object is dierent from the cognition of that cognition, because it is the condition for the latter. Thus the reason sahopalambhaniyama would not be established.
39

72

Aspects of Buddhism the nature of cognition is illuminated, it follows that an external object or something else that is cognized is illuminated as being dierent as well.42 Thus, it follows that the objective [as well as] the subjective (aspect) are established. In this way it follows that the subjective (aspect) which is not established [as long as the objective one is not experienced] and the objective (aspect) which is dierent [from it] are real. Answer: As the subjective (aspect) is experienced and reliable (avisam a. v din ), it is said to be existent (sat ). However, the objective (aspect) is, although it is experienced as being illuminated, not reliable, for it is invalidated by a valid cognition (pram an adhita ). Therefore, although [the two] . ab are not dierent, insofar as [both of them] are experienced as being illuminated, that one whose reliability is established to be without an invalidating [cognition] is real (satya ), while the (other one) without [such a reliability] is false (brdzun pa, al ka ).43 Thus the dierence is established. Moreover, it does not follow either that the objective (aspect) is illuminated as being real, for being connected with the real [subjective aspect] it is not reasonable. [This is so] because the two [kinds of] connection [i.e. t ad atmya and tadutpatti ] contradict [their] having the same time (ekak ala ) and not being of one and the same nature (anekar upa ), and because another kind [of connection] is not possible.44 This was the exclusion of [a valid cognition] that invalidates the assumption of a non-implicative negation.

1.2.2. In [the subsection of] the proof of [a valid cognition] that invalidates the implicative (negation) there are two [proofs]:45 1.2.2.1. [one that
This argument is not clear to me! rNgog lots abas answer is based on the following passage of Dharmottara: n ams su myong ba nges pai rang bzhin mi slu ba ni spang bar nus pa ma yin te | de ni khas blang bar bya ba yin pai phyir ro | | yang gang n ams su myong yang gnod par byed pa mthong pai phyir slu ba de ni spang bar bya ba yin te | dper na zla ba g nis kyi rang bzhin lta buo | | gnod par byed pa med pai phyir khrul pa mi grub po zhes1) gang chad par gyur ro | | de bzhin du rnam grel las kyang | gnod byed rig pa dam pa ni | med na n ams myong spang bya min2) zhes so | | dga ba la sogs pai rang bzhin yang dag pai rig pa ni spang bar bya ba ma yin te | gnod par byed pa med pai phyir ro | | des na gcig ma yin no zhes bya bar gnas so | | PVinT . P 185a2-5 (D 159a2-4); the passage is translated in Iwata I 180. 1) = PVin II 45,19f: gnod par byed pa med pas khrul pa mi grub pai phyir ro | | (= b adhak abh av ad bhr antyasiddheh . PVSV 16,4f) 2) not identied. 44 Cf. mi bden pai rang bzhin n id ma rig pai dbang gis ston par byed kyi bden pa ni ma yin te | bden pa dang lhan cig brel pa nges pa med pai phyir ro | | PVinT . P 185a2 (D 159a1f) = By force of ignorance (avidy a ) [cognition] shows something of an unreal nature, but not something real. For [two] connected (things), that are real and together [at the same time] (saha ) are not ascertained. A more detailed refutation of the two kinds of connection is to be found in Kamala s las TSP 694,23-695,12. 45 In the following refutation rNgog lots aba makes use of the arguments applied by Dharmak rti in PVin I 84,12-86,10 in order to prove that cognition does not resemble its
43 42

H. Krasser rNgog lots aba on the sahopalambhaniyama . . .

73

establishes a valid cognition] that invalidates [the fact] that (manifold) forms are the nature of a unitary (eka ) cognition, and 1.2.2.2. [one that establishes a valid cognition] that invalidates [the fact] that they are the nature of a manifold cognition. 1.2.2.1.46 The rst one is to be known through four alternatives: 1.2.2.1.1.
object. 46 <1 This paragraph has its equivalent in PVinT cii . P 183a2-183b3 (D 157a6-157b5): phyir tha dad pa dgag pa tsam bsgrub par bya ba yin gyi | gcig n id du ni bsgrub pa ma yin no zhes smra | gcig tu ni (ni D: om. P) thad pa yin (yin D: ma yin P) te | gang gi phyir gal te gzung bai rnam pa gsal ba yang mi bden na | rig pa yang bden pa n id du gang gis rtogs (P: rtog D) par byed |1> yang gal te rnam par shes pa mi bden pa gsal bar byed na bden par yang gsal bar byed de | bden pas ni n es ba cung zad kyang bya pa med pai phyir ro | | [1.2.2.1.1.] gal te de ltar gzung bai rnam pa de gal te gcig gi ngo bo yin na ni phyogs chas byas pai gal bai chos dang ldan pa mi thad do | | phyogs cha tha dad pa de yang gcig n id yin na ni yan lag can gyi rdzas gcig cii phyir mi dod de khyad par ci yod | [1.2.2.1.2.] yan lag can gyi rdzas la ni kha bsgyur ba dang ma bsgyur ba yod pai phyir gal gyi | blo la ni ma yin pai phyir di n id khyad par yin no zhe na | shes pa ma yin pai rags pa gcig ma shes pa yang rung ste khyad par ci yod de | bloi rang bzhin n id ni rags pai n es pa n ams pa ma yin no | | [1.2.2.1.3.] gzhan yang kha bsgyur ba dang ma bsgyur ba la sogs pa dang ldan pa kho na ni gal ba ma yin gyi | on kyang phyogs cha tha dad pa yang yin no zhes mang du bshad zin to | | dei phyogs cha tha dad pai rgyu mtshan gyis kyang gal ba na | gal te rnam par shes pa gcig yin na ni yan lag can yang gcig n id yin la | di du ma n id yin na ni khyad par med pai phyir shes pai rags pa yang du ma n id do | | [1.2.2.1.4.] gzhan yang rgyu can ces bya ba ni don dam par yod pa ma yin no | | skad cig mai rdzas la ni gang du kha bsgyur ba dang | g.yo ba dang bsgribs pa yod pa dang med pas byas pai tha dad pa ma mthong ba de n id rdzas gcig tu gyur ro | | g.yo ba la sogs pas byas pai tha dad pai gnas skabs su tha dad pa mthong bas gzhan du yang rjes su jug par byas pa ni ma yin pas tshad ma ,ga zhig yod pa yin no | | dei phyir rags pa thams cad la phyogs gzhan dang brel pas cha shas yongs su bcad pa las gyur pai gal bai chos du bar mthong bas tha dad pa med pa spang bar bya ba yin no zhes rigs pa yin no || <1> This passage is translated in Iwata I 181 (text: II 128171 ) and Matsumoto 1980 p. 18. Both of them understand it in such a way that the p urvapaks . a ends with zhes smra and that the following sentence already is part of the answer. Consequently, they prefer the reading of Peking (gcig tu ni thad pa ma yin te ). To my understanding, however, this part still belongs to the p urvapaks . a which ends with med pai phyir ro. My translation: [Objection:] Why do you say that (the property) to be proved is the mere negation of dierence but that (they) are not to be proved to be identical? For (ni = hi ) it is reasonable that (they) are identical. Because, if the objective aspect is not real although it is illuminated, how could consciousness in turn be known to be real? Further, if cognition illuminates something unreal (asatya ), it illuminates [the objective aspect] when it is real as well, because by something real not the slightest fault is undertaken. [Answer:] If that objective aspect given that it might be so (gal te de ltar = yady evam ) were a unitary thing, it would not be reasonable to be endowed with contradictory properties that are due to its parts. And if those dierent parts are a unit, why do you not assume a substance that is a composite whole? What is the dierence

74

Aspects of Buddhism like a composite whole (avayavin ) cognition too would contradict (its) unity through (its) many parts;47 1.2.2.1.2. coloured (rakta ) as well as uncoloured [parts] are not excluded in case of the gross (form) (sth ula ) in cognition;48 if the [cognitions] unity cannot be negated by the dierent parts alone, it cannot [be negated] by the coloured and uncoloured ones either; 1.2.2.1.3. if, although the unity can be negated by these [coloured and uncoloured parts], it cannot [be negated] by the dierent parts [alone], a composite whole cannot be negated. 1.2.2.1.4. Finally, [if one asks:] [The gross form] may not be an unity in the state of being coloured and uncoloured at the time when it is not denied that it manifests as having dierent parts, [then] however, due to which circumstances (go ci ste ) should [the gross form] at another time being characterized by another phase (ks . an . a ) not be an unity? [If this were the case] then a composite whole [too] would be reasonable.

1.2.2.2.49 [The proof that establishes a valid cognition] that invalidates the as(between them)? . . . 47 Cf. yan lag can gog pai n es pa de n id ni du mai thun mong gcig gi rang bzhin gyi n es par yang blta bar byao | | PVinT . P 166b8 (D 143b2) = The very same fault that negates a composite whole is also to be seen as the fault of a unitary nature that is common to a manifold (object). 48 It is possible that the text shes pai rags pa la should be corrected to shes pai rags pa las. 49 This paragraph corresponds to PVinT . 183b3-185a2 (D 158a6-159a2): gal te de lta na gzung bai rnam pai rang bzhin du ma yin no zhe na | [1.2.2.2.1.] di la yang ji ltar rdul phra rab rnams drug gis (P: gi D) cig car sbyar bas dngos po med pa de bzhin du shes pai rdul phra rab rnams la yang thal bar gyur ro || lus can n id la skyon dir gyur gyi lus can ma yin pa la ni ma yin pa ma yin nam | lus can zhes bya ba rwa zed de ba ni med kyi | on kyang tshad chung (D: tshung P) ngu mang po rnams phan tshun gyi rang bzhin gyi yul yongs su spangs nas skyes (D: skyed P) pai phyir yul rgyas pa dang ldan par gyur pa (P: gyur ba D) ni lus can yin la | de ni rnam par shes pa la yang bye brag med pai phyir kun rdzob tu yod par mtshungs par thal bas de ni du mar yang rigs pa ma yin no | | gzhan yang rnam par shes pai rdul phra rab n ams su myong bar gyur pa rnams la | rags pai rnam pa n ams su myong ba ni bzlog par nus pa ma yin no | | rnam par shes pai bdag n id gcig la ni rags pa yod pa ma yin zhing | rnam par shes pai rdul phra rab mang po rnams kyang so sor rags pai rang bzhin ma yin no | | ji ltar phyi rol gyi rdul phra rab shes pa gcig la snang ba rnams kyi so sor snang bai chos rags pa yin pa de bzhin du | dir yang shes pa gcig la snang bai phyir rags pa n id du snang bar gyur ba yang ma yin te | du ma rnams gzhan ga zhig gis kyang ma bzung bai phyir ro | | dei phyir n ams su myong bai rjes su brangs pa na rags pa gsal bar snang bar n ams su myong bar mi gyur ba zhig na n ams su myong ste | dei phyir gang dang ldan pas yod pa ma yin pas rags pai bdag n id la ston par byed pa shes pai med pa gsal bar byed nus pa yang yod pa n id do | | [1.2.2.2.2.] rags pai rnam pa med na rnam par shes pai rdul phra rab gzhan ci zhig lus la | de brtag pas kyang ci zhig bya ste | gang gi phyir rags pai rnam pa di n id de kho na n id ma yin par mi gyur ba dang | rnam par shes pa yang med pa gsal bar byed pai nus pa dang ldan par mi gyur bar bya bai phyir gzung bai rnam pa rnam par shes pai

H. Krasser rNgog lots aba on the sahopalambhaniyama . . .

75

sumption that [the manifold forms are of the nature] of a manifold [cognition] is to be understood through ve alternatives:
50 1.2.2.2.1. If the mode of existence (spyad pa, caran . a ) of the [external] atoms

bdag n id du brtags pa yin na gzung bai rnam pa mi bden pa dang rnam par shes pa yang med pa gsal bar byed pai nus pa dang ldan par khas blangs na | rnam par shes pai rdul phra rab rtog pa ni don dam pa yin no | | [1.2.2.2.3.] rags par snang ba rnam par rtog pas sprul pa yang rigs pa ma yin te | gsal bar snang bai phyir dang | rnam par rtog pa rnams ni gsal bar snang ba ma yin pai phyir ro | | [1.2.2.2.4.] ji ltar smig rgyu dag la chur rnam par rtog pa gsal bar snang bzhin du rags par rnam par rtog pa yang yin no zhes ni brjod (D: rjod P) par mi nus te | gang gi phyir smig rgyui rang gi mtshan n id dzin pai rnam par shes pa dang dus gcig tu jug pai chui rnam par rtog pa snang ba dang rnam par rtog pa dag gcig tu byed pai phyir gsal bar snang bar nges par gyur na | dir ni gang zhig dang (dang D: om. P) lhan cig rgyu ba las rags pai rnam par rtog pa gsal bar snang bar rtog (P: rtogs D) par gyur ba rags pa n ams su myong ba gsal bar snang ba ni ga yang yod pa ma yin no | | gzhan yang rnam par rtog pai rnam par shes pa yang bdag n id kyi rang bzhin gang yin pa de kho na n ams su myong bar gyur ba yin na | de la ni rags pa yod pa ma yin te | dei phyir snang bar mi gyur ro | | [1.2.2.2.5.] rnam par rtog pai rnam par shes pa ni rang gi bdag n id don med pa la don du lhag par zhen nas jug pa yin no zhe na | don med pa ston pa ni nges par brtags pa na med pa gsal bar byed pa n id du gnas pa yin te | gang gi phyir don med pa gsal ba na bdag n id gsal bar byed pa am | gzhan gsal bar byed par gyur te | rnam pa gzhan ni mi srid pai phyir ro | | re zhig (D: shig P) bdag n id ni gsal bar byed pa ma yin te | rnam par shes pa n id gsal bai rang bzhin yin pai phyir dang | don med pa ni dngos po ma yin pai yang phyir ro | | gzhan gyis gsal bar byed na yang de gsal bar byed pa ni shes pai bdag n id de n id mi bden pa gsal bar byed par skyes pa yin no | | di s nam du ma rig pai dbang gis de ltar gsal ba yin no s nam na | gal te ma rig pa de dngos po med pa yin na dngos po med pas dngos po med pa gsal bar byed do zhes bya bai tshig gi tshul di cir yang mi rung ngo | | ci ste dngos po yin pa de lta na yang de ni rnam par shes pai rang bzhin n id yin na de las kyang dngos po med pa ji ltar gsal te | dngos po dang dngos po med pa dag la ni brel pa ga yang yod pa ma yin no | | <1 dei phyir ma rig pai nus pa dang ldan pai shes pa mi bden pai rang bzhin gsal bai byed pa yin pai phyir ma rig pai dbang gis gsal ba yin no zhes brjod pa la ni kha na ma tho ba yod pa ma yin no | |1> dei phyir de ltar don med par dzin pai shes pa thams cad mi bden pa gsal bar byed pai ma rig pai bdag n id du blta bar byao | | <2 thams cad du gal te snang ba gang yin pa de thams cad yod pa yin na tshangs pas kyang shes pa ga (P: ba D) zhig kyang khrul par brtag par mi nus so || ci ste mi bden pa yang yod na ni brgya byin gyis kyang shes pa mi bden pa gsal bar byed pai nus pa bs non par mi nus so || dod du zin kyang n ams su myong ba thams cad bden pa yin par ni sus kyang gzhag par nus pa ma yin pai phyir shes pai mi bden pa gsal bai nus pa las da bar bya ba ma yin no | |2> mi bden pai rang bzhin n id ma rig pai dbang gis ston par byed kyi (P: pai D) bden pa ni ma yin te | bden pa dang lhan cig brel pa nges pa med pai phyir ro | | [The text of the immediately following passage PVinT . 185a2-5 is quoted in n. 43.] <1> quoted in Sy adv adaratn akara 170,17-19; cf. above fn. 24. <2> This passage is translated in Iwata I 174. 50 It is also possible that spyad pa should be corrected to dpyad pa (vic ara ): If the

76

Aspects of Buddhism (param an uks . u ) is the same also in case of the subtle (s . ma ) manifestation of cognition, and if everything that manifests is really existent, [then] the gross (form) (sth ula ) that manifests [in cognition] is contradictory.51

1.2.2.2.2. If [under the previous conditions] the gross (form) that manifests is not real, [it follows that] that which is conceptualized (kalpita ) is not the object (anartha ), insofar as that which manifests in form of the atoms (param an . utvena ) cannot be conceptualized. 1.2.2.2.3. If the manifestation in a gross (form) is conception (vikalpa ), the manifestation in a clear (form) would be contradictory.52 1.2.2.2.4. It is not reasonable that [the conceptual cognitions] own form manifests in a gross (form) just in conceptual cognition due to the two ends [i.e. the two kinds of cognition it relies on] (mthar thug pa g nis kyis ).53 And even in the case that one assumes that a gross (form) manifests in that (conceptual cognition), it is established that [cognition] illuminates something non-existent. 1.2.2.2.5. Finally, if one says that the manifestation in such a way [i.e. in a gross form] is not contradictory because it is [only] conceptual cognition (vikalpa ) that ascertains [its own nature which is] not the object (anartha )
analysis of the atoms also in case of the subtle manifestation of cognition is the same [as in case of the external atoms], and if . . . 51 Cf. dbang poi (D: po P) rnam par shes pa la gnas pai rnam pa gang yin pa de ni cha shas dang bcas pa dang | rdul phra rab gcig la ni cha shas yod pa ma yin pa des na rdul phra rab kyi rang bzhin dang | shes pa la gnas pai snang ba di gal bai phyir rnam pa di dei yin no zhes brjod par nus pa ma yin no | | PVinT . P 165b7-166a1 (D 142b3f). = That form which is situated in sense-cognition is endowed with parts, and in a single atom parts do not exist. Therefore the nature of an atom and this manifestation which is situated in cognition are contradictory. Thus one cannot say that this form [in cognition is the form] of that (atom). 52 This is the case because the gross form manifests clearly and conceptions are by their nature unclear; cf. n. 49 [1.2.2.2.3]. 53 This enigmatic formulation becomes clearer with the help of the passage of PVinT . it relies on, cf. n. 49 [1.2.2.2.4.], which says: One cannot say: Like the conceptual cognition [which ascertains] sun rays to be water manifests itself in a clear way, also the conceptual cognition [which ascertains atoms to be gross] manifests itself in a gross way. [This is] because [of the following:] [The conceptual cognition which ascertains sun rays to be water] is determined to manifest clearly due to the fact that the cognition which grasps the individual (svalaks . an . a ) of the sun rays, the conceptual cognition of water which occurs at the same time (and) which manifests, and the two conceptual cognitions [of them] are unied [i.e. identied with each other]. However, in the case under consideration there is no conceptual cognition of a gross (form) at all which, due to the co-occurence (sahac aritv at ) with any [other cognition], could be conceptualized to manifest clearly, which experiences a gross (form), and which manifests clearly. Moreover, as the cognition of the conceptual cognition experiences only that which is of its own nature, there does not exist a gross (form). Therefore it would not manifest.

H. Krasser rNgog lots aba on the sahopalambhaniyama . . .

77

as [being the] object,54 it follows that it would be contradictory that [conceptual cognition], not being the object, illuminates itself; if it is illuminated by something else [i.e. cognition], the cognitions capability of illuminating something non-existent is established; if it is illuminated by ignorance (avidy a )55 , this (ignorance) being non-existent is contradictory, and if [this ignorance] is existent, the cognitions capability of illuminating something non-existent is established; and [nally] if we do not assume the capability of illuminating something non-existent, there would not exist any erroneous cognition (bhr anti ) (at all). [This was the examination of] the subject of the thesis (pratij n artha ). 2. The exclusion of the faults of the reason (hetudos . a ) consists of the exclusions of four (faults): 2.1. [the reason] is not established (asiddha ); 2.2. it is contradictory (viruddha ); 2.3. it is inconclusive for being too general (s adh aran anaik antika ); 2.4. it has the fault that its being absent [from the . dissimilar instances (vipaks saya ). . a )] is doubtful (vyatirekasam . 2.1. Regarding the rst, some others say: This (reason) is not established, for if the reason being necessarily perceived together means that perception (upalabdhi ) of the object of cognition (j neya ) is pervaded (vy apta ) by perception of cognition, because there is no perception of the object of cognition without perception of cognition, and if this (reason) moreover is assumed to consist of a perception of that which contradicts the pervading (property) (vy apakaviruddhopalabdhi ),56 then, in case that [many people] watch the moon or wrestlers (gyad, malla ), the object of cognition alone is perceived, although the cognitions [of the other persons] are not perceived. Thus, the (reason) being necessarily perceived together is not established.57
54 This idea is based on PVin II 2,8f: rang gi snang ba don med pa la don du mngon par zhen nas jug pai phyir . . . svapratibh ase narthe rth adhyavas ayena pravartan at . . . 55 Without correcting rang rig pa (svasam vedana ) to ma rig pa ( avidy a ) the text does . not make sense. The correction is based on the equivalent discussion found in the PVinT . passage quoted above (n. 49 [1.2.2.2.5.]), which is introduced by the following p urvapaks nam du ma rig pai dbang gis de ltar gsal ba yin no s nam na | . a : di s 56 gang zhig gang dang lhan cig dmigs pa nges pa de ni de las tha dad pa ma yin te | dper na zla ba gcig las g nis pa bzhin no | | sngon po la sogs pai gzung bai rnam pa yang shes pa dang lhan cig dmigs pa nges pa yin no | | tha dad pa ni lhan cig dmigs pa ma nges pas khyab pa yin te | brel pa med pai phyir ro | | de dang gal ba ni lhan cig dmigs pa nges pa yin te | des na khyab par byed pa gal ba dmigs pas tha dad pa bkag pa yin no | | PVinT . P 189b7-190a1 (D 163a1-3) = yad yena niyatasahopalambham, tat tato na vyatiricyate, yathaikasm ac candramaso dvit yah s ca j na nena . . niyatasahopalambha saha gr ahy ak aro n l adir ity . . . bhedah aniyamena vy aptah abh a. sahopalambh . , pratibandh v at. tasya viruddhah apakaviruddhena bhedo nir akriyate. . sahopalambhaniyamah . , tena vy vijaya 1981 p. 137 (P. 110); translated in Iwata I 181f. Jambu 57 This objection reects the opinion of Subhagupta as formulated in his B ahy arthasiddhik arik a. The following objections as well, namely that the reason is contradictory (viruddha ), inconclusive (anaik antika ) and doubtful (sandigdha ), are based on BASK.

78

Aspects of Buddhism

2.2. Moreover, [the reason] is contradictory, because it is contradictory due to the fact that it is pervaded by [the property that is] the opposite (zlog pa, viparyaya ) [of the property to be proved]. [This is the case] under the presupposition that (zhes bya bar gyur na ) they are dierent, because the word together denotes their being dierent (and) therefore they are perceived 58 to possess the characteristic (vi ses . an . a ) of dierence. 2.3. Moreover, [the reason] is inconclusive for being too general, because it is the case that, although the cognition (thugs ) of Buddha and its object (j neya ) are perceived together, another (persons) [mind-]continuum (sant an antara ), which serves as object of [Buddhas] cognition, is [by its nature] cognition [of the person] and is (nevertheless) not non-dierent [from Buddhas cognition]. Or [it is inconclusive] because the mind (citta ) and the mental factors (caitta ) are not non-dierent, although they are perceived together as if they were the same (mtshungs par ).59 Moreover, [the reason] is inconclusive because of light (snang pa, aloka ) and colour-form (r upa ).60 2.4. Even if [the reason] may be one that is not inconclusive for being too general, [it is inconclusive because] doubt regarding (its) absence (vyatireka ) 61 [from the dissimilar instances (vipaks . a )] cannot be eliminated. [This is the
This p urvapaks . a corresponds to BASK vv. 72-74 (text and transl. in Matsumoto 1980 pp.3, 5), whereas rNgog lots aba has reformulated the rst part in accordance with the passages of the PVinT . quoted in n. 56 & n. 62 and shortened the sec ond part. More detailed it is available in TSP 692,11-16: punah . sa [= Subhagupta] ev aha yadi saha sabda ek arthah a hetur asiddhah a hi nat asu . , tad . . tath . acandramallapreks . na hy ekenaivopalambho n l adeh api n latadupalambhayor ekenaivopalambhah a . . n . . tath hi n lopalambhe pi tadupalambh an am anyasant anagat an am anupalambh at. yad a ca sarvapr an am sarve cittaks ah nen avas yante, tad a katham ekenaivopalambhah . abhr . t . an . . sarvaj . siddhah at. ki nca anyopalambhanis . sy . edhe saty ekopalambhaniyamah . sidhyati. na c anyopalambhapratis avaviprakr s. tasya viddhipratis ayog at. The . edhasambhavah . , svabh .. . edh passage is summarized in Iwata I 88; cf. also his notes in II 78f7072 . 58 This corresponds to BASK v. 71: tatra bhadanta subhaguptas tv aha - saha sabda s ca loke smin naiv anyena vin a kvacit | viruddho yam . tato hetur yady asti sahavedanam | quoted in TSP 692,2-3; text and transl. in Matsumoto 1980 pp. 3, 5; summarized in Iwata I 88; cf. also II 16745 . 59 This opinion corresponds to BASK v. 68 and to a probable commentary on it by Subhagupta which is not available and which seems to be the source of the following quotation by Kamala s la: atha saha sabda ekak alavivaks a, tad a buddhavij neyacittena . ay cittacaittai s ca sarvath a | anaik antikat a hetor ekak alavivaks ay a | ( BASK 68) yath a kila . bhuddhasya bhagavato yad vij neyam an antaracittam, tasya buddhaj na nasya ca sa. sant hopalambhaniyamo py asty eva ca n an atvam, tath a cittacaitt an am saty api sahopalambhe naikatvam ity ato naik antiko hetur iti TSP 692,17-21; the verse is translated in Matsumoto 1980 p. 4f; summarized in Iwata I 88; cf. also the references in II 7962 . 60 The reason is therefore assumed to be inconclusive, because light and colour are perceived together but are obviously dierent. The case of aloka and r upa is already discussed by Dharmak rti (PVin I 94,25). 61 This objection summarizes the opinion expressed in BASK vv. 65-67 and 81 which

H. Krasser rNgog lots aba on the sahopalambhaniyama . . .

79

case] because neither the being pervaded of the dierence by not being perceived together nor something that contradicts the being perceived together is established. These are the four kinds of objections. 2.1.a. The answer to this [is as follows]: [The reason] is not unestablished. For, even in the case that [many persons] watch the moon or wrestlers, it may be that the object of their cognition is perceived, although the particular cognitions (j n anavi ses . a ) [of the other persons] are not perceived due to their dierence [from ones own cognition]. However, the absence of cognition as such (m atra ) is not perceived. Although it is not established in this way that the particular cognition and the object which is not dierent [are perceived together], it is [established that cognition] in general ([j n ana ]s am anya ) and [the object are perceived together]. With regard to that [cognition] in general from which [the object] is to be proved not to be dierent there exists [the property of] being perceived together, because a moon or wrestlers being without cognition as such are not observed. Therefore [the reason] is not unestablished.62 [2.2.a.] [The refutation of this p urvapaks . a is lacking] 2.3.a. [The reason is not inconclusive for being too general either.]63 Because the object of the cognition of the all-knowing (Buddha) too [i.e. the other
is also to be found in TSP 694,9-20. Cf. the section (b) inconclusiveness II (kk 65-67, 81) in Matsumoto 1980 p. 7 and p. 27f15 . The formulation of this p urvapaks ava shows a great similarity to the . a by rNgog lots passage of Dharmottara already quoted above (n. 56): tha dad pa ni lhan cig dmigs pa ma nges pas khyab pa yin te | brel pa med pai phyir ro | | de dang gal ba ni lhan cig dmigs pa nges pa yin te | = bhedah aniyamena vy aptah abh av at. . sahopalambh . , pratibandh tasya viruddhah sahopalambhaniyamah . In the objection, however, khyab pa has to be . . understood in the sense of vy apti, for otherwise it cannot be construed with tha dad pa la. 62 The answer is similar to those of Dharmottara and Kamala s la: gar dang gyad la lta ba la sogs pa rnams la gang shes bya dmigs par mi gyur bai shes pa ni ga yang yod pa ma yin no | | de bas na (D: ni P) shes bya mi dmigs par shes pa (dmigs par shes pa P: om. D) dmigs pa am | shes pa mi dmigs par shes bya dmigs pa ni ga yang yod pa ma yin no zhes rnam pa gzhan n id gog pa yin gyi | dmigs pa thams cad la tha dad pa n id gog pa ni ma yin no | | PVinT su . P 185b3-5 (D 159b1f); na ca nat . acandramallapreks .a ka scij j na nopalambho sti yo na j neyopalambhah neyopalambho v a na j n anopalambhaka . , j iti kuto siddhat a. TSP 693,1-3; cf. Matsumoto 1980 p. 21. 63 One is forced to add such an introductory statement, for otherwise the following formulation of the reason cannot be construed. As the immediately preceding part, the refutation of 2.2., is also missing, one might think of a scribal error. However, rNgog lots aba adds another proof for the reasons not being inconclusive which also lacks the predicate to be proved and which is not connected with the rst formulation by a conjunctive or disjunctive particle such as dang or am. Therefore and also because the remaining part of the refutation is quite short, it is also possible that rNgog lots aba for some reason wanted to nish this section very quickly and just noted the most important points without formulating full sentences.

80

Aspects of Buddhism persons mind-continuum], although his cognition is not perceived [by the other person], is perceived in the other (persons) [mind-]continuum through self-consciousness.64 [It is also not inconclusive] because the all-knowing (Buddha) grasps only mind insofar as one abiding in Yoga (yogav ahin ) does not grasp another (persons) continuum.65 As it is not the case that the mind and the mental factors are only perceived together, which [arguments] could there be for a necessity (niyama ) [of being perceived together]?66 [The objection] regarding light and colour-form will be refuted later [by Dharmak rti himself].67 Therefore [the reason] is not inconclusive for being too general.

2.4.a. Doubt regarding [the reasons] absence (vyatireka ) [from the dissimilar instances (vipaks . a )] is eliminated by showing a valid cognition that establishes the pervasion (vy apti ).

Abbreviations
BASK
64

B ahy arthasiddhika arik a

Similar Dharmottaras refutation which is preserved in Sanskrit in Kamala s las Pa njik a: gang yang bcom ldan das kyi (P: kyis D) shes bya dang thugs (D: thug P) la lhan cig dmigs pa nges pa yod kyang | tha dad pa med pa ni ma yin no zhes smras pa de ni mi rigs te | gang gi phyir de la ni lhan cig dmigs pa nges pa n id med de | tha dad pa n id du rgyud gzhan gyis rang gi sems dmigs pai phyir ro | | de n id kyi phyir sems dang sems las byung bas kyang khrul par gyur ba ma yin te | de dag rnams kyang so sor bdag n id yang dag par rig pai phyir ro | | PVinT . 185b5-7 (D 159b2-4); [n api buddhavij neyacitten anaik antiko hetuh . ], na hi tatraikopalambhaniyamo sti, pr . thak 1) pr thak sarvair eva cittasya sam vedan a t. ata eva na cittacaittair vyabhic a rah , tes a m api . . . . pratyekam atmana eva sam at. TSP 693,19-21; cf. Matsumoto 1980 p. 21. . vedan 1) cf. TSPtib [Peking, vol. 139, No. 5765] 160b8 . . . khrul pa ma yin te | 65 This means that the Buddha, being without delements, is free of the dichotomy of gr ahya and gr ahaka. This idea is expressed in a more detailed fashion in TSP 693,6-13. The rst part (693,6-8) is translated in Matsumoto 1980 p. 13; cf. also his note p.3138 . 66 As for Dharmottaras and Kamala s las explanations, cf. n.64. 67 That is PVin I 94,25-96,7; cf. PVinT . P 186b1f (D 160a5f): gzugs dang snang ba dag gis khrul par dogs pa la | bshad pa | gzugs dang snang ba dag la ni dei shes pa skyed par rung ba gang yin pa de thob pai mtshan n id dam (=PVin I 94,25f) ste | ngo bo gang yin pao | |. Kamala s las refutation: ata eva na r up alokair vyab<1 hic arah , kevalalsy a py a lokadar s an a t. r u pasy a py a lokarahitasya kai s cit pr an ses . . ivi . air upalambh at.1> tasm ad vipaks av asambhav an n anaik antiko hetuh . e bh . . TSP 694,6-8. <1> = PVin I 96,2-4: snang ba ba zhig kyang mthong bai phyir dang | snang ba med pai gzugs kyang srog chags kyi bye brag ga zhig gis mthong ba yin pai phyir . . . (no Skt. equivalent for dang ).

H. Krasser rNgog lots aba on the sahopalambhaniyama . . . Iwata I, II

81

Jackson 1987

Takashi Iwata, Sahopalambhaniyama: Struktur und Entwicklung des Schlusses von der Tatsache, da Erkenntnis und Gegenstand ausschlielich zusammen wahrgenommen werden, auf deren Nichtverschiedenheit. Teil I Studie; Teil II Anmerkungen. Stuttgart 1991. David P. Jackson, The Entrance Gate for the Wise (Section III). Sa-skya Pan .d . ita on Indian and Tibetan Traditions of pram an a and Philosophical Debate. [2 . vols.] Wien. Matsumoto, Sah Shiro opalambhaniyama. Sot osh u Kenky uin Kenky usei Kenky u Kiy o 12, 1980, pp. 1-34 (=298-265). Pram an arttikabh a. sya or V arttik alam ara of . av . k nkr . tya yana. TiPraj n akaragupta, edited by R. Sa betan Sanskrit Works Series, vol. 1. Patna, 1953. Tib. P 5719. Tilmann Vetter, Dharmak rtis Pram an scayah . avini ., 1.Kapitel: Pratyaks am. Einleitung, Text der tibetischen . Ubersetzung, Sanskritfragmente, deutsche Ubersetzung . Wien 1966. Pram an scayat k a (Dharmottara): P 5727 (Dse), D . avini . 4229. Tattvasangrahapa njik a (Kamala s la): Tattvasangraha antaraks of S ita with the Commentary of Kamala s la. . Ed. Dvarikadas Shastri [2 vols.]. Varanasi 1981/82. Leonard W.J. van der Kuijp, Contributions to the Development of Tibetan Buddhist Epistemology. From the eleventh to the thirteenth century. Wiesbaden. Leonard W.J. van der Kuijp, An Introduction to Gtsang-nag-pas Tshad-ma rnam-par nges-pai . ti-ka legs-bshad bsdus pa. An Ancient Commentary on Dharmak rtis Pram an scaya, Otani University Collec. avini tion No. 13971. (Otani University Tibetan Work Series, Vol. II) Kyoto, pp. 1-33.

Matsumoto 1980

PVBh

PVin I

PVinT . TSP

van der Kuijp 1983

van der Kuijp 1989

82

Aspects of Buddhism

Aspects of Buddhism, Liw, Poland, June 25, 1994

Discovering Buddhist Art of Kinnaur

Per Kvrne (Oslo) In October 1993 I had the good fortune to be able to travel for two weeks in the district of Kinnaur, Himachal Pradesh, situated along the upper course of the River Sutlej and its tributaries. The lower part of Kinnaur had been opened to foreign tourists two years earlier, but the area in which I travelled was still classied as restricted at the time. My companions were the two art historians, Dr. Ajay Kumar Singh, Senior Lecturer at Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi, and Professor Manjula Chaturvedi, Kashi Vidyapith, Varanasi. Both had spent much time during the last years registering Buddhist art, particularly bronzes, in Kinnaur. Kinnaur has, at least since the eleventh century, received strong cultural and religious inuence from Tibet, especially in the form of Buddhism. The greater part of the population is Buddhist, and there are numerous private chapels and small temples in which Buddhist art, originating from Tibet, Nepal, and even Kashmir, is preserved. This art has been virtually unknown to scholars, and has remained unregistered until the present day. Consequently, with the opening of Kinnaur to general tourism, it is now in danger of attracting the attention of international art dealers, which in turn is likely to lead to widespread thefts, as has been the case in Ladakh and Nepal. It is, however, hoped that proper registration and documentation will make the selling of art from Kinnaur more dicult and hence render thefts less tempting. With this end in view, the Institute for Comparative Research in Human Culture, Oslo, has for the last few years nanced the registration work carried out by Dr. Singh and Professor Chaturvedi. Dr. Singh is now completing work on a major publication presenting several hundred Buddhist bronzes from Kinnaur. Apart from R ahul S am ayans book Kinnaur de s m e (In the Land of Kin. kr . ty naur, in Hindi), rst published in 1948, there is a remarkable lack of literature on Kinnaur, including its language (Tibeto-Burman, with clear anities, at least as to vocabulary, to the Zhangzhung language of the Bon religion) and its autochthonous (non-Buddhist) religious beliefs, focussing, it seems, on the cult of mountain deities. Together with its rich artistic heritage and architecture (characterized by remarkable wood-carving), Kinnaur is not only an unexplored, but promises to be also an extraordinarily fertile and important eld of research for linguists, art historians, anthropologists, and historians of religion.

