CONSTANTINO v.

CUISA
FACTS: During the Aquino regime, her administration came up w/ a scheme to reduce the
countrys external debt. The solution resorted to was to incur foreign debts. Three restructuring
programs were sought to initiate the program for foreign debts they are basically buyback
programs & bond-conversion programs). Constantino as a taxpayer and in behalf of his minor
children who are Filipino citizens, together w/ FFDC averred that the buyback and bondconversion schemes are onerous and they do not constitute the loan contract or guarantee
contemplated in Sec. 20, Art. 7 of the Constitution. And assuming that the President has such
power unlike other powers which may be validly delegated by the President, the power to incur
foreign debts is expressly reserved by the Constitution in the person of the President. They argue
that the gravity by which the exercise of the power will affect the Filipino nation requires that the
President alone must exercise this power. They argue that the requirement of prior concurrence
of an entity specifically named by the Constitutionthe Monetary Boardreinforces the
submission that not respondents but the President alone and personally can validly bind the
country. Hence, they would like Cuisia et al to stop acting pursuant to the scheme.
ISSUE: Whether or not the president can validly delegate her debt power to the respondents.
HELD: There is no question that the president has borrowing powers and that the president may
contract or guarantee foreign loans in behalf of this country w/ prior concurrence of the Monetary
Board. It makes no distinction whatsoever and the fact that a debt or a loan may be onerous is
irrelevant. On the other hand, the president can delegate this power to her direct subordinates.
The evident exigency of having the Secretary of Finance implement the decision of the President
to execute the debt-relief contracts is made manifest by the fact that the process of establishing
and executing a strategy for managing the governments debt is deep within the realm of the
expertise of the Department of Finance, primed as it is to raise the required amount of funding,
achieve its risk and cost objectives, and meet any other sovereign debt management goals. If
the President were to personally exercise every aspect of the foreign borrowing power, he/she
would have to pause from running the country long enough to focus on a welter of timeconsuming detailed activitiesthe propriety of incurring/guaranteeing loans, studying and
choosing among the many methods that may be taken toward this end, meeting countless times
with creditor representatives to negotiate, obtaining the concurrence of the Monetary Board,
explaining and defending the negotiated deal to the public, and more often than not, flying to
the agreed place of execution to sign the documents. This sort of constitutional interpretation
would negate the very existence of cabinet positions and the respective expertise which the
holders thereof are accorded and would unduly hamper the Presidents effectivity in running the
government. The act of the respondents are not unconstitutional.
Exception
There are certain acts which, by their very nature, cannot be validated by subsequent approval
or ratification by the President. There are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the
Chief Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by him in person and no amount of
approval or ratification will validate the exercise of any of those powers by any other person.
Such, for instance, in his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law
and the exercise by him of the benign prerogative of pardon (mercy).
There are certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptional circumstances, and if
exercised, would involve the suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the
supersedence of executive prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of
government. The declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the
exercise of the pardoning power notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the
accused, all fall within this special class that demands the exclusive exercise by the President of

the constitutionally vested power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be a showing
that the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import.

Issue
:WON the President can delegate thepower to incur foreign debts to other executive agencies
.WON the President can borrow to meet public expenditures in the form of bonds.
Ratio/Doctrine
: Yes, based on the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency. Each head of the department is and must
be, the Presidents alter ego in the matters of that department where the President is required by
law to exercise authority.

