Political Philosophy

Allen Jeffrey Gurfel

Commentary on Rawls

First, I agree with Rawls on nearly everything. But to write about my agreement
with Rawls would be, basically, to summarize Rawls and add, and I agree. So
instead Ill raise some objections and questions. Ill try to answer the main ones too!

With regard to the original position, it seems the parties have been emptied of all
content. This raises the question: on what basis will they decide on starting
principles? The idea is that each party represents a future citizen of an as yet
unspecified society. Each will be motivated by considerations about his future fate: I
might be at the very bottomhandicapped, dumb, weak, poor, a despised minority
so I better make sure even those at the bottom arent royally screwed. This would be
the logic, anyway, if I were risk-averse. But if not? What if I were a utilitarian,
committed to the greatest overall good? I might reason that a free-market capitalist
society produces the greatest amount of wealth, so Ill take my chances. Rawls owes
a response to this possibility. He must say why, in the original position, one would
reason away from such a society and toward a society that endorses his principles.
Theres the further objection that most people cant simply divorce themselves from
their cultural and moral subjectivity.

I think he has the resources to offer a response from solidly within his theory. I
think he can also make some points he doesnt explicitly make (at least not that Im
aware of). First, suppose each citizen is not at the original position bargaining table
representing himself. Instead, hes represented by a party who knows precisely
nothing about him presently or about his future destiny in society once the veil is
lifted. The representatives role is to argue for her citizen. This means that the
representative must consider her citizens interests, but what does she know of
those? It being the case that she knows nothing about her citizen, this might be
tricky. But she does know something about her citizen: hes a human being. There
are some constantsacross geographies, times, and cultureson the list of things
essential to a good human life: shelter, food, health, freedom, the development of the
mind, the ability to develop friendships, to play, to work, to be creative, to be treated
with respect, to have dignity. If the representatives fail to establish a society that
gives every member access to these universally confirmed essentials then the
representatives have failed to represent the interests of their citizens. Rawls admits
common sense, scientific findings and non-controversial psychological theories into
the considerations and deliberations at the original position table. Presumably
history would be admissible as well. When people are denied these essentials, they
tend to revolt. Where respect for these essentials has been absent, atrocities
followed. This all provides solid reason for the representatives to endorse a
principle committed to basic and equal rights and, if possibleRawls assumption is
moderate scarcity, not society-wide dire straitssome basic measure of equality as
regards economic well-being.

It may seem that Ive side-stepped the issue of why citizens self-interest is the
representatives guiding light. It would certainly do no good to declare that this is
just a fact of the thought experiments construction. I have to ground this somehow
and I ground it in reason and rationality. Reason and rationality are instrumental;
this is why the objection to Rawls, that absent end-goals rationality does nothing for
us/doesnt move us, appears strong. Suppose this: the representative is a rational
agent, almost a machine. We need to program it to set its reason to work on
something, to give it a direction. Given the task of ordering the basic structure of
society, what are the candidates? Well, we want a good society. Thats un-
controversial. A rational analysis of the good reveals that in all cases (that I can
think of) to be good is really to be good for, and to be good for is really to be good for
something. In the case of societies, that something is persons. And Ive already
suggested that there are a) grounds for asserting a set of universally acknowledged
human goods and b) overwhelming historical evidence that absent certain
respected and enforced rights disaster follows. Thats what should set the
representatives rational wheels in motion. There arent more plausible alternatives.

I wrote out these arguments to demonstrate that Im interested in creatively but
solidly defending Rawls theory. This was all Id written prior to class. In class,
however, I started talking and went on to a dozen other topics. Ill address the
difference principle and the objections from incentives, effort, and property rights
below and then mention a few of the other questions I raised.

Reason plus a goal give the original position representatives both form and content;
common sense, broad psychological realities across time and place, and history
argue for Rawls principles. But what about the difference principle? Reason and the
goal stated above seem to endorse at least the following version of the difference
principle: if it is possible to increase one individuals wealth, without violating the
two principles weve already come to, then this should be permitted. In other words
(or numbers), 5/6/7 is preferable to 4/5/6. Do we have an argument, however, for
preferring 4/5/6 to 4/5/10 (in a society where 4/5/9 is also possiblei.e. the 10,
as opposed to the 9, isnt necessary to maintain the 4), given that this latter degree
of inequality doesnt produce social ills? Are we sure there is such an argument
besides the moral argument that also responds to objections to Rawls on
meritocratic grounds? The moral argument is straightforward: the conditions that
enable one to have 10 are morally arbitrary accidents: you were born into an
educated family, or a rich family, or a two-parent family; you were born with great
natural intelligence or athletic abilities; you were lucky, you knew the right people
or went to the right school; your talents and abilities matched those in demand in
your society, and so on. Generally, we dont tie desert to fortune. Recall that were
committed to equality, justice, and fairness. What follows is that we should not let
one profit as a result of an unjust distribution of opportunities or abilities. The only
case in which it is coherent (given our starting principles) to do so is when that
profit also benefits those worst-off either by a redistribution of wealth or by other
meansfor example, maybe the extra wealth is an incentive for people to work
certain jobs that promote the general good. (This means that the original position
representative has not actually imported a moral argument, though this appears to
be a moral argument. Rather, the difference principle is rationally derived from a
starting point affirming the two principles.) What tax rate shall we set? The
maximum rate that will still see the potential profit attracting people to these
generally beneficial positions. This is the Rawlsian answer to the objection from
incentives.

Another objection is grounded in self-possession and the right to property. If I have
property in a society that respects property and lays out reasonable rules for
obtaining property something. Im certain this objection has been raised, but I
see it as weak. I just dont believe that there is an unfettered, unlimited right to
property for at least two reasons.

1) I dont believe rights can be grounded in nature, God, or complicated
philosophy. Ultimately, there is no thing I can point to and say, there, a right!
catch it! Rights are essentially pragmatic agreements delineating
obligations, duties, and freedoms. As I argued above, in their absence
atrocities follow. We are motivated to uphold them for that reason and for
reasons of our own interests. History doesnt validate the necessity of an
unlimited, unfettered right to property and its boundless acquisition.
2) The unlimited right to freedom and acquisition leads to a direct contradiction
with rights and freedoms we universally accept as more fundamental and
uncontroversial. Consider the perfect exercise of that right. One individual
could come to rightfully own everything in a region. Should he choose to
exercise the powers attendant to ownership its easy enough to imagine how
other persons who rely on access to those items, areas, and resources could
be profoundly harmed, exploited, or coerced.

There is no such unlimited right. There is nothing to argue for it. It would not be
asserted by the original position representatives. It is not necessary to our safety,
health, happiness, and so on. It is not tied to any profound, metaphysical demand for
respect for the dignity of man, etc. Whatever genuine interests are protected by
property rights, they are equally protected by limited property rights.

I also raised the question, in class, of how this idealized theory can be implemented
in a society that isnt appearing out of thin air but has a concrete reality, history,
culture, norms, complete with injustice, long-standing oppressions, racism, sexism,
and the rest. I expressed doubt that, having been set up, a Rawlsian society would
last. I suggested that perhaps civil friendship is a fanciful idea, that inequality might
be a slippery slope, and that without the former and with the latter, and absent the
determinism characteristic of Rawls response to the objection from effort and the
individualism characteristic of our society today, the principles to argue for anti-
Rawlsian policies and institutions (or lack thereof) are floating around publicly.
Theyre available in our public discourse and the arguments have persuasive force,
especially given what privileged groups have an interest in believing, their interests
in having everyone believe the same, and their control of media and major
institutions.