84

Aspects of Buddhism

Aspects of Buddhism, Liw, Poland, June 25, 1994

Bhavya on M m am a . s
Christian Lindtner (Copenhagen) Should one wish to knowand there are certainly good reasons for wanting to do sowhat the Bauddhas in the sixth century A.D. had to say about the contemporary dar sanas, one should primarily turn ones attention to Bhavyas Madhyamakahr . daya (MH), or Tarkajv al a (TJ), chapters VI, VII, VIII and IX of which deal with S am ses anta and M m am a, respectively. . khya, Vai . ika, Ved . s While the chapters on S am khya and Vai ses . . ika still call for an editor and translator, the chapter on Ved anta was edited and translated (with extracts from the m in his Hindu Philosophy in Buddhist commentary TJ) by Olle Qvarnstro Perspective, Lund 1989, whereas the chapter on M m am a has been the special . s object of several studies by Shinj o Nobusada Kawasaki, whose recent book Issaichi shis o no kenky u, (i.e. Studies in the Idea of Omniscience) Tokyo 1992, contains, inter alia, an edition of the extant Sanskrit verses of MH, i.e. MHK (in all 148 verses) along with the Tibetan translation (167 & 67 extra verses) as well as a Japanese translation. (The Sanskrit text of MHK V was edited by myself in The Adyar Library Bulletin 59 (1995), pp. 37-65, as Yog ac aratattvavini scayah . . A complete edition and translation of all the chapters of MHK, Sanskrit and Tibetan, will be published as the The Heart of Madhyamaka. For further references the reader is referred to these works.) Since there is no complete translation of MHK IX in a Western language, and since Kawasakis edition of the Sanskrit verses still is open to critique and emendations, I do not have to oer any apology for presenting the interested readers of Sanskrit philosophical literature with a new edition and translation of that important work, MHK IX. In preparing the English translation, I have, of course, carefully compared and consulted the commentary (TJ) whichsince there can, in my opinion, be no doubt about its authenticitymust naturally remain the nal authority in all matters of doubt concerning the understanding of the meaning and (with some obvious provisos) also of the wording of the basic verse-text (i.e. MHK). In attempting to establish the Sanskrit recension of the text I have not only compared Kawasakis edition (Kawasaki, pp. 407-467) with the only available m, p. 23)of which a very clear copy is in my Sanskrit Ms (cf. Qvarnstro possessionbut also, of course, with the Tibetan version of MHK (as edited by Kawasaki) and TJ (Peking and sDe-dge editions). Some critical remarks on a

86

Aspects of Buddhism

few verses by Lambert Schmithausen, The Problem of the Sentience of Plants in Earliest Buddhism, Tokyo 1991, have also been taken into consideration. In general, it goes without saying, the Tib. version of MHK is indispensable for checking and supporting the words of the Sanskrit verses. Nevertheless, it should be used with some circumspection. Occasionally it leaves out (e.g. 145b) or inserts words (e.g. 31d, 144c), or even paraphrases the Sanskrit (e.g. 87d) in an attempt to render the syntax or argument more clear. The stern demands of Sanskrit metre, style and syntax must, in such and similar cases, make us refrain from submitting ourselves to the temptation of correcting the Sanskrit in the light of the Tibetan. Occasionally a reading in the Tib. (e.g. 34d) and Sanskrit (e.g. 92b) version of MHK has been inuenced by a reading in TJ. Obvious misunderstandings of the Sanskrit occur (e.g. 94c) but are very rare. In a few cases Tib. reects bad readings in the Sanskrit Ms(s) used by the translators (e.g. 121a). As a rule, the Tib. faces insurmountable incumbrances in catching the rhetoric and irony incidental to the authors arguments. Several allusions (e.g. 73 to G t a 2.2 and 15.18) can only be duly appreciated by a rasika familiar, like Bhavya, with Sanskrit literature. Nor would the desolate Tibetan mkhas pa even with the assistance of the tacit TJhave had any chance of clearly recognizing the implications of the signicant historical allusions to Bhartr arila . hari (14), Kum (15), or the Mah abh arata (12, etc.)not to speak of the tangy list of 363 doctrines (ad 19). The connotations of rare and curious technical entries such as lokapakti (15d), maga s astra (31d), sam aramocaka (35b), siddhiyoga (62a), and dharmagupti . s (68d, etc.), must also have escaped the Tibetan reader. Much the same applies to rare Sanskrit compound formations such as sam abhr antim aran . cinty . a (38, cf. also 39 and Wackernagel Altind. Gr., II,1, p. 69), and man arik a etc. (in .d . alak 141), where -k arik a is used, i.f.c., to designate a particular zoological or botanical species. As opposed to Kawasaki I have no hesitations in normalizing the often inconsistent orthography of our unique Sanskrit Ms. In doing so I am of course assuming that Bhavya consistently wrote a correct Sanskrit, grammatically and orthographically. There is, as pointed out and discussed by Kawasaki (in his 1989/1992 paper Discrepancies in the Sanskrit and Tibetan Texts of Bhavyas Madhyamaka-hr al a, pp. 13) a large number of Tibetan verses that have no . daya-Tarkajv correspondents in the extant Sanskrit Ms. Likewise, there are a couple of Sanskrit verses that have no correspondents in the Tib. of MHK. They are, however, embedded in the prose of TJ. It is clear (from the other chapters of MH/TJ also) that our work was originally conceived as a unit of verse and prose. At some point in the line(s) of transmission it was decided to extract the verses from the prose. Since then one could, at least for practical purposes, speak of the verses as MHK, and the prose of TJ. Bhavya himself, it seems, used both titles (MH and TJ) indiscriminately. Understandably, the unknown readers/translators responsible for extracting the verses from the prose ran into the diculty of having to separate Bhavyas own verses from those that, for various reasons, they did not consider original. The diculty of making the correct distinction is reected in

a C. Lindtner Bhavya on M m am . s

87

the fact that there is, especially in Chapters VIII (see 78-84) and IX a handsome discountenance between the Tibetan and Sanskrit recensions of MHK. On the whole, however, Kawasaki seems to have solved these diculties in a satisfactory manner, though a few uncertainties still remain. In the sequel my only concern is to provide a reliable translation and to establish a Sanskrit text that, with the support of all available materials (with the exception of the Mongolian versions of MH/TJ, and the paper Ms of MHK allegedly available in Lhasa) comes as close as possible to what Bhavya actually wrote in the sixth century A.D. Since Bhavyas archetype is, for all we know, irrevocably lost, we shall have to remain satised, not with absolute certainty, but with a reasonable degree of plausibility. The argument: First the p urvapaks m am a apavarga, . a (1-17). According to M . s or moks a (1,10) is to be obtained not by dhy a na and j n a na (as e.g. in Ved anta, . cf. 8.51), but by the performance of various rituals alone (kriy am atra ). These rituals are prescribed by the authority of agama, the three Vedas. This agama derives its authority from the fact that it consists of words that are permanent, i.e. not created by a fallible human author. As agama it is reliable because it has been handed down without interruption. As a pram an agama informs us of our .a ritual duties (ap urva = dharma), and as such it is quite dierent from anum ana. The Bhagavat of the Buddhists (and Jains) is not omniscient and his words are therefore unreliable. Bhavyas replies, the uttarapaks . a (18-167): If a tradition is to be considered agama it must be true and logical. The highest goal, mukti (= apavarga, moks . a) can only be achieved by j n ana, not by kriy a. Sometimes the words of human beings are reliable (18-23). The three Vedas do, in fact, have a human author, even an evil one (24-31). This is because they prescribe him a etc., which is the cause of . s duh kha . It is impossible to protect oneself and others against the duh a . . kha of him . s by incantations (mantra) and such things. Even if done for some holy purpose or in some sacred place him a is to be rejected. The same goes for madyap ana . s (32-42). The reasons for claiming that the words of the Vedas (the Word) are permanent, and thus authoritative, are not valid. Thus the Word cannot have a permanent sam . bandha to any artha. On the contrary, pratipatti (an important word!) is based on sam . keta (43-49). As a pram an a a gama is not essentially dierent from anum ana (here as else. where Bhavya follows Dign aga etc.), which also has a manifold (abstract) object. Both are, in the end, based on perception (50-54). Since ap urva and kriy a are impermanent their results must also be impermanent. So the Vedas are obviously wrong in saying that they lead to immortality, i.e. apavarga etc. (55-58). Since the main teachers of the three Vedas, i.e. Brahma, Vis .n . u (Kr .s .n . a) and Sivaas seen by many examples in the Mah abh arata etc.lack j n ana and are full of kle sas, they should not serve as authorities. Their immoral behavior cannot be justied by referring to the necessity of dharmagupti. Moreover, they lack compassion, and are full of hatred, desire etc. (59-73).

88

Aspects of Buddhism

Also, the idea that Vis .n . u has two bodies is absurd, and has only been introduced for the purpose (not of dharmagupti but) of vyasanagupti (74-83). So there is no point in meditating, in terms of yoga, on the body of Hari (83-86). Since the gods are ignorant of causality (in the Buddhist sense) and full of passions etc. they cannot serve the cause of dharmagupti, be it by teaching or by their personal pratipatti. So, again, the three Vedas should be rejected (87-94). God, as the creator of the world, has already been refuted in Chapter III. If it is now asked what he, hypothetically, has created, some possibilities are examined and excluded (95-103). Nor can God be considered eka, nitya etc. (104-106). In fact, God seems to be cruel and unjust, so it is safer to say that karma, not God, is responsible for the sr s. ti of the world (107-113). Again, meditation on God will .. not bring an end to suering (114-119). Moreover, the Vedas are wrong when claiming that bad karma can be removed by means of water, for karma is bound to citta with which water obviously cannot get in touch (120-126). There are other silly doctrines in the Vedas, e.g. that it is good to throw oneself into re, and to abstain from food and drinking (127-131). It is, under certain circumstances, allright to eat meat, it mostly depends on ones motive (132-138). The Vedas are also mistaken in claiming that trees are sentient beings endowed with a soul (136-146). Again, it is karma that is responsible for life (147). Finally, one cannot argue that the Vedas must be authoritative because they are endorsed by various authorities, for these authorities are obviously not always reliable. Some of their statements are true, others are false. As said, agama should only be followed to the extent that it satises the demands of logic and anum ana. The Buddha, on the other hand, is reliable and omniscient in the sense that he knows, and preaches (cf. 88) the m arga to svarga and apavarga. It is quite true that the Jains also refute the three Vedas, but of course this does not mean that the Buddhists are also Jains (148-167). So, to sum up, the three Vedas are full of silly ideas and proposals (durvihita ), and should therefore be rejected by sensible people. Also, the reasons for attributing the status of pram an agama of the three Vedas, are all wrong . a to the or inconclusive. What is good in the Vedas must have been borrowed from other sources. Thus, like S am ses anta, the dar sana of M m am a . khya, Vai . ika and Ved . s must also be rejected as ayuktiyukta etc.

. SATATTVANIRN M IMAM ARAH . AYAVAT .

(p urvapaks . a 1-17; uttarapaks . a 18-167) 1. eke pavargasanm argadhy anaj n an apav adinah . | kriy am atren a tatpr a ptim pratipady a napatrap ah . . . || Without any sense of shame some [adherents of Ved anta, viz. the M m am . sakas] deny that meditation and insight [constitute] the true way to deliverance. They insist that it can only be achieved by rituals.

a C. Lindtner Bhavya on M m am . s 2. s astroktavr hipa sv ajyapatn sam . bandhakarman . ah . | n anyo m argo pavarg aya yukta ity ahur agam at ||

89

They say that according to tradition there is no other correct way to deliverance that the rituals prescribed in the sacred texts, i.e. [rituals that involve] rice, cattle, butter and intercourse with ones spouse. 3. r ag adidos tatv at purus s a| . adus .. . asya vaco mr .. vedo purus at pram an . akartr . tv . a[m iti g]r . hyate || [The Buddha cannot serve as pram an . a:] The word of a human being is false, for he is [always] deled by desire and other [passions]. Since it does not have a human being as its author the [self-originated] Veda must be accepted as the [only true] authority. 4. kartur asmaran ac ces to vedo purus . .. . akartr . kah . | sam ay anupacched ad agamo sau tadatyaye || . prad Also, because no author can be recollected, the Veda does not have a human being as its author. Since it has been transmitted without interruption it [the Veda] is our agama.Without it... 5. atyant aks . aparoks . e hi pratipattih . katham . bhavet | adr s t ali ngasam bandhe svarg a p u rv a divastuni || . .. . How could one in fact have any knowledge of invisible things far beyond the senses, such as heaven, ap urva [= dharma] etc., which have no connection with a visible mark? 6. nityah sabdo dhvanivyangyah . . sam . bandho rthena nityatah . | pratipattur yato rthes u pratipattih praj a yate || . . The Word that is expressed in sounds is permanent. It is associated with meaning (artha ) from eternity. It is due to the [Word] that one understands the meaning of things when one has understanding. 7. advipravr as at pratyabhij n anatas tath a| . tter abhy sabdavac chr avan atv a d dhi nityah s abdo vas yate || . . The Word is understood to be permanent, because it never is used twice, because it can be repeated, because it allows recognition, and because it is audible, just like a sound. 8. anum an at pr asau pram an at tadanyavat | . thak c . atv ek anek arthavis api v a || . ayapratipattir ath Moreover, it [viz. agama ] is dierent from anum ana, because it is a pram an . a, just like the one dierent from that [i.e. pratyaks a ]. It is also an understand. ing that has an object that is one or many [like pratyaks ana, . a and anum respectively].

90

Aspects of Buddhism 9. adr s. talingasam arthamatihetutah .. . bandhapad . | bhinnagocaradh janmak aran atv a d ath a pi v a || . Also [ agama is dierent from anum ana,] because it gives rise to an understanding of something [such as heaven etc.,] that has no visible connection to a mark, or because it gives rise to an understanding of a manifold object.

10. ap urvo pi kriy avyangyah a moks adhanam | . kriy . e pi s somap an adik a vidv an nirj[ayed a]ntakam yay a || . Moreover, duty (ap urva = dharma ) is expressed in [ritual] action, and ritual actions such as drinking soma etc. bring about liberation (moks .a = apavarga ). By means of such [ritual actions] a knowing person may overcome Death. 11. devars ta sis tes tam an sobhanam | . ijus .. .. .. . pur . am . vartma ved arthab ahyaih str s u drair yuktam yat tyajyate tray || . . The pristine glorious path [of the Three Vedas] is frequented and taught by the gods and the sages. That the three Vedas are rejected by women and slaves who have nothing to do with the Veda is, of course, quite logical. 12. yad ih asti tad anyatra yan neh asti na tat kvacit | catus t aye pi dharm a dau tad ev anyatra dr syate || .. . What exists here [in the Vedas,] that [also exists] elsewhere. What does not exist here, exists nowhere. With regard to the four [aims of mans life, viz.] dharma, [k ama, artha and moks . a ]is such a thing actually seen elsewhere? 13. d u. sayitv a tray m argam adinah . hetubhir hetuv . | anum anapradh anatv at svanayam dyotayanti ye || . [Another point:] Finding faults with the three Vedas with the help of arguments, certain logicians, by putting too much emphasis on anum ana, celebrate their personal interpretations; 14. p adaspar s ad iv[ andh an am avat am | . ] vis . ame pathi dh anum anapradh an an am p a tah tes a m na durlabhah . . . . . || But, as in the case of blind people running on an uneven path with only the contact of their feet, such people are prone to fall when they regard anum ana as the most important pram an a . . 15. na c asti ka scit sarvaj no ned an m syate yatah . dr . . | sarvaj nat a hi buddhasya kalpit a lokapaktaye || Moreover, there exists no omniscient person at all, for such a [human being] is not seen nowadays. The [doctrine of the] omniscience of the Buddha has in fact been invented [by his followers] in order to impress people. 16. apram an at tadanyavat | . am . vaco bauddham . kr . takatv asarvaj na s ca sam buddhah purus atv a t tadanyavat || . . .

a C. Lindtner Bhavya on M m am . s

91

The word of the Buddha is no pram an . a, because it is created, just like [the words] of other such [human beings]. Moreover, the Buddha is not omniscient, for he is a human being, just like others. 17. apram an dar sanad u. san at | . am . vaco bauddham . tray . yat yathoktam a nagn a. tadar sanam || . [tathoktam . tad yat]h The word of the Buddha is no pram an . a, for it criticizes the theory of the three Vedas. Any [theory] that does so is said to be [no pram an . a], as, for instance, the theory of the Jainas. Reply to the opponents objections: 18. tad atr api par ks abh utagaves . ante yath . in . ah . | paks atavis a sabd arthany ayyakovidah . ap . am . hitv . || Those seekers of truth who are clever in guring out the proper meaning of words abandon the poison of partiality and also investigate this in the following way: 19. sam ay anupacched ad agamasy agamatvatah . prad . | sarvasy agamat asiddheh aryat am || . kim . tattvam iti dh If agama has status of agama simply because it has been handed down without interruption [cf. 4], then it is established that all [the 363 doctrines] are agama! [But this is absurd!] One should hold on to what is true! ks aks a vacanam agamah 20. yat par . . amam . yukty . cet tad . | tad eva t avan m m am sc at tenoditam . syam . pa . hi yat || If a statement is logically capable of critique then it is agama. First one must nd that which is [true], and then one must, of course, [gure out,] what it means. 21. tatra tatpra[tipaks aj] j n an an muktir it s am | . atv . yat amayapratipaks atv a d aus adh a d vy a dhimuktivat || . . We maintain that liberation is due to insight, because it, in this case, is an antidote [to ignorance]. It is like being free from a disease by means of medicine, because it is an antidote to sickness. 22. kriy atv an na kriy abhis t a kr sivan muktyav aptaye | .. .. adh tve sati v acyatv an mitak alatvato pi v a || We do not accept that a ritual [cf. 2] can lead to liberation, because it is just an activity, like ploughing. Also because it, having no understanding, can be expressed in words, or because it only lasts for a limited time. 23. nr ak ced dos tatv ad apram an s . v . adus .. . am it . yate | sauvarn ik a div a kyena hetuh sy a d vyabhic arav an || . . If you maintain that the statement of a human being cannot serve as authority, because it is deled by [various] faults [cf. 3], then this reason is not

92

Aspects of Buddhism compatible with [the fact that] the words of a goldsmith and other [experts may be quite reliable].

24. pr am an adhyate kartr . yam atha vedasya s . katvatah . | as a[dh aran a ] t a hetoh sy a d asiddh a rthat a pi ca || . . If, alternatively, you want to prove that the Veda has status of pram an . a, because it does not have a creator, then this reason is either too narrow [as no other example can be given,] or else it fails to make any sense [to other people]. 25. anuv ad ad akartr . tve bauddham apy asty akartr . kam | p urvabuddh abhisam buddham yato buddhair an udyate || . . If [the Vedic Word] has no creator because it is [permanent] repetition, well, then the word of the Buddha may also be without a creator. This is because the Buddhas just repeat what former Buddhas have understood. 26. kr anum an ac ca paks adh anum anatah . takatv . ab . | kartur asmaran asiddher heto s ca sy ad asiddhat a || . Still, the reason [because it has no creator] will be unestablished, because one can infer that it does have a creator, and because it cannot be proved that there is no recollection of a creator. 27. samantrasyaiva sam uto mantrakartuh a yadi | . bh . pur s astram vah samabhipretam tatkartr kam akartr . . . . . kam || Opponent: If we say that [the Veda] at rst came into the possession of the creator of the mantra, i.e. one who had the mantra, will it then be acceptable to you that a sacred text with such a creator [really] does not have a creator? 28. sakartr sa strasya kim evam yate | . katvam . . na prat tatsahotpannakartr aj j atismarakr a || . tv . tir yath Reply: But, if so, why do you not acknowledge that your sacred text does have a creator? This is because he becomes a creator at the same time [that the mantra] occurs, just like an activity [takes place the very moment] one recollects [an earlier] incarnation. 29. pratipatty anugun amn ay ad ath api v a| . yena varn . gr aky an am a || . hyate vedav . na kim . purus . akartr . t Or why not accept that the words of the Vedas actually are created by a human being, either because they are consistent with [human] understanding, or because of the tradition of language [or words]? 30. ita s ca vedav aky an am a purus a| . mat . akartr . t vivaks it a rthadh janmak a ran atv a d yathe ngitam || . .

a C. Lindtner Bhavya on M m am . s

93

We also think that the words of the Vedas must have a human author, because they give rise to ideas about meanings that one wants to express in words. It is just like a sign. 31. anumeya s ca vedo yam asatpurus . akartr . kah . | bh utahim asur ap anakriyokter maga s astravat || . s Moreover, one can even infer that this Veda must have an evil human being as its author [or creator]! This is because [the Vedas] recommend [abhorrent] rituals [such as] slaughter of animals and drinking of alcohol, just like the sacred texts of the [Persian] Maga. 32. vis a yadi mantraparigrah at | . opayuktivad dhim . s n abh s t anis taphalad a s astrokter v api d anavat || .. .. Perhaps you maintain that violence (him a) does not give an undesirable re. s sult, either because one is protected by a mantra, as in the case of consuming poison, or because it is prescribed in the holy texts, just as generosity is? 33. mantrakars urn adyair agamy agamanam . an . ac . . hi yat | ten anek antikah urvo madyap anena cottarah . p . || [But this is wrong:] The rst [argument] is not to the point, for then one could obviously [justify] illicit intercourse by means of mantras, seduction, magic powder etc. The second argument [in 32] is also not to the point [for generosity may be associated] with consumption of alcohol. 34. ayucchedaprayogatv ad is to mantraparigrahah .. . | anis taphaladah sastraprayogavat || .. . kartur vis . a If one wants to protect oneself with a mantra in order to commit a murder, it will have undesirable results for the person responsible. It is as [dangerous as] to employ poison and weapons! 35. sva s astra eva ced ukte siddhah aramocakah . sam . s . | s am anyena ca het uktau sy ad anyatarasiddhat a || Opponent: But what if it says so in our [own] sacred text? Reply: Then it is also perfectly allright to [murder people in order to] liberate them from samsara!But if the reason is stated in a general sense, would it then be established for any one of us? [No! So it proves nothing!] 36. yaj ne pa su n am a cen n anis taphalad ayin | . him . s .. t adarthy ad br ahman arth a hi yathes t a pacanakriy a || . .. If [the opponent thinks] that it does not give an undesirable result to slaughter cattle during a sacrice, because one does it for the same purpose that one does something for the sake of a priest. It is, for instance, allright to cook food for him...

94

Aspects of Buddhism

37. bhoktrarth ah savo bh s t a bhogyatv at tad yath angan a| . pa .. tasm ad yaj na rthat asiddheh pa s u n a m hetvasiddhat a || . . Reply: This must mean that animals are created for the sake of those who eat them, for they have to be enjoyed, just like a woman. Therefore it has not been established that animals [have been created] for the purpose of sacrice. So the reason [for the creation of animals, viz. sacrice] remains unestablished. 38. antarvedy am abhr antim aran at | . ca him . seyam . sam . cinty . anis tapha[la]d a kartur ayaty am a || .. . tad yathetar Even in a [sacred place such as] Antarved this kind of violence (him a = . s yaj na) gives an undesirable result in the future for the person responsible. This is because it is deliberate cold-blooded murder, just as other kinds [of violence]! 39. ita s c anis taphalad a him a yaj na it s .. . s . yate | sam vitocchediduh adh an ad yathetar a || . cintyaj . kh Another reason why we think that violence during a sacrice has an undesirable result, is that deliberate murder inicts suering [upon its victims,] just like other kinds [of violence or slaughter]. 40. y adr th ane dr s. te hi kurute kriy a| . k phalam adhis .. .. kartus t adr s. te pi him ad v a tad yathetar a || . g adr .. . s So, surely, whether the authority is seen or not seen, a ritual action brings about a result that corresponds to [the evil action] of one who commits it. This is because it is motivated by violence, just like other [ritual actions]. 41. vy akhy atam an adi praty akhy an ad yathodit at | . madyap madyam na madahetutv a t sevyam dhust u rak a divat || . . Consumption of alcohol etc. is explained by a prohibition which has the same purpose as [above, viz. to prevent undesirable results:] One should not consume alcohol, because it causes madness, just as a poisonous apple etc. does. 42. [na madya]p anam ne mantraparigrah at | . nirdos . am . yaj madyatv at tad yath anyatra dr s t o mantraparigrah a t || . .. One cannot render consumption of alcohol harmless by protecting oneself with a mantra during the sacrice, for [alcohol may still] make one mad. Thus, for instance, in other cases one is seen to [be mad] because one assumes the protection of a mantra! 43. dr s. tam ast ti yadi svarg adyani scayah .. . na lingam . | ling ad anumi[ta]tv ac ca ni scetur ni sciter na kim || If [the opponent thinks, cf. 5] that one cannot be certain of heaven and [ap urva = dharma], since [without the agama of the Vedas] there is no visible

a C. Lindtner Bhavya on M m am . s

95

sign, can one who is certain not have a certain understanding by inferring [these things] from a sign? [In other words, the validity of agama must be ascertained by means of anum ana.] pe py advipravr 44. advipravr . tter ity atra d . ttitah . | vyabhic aritay a hetoh s abdanityatvam apy asat || . To say that the Word is permanent because it never occurs twice [cf. 7], is also wrong, because the reason is uncertain, since [for instance, the same] lamp also never occurs twice. [Still it is not, on that account, permanent.] sabdo yam avat kim 45. sattv ad anityah . . kriy . na gr . hyate | atha [v a de]haces t a vad dh hetutv a d vin a s y ayam || .. Why do you not accept that the Word is impermanent, because it exists, just like a ritual action? Or that it is impermanent, because it gives rise to ideas, just as the movements of the body? 46. abhy asapratyabhij n anahetvor anvayah nat a| n abhy asapratyabhij n ane nitye dr s t e kvacid yath a || . .. The two other reasons [given above in 7, viz. that the Word is permanent because] it can be repeated [or studied] and recognized, are not appropriate, for repetition [or study] and recognition are always experienced to be impermanent! sabdatvanityat asiddheh sabdatvam sanam | 47. . . na nidar abhivyaktinis ac ca dhvanivyangyo na c apy ayam || . edh Since it has not been established that the Word is permanent, to be [like] a word [cf. 7] cannot be used as an example. Moreover, the Word cannot be expressed in sounds, because expression [or manifestation in general] has been refuted [already as being quite impossible]. 48. sr avan sabdas te dhvanivyangyah . o yadi . katham . matah . | pratipattis tu sam ad asau sabdah . ket . prasajyate || If you think that the Word is audible [cf. 7], why do you also maintain that it must be expressed in sounds [cf. 6]? [This is unnecessary and absurd.] The understanding of [the meaning of a word] depends, in our opinion, on convention. It follows as a word. 49. sam asam ad adau pratipattir na yujyate | . ket . bhav sam aravad an aditv at sam anuv adatah . s . ketasy . || If there is no convention to begin with then understanding is not possible at all. [Understanding arises] from a repetition of a convention, since this, like sam ara, is without beginning. . s 50. anum ane pram an atmanah . atvam . bhinnam . ca na tad . | ato naik antiko hetuh pram a n atv a d it ritah || . . .

96

Aspects of Buddhism Moreover, what gives anum ana the status of pram an . a is [a kind of cognition] that is not dierent from the one [of agama] that has the same nature. Therefore, the argument mentioned [in 8] because it is a pram an . a, is uncertain.

51. bhinnagocarat asiddher heto s ca sy ad asiddhat a| bhinnagocaradh janmak aran atvasya netarah || . . Moreover, the [other] reason [for saying that agama is dierent from anum ana], viz. that it, because it has a dierent object, gives rise to ideas of manifold objects [cf. 9], is also not valid. [You may think so] but others [such as the Buddhists] do not! 52. anek arthavin abh av ad anum anam ap s . yate | naik arthapratipaddhetur asm ac ch abd an na bhidyate || Since it is impossible without a plurality we also maintain that anum ana gives rise to an understanding of a manifold object. Therefore [we do] not dierentiate it [viz. anum ana] from language ( sabda = agama) [which is, in fact, contained in anum ana]. 53. adr s. talingasam arth ad anum anatah .. . bandhe par . | pratipattir yato boddhye tasm ad arth antaram . na sah . || Since one can understand an understandable object with no visible connection to a mark by inferring it from something else [that is visible], therefore it [viz. agama] is not absolutely dierent from [anum ana]! 54. n anum an at pr abdah . thak ch . paroks . amatihetutah . | sam bandhasmr tyapeks atv a d anum a nam yath a svatah . . . . . || Moreover, since it is the cause of an understanding of something beyond perception, language ( sa bda = agama) is not dierent from anum ana. This is because it, like anum ana itself, depends on recollection of a connection between [a mark and that which may be inferred from that mark, based on previous experience]. 55. n ap urvo pi kriy avyangyah sabdavyaktinis . . edhavat | ghat avad v a py abhivyakter ap u rvo nitya is am || . . yat Moreover, ap urva [= dharma] is not to be expressed in ritual action [cf. 10], [for this can be refuted] just like the manifestation of the word is refuted. Also, we think that ap urva is impermanent because, like a jar, it is something manifest. 56. anityam an adikri[y a]phalam it s . somap . yate | kriy apha[la]tv at tad yath a k amanaimittikam . phalam || [Moreover,] we maintain that the result of ritual actions such as drinking soma is impermanent. This is because it is the outcome of an action, as for instance the result of [an activity] motivated by desire.

a C. Lindtner Bhavya on M m am . s 57. na moks apik a yukt a somap an adik kriy a| . apr kriy atv at tad yath a nes t a k a manaimittik kriy a || ..

97

A ritual action such as drinking of soma cannot possibly make one obtain freedom. This is because it is an action. Likewise, an action motivated by desire is not acceptable. 58. na jayaty antakam ad enam anam a sritah . tasm . panth . | parapran eyair jus t o yam vic a r a ks amabuddhibhih || . .. . . . Therefore, by following this path [of the three Vedas, cf. 10 & 11] one cannot overcome Death. It is only accepted by [people] seduced by others, [people] with minds unable to analyse [things correctly]. 59. tray m argapran r am sava su lin am | . et .n . . brahmake dr s. tv a kle s atmik am am || .. . cary . yuktam . yat tyajyate tray It is quite logical to reject the three Vedas [cf. 11] when one notices the thoroughly vicious behaviour of the prophets of the path of the three Vedas, i.e. Brahma, Vis .n . u (Kr .s .n . a) and Siva. 60. j n anena j n aninah apam . p . dahaty agnir ivendhanam | atas tejovi ses a c ca na tes am ayit a || . . . pratyap As re burns fuel, thus men of insight [burn] evil karma with their insight. So it must be due to a special power that they do not face an evil destiny. 61. yat kle sadahan ay alam n anam na nino viduh . taj j . j . | apam n an taddhetvasam at || n atah . prakurute p . j . bhav The kind of insight that men of insight acknowledge is one that is capable of burning away the vices (kle sa). Therefore a man of insight does not commit any evil. This is because the cause [of evil, viz. ignorance] cannot possibly arise [in him]. 62. siddhiyogo na lipyeta karman a p atakena v a| . iti bruv an aih sanm a rg a n nas t air anye pi n a sit ah . . .. . || Others have been corrupted by those who have deviated from the right way claiming that the yoga of perfection (siddhiyoga) is not sullied even by a criminal action [such as the murder of a priest]. 63. tattv arthadar san buddhih ad n am . brahm . na ces . yate | tilottam ay am su linau || . sam . raktau katham . brahmatri Nor do we believe that the mind of Brahma etc. sees things as they actually are: How in the world could Brahma and Siva be [so stupid as to] fall in love with Tilottam a! 64. p urvam agnin adagdho dad aha tripuram . krodh . katham | p u. sn ah s a s a sa dant a m s ca bhagasy a pi ca locane || . . .

98

Aspects of Buddhism How could [Siva] burn Tripura without rst having been inuenced by the re of anger? Or how could he knock out the teeth of P us . an, or the two eyes of Bhaga?

65. brahmah a madyapah am dr s. tatattvo yad svarah . k .. . | k a kath adr s t atattv a n a m tatpaddhatyanug a min a m || . .. . If God can kill a priest, drink alcohol and be in love, and still [be considered] to have seen the truth, what can one say of those who, following in his path, have not seen the truth! 66. katham savah sic an ran arak adik an | . ca ke . ke .u vyayojayad ak arun ad asubhir vasubhi s ca t an || . y And how could Vis si, C an ra and .n . u [or Kr .s .n . a] without mercy deprive Ke .u others in hell of their lives and their possessions! 67. par angan adhan ad ay madyapah an atakah . pr . igh . | dr s t atattvo yadi harir jitam s avarataskaraih || . .. . . If Hari [Vis n u-Kr s n a] is [considered] to have seen the truth when he takes .. .. . other mens women and goods, when he drinks alcohol and kills living beings, then he cannot compete with bandits and robbers! 68. praj ap alanadaks ad asur an surakan tak an | . atv .. n ato dos . o ghnato py asti tasya ced dharmaguptaye || Opponent: If he is good at protecting people, then it is not a sin for him to kill godless [creatures] who are a thorn in the eyes of godsas long as it is his [intention] to protect dharma (dharmagupti)! 69. parastr dravin ad anam ay a s a. thyapravr . . ttayah . | kim na tyakt a v a v a n ch a sti tasya ced dharmaguptaye || . Reply: But if it is his desire to protect dharma why not abandon actions such as adultery, theft, deceit and dishonesty? 70. adharma s cendriyo n asya katham s. tik arit a| . tatsr .. adr s. tados natv at tatsr s. tir atha v a kr a || .. . air aj .. . t But if adharma is not his domain, why is he responsible for its creation? Or has it [viz. adharma] been created by [gods] who failed to recognize their own faults because they were ignorant? 71. tr sn a p ati lokam a tr sn ad asah | .. . ay . v .. . . katham . kr . t k arun y a c cet katham lokam m a yay a samam u muhat || . . . If it is out of desire that [God] protects the world, how can he, being a slave of desire, be an accomplished [and perfect being as a god should be]? If, on the other hand, he [does so] out of compassion, why did he always confuse the world with all his tricks?

a C. Lindtner Bhavya on M m am . s 72. kim asures arun aty adiduh . n . u k . yam . mr . tyuj . khis .u | sarvatra samadar sitv an n arisam j n a sya yujyate || .

99

Why does he not have compassion for all the living beings who suer from death, rebirth etc.? Since he [is supposed] to regard everything with equanimity it ought not be possible for him to have any notion of an enemy! 73. r agadves adi savalam dr . . kim . k caritam . hareh . | an aryacarita s caivam . katham . sa purus . ottamah . || How can such a behaviour that is so lled with desire, hatred and [ignorance] be ascribed to Hari! And how can he be a superman when he behaves in a manner so unworthy of Aryans [cf. G t a 2.2 & 15.18]! 74. anyaiv asau harer m urtih siv a yadi vikalpyate | . dr s. tv a hi yatayo y am anti punarbhavam || .. . na punar y If [our opponents, cf. G t a 9.11 etc.] imagine that Hari has an entirely dierent body that is blissfulit is, of course, the one that ascetics see and are no more reborn 75. na sat n asat c asau n asau sadasat mat a| tasm at sattv ad asattv ac ca sadasattv ac ca s a par a || It is considered not to exist, not not to exist, not to exist and not to exist, and so it is beyond being, non-being, and being and non-being... adim urtaih any a ced anyatv ad acyut a na s a| 76. matsy . s ananyatv ad anany api s apy a s ant a yathetar a || Then, if it is [considered] to be dierent from the material forms such as sh etc. it cannot, because it is dierent, be permanent. But if it is the same, because it is not dierent, then, like the other form, it is also not blissful! 77. ath apy a s ant a tasyaik a s ant anyaik atmanah . satah . | bandhak n ama s adhv sy ac char r arddhena sam yat a || . If one, on the other hand, [assumes] that this real soul [has two bodies,] one that is not blissful and one that is blissful, then his chaste wife is actually unchaste, because she is only devoted to one half of his body! 78. sad adi sabd av acyatv at par a ceti na yujyate | sato hi parat a yukt a yukt a k aran api ca || . at Also, if one cannot say that it exists etc. [cf. 75], it is not logical to speak of a higher [form of Hari]. Of course, for something to be higher it must exist, and for something to be a cause [of creation, it must] also [exist]. 79. k aran ad anyatvasya ca p urvavat | . atvapratiks . ep na k aran am na c a ny a sau n a cyuta s c a py aj atitah . . . || Since we have already refuted that [God] is the creator of the world, [the refutation of his] being dierent [from the world] is also like before [as in

100

Aspects of Buddhism Chapter 3 etc.]. He is not the cause [of the world] and [his higher form] is not dierent [from his material form]. Moreover, he is not immortal, for he is not even born!

