Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 164679

Present:

- versus -

CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*
BRION,
PERALTA,** and
PEREZ, JJ.
Promulgated:

ULDARICO P. ANDUTAN, JR.,

Respondent.

July 27, 2011

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BRION, J.:

Through a petition for review on certiorari,[1] the petitioner Office of the

Ombudsman (Ombudsman) seeks the reversal of the decision [2] of the Court of
Appeals (CA), dated July 28, 2004, in Uldarico P. Andutan, Jr. v. Office of the
Ombudsman and Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB), etc., docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 68893. The assailed decision annulled and set aside the decision

of the Ombudsman dated July 30, 2001, [3] finding Uldarico P. Andutan, Jr. guilty of
Gross Neglect of Duty.

THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

Andutan was formerly the Deputy Director of the One-Stop Shop Tax Credit
and Duty Drawback Center of the Department of Finance (DOF). On June 30,
1998, then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora issued a Memorandum directing
all non-career officials or those occupying political positions to vacate their
positions effective July 1, 1998.[4] On July 1, 1998, pursuant to the Memorandum,
Andutan resigned from the DOF.[5]
On September 1, 1999, Andutan, together with Antonio P. Belicena, former
Undersecretary, DOF; Rowena P. Malonzo, Tax Specialist I, DOF; Benjamin O.
Yao, Chairman and Executive Officer, Steel Asia Manufacturing Corporation (Steel
Asia); Augustus S. Lapid, Vice-President, Steel Asia; Antonio M. Lorenzana,
President and Chief Operating Officer, Steel Asia; and Eulogio L. Reyes, General
Manager, Devmark Textiles Ind. Inc., was criminally charged by the Fact Finding
and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) of the Ombudsman with Estafa through
Falsification of Public Documents, and violations of Section 3(a), (e) and (j) of
Republic Act No. (R.A.) 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.[6] As government employees, Andutan, Belicena and Malonzo were
likewise administratively charged of Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, Falsification
of Official Documents and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.[7]
The criminal and administrative charges arose from anomalies in the illegal
transfer of Tax Credit Certificates (TCCs) to Steel Asia, among others.[8]
During the investigation, the FFIB found that Steel Asia fraudulently
obtained TCCs worth Two Hundred Forty-Two Million, Four Hundred Thirty-Three
Thousand, Five Hundred Thirty-Four Pesos (P242,433,534.00).[9] The FFIB
concluded that Belicena, Malonzo and Andutan in their respective capacities
irregularly approved the issuance of the TCCs to several garment/textile companies
and allowing their subsequent illegal transfer to Steel Asia.[10]

On November 11, 1999, the Ombudsman ordered the respondents therein

(respondents) to submit their counter-affidavits.Only Malonzo complied with the
order, prompting the Ombudsman to set a Preliminary Conference on March 13,
2000.
Upon the respondents failure to appear at the March 20, 2000 hearing, the
Ombudsman deemed the case submitted for resolution.
On July 30, 2001, the Ombudsman found the respondents guilty of Gross
Neglect of Duty.[11] Having been separated from the service, Andutan was imposed
the penalty of forfeiture of all leaves, retirement and other benefits and privileges,
and perpetual disqualification from reinstatement and/or reemployment in any
branch or instrumentality of the government, including government owned and
controlled agencies or corporations.[12]
After failing to obtain a reconsideration of the decision, [13] Andutan filed a
petition for review on certiorari before the CA.
On July 28, 2004,[14] the CA annulled and set aside the decision of the
Ombudsman, ruling that the latter should not have considered the administrative
complaints because: first, Section 20 of R.A. 6770 provides that the
Ombudsman may not conduct the necessary investigation of any administrative act
or omission complained of if it believes that x x x [t]he complaint was filed after
one year from the occurrence of the act or omission complained of; [15] and second,
the administrative case was filed after Andutans forced resignation.[16]
THE PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS
In this petition for review on certiorari, the Ombudsman asks the Court to overturn
the decision of the CA. It submits, first, that contrary to the CAs findings,
administrative offenses do not prescribe after one year from their commission,
[17]
and second, that in cases of capital administrative offenses, resignation or
optional retirement cannot render administrative proceedings moot and academic,
since accessory penalties such as perpetual disqualification and the forfeiture of
retirement benefits may still be imposed.[18]