SPOUSES RENATO CONSTANTINO, JR. and LOURDES CONSTANTINO Present: and their minor
children RENATO REDENTOR, DAVIDE, JR., CJ., ANNA MARIKA LISSA, PUNO, NINA ELISSA, and
PANGANIBAN, ANNA KARMINA, QUISUMBING, FREEDOM FROM DEBT YNARES-SANTIAGO,
COALITION, and FILOMENO SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, STA. ANA III, CARPIO, Petitioners , AUSTRIAMARTINEZ,CORONA, CARPIO-MORALES, CALLEJO, SR., - versus - AZCUNA, TINGA, CHICONAZARIO, and GARCIA, JJ. HON. JOSE B. CUISIA, in his capacity as Governor of the Central Bank,
HON. RAMON DEL ROSARIO, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, HON. EMMANUEL V. PELAEZ,
in his capacity as Philippine Debt Negotiating Chairman, and the NATIONAL Promulgated:
TREASURER, Respondents. October 13, 2005
x-------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The quagmire that is the foreign debt problem has especially confounded developing
nations around the world for decades. It has defied easy solutions acceptable both to debtor
countries and their creditors. It has also emerged as cause celebre for various political
movements and grassroots activists and the wellspring of much scholarly thought and debate.
The present petition illustrates some of the ideological and functional differences between
experts on how to achieve debt relief. However, this being a court of law, not an academic forum
or a convention on development economics, our resolution has to hinge on the presented legal
issues which center on the appreciation of the constitutional provision that empowers the
President to contract and guarantee foreign loans. The ultimate choice is between a restrictive
reading of the constitutional provision and an alimentative application thereof consistent with
time-honored principles on executive power and the alter ego doctrine.
This Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus assails said contracts which were
entered into pursuant to the Philippine Comprehensive Financing Program for 1992 (Financing
Program or Program). It seeks to enjoin respondents from executing additional debt-relief
contracts pursuant thereto. It also urges the Court to issue an order compelling the Secretary of
Justice to institute criminal and administrative cases against respondents for acts which
circumvent or negate the provisions Art. XII of the Constitution. [1]
Parties and Facts
The petition was filed on 17 July 1992 by petitioners spouses Renato Constantino, Jr. and
Lourdes Constantino and their minor children, Renato Redentor, Anna Marika Lissa, Nina Elissa,
and Anna Karmina, Filomeno Sta. Ana III, and the Freedom from Debt Coalition, a non-stock, nonprofit, non-government organization that advocates a pro-people and just Philippine debt policy.
[2]
Named respondents were the then Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, the Secretary
of Finance, the National Treasurer, and the Philippine Debt Negotiation Chairman Emmanuel V.
Pelaez.[3] All respondents were members of the Philippine panel tasked to negotiate with the
countrys foreign creditors pursuant to the Financing Program.

The operative facts are sparse and there is little need to elaborate on them.
The Financing Program was the culmination of efforts that began during the term of
former President Corazon Aquino to manage the countrys external debt problem through a
negotiation-oriented debt strategy involving cooperation and negotiation with foreign creditors.
[4]
Pursuant to this strategy, the Aquino government entered into three restructuring agreements
with representatives of foreign creditor governments during the period of 1986 to 1991. [5] During
the same period, three similarly-oriented restructuring agreements were executed with
commercial bank creditors.[6]
On 28 February 1992, the Philippine Debt Negotiating Team, chaired by respondent Pelaez,
negotiated an agreement with the countrys Bank Advisory Committee, representing all foreign

commercial bank creditors, on the Financing Program which respondents characterized as a

