SMALL WARS JOURNAL

smallwarsjournal.com

Japanese Counterinsurgency in the Philippines:

1942-45
Brian Hardesty
The first Japanese attack on the Philippines in World War II (WWII) was on December 8, 1941,
only hours after the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. The Japanese occupied the islands from
1942 until 1945. Much of the conflict was a conventional war for territory, remembered for the
Battles of Bataan, Corregidor, and the Bataan Death March much more than actions afterwards,
at least until MacArthurs return. Yet one could argue that there was a nascent insurgency in the
Philippines during this period: In fact, post war studies suggested that as many as 260,000
people were in guerrilla organizations. 1 The fact that the fall of the Japanese occupation
ultimately depended on returning American forces, rather than strategic victory through
insurgency, might limit the insurgencys historical significance, but does not diminish its value
as a case worthy of study.
The theory of counterinsurgency warfare that David Galula explained in his influential book
Counterinsurgency Warfare provides a lens through which to view the internal conflict in the
Philippines during WWII. In this way, one can analyze the Japanese successes and failures. I
argue that the Japanese counterinsurgency methods in the Philippines were largely ineffective
because of the excessive use of military force and political mistakes. This case may suggest that
Galulas theory has some explanatory power for insurgency/counterinsurgency during a hot war
between great powers. 2
Galulas thesis is that insurgency is a protracted struggle between asymmetric forces (with
different assets) for control of and support from the population. 3 Insurgents have few if any
tangible assets at the start of an insurgency, while counterinsurgents have the tremendous
military, civil and economic resources of the state. While the insurgents have tremendous
ideological power in the form of a cause, the counterinsurgents have the liability of having to
maintain security throughout the country and being judged on what they do, not what they say. 4
The insurgents strive to turn their intangible assets into tangible ones, through forming a political
party, gaining allies, conducting guerilla warfare, and eventually developing armed forces and
1

US Library of Congress Country Studies. Philippines: World War II, 1941-45. June 1991. WWW
Available: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/phtoc.html. See also: Rottman, Gordon L. World War II Pacific Island
Guide : A Geo-Military Study, Greenwood: Westport, CT, 2001, pp 288.
2
Galula, David. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International,
2006, pp xvi.
3
Galula, pp 2-4.
4
Galula, pp 3-6, 9.

overpowering the opponent. 5 Galula offers four laws of counterinsurgency, which he translates
into eight steps in a procedure: destroy the main insurgent forces; deploy static units with the
population; contact and control the population; destroy local insurgent political groups; have
local elections; test local leaders; organize a national political party; win over or suppress last
guerrillas. 6
The diverse groups of insurgents and nascent insurgents during the Japanese occupation had a
variety of causesprerequisites for insurgents, according to Galula. 7 These groups included the
Huks in central Luzon, guerrillas connected to the United States Army Forces in the Far East
(USAFFE), some former politicians, Filipino individuals, 8 US citizens living in the Philippines, 9
and ethnic Chinese. 10 The Huks were under the leadership of Luis Taruc, a Communist, in a preexisting (but adapted) insurgency. 11 Many of the other groups maintained straightforward and
salient anti-Japanese causes as a result of the invasion, brutality, 12 and the unconvincing
Japanese justification of guaranteeing the Philippines for Filipinos,13 given the previously
promised independence from the United States. 14
The diverse insurgent groups failed, however, to establish a united front, living instead with
hostile relations 15 and fear of internecine war among guerrillas. 16 The failure to establish a
united front could explain the insurgents inability to proceed beyond guerrilla warfare, based on
Galulas theory that an individual party cannot overpower the counterinsurgent by itself, but
needs allies. 17 This would explain the limited effectiveness of the massive number of guerrillas:
one could say there was not one insurgency, but several, spread across an immense archipelago
of over 7000 islands. Perhaps as a result, open war and an annihilation campaign against the
counterinsurgent forces in the Philippines took the return of US forces.
Luzon-based insurgents conducted numerous guerrilla actions, including burning bridges,
staging ambushes, destroying gasoline, raiding supply depots . . . stealing or sabotaging
telephone apparatus and wire, and capturing enemy troops. Some of the actions do not seem to
completely fit with Galulas view that the actions should be planned to organize the
population, probably because of the wartime need to affect Japanese industry--mining was a
5