80. acyuto yadi bh avah at sa nas tah ad ras adivat | . sy .. . sy acyuto yady abh avah sy a d asam s c a sau khapus . . . pavat || If immortal is something real [that, as such, always changes,] then it is destroyed like taste etc. If immortal is something unreal, then it is as unreal as a ower in the sky. 81. sadasatt a na yuktaivam agner us s tate | . yath .n . a ath apy anabhil apyah sy a d yukto sau katham . . acyutah . || It is not possible for him to exist and not to exist, just as it is [not possible] for re to be hot and cold. Again, how can he possibly be [spoken of as] immortal [if he is also said] to be unspeakable! 82. na c asy anabhil apyatvam atmavat tannis . edhatah . | acyuter n acyutah scid asti cen n acyuto cyutah . ka . || Nor can he be unspeakable, for this can be refuted, just as the self [was refuted in Chapter 8].But can he not somehow, due to immortality, remain immortal?If so, as immortal will he not [always remain] immortal? [There is no example of this, so it is impossible.] 83. m urtir any a ca y a tasya kl a vyasanaguptaye | .pt katham alambam an as t am mucyante nirmumuks . . avah . || [So there is no immortal form of Hari:] So how can [yogis] longing for liberation become liberated by taking as object [of meditation] this other [material] form of his which has only been introduced to cover up a calamity [in your system]! 84. indri[y an ndri]y arthebhyah urmo ng an va sam . . k . haran | om aram aharan smr a tadbhakto mucyate yadi || . k . vy . ty If [the opponent] thinks that a devotee of him [i.e. of Hari] is liberated by withdrawing his senses from the objects of the sensesas a tortoise [withdraws] its limbsand by mindfully uttering the syllable OM [then he is mistaken]: 85. muktir na haribhakt an am san at | . yujyate haridar vikalpasmr at tad yath a haridar san at || . tiyogatv The devotees of Hari are not liberated by visualizing Hari, for they are still bound by ideas and recollections, for instance because they visualize Hari. 86. nirvikalp api dh r nes t a yogayuktasya muktaye | .. nimittagrahan a n mithy a kim a || . . punah . parikalpit

a C. Lindtner Bhavya on M m am . s

101

Nor do we accept that the mind of a yogi will become free even if it is nonconceptual. This is because it falsely still holds on to signs. So much the more a mind that is full of images! ag adisamud ac ar ad brahm ad n am a]tavat | 87. r . ki[r tattvacint am akars aran . nir . yah . sam . deho na hi k . e || Since they are deeply steeped in desire and other [passions], like primitive tribesmen, Brahma and the other gods do not, of course, have that curiosity about causality which ought to draw it towards scientic studies! 88. tathyadharmopade sena pratipatty api v a svayam | dharmaguptir bhavant sy at s a dvidh apy es a || . u duh . sthit Real protection of dharma (dharmagupti) would consist either in teaching the true dharma [to others] or in realizing it personally. But with regard to the gods, it is, in both cases, in a bad state! 89. sarve ca sr s. tihetutvam atmanah .. . bruvate sv . pr . thak | kasy atra vacanam utam abh utam a vikalpyat am || . bh . v Each one of all of them claims that he is the only cause of creation. So here one must consider whose word is true, and whose is not true! 90. tadekatv ad ados s ced brahm api brahmah a katham | . a ekatvapratis ac ca tadekatvam ayuktimat || . edh If one says that there is no problem since they are all one [and the same god], how can it be that only Brahma is [said to be] a killer of priests? If one denies that they are one [as done in Chapter 3 etc.], then their unity is illogical. 91. atmabhede pi c ayog at tritayam sanam . ce . katham | duh khahetau vim u d h a n a m tacch a ntyuktau kath astu k a || . . . But assuming that there is no essential dierence [between the three gods], how can a divinity be a trinity?When they do not know the cause of suering, how in the world can they tell us how to make it cease! 92. vedayogopade s aditadukter vikalatvatah . | na t avat tathyadharmokty a sakt as te dharmaguptaye || Since the teachings etc. about yoga in the Vedas are decient when they are talking about this [viz. suering etc.], it cannot, rst of all [cf. 88] be by teaching the true dharma that they are [considered] able to protect the dharma. 93. pratipadvikalatv ac ca n alam an chamam | . netum . par yath a net a svam argen a prap a tapatitah par an || . . Moreover, since their personal understanding is decient, they are not able to lead others to peace [and freedom from suering]. It would be as if a guide who has fallen into a precipice were to lead others along his own path!

102

Aspects of Buddhism

94. trayy am aj alakalpitaih . hetuviparyastaih . kalpan . | ayuktiyuktam m m a m syam yuktam yat tyajyate tray || . . . . One must scrutinize the mass of bad logic in the three Vedas put together by mistaken arguments that have been arranged by the web of conceptual constructions! [If one does so] it is logical that the three Vedas are rejected! 95. ne s adik aran svam a| . am . vi . yuktam ity uditam . pur saty ap sa dikartr tve kim hi tatkr takam bhavet || . . . . I have already stated earlier [in Chapter 3] that the universe does not have God etc. as its cause. Even if one assumes that God etc. is its cause, what, exactly, has he created? 96. atm a t avad ajanyatv an na tatkr . taka is . yate | dharm adharmau na tasyes tau tadgun ad yath adhun a || .. . atv First of all, it cannot be maintained that the soul has been created by him. This is because it cannot be created at all. Nor can it be maintained that he is responsible for dharma and adharma, for they [have always been] his attributes, just as they are so today. 97. deho pi t abhy am . nirvr . ttah . sukhaduh . khopalabdhaye | deho pi dehin am tasm a d yukto ne s a dikartr . . [kah . ] || Moreover, the body [necessary] for perceiving pleasure and pain is produced by those two [viz. dharma and adharma]. Therefore the body that living beings are in possession of, cannot possibly have been created by one of the gods. 98. kalp adau dehin am akkr adr s. tahetutah . dehah . pr . t .. . | sukh adyutpattihetutv at tad yath adyatan tanuh . || The body that incarnated beings possess at the beginning of a kalpa must be caused by invisible [dharma and adharma] done previously. This is because [it is the body] that is the cause of the arising of pleasure and [pain], just as the present body. 99. svarasya yad ai svaryam . tac cet pun . yakr . tam . bhavet | tatpun ad svarah ad an svarah . yaparatantratv . sy . || If the almighty status of the almighty god is supposed to be created by good karma, then the almighty is, eo ipso, not almighty, since he must depend on that good karma! svara[sya yad ai svarya]m akasm ac cet tad is 100. . yate | tasy anyair api s am any ad svarah sy a d an s varah . . || If the almighty status of the almighty God is supposed to be entirely accidental, then he must have this in common with others also. Therefore the almighty God is not almighty!

a C. Lindtner Bhavya on M m am . s 101. svaro j nasvabh ava s cet tena tatkartr . kam . jagat | k aran a nuvidh a yitv a t sarvam te cetanam . . . jagat ||

103

If you say that God consists in spirit, then the world created by him must also, according to you, consist entirely in spirit. This is because [an eect] must be in conformance with its cause. 102. svaro yadi hetuh aj jagat sy ad an adivat | . sy . im svaro v a na hetuh sy a j jagac cen n a n im . . adivat || If God is its cause the world would have had to possess subtlety and [the seven other attributes of God, cf. 8.8]. In other words, if the world does not possess subtlety etc., God could not be its cause. 103. svarah a cet pacyeta na[rakes . karmakart . v api | tadanyes a m hi ] p a ke v a kr tan a s a kr t a gamau || . . . . If God were responsible for doing karma he would also have to boil in the hells. If one assumes that it is others than himself that have to boil [in the hells], then actions done are lost, and actions not done come back! [This is obviously against the law of karma!] 104. duh s ca nityatv at tadduh samah . khaheto . khopa . kutah . | nos n avyupa s amo dr s t o jvalaty eva vibh a vasau || .. . .. Moreover, assuming that the cause of suering is permanent, how then can such suering be extinguished? Clearly, as long as a re is burning its heat is not extinguished! 105. ekasya v avicitrasya katham aryavicitrat a| . k n api cecch adivaicitry a yuktaikasya vicitrat a || Moreover, if God is one and not manifold, how can he be responsible for a manifold eect? Nor can the manifoldness he, as one, is [considered responsible for] possibly be due to his manifold desires etc. 106. nityo navayavah uks aran . s . mah . k . am . jagatah . kila | ekah sarvagata s ceti kim a s carya [ m tato param ] || . . If the cause of the world, as claimed, is a god that is permanent, without parts and subtle, what can be more odd than to say that he is also one and omnipresent? 107. [kr d artham ah tiphalam . . tan]nimittam . cet tasy . pr . kila | pr tau svaparatantratv ad svarah sy a d an s varah . . || If his motive for this allegedly is to play, then the result of such [a play] must be pleasure. Since pleasure only depends on itself [for motivation], the almighty god cannot be almighty [since, as said, he is subject to pleasure]. 108. anyonyabhaks ad bh tais tiryagbhir durlabhotsavaih . an . . | nis pes acchedad a h a diduh kh a rtair n a rakair api || . . .

104 109. nr arogabhaya sokaklam arditaih . bhir janmajar . | pr yate yo namas tasmai rudr ay anvarthasam nine || . j

Aspects of Buddhism

Homage to the [terrible god] Rudra whose name corresponds to what he actually is: He delights in the hapless animals that are afraid of being devoured by one another, and also in the inhabitants of hell who are tormented by clashings, cuttings, burnings etc., [and he also delights in] human beings haunted by rebirth, old age, disease, fear, sorrow and exhaustion. 110. kr a dhanino yad v a par ann ad a s ca s[ attvik ah . pan . . | svarge c adharmin svaraces titam || . ah . ] kecid vyaktam .. It is obviously the whim of God that some miserable men are rich, that some good men live as parasites, and that some immoral people [are reborn] in heaven! 111. alp ayus a durvr a s ca cir ayus . o gun . adhan . tt . ah . | d at ara s c alpavibhav a vyaktam svaraces t itam || .. It is obviously the whim [will] of God that men rich in virtues have a short life, that rogues have a long life, and that generous people have little power! 112. bauddh a hi sukhinah a duh s ca kim | . kecid [tad]bhakt . khina svar aj n avidh an ac ca pun ak kim apakr . yabh . na p . t || Some Buddhists are, naturally, happy, but why are [some of] their devotees suering? Why do some good people, following the commandments of God, not commit evil? 113. vaicitryakarman nasya taddhetutvena v acyat a| . o j etena sr s t ikartr tvam pratyuktam brahmakr s n ayoh . .. . . . .. . . || The answer to one who does not understand manifoldness and karma is that it [viz. karma] is its cause.Hereby I have refuted that Brahma and Kr .s .n .a are responsible for the creation [of the world etc., cf. 95]. 114. [sam a ]rah apayitv a sive manah . yamitamatidv . sth . | tathom k a ram abhidhy a yan dh a rayan dh a ran a m . . . hr . di || 115. ks adidh aran abhy as at pr aksam ahitam anasah . ity . . | se prasanne duh antam ty etad apy asat || . kh . gacchat It is also wrong to think as follows [in the Sivatantra :] Having closed the door of the mind, [the yogi] places his mind in Siva. Then he meditates on the syllable OM while xing his concentration in his heart. When one has thus rst concentrated ones mind by trying hard to keep it concentrated on earth etc., one becomes free from suering, when the lord [Siva] is propitious. 116. manoj n anodayo y avat t avan muktir na yujyate | manoj n anoday at p urvam a muktir na yujyate || . yath

a C. Lindtner Bhavya on M m am . s

105

[It is wrong, for] as long as a mental cognition arises there cannot possibly be liberation. Likewise there cannot possibly be liberation before mental cognition arises. 117. muktir ne svarabhakt an am an san at | . yujyate sth . udar upalambhavih aritv at tad yath a sth an udar s an a t || . It is not possible for the devotees of God to become liberated by seeing [an image of] Siva, because [their mind] is xed on an object, just as when they see an image. 118. duh sah an nityatv at so pratikriyah . khe hetur yad . sy . | ato duh kh a ntagamanam ne s var a d asti kasyacit || . . Moreover, if God were the cause of suering, then it cannot be counteracted, because it is permanent. Therefore it is not [possible] for any [devotee of God] to reach the end of suering by [seeing] God. 119. etena ses ah a brahmavis atmav adinah . . pratyukt .n . v . | pr ti s caivam ayuktatv an ne s adau dh yate dhiyah . || Hereby the remaining adherents of Brahma, Vis .n . u and the Soul have been refuted. Thus one should not take any pleasure of mind in God etc., for that would be illogical. 120. p apapraks alanam adbhih subh adikrayavikrayam | . . c . dr s t v a durvihitam trayy a m yuktam || . .. . . . yat tyajyate tray Moreover, when one sees that it is recommended in the three Vedas that one washes away ones sins with water as a sort of trade in good and [bad karma], it is logical that the three Vedas are rejected. 121. p apam alyate n adbhir aspr s. ter anidar san at | . praks . .. akled ad v asan adh an at smr tij n a na s ubh a divat || . Sins [or bad karma] cannot be washed away with water. This is because it cannot be touched, it cannot be seen, it cannot be moistened, and because it is determined by impregnationsjust like memory and pure karma etc. 122. na p apam atayaty ambhah ahnav adi v a| . p . paus . karam . j spr s yatv a t kledan a c c a pi gr hasyandikap u yavat || . . Lotus water or water from the Ganges etc. cannot remove ones sins. This is because it can be touched and because it can moisten, just like the drainage inside a house. 123. avag ah adin a ks akkr apun am | . aye pr . t . yakarman . kr tat rth a bhis ek a n a m duh kham na sy a d ahetukam || . . . . . If one could get rid of ones original bad karma by bathing [in a river etc.], would this not create unfounded suering for [other quite innocent people] who had made an ablution [at the same] bathing-place!

106

Aspects of Buddhism

124. na ca [kar]maks api na ka scit p atak bhavet | . aye c sam s ucyaty antar a tm a dbhir ity ukti s cet tad apy asat || . Opponent: But assuming that karma cannot be destroyed, then nobody can get rid of his sins! It is the inner soul that is aected by the water [of ablution].Reply: If you say so, this is also wrong: 125. sant[ an antarasam apam iti gr . kramam . ] na p . hyate | am urtatv ad yath a r agadves adyasam . amoh . kramah . || It is inconceivable that a sin is transferred from the soul of one person to that of another. This is because [sin, as bad karma] is not something material. Likewise, desire, hatred and delusion etc. cannot be transferred [from one soul to another]. 126. na d anagrahan ader iti ni scayah . am . yuktam . pun . y . | cittena sam at tad yath a sukhaduh . prayogitv . khayoh . || One can be sure that it is not possible to give and receive good and [bad karma]. This is because [karma] is bound up with the mind. The same goes for pleasure and pain. 127. brahmalok adigamanam adiprap atatah . jvalan . | dr s t v a durvihitam trayy a m yuktam yat tyajyate tray || . .. . . . Seeing, in the three Vedas, the bad rule that one can go to the world of Brahma etc. by hurling oneself into ames etc., it is logical that the three Vedas are rejected. 128. hetur n agniprap at adi brahmalok adyav aptaye | [pr an ab a dhak a ran atv a ] c chalabh a diprap atavat || . . Throwing oneself into a re etc. is not the cause of obtaining the world of Brahma etc. This is because one only brings harm upon oneself, just as when a night-moth throws [itself into a re]. 129. n annap anaparity agah apaka is . svargapr . yate | ks utsam t a p a dihetutv a d anicch a na s an a divat || . . Nor do we accept that abstention from food and drinking can bring one to heaven. This is because it only brings about hunger, pain etc., just as in the case of anorexia etc. 130. abhojan adau pun ag at p apanivr . yam . ca ty . ttivat | satyaty ag adibhir hetoh ad evam arit a || . sy . vyabhic Opponent: But it is good karma not to eat etc., for it is a kind of renunciation, just as when one abandons evil.Reply: If so, your argument is rendered inconclusive by the fact that one can renounce truth etc. [ which is a bad thing].

a C. Lindtner Bhavya on M m am . s 131. bhuktity ago na pun aya yat kriyeyam ap atak a| . y yac chubhamanas[k arasya tyaktamanasik aravat] ||

107

Abstention from food does not [in itself] lead to good karma, for [in itself] such an action [as eating food] is not sinful. It would be like a man of good intentions having abstained from his intentions! 132. trikot suddham am . i . yan m . sam . na tad bhaks . itam enase | ras adiparin a mitv a d bhaiks a nnam na yathainase || . . . It is not to be considered a sin to eat meat if only it is pure from the three points of view. This is because [meat is only] a transformation of juice etc. Likewise it is not a sin to eat begged food. 133. na m am apak aran at | . sabhaks . an . am . bhoktum . bhujyate p . ks k arahetutv ad yadr agatabhaktavat || . utprat . cch It is not from an evil motive that one is inclined to eat meat, because it is in order to counteract hunger, as in the case of a meal obtained unexpectedly. 134. a sucitv ad abhaks am ayo pi cintyat am | . yam . cen m . sam . k b jasth an ad upastambh ad a sucir vit kr mir yath a || . . If you think that meat is not to be eaten because it is impure, then also think of your own body! It is caused and supported by seedsjust as an impure worm feeding on ordure! 135. sukr adisam ad eva matsyam am . bhav[ . sam . vigarhitam] | tad ghr r adyair hetoh ad evam arit a || . taks . . sy . vyabhic If you nd it reprehensible to eat the meat of sh because it is born from semen virile etc., then this reason is not compatible with the [fact that] butter, milk etc. [also have the same origin]! 136. m am adah an at cet tannimittatvato matah . s . pr . igh . | ajin adidharair hetoh sy a d evam vyabhic a rit a || . . If you think that a carnivorous person kills an animal because [killing] must be his inner motive, then [the fact that some people] wear leather renders this argument quite uncertain. 137. na m am tam an m an at | . sabhaks . an . am . dus .. . tad . pr . yaduh . khan mukt abarhikal ap aditan amb upayogavat || .d . ul It is not a sin to eat meat, for while doing so one does not make the living animal suer. It is just [as harmless] as making use of pearls, a peacocks tail etc., and grain of rice and water. 138. sam ad r agasya na hetur m am . kalpajatv . sabhaks . an . am | [tad]vin api tadutpatter gav am iva tr n a s in a m || .. Eating meat is not the cause of desire, for [desire] arises from the will. This is [clear] from [the fact] that it also arises without this [i.e. without meat], as in the case of cattle eating grass.

108

Aspects of Buddhism

139. acetanes avares . u caitanyam . sth . u prakalpitam | dr s t v a durvihitam trayy a m yuktam || . .. . . . yat tyajyate tray Seeing in the three Vedas the bad doctrine that an imagined soul exists in things that have no soul, it is logical that the three Vedas are rejected. a hi taravo na caturyonyasam at | 140. sacittak . grah madhyacchede pi v aspand aj jad tavat || . atve sati los .. Of course trees do not have a soul for they are not included in the four [groups of living beings arising from a] womb. Moreover, they do not move even when cut right through, it being a fact that they are inanimate like a clod. 141. spar sato yadi sam ad yath a man arik a| . koc .d . alak sacittake tath abh s te sa[mang an ]jalik arike || .. If you still are convinced that various kinds of mimosa have a soul, because of their contraction when touched, just like a millepede... 142. vahnisam s. take s adyaih ad dhetor vyabhic arit a| . spr .. . sy c urn ap a ratasam sr s t ake s air v a pi vi s es atah || . . . .. . . Then the reason [given by you] is rendered uncertain by [the fact that] hair etc. touched by re [also are contracted without, therefore, being alive], and, in particular, by [the contraction of] hair that has been treated with pulverised quicksilver! an na taravo yujyante hi sacittak ah 143. cikitsyatv . | vinas t asy a pi mady a deh praty a patte s ca sam s .. . . ayah . || Of course it is not possible [to claim] that trees have a soul just because they can be healed. [This reason would be] inconclusive because wine etc. that has lost [its spirit] can have it restored. [This does not imply that it has a soul.] 144. sam anaprasav ad vr ac ca sacittak ah . ddher dohad . | r tujatv a t tath a sv a p a n n a p s t a s turag a divat || . .. Opponent: But can trees not be maintained to have a soul because their procreation is similar, because they grow [as they do], because they are malevolent, because they are born in season, and because they can sleep, just like a horse etc.? 145. dadru[vidruma]vaid ryake sahem ankur adibhih .u . | vyabhic ar at tu taravo na sidhyanti sacittak ah . || Reply: Trees cannot be proved to have a soul, for this is at variance with [the fact that] ulcers, corals, cats eyes, hair, golden nuggets and the like [can grow etc., cf. 144, without having a soul].

a C. Lindtner Bhavya on M m am . s 146. acittakatv ad evais am adyaprasiddhatah . . dohad . | hetavah syur asiddh a rth a gadai s ca vyabhic a rin . . ah . ||

109

Since all these are absolutely without soul, the [ve arguments given, viz.] malevolence etc. are not established. Therefore the arguments [viz. dohad at and sv ap at] are either meaningless, or [in case of the remaining three] rendered inconclusive by [the fact that] diseases [such as leprosy occur without being animate etc.]. adhipatyena k alaj ah adap adayah 147. sattvakarm . p . | narake svargaloke ca sastraratnadrum a yath a || It is due to the overhelming power of the karma of creatures that trees etc. gradually grow. The same goes for the [trees with the] swords in hell and the jewel-trees in the world of heaven. 148. yath artho hi tray m argo brahmokter vaidyak adivat | a[t t a]n agataj nair v a tadukte s cet pras adhyate || What if [the opponent] tries to prove that the way of the three Vedas is true either because it has been preached by Brahma, or because it has been preached by [sages] who know the past and the future, as in the case of [something said] by a learned doctor for instance? [149-167 only available in Tibetan:] 149. Reply: The argument that [the way of the three Vedas] has been preached by Brahma is given by those who make him the creator [of the world etc.]. I have already proved that this is a wrong idea. Therefore you cannot be sure of this [argument]. 150. In some cases he sees things as they are, but [his words] are not always true. Likewise the words of cowherds and madmen are not always true. 151. Even animals and so on may have knowledge of the past and the future [cf. 148]. But it is not everything [the sages] have said [that they have understood]. Therefore [their words] must be analysed for arguments. 152. [In 12 the opponent said] that the dharma etc. found here [in the three Vedas] is also to be found elsewhere. But actually in some cases [the words of the Vedas] are like the syllables of a worm [carved in wood], in other cases they just happen to be nicely spoken. 153. For example, some [jeweller] may spot a jewel in a pile of waste. He recognizes it as he is aware of its power and origin. 154. It would be like [a Buddhist] discovering some nice remark in the three Vedas! A jewel does not [originally] belong to a heap of waste in an alley!

110

Aspects of Buddhism

155. If one does not investigate what is logical and what is not logical by means of anum ana free from faults, then ones understanding will be formed by other [traditions], and therefore one will be in doubt about other traditions ( agama). 156. It is like a man wanting to cross a large river who gets hold of a boat. Likewise one must rst hold on to anum ana, even if one has to abandon it [later on]. 157. Following mere words ( sabdam atra), and going along with the past like blind men here in this circuit fools revolve in samsara. 158. Just as blind men without anything to hold on to must follow a dreadful path, thus it is all too easy to fall for those who put too much emphasis on the mere words [of agama] ( sabdam atrapradh ana, [cf. 14]). 159. The epithet omniscient [in 15, can correctly be applied to the Buddha] in certain cases. The word lion is also true [to life] in some cases [when speaking of real lions], but occasionally it is used in a gurative sense [e.g. when speaking of brave men etc.]. 160. In our opinion the dharma- and nirm an aya do not belong to a human . ak being. Nor can Tath agata be proved to be [a human being, as assumed in 16]. Therefore [the example in 16 is also] not conclusive. 161. Opponent: If you are entitled to opine that Bhagavat is not omniscient, . kara [Siva], am I not likewise [entitled to opine] that Sam Vis .n . u etc. know [everything]? 162. Reply: If it were true that their kind of knowledge were omniscient, then they still seem to see [things] with the cataract [of ignorance, avidy apat . ala]; they do not seem to see [things] with a clear eye! 163. If, on the other hand, you think that they are omniscient in the sense that they know enough, this argument is not valid, for lepers etc. [also know enough, without being truly omniscient]. 164. Opponent: But [the Buddha only] knows certain things, he does not know everything!Reply: What is it that the Muni does not know? Is it the way to svarga and apavarga? [No!] For he teaches [the way] based on this teaching! 165. Opponent: Even though he teaches [this way] it may be wrong!Reply: If you have this [silly] idea, it must be due to ignorance; the reply to this has already been given [in 163]. 166. Moreover, the standpoint that [our] sacred texts, ideas and words [are not valid, because they are created, cf. 16] should be answered in the same way: [The mind] that analyses is uncertain, since it is created; therefore [the argument is] fallacious.

a C. Lindtner Bhavya on M m am . s

111

167. Just because I think that the three Vedas can be criticized in the same way that the Jains do, this does not mean that I follow their religion (s adhya). Therefore the comparison [in 17] is no good!

Apparatus criticus
Sigla:
M K S [ ] m, 1989, p. 23. Unique Sanskrit Ms of MHK, cf. Qvarnstro Kawasakis ed. of MHK, 1992; for the basis of which see p. 471. Emendations to K proposed by Schmithausen, 1991, cf. p. 118. Lacuna in M, lled in by K, mostly following a conjecture by m yana (not specied here), and V.V. Gokhale or R. Sa . kr . tya by myself (with some exceptions: 114a, 128c and 131d).

1d -trap ah aM . K : -trap 2d yukta : ukta M : bhukta K 3c 6c -tv at K : tv a- M rthes . u K : rthes . uh . M 7b -j n anatas K : -j n anas M 7c sabdavac K : sabdavic M 8b -tv at K : -tv aM 8d ath api M : yath api K 10a -vyangyah . K : -vyam . gah . M 10c vidv an K : vidv aM 12d ev an- M : naiv an- K 13d sva- K : sa- M 17b -dar sanad u. san at : -d u. san san at MK . . adar 18b -ny ayyakovidah ayakovid a K : - ayatakovid aM . : -ny 20a -ks . amam . K : -ks . asam . M 21d aus ad vy adhimuktivat K : os adyadhimuktivat M . adh . av 22a kriy atv an na K : kriyatv anu M 23b it s ks . yate K : it . ate M 23d -c arav an : -c arivan K : -c aravan M 24b kartr . katvatah . : kr . tr . matvatah . M : kartr . matvatah . K 25b akartr . kam K : atkartr . kam M

112 26a 27d 29b 30d 31b 31d 32a 33a 34b 35a 36a 36c 37a -tv anum an ac ca K : - anum anatv ac ca M tatkartr . kam : tat kartr . kam K varn amn ay ad : varn am n ay ad K . .n . yathengitam : yathegitam M : yathehitam K asat- K : asa- M kriyokter : kr . yokter M : mithyokter K -vad dhim a K : rthasiddhits aM . s mantra- K : manu- M mantra- K : manu- M

Aspects of Buddhism

- s astra K : - s astre M; -mocakah ah . K : -mocak . M 35d anyatara- : anyatarah a- K . M : anyatar yaj ne K : yaj no M hi M : ni K

bhoktrarth ah s t a K : bhoktr ah s t ah . ... bh .. . rth . ... bh .. . M 38b sam . cintya- : sam . cintya K : sam . citya M 38d 39c ayaty am ayaty am K : avyaty am . : . M sam . cintya- : sam . cintya K 40b kriy a K : kr aM . p 41a 41d 43a 43c 44a 44b 46d 48b 49a 50c vy akhy atam akhy anam . M : vy . K dhust ura- : dhunt ura- MK dr s. tam tam .. . K : is .. . M ca K : catri M atra K : ad M d pe py advipravr pe py advipravr aK: . ttitah . : d . ttin dv yenodvipravr ttin a M . dr s. te K : is te M .. .. -vyangyah . K : -vyam . gah . M (cf. 10a) sam asam ad adau K : sam adau M . ket . bhav . ketasam . bhav

hetuh . K : hetu- M 52d asm ac ch abd an : asm ac chabd an K : asm abd an M 54a 55a 55d 56a ch abdah . : chabdah . K kriy a- K : kr a- M . y nitya is am K : nityadr syat am M . yat .. -p an adi- : -p an adi K

a C. Lindtner Bhavya on M m am . s 56c tad yath a : varttante MK 57b kriy a K : kr a M (cf. 55a) . y 57c -tv at K : -tv aM 58d vic ar aks araks . ama- K : vic . ama- M 60a p apam ayam . K : m . M 60d pratyap ayit a : pratyap ayin aK 62d n a sit ah a srit aM . K : n 63b na ces . yate : nis . edhyate K : te M 64b tri- K tr .- M 64c sa s ada K : sa s anta M 66b -n arak adik an : -narak adik an K 66d t an K : t aM 67d jitam . K : jitah . melius? 69c tyakt a v a : tyakt adi- K 70a adharma s K : athadharma sM 70b -k arit a : -k arite K 71a tr sn a K : kr sn aM .. . ay .. . ay 71d samam umuhat K : samubh ubhuham M 72b mr . tyu- K : mr . tyur M 73b dr dr . k caritam . : . k-caritam . K 74a m urtih urtti M . : m 74b yadi K : yayad M 74c y am anti MK . na : y 74d punar M : na ye K 75d s a par a : s apar a melius? 76b acyut a K : acyuto M 78a - sabd av acya- : - s abdav acya- MK 80b sa nas tah tah .. . : sam . nasau M : sam . nas .. . K 80d asam s c asau (sive asad atm a) : sam s c atma- K . . tmaka- M : asam . 82d n acyuto cyutah acyuta s cyutah . M : n . K 83b kl a K : kupt aM .pt 87d sam . deho : sandahyo M : sandehyo K 90d ayuktimat K : ayuktima M 92a -yogopade s adi- : -yogopade s adi K : -yogapade s adi M

113

114 92b 93b 94b 99b vikalatvatah . : vitathatvatah . MK par an : par am a K : nait aM . c K; net kalpan aj alakalpitaih adaujanmakatam M . K : svakalp

Aspects of Buddhism

pun . yakr . tam . : pun . yam . kr . tam . MK 100b akasm ac cet M : akasmikam . K 101a 104c 105c 106c 109b 110a 111b 112d 113a 114a 114d 115c j na- K : j nah . M 102d jagac K : jaga M dr s. to K : dus to M .. .. -vaicitry a : -vaicitry ad melius? sarvagata s : sarvata s MK -klam arditaih attaraih antaraih . : klam . M : klam . K yad v a : yat v aK cir ayus ayus ah . ah . : cir . . MK kim apakr anakr . : kan M : ko K; p . t K : p .t M vaicitrya- : vaicitryat M : vaicitry at K [sam . yamita-... ] : [sam . yamaka-... ] K dh aran am aran . . : dh . am . K

duh antam arttam . kh . : duhkh . MK 115d asat : asan MK 118a 121c 121d 122c 122d 123a hetur yad sah sa M . K : hetu yad 120b -krayavikrayam K : kriyavikriyam M v asan adh an at K : v asan adh an a -j n ana- K : -j n an at M -tv at K : -tv aM -kap uyavat : kam apnuvat M : kaph apavat K

ks . aye K : ks . an .a M 123b pr akkr aks aM . ta- K : pr . it 124d asat : asan K 128b 128c 130a 131a 131b -lok adyav aptaye K : -lok adyath aptaye M [pr an adhak aran a]c : [pr an apak aratv a]c K . ab . atv . ca ty ag at K : cety a s at M bhukti- : bhuji M : bhu nji- K yat kriyeyam ap apak a : yatkriy ay am ap apak at K : yatkriy ay am ap atak at M

a C. Lindtner Bhavya on M m am . s 131d [... tyaktamanasik aravat] : [... manasik araty agavat] K 132a m am asam . sam . K : m . M 132d yathainase K : yathenase M 134d a sucir : a suci- MK 135c -ks r adyaih r adir MK (-ks r adi- melius?) . . : -ks . . 136c -dharair K : -dharai M 137c -kal ap adi- : -kal ap adi K 138c [tad] : [tad-] K 139c dr s. tv a... trayy am s. ty a... trayy aK .. . S : dr .. 140d jad atve M : j ad . atve S : j . yatve K 141d -jali- K : -j ala- M 142a -ke s adyaih s adau K . S : -ke 144c r at S : ritujan at M : r at K . tujatv . tujan 144d n ap s t as K : c apis t as S .. .. 145c tu taravo : r up an an M : r up an am un am . . K : tar . . (& te aut tair?) S 145d na sidhyanti sacittak ah aS . K : na sidhyati sacittat 146b -siddhatah aS . MK : -siddhat 146d gadai s K : gan s S (male, ut etiam vyabhic arit a etc.) .d . ai 148b brahmokter K : brahmoktai M

115

116

Aspects of Buddhism

Aspects of Buddhism, Liw, Poland, June 25, 1994

A Note on Buddhist Studies in Poland

Marek Mejor (Warszawa) In its past Poland did not have many contacts with Asia, and the travellers of those days were mostly the Christian missionaries.1 Here it suces to mention two names. About the middle of the 13th century the Franciscan Father Benedictus Polonus accompanied a special papal legate, Giovanni da Pian del Carpine in his mission to the Mongol Khan.2 Father Benedictus left an important account of his journey, which was the rst journey from the Western Europe to the Central Asia. In the 17th century the Jesuit Father Michal Boym (16121659)3 was sent to China. He travelled also to India, Burma, Siam, and Vietnam. Boym is famous for his numerous works on geography, botany, medicine, and linguistics of China. A manuscript copy of his Atlas of China is kept in the Vatican Library. His main work is Flora sinensis (1656). Unfortunately, these and other contacts with Asia and specically with India, remarkable as they were then, did not result in gathering collections of original texts or objects of art, which could serve a basis for scholarly research, as it later happened in other countries, like for example in England, France, Germany, Denmark or Russia. In the beginning of the nineteenth century some interest in Sanskrit and comparative studies was inspired by the works of Franz Bopp: here one should mention the pioneer, but unscientic, works by Walenty Skoroch od-Majewski (1764 1835), and among them the rst Sanskrit grammar in Polish (1828). Premature death of Jan Hanusz (18581887)4 had delayed establishment of the rst chair
1 Cf. E. Sluszkiewicz, India as seen by Polish travellers upto the 19th century, Indo-Asian Culture 9, April 1961, pp. 385403; ditto, India as seen by Polish travellers of the XIX century, Indo-Asian Culture 10, January 1962, p. 336339. 2 The Mission to Asia. Narratives and Letters of the Franciscan Missionaries in Mongolia and China in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries. Ed. by Christopher Dawson. Sheed & Ward, London 1980, pp. 7884. 3 C. Sommervogel, Biblioth` eque de la Compagnie de J esus, 11 vols., Paris 1890 1932; vol. II, pp. 6973; P. Pelliot, Michel Boym, Toung Pao 31, 1935, pp. 95 151; B. Szcze sniak, The writings of Michael Boym, Monumenta serica 14, 194955, pp. 481538. 4 Studied in Leipzig (Windisch) and Berlin (Weber, Oldenberg); he obtained his Ha-

118

Aspects of Buddhism

of Sanskrit, which was later created for Leon Ma nkowski (18581909)5 in 1893 (or 1904) at the Jagiellonian University, Cracow. It is only with Andrzej Gawro nski (18851927) that the Sanskrit and Indological studies were rmly established in Poland, and reached immediately the highest level.6 Gawro nski received his doctors degree in Leipzig (1907), where he was a student of prof. E. Windisch (Sprachliche Untersuchungen u ber das Mr cchakat ika und das Da s akum a racarita , Leipzig 1907). In 1911 he obtained his . . Habilitation (Am Rande des Mr cchakat ika , Kuhn Zeitschr. 1911), in 1916 he was . . appointed Professor in Jagiellonian University, Cracow, and from 1917 he was Professor of Indology at the University of Lw ow. Gawro nski was also a founder and editor of the Rocznik Orientalistyczny, a journal of Oriental studies which is still published. His main works include a series of studies on the Buddhist Sanskrit literature: Gleanings from A svaghos . as Buddhacarita, Rocznik Orientalistyczny I:1, 19141915, pp. 141; Studies about the Sanskrit Buddhist Literature, Prace Kom. Orient. PAU, Nr 2, Cracow 1919, pp. 80; Notes on the Saundarananda, critical and explanatory (Second series), Prace Kom. Orient. PAU, Nr 6, Cracow 1922, pp. 38; Notes on the Saundarananda, critical and explanatory (Third series), Rocznik Orientalistyczny IV, 1926, pp. 219229. His Polish translation of selected fragments from A svaghos . a appeared shortly before his death (2nd. ed. 1966). Gawro nski was also an author of the rst Polish academic handbook on Sanskrit grammar (1932), still in use in our indological curriculum. Gawro nskis interests were extremely wide and manifold. The inspiration with Buddhist studies in Poland comes actually from him, as the author of a wellknown series of studies on the Buddhist Sanskrit literature.7 It was at Gawro nskis instigation that Schayer left Munich and came to Poland to continue successfully his academic career. Thus, it is remarkable that in the thirties (19321939) a group of scholars supervised by Prof. S. Schayer at the Oriental Institute of the Warsaw University pursued Buddhist studies. Stanislaw Schayer (18991941),8 Professor of Indology at the Warsaw University (from 1931), a founder of the Oriental Institute at the same University
bilitation under G. B uhler in 1884 in Vienna (Uber das allm alige Umsichgreifen der -nDeklination im Altindischen, Sitzber. hist.-phil. cl. Ak. d. Wiss. CX, Wien 1885, pp. 4283). 5 Studied in Wroclaw (Breslau) (Stenzler, Hillebrandt) and Vienna (B uhler, M uller, Kirste); obtained his Habilitation in 1892 in Vienna (Der Auszug aus dem Pa ncatantra im Kshemendras Brihatkath ama njar , Leipzig 1892). 6 Cf. E. Sluszkiewicz, Indian studies in Poland, in: Indian Studies Abroad. Indian Council for Cultural Relations. Asia Publishing House, London 1964, pp. 6572. 7 Cf. E.H. Johnston, Andrzej Gawro nski and Sanskrit Textual Criticism, Rocznik Orientalistyczny XII, 1936, pp. 209215. 8 S. Schayer, O lozofowaniu Hindus ow. Artykuly wybrane. [On Philosophizing of the Hindus. Selected Articles.] Ed. by M. Mejor. Warsaw 1988. Contains full bibliography on pp. xxviixxxii. Cf. Rocznik Orientalistyczny, M emorial St. Schayer, vol. XXI, Warsaw 1957.

