Scribd
Upload
30 views

The Grue Paradox: References

The document discusses Goodman's Grue Paradox, which challenges inductive reasoning. Goodman invented the predicate "grue" to refer to objects that are green if observed before a given time, and blue if not observed before that time. Using this definition, one could construct inductive arguments that seem valid but produce false conclusions, such as arguing that all emeralds are grue based on observing emeralds that are green. This paradox shows that not all generalizations are confirmed by their instances. The paper aims to study the problems caused by using "grue" in inductive arguments and how to address issues with induction.

Uploaded by

Anonymous
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
30 views

The Grue Paradox: References

The document discusses Goodman's Grue Paradox, which challenges inductive reasoning. Goodman invented the predicate "grue" to refer to objects that are green if observed before a given time, and blue if not observed before that time. Using this definition, one could construct inductive arguments that seem valid but produce false conclusions, such as arguing that all emeralds are grue based on observing emeralds that are green. This paradox shows that not all generalizations are confirmed by their instances. The paper aims to study the problems caused by using "grue" in inductive arguments and how to address issues with induction.

Uploaded by

Anonymous
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
You are on page 1/ 1

The Grue Paradox

Rohit Kumar Jha


1
1
Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur
ABSTRACT
There is a classical problem with Induction, as pointed out by Hume, that
we can provide no non-circular justication for inductive reasoning. Goodman
came up with a very dierent question, not concerning the justication of in-
duction, that asks what sort of inductive practices are legitimate.
Goodmans new riddle of induction shows that this is a false step: not all gen-
eralizations are conrmed by their instances. He shows this by inventing the
predicate grue. It is dened as follows:
An object is grue if and only if the object is either green, and has been observed
before now, or, blue, and has not been observed before now.
We can use this term in inductive arguments like this:
Emerald 1 is grue.
Emerald 2 is grue.
. . .
. . .
Emerald n is grue.
So, all emeralds are grue.
This argument seems, by the standard suggested above, to be a perfectly good
inductive argument. But it cannot be, since it does not give us good reason to
believe that all emeralds which have not been observed till now are blue.
In this paper, we plan to study, in depth, the problems caused by the use of
grue in inductive arguments and how we can x problems, in particular this
one, with induction.
References
[1] Speaks,J. The Problem of Grue, http://www3.nd.edu/

jspeaks/courses/
2007-8/20229/_HANDOUTS/grue.pdf.
[2] Folse,H., The Grue Paradox http://www.loyno.edu/

folse/grue.html.
[3] Pennoc,R.T., Evidential Relevance and the Grue Paradox https://www.msu.
edu/

pennock5/research/papers/Pennock_Grue.pdf.
1

You might also like