multi-option financing

package.[7] The Program was scheduled to be executed on 24 July 1992 by respondents in behalf
of the Republic. Nonetheless, petitioners alleged that even prior to the execution of the Program
respondents had already implemented its buyback component when on 15 May 1992, the
Philippines bought back P1.26 billion of external debts pursuant to the Program. [8]
The petition sought to enjoin the ratification of the Program, but the Court did not issue
any injunctive relief. Hence, it came to pass that the Program was signed in London as
scheduled. The petition still has to be resolved though as petitioners seek the annulment of
any and all acts done by respondents, their subordinates and any other public officer pursuant to
the agreement and program in question.[9]Even after the signing of the Program, respondents
themselves acknowledged that the remaining principal objective of the petition is to set aside
respondents actions.[10]
Petitioners characterize the Financing Program as a package offered to the countrys
foreign creditors consisting of two debt-relief options. [11] The first option was a cash buyback of
portions of the Philippine foreign debt at a discount. [12] The second option allowed creditors to
convert existing Philippine debt instruments into any of three kinds of bonds/securities: (1) new
money bonds with a five-year grace period and 17 years final maturity, the purchase of which
would allow the creditors to convert their eligible debt papers into bearer bonds with the same
terms; (2) interest-reduction bonds with a maturity of 25 years; and (3) principal-collateralized
interest-reduction bonds with a maturity of 25 years. [13]
On the other hand, according to respondents the Financing Program would cover about U.S. $5.3
billion of foreign commercial debts and it was expected to deal comprehensively with the
commercial bank debt problem of the country and pave the way for the countrys access to
capital markets.[14] They add that the Program carried three basic options from which foreign
bank lenders could choose, namely: to lend money, to exchange existing restructured Philippine
debts with an interest reduction bond; or to exchange the same Philippine debts with a principal
collateralized interest reduction bond.[15]
Issues for Resolution
Petitioners raise several issues before this Court.
First, they object to the debt-relief contracts entered into pursuant to the Financing
Program as beyond the powers granted to the President under Section 20,
Article VII of the Constitution. [16] The provision states that the President may contract or
guarantee foreign loans in behalf of the Republic. It is claimed that the buyback and
securitization/bond conversion schemes are neither loans nor guarantees, and hence beyond the
power of the President to execute.
Second, according to petitioners even assuming that the contracts under the Financing
Program are constitutionally permissible, yet it is only the President who may exercise the power
to enter into these contracts and such power may not be delegated to respondents.
Third, petitioners argue that the Financing Program violates several constitutional policies
and that contracts executed or to be executed pursuant thereto were or will be done by
respondents with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Petitioners contend that the Financing Program was made available for debts that were
either fraudulently contracted or void. In this regard, petitioners rely on a 1992 Commission on
Audit (COA) report which identified several behest loans as either contracted or guaranteed
fraudulently during the Marcos regime. [17] They posit that since these and other similar debts,
such as the ones pertaining to the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant, [18] were eligible for buyback or
conversion under the Program, the resultant relief agreements pertaining thereto would be void
for being waivers of the Republics right to repudiate the void or fraudulently contracted loans.
For their part, respondents dispute the points raised by petitioners. They also question the
standing of petitioners to institute the present petition and the justiciability of the issues
presented.

The Court shall tackle the procedural questions ahead of the substantive issues.
The Courts Rulings
Standing of Petitioners
The individual petitioners are suing as citizens of the Philippines; those among them who
are of age are suing in their additional capacity as taxpayers. [19] It is not indicated in what
capacity the Freedom from Debt Coalition is suing.
Respondents point out that petitioners have no standing to file the present suit since the
rule allowing taxpayers to assail executive or legislative acts has been applied only to cases
where the constitutionality of a statute is involved. At the same time, however, they urge this
Court to exercise its wide discretion and waive petitioners lack of standing. They invoke the
transcendental importance of resolving the validity of the questioned debt-relief contracts and
others of similar import.
The recent trend on locus standi has veered towards a liberal treatment in taxpayers
suits. In Tatad v. Garcia Jr.,[20] this Court reiterated that the prevailing doctrines in taxpayers suits
are to allow taxpayers to question contracts entered into by the national government or
government owned and controlled corporations allegedly in contravention of law. [21] A taxpayer is
allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that public
money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds
through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. [22]
Moreover, a ruling on the issues of this case will not only determine the validity or
invalidity of the subject pre-termination and bond-conversion of foreign debts but also create a
precedent for other debts or debt-related contracts executed or to be executed in behalf of the
President of the Philippines by the Secretary of Finance. Considering the reported Philippine debt
of P3.80 trillion as of November 2004, the foreign public borrowing component of which
reached P1.81 trillion in November, equivalent to 47.6% of total government borrowings, [23] the
importance of the issues raised and the magnitude of the public interest involved are
indubitable.
Thus, the Courts cognizance of this petition is also based on the consideration that the
determination of the issues presented will have a bearing on the state of the countrys economy,
its international financial ratings, and perhaps even the Filipinos way of life. Seen in this light,
the transcendental importance of the issues herein presented cannot be doubted.
Where constitutional issues are properly raised in the context of alleged facts, procedural
questions acquire a relatively minor significance. [24] We thus hold that by the very nature of the
power wielded by the President, the effect of using this power on the economy, and the wellbeing in general of the Filipino nation, the Court must set aside the procedural barrier of
standing and rule on the justiciable issues presented by the parties.
Ripeness/Actual Case Dimension
Even as respondents concede the transcendental importance of the issues at bar, in
their Rejoinder they ask this Court to dismiss thePetition. Allegedly, petitioners arguments are
mere attempts at abstraction.[25] Respondents are correct to some degree. Several issues, as
shall be discussed in due course, are not ripe for adjudication.
The allegation that respondents waived the Philippines right to repudiate void and
fraudulently contracted loans by executing the debt-relief agreements is, on many levels, not
justiciable.
In the first place, records do not show whether the so-called behest loansor other
allegedly void or fraudulently contracted loans for that matterwere subject of the debt-relief
contracts entered into under the Financing Program.