Galula, pp 30-39.
Galula, pp 55-6, 76-96.
7
Galula, pp 11.
8
Ikehata Setsuho & Ricardo Trota Jose. The Philippines Under Japan : Occupation Policy and Reaction. Manila:
Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1999; pp 1-2.
9
Norling, Bernard. The Intrepid Guerrillas of North Luzon. Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky,
1999; pp viii.
10
Li, Yung. The Huaqiao Warriors: Chinese Resistance Movement in the Philippines: 1942-45. Hong
Kong
University Press: Hong Kong, 1995.
11
US Library of Congress Country Studies.
12
Joes, James. Counterinsurgency in the Philippines, Ch. 2 in: in Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian,
Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare. New York: Osprey, 2008, pp 47.
13
Japanese Military Administration of the Philippines. The Official Journal. Vol. 1, 2nd edition. Manila: Nichi
Nichi Shimbon Sha Inc. 1942, pp v.
14
Ikehata and Jose, pp 1-2.
15
Ikehata and Jose; pp 7.
16
Norling; pp 103.
17
Galula, pp 31.
6

Page 2 of 7

smallwarsjournal.com
2009, Small Wars Foundation

special target in Luzon. 18 The fact that USAFFE-connected insurgent organizations were largely
wiped out by September 1943 suggests that Galulas thesis may hold explanatory power even in
this situationas insurgents, they might have benefited from a different approach, despite
wartime goals. 19 Filipino guerrillas, in contrast, were expanding in this time period.
Many Filipinos became insurgentsand the populations support for insurgency grewbecause
of the Japanese militarys policy of oppression through violence, massacre, abuse and
plunder. 20 This was especially true in and after 1943, as conditions in the Philippines grew
worse and the Japanese took offensive measures against growing numbers of guerrillas, hurting
the population. 21 In 1944, the whole island chain became hostile territory. 22 These
developments were connected to outside events, as the Japanese counterinsurgents lost what
Galula would call the will, the means, and the ability to win in the eyes of the population. 23
Indeed, after American forces returned to the islands, guerrilla forces rose up everywhere. 24
Although events outside the spectrum of insurgency were decisive for Japans defeat in the
Philippines, it is worth examining the contributing factors in their counterinsurgency campaign.
The first seven steps Galula theorizes as necessary for successful counterinsurgency (outlined
above) were carried out to varying degrees and in a different order in the Philippines. The
Japanese campaign was not effective enough to eliminate the last guerrillas, Galulas eighth step.
Galulas explanation of the destruction of insurgent forces in the selected area is contingent on
his preconditions for how the insurgency would start, grow, and only then reveal itself. 25 This
evolution was not the case in the wartime Philippines, especially since the Japanese were a new
occupying power and the insurgents started attacking sooner than Galula recommends. The
propaganda of the Japanese Military Administration (JMA), the initial Japanese authority after
the invasion, followed Galulas advice to ask for neutrality to a degree, but with additional
brutality. 26 Although the JMA did call for cooperation (in line with their racial discourse), there
was initial emphasis on punishing 17 kinds of broad guerrilla and non-neutral behavior with the
death penalty. 27
The Japanese do not seem to have deployed static units, but instead formed neighborhood
associations in the Philippines, which were intended to incentivize spying on each other and
reporting to the authorities (as in Japan). Although Galula notes that such organizations helped
to prevent insurgency in Communist countries, 28 their corrupt behavior in the Philippines
seems to have undermined their intent to a degree. 29 The failure to deploy static units may have
18

Galula, pp 34.
Some Filipinos who had been connected to these units regrouped further South. Norling; pp viii, 239- 240.
20
Ikehata and Jose; pp 10.
21
Dowlen, Dorothy Dore. Enduring What Cannot Be Endured : Memoir of a Woman Medical Aide in the
Philippines in World War II. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Company, 2001, pp 131-3.
22
Ienaga, Saburo. The Pacific War 1931-1945. New York: Pantheon, 1978, pp 172.
23
Galula, pp 55.
24
US Library of Congress Country Studies.
25
Galula, pp 75.
26
Galula, pp 77.
27
Official Journal, Vol. 1, pp 12, 32-33.
28
Galula, pp 18-19,
29
Agoncillo, Vol. 1, pp 355.
19