The Ombudsman argues that Section 20 of R.A. 6770 is not mandatory. Consistent
with existing jurisprudence, the use of the word may indicates that Section 20 is
merely directory or permissive.[19] Thus, it is not ministerial upon it to dismiss the
administrative complaint, as long as any of the circumstances under Section 20 is
present.[20] In any case, the Ombudsman urges the Court to examine its mandate
under Section 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, and hold that an imposition
of a one (1) year prescriptive period on the filing of cases unconstitutionally
restricts its mandate.[21]
Further, the Ombudsman submits that Andutans resignation from office does not
render moot the administrative proceedings lodged against him, even after his
resignation. Relying on Section VI(1) of Civil Service Commission (CSC)
Memorandum Circular No. 38,[22] the Ombudsman argues that [a]s long as the
breach of conduct was committed while the public official or employee was still in
the service x x x a public servants resignation is not a bar to his administrative
investigation, prosecution and adjudication.[23] It is irrelevant that Andutan had
already resigned from office when the administrative case was filed since he was
charged for acts performed in office which are inimical to the service and
prejudicial to the interests of litigants and the general public. [24]Furthermore, even if
Andutan had already resigned, there is a need to determine whether or not there
remains penalties capable of imposition, like bar from reentering the (sic) public
service and forfeiture of benefits.[25] Finally, the Ombudsman reiterates that its
findings against Andutan are supported by substantial evidence.
THE RESPONDENTS ARGUMENTS
Andutan raises three (3) counterarguments to the Ombudsmans petition.
First, Andutan submits that the CA did not consider Section 20(5) of R.A.
6770 as a prescriptive period; rather, the CA merely held that the Ombudsman
should not have considered the administrative complaint. According to Andutan,
Section 20(5) does not purport to impose a prescriptive period x x x but simply
prohibits the Office of the Ombudsman from conducting an investigation where the
complaint [was] filed more than one (1) year from the occurrence of the act or
omission complained of.[26] Andutan believes that the Ombudsman should have
referred the complaint to another government agency.[27] Further, Andutan disagrees

with the Ombudsmans interpretation of Section 20(5). Andutan suggests that the
phrase may not conduct the necessary investigation means that the Ombudsman is
prohibited to act on cases that fall under those enumerated in Section 20(5).[28]
Second, Andutan reiterates that the administrative case against him was moot
because he was no longer in the public service at the time the case was commenced.
[29]
According to Andutan, Atty. Perez v. Judge Abiera[30] and similar cases cited by
the Ombudsman do not apply since the administrative investigations against the
respondents in those cases were commenced prior to their resignation. Here,
Andutan urges the Court to rule otherwise since unlike the cases cited, he had
already resigned before the administrative case was initiated. He further notes that
his resignation from office cannot be characterized as preemptive, i.e. made under
an atmosphere of fear for the imminence of formal charges[31] because it was done
pursuant to the Memorandum issued by then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora.
Having established the propriety of his resignation, Andutan asks the Court to
uphold the mootness of the administrative case against him since the cardinal issue
in administrative cases is the officers fitness to remain in office, the principal
penalty imposable being either suspension or removal. [32] The Ombudsmans
opinion - that accessory penalties may still be imposed - is untenable since it is a
fundamental legal principle that accessory follows the principal, and the former
cannot exist independently of the latter.[33]
Third, the Ombudsmans findings were void because procedural and
substantive due process were not observed. Likewise, Andutan submits that the
Ombudsmans findings lacked legal and factual bases.

ISSUES
Based on the submissions made, we see the following as the issues for our
resolution:
I.
II.
III.