M. Mejor A Note on Buddhist Studies in Poland

119

(1932), an editor of the Polish Bulletin of Oriental Studies (193739), was one of the most eminent Polish Indologists. Soon, under his direction, the Indology Department at the Oriental Institute of the Warsaw University became a well-known centre of advanced studies on Buddhism. Schayers research was focused on Indian (especially Buddhist) philosophy, religiology, and logic. In his paper on Professor Schayer and the Indian studies in Poland A. Kunst characterized the work of his Teacher in the following words:9 While mainly engaged in philosophic and soteriological problems of the Mah ay ana Buddhism, and more particularly in the Madhyamika exegesis of [the] Buddhas doctrines, he contributed [also] (...) to the knowledge of Hinduism by articles on the structure of the magic conception according to the Atharva-Veda and the Brahmanas, on the meaning of the word Upanishad, [on] Indian Philosophy as the Problem of the Present Times, [on] the Transience of Existence (anityat a ), on Indian Logic and the methods of the Ny aya analysis. (...) His contribution to Indian logic, though scarce in volume is of quite particular interest, as he has for the rst time attempted to formulate formalistically the Ny aya and the Buddhist types of syllogism. In Schayers own words, Indian philosophy may be an interesting and instructive eld of historical and comparative research for a scholar, but the essential value of this philosophy is more than that; in this philosophy we are faced with new problems and new ways of solving them, and therefore our own understanding of the world becomes enriched with the new perspectives and new dimensions of spiritual life. It is the Indian philosophy that can be acknowledged as a true partner of the Western tradition. Schayer started his scholarly career in 1921 with the publication of his doctoral dissertation Mah ay ana Doctrines of Salvation.10 He oered in it an analysis of soteriology of the Mah ay ana Buddhism with special reference to the problem of discrepancy between the ancient Indian concept of self-salvation and the later mediaeval ideals of theistic soteriology. Moreover, on the authority of a large number of texts he could oer an adequate explanation of such important Buddhist terms as n ama-r upa, vij n ana, m ay a, etc. In 1931 Schayer published his main work, an annotated translation of the six chapters from Candrak rtis commentary on N ag arjunas M ulamadhyamakak arik a.11 This work of Schayers is still regarded as a valuable compendium of Buddhist
A. Kunst, Indian studies in Poland: Stanislaw Schayer, in: Indian Studies Abroad. Indian Council for Cultural Relations. Asia Publishing House, London 1964, pp. 7389; quot. from pp. 81, 85. 10 Translated from the original German Vorarbeiten zur Geschichte der mah ay anistischen Erl osungslehren (Zeitschrift f ur Buddhismus III, 1921) by R.T. Knight. Probsthain, London 1923. 11 Ausgew ahlte Kapitel aus der Prasannapad a, V, XII, XIII, XIV, XV, XVI, Krak ow 1931. The 10th chapter was published separately under the title Feuer und Brennsto, Rocznik Orientalistyczny VII, 1929 (= On Philosophizing of the Hindus, pp. 383409).
9

120

Aspects of Buddhism

(Mah ay ana) philosophy, thanks to his lucid translation of the Sanskrit text, which is accompanied with a lengthy introduction and detailed notes. His last major work was devoted to the problem of time in Indian (Buddhist) philosophy (Contributions to the Problem of Time in Indian Philosophy, Krak ow 1938). The introductory essay, in which is explained the Buddhist theory of three times (traik alya ) in comparison with the notion of Time-substance as developed by the schools of the Vai ses m am . ikas and M . sakas, is followed by an English trans lation of the k ala-par ks a chapter from S a ntaraks . . . itas Tattvasangraha Among Schayers students and collaborators were: Constantin Regamey, the author of two studies on Mah ay ana Buddhism; Arnold Kunst, who wrote his dissertation on Buddhist logic; Jan Jaworski, the author of a series of studies on the Buddhist Vinaya in Chinese; Ludwik Skurzak, the author of a study on the beginnings of Indian ascetism; Maryla Falk, the author of a large study of two ancient Indian concepts of n ama-r upa and dharma-r upa, which was prepared for publication in Warsaw. Constantin Regamey (19071982), studied simultaneously classical philology (M.A. 1931) and Indology (under S. Schayer; M.A. 1931) at the Warsaw University; he continued his studies in Paris under prof. J. Przyluski and prof. M. Lalou; in 1935/36 obtained his doctorate (Three Chapters from the Sam adhir ajas utra , Warsaw 1938); from 1938 Dozent at the Warsaw University (Habilitation: The Bhadram ay ak aravy akaran . a, Introduction, Tibetan Text, Translation and Notes. Warsaw 1938); in 1944 (after the Warsaw uprising) together with his wife went to Switzerland, where he was appointed professor at the Universities of Lausanne and Fribourg.12 Among his papers published before he left Poland one should mention: a series of essays on Buddhism (published in a bimonthly journal ZET, IV 1935/36, nos. 8,10, 12, 13, 14; V 1936/37, nos. 8, 9, 10, 12, 16, 17; VI 1937, nos. 2, 3-4, 5); Bibliographie analytique des travaux relatifs aux el ements anaryens dans la civilisation et les langues de lInde, BEFEO XXXIV, 1935, pp. 429-566; Le probl eme des langues austroasiatiques et nno-ougriennes dans lInde, Polish Bulletin of Oriental Studies II, 1938, pp. 13-40; reviews in the Polish Bulletin of Oriental Studies II, 1938: Walther W ust, Vergleichendes und etymologisches W orterbuch des Altindoarischen (Altindischen), Heidelberg 1935, Lief. 1-3 (pp. 111-119), Portugese Vocables in Asiatic Languages, transl. into English by Anthony Xavier Soares, Baroda 1936 (pp. 136-138), Alan S.C. Ross, The Numeral-Signs of the Mohenjo-Daro Script, Delhi 1938 (pp. 138-143). He also contributed a paper on Oriental studies in Poland to a volume Pologne 1919-1939. T. 3: Vie intellectualle et artistique, Editions de la Bacconi ere, Neuchatel 1947, pp. 374-386 (Les etudes orientales). Arnold Kunst (19031981), studied Indology under prof. S. Stasiak in Lw ow (M.A. 1933/34), continued in Warsaw under S. Schayer and in Vienna under E. Frauwallner; after his doctorate (Probleme der buddhistischen Logik in der Darstellung des Tattvasangraha , Krak ow 1939) went in August 1939 to London; after the
Cf. J. May, Liminaire, Asiatische Studien/Etudes Asiatiques XXXV:2 (1981), Num ero sp ecial oert en Hommage ` a Constantin Regamey.
12

M. Mejor A Note on Buddhist Studies in Poland

121

war he was a lecturer at the SOAS, London.13 Jan Jaworski (19031945), sinologist and japanologist, studied in Paris under prof. J. Przyluski, specialized in the Buddhist Vinaya texts in Chinese translations.14 Ludwik Skurzak (19001979), studied under prof. S. Stasiak in Lw ow, later continued his studies in Paris; he obtained his doctorate on the study of ancient Indian asceticism (Etudes sur origines de lascetisme indien, Wroclaw 1948); after the war he was a lecturer at the Wroclaw University. Maryla Falk (19061979 ?), not much is known about her career; she seems to had been inuenced by comparative religious studies of J. Przyluski (1885 1944), Coll` ege de France, Paris, a French Buddhologist of Polish origin; she worked in Rome, visited Warsaw several times before the war, then lived in India (Calcutta); she took part in the International Congress of Orientalists in Paris in 1948: Arri` ere-plans v ediques: dissimilation et catharsis de la conqu ete de laccroissement vital, Actes du XXIe Congr` es des Orientalistes, Paris 2331 Juillet 1948, Paris 1949, pp. 214215; Lhistoire du mythe de la Perle, ibid., pp. 371373.15 With the outbreak of Second World War and the complete destruction of the
The two-membered syllogism, Rocznik Orientalistyczny XV (19391949), Krak ow 1949, pp. 7283; The Concept of the Principle of Excluded Middle in Buddhism, Rocznik Orientalistyczny XXI, 1957, pp. 141147; ed. (with E.H. Johnston) N ag arjunas Vigrahavy avartan , M elanges Chinoise et Bouddhiques 9, 19481951, pp. 99 152; ed. Tibetan text of the Tattvasangraha : Anum anapar ks elanges Chinois et . a, M Bouddhiques 8, 1947, pp. 106216. Cf. obituary In Memoriam A.K. by D. Seyfort Ruegg, Journal of Indian Philosophy 11, 1983, pp. 35; The Friend A.K., The Times, Wednesday December 23 1981, p. 12 (Obituary). 14 La section des Rem` edes dans le Vinaya des Mah sa saka et dans le Vinaya pali, Rocznik Orientalistyczny V, 1926, pp. 92101; La Section de la Nourriture dans le Vinaya des Mah sa saka, Rocznik Orientalistyczny VII, 1931, pp. 53124; La Section de lOrdination dans le Vinaya des M ulasarv astiv adin, Compte rendu des S eances de la Soci et e des Sciences et des Lettres de Varsovie, XXIII (1931), pp. 148; LAvalambanaS utra de la Terre Pure, Traduit et annot e, Monumenta Serica I (193536), pp. 82 107; Notes sur lancienne litt erature populaire en Chine, Rocznik Orientalistyczny XII, 1936, pp. 181193. Cf. A. Yuyama, Vinaya-Texte, Systematische Ubersicht u ber die buddhistische Sanskrit-Literatur I. Wiesbaden 1979, Nos. 1.27.C.1.f.; 1.4547.C.1.f.2; 1.4547.C.1.f.3. 15 Her main publications include: I misteri di Novalis. Collezione di studi losoci diretta da Carmelo Ottaviano, Serie Storica, Monograe N. 17. Napoli 1937; Origine dellequazione ellenistica Logos-Anthropos, Studi e Materiali di Storia delle Religioni, XIII, 1937, pp. 166214 (cf. rev. by J. Przyluski, Logos-Anthropos, Polish Bulletin of Oriental Studies 2, 1939, pp. 712); Indologie auf den Wegen und Abwegen vergleichender Religionsforschung, Polish Bulletin of Oriental Studies 1, 1937, pp. 1837; Up asana et upanis . ad, Rocznik Orientalistyczny XIII, 1938, pp. 129158; Il mito psicologico nell India antica, Memorie delle Reale Accademia nazionale dei Lincei, Classe di scienze morali, storiche e lologiche, Roma, ser. VI, vol. VIII, fasc. V (1939), pp. 289 738 [see review by D. Snellgrove, BSOAS 51, 1988, pp. 362365.]; N ama-r upa and Dharma-r upa. Origin and Aspects of an Ancient Indian Conception. Calcutta 1943.
13

122

Aspects of Buddhism

Oriental Institute in September 1939, the Warsaw school of Buddhology terminated its activities. Professor Schayer passed away soon (1 December 1941), and the disciples and collaborators dispersed. After the War only a few scholars did some work in the eld of Buddhist studies. One should mention here: Stanislaw Fr. Michalski (18811961) studied in Vienna under prof. L. von Schroeder and prof. P. Kretschmer; in 1912 received his doctorate in Vienna (Kr sn abh arata); continued his studies in G ottingen (H. Oldenberg, J. .. . a im Mah Wackernagel). From 1945 Michalski was a lecturer at the University of L od z. He translated into Polish a number of important texts: Bhagavadg t a, selected Upanishads, Dhammapada (1925, 2nd. ed. 1948), some fragments from the Suttanip ata (Przegl ad Orientalistyczny 1, 1957; 4, 1958; 3, 1958), wrote a number of articles on Vedic philology, and prepared a grammar of P ali language for students (Warsaw 1963). He was not connected with the Warsaw School of Buddhology. Eugeniusz Sluszkiewicz (19011981), Professor of Indology and linguistics, a pupil of A. Gawro nski, studied in Lw ow and Paris. From 1953 until his retirement (1971) he was head of the Department of Indology at the University of Warsaw. E. Sluszkiewicz is best known for his studies on the language of Kaut . ilyas Artha s astra (Rocznik Orientalistyczny V, 1927, 108164), and on the recensions of the R am ayan ow 1938).16 He was an author of a series of popular books and . a (Krak articles on the Buddha and Buddhism (Budda i jego nauka, Warsaw 1965; Religie Indii, Buddyzm pierwotny in: Zarys dziej ow religii, 3rd ed. Warsaw 1976; Budda in: Od Moj zesza do Mahometa, Warsaw 1969; Opowie sci buddyjskie, Warsaw 1982). Artur Karp, a lecturer in the Indology Department at the Warsaw University, wrote a paper on phonology of the middle Indian dialects17 and translated a 18 fragment from the Mah aparin . ibbanasutta. Janusz Chmielewski (b. 1916) Professor emeritus of Chinese, studied sinology in Warsaw 193438 (under prof. Jaworski and also under prof. Schayer), in 194748 studied in Paris under prof. P. Demi eville. J. Chmielewski specialized in Chinese logic and linguistics.19 He wrote a comparative study on the principle of reductio ad absurdum (Zasada redukcji do absurdu na tle por ownawczym, Studia Semiotyczne 11, 1981, 21106), which contains a large section devoted to the Buddhist aspects of the problem (pp. 4075). At present, the organizers of this symposium are doing research on the historical aspects of the Indian Buddhist doctrine (especially the doctrine of prat tyasamutp ada) (M. Mejor), and on the history of Buddhism in Tibet and Mongolia (A. BarejaStarzy nska). Marek Mejor (b. 1950) published a popular book on Buddhism (Warsaw
16 See Festschrift E. Sluszkiewicz (Ksi ega Pami atkowa ku czci E. S.), ed. by J. Reychman, Warszawa 1974 (with bibliography). 17 Nirukta Jaski i jej znaczenie dla bada n nad pocz atkami srednioaryjskiego stadium j ezykowego, Przegl ad Orientalistyczny 2(66), 1968, pp. 165-168 18 Ostatnie dni Buddy, Euhemer 2(68), 1968, pp. 77-88. 19 See Anniversary Volume dedicated to J. Ch. on His Seventy-Fifth Birthday, Rocznik Orientalistyczny XLVII:2, 1991, pp. 714.

M. Mejor A Note on Buddhist Studies in Poland

123

1980), a study on Vasubandhus Abhidharmako sa and its commentaries preserved in the Tanjur (Stuttgart 1991), a study of Ks emendras Bodhisattv avad anakalpala. t a (Tokyo 1992), an edition of collected papers by Schayer (Warsaw 1988); he wrote several papers on Vasubandhu (The problem of two Vasubandhus reconsidered, Indologica Taurinensia XVXVI, 198990, pp. 275- 283) and his Abhidharmako sa (Klong rdol bla mas explanatory notes on the Abhidharmako sa of Vasubandhu, in: Tibetan Studies. Ed. by H. Uebach and Jampa L. Panglung. M unchen 1988, pp. 249252), on the date of Tibetan translation of Dign agas Pram an . asamuccaya and Dharmak rtis Pram an arttika (Studies in the Buddhist Epistemological Tra. av dition. Proc. of the 2nd Dharmak rti Conference, ed. E. Steinkellner, Vienna 1991, pp. 175197), Some Problems of the Sanskrit Lexicography (Review Article), in: Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik, Bd. 16/17, 1992, pp. 149160, etc. Agata Bareja-Starzy nska (b. 1964) wrote a series of papers on Mongolian historiography.20 Now she is preparing for publication her doctoral dissertation, which contains an edition, analysis and Polish translation of the Ciqula keregleg ci, 21 a 16th century Mongolian manual of Buddhism. Several translations from the original Tibetan into Polish were done by Ireneusz Kania, an independent scholar from Krak ow (Tibetan Book of the Dead, Krak ow 1991; Sakya Panditas Legs par bshad pa rin po chei gter, Krak ow 1991; Life of Milarepa (Mi la ras pai rnam thar), Krak ow 1996). Three volumes of a Polish journal of Indological research (Studia Indologiczne) have been published since 1994 at the Oriental Institute, Warsaw University (ed. ska). Under the supervision of by M. Mejor, P. Balcerowicz, M. Wielin M. Mejor a few M.A. theses on Buddhism were prepared: Polish translation of ard the S ulakarn avad ana (Divy avad ana XXXVII) ( by P. Bana s), a study of basic . doctrinal notions and Polish translation of the 2nd book of the Milindapa nha (by N. Szczucka), a study of the early reception of the Hr utra in Japan, with Polish . daya-s translation of its three Chinese versions and excerpts from Kukais commentary thereon (by A. Zalewska). A lecturer of Tibetan, Mr. Thupten Kunga, came from Dharamsala and started his work in the Oriental Institute, Warsaw University, from 1994. He teaches spoken Tibetan at the Department of Mongolian Studies. Currently he works on an edition and English translation of a commentary on Tibetan grammar (Dngul chu Dharmabhadras Situi shal lung). At present an attempt was undertaken towards establishing a seminar on Buddhist studies at the Oriental Institute, Warsaw University.
The History of Ancient Tibet According to the XVIIth Century Mongolian Chron ren Ihara and icle Erdeni-yin tob ci by Sagang Se cen, in: Tibetan Studies, ed. by Sho Yamaguchi, Narita 1992, pp. 341351; A Note on the Chapter on Tibetan HisZuicho tory in Ciqula keregleg ci, Tibetan History and Language, ed. E. Steinkellner, Vienna 1991, pp. 17. 21 A Preliminary Note on Ciqula keregleg ci - a Mongolian Treatise on Buddhism, Proc. of the 33rd Meeting of the PIAC, Budapest 1992, pp. 1923; Additional Notes on the Manuscripts of the Ciqula keregleg ci, Acta Orientalia Belgica 6, 1991, pp. 387393.
20

124

Aspects of Buddhism

Aspects of Buddhism, Liw, Poland, June 25, 1994

On the Formulation of the Prat tyasamutp ada: Some Observations from Vasubandhus Prat tyasamutp adavy akhy a
Marek Mejor (Warsaw)

1. In almost every Buddhist text one can nd a mention of the notion of dependent origination, and many texts devote a considerable space to its exposition and/or discussion. It is no wonder that due to its obvious importance as well as lack of clarity, in the course of time, the doctrine of dependent origination became one of the most debated Buddhist tenets and, naturally, over the years it underwent many modications. Among the most prominent expositors of this doctrine stands Vasubandhu with his treatise entitled Prat tyasamutp ada-vy akhy a. 2. It goes without saying that the prat tyasamutp ada has been a subject of various interpretations also among modern scholars and many opinions were oered on its origin, meaning and role. An excellent exposition of the problems connected with the issue of prat tyasamutp ada was oered by E. Frauwallner in the rst volume of his history of Indian philosophy,1 and in his book on the Buddhist philosophy2 from which I have culled some important statements. Frauwallner observed that according to the Sermon from Benares, i.e. the rst sermon delivered by the Enlightened One (Dharmacakrapravartanas utra), desire (tr s n a ) is the cause of all suering ( duh kha ). In course of development of the .. . . notion of desire another notion was added in order to explain the revolving of the wheel of transmigration, viz. the notion of ignorance (avidy a). Thus, ignorance and desire were put together as the cause(s) of entanglement in the wheel of existence. Through connection of the two notions originated a chain of causes and eects which was meant to explain the arising of suering and, in consequence, the entanglement in worldly existence and new rebirths. In such a manner originated the most signicant Buddhist theory, theory of dependent (co-)arising (or dependent (co-)origination), prat tyasamutp ada. The Buddhas legend put the discovery of the formula of dependent origination akyamuni attained the Enlightenment (bodhi), and after a in the time when S
1 2

Frauwallner 1953, p. 197. Frauwallner 1956, esp. pp. 27f., 29f., 39, 43, 48f.

126

Aspects of Buddhism

prolonged eort came to the understanding of the prat tyasamutp ada (cf. Vinaya, Mah avagga I.1,1-3). In this place, however, we should make a remark that it has been shown by E. Lamotte (Lamotte 1980) that the Buddhist tradition is uncertain as to the exact moment of discernment of the law of dependent origination. Lamotte systematically arranged the texts which put this event either: (a) during the Enlightenment (e.g. Mah avastu II, p. 285; Lalitavistara pp. 346-8; Buddhacarita XIV.49-86), or (b) after the Enlightenment (e.g. Ud ana pp. 1-2; Vinaya pp. 1-2; Catus . paris . ats utra pp. 100-104, 439-440; Sanghabhedavastu p. 127), or (c) before the Enlightenment Nagaropamas utra (Sam aya II, pp. 104. yutta Nik 107; Sam agama T 99, pp. 80b24-81a8; Nid anasam . yukt . yukta, pp. 94-106). 3. The twelve-membered formula is not clear at many places. First, it is to be observed that two causes of rebirth: ignorance and desire, were put together in a quite supercial way, starting two parallel series of elements (1-7, i.e. ignorance to feeling, and 8-12, i.e. desire to old-age-and-death). In consequence the compilation produced two dierent descriptions of how a worldly being comes into existence. Frauwallner made an attempt towards a reconstruction of the possible evolution of the doctrine of dependent origination in the Buddhas teaching and advanced a hypothesis that the twelve-membered formula was compiled by the Buddha himself from two shorter formulae, viz. the one consisting of the links 1-7 (i.e. avidy a to vedan a) and the other consisting of the links 8-12 (i.e. tr sn a to .. . jar amaran . a). This hypothesis was later supported by F. Bernhards philological argument (Bernhard 1968-69). The doctrine of dependent origination has always been regarded as dark and dicult. This, observed Frauwallner (op. cit.), together with the signicant place it occupied in the Buddhas teaching, caused constant interest in it and led to repeated attempts towards its new interpretation. We can observe this tendency already in the oldest parts of the Buddhist canon and it was extended over the dogmatic writings of later schools. In the course of time a much wider sense has been attributed to the theory of dependent origination and a fundamental philosophical meaning has been attached to it. 4. There are many texts which give the formula in its standard twelve-membered formulation. However, there are also found canonical texts (e.g. Mah anid anasuttanta, DN XV,1-22) which give it in a shorter, e.g. ten-membered formulation, or combine the elements of the twelvefold chain with other elements or even doctrines. In his analysis of the older stratum of the P ali Nid anasam aya . yutta (Sam . yutta Nik II) ] Pande3 gave the following classication of texts: (a) the bare formula of pat ada (e.g. sutta no. 1: Desan a); . iccasamupp
3

Pande 1957, p. 197f.

M. Mejor On the Formulation of the Prat tyasamutp ada...

127

(b) the formula of pat ada enlarged by elucidation of its elements (e.g. . iccasamupp sutta no. 2: Vibhanga ); (c) the formula of pat ada combined with other doctrines or formulae . iccasamupp (e.g suttas 11-12). A good example of the rst case is co-appearance of the two chains, shorter and longer, in the Nagaropama-s utra4 where the tenfold chain occurs only in the sequence of origination (samudaya), whereas the full twelvefold formula is presented in the sequence of annihilation (nirodha), viz. samudaya = 12. jar amaran .a (...) 3. vij n ana (4.1-15.2); nirodha = 12. jar amaran a . a (...) 1. avidy (16.1-27.2:), respectivelly. As an illustration of the second case one can bring forward the Mah atanh asankhayasutta (MN 38 = vol. I, pp. 256-271). There are mentioned four kinds of nourishment5 ( ah ara) which are acting for the persistence of living beings and for taking up those beings which are seeking (re)birth. The four nourishments are, in their turn, conditioned by -, originating in -, descended from -, and produced from desire (tanh a-nid an a, tanh a-samuday a, tanh a-j atik a, tanh apabhav a). The whole causal sequence contains the members 8-1 of the twelvefold chain of prat tyasamutp ada and it runs as follows: catt aro ah ar a tanh a vedan a phassa sal a yatana n a ma-r u pa vi n n a n a sa nkh a r a avijj a. . . Next follow the regular anuloma and pratiloma formulations of the twelvefold prat tyasamutp ada. The third case can be illustrated with the same text too: in the following part the Mah atanh asankhayasutta contains a juxtaposition of the theorem of dependent origination and another explication of entanglement in the painful world, viz. the theory of gandhabba (Skt. gandharva), an intermediate immaterial being, which presides over conception (MN I, p. 265f.).6 It describes the consecutive stages of conception, development of an embryo, birth, growing up, and sensual contact with the outer world, which result in origination of the whole mass of suering. The fusion of the theory of antar abhava and gandharva and the theory of
Ed. Murakami 1973. Cf. Schmithausen 1987, p. 214., nn. 1139-41. A similar occurence of such two chains is also found in the Buddhacarita by A svaghos . a (1st cent.) XIV.50-79 and XIV.80-83, respectivelly. 5 The theory of four nourishments was explained in the Abhidharmako sa III.38d &. catt aro me bhikkhave ah ar a bh ut ana v a satt ana hitiy a sambhaves na v a anuggah aya (MN I, p. 261). 6 Cf. Schayer 1988, p. 465: At the moment of death, the individual loses his psycho-physical apparatus and becomes a so-called Gandharva, a separate being in the intermediary state, which sets forth into the world to look for the womb of its future mother. As soon as it nds its proper parents proper meaning that they belong to the class of beings in which it is to be born in accordance with its karmic destination it keeps ready (pratyupasthita) and, on the occasion of its parents coition enters its mothers vulva. Schayer long ago drew attention to the fact that the popular Buddhist theory of reincarnation (...) should be distinguished from its philosophical exposition on the ground of the dharma-theory. (ibid., n. 2).
4

128

Aspects of Buddhism

the twelvefold dependent origination is also described in Vasubandhus Abhid8 harmako sa7 (AKBh ad III.15a-b; III.19) and in the Can aros .d . amah . an . atantra, a Tantric text. 5. The Prat tyasamutp ada- adi-vibhanga-nirde sa-s utra is a specimen of the oldest Buddhist dogmatics. It has a form of the Buddhas sermon but here it is only a supercial addition. The lecture is divided into two parts: (a) the rst part contains the so-called beginning ( adi),9 in which the twelvemembered formula is presented together with the so-called general formula (asmin sati, idam . bhavati etc.), and (b) the second part contains the so-called explanation (vibhanga ), in which all the members are briey explained. The explanation is short and dry, in the style of old scholastics. However, the text has been highly esteemed among the Buddhists and became a basis of the exposition of the formula of dependent origination in the dogmatic writings of a classical period. Vasubandhus commentary on the above text, the Prat tyasamutp ada-vy akhy a, oers a good introduction into the exegetical literature of the classical period in general. First of all, it shows how the sacred texts have been comprehensively explained and how their inconsistencies were taken into consideration and attempted to solve. 6. It was said that the Prat tyasamutp ada-s utra is a canonical textit means it was regarded as spoken by the Buddha himself (buddha-vacana). For Vasubandhu the problem of the authorship/authenticity of the Prat tyasamutp ada-s utra is out of question: it is certainly a buddha-vacana. However, the actual question he poses is: Which is the S utra? As it becomes soon clear from Vasubandhus discussion in his PSVy, there are namely several texts regarded undoubtedly as a buddha-vacana which teach the doctrine of prat tyasamutp ada, yet to dierent doctrinal eects! The diculty is clearly seen when Vasubandhu is discussing passages from dierent s utras, above all from the Adi-vi ses a-vibha nga and the Sahetusapratyayasanid a na-s u tra, both of . which represent the Sautr antika doctrinal positions and explain prat tyasamutp ada
Cf. Schayer 1988, p. 466: In Abhidharmako sa, the celebrated treatise of Vasubandhu, we nd an interesting passage describing the reincarnation process in the following way: The Gandharva seeing from a distance its father and mother united in the act of procreation, is overpowered by passion for its mother and hatred for its father, when it is a male Gandharva, or with passion for its father and hatred for its mother, if it is a female Gandharva. Under the inuence of these conicting sentiments, it loses his presence of mind and becomes aected by the illusion that it takes itself an active part in the act, mixes with the secretions, and penetrates its mothers womb as an embryo. It is clear, from this curious anticipation of Freudian theories, that the Gandharva is both a child spirit and a lover of its mother. 8 Cf. LVP, Ko sa, III, p. 50 n. 4; LVP, Th eorie, p. 125. 9 Cf. NidSa 16.1, p. 157.
7

M. Mejor On the Formulation of the Prat tyasamutp ada...

129

in a special way. Thus, Vasubandhu is careful to precise which s utra-text he is going to comment upon as the Prat tyasamutp ada-s utra: it is the Prat tyasamutp ada adi-vibhanga (-nirde sa)-s utra, i.e. the text which consists of two partsbeginning ( adi) and explanation (vibhanga ), and which opens with the Buddhas words directed to his disciples: I shall preach to you, monks, the beginning ( adi) of dependent origination and the explanation (vibhanga ).10 It seems that the title *Prat tyasamutp ada-s utra11 should be taken as a conventional one only. The quotation from a Prat tyasamutp ada-s utra in the Prasannapad a comes from the Sahetusapratyayasanid ana-s utra, which belongs to a group of texts that explain the doctrine of dependent origination from a specic point alistamba-s of view, like S utra and Adi-vi ses (T 716, 717). Moreover, . a-vibhanga there are also texts that are (almost) identical in form but either bear dier ent titles (Prat tyasamutp ad adi-vibhanga-nirde sa, Adi-s utra,12 Prat tyasamutp ada13 vibhanga ), or have no title at all (a brick inscription from N aland a, a golden plate inscription from Djakarta, a Br ahmi stone inscription from Dunhuang), or are included into another larger text (Arthavini scaya-s utra, Yog ac arabh umi (Vibhanga )). In his PSVy Vasubandhu speaks about texts which bear titles adequate to their contents, viz. Param artha- su nyat a-s utra and Prat tyasamutp ada-( adi-vibhanga )s utra. Accordingly, a text which deals essentially with the exposition of the doctrine of prat tyasamutp ada may be called a Prat tyasamutp ada-s utra. The Prat tyasamutp ada- adi-vibhanga-nirde sa-s utra is preserved in full (or partly cited) in the following sources : (a) Skt. sources: 1. Nid ana-sam utra No. 16: Adi-s utra, Ms from Turfan, ed. Tri. yukta, S pathi, 2. N aland a bricks, ed. Chakravarti, 3. Djakarta Golden Plate inscription, ed. de Casparis, 4. Br ahmi stone inscription from Dunhuang, ed. V.V. Gokhale, 5. Arthavini scayas utra, ch. 5, ed. Samtani, 6. Yog ac arabh umi, (Vibhanga ), Skt. ed. Bhattacharya, [cf. Tib. & Chin. transl.], avakabh 7. Sr umi (quotations), ed. Shukla,
Cf. NidSa, p. 11 n. 1, 2. NidSa, S utra no. 16. Cf. Waldschmidt 1967a, p. 295: S utra 16 (Tsa-a-han-ching 298). Place: village in the land of the Kurus. In the summarizing word a din a means adi of the basic text of the formula of dependent origination which is in the opposite to the following in the S utra explanation (vibhanga ). P ali parallel: N[id ana] S[am . yutta] Sutta 2 (vibhanga , Geiger: Zergliederung [analysis]); place: S avatthi. 12 Waldschmidt 1967a, p. 289 n. 4, refers to Ms S 474 from Turfan, fol. 13a1-2: ayam ucyate prat tyasamutp adavibhanga ; Waldschmidt 1967b, p. 360, refers to Ms S 472, fol. 1(25) v 5: || prat tyasamutp adavibhangas utra sam apta ||. 13 See also de Jong 1974.
11 10

130

Aspects of Buddhism 8. Arthavini scayanibandhana of V rya sr datta (contains extracts from Vasubandhus PSVy and Gun amatis PSVy -t k a), ed. Samtani, . . 9. Abhidharmako sa-vy akhy a of Ya somitra (fragments collected in: Mejor 1991, pp. 59-62).