Page 3 of 7

smallwarsjournal.com
2009, Small Wars Foundation

been a key failure, not convincing the population that the occupiers were there to stay, in
Galulas terms. 30
Contact with the population was a key problem for the Japanese counterinsurgency efforts. The
population suffered a punishing response from the Japanese as a result of the guerillas and the
American return, with an estimated 1,000,000 Filipinos dead by the end of the war. The fact that
most of these deaths came near the end of the warafter MacArthur returnedmay suggest that
the deaths cannot be accounted for within the counterinsurgency paradigm, but rather as part of a
conventional war for territory.32 According to the scholar Theodore Friend, the Japanese also
behaved as if the political and geographic identity, flag, anthem, and a constitution of the
Philippines had never existed, which proved to be counterproductive. 33
There were some more productive attempts in
this area: the Japanese attempted to control the
movement of people in goods, especially in
Manila. 34 Where and when neighborhood
associations functioned, they would have
probably been the counterinsurgents first line
of defense. Americans were interned in camps
like Santo Tomas, keeping them separate from
the population. Identity documents were
issued to the population, which Galula says is
essential. 35 The Japanese used divisions in
the Philippines to their advantage, organizing
Japanese immigrants to Davao, the Ricartistas,
Sakdals, and Ganaps to support their efforts
The Japanese attempted to control the
31
and collect intelligence, as part of what Galula
population with identity documents.
might call an active minority. 36 This groups
were unpopular in the Philippines, however, so they may not have been the most beneficial to
organize. 37 Nevertheless, these efforts seem completely overshadowed by the suffering inflicted
on the population, a sign that protecting the population was not an overarching goal.
Likely to their detriment, the Japanese failed to carry out Galulas political steps completely or in
order. They did not destroy the prewar political class, but rather attempted to co-opt it for their
own purposes. The Japanese sought to patronize this already existing Philippine political elite,
in a country with sharp class differences and a relatively small political class. The Japanese may
have thought this approach to be necessary because the Philippines had already been promised
independence from the United States.38 At the elite level, the Japanese did abolish political
30

Galula, pp 80.
Hollis P. Allen Materials. Honold-Mudd Library: Special Collections. Claremont, CA.
32
Norling, pp xi. See also: US Library of Congress Country Studies.
33
Friend, Theodore. The Blue-Eyed Enemy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988, pp 121.
34
Official Journal. Vol. 1, pp 10.
35
Galula, pp 82.
36
Galula, pp 53.
37
Ikehata and Jose, pp 11, 16-17.
38
Ikehata and Jose, pp 3-4. See also: Friend, pp 84-6.
31

Page 4 of 7

smallwarsjournal.com
2009, Small Wars Foundation

parties and formed the Executive Commission, which worked under the JMAs pressure, issuing
edicts along with the JMA. 39 But they accepted the mayor of Manila--who had been appointed
by the previous president--as Chairman of the Executive Commission until 1943, when Japan
proclaimed the Philippines to be an independent republic. 40 These steps do not amount to the
full destruction of the insurgent political organization, which Galula calls a necessity. 41
The counterinsurgents did create a national political party, but it does not follow Galulas theory
because it was not preceded by free local elections, probably hurting the partys credibility. The
Japanese established the KALIBAPI, or Association for Service to the New Philippines, as the
only Filipino political party in 1943, which was directed through the Tokyo-based Imperial Rule
Assistance Association. 42 This discrepancy can be easily explained due to the authoritarian
nature of the Japanese regime, which would of course be unlikely to have free elections.
Japan did have limited, controlled elections for the Preparatory Commission for Philippine
Independence and the national assembly. The national assembly, under Japanese pressure,
elected Jose P. Laurel president of the new republic. The Japanese had kept incumbent mayors
and governors as half of the assembly, perhaps trying to draw on their legitimacy. 43 This
approach is another sign of the incomplete destruction of the prewar political machinery. At
least in some cases, the results of the Japanese political approach were deleterious for their
counterinsurgency efforts: political factions sent some members to both the guerrillas and the
Japanese side. 44
The leaders were tested to some degree, but under Japanese domination they lacked the freedom
to be truly tested. Japanese control may have contributed to their problems based on Galulas
theory: testing the leaders is metric by which the counterinsurgent can judge if he is an outsider
vis--vis the population and gauge the situation. 45 Before assuming office, Laurel published a
book that praised the Japanese and their ideology. 46 This may have been a test of his loyalty, or
a step to make it clear that he had come out on the side of the counterinsurgents, a sign of
irreversibility. 47 The KALIBAPI were charged with much responsibility for propaganda: a test
and a counterinsurgency necessity. 48