Does Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting
an administrative investigation a year after the act was committed?
Does Andutans resignation render moot the administrative case filed against
him?
Assuming that the administrative case is not moot, are the Ombudsmans
findings supported by substantial evidence?
THE COURTS RULING

We rule to deny the petition.

The provisions of Section 20(5) are merely
directory; the Ombudsman is not
prohibited from conducting an
investigation a year after the supposed act
was committed.
The issue of whether Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 is mandatory or
discretionary has been settled by jurisprudence. [34] In Office of the Ombudsman v.
De Sahagun,[35] the Court, speaking through Justice Austria-Martinez, held:
[W]ell-entrenched is the rule that administrative offenses do not prescribe
[Concerned Taxpayer v. Doblada, Jr., A.M. No. P-99-1342, September 20, 2005,
470 SCRA 218; Melchor v. Gironella, G.R. No. 151138, February 16, 2005, 451
SCRA 476; Heck v. Judge Santos, 467 Phil. 798, 824 (2004); Floria v. Sunga, 420
Phil. 637, 648-649 (2001)]. Administrative offenses by their very nature pertain to
the character of public officers and employees. In disciplining public officers and
employees, the object sought is not the punishment of the officer or employee but
the improvement of the public service and the preservation of the publics faith
and confidence in our government [Melchor v. Gironella, G.R. No. 151138,
February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 476, 481; Remolona v. Civil Service
Commission, 414 Phil. 590, 601 (2001)].
Respondents insist that Section 20 (5) of R.A. No. 6770, to wit:

SEC. 20. Exceptions. The Office of the Ombudsman may not conduct the
necessary investigation of any administrative act or omission complained
of if it believes that:
xxxx
(5) The complaint was filed after one year from the occurrence of the act
or omission complained of. (Emphasis supplied)
proscribes the investigation of any administrative act or omission if the complaint
was filed after one year from the occurrence of the complained act or omission.
In Melchor v. Gironella [G.R. No. 151138, February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA
476], the Court held that the period stated in Section 20(5) of R.A. No. 6770 does
not refer to the prescription of the offense but to the discretion given to
the Ombudsman on whether it would investigate a particular administrative
offense. The use of the word "may" in the provision is construed as permissive
and operating to confer discretion [Melchor v. Gironella, G.R. No. 151138,
February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 476, 481; Jaramilla v. Comelec, 460 Phil. 507, 514
(2003)]. Where the words of a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity,
they must be given their literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation [Melchor v. Gironella, G.R. No. 151138, February 16, 2005, 451
SCRA 476, 481; National Federation of Labor v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 383 Phil. 910, 918 (2000)].
In Filipino v. Macabuhay [G.R. No. 158960, November 24, 2006, 508 SCRA
50], the Court interpreted Section 20 (5) of R.A. No. 6770 in this manner:
Petitioner argues that based on the abovementioned provision [Section
20(5) of RA 6770)], respondent's complaint is barred by prescription
considering that it was filed more than one year after the alleged
commission of the acts complained of.
Petitioner's argument is without merit.
The use of the word "may" clearly shows that it is directory in nature and
not mandatory as petitioner contends. When used in a statute, it is
permissive only and operates to confer discretion; while the word "shall"
is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced.
Applying Section 20(5), therefore, it is discretionary upon the
Ombudsman whether or not to conduct an investigation on a
complaint even if it was filed after one year from the occurrence of the
act or omission complained of. In fine, the complaint is not barred by
prescription. (Emphasis supplied)

The declaration of the CA in its assailed decision that while as a general rule the
word "may" is directory, the negative phrase "may not" is mandatory in
tenor; that a directory word, when qualified by the word "not," becomes
prohibitory and therefore becomes mandatory in character, is not plausible.
It is not supported by jurisprudence on statutory construction. [emphases and
underscoring supplied]