(b) Tib. sources: 1. Kanjur (not all editions contain this text!), 2. Samathadevas Up ayik a-n ama comm. on the AKBh (in: Mejor 1991, pp. 70-73), 3. Gun k a, . amatis PSVy-t . 4. Arthavini scaya-t k a. . (c) Chin. sources: 1. Gun , T 99, no. 298, . abhadras transl. of the Sam . yukta-Agama 2. Xuanzang, T 124, 3. Chinese votive stupas (analysed by H. Durt). 7. Vasubandhus attempt towards the identication of the Prat tyasamutp adas utra is relevant from the historical point of view. As we have just seen, the problem of origin and historical development of prat tyasamutp ada-doctrine and its formulations is a very complex issue. In the following I shall try to show that the Prat tyasamutp ada- adi-vibhanga-nirde sa-s utra, which is the subject of Vasubandhus commentary, is a later compilation. Through the juxtaposition of the various formulations of the denition of avidy a the composite character of the Prat tyasamutp ada-s utra will be demonstrated and it will be shown that the primitive Buddhist tradition concerning the prat tyasamutp ada-doctrine split early and compiled dierent texts of the Prat tyasamutp ada-s utra. With the Therav adins the text of the S utra has preserved its more primitive formulation, while with the Sarv astiv adins it has evolved and acquired its developed form in the Prat tyasamutp ada- adi-vibhanga-nirde sa-s utra. 8. As it was said, Vasubandhus Prat tyasamutp ada-vy akhy a is a commentary on the Prat tyasamutp ada- adi-vibhanga-nirde sa-s utra. The s utra text has been preserved in several versions: Sanskrit, Tibetan, Chinese, and each of them shows some variants. These variants are particularly signicant and numerous within the denition of ignorance (avidy a), the rst link of the twelve-membered formula of dependent origination, and concern variant readings, the number and arrangement of the items. 9. The Prat tyasamutp ada- adi-vibhanga-s utra denition of avidy a is as follows:14
14 Prat tyasamutp ada-s utra = Nid anasam utra [ed. Tripathi] (with com. yukta 16: Adi-s parative notes according to the N aland a text, ed. Chakravarti):

avidy apratyay ah ar a ity avidy a katam a / yat tat p urv ante j n anam, . sam . sk

M. Mejor On the Formulation of the Prat tyasamutp ada... What is ignorance? Nescience as to the past, nescience as to the future, nescience as to the past and future, nescience as to the inward, nescience as to the outward, nescience as to the inward and outward, nescience as to the action, nescience as to the result, nescience as to the action and result, nescience as to the Buddha, nescience as to the Doctrine, nescience as to the Community, nescience as to the suering, nescience as to the arising [of suering], nescience as to the cessation [of suering], nescience as to the path, nescience as to the cause, nescience as to the elements originated from the causes, nescience as to the virtuous and non-virtuous, faultless and sinful, to be cultivated and not to be cultivated, low and excellent, dark and white dependently originated elements, *together with their counterparts,15 or, [nescience] as to the *penetration into to the real state of things16 in the six bases of contact; *that which is in every case:17 nescience of the real state of things, not seeing, not comprehension, obscurity, complete delusion, and *darkness of ignorance18 this is called ignorance.

131

10. In the P ali canon we do not nd a text which would fully agree with its Sanskrit counterpart. The nearest parallels are two short suttas from the Nid ana
apar ante j na nam, p urv ant apar ante j n anam, adhy atme j na nam, bahirdh aj na nam, adhy atmabahirdh aj na nam, karman n anam, vip ake j na nam, N a. y aj land a ad.: karmavip ake j na nam , buddhe j na nam, dharme j na nam, sanghe j na nam, duh na nam, samudaye N aland a ad.: j na nam , nirodhe N a. khe j land a ad.: j na nam , m arge j na nam, het av aj na nam, hetusamutpannesu dharmes na nam, ku sal aku sales avady anavadyes asevita. . v aj . u, s . u, sevitavy vyes na-pran tes sn sukles aga-prat tyasamutpanne. u, *h . . u, *kr .. . a- . u * sa pratibh su (N aland a: ** one compound) dharmes na nam, . sat a punah . . v aj . su v . spar sa yatanes u yath a bh u ta [ ma ] sam prativedhe iti | (N a land a : yat tatra ) yatra . . tatra N aland a ad.: yath abh utasya aj na nam adar sanam anabhisamayas tamah andhak aram (Tripathi: avidy anu( sayah . sam . moho vidy . )) | iyam (Tripathi: ayam) ucyate vidy a |. (a) NidSa 16.4; Brahmi inscr.: pratibh aga-. (b) PSVy [D 9b3; P 10a7], N aland a [p. 198.8], DhSk 3r8 [Dietz, p. 26], YBh [p. 205.8; Tib. so soi cha yod pa]: sapratibh aga-. (c) AVS om.! 16 (a) NidSa 16.4: yath abh utam asam . prativedha iti, cf. Tripathis note, p. 159, n. 1: P ali appativedha (read: appat . i-); cf. PTSD sam . prat . ivedha and BHSD prativedha: penetration; Kanjur: khong du mi chud pa; PSVy [P 10b1; D 9b4], Gun . amati [P 110a8]: yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du khong du chud pa r mi ses pa . (b) N aland a: yath abh utasam . prativedhe iti; YBh [p. 205.9]: yath abh utasam na nam; AVN [p. 110.1]: yath a. prativedhe j bh utam aj na nam ity aprativedhah abh utam aj na nam adar sanam.... . . (c) AVS om. [!]: yath 17 NidSa 16.4: yatra tatr aj na nam...; N aland a [p. 198.8-9]: yat tatra tatra yath abh utasy aj na nam...; Djakarta inscr. [A.11]: yat tatra tes u ; PSVy [P 10b7; D 10a2], Gun amati . . [P 111b5]: gang de dang der; AVS om. 18 NidSa 16.4, p. 159: avidy anu( sayah . |), and also SWTF s.v., against other Skt. sources: avidy andhak ara. But Tib. reads regularly: ma rig pa dang mun pai rnam pa (*avidy andh ak ara) [!].
15

132

Aspects of Buddhism

Sam a, and no. 2: Vibhanga . The rst sutta corresponds to . yutta II: no. 1: Desan the adi-part, and the second one corresponds partially to the vibhanga -part of the Prat tyasamutp ada- adi-vibhanga-s utra. The denition of ignorance (avijj a) from the P ali Vibhanga (NS II.2 15.) is as follows: And what is, monks, ignorance? The nescience about the suering, the nescience about the arising of suering, the nescience about the cessation of suering, the nescience about the path leading to the cessation of suering - this, monks, is called ignorance. As it is clearly seen from the above, here ignorance is dened simply as a nescience of the Four Noble Truths. The extended denitions of ignorance are found in the old P ali Abhidhamma work, the Dhammasangan . i. The rst is denition of delusion (moha) (DhS 390). (Here it should be noted that in the early sources, both P ali and Sanskrit, the two notions moha and avijj a/avidy a are used interchangeably.) It is a simple enumeration of 25 various negative terms which characterize ignorance: What is delusion (moha)? Nescience, not seeing, non-comprehension, non-awakening, lack of enlightenment, non-intelligence, not collecting, not penetrating, not considering, inability to consider, not realizing, foolishness, stupidity, non-discrimination, delusion, deception, confusion, ignorance, the ood of ignorance, the bond of ignorance, the proclivity of ignorance, the overwhelming of ignorance, the bar of ignorance, delusion, which is the root evil - this is called delusion. The second denition (DhS 1061 = 1161 [here it is denition of ignorance as a hindrance]) consists of two parts: rst part contains the elements of denition known to us from the Sanskrit *Prat tyasamutp ada-s utra, viz. such expressions as nescience about the Four Noble Truths, nescience as to the past, as to the future, as to the both, and nescience about the elements originated in dependance on this-conditioning. The second part is a mere repetition of the said enumeration of 25 negative terms.19
19

Dhammasangan . i 1061 [PTS ed.]: Tattha katamo moho? Dukkhe a nn a n nn an nn an . am . dukkhasamudaye a . am . dukkhanirodhe a . am . dukkhanirodhag aminiy a pat aya a nn a n nn a n nn a. ipad . am . pubbante a . am . aparante a n aparante a nn a n a pat . am . pubbant . am . idappaccayat . iccasamuppannesu dhammesu a nn an upam nn a n . am . - yam . evar . a . am . adassanam . anabhisamayo ananubodho asambodho appat ivedho asa ng a han a apariyog a han a asamapekkhan a . apaccavekkhan a apaccakkhakammam nn am . - dummejjham . balyam . asampaja . moho pamoho sammoho avijj a avijjogho avijj ayogo avijj anusayo avijj apariyut th anam alang moho akusalam ulam .. . avijj . - ayam vuccati moho.

M. Mejor On the Formulation of the Prat tyasamutp ada...

133

It is clear then that the second denition in the Dhammasangan . i is but a mechanical conjunction of a few scriptural passages. The same denition is repeated also in another P ali canonical Abhidhamma work, Vibhanga , and in other texts. 11. The Sanskrit Dharmaskandha, most probably the oldest canonical treatise of the Sarv astiv ada Abhidharma, contains a close parallel to the above given Prat tyasamutp ada-s utra denition of avidy a; it is also found in the second oldest Sarv astiv ada Abhidharma treatise, in the Sang tipary aya, but this time as a denition of moha (delusion). What is the most interesting here is the fact that the denition from the Dharmaskandha [ed. Dietz, p. 24] and the Sang tipary aya [ed. StacheRosen, III.3, p. 64] is wider than that of the Prat tya-samutp ada-s utra. It contains in addition an enumeration of negative terms characterizing avidy a, similar to that which is known to us from the P ali sources (but not identical). The composition of this extended denition also points out to a mechanical connection of several formulations. Unfortunately, a direct comparison of the terms with the list from the Dhammasangan . i is not possible since that part of the Sanskrit text of the Dharmaskandha is lost and the full denition is preserved only in the Chinese translation [T 1537, p. 505c13-26]. Denition of avidy a:20 Now, again, in dependence on ignorance are formations (avidy apratyay ah sam sk a r a h ). What is ignorance ( avidy a , wu-ming )? . . . Now, nescience (aj n ana, wu-zhi) as to the past, nescience as to the future, nescience as to the past and the future, nescience as to the inward, nescience as to the outward, nescience as to the inward and outward, nescience as to the action, nescience as to the result, nescience as to the action and the result, nescience as to the well-done action, nescience as to the wrongly done action, nescience as to the well done and wrongly done actions, nescience as to the cause, nescience as to the factors originated due to the causes, nescience as to the Buddha, Dharma and Sangha, nescience as to the suering, [its] origin, [its] annihilation, [and] the path [leading to its annihilation], nescience as to the virtuous and not virtuous factors, nescience as to the faultless and sinful factors, nescience as to the factors which are to be cultivated (ying-xin) and which are not to be cultivated, nescience as to the low (xia-lie) and excellent (sheng-miao) factors, nescience as to the dark and white factors, nescience as to the factors having (together with) their counterparts (you-di-dui), nescience as to the origination in dependence, nescience as to the six bases of contact according to the real state of things; further, it is nescience, not seeing, not intuitive comprehension (abhisamaya, xian-guan), obscurity (hei-an), complete delusion (yu-chi), darkness of ignorance (wu-ming mang-ming); [moreover,] [ignorance is like a shing] net (zhao-wang), bonds (chan-guo), stupidity (wan-ai), turbidity (hun-zhuo), hindrance (zhang-gai) which issues blindness, ignorance, nescience, evil knowledge (lie-hui); [it is an]
20

Cf. Dietz, DhSk p. 24f.; Stache-Rosen, Sang ti, p. 64.

134

Aspects of Buddhism obstacle for good qualities, [and] is not t for nirv an . a; [it is] evil inuence of ignorance, ood of ignorance, bond of ignorance, poisonous root of ignorance, poisonous stem of ignorance, poisonous branch of ignorance, poisonous leaf of ignorance, poisonous ower of ignorance, poisonous fruit of ignorance, delusion (chi), complete delusion, utmost delusion, erceness (v.l. hen), complete erceness, utmost erceness, a kind of delusion, originated from delusionall this is called ignorance (avidy a, wu-ming).

Another extended denition of avidy a is found in a later Sanskrit text, the Arthavini scayas utra.21 Its fth chapter contains the full text of the Prat tyasamutp ada- adi-vibhanga s utra. 12. Apparently, the Prat tyasamutp ada- adi-vibhanga-s utra was not only an authority for the school of Sarv astiv adins but also it was accepted by the followers of the Yog ac ara. The Yog ac arabh umi (ed. Bhattacharya, 204.1-206.9) oers explanations on avidy a which go beyond the denition of the S utra. This is reproduced by Vasubandhu in his PSVy. As an example let us quote a few passages from the YBh: What is nescience (aj n ana) as to the past? - It is nescience of one who is thinking incorrectly (ayoni sas) about the past formations (sam ara): . sk Did I exist in the past, or did I not exist in the past? Who was I? How did I exist? Which is nescience as to the future? - It is nescience of one who is thinking incorrectly about the future formations: Shall I exist in the future, or shall I not exist in the future? Who shall I be? How shall I be? Which is nescience as to the past and the future? - It is nescience of one who doubts incorrectly inward(ly): Who they are? Who will we be(come)? From where did come this sentient being? Where it will go after falling down from this [state of existence]? Even more extended are the explanations in the Arthavini scaya-t k a (P 5852, . Jo. 40b.) which also include those of the Yog ac arabh umi. The YBh contains speculations on the order and arrangement of the characteristic forms ( ak ara) of nescience (aj n ana).22 Further, it contains a discussion on
The AVS exists also in Tibetan version (Peking Kanjur 983) and two Chinese translations: T 762 (= Nj 928) in 21 chapters, by Faxian from 982-1001 A.D.; T 763 (= Nj 1015) in 27 chapters, by Jinzunzhe from ca. 1113 A.D. It is interesting to observe that the definition of avidy a in the earlier Chinese version (T 762, vol. xvii, pp. 650a24-651a13) is further developed and shows close resemblance to the denition from the Dharmaskandha (the series of similies: ignorance as a ood, as a yoke, etc., ignorance as a poisonous part of a plant, etc.). 22 The nineteen forms are arranged according to the sevenfold nescience. Both the
21

M. Mejor On the Formulation of the Prat tyasamutp ada...

135

the series of six (quasi-)synonyms (pary aya) of the word avidy a which are closing the S utra denition. The passage is as follows: aj n anam adar sanam anabhisamayas tamah andhak aram, iyam ucyate vidy a (iti) (Nescience, not . sam . moho vidy seeing, non-penetration, obscurity, delusion, darkness of ignorance - this is called ignorance.).23 13. Summing up, the denition of avidy a ignorance, one of the most important notions of the Buddhist doctrine, has been compiled from several scriptural passages ascribed to the Buddha. The Therav adins preserved its more primitive formulation fairly unchanged, while the Sarv astiv adins extended it in its own way and included it into the Prat tyasamutp ada- adi-vibhanga-s utra, a text which certainly is a compilation of the school. Moreover, the denition of avidy a may have its further source in the pre-Buddhistic speculations, which have been preserved in the S am . khya-Yoga texts. More primitive formulation of the denition of avidy a in the P ali canon speaks for its greater antiquity. Consequently, the two short suttas from the Nid anasam a and the Vibhanga should be regarded as . yutta (SN II.1-2), viz. the Desan a prototype of the later Prat tyasamutp ada- adi-vibhanga-s utra. It seems that the Prat tyasamutp ada- adi-vibhanga-s utra which was commented upon by Vasubandhu may come from the time of the split of the Buddhist sangha, which took place after the second council, according to the Buddhist tradition. Judging from the later sources, its origin may be placed some time before the compilation of the Dhammasangan . i of the Therav adins and the Dharmaskandha of the Sarv astiv adins. This is, of course, rather rough and tentative estimation and only further scrutinizing of the sources may give us a more precise answer.

Bibliography and Abbreviations

AKBh AN AVN AVS DhS DhSk DN N Abhidharmako sa-bh a. sya Anguttara Nik aya Arthavini scaya-nibandhana Arthavini scaya-s utra Dhammasangan .i Dharmaskandha D gha Nik aya Nanjio

Sanskrit and the Tibetan text have here a wrong number by mistake; it is only following an emendation after the Chinese text that the numerical arrangement agrees [T 1579, p. 322c16]. 23 This series has its parallel in the S am utra-bh a. sya ad I.8; comm. . khya-Yoga texts [Yogas on S am arik a 47 and 48] which explain the vefold delusion (ignorance): tamo moho . khyak mah amohas t amisro ndhat amisra iti |.

136 SN PSVy PSS PSAVN YBh Bernhard 1968-69 Casparis 1956 Sam aya . yutta Nik Prat tyasamutp ada-vy akhy a Prat tyasamutp ada-s utra

Aspects of Buddhism

Prat tyasamutp ada- adi-vibhanga-nirde sa-s utra Yog ac arabh umi Bernhard, F., Zur Interpretation der Prat tyasamutp ada-Formel, WZKS 12/13, 1968-69, pp. 53-63. Casparis, J.G. de A Buddhist text engraved on gold plates, Selected Inscriptions From the 7th to the 9th Century A.D.. Prasasti Indonesia, Masa Baru, Bandung, pp. 47-167; 338-341 (Addenda); 372-395 (Sanskrit index). Chakravarti, N.P. Two Brick Inscriptions from Nalanda, Epigraphia Indica XXI (1931-32), pp. 193-199. Cordier, P. Catalogue du fonds tib etain de la Biblioth` eque Nationale. III. Index du Bstan-h . gyur. (Tib etain 180-332). Paris 1915. Dietz, S. Fragmente des Dharmaskandha, ein Abhidharma-Text in Sanskrit aus Gilgit. G ottingen 1984. Durt, H., Krishna Riboud et Lai Tung-Hung, A propos de st upa miniatures votifs du Ve si ecle d ecouverts a Tourfan et au Gansu, Arts Asiatiques, Annales du Mus ee Guimet et du Mus ee Cernuschi, XL, pp. 92-106. Frauwallner, E. Geschichte der indischen Philosophie. Vol. 1, Salzburg 1953. Frauwallner, E. Die Philosophie des Buddhismus. Berlin 1956. Gokhale, V.V. Brahmi stone inscription from Tunhuang, Sino-Indian Studies, vol. I:1, pp. 18-22. Jong, J.W. de A propos du Nid anasam . yukta, M elanges de sinologie oerts a M. Paul Demi eville, Paris, vol. II, pp. 137-149. Lamotte, E. Conditioned Co-production and Supreme Enlightenment, Buddhist Studies in Honour of Walpola Rahula. London 1980, pp. 118-132. German version of the paper appeared as: Die Bedingte Entstehung und die h ochste Erleuchtung, Beitr age zur Indienforschung Ernst Waldschmidt gewidmet. Berlin 1977, pp. 279-298.

Chakravarti 1932 Cordier

Dietz 1984 Durt 1985

Frauwallner 1953 Frauwallner 1956 Gokhale 1944 de Jong 1974

Lamotte 1980

M. Mejor On the Formulation of the Prat tyasamutp ada... LVP Ko sa LVP Th eorie LVP 1937

137

e Poussin, L. de LAbhidharmako La Valle sa de Vasubandhu. 6 vols. Paris-Louvain 1923-1931. e Poussin, L. de Th La Valle eorie des douze causes. Gand 1913. e Poussin, L. de Le bouddhisme et le yoga La Valle de Pata njali, M elanges chinois et bouddhiques V (19361937), pp. 223-242. Mejor, M. Vasubandhus Abhidharmako sa and the Commentaries Preserved in the Tanjur. Stuttgart. (Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien 42.) Murakami, Shinkan The Sanskrit Nagaras utra: the ten-membered and the twelve-membered prat tyasamutp ada [in Japanese; Sanskrit text Romanized], Bukky o Kenky u 3, pp. 20-47. Pande, G.Ch. Studies in the Origins of Buddhism, 1957. Samtani N.H. ed. Arthavivi scaya-s utra and its Commentary. Patna 1971. Schmithausen, L. Alayavij n ana. On the Origin and the Early Development of a Central Concept of Yog ac ara Philosophy. Part I: Text; Part II: Notes, Bibliography and Indices. Tokyo, The International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 1987. Tripathi, Ch. F unfundzwanzig S utras des Nid anasam yukta . Berlin. (Sanskrittexte aus den Turfanfun. den VIII.) Waldschmidt, E. Identizierung einer Handschrift des Nid anasam . yukta aus den Turfanfunden, Von Ceylon bis Turfan. Schriften zur Geschichte, Literatur, Religion und Kunst des indischen Kulturraumes von Ernst Waldschmidt. G ottingen, pp. 288-401. Waldschmidt, E. Ein zweites Da sabalas utra, Von Ceylon bis Turfan..., pp. 347-370.

Mejor 1991

Murakami 1973

Pande 1957 Samtani Schmithausen 1987

Tripathi 1962

Waldschmidt 1967a

Waldschmidt 1967b

138

Aspects of Buddhism

Aspects of Buddhism, Liw, Poland, June 25, 1994

On Vasubandhus Prat tyasamutp adavy akhy a1

Marek Mejor (Warsaw) Vasubandhus Prat tyasamutp adavy akhy a [from hereon abbreviated: PSVy] is a commentary on the (so-called) Prat tyasamutp ada-s utra,2 viz. Prat tyasamutp ad adivibhanga-nirde sa-s utra, a canonical text which is an exposition of the fundamental doctrine of Buddhism.3 The Prat tyasamutp ada-vy akhy a4 is preserved in a few Sanskrit fragments from a single Nepalese manuscript which was discovered and published by Giuseppe Tucci in 1930.5 Several passages can also be traced in the Abhidharmako sa-bh a. sya,
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the VIIIth World Sanskrit Conference, Vienna, August-September 1990. 2 It seems that the title *Prat tyasamutp ada-s utra should be taken as a conventional one. The quotation from the Prat tyasamutp ada-s utra in Candrak rtis Prasannapad a can be shown to come from the Sahetusapratyayasanid ana-s utra, which belongs to a group of texts which explain the doctrine of dependent origination from a specic point alistamba, Sahetusapratyayasanid of view (S ana). Moreover, there exist texts which are almost identical but bear dierent titles (Prat tyasamutp ad adivibhanganirde sa, [Nid ana sam utra, Prat tyasamutp adavibhanga) , or have no title at all (N aland a brick . yukta:] Adi-s inscription, Br ahmi stone inscription from Dunhuang, Djakarta golden plates inscription), or are included into another larger text (Arthavini scaya-s utra). 3 E. Frauwallner made an attempt towards a reconstruction of the possible evolution of the doctrine of dependent origination in the Buddhas teaching (Frauwallner 1953, p. 211.) He put forth a hypothesis that the twelve-membered formula was compiled by the Buddha himself from two shorter formulae, viz. one consisting of the links 1-7 (i.e. avidy a vedan a) and the other consisting of the links 8-12 (i.e. tr sn a to jar amaran .. . . a). This hypothesis was later supported by Bernhard (Bernhard 1968-69). See also Aramaki 1985. 4 So reads the Ms. (once: vy akhy ana). De Jong 1974, p. 145 suggested *Prat tyasamutp ad adivibhanga-vy akhy a as a probable original title of the text. The Tibetan translation reads: Prat tyasamutp adasy adivibhangayor nirde sah .. 5 Tucci 1930 (in devanagari); reprinted (in Roman characters) in: Tucci 1971. The palm-leaf manuscript from which my copy has been taken belongs to His Holiness Sr Hemar aja Sarm a, spiritual preceptor to His Highness the Mah ar aja of Nepal. It is written in old Newari characters of the twelfth or thirteenth century and it is generally correct. It contains six lines per page. (Tucci 1930, p. 612). The Skt. Ms. was available to me in colour photos thanks to the kind permission of Prof. A. Wezler (Hamburg): Ms.
1

140

Aspects of Buddhism

in the Karmasiddhiprakaran scaya-nibandhana, a commen. a, and in the Arthavini tary by V rya sr datta on the Artha-vini scaya-s utra. The entire text of the PSVy is extant in Tibetan translation;6 in the Tanjur it is followed by a large . t k a by 7 Gun . amati. The text is divided into fourteen chapters: twelve chapters discuss successively the twelve links of the prat tyasamutp ada, and the last two chapters are devoted to some special questions. Gun t k a provides us with further . amatis . divisions within the chapters.8 The preserved Sanskrit fragments belong to the following chapters: (1) avidy a-vibhanga , (7) vedan a-vibhanga , (8) tr sn a-vibhanga .. . (complete), (9) up ad ana-vibhanga , (10) bhava-vibhanga . The eighth chapter, On desire (tr sn a-vibhanga ), was translated into Ger.. . man by Frauwallner.9 A new edition of the text of the vedan a-vibhanga and 10 the tr s n a -vibha nga was prepared by Muroji. Iida and Matsumoto analysed the .. . so-called adi-portion of the rst chapter11 ; this part has been critically edited by Muroji.12 Recently Muroji13 published a critical edition and translation of two further chapters from Vasubandhus PSVy: sam ara- and vij n ana-vibhanga . . sk Muroji also made a comparative edition of Vasubandhus Karmasiddhiprakaran .a and showed its close relation to the PSVy.14 Matsuda studied the introductory stanzas of the PSVy and proved that they were inserted by Param artha at the end of his translation of the Vini scaya-sam grahan and in the concluding part of . . the Madhy antavibh aga-bh a. sya.15 The present author is preparing a critical edition, accompanied with an English translation, of the rst chapter, On ignorance (avidy a-vibhanga ), of the PSVy.16 In the following a brief analysis of its contents will be given, together with some additional observations.
No. 5-138/vi, bauddhadar sana 55, Reel No. B23/26; No. of leaves 6; Size 31x5 cm, palmleaf. Nepal-German Manuscript Preservation Project, National Archives, Kathmandu. This is the same Ms. which was available to Tucci. See also Muroji 1993, p. 41. 6 P Tanjur, vol. Chi, fol. 1-71a8; transl. by Surendr akaraprabha and Nam mkha. Cordier III, p. 365 (Prat tyasamutp ad adivibhanganirde sa). Cf. Lhan kar ma catalogue (ed. Lalou), No. 653. 7 P Tanjur, vol. Chi, fol. 71a8-283b6; same translators as above. Cordier III, p. 365, (Prat tyasamutp ad adivibhanganirde sat k a). Cf. Lhan kar ma catalogue (ed. Lalou), . No. 654. 8 Cf. note 15 below. 9 Frauwallner 1956, pp. 43-48. 10 Muroji 1990. 11 Iida, Matsumoto 1978. 12 Muroji 1986. 13 Muroji 1993. 14 Muroji 1985. 15 Matsuda 1984 [cf. short summary of this and some of Matsudas other papers in IIJ 28 (1985), p. 319f. (Publications received)]. 16 The project was carried out by means of a research grant from the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung, Hamburg University. Here I would like to express my sincere thanks to the Humboldt Foundation and especially to Prof. Dr. L. Schmithausen, who acted as my host-professor.

M. Mejor On Vasubandhus Prat tyasamutp adavy akhy a

141

First chapter, the Explanation of ignorance (avidy a-vibhanga ), is the longest chapter of the PSVy, and in the Tibetan translation it occupies 12 folios. One folio of the Sanskrit manuscript (approx. 1,5 folios of the Tibetan) has been preserved. Generally, one can divide this chapter into four parts as follows17 : (a) The text opens with four mangala slokas (salutary stanzas); three of them praise the ratna-trayam, i.e. Buddha, Dharma, and Sangha; in the fourth the author, having been urged by those desiring to hear the Buddhas teaching, gives the reason for the present compilation. (b) Next comes an important part in which the S utra, i.e. that text which is a basis for the present commentary, is discussed; a characteristic of the S utra are the opening words of the Buddha: I shall preach to you, monks, the beginning ( adi) of dependent origination and the explanation (vibhanga ).18 Then Vasubandhu discusses at some length the so-called s utra- sar ra, body of a s utra19 ; accordingly, the relation between the two parts of the S utra: the adi and the vibhanga , is like that between s utra and its vr . tti. (c) The following part is an explanation of the adi or beginning of the S utra. Vasubandhus detailed discussion focuses on the so-called general formula of the prat tyasamutp ada only, i.e. on the formula: asmin sati, idam bhavati 20 | asyotp ad ad idam adi-part of the preserved ver. utpadyate. Actually the sions of the S utra contains also an enumeration of the twelve members of the prat tyasamutp ada, in its anuloma (ascending) order.21 Vasubandhu explains, in response to the queries of some opponents, why the Buddha proclaimed the formula in its double formulation: (a) this having existed, that comes into existence; (b) this having originated, that originates, and refers sa. to four possible explanations which are also found in the Abhidharmako In short, the general formula is meant to reject the notion of an eternal cause (nitya-hetu).
Gun . amati distinguishes as many as ten sections: 1) rang gi rigs rkyen du bzhag pa, 2) gzhan gyi rigs rkyen du rnam par bzhag pa, 3) du byed kyi rkyen du rnam par bzhag pa, 4) mi mthun pai phyogs kyi mtshan n id rnam par bzhag pa, 5) rab tu dbye ba rnam par bzhag pa, 6) rnam grangs rnam par bzhag pa, 7) rnam pa rnam par bzhag pa, 8) mi mthun pai phyogs rab tu dbye ba rnam par bzhag pa, 9) ngo bo n id rnam par bzhag pa, 10) byed par rnam par bzhag pa. 18 Cf. Nid anasam tyasamutp adasya vo bhiks . yukta 16.1 (ed. Tripathi, p. 157): prat . ava adi n ca de sayis n ca; N aland a text (ed. Chakravarti, p. 197(2)) reads: . ye vibhanga prat tyasamutp adasya vo bhiks di[m sayis ami vibhangam . ca. Cf. the golden . avah . a . ] vo de . y plate inscription from Djakarta (ed. de Casparis, p. 108 & n. 6). 19 For a detailed explanation see the Arthavini scayanibandhana (Samtani p. 71.). The body of a s utra consists of the following six parts: nid ana (circumstances), upodgh ata (prologue), prayojana (purpose), udde sa (short announcement), nirde sa (detailed exposition), and anusandhi (juncture). 20 Cf. the discussion of this formula in LVP, Th eorie, p. 49f.; LVP, Ko sa, III, p. 81 n. 2; Jayatilleke 1963, 771; Kalupahana 1975. See also next footnote. 21 Cf. Law 1937.
17

142

Aspects of Buddhism Here, polemics against the S am . khya doctrine of the preexistence of an eect in its cause (satk aryav ada) and various opinions on the meaning of the sequence of the two general formulae are discussed at some length. Vasubandhu refers to the opinion of the followers of the Yog ac arabh umi who claim that 22 the formula was uttered in the sense of non-abandonment (aprah n . a). In his answer Vasubandhu refers to the *Adi-vi ses ama-dharma. a-vibhanga-n pary aya23 its three denitions of the prat tyasamutp ada correspond precisely to those found in the Abhidharmasamuccaya(bh a. sya).24 A grammatical (etymological) explanation of the general formula of prat tyasamutp ada is given by Vasubandhu.25 In the Abhidharmako sa the grammatical explanation consists of three parts: an explanation approved by Vasubandhu, l an objection by the grammarians, and an opinion of bhadanta Sr ata, a Sautr antika. The rst and the last opinion are quoted by Candrak rti in his Prasannapad a; the last opinion is also quoted in the Arthavini scayanibandhana. The adi-part closes with a discussion of the term cause (hetu, pratyaya).

(d) The vibhanga or explanatory part of the S utra contains a detailed exposition of the twelve successive members of the prat tyasamutp ada. Vasubandhus commentary on the vibhanga -part begins in the middle of the avidy a-chapter. It opens with a discussion of the Buddhas words: What is dependent origination? This having existed, that comes into existence etc. Which are the elements which have originated in dependence? Ignorance, karmic formations, etc. up to existence, old age and death, etc.26 Another topic which is the subject of a long doctrinal discussion is the question of the (eventual) cause of avidy a, or ignorance, the very rst member of the prat tyasamutp ada. Actually, avidy a begins the series of the twelve consecutive links in the standard textual formulation. However, there are some texts which oer dierent answers. Thus, incorrect judgement (ayoni somanasik ara) is said to be the cause of avidy a 28 in the Sahetusapratyayasanid ana-s utra27 , whereas in the *Mah akaus t hila-s u tra ..
YBh, p. 221.16-17. The text, which is preserved in two Chinese translations (T 716, tr. by Dharmagupta, ca. 590-616 A.D; T 717, tr. by Xuanzang, ca. 645-664 A.D.) and in a few Tibetan fragments, studied in Matsuda 1982 and in Matsuda 1983. Cf. also Muroji 1986. 24 Cf. also Madhy antavibh aga-t k a 3. pariccheda, ad k arik a 18. In the Arthavini scaya. t k . a the full denitions are preserved. 25 Cf. the etymological explanations found in the Prasannapad a, Tattvasam . graha, Arthavini scaya-nibandhana, Rol pai rdo rjes Dag yig, Tibetan Dpang lots ava Blo gros brtan pas treatise according to the C andra-vy akaran eorie, p. 48f.; . a, etc. See LVP, Th LVP, Ko sa, III, p. 78.; Jayatilleke 1963, 763, 767. 26 Cf. AKBh ad III.28. 27 Cf. de Jong 1974, p. 144 n. 3. The Tibetan version was edited in Matsuda 1984, pp. 91-93. The present author has prepared a new edition (Skt. fragments, Tib., Chin.) with an English translation. 28 The text does not exist in Sanskrit. Schmithausen 1987, p. 338, identied one
23 22

M. Mejor On Vasubandhus Prat tyasamutp adavy akhy a

143

29 it is the vefold hindrance (n varan . a). A parallel discussion, in a modied form, is also found in the Abhidharmako l l sa, where it is directed mainly against the Sautr antika master Sr ata (Sr abha) who seems to refer to the Sahetusapratyayasanid ana-s utra as his authority. It is interesting that the so-called ancient Vasubandhu (sthavira Vasubandhu, preceptor of master Manoratha)30 also refers to this text in an attempt to reconciliate its teachings with the Prat tyasamutp ada-s utra. The above discussion is followed by an explanation of the meaning of the word avidy a, according to a sevenfold meaning of the sux na n (P an . ini II.2.6). This is a very interesting issue from the point of view of the history of the grammatical tradition in India. According to the grammarians, the sux na n has four or six dierent meanings.31 Vasubandhu, in his explanation of the word a-vidy a, that which is in opposition to knowledge (*vidy a-virodha),32 refers to a sevenfold grammatical analysis of the meaning of the sux na n. Thus, the negative sux can be used in the sense of absence, dierence, similarity, contempt, smallness, separation, and contrariety.33 A very interesting parallel passage is found in the Rasavai ses a. sya,34 a . ika-bh commentary by Narasim ses utra, a medical text ascribed . ha on the Rasavai . ika-s to N ag arjuna.35 Here, the word aroga is to be understood as a state opposite to illness (rogavipaks a). Vasubandhus . a), i.e., as a state of well-being (svasthat denition of avidy a in the Abhidharmako sa36 and its relation to the six meanings, [viz., similarity, absence, otherness, diminution, impropriety (reproach), and opposition,] has been analyzed by Matilal in his important paper on the Buddhist

*Mah akaus thila-s utra in the Madhyam agama (T 26, No. 211), with its P ali parallel in .. the Majjhima Nik aya (No. 43). Cf. also quotations from the Mah akaus thila-s utra in .. Vasubandhus Karmasiddhiprakaran . a (in Muroji 1985, pp. 33, 35). So far the quotations from PSVy have not been traced in the above mentioned texts (cf. T 26, p. 791a). 29 Cf. BHSD s.v. 30 So Ya somitra, Abhidharmako sa-vy akhy a (Wogihara ed., p. 289.6). The whole question is discussed in Mejor 1991. 31 Durghat narthah ad ucyate : ca. avr . tti, ed. Renou, vol. 1, fasc. 2, p. 31: na . prasang tv aro na narth ah adr sy anyavirodhes a. sye tu . sat rtit ah . : s . . u prasaktasya nivartane | bh . prak . : tats adr syam abh ava s ca tadanyatvam a | apr a sastyam s ca na narth ah . . tadalpat . virodha . sat rtit ah (Bhat ks . . prak . ||. This aphorism is found also in the Sabdakaustubha .t . oji D . ita), the B alamanoram a (V asudeva D ks ac na], cf. Renou, . ita) [here it is ascribed to the pr loc. cit., n. 10. 32 Cf. Ya somitras Abhidharmako sa-vy akhy a (ed. Wogihara, p. 301.5): virodhe na n iti dar sayati |. 33 PSVy, P Tanjur, vol. Chi, fol. 7b5. 34 Ed. Muthuswami, p. 3.1f.: pratis ay a, anyatve, sadr se pi ca | kuts alpavirah arthes api na n . edhe ca satt . . u vipaks . e c bhavet ||. (I am indebted to Prof. A. Wezler for calling my attention to this text). 35 Cf. Filliozat 1979, p. x.; Lindtner 1982, p. 14 n. 30. 36 Avidy a is a dharma (element of reality), a dierent one, which is the opposite (reversal) of vidy a. The negative compound here is to be explained in the manner of amitra (a non-friend) or an-r . ta (untruth), Matilal 1980, p. 161 (see the next footnote).