Moreover, asserting a right to repudiate void or fraudulently contracted loans begs the
question of whether indeed particular loans are void or fraudulently contracted. Fraudulently
contracted loans are voidable and, as such, valid and enforceable until annulled by the courts.
On the other hand, void contracts that have already been fulfilled must be declared void in view
of the maxim that no one is allowed to take the law in his own hands. [26] Petitioners theory
depends on a prior annulment or declaration of nullity of the pre-existing loans, which thus far
have not been submitted to this Court. Additionally, void contracts are unratifiable by their very
nature; they are null and void ab initio. Consequently, from the viewpoint of civil law, what
petitioners present as the Republics right to repudiate is yet a contingent right, one which cannot
be allowed as an anticipatory basis for annulling the debt-relief contracts. Petitioners contention
that the debt-relief agreements are tantamount to waivers of the Republics right to repudiate socalled behest loans is without legal foundation.
It may not be amiss to recognize that there are many advocates of the position that the
Republic should renege on obligations that are considered as illegitimate. However, should the
executive branch unilaterally, and possibly even without prior court determination of the validity
or invalidity of these contracts, repudiate or otherwise declare to the international community its
resolve not to recognize a certain set of illegitimate loans, adverse repercussions [27] would come
into play. Dr. Felipe Medalla, former Director General of the National Economic Development
Authority, has warned, thus:
One way to reduce debt service is to repudiate debts, totally or selectively.
Taken to its limit, however, such a strategy would put the Philippines at such odds
with too many enemies. Foreign commercial banks by themselves and without the
cooperation of creditor governments, especially the United States, may not be in a
position to inflict much damage, but concerted sanctions from commercial banks,
multilateral financial institutions and creditor governments would affect not only our
sources of credit but also our access to markets for our exports and the level of
development assistance. . . . [T]he country might face concerted sanctions even if
debts were repudiated only selectively.
The point that must be stressed is that repudiation is not an attractive
alternative if net payments to creditors in the short and medium-run can be
reduced through an agreement (as opposed to a unilaterally set ceiling on debt
service payments) which provides for both rescheduling of principal and
capitalization of interest, or its equivalent in new loans, which would make it easier
for the country to pay interest.[28]
Sovereign default is not new to the Philippine setting. In October 1983, the Philippines
declared a moratorium on principal payments on its external debts that eventually lasted four
years,[29] that virtually closed the countrys access to new foreign money [30] and drove investors to
leave the Philippine market, resulting in some devastating consequences. [31] It would appear then
that this beguilingly attractive and dangerously simplistic solution deserves the utmost
circumspect cogitation before it is resorted to.
In any event, the discretion on the matter lies not with the courts but with the executive.
Thus, the Program was conceptualized as an offshoot of the decision made by then President
Aquino that the Philippines should recognize its sovereign debts [32] despite the controversy that
engulfed many debts incurred during the Marcos era. It is a scheme whereby the Philippines
restructured its debts following a negotiated approach instead of a default approach to manage
the bleak Philippine debt situation.
As a final point, petitioners have no real basis to fret over a possible waiver of the right to
repudiate void contracts. Even assuming that spurious loans had become the subject of debtrelief contracts, respondents unequivocally assert that the Republic did not waive any right to
repudiate void or fraudulently contracted loans, it having incorporated a no-waiver clause in the
agreements.[33]
Substantive Issues