Clearly, Section 20 of R.A. 6770 does not prohibit the Ombudsman from
conducting an administrative investigation after the lapse of one year, reckoned
from the time the alleged act was committed. Without doubt, even if the
administrative case was filed beyond the one (1) year period stated in Section
20(5), the Ombudsman was well within its discretion to conduct the administrative
investigation.
However, the crux of the present controversy is not on the issue of
prescription, but on the issue of the Ombudsmans authority to institute an
administrative complaint against a government employee who had already
resigned. On this issue, we rule in Andutans favor.
Andutans resignation divests the
Ombudsman of its right to institute an
administrative complaint against him.
Although the Ombudsman is not precluded by Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 from
conducting the investigation, the Ombudsman can no longer institute an
administrative case against Andutan because the latter was not a public servant at
the time the case was filed.
The Ombudsman argued in both the present petition and in the petition it filed with
the CA that Andutans retirement from office does not render moot any
administrative case, as long as he is charged with an offense he committed while in
office. It is irrelevant, according to the Ombudsman, that Andutan had already
resigned prior to the filing of the administrative case since the operative fact that
determines its jurisdiction is the commission of an offense while in the public
service.

The Ombudsman relies on Section VI(1) of Civil Service Commission

Memorandum Circular No. 38 for this proposition, viz.:
Section VI.
1. x x x
An officer or employee under administrative investigation may be allowed to
resign pending decision of his case but it shall be without prejudice to the
continuation of the proceeding against him. It shall also be without prejudice to
the filing of any administrative, criminal case against him for any act
committed while still in the service. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The CA refused to give credence to this argument, holding that the provision refers
to cases where the officers or employees were already charged before they were
allowed to resign or were separated from service.[36] In this case, the CA noted that
the administrative cases were filed only after Andutan was retired, hence the
Ombudsman was already divested of jurisdiction and could no longer prosecute the
cases.[37]
Challenging the CAs interpretation, the Ombudsman argues that the CA limited the
scope of the cited Civil Service Memorandum Circular to the first sentence.
[38]
Further, according to the Ombudsman, the court a quo ignored the second
statement in the said circular that contemplates a situation where previous to the
institution of the administrative investigation or charge, the public official or
employee subject of the investigation has resigned.[39]
To recall, we have held in the past that a public officials resignation does not render
moot an administrative case that was filed prior to the officials
resignation. In Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr.,[40] we held that:
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Juan [A.M. No. P-03-1726, 22 July
2004, 434 SCRA 654, 658], this Court categorically ruled that the precipitate
resignation of a government employee charged with an offense punishable by
dismissal from the service does not render moot the administrative case against
him. Resignation is not a way out to evade administrative liability when
facing administrative sanction. The resignation of a public servant does not
preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which he or she shall

still be answerable[Baquerfo v. Sanchez, A.M. No. P-05-1974, 6 April 2005, 455

SCRA 13, 19-20]. [emphasis and underscoring supplied]

Likewise, in Baquerfo v. Sanchez,[41] we held:

Cessation from office of respondent by resignation [Reyes v. Cristi, A.M.
No. P-04-1801, 2 April 2004, 427 SCRA 8] or retirement [Re: Complaint Filed by
Atty. Francis Allan A. Rubio on the Alleged Falsification of Public Documents
and Malversation of Public Funds, A.M. No. 2004-17-SC, 27 September
2004; Caja v. Nanquil, A.M. No. P-04-1885, 13 September 2004] neither
warrants the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against him
while he was still in the service [Tuliao v. Ramos, A.M. No. MTJ-95-1065, 348
Phil. 404, 416 (1998), citing Perez v. Abiera, A.C. No. 223-J, 11 June 1975, 64
SCRA 302; Secretary of Justice v. Marcos, A.C. No. 207-J, 22 April 1977, 76
SCRA 301] nor does it render said administrative case moot and academic [Sy
Bang v. Mendez, 350 Phil. 524, 533 (1998)]. The jurisdiction that was this Courts
at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere
fact that the respondent public official had ceased in office during the pendency of
his case [Flores v. Sumaljag, 353 Phil. 10, 21 (1998)]. Respondents resignation
does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which he shall
still be answerable [OCA v. Fernandez, A.M. No. MTJ-03-1511, 20 August
2004]. [emphases and underscoring supplied)