39

Japanese Military Administration of the Philippines. The Official Journal. Vol. 2, 2nd edition. Manila: Nichi
Nichi Shimbon Sha Inc. 1942, pp 29.
40
Malay, Armando, J. Occupied Philippines: The Role of Jorge B. Vargas during the Japanese Occupation.
Manila: Filipiniana Book Guild, 1967, 14.
41
Galula, pp 87-89.
42
Jose, Ricardo Trota. "The KALIBAPI (Association for Service to the New Philippines) during the Japanese
Occupation." Asian Studies Conference Japan, 23 June 2002. WWW
Available: http://www.meijigakuin.ac.jp/~ascj/2002/200229.htm.
43
Japanese Occupation of the Philippines During World War II. January 3, 2009. WWW
Available: http://www.philippine-history.org/japanese-occupation.htm.
44
Ikehata and Jose, pp 3-4.
45
Galula, pp 90.
46
Laurel, Jose P. Forces that Make a Nation Great. Bureau of Information and Public Security, Ministry of the
Interior. Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1943.
47
Galula, pp 57.
48
Japanese Occupation of the Philippines During World War II. January 3, 2009. WWW
Available: http://www.philippine-history.org/japanese-occupation.htm.

Page 5 of 7

smallwarsjournal.com
2009, Small Wars Foundation

The failure of the Japanese in the Philippines can be attributed to the militarys overreactions and
political mistakes. Political mistakes can be attributed to the nature of the Japanese regime, but it
is harder to explain why the military would overreact: For that one can turn to Galula, who
posits that being aware of the strategy and tactics of counterinsurgency, having the ability to
cope, and adapting minds to counterinsurgency are clear needs for fighting a
counterinsurgency. 50 The Japanese military was sorely deficient in these key areas, according to
a leading Japanese historian, Saburo Ienaga, who wrote that Japanese military culture after the
Meiji Restoration stifled creative research and led to impoverished strategic thinking and
military doctrine, in a system where officers were akin to feudal lords over privates who had
no human rights. 51 The Japanese Army, resolute, secure at home, and controlling abroad, may
have been susceptible to infection in
part because they did not have the
structure or culture to adapt and learn. 52

The Japanese did not adapt to the challenges of

guerrilla warfare, calling it petty in this
propaganda poster. 49

By and large, variables in the case of the

Philippines during World War II play
the roles Galula suggests they would.
Although there were discrepancies with
the timeline and order of some of the
steps on both sides, perhaps due to the
quick formation of the occupying
regime, both sides benefited from
successfully conducting Galulas steps
and suffered when they did not. As a
result, this case supports Galulas theory,
even after the Japanese invasion and
with the Tokyos focus on the broader
war effort. The basics of Galulas
theory alone have explanatory power for
the counterinsurgents most important
failure: not understanding
counterinsurgency, the Japanese did not
seek the support of the population, let
alone try to protect it, and instead left a
million dead in their wake.

Brian Hardesty is in his final semester in Georgetown's Security Studies Program. He first
studied the Japanese occupation of the Philippines at the Claremont Colleges' library, which has
two special collections on the subject thanks to the generous contributions of Hollis P. Allen and
William B. Simpson. Dr. John Nagl's class on counterinsurgency at Georgetown rekindled
Brian's passion for the case.
49

Hollis P. Allen Materials. Honold-Mudd Library: Special Collections. Claremont, CA.

Galula, pp 17, 65-66.
51
Ienaga, pp 48-51.
52
Galula, pp 17.
50

Page 6 of 7

smallwarsjournal.com
2009, Small Wars Foundation

This is a single article excerpt of material published in Small Wars Journal.

Published by and COPYRIGHT 2009, Small Wars Foundation.
Permission is granted to print single copies for personal, non-commercial use. Select non-commercial use is licensed
via a Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 3.0 license and per our Terms of Use. We are in this together.

No FACTUAL STATEMENT should be relied upon without further investigation on your part sufficient to satisfy you in
your independent judgment that it is true.
Contact: [email protected]

Visit www.smallwarsjournal.com
Cover Price:

Your call. Support SWJ here.

Page 7 of 7

smallwarsjournal.com
2009, Small Wars Foundation