It is helpful to put the matter in perspective before moving on to the merits. The Financing
Program extinguished portions of the countrys pre-existing loans through either debt buyback or
bond-conversion. The buyback approach essentially pre-terminated portions of public debts
while the bond-conversion scheme extinguished public debts through the obtention of a new
loan by virtue of a sovereign bond issuance, the proceeds of which in turn were used for
terminating the original loan.
First Issue: The Scope of Section 20, Article VII
For their first constitutional argument, petitioners submit that the buyback and bondconversion schemes do not constitute the loan contract or guarantee contemplated in the
Constitution and are consequently prohibited. Sec. 20, Art. VII of the Constitution provides, viz:
The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans in behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines with the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board and
subject to such limitations as may be provided under law. The Monetary Board shall,
within thirty days from the end of every quarter of the calendar year, submit to the
Congress a complete report of its decisions on applications for loans to be
contracted or guaranteed by the government or government-owned and controlled
corporations which would have the effect of increasing the foreign debt, and
containing other matters as may be provided by law.
On Bond-conversion
Loans are transactions wherein the owner of a property allows another party to use the
property and where customarily, the latter promises to return the property after a specified
period with payment for its use, called interest. [34] On the other hand, bonds are interest-bearing
or discounted government or corporate securities that obligate the issuer to pay the bondholder
a specified sum of money, usually at specific intervals, and to repay the principal amount of the
loan at maturity.[35] The word bond means contract, agreement, or guarantee. All of these terms
are applicable to the securities known as bonds. An investor who purchases a bond is lending
money to the issuer, and the bond represents the issuers contractual promise to pay interest and
repay principal according to specific terms. A short-term bond is often called a note. [36]
The language of the Constitution is simple and clear as it is broad. It allows the President
to contract and guarantee foreign loans. It makes no prohibition on the issuance of certain kinds
of loans or distinctions as to which kinds of debt instruments are more onerous than others. This
Court may not ascribe to the Constitution meanings and restrictions that would unduly burden
the powers of the President. The plain, clear and unambiguous language of the Constitution
should be construed in a sense that will allow the full exercise of the power provided therein. It
would be the worst kind of judicial legislation if the courts were to misconstrue and change the
meaning of the organic act.
The only restriction that the Constitution provides, aside from the prior concurrence of the
Monetary Board, is that the loans must be subject to limitations provided by law. In this regard,
we note that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 245 as amended by Pres. Decree (P.D.) No. 142, s. 1973,
entitled An Act Authorizing the Secretary of Finance to Borrow to Meet Public Expenditures
Authorized by Law, and for Other Purposes, allows foreign loans to be contracted in the form
of, inter alia, bonds. Thus:
Sec. 1. In order to meet public expenditures authorized by law or to provide for the
purchase, redemption, or refunding of any obligations, either direct or guaranteed
of the Philippine Government, the Secretary of Finance, with the approval of
the President of the Philippines, after consultation with the Monetary
Board, is authorized to borrow from time to time on the credit of the
Republic of the Philippines such sum or sums as in his judgment may be
necessary, and to issue therefor evidences of indebtedness of the
Philippine Government."
Such evidences of indebtedness may be of the following types:
....