144

Aspects of Buddhism

concept of avidy a.37 Four meanings of negation are explained in the Arthavini scayat k a:38 small. ness, contempt, opposition, and absence. Here, too, avidy a is to be understood as that which is opposed or contrary to knowledge. Also the Yogas utra-bh a. sya (and Vivaran a ) (on YS II.5) contains a short discussion on the meaning of the word . avidy a,39 as that which is opposed to knowledge. a occupies a considerable space in The discussion explicating the word avidy Vasubandhus PSVyy. It is followed by a long quotation from the S utra, i.e. the *Prat tyasamutp ada-s utra, which contains a denition of avidy a.40 A large number of Sanskrit passages from Vasubandhus PSVy can be traced in V rya sr dattas Arthavini scayanibandhana.41 It can be proven that V rya sr datta made extensive use of both Vasubandhus PSVy as well as Gun amatis t k . . a. In 42 passing, V rya sr dattas adherence to the K a sm ra Vaibh as ikas can be ascertained. . The discussion in Vasubandhus PSVy which then follows contains a reference to an opinion of the dharmav adins and to an opinion of a certain ac arya whom 43 Gun amati identies as Asa nga. . Next comes a long quotation from the Yog ac arabh umi,44 which explains the denition of avidy a, which is known to us from the *Prat tyasamutp adas utra, Nid anasam yukta , N a land a bricks, Br a hmi stone inscription, Arthavini s caya , and . Djakarta golden inscription. Actually the Sarv astiv adin and Yog ac arin denition of avidy a goes back to the formulation found in the Dharmaskandha (ed. Dietz, p. 24) and the Sang tipary aya,45 which are the oldest Sarv astiv ada Abhidharma 46 canonical books. The closing part of the avidy a chapter in Vasubandhus PSVy contains two
Matilal 1980, esp. p. 156f. Matilal refers here to the B alamanoram a. P Tanjur, No. 5852, vol. Jo, fol. 40b7-41a2. Cf. Wayman 1984, esp. p. 201f. 39 nkara-Bhagavatp Pata njala-Yogas utra-Bh as ada, Madras, 1952, . ya Vivaran . am of Sa p. 137.2-3: evam avidy a na pram an an bh avah avipar tam n a. am . , na pram .a . , kim . tu vidy . j n antaram avidy a iti |. 40 Cf. Nid anasam utra: S utra 16.4, ed. Tripathi, from a Turfan Skt. . yukta (Adi-s Ms.): avidy apratyay ah sam sk a r a ity avidy a katam a | yat tat p urv ante aj na nam, apar ante . . aj n anam, etc. Cf. N aland a brick inscription(s) (ed. Chakravarti); Dunhuang Br ahmi stone inscription (ed. V.V. Gokhale); Arthavini scaya-s utra ((i) ed. A. Ferrari, (ii) Samtani); Yogac arabh umi (ed. Bhattacharya); Djakarta golden plate inscr. (ed. de Casparis). avakabh Further cf. the reference in Sr umi (ed. Shukla, p. 382.3-4). 41 Samtani pp. 103.2-110.10. 42 Arthavini scayanibandha (Samtani pp. 104.7-105.1) and Gun t k a . amatis PSVy-. (P vol. Chi. 107a6-7). See also Samtani, Introduction, p. 137. 43 P Chi. 114a4; C Chi. 103a2: slob dpon chad pa ni zhes bya ba ni slob dpon thogs med do ||. 44 Ed. Bhattacharya, pp. 204.2-206.9. Some passages are also traceable in the Arthavini scayanibandhana; cf. Wayman 1984. 45 Ed. V. Stache-Rosen, Berlin 1968, pp. 49; 64. Actually the denition of avidy a is found under the heading of moha; the Sang tipary aya explicitly refers to the Dharmaskandhas formulation. 46 Dietz 1984, p. 16 & n. 10.
38 37

M. Mejor On Vasubandhus Prat tyasamutp adavy akhy a

145

quotations from the *Adi-vi ses aya and the Yog ac arabh u. a-vibhanga-dharma-pary mi. Vasubandhus PSVy is very rich in quotations from dierent sources: Sarv astiv ada-Vaibh as ika, Sautr a ntika, Yog a c a ra; constant reference must be made to the . Abhidharmako sa(bh a. sya), where many of the topics of the PSVy are discussed, and often in a dierent way. According to K. Matsuda, Vasubandhus PSVy represents a Sautr antika position. Here, I would like to call attention to the following topics which, it seems to me, are of interest. First is the question of the text (Ur-text) of the so-called Prat tyasamutp adas utra (please refer to footnote 2). This text is found in several versions in Sanskrit, Tibetan, Chinese, which show (in places) considerable deviation, especially in the denitions of the rst and twelfth members of the prat tyasamutp ada, i.e. avidy a and jar amaran . a, respectively. The text was subject to some modications, which are especially siginicant for the denition of avidy a, given its doctrinal importance. Now, it is interesting to observe that the P ali tradition did not develop a text fully parallel to that of the Sanskrit Prat tyasamutp ada-s utra. Its denition of avidy a (avijj a) is much simpler (vide Dhammasangan . i 390; 1061, 1161). On the other hand, the Sarv astiv ada denition (vide Dharmaskandha) is very elaborate. The Yog ac arins referred to the latter (vide Yog ac arabh umi). The anity of the Buddhist notion of avidy a as m ula-kle sa (main aiction) with that of the Yogas utras (and the Bh a. sya ad YS II.4) is noteworthy.47 Secondly, Vasubandhus quotations from or references to the Yog ac arabh umi and the Sahetusapratyayasanid ana-s utra are of special interest from the doctrinal point of view. The former explains the prat tyasamutp ada under nine headings48 49 (cf. ten headings in the Abhidharmasamuccaya ). The latter develops a concept of avidy a as being conditioned by incorrect judgement (ayoni so-manasik ara), l which is supported by the Sautr antika master Sr ata. Incidentally, the issue becomes more important since the older Vasubandhu is involved in the discussion. The Adi-vi ses utra has been identied by K. Matsuda as a text of . a-vibhanga-s Sautr antika aliation. Thirdly, the sevenfold etymological explanation of the sux na n with reference to the word a-vidy a in Vasubandhus PSVy as well as in Narasim ses . has Rasavai . ika-bh a. sya bears an importance for the history of the Indian grammatical tradition.

Bibliography and Abbreviations

C PSVy SK
47 48

Cone Prat tyasamutp adavy akhy a S am arik a . khyak

It was already noticed by La Vall ee Poussin (LVP 1937). Ed. Bhattacharya, p. 198.14-16. 49 Ed. Pradhan, p. 26.12-15.

146 YBh YS Aramaki 1985 Yog ac arabh umi Yogas utra

Aspects of Buddhism

Aramaki, N., On the Formation of a Short Prose Prat tyasamutp ada S utra, Buddhism and Its Relation to Other Religions. Essays in Honour of Dr. Shozen Kumoi on His Seventieth Birthday. Kyoto, pp. 87-121. Bernhard, F., Zur Interpretation der Prat tyasamutp ada-Formel, WZKS 12/13, 1968-69, pp. 53-63. Casparis, J.G. de A Buddhist text engraved on gold plates, Selected Inscriptions From the 7th to the 9th Century A.D.. Prasasti Indonesia, Masa Baru, Bandung, pp. 47-167; 338-341 (Addenda); 372-395 (Sanskrit index). Chakravarti, N.P. Two Brick Inscriptions from Nalanda, Epigraphia Indica XXI (1931-32), pp. 193-199. Cordier, P. Catalogue du fonds tib etain de la Biblioth` eque Nationale. III. Index du Bstan-h . gyur. (Tib etain 180-332). Paris 1915. Dietz, S. Fragmente des Dharmaskandha, ein Abhidharma-Text in Sanskrit aus Gilgit. G ottingen 1984. Filliozat, J. Yoga sataka. Texte m edical attribu e ` a N ag arjuna. Pondich ery. Frauwallner, E. Geschichte der indischen Philosophie. Vol. 1, Salzburg 1953. Frauwallner, E. Die Philosophie des Buddhismus. Berlin 1956. Gokhale, V.V. Brahmi stone inscription from Tunhuang, Sino-Indian Studies, vol. I:1, pp. 18-22. Iida, Sh. and Matsumoto, Sh. Vasubandhus interpretation of Prat tya-samutp ada- adi, The University of British Columbia, Department of Religious Studies, 63 pp. (Paper prepared for the 188th Meeting of the American Oriental Society, Toronto, April 11-13, 1978.) Jayatilleke, K.N. Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge. London. Jong, J.W. de A propos du Nid anasam . yukta, M elanges de sinologie oerts a M. Paul Demi eville, Paris, vol. II, pp. 137-149. Kalupahana, D.J. Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism. Honolulu.

Bernhard 1968-69 Casparis 1956

Chakravarti 1932 Cordier

Dietz 1984 Filliozat 1979 Frauwallner 1953 Frauwallner 1956 Gokhale 1944 Iida/ Matsumoto 1978

Jayatilleke 1963 de Jong 1974

Kalupahana 1975

M. Mejor On Vasubandhus Prat tyasamutp adavy akhy a Lalou 1953

147

Law 1937 Lindtner 1982

Lalou, M. Les textes bouddhiques au temps du roi Khri-sron-lde-bcan, Journal Asiatique 241:3, pp. 313353. Law, B.C. Formulation of Prat tyasamutp ada, JRAS, April, pp. 287-292. Lindtner, Ch. Nagarjuniana. Studies in the Writings and Philosophy of N ag arjuna. Copenhagen. Indiske Studier 4. e Poussin, L. de LAbhidharmako La Valle sa de Vasubandhu. 6 vols. Paris-Louvain 1923-1931. e Poussin, L. de Th La Valle eorie des douze causes. Gand 1913. e Poussin, L. de Le bouddhisme et le yoga La Valle de Pata njali, M elanges chinois et bouddhiques V (19361937), pp. 223-242. Matilal, B.K. Ignorance or Misconception? - A Note on Avidy a in Buddhism, Buddhist Studies in Honour of Walpola Rahula. London, pp. 154-164. Matsuda, K. Funbetsu-engi-shosh o-h omon-ky o (VVS) Ky ory obu Seshin no Engisetsu [*Adi-vi ses . avibhanga-s utra Theory of Prat tyasamutp ada as Presented by Vasubandhu from the Sautr antika Position], Bukky ogaku semin a [Buddhist Seminar], 1982, No. 36, pp. 40-70. Ky ot o. Matsuda, K. Abhidharmasamuccaya ni okeru j unishi-engi no kaishaku [Interpretation of the twelvefold chain of dependent origination in the Abhidhar masamuccaya], Otani-Daigaku Shinsh u s og okenky ujo Kenky ujo-Kiy o [Annual Memoirs of Otani ShinBuddhist Comprehensive Research Institute], no. 1, pp. 29-50. Ky ot o. Matsuda, K. Vasubandhu ni okeru sankie no kitei to sono oy o, Bukky ogaku semin a [Buddhist Seminar] 39, pp. 96(1)-81(16). (Cf. short English summary in IIJ 28 (1985), p. 319f.: Publications received.) Mejor, M. Vasubandhus Abhidharmako sa and the Commentaries Preserved in the Tanjur. Stuttgart. (Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien 42.) Muroji, G. [Y.] The Tibetan Text of the Karmasiddhiprakaran . a of Vasubandhu with reference to the Abhidharmako sa-bh as tyasamutp ada. ya and the Prat vy akhy a. Ky ot o.

LVP Ko sa LVP Th eorie LVP 1937

Matilal 1980

Matsuda 1982

Matsuda 1983

Matsuda 1984

Mejor 1991

Muroji 1985

148 Muroji 1986

Aspects of Buddhism Muroji, Y. Kusha-Ron, J og o-Ron, Engi-Ky oShaku [On the Abhidharmako sabh as ya, Karmasiddhi. prakaran tyasamutp adavy akhy a], Mikky o . a and the Prat Bunka vol. 156, pp. 53-82. Muroji, Y. Vedan a - und Tr a vibhanga in der .s .n . Prat tyasamutp adavy akhy a, Mikky o Bunka, vol. 173, pp. 74-98. Muroji, Y. Vasubandhus Interpretation des Prat tyasamutp ada. Eine kritische Bearbeitung der Prat tyasamutp adavy akhy a (Sam ara- und Vij n anavibhanga) , . sk Stuttgart. (Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien 43.) Samtani N.H. ed. Arthavivi scaya-s utra and its Commentary. Patna 1971. Schmithausen, L. Beitr age zur Schulzugeh origkeit und Textgeschichte kanonischer und postkanonischer buddhistischer Materialien, Zur Schulzugeh origkeit von Werken der H nay ana-Literatur, ed. by Heinz Bechert, G ottingen, vol. II, pp. 304-406. Tripathi, Ch. F unfundzwanzig S utras des Nid anasam . yukta. Berlin. (Sanskrittexte aus den Turfanfunden VIII.) Tucci, G. A Fragment from the Pratityasamutpada-vyakhya of Vasubandhu, JRAS, pp. 611-623. (= Reprinted in: G. Tucci, Opera Minora, Roma 1971, Part I, 239-248.) Wayman, A. Dependent Origination - The IndoTibetan Tradition, Buddhist Insight, Essays by Alex Wayman, ed. by George Elder, Delhi, pp. 163-192.

Muroji 1990

Muroji 1993

Samtani Schmithausen 1987

Tripathi 1962

Tucci 1930

Wayman 1984

Aspects of Buddhism, Liw, Poland, June 25, 1994

S am an adhikaran . ya in Dign aga, Uddyotakara and Dharmak rti

Michael Torsten Much (Vienna) In the Indian version of the discussion of universals the linguistic phenomenon of s am an adhikaran . ya served as a touchstone for the accuracy of the contentions of the various panelists on the meaning of words. The term s am an adhikaran . ya means literally having the same basis. A modern equivalent for the term is referential identity or co-referentiality, coreference. On the grammatical level the term expresses the fact that two or more words within a syntagma may apply to the same thing. This is supposed to reect a factual level, on which two or more phenomena may occur in the same locus.1 Words having the relation of s am an adhikaran . ya display concordant endings, as for example in the sentence tvam pacasi where the endings -m and -si agree. In the case of declinable words the words stand in apposition, as in n lam utpalam .2 In the latter case they may form a compound, n lotpalam .3 In the context of the discussion of universals it is the case of two or more declinable words standing in apposition that is normally dealt with. In this instance the following questions may be raised: do two words qualify one another (as in n lam utpalam or v rapurus . ah . ), or do they refer together to one referendum (as in kha njakubja )? How is it possible that two or more words refer to the same item? How is referential identity possible? The grammarians discussed referential identity because P an . ini prescribed the rst case only for words conveying their own basic sense.4 In contrast to words
Cf. Cardona 1974, p. 289. (n. 56): Two things or properties ... are sam an adhikaran ana ) locus (adhikaran . a when they occur in the same (sam . a )... If, on the other hand, one considers items qua signiers, two such item are sam an adhikaran . a by virtue of refering to the same thing... 2 yako See e. g. the denition of s am an adhikaran sa (for the sense that . ya in the Nya concerns us here): sa bdik as tu padayor ek arth abhidh ayitvam s am anvibhaktikatvam a, . v yath a n lo ghat lapadaghat am an adhikaran . ah . ityadau n . apadayoh . s . yam, cf. Joshi 1968, p. 148, n. 328: The word sam an adhikaran . a has two meanings: 1. referring to the same object (adhikaran a meaning dravya... ), 2. syntactically agreeing (adhikaran . . a meaning vibhakti , i.e. either case-ending or verbal ending. 3 n See the denition of a karmadh araya compound in Pa . ini 1.2.42: tatpurus . ah . sam an adhikaran ah karmadh a rayah (cf. Cardona 1973a , p. 48). . . . 4 n Pa atipadik arthalingaparim an atre pratham a. Cf. Thieme . ini 2.3.46: pr . avacanam
1

150

Aspects of Buddhism

that are connected by oblique cases, words standing in apposition appear to be unconnected. And since they have dierent objects of reference (asam arthatva ), demand arose for an additional rule providing for the nexus of the seemingly unconnected words in apposition.5 In this contextconsidering the example of v rah . purus rapurus abh as . ah . and the derivation v . ah . the Mah . ya says, if an individual thing is the referendum of the word, then there is no semantic connection; but if a quality is the referendum of the word, then there is semantic connection.6 It is pointed out that the two qualities have a common substratum (ekam . tayor 7 adhikaran . am ). In another passage of the Mah abh as . ya we nd a discussion of the expression 8 kr s n atilaka , black sesame. The question is raised as to which of the two words .. . kr s n a and tilaka is the main word ( pradh a na ) that is qualied and which one is .. . the secondary word that is the qualier (vi ses . aka ). Regarding this question the following statements are made: [1.] And where is there any doubt, where both are words for qualities (gun sabda )? E.g. lame-humpbacked [or] humpbacked-lame. [2.] On the other . a hand, where the one is a substance (dravya ) and the other one a quality (gun . a ), there the substance is the pradh ana . ... Certainly one expects ( ak anks . ati ) a substance having this quality. [3.] In what way then are such two main words (as) vr sim sap a applied simultaneously to one object? For these two it is not . ks . ah . . necessary to apply (them) together, for there is no sim sap a that is not a tree.9 . The term s am an adhikaran . ya is not mentioned here, but it is clear that according to this paragraph an adjective and a substantive stand in apposition, the former qualifying the latter. Two adjectives may stand in apposition, and it seems to follow from this paragraph that they together cause expectancy, the desire to learn about the main word, the substantive, they refer to, just as a single adjective does. Of two main words, nally, it is said, that there is no necessity of using them together.10 11 In contrast to this, we nd in Bhartr . hari the opinion that in an adjective1956, pp. 1-4, and Cardona 1974, p. 287f. (n. 42). 5 n V arttika 20 ad Pa an adhikaran pasam anam asam arthatv at. . ini 2.1.1.: sam . es .u . khy 6 MBh ad V arttika 21: yadi dravyam artho na bhavati s amarthyam. atha hi gun . pad . ah . pad artho bhavati tad a s amarthyam. 7 For a translation of the whole passage see Joshi 1968, p. 148., (cf. the review of Cardona 1973b, pp. 229-231, 235). Cf. also the explanation of the relation abheda , the semantic counterpart of coreference (s am an adhikaran . ya ), Cardona 1974, pp. 247-250. 8 n MBh ad Pa ini 2.1.57, 399.12-26 (translated in Joshi-Roodbergen 1971, p. 139f.). . 9 sa c api kva sam sabdau. tadyath a kubjakha njah njakubja . dehah . , yatrobhau gun . a . kha iti. yatra hi anyattarad dravyam anyataro gun anam ... . ah . , tatra yad dravyam, tat pradh ava syam ak anks . ati. katham mau dvau pradh ana sabd av eka. tadgun . am . dravyam . tarh sminn arthe yugapad avarudhyete vr ks ah s im s apeti. naitayor a va s yakah sam a ve sah . . . . . . , na hy avr sim sap asti. . ks . ah . . 10 One wonders: certainly there are no sim sap a s that are not trees, but are there not . trees that are no sim sap a s? . 11 Cf. Kapila Deva Sastri 1964, p. 42.

aga, Uddyotakara and Dharmak rti T.Much S am an adhikaran . ya in Dign

151

substantive phrase like kr sn .. . ah . tilah . the adjective is not considered as qualifying the substantive: Necessarily two words denoting a quality (gun . a ) and a qualied (gun . in ) have dierent case endings. For two substance-words referential identity is established [8]. The word kr sn .. . a is applied to a substance of which the universal is undetermined, and the word tila just occurs for something of which the quality is undetermined [9].12 Since the s am anyas are [mutually] unconnected, two words express the particular. They cannot show the particular [alone] because of their common nature [of being general terms] [10].13 14 Dign aga (PS p urvapaks . a) Dign aga opens the fth chapter of his Pram an . asamuccaya with the well known verse: Word ( sabda ) is not a means of valid cognition dierent from inference, it indicates its own object of reference through preclusion of other [objects of reference] in the same way as [the logical reason] producedness etc.15 Thus he claims the preclusion of others (any apoha ) as the referendum of words. He proceeds to refute the traditonally assumed referenda, viz. the particular (bheda ), the universal (j ati ), the relation (yoga , sambandha ) (between universal and the particular, its instantiation) and the instantiation (tadvat ). One argument against the universal, the relation and the instantiation is that for such referenda referential identity would be impossible. To begin with, the universal cannot be the referendum of words,16 because referential identity would not be explicable. If in a common string of words such as sad dravyam the word sad referred to a universal, one would have to understand satt a dravyam (in the last consequence even satt a dravyat a ). This is a logically and grammatically impossible construction. (The notions just stand side by side
12 Helar aja explains that the word kr sn .. . a applies to the substance because non-dierence is ascribed to the thing (abhedopac ara ) or, because the possessive sux of the word kr sn .. .a had been dropped matuplopa . (abhedopac ar an matuplop ad v a kr s n a s abdo dravye vartate. ) .. . 13 VP 3.14.8-10: vibhaktibhedo niyam ad gun am an adhikaran . agun . yabhidhayinoh . | s . yasya dravya sabdayoh na taj at ye kr sn sabdah na tagun . ||8 || dravye nij .. . a . prayujyate | anij . e caiva tila sabdah am any an am asam at tau vi ses . pravartate ||9 || s . bandh . em . vyavasthitau | r up abhed at vi ses saknutah . am tam abhivyanktum . na . ||10 || But see VP 3.14.24-25 for n a dierent opinion (apparently in accordance with MBh ad Pa . ini 2.1.57). 14 At this point I would like to thank Ole H. Pind, Kopenhagen, for his support in the study of Dign aga. 15 PS V 1: na pram an ntaram sabdam anum an at tath a hi sah adivat sv artham .a . . | kr . takatv any apohena bh a. sate || For this and the following quotes from PS V cf. the annotated translation of Richard Hayes (Hayes 1988, chapter seven, 252-308). 16 See PS V 2cd and PSV. Dign aga here deals with j ati sabdas, but his explanations are valid for all classes of words he accepts. These are mentioned PSV ad PS I 3d: yadr a sabda, j ati sabda, gun sabda, kriy a sabda, dravya sabda (see Hattori 1968, pp. 25, . cch . a 83f., cf. Hayes 1988, p. 203).

152

Aspects of Buddhism

such as cow and horse.17 ) If one speaks of the universal satt a , one can only formulate satt a dravyasya , since satt a is predicable only of something which shows a genitive ending, but does not stand in apposition to satt a . In support of the argument the mentioned verse of Bhartr . hari is quoted: Necessarily two words denoting a quality (gun . a ) and a qualied (gun . in ) have dierent case endings. For two substance-words referential identity is established.18 The same argument19 holds for the relation as referendum. If the word sad referred to a relation, the string sad dravyam would be impossible, sad and dravyam could not stand in apposition, because a relation is predicable only of something (dravyasya ). The instantiation cannot be the referendum, because in this case the word sad would not refer directly to its own object of reference, but would refer indirectly to an object that is connected with the universal satt a. Again referential identity would be impossible, because one quality does not implicitly refer to another quality.20 And nally, if two words standing in apposition had a particular as their object of reference, the two words would become synonyms.21

Dign aga: PS siddh anta (PS V 14-16, 17-20, 30)

Dign agas statement of his own ideas on referential identity is found in PS and PSV V 14 to 20 and PS V 30. In 14-15a-c Dign aga says: [Two words like e. g. blue and lotus] that have dierent objects of reference are incapable of indicating the particulars of their own reference, because they have dierent objects of preclusion. But they are qualier and qualied [respectively], because they are of uniform eect for a single [object of reference] (14). It is neither blue in isolation, nor lotus in isolation, because it is the aggregate that is the denotated object (15a-c).22 This is to say, two words may be considered to apply to one
17 Cf. PSVK 125.16-19 (PSVV 124.16-18): gal te rta dang ba lang dag tha dad pai spyi mngon par gsal bar byed pai phyir gzhi mthun pa yod pa ma yin no || de bzhin du u tpa la yang yod pa n id dang rdzas n id la sogs pa mngon par gsal bar byed pa n id du mthong ba yin no|| If [one accepts that] horse and cow are without coreference, because they manifest dierent universals, one sees in the same way that the lotos manifests [the dierent universals] being, thingness etc. 18 VP 3.14.8 (see n. 13.) in PSVV 106.33., not to be found in PSVK . 19 See PS V 2cd with PSV. 20 See PS V 4a with PSV: tadvato n asvatantratv at |(4a) tath a ca sacchabdo j atisvar upopasarjanam aha na s aks ad iti tadgataghat dibhed an aks ad atabhedatve . dravyam . .a . ep s am an adhikaran abh avah . y .. 21 PSVV 120.14f.: gal te g nis ka yang bye brag gi don du yin na ni rnam grangs pai sgra gyur te | 22 apohyabhed ad bhinn arth ah arthabhedagatau jad ah . sv . .| ekatr abhinnak aryatv ad vi ses ses ah . an . avi . yak . ||14 || na hi kevalam lam . n . na ca kevala utpalam | samud ay abhidheyatv at ||15a-c ||

aga, Uddyotakara and Dharmak rti T.Much S am an adhikaran . ya in Dign

153

thing, because they undergo an integrating semantic operation (abhinnak aryatv at ), and because it is an aggregate that is expressed (samuday abhidheyatv at ). There is no question of which of the words is the qualied main word and which the qualifying secondary. Both give rise to expectancy regarding their particulars. They stand in a mutual qualier-qualied relation. And this is only possible because words do not designate their objects of reference, and because they do not preclude them.23 If a word like sad designates in a direct armative way its referendum, (especially if the word refers to a real entity that is a universal etc.), it designates just that: it does not imply particulars like ghat . a . Since the word is conned to its referendum, it even rejects them. But, if preclusion is the referendum of the word sad, only asad is precluded. In the domain that is not precluded, room is left to speak of particulars such as pots etc.24 In another paragraph Dign aga discusses the referential identity of two or more words that do not qualify each other, but refer to a common substratum. In the PS s am an adhikaran . ya always means the relation of referring in a certain context to the same thing, for narrower terms, however, their relation of having the same locus needs explanation. The question is raised how narrower terms (bheda sabda ) as words for qualities like sweet, sticky etc. that preclude the referenda of other narrower terms, (i.e. words that would not normally qualify each other), can stand in apposition. The answer is: for those qualities that may have the same locus (for adjectives standing in apposition) there is no contradiction to a common substratum, since they [also separately] occur in (are applicable to) one and the same substance.25 Dign aga thinks in terms of a hierarchical tree of concepts, similar to the Vai ses ikas hierarchy of universals.26 . Finally, one has to bear in mind that for Dign aga the distinction between property and property-bearer is only a mental construction.27 A universal such as the condition of colour (r upatva ) is not dierent from the colours (r upa ) blue etc.
See PS V 18b2 and PSV. Cf. also the statement in PSV ad PS V 4ab: If there is no pervasion, there is no referential identity. (PSVK 109.9f.: khyab pa yod pa ma yin pa la ni gzhi mthun pa yod pa ma yin te ...) This does not mean that two terms have to be in the relation of pervader and pervaded. Obviously there is no such relation between blue and lotus. But a term like lotus must encompass particulars like blue lotuses. This is possible if the term lotus precludes that what is not a lotus, but is not possible (as argued in PS V 4ab plus PSV) lotus designates an instantiation of lotushood. Cf. also PS V 36 (Hayes 1988, p. 299). 25 PSV V 30: gang zhig gzhi mthun gyur pa ste | yon tan dang ni yon tan gzhan | de rdzas gcig la jug pai phyir | gzhi yis mi gal bar byas n id | PSK V 30: yon tan yon tan gzhan dang ni | gzhi mthun pa ni gang yin pa | de ni rdzas gcig la jug phyir | rten gyis mi gal ba med pa n id | 26 For the rules governing the dierent possibilities of exclusion and implication see Katsura 1979, pp. 493-491. 27 Cf. sarvam ev ayam anum an anumeyavyavah aro buddhy ar ud . henaiva dharmadharmibhedena na bahih aga in . sadasattam apeks . ate . This fragment is ascribed to Dign Frauwallner 1959, pp. 104, 163.
24 23

154

Aspects of Buddhism

The usage of words like r upatva and r upa is just a convention (laukikavyavah ara ).28

Dign agas critic Uddyotakara29

For Uddyotakara the objects of reference of words are particulars (vyakti ), uni30 versals (j ati ), and forms ( akr . ti ). One must mention in addition that it is not the particular as such that is the object of a word, but the particular as qualied by a universal.31 In a given utterance one of the three is consideredaccording to an intentionas the principal (pradh ana ) or the secondary (anga , upasarjana ) meaning.32 The objects of the reference of words are regarded as realia. Therefore, s am an adhikaran . ya in this context may also mean referential identity, reference to one thing, but it must be understood in the sense of having the same locus. Uddyotakara accuses Dign aga of not understanding the concept of s am an adhikaran agas opinion that referential identity is impossible if . ya. He rejects Dign universals are the referenda of words. In Uddyotakaras opinion s am an adhikaran ana and what is upasarjana. If dravya is . ya is a matter of deciding what is pradh considered as pradh ana, as something that realizes (s adhana ) Being (satt a ), there is a relation of qualier and qualied. The words sad and dravyam can be put in apposition because they have one and the same object (ekavis at ).33 If Being . ayatv is considered as pradh ana, there is no referential identity. One would formulate satt a dravyasya .34 In discussing instantiations as referenda the same reason for s am an adhikaran . ya is brought forward: the words sad and dravyam can be put in apposition, because they have one and the same object (ekavis at ). In accordance with . ayatv the Ny aya-Vai ses . ika hierarchy of universals it is added that sad implies dravya, 35 gun . a etc. The point is made that it is a contradiction to speak of s am an adhikaran . ya, if words are considered not to refer to particulars (bheda sabda ).36 Further, Uddyotakara asks: Is preclusion something separate from the cow or not? If it is separate, is it connected to the cow or not? If preclusion is separate and connected, it can be understood only as something which qualies the cow. Then the word cow designates a quality, and sentences such as the cow
See PS V 37-38ab and PSV, pointed out by Katsura 1979, p. 490. For Uddyotakaras critique of apoha see Hattori 1979, 1989; Much 1994. 30 NS 2.2.66.: vyakty akr atayas tu pad arthah . tij .. 31 See NBh 662.5f.: na dravyam atram avi sis tam atya vin abhidh yate, kim .. . j . tarhi j ativi sis tam ; and NV 676.10f.: asmakam an avi ses any abhi.. . tu dravyagun . akarm . i satt . an . dh yante . 32 See NV 671.8-672.1. 33 NV 675.11f. (see also NV 677.10): ... yuktam am an adhikaran . s . yam ubhayoh . saddravya sabdayor ekavis at. . ayatv 34 See NV 675.8-676.15 and NV 676.2-4 ad PS V 2cd against universals and relation (cf. Much 1994, p. 357f.). 35 NV 677.8-678.5 ad PS against instantiation, cf. Much 1994, p. 359. 36 See NV 677.5.(cf. Much 1994, p. 359), and NV 680.19-686.6 (cf. Much 1994, p. 360).
29 28

aga, Uddyotakara and Dharmak rti T.Much S am an adhikaran . ya in Dign

155

stands become nonsensical, because referential identity is not possible between the adjective and the verb. If preclusion is not connected to the cow, in what then consists the connection that is visible in expressions such as the preclusion of the cow? If at last the preclusion is not something that is dierent from the cow, nothing at all is gained by introducing the notion preclusion.37 Finally, the view that two words standing in apposition qualify each other is criticized once more. It is said that, for two words standing in apposition, in order to establish a relation of qualier and qualied, it has to be decided which word is regarded as pradh ana.38 This is not a problem for those who establish the objects of words in an armative way. Substance is qualied by universals and qualities. The apohav adin is accused of being unable to point to an object of referential identity.39 Thus, Uddyotakara can never see the question of referential identity eye to eye with Dign aga. The positions are quite contrary: the Buddhists hold that words are mental constructions whose referenda are the preclusions of other objects of reference, and that referential identity is only possible in the realm of an exclusively mentally dierentiated object for which preclusions do not preclude each other. The Naiy ayikas on the other hand think in terms of concrete entities, which are refered to by words. Referential identity is the result of entities residing in the same place. Since the grammatical tradition does not generally agree on the point of s am an adhikaran . ya, both sides can claim to be in accordance with grammar.

Dharmak rti
The question of s am an adhikaran . ya (and the question of the import of words in general) can also be seen from the angle of the status of abstract terms. And for Dharmak rti this is the important perspective. Dharmak rti does not repeat Dign agas treatment of s am an adhikaran . ya, but concentrates on discussing the preclusion 40 (apoha, vy avr avr . tti ) and the precluded (apod . ha, vy . tta). Words are traditionally classied according to their instigating phenomena 41 (pravr . ttinimitta ), the grounds for application. So one may say, e. g., that the word go is a j ati sabda , because it is occasioned by the j ati gotva .42 But for the
See NV 688.2-6 (cf. Much 1994, p. 361). n Uddyotakara follows here Pa urvam ) when he says that in . ini 2.2.30 (upasarjanam . p a compound like n lotpalam the rst member qualies the second. 39 See NV 688.16-689.9 (cf. Much 1994, p. 362). 40 For an explication of reality and concept in Dharmak rti see Steinkellner 1971; for apoha, vy avr avr . tti and apod . ha, vy . tta see Akamatsu 1986. 41 n See MBh ad Pa utra 2: gauh sukla s calo D aga in . ini Sivas . . itthah . . Similarly Dign PSV ad PS I 3d: yadr a sabda, j ati sabda, gun sabda, kriy a sabda, dravya sabda (cf. above . cch . a n. 16). 42 The word go is a j ati sabda for Naiy ayikas and Buddhists alike. In modern linguistics go will be classied as a general concrete term. The word gotva is a derivative of go. This form, a single abstract term, is not classied as a basic kind of word. Then, what is a bheda sabda ? For Dign aga it apparently means the same as j ati sabda, but refers to items of rather smaller extensions (like colours, cf. PS V 30). Uddyotakara uses the term bheda sabda; it seems to emphasize that in a certain context (like referential identity)
38 37

156

Aspects of Buddhism

Buddhist there are no universals. Therefore they cannot occasion words. So what is behind expressions like go and gotva ? Dharmak rti holds that these word forms, go and gotva, are conventionally agreed upon. The reason for this convention is the following: If it is intended to communicate something without wanting to take into consideration further preclusions, a word for a preclusion, dierence, is used that is provided with the sux -tva or -t a, and that stands for a property. If it is intended to communicate something without wanting to neglect further preclusions, a word for something which is precluded, dierentiated, is used that is not provided with the sux -tva or -t a, and that stands for a property-bearer. In the rst case there is no referential identity, because the dierence that consists just in gotva does not appear to be identical with a property-bearer. And there is no qualier-qualied relation, because further properties are excluded. In the second case there is referential identity, because a property-bearer that is dierentiated by dierent properties that stand side by side and preclude each other appears in the cognition as one. And there is a qualier-qualied relation, because it is intended to cognize further preclusions. This distinction of preclusion and precluded (gotva and go) shows the two sides of the coin, it is not found in the thing itself. They are not distinct entities like the s am anya and the vyakti of the Naiy ayikas. Dharmak rti says: Only for this reason in the rst instance [in the case of gotva etc.] there is no referential identity nor a qualier-qualied relation, because the word occurs precluding other properties. [E. g. in the sentence] The cowness of this is white [there is no referential identity], because on account of the property that consists in this [cowness] only, the cognition that is based on the [cowness] does not appear as identical with [the property-bearer]. And [there is no qualier-qualied relation], because it is not intended [to cognize other properties]. In the second instance [in the case of a property-bearer as go], however there is [referential identity], because on account of presenting a word in accordance with convention the [property-bearer], which is dierentiated by properties that occur side by side and exclude each other, appears [in the cognition] as one. And [there is a qualier-qualied relation], because one wishes [to learn about] further exclusions. Only this is the dierence in every instance between words that denote a thing or a property. With the denoted there is no dierence whatsoever [k. 64].43
words refer to particulars (n lam utpalam ). Both j ati sabda and bheda sabda are concrete general terms. 43 PVSV 33.14-21 plus PV I 64: ata eva p urvatra pratiks antaratv ac sabdavr . iptabhed . tter na s am an adhikaran ses ses avo v a. gotvam asya suklam iti tanm atravi se. yam . vi . an . avi . yabh s en a buddhes tad a s rayabh u t a y a ekatvena nir a k a nks atv a c ca. dvit ye tu bhavati. tath a . . . sam anus aren agavata ekasya iva sam sa. ket . a sam . hr . tasakalavyavacchedadharmair vibh . dar nena pratibh asan at, vyavacched antaras ak anks . atv ac ca. bhedo ayam eva sarvatra dravyabh av abhidh ayinoh . | sabdayor na tayor v acye vi ses as tena ka s cana || 64 || .

aga, Uddyotakara and Dharmak rti T.Much S am an adhikaran . ya in Dign

157

Dharmak rti argues repeatedly that the assumption of a universal as an existing reality is untenable,44 and that referential identity under this assumption is impossible.45 Dign aga had said that it is an aggregate that is expressed (samud ay abhidheyatva ) by words standing in apposition. Dharmak rti explains that the image appearing in the cognition is homogeneous. An aspect of this image, and further aspects of this image, are determined by concepts and words only on account of an intention or interest. The [image appears in the cognition] as homogeneous, also if one aspect is made the object [e. g. blue] and another aspect is not ascertained. A further aspect [e. g. lotos] is grasped by a [conceptual] cognition only on account of an intention. But also when dierent objects of words are brought together, (the image) appears as homogeneous in the cognition. For this reason there is neither a contradiction in a common character, a qualier-qualied relation, and coreference insofar these are conceptual, nor in the distinction of property and property-bearer with regard to the (image). If it is possible to distinguish several objects (and) if it is intendend to ascertain or negate the dierentiation from another object with respect to an (image), one shows just this thing [either] as an seemingly (iva ) isolated property expressing (it) with a property-word that has further distinctions excluded, because this is the way it appears in [conceptual] cognition; [or] postulating its further essence in terms of a property-bearer without (other) dierentiations. And because insofar property and property-bearer are dierent, cognition appears as seemingly equipped with dierences, [but cognition does not appear this way] on account of a dierence in the thing...46 Thus referential identity does not simply reect a state of realia like dravyas, gun a . s etc. It is a mental construct. So what is the instigating phenomenon (pravr . ttinimitta ) for the usage of words? It is the ecacy of things. Things are dierentiated according to their ecacy. Similar ecacy causes similar judgment. This leadstogether with the mental residues (vasan a ) and conventionto the formation of concepts and words. The term s am an adhikaran rti in the apoha -part of . ya is mentioned by Dharmak the Pram an av a rttikasvavr tti several times in discussing universals and the mental . . image. But, without mention of the term, a large part of his writings is devoted to the question of how two terms apply to one thing. These are the problems of perCf. also PVSV 42.12-43.18, PV I 80-81, PV I 133-135. For a translation of the arguments in PVSV see Vetter 1964, pp. 98-110. 45 Cf. PVSV 34.25-35.4, 42.12-43.18, 65.19-66.1. 46 See PVSV 44.2-12: tadabhinnam ek ak aravis karan scit any ak aram . ay . e apy ani ak ar antaras ak anks . abuddhigr ahyam sabd arthopasam are apy abhinnam . bhinna . h . buddhau pratibh ati iti s am anyavi ses ses avas am an adhikaran ani yath aprat ti na virudhya. an . avi . yabh . y nte, dharmadharmibhedo apy asya. anek arthabhedasam bhave tadek a rthabhedavidhiprati. sedhajij na s ay am antaren sabdena sam . . tad eva vastu pratiks . iptabhed . a dharma . codya buddhes tath apratibh asan ad vyatiriktam ses avam . dharmam iva avi . en . a aparam asya svabh . dharmitay a vyavasth apya pradar syate. t avat a ca am sena dharmadharmin ad bhedavat . . or bhed iva buddhih pratibh a ti, na vastubhed a t ... .
44

158

Aspects of Buddhism

vasion (vy apti), the reason that is an essence (svabh avahetu ), identity (tad atmya ), preclusion (apoha ) as the import of words etc. But these are beyond the scope of this paper.