However, the facts of those cases are not entirely applicable to the present case. In
the above-cited cases, the Court found that the public officials subject of the
administrative cases resigned, either to prevent the continuation of a case already
filed[42] or to pre-empt the imminent filing of one.[43] Here, neither situation obtains.
The Ombudsmans general assertion that Andutan pre-empted the filing of a
case against him by resigning, since he knew for certain that the investigative and
disciplinary arms of the State would eventually reach him[44] is unfounded. First,
Andutans resignation was neither his choice nor of his own doing; he was forced to
resign. Second, Andutan resigned from his DOF post on July 1, 1998, while the
administrative case was filed on September 1, 1999, exactly one (1) year and two
(2) months after his resignation. The Court struggles to find reason in the
Ombudsmans sweeping assertions in light of these facts.
What is clear from the records is that Andutan was forced to resign more
than a year before the Ombudsman filed the administrative case against

him. Additionally, even if we were to accept the Ombudsmans position that

Andutan foresaw the filing of the case against him, his forced resignation negates
the claim that he tried to prevent the filing of the administrative case.
Having established the inapplicability of prevailing jurisprudence, we turn our
attention to the provisions of Section VI of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 38. We
disagree with the Ombudsmans interpretation that [a]s long as the breach of
conduct was committed while the public official or employee was still in the
service x x x a public servants resignation is not a bar to his administrative
investigation, prosecution and adjudication.[45] If we agree with this interpretation,
any official even if he has been separated from the service for a long time may still
be subject to the disciplinary authority of his superiors, ad infinitum. We believe
that this interpretation is inconsistent with the principal motivation of the law
which is to improve public service and to preserve the publics faith and confidence
in the government, and not the punishment of the public official concerned.
[46]
Likewise, if the act committed by the public official is indeed inimical to the
interests of the State, other legal mechanisms are available to redress the same.
The possibility of imposing
accessory penalties does not
negate the Ombudsmans lack
of jurisdiction.
The Ombudsman suggests that although the issue of Andutans removal from
the service is moot, there is an irresistible justification to determine whether or not
there remains penalties capable of imposition, like bar from re-entering the public
service and forfeiture of benefits.[47] Otherwise stated, since accessory penalties
may still be imposed against Andutan, the administrative case itself is not moot and
may proceed despite the inapplicability of the principal penalty of removal from
office.
We find several reasons that militate against this position.
First, although we have held that the resignation of an official does not
render an administrative case moot and academic because accessory penalties may

still be imposed, this holding must be read in its proper context. In Pagano v.
Nazarro, Jr.,[48]indeed, we held:
A case becomes moot and academic only when there is no more actual
controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing
upon the merits of the case [Tantoy, Sr. v. Abrogar, G.R. No. 156128, 9 May 2005,
458 SCRA 301, 305]. The instant case is not moot and academic, despite the
petitioners separation from government service. Even if the most severe of
administrative sanctions - that of separation from service - may no longer be
imposed on the petitioner, there are other penalties which may be imposed on her
if she is later found guilty of administrative offenses charged against her, namely,
the disqualification to hold any government office and the forfeiture of benefits.
[emphasis and underscoring supplied]

Reading the quoted passage in a vacuum, one could be led to the conclusion that
the mere availability of accessory penalties justifies the continuation of an
administrative case. This is a misplaced reading of the case and its ruling.
Esther S. Pagano who was serving as Cashier IV at the Office of the Provincial
Treasurer of Benguet filed her certificate of candidacy for councilor four days after
the Provincial Treasurer directed her to explain why no administrative case should
be filed against her.The directive arose from allegations that her accountabilities
included a cash shortage of P1,424,289.99. She filed her certificate of candidacy
under the pretext that since she was deemed ipso facto resigned from office, she
was
no
longer
under
the
administrative
jurisdiction
of
her
superiors. Thus, according to Pagano, the administrative complaint had become
moot.
We rejected Paganos position on the principal ground that the precipitate
resignation of a government employee charged with an offense punishable by
dismissal from the service does not render moot the administrative case against
him. Resignation is not a way out to evade administrative liability when facing
administrative sanction.[49] Our position that accessory penalties are still imposable
thereby negating the mootness of the administrative complaint merely flows from
the fact that Pagano pre-empted the filing of the administrative case against her. It
was neither intended to be a stand-alone argument nor would it have justified the
continuation of the administrative complaint if Paganos filing of

candidacy/resignation did not reek of irregularities. Our factual findings

in Paganoconfirm this, viz.:
At the time petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy, petitioner was already
notified by the Provincial Treasurer that she needed to explain why no
administrative charge should be filed against her, after it discovered the cash
shortage of P1,424,289.99 in her accountabilities. Moreover, she had already
filed her answer. To all intents and purposes, the administrative proceedings
had already been commenced at the time she was considered separated from
service through her precipitate filing of her certificate of
candidacy. Petitioners bad faith was manifest when she filed it, fully
knowing that administrative proceedings were being instituted against her as
part of the procedural due process in laying the foundation for an
administrative case.[50] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Plainly, our justification for the continuation of the administrative case

notwithstanding Paganos resignation was her bad faith in filing the certificate of
candidacy, and not the availability of accessory penalties.
Second, we agree with the Ombudsman that fitness to serve in public office
x x x is a question of transcendental [importance][51] and that preserving the
inviolability of public office compels the state to prevent the re-entry [to] public
service of persons who have x x x demonstrated their absolute lack of fitness to
hold public office.[52] However, the State must perform this task within the limits
set by law, particularly, the limits of jurisdiction. As earlier stated, under the
Ombudsmans theory, the administrative authorities may exercise administrative
jurisdiction over subordinates ad infinitum; thus, a public official who has validly
severed his ties with the civil service may still be the subject of an administrative
complaint up to his deathbed. This is contrary to the law and the public policy
behind it.
Lastly, the State is not without remedy against Andutan or any public official
who committed violations while in office, but had already resigned or retired
therefrom. Under the threefold liability rule, the wrongful acts or omissions of a
public officer may give rise to civil, criminal and administrative liability. [53] Even if
the Ombudsman may no longer file an administrative case against a public official
who has already resigned or retired, the Ombudsman may still file criminal and
civil cases to vindicate Andutans alleged transgressions. In fact, here, the
Ombudsman through the FFIB filed a criminal case for Estafa and violations of

Section 3(a), (e) and (j) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against
Andutan. If found guilty, Andutan will not only be meted out the penalty of
imprisonment, but also the penalties of perpetual disqualification from office, and
confiscation or forfeiture of any prohibited interest.[54]
CONCLUSION
Public office is a public trust. No precept of administrative law is more basic
than this statement of what assumption of public office involves. The stability of
our public institutions relies on the ability of our civil servants to serve their
constituencies well.
While we commend the Ombudsmans resolve in pursuing the present case
for violations allegedly committed by Andutan, the Court is compelled to uphold
the law and dismiss the petition. Consistent with our holding that Andutan is no
longer the proper subject of an administrative complaint, we find no reason to
delve on the Ombudsmans factual findings.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the Office of the Ombudsmans petition for
review on certiorari, and AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 68893, promulgated on July 28, 2004, which annulled and set aside
the July 30, 2001 decision of the Office of the Ombudsman, finding Uldarico P.
Andutan, Jr. guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

TERESITAJ. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

AT T E S TAT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Designated as Acting Member of the Second Division per Special Order No. 1006 dated June 10, 2011.
Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno per Special Order No. 1040 dated July
6, 2011.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 12-74; filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[2]
Id. at 76-83; penned by Associate Justice Roberto A. Barrios, and concurred in by Associate Justices Amelita G.
Tolentino and Vicente S.E. Veloso.
[3]
Id. at 173-188.
[4]
Id. at 163.
[5]
Id. at 164.
[6]
Id. at 22.
[7]
Ibid.
[8]
Id. at 77.
[9]
Id. at 78.
[10]
Id. at 77-78.
[11]
Supra note 3.
[12]
Id. at 186.
[13]
Rollo, pp. 189202.
[14]
Supra note 2.
[15]
Id. at 8182.
[16]
Id. at 82.
[17]
Rollo, p. 26.
[18]
Id. at 6365.
**