Abbreviations and Bibliography

NBh NV Ny ayabh a. sya (Paks amin): see NV. . ilasv Ny ayav arttika (Udyyotakara): Ny ayadar sanam Bh asya-V arttika-T atparyat k a-sahitam . Vol. 1 ed. Tarana. . tha Nyayatarkatirtha, Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha. Calcutta 1936 (Calcutta Sanskrit Series 28). Vol. 2 ed. Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha, Hemantakumar Tarkatirtha. Calcutta 1944 (Calcutta Sanskrit Series 29). Reprint Kyoto 1982 (Rinsen Sanskrit Text Series). Ny ayas utra: See NV. P an Herausgegeben, u bersetzt, . inis Grammatik . erl autert und mit verschiedenen Indices versehen von Otto B ohtlingk. Leipzig 1887. Nachdruck Hildesheim 1964. Pram an aga, P 5700. . asamuccaya of Dign Pram an aga): The Pram an . asamuccaya (Dign . asamucayavr tti of Dign a ga. With Jinendrabuddhis Commen. tary. Chapter Five: Any apoha-par ks a . Tibetan Text . with Sanskrit Fragments. Ed. by Masaaki Hattori. Memoirs of the Faculty of Letters, Kyoto University , 21, 1982, pp. 103-224. Pram an (Dign aga), transla. asamuccaya tion by Kanakavarman and Dad pai ses rab: in PS V. Pram an . asamuccaya (Dign aga), translation by Vasudhararaks . ita and Seng rgyal: in PS V. Pram an aga): in PS V. . asamuccayavr . tti (Dign Pram an aga), translation by . asamuccayavr . tti (Dign Kanakavarman and Dad pai ses rab: in PS V. Pram an aga), translation by . asamuccayavr . tti (Dign Vasudhararaks . ita and Seng rgyal: in PS V. Pram an arttika of Dharmak rti . av Pram an arttikasvavr rti): Raniero Gnoli, . av . tti (Dharmak The Pram an arttikam of Dharmak rti . The First . av Chapter with the Autocommentary. Text and Critical Notes. Roma 1960 (Serie Orientale Roma 23).

NS n Pa . ini

PS PS V

PSK V

PSV V

PSV PSVK PSVV PV PVSV

aga, Uddyotakara and Dharmak rti T.Much S am an adhikaran . ya in Dign MBh

159

VP

Akamatsu 1986

Cardona 1969-70

Cardona 1973a

Cardona 1973b

Cardona 1974 Frauwallner 1959 Hattori 1968

Hattori 1979

Hattori 1980 Hayes 1988 Joshi 1968

The Vy akaran abh a. sya of Pata njali . Ed. F. Kiel. a=Mah horn. Third edition ... by K. V. Abhyankar. [3 Bde.] Poona 1962-1972. V akyapad ya of Bhartr rn a sa . hari with the Prak . aprak of Hel ar aja . K an d a III, Part ii. Critically ed. by .. K.A. Subramania Iyer. Poona 1973. Akamatsu Akihiko: Vidhiv adin et Pratis adin: . edhav Double aspect pr` esent` e par la th` eorie s` emantique du bouddhisme indien. Zinbun 21, pp. 67-89. George Cardona, review of: J.F. Staal, Word Order in Sanskrit and Universal Grammar. Dordrecht 1967. IIJ 12, pp. 232-239. George Cardona, review of: Sumitra Mangesh Katre, Dictionary of P an . ini. Poona 1968-1969. IIJ 15, pp. 4356. George Cardona, A New Translation of the Mah abh as . ya. OLZ 67, 5/6, pp. 229-238. George Cardona, P aninis K arakas: Agency, Animation and Identity. JIPh 2, pp. 231-306. Erich Frauwallner, Dign aga sein Werk und seine Entwicklung. WZKSO 3, pp. 83-164. Hattori Masaaki, Dign aga, On Perception , being the Pratyaks apariccheda of Dign agas Pram an . . asamuccaya from the Sanskrit fragments and the Tibetan versions, translated and annotated. Cambridge, Mass. (Harvard Oriental Series 47). Hattori Masaaki, Uddyotakara ni hihan sareru apoha ron. In: Ito Shin oj Taraka Junsh o kyoj u sh oku kinen Bukky ogaku ronibun sh u . T oky o, pp. 117-131. Hattori, Masaaki, Ny ayav arttika, II.2.66 ni okeru Apoha-ron hihan. Mikky o-gaku 16, pp. 15-30. Richard P. Hayes, Dign aga on the Interpretation of Signs. Dordrecht (Studies of Classical India 9). Pata njalis Vy akaran abh a. sya samarth ahnika (P. . a-mah 2.1.1) , Edited with Translation and Explanatory Notes by S. D. Joshi. Poona 1968 (Publications of the Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit, Class C, No. 3). Pata njalis Vy akaran abh a. sya karmadh aray ahnika . a-mah (P. 2.1.51-2.1.72) , Edited with Translation and Explanatory Notes by S.D. Joshi and J A.F. Roodbergen. Poona 1968, (Publications of the Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit, Class C, No. 6).

Joshi-Roodbergen 1971

160 Kapila Deva Sastri 1964 Katsura 1979 Much 1994 yako Nya sa

Aspects of Buddhism Kapila Deva Sastri, Bhartr . haris Discussion on s am an adhikaran ya. ALB 38, pp. 41-54. . Katsura, Shoryu, The Apoha Theory of Dign aga. Indogaku Bukky ogaku Kenky u 28/1, 493-489. M.T. Much, Uddyotakaras Kritik der apoha-Lehre (Ny ayav arttika ad NS 2.2.66). WZKS 38, pp. 351-366. Ny ayako sa, or Dictionary of Technical Terms of Indian Philosophy, by Bh m ac arya Jhalak kar, revised and re-edited by V asudev Sh astr Abhyankar. Poona 1978 (Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series 44). Ernst Steinkellner, Wirklichkeit und Begri bei Dharmak rti. WZKS 15, pp. 179-211. Paul Thieme, P an an yas. JAOS 76, . ini and the P . in pp. 1-23. Vetter, Tilmann, Erkenntnisprobleme bei Dharmak rti . Wien.

Steinkellner 1971 Thieme 1956 Vetter 1964

Aspects of Buddhism, Liw, Poland, June 25, 1994

Dharmak rti on prasiddha and yogyat a1

Tom J.F. Tillemans (Lausanne)

In the last few years there has been a growing tendency to make a separation between Dign agas thought and that of Dharmak rti. This has probably been, on the whole, a good thing, and was arguably long overdue in that for too long we did see the two in an almost interchangeable perspective and thus disregarded virtually all historical evolution. Indeed, in order to understand Dharmak rti as presenting a particularly sophisticated and profound interpretation of Dign aga, we need to know about the real dierences which he introduced in numerous areas of Dign agas philosophy. Some important points of dierence are becoming clearer, such as Dharmak rtis development of the idea of svabh avapratibandha (natural relations), ni scaya (certainty, necessity), and in general his signicantly transforming the looser, inductive Dign agean logic into a more rigid deductive system, changes which, at least for some of us, might even seem to be an improvement at any rate, for better or for worse, they eliminate some baroque complexities in Dign aga. There are also some (unconvincing) examples of would-be negative changes, such as Dharmak rti supposedly misrepresenting Dign agas scepticism about scripture and perverting the latters open and neutral philosophy into a Buddhist dogmatic edice. One area which we personally have begun to investigate is how Dharmak rti treated Dign agas denition of the thesis

This article results from research done during a project nanced by the Fonds national suisse de la recherche scientique. I have beneted from a recent article in Japanese by M. Inami, Dharmak rti no paks abh asa setsu prat tinir akr . . ta no baai, which discusses the argumentation in this section of PV IV. I have also beneted from discussions with V. Eltschinger.

162

Aspects of Buddhism

in Pram an ayamukha (NM).2 In an earlier article3 , . asamuccaya (PS) III and Ny we discussed Dharmak rtis version of the phrase svayam is ta (intended/accepted .. by the [proponent] himself) in this denition, and tried to show what seems to have been a complex dialectic between Dharmak rti and I svarasena on the question as to whether a proponent was not only bound to accept the thesis which he himself advanced, but also everything which the treatises of his school might have said on the matter in question. We will now turn to Dharmak rtis treatment of prasiddha, viz. the principle that a valid thesis should not be opposed by what is commonly recognized (prasiddha). We shall try to show that Dharmak rti, in Pram an arttika (PV) IV, used this apparently banal idea in Dign aga for quite . av a dierent purpose than Dign aga had probably ever intended. In particular, he used the clause about prasiddha in PS III, k. 2 and the explanation of this passage in Dign agas Pram an aga had a certain . asamuccayavr . tti, to show that Dign theory about the tness (yogyat a) of words to designate their objects, the result being that in this way Dharmak rti was able to create antecedents in Dign agas philosophy for his own anti-M m am . saka polemic.

The critique of the M m am . sakas and other realists

Repeatedly, in the last sections of Pram an arttika (PV) I, in PV IV (k. 109-130), . av and in Pram an scaya (PVin) II, we nd the following semantical principle in . avini Dharmak rtis logic: I. Words do not have any naturally determined signication, or any naturally existent (svabh avika) relation (sam . bandha) with their objects, so that a cer ) a certain object and not another. To tain word would designate (abhi-DHA put it in another way, words do not have any intrinsic tness (yogyat a) to designate just one thing and not another. This is supplemented by another fundamental principle found throughout Dharmak rtis philosophy of language:
For the sake of convenience, here is the k arik a in question in Pram an . asamuccaya, viz. PS III, k. 2: svar upen syah to nir akr rth anum a. aiva nirde . svayam is .. . tah . | pratyaks .a n aptaprasiddhena svadharmin ta ) by [the . i || [A valid thesis] is one which is intended (is .. proponent] himself (svayam ) as something to be stated (nirde sya) according to its essence alone (svar upen adhya ]; [and] with regard to [the proponents] own sub. aiva) [i.e. as a s ject (svadharmin), it is not opposed (anir akr artha), by . ta) by perceptible objects (pratyaks . inference (anum ana), by authorities (a pta), or by what is commonly recognized (prasiddha). PS Tib.: rang gi ngo bo kho nar bstan || bdag dod rang gi chos can la || mngon sum don dang rjes dpag dang || yid ches grags pas ma bsal bao ||. Skt. of svar upen . aiva ... nir akr rtis Ny ayabindu (NB) III, 38. The restitution . tah . is to be found in Dharmak of PS III, k. 2 follows Frauwallner 1957, p. 885; see also van Bijlert 1989, p. 72. Cf. NM, k. 1: svayam adhyatvenepsitah arth anir akr . s . paks . o viruddh . tah . | The thesis is what is intended by [the proponent] himself as the s adhya [and] is not opposed by contradicting states of aairs. See the edition and translation of NM in Katsura 1977, p. 109. 3 See Tillemans 1994.
2

T.J.F. Tillemans Dharmak rti on prasiddha and yogyat a

163

II. Words designate primarily mentally created ctions. Real objects (i.e. particulars, svalaks . an . a) are ineable. Corrollaries of I and II: The designatum (abhidheya; v acya) being a ction, the relation and tness between a word and its object are also mentally created ctions. As a result, this relation can be as one wishes: any word can, if one so wishes, designate any thing: the tness of words ( sabdayogyat a) is unrestricted by any ontological factors. The relation between word and object is thus established purely by vivaks a (speech intention). . Now, the adversaries being refuted by principle I are various non-Buddhist philosophers who held that words have a permanent relation with their meaning and that this relation is somehow not dependent on anything else (e.g. man, God, etc.), but is an uncreated, inherent fact belonging to the nature of the words and things. As the underlying theme motivating adoption of such a semantic theory was invariably to explain Vedic language as not subject to human creation and hence to human error, it is not surprising, then, that Dharmak rti and his commentators found it necessary to refute this position in extenso in order to be able to trivialize Vedic language as having no special authority whatsoever. Indeed, the polemical anti-Vedic thrust of the debate is brought out in full force when Dharmak rti and his commentators argue that the words One who desires heaven should oer the agnihotra sacrice are equally t (yogya) to mean One should eat dog-meat, etc. ( svam am adi), for, following Dharmak rti, there is . sabhaks . an . nothing innate in the words of the injunction agnihotram at svargak amah . juhuy . which would preclude that it could also very well be a provocative, indeed oensive, anathematism against Vedic religion.4 The stakes are therefore quite clear, and the debate is by no means insignicant. In Pram an arttika I and Pram an scaya II, the adversary is portrayed by . av . avini the commentators and by Dharmak rti himself as being a M m am . saka, one whose fundamental position is as found in the well-known formulation of M m am as utra . s I.1.5: autpattikas tu sabdasy arthena sam bandhah (The relation between a word . . and its meaning, however, is innate). True, as Steinkellner has pointed out, the term yogyat a which gures in the context of PV I and PVin II does not correspond to the actual terminology of the M m am . saka himself, who, to take the case of Kum arila, rather speaks of words having an innate or natural power ( sakti). It is indeed more usual that yogyat a would belong to the grammarians philosophies, and in particular to Bhartr . hari, who clearly does have this notion in the
See PVin II, k. 37 (= PV I, 318). See also PVBh ad PV IV, k. 112 (530.26-28): na khalu bh avin bh ut a v a yogyat a pratis saky a sabdasy agnihotram . edhena nivartayitum . . juhuy at svargak ama ity adeh svam am adau artham atr anurodhitv at | tatr apy arthe . . sabhaks . an . pratik ulat a yogyat a | Neither future nor past tness can be blocked by any interdiction, for words such as One who desires heaven should oer the agnihotra are in keeping with the mere [conceptual] object in case of [them meaning that one should engage in] eating dog-meat and so forth. There too, there is no opposition with regard to the object, i.e. there is tness (yogyat a).
4

164

Aspects of Buddhism

Sam sa of his V akyapad ya.5 Perhaps certain M m am . bandhasamudde . saka currents of the time had themselves made a rapprochement between sakti and yogyat a. Although we do need more information on this potential synthesis of M m am . saka 6 and Vy akaran . a ideas , there is at least a passage in the Svavr . tti ad PV I, k. 283 (ed. Gnoli p. 150) which shows clearly that Dharmak rti himself had no compunctions about substituting yogyat a for the M m am sakti : y a ca . saka notion of sabda saktir yogyat akhy a rthapratipaty a srayo jaimin yair varn arth antaram . yate | s eva na bhavati.7 Commentators on Dharmak rtis PV I and Svavr . tti did however broaden the range of adversaries which would be refuted Karn . akagomin, for example, cites somewhat later Sphot adins, such as Man sra, and even . av .d . anami 8 Bhartr . hari himself was cited on occasion. For the sake of convenience, let us therefore speak of the general view of a naturally existent sam a . bandha and yogyat as being a type of realism. Realism was, no doubt, the view of the M m am . sakas which Dharmak rti was primarily refuting in PV I and PVin II, but it was also the view of quite a number of other philosophers, some of whom, like Bhartr . hari, may have played a role, albeit obscure, in the development of Dharmak rtis thought. At any rate, the anti-M m am a in PV I and PVin II is . saka polemic about yogyat basically due to Dharmak rti himself he is not commenting on Dign aga here and only cites him very occasionally in the Svavr . tti in an incidental way. It seems unlikely that Dign aga himself was particularly concerned with the notion of yogyat a at all, as it seems to play no prominent role in his own works. The notion of yogyat a does, of course, gure prominently in the Sam sa of . bandhasamudde Bhartr alyapar ks a, attributed (rightly or wrongly) . hari and we know that the Traik . to Dign aga, corresponds to k. 53-85 of this portion of the V akyapad ya. But the k arik as on yogyat a in Bhartr . hari occur earlier on (e.g. k. 29), and do not gure in the Traik alyapar ks a. . Now, what is the logical relation between principle I and II? Intuitively speaking, it seems that accepting the unreality of objects of words advocated in principle II would entail that one rejects realism concerning sam a, but . bandha and yogyat that the implication only holds in one direction: principle II implies principle I, but not vice versa. In short, principle II seems to be considerably stronger than principle I. And indeed, historically speaking, Indian philosophers did treat II as stronger than I. In other words, there certainly were philosophers who accepted principle I but not principle II. Some non-Buddhists thought it quite possible to deny that there was a naturally existent, intrinsic sam sakti or yogyat a, but . bandha, to maintain nonetheless that the object of a word was a real entity. This seems to
See Steinkellner 1979, n. 211, 220. Cf. Steinkellner 1979, n. 208. 7 The power of a word, which is called yogyat a and is said by the Jaimin yas [i.e. the M m am sakas] to be the basis for understanding meaning, that [power] does not exist as . a separate entity. 8 Steinkellner 1979, n. 222 points out that J na na sr bhadra, in commenting on PVin II, even cites as a M m am arik a 29 from the V akyapad ya s Sam . saka verse, k .bandhasamudde sa, an important k arik a in which Bhartr hari speaks of yogyat a . .
6 5

T.J.F. Tillemans Dharmak rti on prasiddha and yogyat a

165

have been the usual Naiy ayika perspective (stemming from Ny ayas utra 2.1.559 ), in that these thinkers accepted that words designated real entities, but maintained that words were simply conventional, or governed by agreement (s amayika), and did not possess any natural or innate powers to designate such and such an object and not another. Dharmak rti, however, did accept principle II, which is much of what is involved in the Buddhist apoha theory of language: words cannot directly designate particulars (svalaks . an . a), but directly designate only conceptually created ctions, i.e. universals or s am anyalaks . an . a. It is worthwhile to stress that this basic theoretical stance on words designating s am anyalaks . an . a (and not directly designating svalaks an a ) is common to both Dign a ga and Dharmak rti, in spite of what certain . . contemporary writers claim. This matter has been taken up elsewhere10 : suce it to say that the attempts to make a separation between Dign aga and Dharmak rti on this matter have been very unconvincing. It is clear that Dharmak rti himself in Pram an arttika and elsewhere, and . av certainly his commentators, saw principle II as entailing principle I. He and his commentators give the argument that whatever is an object of a conceptual cognition (and is hence an unreal ction), can be designated by whatever word one wishes. In short, conceptual objects entail that there is intrinsically unrestricted yogyat a. Durvekami sra, in commenting on Ny ayabindu III.51 and Dharmottaras Ny ayabindut k a , actually gives the formal reasoning (prayoga) in all its details. . Dharmottaraprad pa (DMP) 184.16-17: evam tavyah . tu prayoga dras .. . yo rtho vikalpavij n anavis am sabdena vaktum sakyah . ayah . sa s . ketikena . . | yath a sa kh adim an artho vr sabdena | vikalpavij n anavis s ca sa s ti |. . ks . a . aya The prayoga should be regarded as follows: Whatever entity is the object of a conceptual cognition, can be designated by an agreed upon word, just like the entity having branches and so forth [can be designated] by the word tree. Now, sa sin is the object of a conceptual cognition. (The conclusion is that sa sin can be designated by the agreed upon word candra.).11
9 NS 2.1.55: na s amayikatv ac chabd arthasampratyayasya (This is not so [i.e. there is no eternal connection between word and object], because the knowledge of the meaning of a word is governed by agreement.) 10 See e.g. Katsura 1991, pp. 129-133. 11 The usual Tibetan formulation of the prayoga is: ri bong can la zla ba zhes pai sgras brjod rung ba yin te | rtog yul na yod pai phyir | That which is hare-marked is tting to be designated by the word moon, because it exists as an object of conceptualization. The reason is classied as a svabh avahetu, because it has an essential identity (t ad atmya) with the property to be proved. See Yons dzin rtags rigs (ed. Onoda), p. 46; cf. dGe 312.6- 313.1: gro ba la grags pa rtog yul na yod pa chos can | ri bong can zla bai sgras brjod rung du sgrub pai rang bzhin gyi rtags yang dag yin te | de sgrub kyi sgrub rtags yang dag gang zhig | zla bai sgras brjod rung la bdag gcig tu brel bai phyir |. See our akyabuddhis PVT P 328b 1-2: remarks to PV IV, k. 92 in Tillemans 1995. Cf. also S dir sbyor ba yang di dra ba yin te | gang zhig dod pa tsam gyi rjes su jug pa de ni

166

Aspects of Buddhism

This reasoning is not just a later commentators invention: it is based on the same logical reason which Dharmak rti had alluded to in PV IV k. 92 as being a svabh avahetu, a reason which is an essential property of what is to be proved. Noteworthy too is that Dharmak rti, in works subsequent to Pram an arttika12 , . av went so far as to signicantly change Dign agas denition of conceptual thought (kalpan a) so that it would explicitly include mention of the idea of yogyat a. This new denition of kalpan a is to be found in Ny ayabindu I.5 and Pram an scaya: . avini abhil apasam as a prat tih a: Conceptual thought is a cogni. sargayogyapratibh . kalpan tion in which a representation is tting to be associated with a verbal designation.13 By the time of the Ny ayabindu and Pram an scaya, then, it had become inte. avini gral to Dharmak rtis explanation of conceptual cognition (kalpan a / vikalpa) that any and all conceptual representations were tting to be associated with any and all words (abhil apasam sabd ak arasam . sargayogya / . sargayogya). It is thus not at all articial that Dharmottara, in commenting on Dharmak rtis Ny ayabindu III.51, where the question of refutation by prasiddha is discussed 14 , understood the key points in this discussion as turning on the Dharmak rtian denition of kalpan a with its explicit mention of yogya / yogyat a.15

Dharmak rtis sources for yogyat a in Dign agas Pram an . asamuccaya

Dharmak rti nds sources for the idea of unrestricted yogyat a in Pram an . asamuccaya III, k. 2s specication of four sorts of opposition which a valid thethams cad du yod pa yin te | dper na yid kyi rtog pa ran rgyud pa ga zhig lta buo || dod pai sgra yis brjod par bya ba n id kyang dod pa tsam gyi rjes su jug pa yin no zhes bya ba ni rang bzhin gyi* gtan tshigs yin no || (*P reads gyis). Here the prayoga is as follows: Whatever conforms to mere wishes pertains to everything, just like a free conception of the mind. Now an intended words designatum also conforms to mere wishes. This is a reason which is an essential property (svabh avahetu). (The conclusion is that an intended words designatum pertains to everything.) 12 We adopt here Frauwallners ordering of Dharmak rtis works. See Frauwallner 1954. 13 Two variants are possible here, the rst being to read pratibh as a (hence a bahuvr hi), the second being to read pratibh asaprat ti (i.e. a genitive tatpurus . a). The latter corresponds better with PVin 252b.4: rtog pa ni brjod pa dang drer rung ba snang bai shes pa, since pratibh asaprat tih . = snang bai shes pa. This was the reading adopted by Hattori 1968, n. 1.27, p. 85, who translated as follows: a cognition of representation which is capable of being associated with a verbal designation. There is, however, some important support for the bahuvr hi reading of pratibh as a in that Dharmottaras NBT explicitly takes the compound in this way. NB Tib. gives no clues, as it does not seem to have the word shes pa, but ends with snang ba = pratibh asa. See also Tillemans 1990, p. 274-275, n. 367. 14 NB III.51: prat tinir akr a acandrah sa s ti (It is opposed by a concept, as when . to yath . one says that what has a rabbit ( sa sin) is not the moon ). Note that Dharmak rti deliberately changes Dign agas term prasiddha to prat ti; see n. 18 and Appendix. 15 See Appendix.

T.J.F. Tillemans Dharmak rti on prasiddha and yogyat a

167

sis must avoid, that by perception (pratyaks ana), authorities . a), inference (anum ( apta) and by what is commonly recognized (prasiddha). In particular, it is the Pram an agas own commentary on k. 2 which forms . asamuccayavr . tti (PSV), Dign the basis for Dharmak rtis commentary on prasiddha in PV IV 109-103. Here is the passage from PSV in full: tadyath a | a sr avan sabdo nityo ghat an ani prame. ah . . a iti | na santi pram . y arth an ti pratij na m atrena | yatr apy as adh aran atv a d anum an abh ave . s abdaprasiddhena viruddhen arthen apohyate yath acandrah s a s sattv ad . iti n asau paks ah . . . For example: [1] sound is not audible; [2] a vase is permanent; [3] because of simply accepting it, [a proposition like] there are no pram an . a which have as their objects prameya; [4] and where, though there is no [valid] inference since [the latter] would be over-exclusive (as adh aran . atva), [a proposition] is opposed by a contradicting proposition because of something which is commonly recognized through verbal knowledge ( s abdaprasiddha), as in [the reasoning] that which has a rabbit ( sa sin) is not the moon (acandra) because it exists this [too] is not a [valid] thesis.16 The rst thesis (viz. sound is not audible) is refuted by perception (pratyaks . a), the second by inference (anum ana), or more specically, inference which functions due to the force of real entities (vastubalapravr anum ana). In the case of . tt the third thesis, Dign aga not only presents the proposition itself, but also gives the specic cause for its being invalidated. Accepting that there are no pram an . as is self-refuting (much like the liar paradox), for by merely accepting that proposition as true, it is understood that one recognizes that there is at least one pram an . a, viz. the one which validates the proposition itself. The fourth type of invalidation
16 Skt. of yatr apy ... n asau paks a ...apo. ah . in TSP ad TS 1395. The Skt. of tadyath hyate is found in PVBh ad k. 130 (PVBh 545.8-10): tadyath a | a sr avan sabdo nityo . ah . ghat an ani pramey arth an ti pratij na m atrena | yatr apy as adh aran ad . a iti | na santi pram . . atv anum an abh ave sa bdaprasiddhena viruddhen a[rthen a]pohyate na sa paks . a iti |. See also Kitagawa 1973 n. 169. We should, however, read sa bdaprasiddha instead of Kitagawas sabdaprasiddha. Furthermore, Kitagawa, in his translation, seems to have chosen PSVas reading of sbyor ba (use) instead of PSVbs sel bar byed pa (oppose), the latter being the equivalent of apohyate. Kitagawas translation is, accordingly, dicult to justify. The passage y atr apy ... also occurs in NM, T. XXXII 1628 1a 19-20; see Katsura 1977 .1.3; Inami 1988, p. 383. In both the Chinese of NM and the Tibetan of PSVa P 43b 1-2 and PSVb P 125a 4-5 (see Kitagawa p. 472), there is no equivalent of the words n asau paks . ah . found in TSPs quotation. However, PVin P 296b 5-6 also cites this passage and does include n asau paks . ah . : gang la thun mong ma yin pai phyir ... de yang phyogs ma yin no zhes so. Note that in PV IV k. 130 and PVBh we see that s abdaprasiddhena is taken as showing the cause (hetu; rgyu) for invalidating the thesis acandrah sa s , just as mere acceptance (pratij na m atrena) of a thesis like na santi . pram an ni pramey arth ani is the cause for invalidating that very thesis. Hence, we have .a translated the instrumental of these phrases by because of ....

168

Aspects of Buddhism

where propositions like acandrah sa s are refuted because of what is recognized . through verbal knowledge ( s abdaprasiddha) is the subject of PV IV, k. 109130.17 The key passage in Dign aga which inspires this section is thus yatr apy ... n asau paks . ah .. Now, Dign aga, in the PSV passage quoted above, had given the following example of a bogus thesis which would be refuted by prasiddha / s abdaprasiddha: That which has a rabbit ( sa sin) is not the moon (acandra), because it exists (sattva). The basic idea here is that a thesis should not contradict established verbal usage, in other words, given the verbal conventions of Sanskrit speakers, it just contradicts prasiddha to say That which has a rabbit ( sa sin) is not the moon (acandra) there is absolutely no conict with observable or inferable biological facts about rabbits or astronomical facts about the moon, but only with some elementary and generally acknowledged facts about usage of language. Dign aga therefore held that there was no inference functioning objectively, or due to the force of entities (vastubalapravr anum ana), which would be able to prove either . tt candrah s a s (that which has a rabbit is the moon) or the contrary, viz. acandrah . . sa s , for logical faults like as adh aran atva would ensue. This is what is specied in . the PSVs words as adh aran ad anum an abh ave, viz. though there is no [valid] . atv inference since [the latter] would be over-exclusive (as adh aran . atva). We will not, however, go into the details of this fallacy here as it would take us too far aeld, especially given that Dharmak rti himself has a rather particular interpretation of as adh aran atva in this context. . In Dharmak rtis hands, in PV IV k. 109-130, however, the interpretation of this passage from PSV becomes quite complex. He rst of all signicantly reinterpreted the bogus thesis in question so that it not longer was just sa sin is not candra, but rather sa sin is not the designatum of the word candra (candra sabdav acya), or equivalently, sa sin is not tting (yogya) to be the designatum of the word candra. Following Dharmak rti, then, the bogus thesis acandrah sa s . in Dign aga was taken to be that of some type of realist, someone who wanted to say that while words designate objects in virtue of naturally existent yogyat a, candra and sa sin are not linked by this yogyat a. Perhaps, this opponent thought that the word candra would only have such tness for the moon, and not for something like sa sin, which is only the moon by conventional agreement. This point was not developed by Dharmak rti, nor by his commentators nor was it made clear by anyone whether the thesis acandrah sa s was actually advanced by any historical . adversary, or whether, as seems more likely, it was purely hypothetical. At any rate, for Dharmak rti, this thesis is false, because sa sin, and for that matter, everything else, is intrinsically t to be the designatum of the word candra in short the thesis is bogus because there are absolutely no restrictions on yogyat a inherent in the words themselves: whatever people wish to use a word for, that
Note that Dharmak rti in PV IV dealt with these four invalidations in a dierent order from that given by Dign aga: he commented upon apta (k. 93-108) and vastubalapravr anum ana (k. 91-92) earlier on in PV IV and took up invalidation by . tt pratyaks . a (k. 131-135) after the section on prasiddha.
17

T.J.F. Tillemans Dharmak rti on prasiddha and yogyat a

169

they can use it for. The only factor governing whether something is t or not to be dubbed by such and such a word is whether we intend the word to be used in that manner.18

Final remarks: What was Dharmak rti up to here?