[19]

Id. at 29.
Id. at 2930.
[21]
Id. at 3334.
[22]
Section VI.
1.
xxx
An officer or employee under administrative investigation may be allowed to resign pending decision of his
case but it shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the proceeding against him. It shall also be
without prejudice to the filing of any administrative, criminal case against him for any act committed while
still in the service.
[23]
Rollo, p. 57.
[24]
Id. at 59, citing Perez v. Abiera, A.C. No. 223-J, June 11, 1975.
[20]

[25]
[26]

Id. at 62-63.
Id. at 255.

[27]

Ibid.
Id. at 256; relying on Ruben Agpalo, Statutory Construction 338 (4th ed., 1998):
The use by the legislature of negative, prohibitory or exclusive terms or words in a statute is indicative of the
legislative intent to make the statute mandatory. A statute or provision which contains words of positive prohibition,
such as shall not, cannot, or ought not, or which is couched in negative terms importing that the act shall not be done
otherwise than designated is mandatory. Prohibitive or negative words can rarely, if ever, be directory, for there is
but one way to obey the command, thou shall not, and that is to completely refrain from doing the forbidden act.
[29]
Id. at 257.
[30]
159-A Phil. 575 (1975).
[31]
Rollo, p. 262.
[32]
Ibid.
[33]
Id. at 263.
[28]

[34]

Office of the Ombudsman v. De Sahagun, G.R. No. 167982, August 13, 2008, 562 SCRA 122, 128.
Id. at 128130.
[36]
Rollo, p. 82.
[37]
Ibid.
[38]
Rollo, p. 56.
[39]
Ibid.
[40]
G.R. No. 149072, September 21, 2007, 533 SCRA 622, 628.
[41]
495 Phil. 10, 16-17 (2005).
[42]
See Baquerfo v. Sanchez, supra note 41; and Tuliao v. Judge Ramos, 348 Phil. 404, 416 (1998), citing Perez v.
Abiera, A.C. No. 223-J, 11 June 1975, 64 SCRA 302, Secretary of Justice v. Marcos, A.C. No. 207-J, 22 April 1997,
76 SCRA 301.
[43]
See Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr., supra note 40; and OCA v. Juan, 478 Phil. 823 (2004).
[44]
Rollo, pp. 6162.
An officer or employee under administrative investigation may be allowed to resign pending decision of his case but
it shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the proceeding against him. It shall also be without prejudice to
the filing of other administrative or criminal case against him for any act committed while still in the service.
[45]
Id. at 57.
[46]
Office of the Ombudsman v. De Sahagun, supra note 34, at 128, citing Melchor v. Gironella, G.R. No. 151138,
February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 476, 481; and Remolona v. Civil Service Commission, 414 Phil. 590, 601 (2001). See
also Bautista v. Negado, 108 Phil. 283 (1960).
[47]
Rollo, pp. 6263.
[48]
Supra note 40, at 628.
[49]
Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr., supra note 40, at 628, citing Office of the Court Administrator v. Juan, A.M. No. P-031726, 22 July 2004, 434 SCRA 654, 658.
[50]
Id. at 631.
[51]
Rollo, p. 63.
[52]
Id. at 65.
[53]
Antonio E.B. Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law 478 (2009 ed.). See also Hector S. De Leon and Hector
M. De Leon, Jr., The Law on Public Officers and Election Law 262 (6thed., 2008).
[54]
R.A. 3019. Sec. 9. Penalties for violations. - (a) Any public officer or private person committing any of the
unlawful acts or omissions enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment for
not less than one year nor more than ten years, perpetual disqualification from public office, and confiscation or
forfeiture in favor of the Government of any prohibited interest and unexplained wealth manifestly out of proportion
to his salary and other lawful income.
[35]