Certainly, introducing the Dharmak rtian position on yogyat a into PS III, k. 2 and PSV, yields an interpretation of Dign agas treatment of theses like acandrah sa s . which goes far beyond the simple refutation of absurd propositions which contravene speech-conventions in Sanskrit. I think, however, that almost inevitably we have a sense that Dharmak rti was up to something strained and articial in treating Dign agas explanations on prasiddha in this way. And indeed, it seems that this articiality was not entirely lost on the Indian commentators either. Vin tadeva in his T k a (NBT ) on the Ny ayabindu III.51, alluded to a fairly banal, but more . intuitively plausible, interpretation of Dign agas actual words, one which held that the thesis acandrah s a s was false, not because of anything abstruse or philosoph. ical to do with intrinsically unrestricted yogyat a of words, but simply because of the commonly known facts about Sanskrit usage. la la zhig ri bong can ni zla bai sgrar brjod par bya ba ma yin no zhes dam cha bar byed na | de ni ri bong can zla bai sgrar brjod pa n id du gnag rdzi mo tshad grags pas sel bar byed do || yang na don thams
Important to mention in this connection is Dharmak rtis switch from the Dign agean terminology prasiddhab adh a (invalidation by what is commonly recognized) to prat tib adh a (invalidation by concepts). The term prat ti appears regularly in this context in PV IV (see e.g. kk. 118, 120, 123). True, in PV IV, k. 92, Dharmak rti had retained a more usual understanding of prasiddha in the context of PSs thesis-denition, referring to it by the term jagatsthiti, worldly custom. But in PV IV, kk. 109-130 and NB III.51 it is clear that he understood prasiddha as prat ti, deliberately using the term prat tinir akr ta (opposed by a concept), rather than prasiddhanir akr . . ta. In PV IV he was also obliged to reinterpret the phrase sa bdaprasiddha in PSV as being non-literal. (In PV IV, k. 110cd Dharmak rti argues that there are other examples of non-literal terms in the thesis-denition in PS III, k. 2. The word pratyaks . a in k. 2 means direct perception, nonetheless, it can also metaphorically designate the objects of direct perception, in other words, perceptible objects this is the case when Dign aga speaks of a thesis not being opposed by perceptible objects (pratyaks artha).) The idea behind . Dharmak rtis using prat ti rather than prasiddha/prasiddhi is that it is not actually Sanskrit verbal usage itself which would refute thesis acandrah sa s , but rather the concept . (prat ti) that sa sin can, or is t to be, dubbed candra. This concept of a word being t (yogya) for such and such a ctional object is completely dependent on intentions and upon the ensuing intentionally governed verbal practices nothing in the word or object themselves dictates tness. In short, tness is objectively unlimited, but it is determined by intentions, and it is these intentions which constitute the concept (prat ti) which opposes theses like acandrah sa s . Some references from PV IV and NBT are given in . Appendix.
18

170

Aspects of Buddhism cad la sgra thams cad kyi brjod par byar rung bas sel bar byed de | sgra dang don du brel ba ni brdai rtags pa yin pai phyir | dper na bum pa la yang zla bai sgrar brjod par bya ba n id du rung ngo || If someone maintains that sa sin is not the designatum of the word candra, he is refuted since it is commonly recognized (grags pa = prasiddha) by everyone from cowmaids on up that sa sin is designated by the word candra. Alternatively (yang na), he is refuted because all objects are tting (rung ba = yogya) to be the designata of all words, since the relation (brel ba = sam . bandha) between words and objects is marked by agreement (brda = sam . keta), just as, for example, a vase too is tting to be the designatum of the word candra.19

The rst interpretation mentioned by Vin tadeva is what we might term the simple or intuitively plausible interpretation of Dign agas words; the second interpretation is that of Dharmak rti. Alas, we do not know who held the simple interpretation, but it may have been the so-called commentator on [Dign agas] Ny ayamukha (ny ayamukhat k a k a ra ) who appeared earlier in PV IV, but whose . identity remains a mystery. In PV IV k. 27, this ny ayamukhat k ak ara whom . akyabuddhi had named as Mang po len pai bu, a name which corresponds to S no-one at all that we know of in Buddhist logic was being ridiculed for an inept and inelegant refutation of Naiy ayika arguments proving that the thesis-statement (paks avacana ) was a legitimate means of proof (s adhana).20 Dharmak rti, in k. 27, . had dismissed this refutation as an irrelevant farce (vid amban a asam a). . . baddh Now the same ny ayamukhat k a k a ra , who seems to be treated as little better than a . buoon in PV IV, reappears in the section on prasiddhab adh a / prat tib adh a in PV IV and oers a rival and simpler interpretation of Dign agas idea of as adh aran . atva, one against which Dharmak rti argues in detail in PV IV, k. 121 et seq. This simpler interpretation of as adh aran . atva harmonizes very naturally with what we are terming the simpler or intuitively plausible interpretation of Dign agas words on prasiddha. It is logical, then, that the curious . t k ak ara, about whom we know so little, must also have oered a simpler interpretation of Dign agas use of prasiddha, one which would have been at least along the same general lines, if not identical, to the intuitively plausible interpretation alluded to in passing by Vin tadeva. What is supremely ironic is that the ny ayamukhat k a k a ra , if indeed it was he, . might very well have gotten Dign aga dead right. The inescapable impression is that the Dharmak rtian version is a philosophically interesting, but overly complex tangent on what was a fairly trivial subject for Dign aga. In short, Dharmak rti needed to legitimize an anti-Vedic polemic by nding sources in Dign aga, and he found them in a very unlikely place. The much-maligned . t k ak ara, or whoever it was that took things more simply, was probably more accurate in reecting Dign agas thought.
19 20

e Poussin). NBT on NB III.51, p. 106 (ed. de la Valle See Watanabe 1976, Tillemans 1987 pp. 155-159 and 1991 pp. 403-406.

T.J.F. Tillemans Dharmak rti on prasiddha and yogyat a

171

Appendix
Some references on prat ti from PV IV: PV IV, k. 109: arthes at purus anurodhinah . v apratis . iddhatv . ecch . | 21 is ta sabd abhidheyatvasy apto tr aks ag janah .. . atav . || An intended words designatum (abhidheya) which is in keeping with peoples wishes, is unrestricted with regard to objects. Therefore, the person, whose speech is unopposed, is an authority here [i.e. with regard to the designatum of an intended word ]. 22 PV IV, k. 110: uktah sabdena dharmas tadvyavah arajah . prasiddha . | 24 pratyaks adimit a m ana sruty aropen ucit ah . . a s . ||
23

The [conceptual] dharma [known as tness (yogyat a)], which arises from that [verbal] practice (vyavah ara), was indicated [by Dign aga] by means of the word prasiddha ( commonly recognized).25 The [objects] which are cognized (mita) by perception and so forth are indicated by superimposition of the names of the means of cognition (m ana).
PV-k(I),(II) v aks aks . ata ; PV-k(III) and Miyasakas reading tr . ata is in accordance with PVP. Note that PV Tib., in Peking, sDe dge and sNar thang editions, reads gnod med ngag skye bo rnams dod yid ches yin. However, it seems that dod might well be an error for dir (= atra). 22 See PVV 491.7-8: tata s c atres ta sabd abhidheyatve vis apto vyavahart a jano ks .. . aye . atav ag apratis tavacanah sa bda. iddhes .. . |. Devendrabuddhi, however, glosses atra (= di) as prasiddh artha (= sgra las byung bai grags pai don). Thus atra is interpreted by him as with respect to something commonly recognized through verbal knowledge ( s abdaprasiddha). See PVP P 347b 3-4: bkag pa med n id phyir di | sgra las byung bai grags pai don la | gnod med tshig ste | rang gi dod pa ston par byed pai yul can gyi tshig ma bkag pa can gyi skye bo yid ches pa yin no zhes bya bai don to | (D 291a 4-5). 23 Miy. tad vyavah arajah . . Devendrabuddhi clearly takes tad as compounded with vyavah ara. PVP P 347b 4-5: slob dpon gyis tha s nad de las skyes pai chos rab tu grags pa yis bstan | (D 291a 5-6). PV Tib. seems to have erroneously taken tad as qualifying dharma: tha s nad las ni skyes pa yi || chos de grags pai sgra yis brjod ||. 24 Miy. misread k. 110cd as pratyaks adim iti m ana sruty aropen ucitah . . a s . . PV-k(I), (II), (III) read pratyaks adimit a m ana sruty aropen ucit ah . . a s . , which is supported by PV Tib. mngon sum sogs kyi gzhal bya yang || jal byed sgra sgro btags nas brjod ||. 25 See PVV 451.13-14: candra s candra ity adi sabdavyavah araj ato dharmah avis . kalpan . ayo yogyat akhya ac aryen a prasiddha s abdena tadyath a s a bdaprasiddhenety a dinoktah | The . . dharma, which arises from verbal practices such as that the moon is termed moon, and which is an object of conceptualization (kalpan a) [and] which is known as yogyat a, was indicated by the Master by means of the word prasiddha in the following [phrase in PSV]: sa bdaprasiddhena [viruddhen arthen apohyate] etc. etc. 21

172

Aspects of Buddhism

PV IV, k. 116 along with PVPs introduction to k. 116: Since all words are established for all objects, then why did [Dign aga] speak of what is commonly recognized through verbal knowledge (sgra las byung bai grags pa = s abdaprasiddha). Here [Dharmak rti replies] as follows [k. 116]:26 sam sray ah sabd ah am atrasam srayah . ketasam . . . sa cecch . . | n asiddhih sabdasiddh an am iti s abdaprasiddhav ak || . [Dign aga used] the word s abdaprasiddha for the following reason: Words depend on agreement (sam keta ), and this [agreement] depends upon mere intentions . (icch am atra). [So] the [designations] established by words are not unestablished.27 Finally, we should note that Dharmottara has a rather unusual explanation of prat ti, taking it to be equivalent to the logical reason, vikalpavij n anavis . aya, in the proof that sa sin is t to be dubbed candra. (See the passage from DMP quoted above and n. 11.) Dharmak rti, in PV IV, k. 110 and k. 116 seems to have taken prat ti to be the simple concept, dependent upon intentions, that a word is to be used for such and such an object. Dharmottara takes prat ti to be the (ctional) objects themselves, i.e. the objects which are designated by words and conceived of by thought: any such object is, in its nature, a prat ti and can hence be dubbed with any verbal label. See Ny ayabindut k a ad NB III.51: . prat ty a nir akr sabdav acyo na bhavati sa s ti prati. tah . acandra iti candra j n at arthah ty a nir akr to rtha ucyate vikalpavi. | ayam . ca prat . tah . | prat j n anavis tih tatvam n anavis . ayah . | prat . prat . vikalpavij . ayatvam ucyate | 28 tena vikalpavij n anavis tir upen sa sina s candra sabdav a. ayatvena prat .a cyatvam a hi yad vikalpavij n anagr ahyam . siddham eva | tath . tac chabd ak arasam ak arasam am . sargayogyam | yac chabd . sargayogyam . tat s . ketikena sabdena vaktum sa kyam | atah tirupen n anavi. . prat . a vikalpavij sayatvena siddham sabdav acyatvam acandratvasya b adhakam | . candra svabh avahetu s ca prat tih ad vikalpavis atr anubandhin . | yasm . ayatvam s am sabdav acyat a tatah avahetusiddham sabdav acya. ketika . svabh . candra tvam av acyatvasya b adhakam tavyam || . dras ..
26 PVP P 349a 3: gal te gang las sgra thams cad don thams cad grub pa yin na | gang gis na sgra las byung bai grags pa zhes brjod ce na | dir di ltar | (D 292a 6-7). 27 See PVV 453.4-6: sam acak adr s. teh sray ah sabd ah . ketam antaren . a v .. . sam . ketasam . . . sa ca sam am atrasam srayah apeks yasy abh av at | tasm ac cha. ketah . purus . ecch . . tadatiriktasy . an . bdasiddh an am abhidheyatv ad n am asiddhih sa bdaprasiddhir . kvacid apy arthe n . | iti hetoh . ac aryasya || Since expressions are not found apart from agreements, words are dependent upon agreements. And this agreement depends solely on the intentions of people, for there is nothing to be taken into consideration over and above that [intention]. So, those things which are established by words, viz. designations and so forth, are not aryas [use of unestablished with regard to any objects. Thus, for [this] reason, the Ac the phrase] sa bdaprasiddhi. 28 Note that Malvania read vikalpaj na nena in keeping with DMP; however the variant vikalpavij na navis . ayatvena occurs in several mss. of NB and is supported by NB Tib. rnam par rtog pai rnam par shes pai yul n id des.

T.J.F. Tillemans Dharmak rti on prasiddha and yogyat a

173

Translation: The following is [a case of a proposition] being opposed by prat ti: the thesis sa sin is not the moon (acandra) [or in other words] it is not the designatum of the word candra. Now this is opposed by prat ti. An entity is said to be conceived of (prat ta) when it is an object of conceptual cognition (vikalpavij n anavis ti) or the fact of being conceived . aya); concept (prat (prat tatva) is said to be the fact of being an object of conceptual cognition sins being the designatum of the word candra is (vikalpavij n anavis . ayatva). Sa established by this property of being an object of conceptual cognition, i.e. its being in essence a prat ti. As follows: Whatever is to be grasped by a conceptual consciousness is tting to be combined with the image ( ak ara image/ aspect) of a word. Whatever is tting to be associated with the image of a word can be designated by an agreed upon word. Thus, [ sa sins] being the designatum of the word candra (candra sabdav acyatva), which is established on account of its being an object of conceptual cognition, i.e. in essence a concept, serves to invalidate (b adhaka) acandratva (not being the moon). Now prat ti ( concept) is a reason which is an essential property (svabh avahetu). Since the property of being the designatum of an agreed upon word (s am sabdav acyat a) is neces. ketika sarily connected with the simple fact of being an object of conceptual cognition (vikalpavis atra), therefore candra sabdav acyatva, which is established by . ayatvam means of a svabh avahetu, should be seen to invalidate the property of not being a designatum [of the word candra].

References and Abbreviations

D dGe sDe dge edition of Tibetan canon. sDe dge Tibetan Tripit . aka, bsTan gyur Tshad ma. Tokyo, 1981. Tshad ma rnam grel legs par bshad pa gzhan don rjes dpag gi leui rnam bshad of the First Dalai Lama, rGyal ba dGe dun grub pa (1391-1474), included in Collected Works, Vol. 5. Gangtok, 1981. Dharmottaraprad pa of Durvekami sra. See NB. E. Frauwallner, Die Reihenfolge und Entstehung der Werke Dharmak rtis. Asiatica. Festschrift Friedrich Weller. Leipzig, 1954, pp. 142-154 (= Kleine Schriften, pp. 677-689). nkr . tya yanas E. Frauwallner, Review of R. Sa edition of the Pram an arttikabh a. sya. Journal of the . av American Oriental Society 77, pp. 58-60 (= Kleine Schriften, pp. 883-885). M. Hattori, Dign aga on Perception: being the Pratyaks agas Pram an . apariccheda of Dign . asamuccaya. Harvard Oriental Series 47. Cambridge, Mass., 1968.

DMP Frauwallner 1954

Frauwallner 1957

Hattori 1968

174 Inami 1988

Aspects of Buddhism M. Inami Dharmak rti no paks abh asa setsu . prat tinir akr ta no baai, Journal of Indian and Buddhist . Studies (Indogaku Bukky ogaku Kenky u), 37, 1, 1988, pp. 383-380. k arik a(s). S. Katsura Inmy o sh orimonron kenky u I. Bulletin of the Faculty of Letters of Hiroshima University 37, 1977, pp. 106-127. S. Katsura Dign aga and Dharmak rti on apoha, in Steinkellner 1991, pp. 129-146. H. Kitagawa Indo koten ronrigaku no kenky u. Jinna no taikei. Tokyo, 1973. (Includes an edition and Japanese translation of parts of PS and PSV.) Y. Miyasaka ed. Pram an arttika-k arik a (Sanskrit . av and Tibetan). Acta Indologica 2, 1971/2, pp. 1-206. Ny ayabindu of Dharmak rti, with Ny ayabindut k a of . Dharmottara and Pan d ita Durvekami s ras Dharmot.. taraprad pa. Edited by D. Malvania. Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, vol. 2. Patna, 1955. Ny ayabindut k a of Dharmottara. See NB. . Ny ayabindut k a of Vin tadeva. Edited by Louis de . e Poussin, The Tibetan Translation of the la Valle Ny ayabindu of Dharmak rti with the Commentary of Vin tadeva. Bibliotheca Indica No. 171. Calcutta, 1913, reprinted 1984. Ny ayamukha of Dign aga, T. XXXII, 1628. Ed. and Japanese translation in a series of articles by S. Katsura entitled Inmy o sh orimonron kenky u, Bulletin of the Faculty of Letters of Hiroshima University. Ny ayas utra of Gautama. Ed. with the bh a. sya of str V atsy ayana by P. Sha and H. Shukla. Kashi Sanskrit Series 43. Varanasi, 1970. S. Onoda, The Yons dzin rtags rigs A manual for Tibetan logic. Studia Asiatica 5. Nagoya, 1981. Pram an aga, P 5700. . asamuccaya of Dign Pram an aga. (a) transl. Vasu. asamuccayavr . tti of Dign dhararaks ita and Seng rgyal, P 5701. (b) transl. Kana. kavarman and Dad pa shes rab, P 5702. Pram an arttika of Dharmak rti (PV I = . av Sv arth anum ana; PV II = Pram an asiddhi ; PV III = . Pratyaks a ; PV IV = Par a rth a num a na ). Sanskrit and . Tibetan texts edited in Miy.

k./kk. Katsura 1977

Katsura 1991 Kitagawa 1973

Miy. NB

NBT NBT

NM

NS

Onoda 1981 PS PSV

PV

T.J.F. Tillemans Dharmak rti on prasiddha and yogyat a PVBh

175

Pram an arttikabh a. sya or V arttik alam ara of . av . k nkr . tya yana. TiPraj n akaragupta, edited by R. Sa betan Sanskrit Works Series, vol. 1. Patna, 1953. Tib. P 5719. Pram an scaya of Dharmak rti, P 5710. Chapter II . avini ed. and transl. in E. Steinkellner 1973 and 1979 respectively. Pram an arttikapa njik a of Devendrabuddhi, P 5717. . av akyabuddhi, P 5718. Pram an arttikat k a of S . av . Pram an arttikavr . av . tti of Manorathanandin. In Dharmak rtis Pram an av a rttika with a Commentary by Mano. nkr . tya yana in the aprathanandin. Edited by R. Sa pendices to Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society 24, 1938, Part III. Sanskrit. E. Steinkellner, Dharmak rtis Pram an scayah . avini ., Zweites Kapitel: sv arth anum anam. Teil I, 1973. Teil II, 1979. Osterreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Vienna, 1973/79. Studies in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition. Proceedings of the Second International Dharmak rti Conference Vienna, June 11-16, 1989. Edited by E. Steinkellner. Osterreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-Historische Klasse, Beitr age zur Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte Asiens 8. Vienna, 1991. Tibetan. T. Tillemans, Pram an arttika IV (2), WZKS 31, . av 1987, pp. 141-161. T. Tillemans, Materials for the Study of Aryadeva, Dharmap ala and Candrak rti. The Catuh sataka of . Aryadeva, chapters XII and XIII, with the commentaries of Dharmap ala and Candrak rti: Introduction, translation, Sanskrit, Tibetan and Chinese texts, notes. WSTB 24,1 and 24,2. Vienna, 1990. T. Tillemans, Dharmak rti on Some Sophisms, in E. Steinkellner 1991, pp. 403-418.

PVin

PVP PVT PVV

Skt. Steinkellner 1973, 1979

Steinkellner 1991

Tib. Tillemans 1987 Tillemans 1990

Tillemans 1991

176 Tillemans 1994

Aspects of Buddhism T. Tillemans, Pre-Dharmak rti Commentators on Dign agas Denition of a Thesis (paks . alaks . an . a), in T. Skorupski and U. Pagel (eds.), The Buddhist Forum, Vol. III, Papers in honour and appreciation of Prof. David Seyfort Rueggs contribution to Indological, Buddhist and Tibetan Studies. School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1994, pp. 295-305. T. Tillemans, Pram an arttika IV (5), WZKS 39, . av 1995, pp. 103-150. antaraks Tattvasam . graha of S . ita. In Tattvasam . graha of Ac arya S antaraks njik a . ita with the Commentary Pa Kamala str of Sr s la. Edited by D. Sha . Bauddha Bh arat 1. Varanasi, 1981. Tattvasam njik a of Kamala s la. See TS. . grahapa V.A. Van Biljert, Epistemology and Spiritual Authority . The development of epistemology and logic in the old Ny aya and the Buddhist school of epistemology with an annotated translation of Dharmak rtis Pram an arttika II (Pram an . av . asiddhi) vv. 1-7. WSTB 20. Vienna, 1989. S. Watanabe, Sadvit yaprayogah . . Indo ronrigaku no ichi danmen, Mikky ogaku 13, pp. 194-209.

Tillemans 1995 TS

TSP Van Biljert 1989

Watanabe 1976

Aspects of Buddhism, Liw, Poland, June 25, 1994

Some Rare Oirat Manuscripts in the Collection of the St. Petersburg University Library
Vladimir L. Uspensky (St. Petersburg) The collection of the Mongolian manuscripts and xylographs kept in the Library of the St. Petersburg University ranks as one of the worlds best for its completeness and selection. This is also true of its Oirat (Kalmuck) sub-section. The Oirat manuscripts were acquired mainly from the Volga Kalmucks by the Russian scholars A.V. Popov, K.F. Golstunsky and A.M. Pozdneev. Many of these books are very rare and deserve special notice. Catalogue-style descriptions of the manuscripts mentioned in the present article will not be given. Rather, the descriptive remarks are reduced to the extent necessary to indicate the important specic features of a manuscript if compared with the already known copies. I. The Oirat manuscripts of the Manchu prince Kengse, alias Yun-li (1697-1738). The private library of the Mongolian books which belonged to prince Kengse, the youngest son of the emperor Kang-xi, was purchased by the future Academician V.P.Vassiliev in Peking during the 1840s.1 Among the hundreds of Mongolian books there are several Oirat manuscripts which appear to originate from the Koko-Nor (Qinghai) area. Under the imperial order in 1734-35, Kengse - together with lCang-skya Rol-pai rdo-rje accompanied the Seventh Dalai Lama to Tibet, and passed through the Oirat-inhabited territories. Included in these manuscripts are: 1. The translation of the Pa ncaraks . a by Za-ya pan .d . ita, pt. 1: Calm. D 33/1 (Q 432), . 1-59a; pt. 2: Calm. D 33/2 (Q 433), . 1-74a; pt. 3: Calm. D 33/3 (Q 434), . 1-49a; pt. 4: Calm. D 33/4 (Q 435), . 1-37a; pt. 5: Calm. D 33/5 (Q 436), . 1-14a. All ve parts are written on one kind of paper, partly in red ink. However, the folios dier in
Wassiljew, Die auf den Buddhismus bez uglichen Werke der Universit ats-Bibliothek zu Kasan. M elanges asiatiques tir es du Bulletin historico-philologique de lAcad emie Imp eriale des sciences de St.-P etersbourg. Tome 11, 4e livraison. St.-P etersbourg, 1855, p. 351; Wassiliev, Notice sur les ouvrages en langues de lAsie orientale, qui se trouvent dans la biblioth` eque de lUniversit e de Saint-P etersbourg. Ibid., tome 11, 6e livraison. St.-P etersbourg, 1856, pp. 566-67.
1

178

Aspects of Buddhism size. These manuscripts are illuminated. The colophon is found in the fth part (. 13b:1-14a) and agrees with the copies already known.2 2. The translation by Za-ya pan .d . ita of the Bu chos : Calm. E 12 (Q 431).3 This copy is incomplete and was severely damaged (it had undergone restoration work). It consists of three parts with dierent pagination (the rst chapter; chapters 2-6; chapters 7-22). The folios of this manuscript seem to be intermingled in some places, therefore a thorough line-to-line collation with the Tibetan original is required to put the text in order. Since the text consists of 22 chapters, it is clear that the two chapters of the Khu chos are also added to the Bu chos itself. According to an unpaginated folio attached to the main text (the colophon of an unknown scribe), the manuscript should have numbered 394 folios. 3. The translation by Za-ya pan .d . ita of the autobiography of the First Panchen Lama Blo-bzang chos-kyi rgyal-mtshan (1570-1662), entitled Nom og ul uqci toyin sumadi darma doca-yin yabudal-i-yin yosu todorxoya u z uu l uqci erdeni erike kem ek u oro siba : Calm. E 10 (Q 372), . 1184a.4 This biography was completed by the Second Panchen Lama Blo-bzang ye-shes (1663-1737). The Mongolian translation of the second part is also found in the book collection of Kengse: Ban cin sumadi dharm-a duva ca-yin cadig todorqai u u g ulegsen cintamani erike-yin ada orosiba: Mong. D 23 (Q 374), . 1-45a.

II. Uzeqs er tusatai cuxula kereqt u kem ek u: Calm. E 2 (Q 560), .176b.5 This manuscript was originally the property of the unidentied honourable citizen Stepanov and was acquired by the University in 1863 by Prof. K.F. Golstunsky. Though it was received from the Volga Kalmucks it is written not on the Russian paper; it seems to be an old copy originating from Jungar or Koko-Nor (it resembles the Oirat books from the collection of Kengse). The work is known to have been translated by Za-ya pan .d . ita, but the manuscript has no colophon. It was mistakenly taken by some scholars for the translation of the Shes bya rab gsal by Phags-pa Blo-gros rgyal-mtshan.6 mkho mthong The name of its Tibetan original was given by Sh. Bira as Ne ba don yod and the authors name is listed in the somewhat strange form Blo b can bzan poi dpal.7 This work could be the same one which was used by Sa ang Se cen for compiling the Erdeni-yin tob ci, and by Blo-bzang tshe-phel
Luvsanbaldan, p. 125, no. 2; p. 234, no. 0246. Luvsanbaldan, p. 126, no. 23; p. 209, no. 0015; Vostrikov, pp. 206-208. 4 Luvsanbaldan, p. 126, no. 30; p. 210, no. 0019; Vostrikov, pp. 308-09. 5 Luvsanbaldan, p. 126, no. 26; p. 210, no. 0024. 6 ru ng, Mong ol uran Ce. Damdinsu okiyal-un dege i a un bilig orosibai. Ula anba atur, 1959, p. 328, no. 40. 7 Sh. Bira, Mongolskaya istoriograya XIII-XVII vv . Moscow, 1978, pp. 190-91.
3 2

V.L. Uspensky Some Rare Oirat Manuscripts. . .

179

for compiling the Hor chos byung. It was entitled in Mongolian and Tibetan respectively as ayiqamsi -a u egdek ui ce ceq- un comurli neret u sastir and Me tog gi tshoms mthong ba don ldan 8 The book is an exposition of Buddhist i. teaching very close in content to the Ciqula keregleg ci by Guu si Cor III. Two Oirat xylographs are kept in the University Library. 1. Xutuqtu biligiyin cinadu k ur uqsen tasuluq ci o cir kem ek u yeke k olg oni sudur orosibu : Calm. B 3 (Q 564), . 1-52a; 21.5 x 8 (19 x 5.3) cm, 17 lines. This xylograph was acquired by A.M. Pozdneev in the Astrakhan province in 1875. The book contains a colophon (. 51b:14-52a) saying that it was translated by Za-ya pan .d . ita. Three Oirat xylographical editions of the Vajracchedik a numbering 55, 56 and 26 folios have been described already.9 But the University copy is not one of them. si xur ang ui oro sibu : Calm. E 5 (Q 648); . 2. Blama burxani yoga ma 1-6a; 52 x 10.3 (44 x 8) cm; 37 lines. This xylographical edition of a work on the guru-devat a-yoga practice is not mentioned anywhere. It was acquired by A.M. Pozdneev during his expedition to Mongolia in 1876-79. According to the colophon (. 5b:27-6a), the author was sGo mang c rpa Blo neret u, i.e., the former lama (Tib. bla zur pa ) .u of the sGo-mang [grwa-tshang of the Bras-spungs Monastery] named Blo. He is also said to have been a direct disciple of Jam-dbyangs bzhad-pai rdo-rje Ngag-dbang brtson-grus (1648-1722) (Oirat xamugi ayiladuqci Man cu sri m u s ek u ). This information is conrmed by the fact that he was also the author of the petition to Jam-dbyangs bzhad-pai rdo-rje and his previous incarnations entitled bKa drin gsum ldan rin po chei skyes rabs rnam thar gsol debs byin rlabs myur du jug ma.10 His name is styled in Tibetan in the same way: sGo-mang bla-zur Blo ming-can. Blo is obviously the rst syllable of his name. The gsung-bum of Jam-dbyangs bzhad-pai rdo-rje also contains a work which is an exposition of teachings on the guru-yoga practice entitled Bla mai rnal byor tsint ning.11 The . a man . ii phreng mdzes kyi yang s authors name is given in the colophon as sGo-mang bla-zur Siddhih . laks , i.e., the former lama of the sGo-mang [grwa-tshang] named . m dNgos-grub. It is also said that he was the preceptor (Tib. mkhan po ) of the Oirats and the d anapati of the Yellow Hat [Teaching] in
G. M. Roerich, The Author of the Hor-chos-hbyun In: Izbrannye trudy. Moscow, 1967, pp. 226, 228. 9 Luvsanbaldan, pp. 117-18, no. 6, 7, 8; Luvsanbaldan/Badmaev, pp. 82-83, no. 2, 3; A.G. Sazykin, Mongolskiye rukopisi i ksilografy, postupivshiye v Aziatskiy muzei Rossiyskoi Akademii nauk ot B.Ya. Vladimirtsova, in: Mongolica. Moscow, 1986, p.288, no. 64. 10 Yoshimizu, p. 447, no. 2130. 11 Yoshimizu, p. 446, no. 2127.
8

180

Aspects of Buddhism the Northern Country (Tib. byang phyogs zhva ser gyi sbyin bdag os rod mkhan po ). The work was composed in the great capital of the Oirats (Tib. os rod kyi rgyal khab chen po ) in the water-sow year (1743). There are good reasons to suppose that Siddhih . and Blo were one and the same person. The Oirat book was printed in the water-mouse year (1744) under the auspices of Galdan-Tsering (Tib. dGa-ldan tshe-ring; Oirat Dg a ldan c e ring; 1695-1745). The latter was the ruler of the Jungar State in . 1727-1745. The scribe for the wood-blocks was dge-tshul Rin-chen bkra-shis (Oirat dge c l Rincen bgra sis). .u 3. Manuscript copy of the xylographical edition of the Suvarn asa. aprabh s utra : Calm. D 23 (Q 563), . 1-89a. This manuscript was acquired by A.M. Pozdneev in 1875 in the Astrakhan province. This sutra was translated into Oirat by Za-ya pan .d . ita and was later printed from the wood-blocks twice: by the Volga Kalmucks and the Oirats of Jungar.12 The manuscript in question is a copy of the second edition, executed in a ne artistic manner. The original was printed in 1741 under the auspices of the above-mentioned Galdan-Tsering (this information is taken from the colophon on the f. 89a:5-20). No printed copy of this edition has yet been found. The Mongolian Institute of Language and Literature (Ulan Bator) also possesses just a manuscript copy of it.

IV. The translation by Za-ya pan .d . ita of the Ma n . i bka bum. It is a well-known fact that Za-ya pan d ita translated the Ma n .. . i bka bum into Mongolian in 1644, i.e., before inventing the todo u z ug writing. This Mongolian translation consists of eleven chapters, though some Tibetan versions of this book are more voluminous.13 The University manuscript has been divided by putting dierent library catalogue numbers to its dierent parts. This partition was already made by A.V. Popov who acquired the manuscript from the Volga Kalmucks (one portion was given the library number Q 494, another - Q 503). All these manuscripts can be put together in the following sequence: chapter 1: Calm. D 22 (Q 494), inventory no. 1786 chapter 2: Calm. D 37 (Q 503), inventory no. 1797 chapter 3: Calm. D 22 (Q 494), inventory no. 1788 chapter 4: Calm. D 32 (Q 503), inventory no. 1798 chapter 5: missing chapter 6: Calm. D 22 (Q 494), inventory no. 1789
12 13

Luvsanbaldan/Badmaev, pp. 87-92. Vostrikov, pp. 42-45.

V.L. Uspensky Some Rare Oirat Manuscripts. . . chapter chapter chapter chapter chapter 7: Calm. D 32 (Q 503), inventory no. 1799 8: Calm. D 37 (Q 503), inventory no. 1800 9: missing 10: Calm. D 37 (Q 503), inventory no. 1801 11: missing

181

It should be added that the manuscript Calm. C 1 (Q 530) contains incomplete chapters 2 (. 1-8b) and 11 (. 31a-50b) of the Ma n . i bka bum, the latter with a colophon by Za-ya pan .d . ita. Especially interesting is a section of the Ma n . i bka bum Calm. D 22 (Q 494), inventory no. 1787; . 1-69b; cover and left marginal Tibetan signature: kha. This is the section which was not included in the Mongolian version, viz., Sangs rgyas sh akya thub pai bstan pa la mdzad pai lo rgyus (a biography of the king Srong-btsan sgam-po) and Sangs rgyas gzhan gyi bstan pa la mdzad pai lo rgyus (ten stories of the previous incarnations of Srong-btsan sgampo).14 This serves witness to an interesting fact, that the Oirat version of the Ma n . i bka bum is more complete than the Mongolian one. V. A versed biography of Tsong-kha-pa entitled Bzongkaba-yin tuu i : Calm. C 13 (F 65), . 1-25b. This biography was acquired by K.F. Golstunsky from the Volga Kalmucks in 1856-57. It is a very rare work written at the request of Oirat princes in the end of the 17th century by Bya-khyung mkhanpo xutuq-tu, i.e. an incarnation of an abbot of the Bya-khyung theg-chen yon-tan dar-rgyas gling Monastery in Amdo.15 Among the books from the collection of Kengse there is its Mongolian translation entitled Bc onggaba. yin cadig : Mong. E 14 (Q 368), . 1-26a. I was unable to locate its Tibetan original. VI. A collection of biographies written by the Second Panchen Lama entitled Bodhi m oriyin u nd us un blamanariyin tuu i: ca an lingxua-yin erike : Calm. D 36 (Q 500), . 1-84a. This collection was acquired by A.V. Popov from the Volga Kalmucks in 1838. The title of its Tibetan original is Byang chub lam gyi rim pai bla ma brgyud pai rnam par thar pa pad ma dkar poi phreng ba.16 According to the Oirat colophon (. 83b:1-84a) it was translated by masi ket urkei Sumadi kem eqci, i.e. Rab-byams-pa Blo-bzang. He was the Kalmuck Buddhist leader in the mid-18th century and participated in the preparation of the xylographical edition of the Suvarn asa-s utra mentioned . aprabh above.17 The fact that this almost contemporary Tibetan work was translated into Oirat shows that the spiritual contacts between Tibet and the Volga Kalmucks were rmly established in the 18th century.
14 15

Vostrikov, p. 44. Vostrikov, p. 282. 16 Vostrikov, pp. 110-11, 294-95. 17 Luvsanbaldan/Badmaev, pp. 88-90.

182

Aspects of Buddhism Among the books from the collection of Kengse there is the Mongolian translation of this work entitled Bodi m or- un erge-yin u nd us un blam-a-nar-un cadig ca an lingqu-a-yin erike kemek u oro siba : Mong. D 64 (Q 375), . 1-50a.

VII. A history of the tantra of T ar a by T aran atha (1575- ca. 1635) entitled Dare ekeyin u nd us uni arxoi arul a tododxon u iledk ui tuu i altan eriken kem ek u oro sibu: Calm. D 30 (Q 531), . 1-35a. The title of its Tibetan original is sGrol mai rgyud kyi byung khungs gsal bar byed pai lo rgyus gser gyi phreng ba. According to the colophon (. 34b:26-35a), it was translated by RadnaBhadra (Skt. Ratnabhadra = Tib. Rin-chen bzang-po). He was one of the disciples of Za-ya pan .d . ita and assisted his teacher as a scribe. While a few of his translations are known, this is not one of them.18 The name of the initiator of this translation is given as dayani ezen C u krid (Tib. . e dbang b ? khyab bdag Tshe-dbang-po khrid). I was unable to identify this person. The colophon also says that Radna-Bhadra was translating on the basis of i, (i.e. his teacher) and the precepts of g ur u blama and Rab-byam-pa Cor Rab-byams-pa chos-rje. The latter is also known as Dar-rgyas dka-bcu and Ras-chung nom-un qan.19 The Mongolian translation of this work was published xylographically by the learned Buriat lama Rincen Nomtoev (1820-1907). It is entitled Dar-a ekeyin u nd us un- u u -i todora ulu ci domo altan erike neret u oro sibai : Mong. D 264 (Q 623), . 1-51a. VIII. urban sanvariyin teyin talbil oro sibu: Calm. E 5 (Q 649), . 1107a. This manuscript was acquired by A.M. Pozdneev during his expedition to Mongolia in 1876-79. A comparison of the texts shows that this is a translation of the sDom pa gsum gyi rnam par bzhag pa mdor bsdus te gtan la dbab pai rab tu byed pa thub bstan rin po chei byi dor by mKhas-grub dGe-legs dpal-bzang-po (1385-1438).20 His name is styled in Oirat as Sayin Buyani Coq. It is unknown if a Mongolian translation of this work exists.

Conclusion
The collection of the St. Petersburg University Library contains many other Oirat manuscripts which deserve special notice for their scholarly value and artistic execution, including an exposition of Buddhist teaching by a Kalmuck lama Jinjang (Tib. ? mKhyen-bzang) dge-slong (d. 1852) entitled Uxani toli kem ek u debter (Calm. C 12), written at the request of Prof. A.V. Popov; a luxurious manuscript of Za-ya pan .d . itas biography (Calm. C 20), and many others. This article merely reects the immediate impressions of a catalogue-compiler upon nishing his work.
Luvsanbaldan, pp. 152-55. Luvsanbaldan, p. 144, no. 27. 20 Yoshimizu, p. 240, no. 1667.
19 18

V.L. Uspensky Some Rare Oirat Manuscripts. . .

183

Abbreviations
Luvsanbaldan Luvsanbaldan/ Badmaev Yoshimizu Kh. Luvsanbaldan, Tod u seg, t uu niy dursgaluud. Ulaanbaatar, 1975. Kh. Luvsanbaldan and A.V. Badmaev, Kalmytskoye ksilogracheskoye izdaniye sutry Altan gerel , in: 320 Let starokalmytskoi pismennosti. Elista, 1970. Ch. Yoshimizu (ed.), Descriptive Catalogue of the Naritasan Institute Collection of Tibetan Works. Vol. 1. Naritasan, 1989. A.I. Vostrikov, Tibetskaya istoricheskaya literatura. Moscow, 1962.

Vostrikov