c. Treasury bonds, notes, securities or other evidences of indebtedness

having maturities of one year or more but not exceeding twenty-five years
from the date of issue. (Emphasis supplied.)
Under the foregoing provisions, sovereign bonds may be issued not only to supplement
government expenditures but also to provide for the purchase,[37] redemption,[38] or
refunding[39] of any obligation, either direct or guaranteed, of the Philippine Government.
Petitioners, however, point out that a supposed difference between contracting a loan and
issuing bonds is that the former creates a definite creditor-debtor relationship between the
parties while the latter does not. [40] They explain that a contract of loan enables the debtor to
restructure or novate the loan, which benefit is lost upon the conversion of the debts to bearer
bonds such that the Philippines surrenders the novatable character of a loan contract for the
irrevocable and unpostponable demandability of a bearer bond. [41] Allegedly, the Constitution
prohibits the President from issuing bonds which are far more onerous than loans. [42]
This line of thinking is flawed to say the least. The negotiable character of the subject
bonds is not mutually exclusive with the Republics freedom to negotiate with bondholders for the
revision of the terms of the debt. Moreover, the securities market provides some flexibilityif the
Philippines wants to pay in advance, it can buy out its bonds in the market; if interest rates go
down but the Philippines does not have money to retire the bonds, it can replace the old bonds
with new ones; if it defaults on the bonds, the bondholders shall organize and bring about a renegotiation or settlement.[43] In fact, several countries have restructured their sovereign bonds in
view either of inability and/or unwillingness to pay the indebtedness. [44] Petitioners have not
presented a plausible reason that would preclude the Philippines from acting in a similar fashion,
should it so opt.
This theory may even be dismissed in a perfunctory manner since petitioners are merely
expecting that the Philippines would opt to restructure the bonds but with the negotiable
character of the bonds, would be prevented from so doing. This is a contingency which
petitioners do not assert as having come to pass or even imminent. Consummated acts of the
executive cannot be struck down by this Court merely on the basis of petitioners anticipatory
cavils.
On the Buyback Scheme
In their Comment, petitioners assert that the power to pay public debts lies with Congress
and was deliberately
withheld by the Constitution from the President. [45] It is true that in the balance of power between
the three branches of government, it is Congress that manages the countrys coffers by virtue of
its taxing and spending powers. However, the law-making authority has promulgated a law
ordaining an automatic appropriations provision for debt servicing [46] by virtue of which the
President is empowered to execute debt payments without the need for further appropriations.
Regarding these legislative enactments, this Court has held, viz:
Congress deliberates or acts on the budget proposals of the President, and
Congress in the exercise of its own judgment and wisdom formulates an
appropriation act precisely following the process established by the Constitution,
which specifies that no money may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance
with an appropriation made by law.
Debt service is not included in the General Appropriation Act, since authorization
therefor already exists under RA Nos. 4860 and 245, as amended, and PD 1967.
Precisely in the light of this subsisting authorization as embodied in said Republic
Acts and PD for debt service, Congress does not concern itself with details for
implementation by the Executive, but largely with annual levels and approval

thereof upon due deliberations as part of the whole obligation program for the year.
Upon such approval, Congress has spoken and cannot be said to have delegated its
wisdom to the Executive, on whose part lies the implementation or execution of the
legislative wisdom.[47]
Specific legal authority for the buyback of loans is established under Section 2 of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 240, viz:
Sec. 2. The Secretary of Finance shall cause to be paid out of any
moneys in the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, or from
any sinking funds provided for the purpose by law, any interest
falling due, or accruing, on any portion of the public debt authorized
by law. He shall also cause to be paid out of any such money, or
from any such sinking funds the principal amount of any obligations
which have matured, or which have been called for redemption or for
which redemption has been demanded in accordance with terms prescribed
by him prior to date of issue: Provided, however, That he may, if he so
chooses and if the holder is willing, exchange any such obligation with any
other direct or guaranteed obligation or obligations of the Philippine
Government of equivalent value. In the case of interest-bearing obligations,
he shall pay not less than their face value; in the case of obligations issued at
a discount he shall pay the face value at maturity; or, if redeemed prior to
maturity, such portion of the face value as is prescribed by the
terms and conditions under which such obligations were originally
issued. (Emphasis supplied.)
The afore-quoted provisions of law specifically allow the President to pre-terminate debts without
further action from Congress.

Petitioners claim that the buyback scheme is neither a guarantee nor a loan since its
underlying intent is to extinguish debts that are not yet due and demandable. [48] Thus, they
suggest that contracts entered pursuant to the buyback scheme are unconstitutional for not
being among those contemplated in Sec. 20, Art. VII of the Constitution.
Buyback is a necessary power which springs from the grant of the foreign borrowing
power. Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be
necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or
jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be
fairly and logically inferred from its terms. [49] The President is not empowered to borrow money
from foreign banks and governments on the credit of the Republic only to be left bereft of
authority to implement the payment despite appropriations therefor.
Even petitioners concede that [t]he Constitution, as a rule, does not enumeratelet alone
enumerate allthe acts which the President (or any other public officer) may not do, [50] and [t]he
fact that the Constitution does not explicitly bar the President from exercising a power does not
mean that he or she does not have that power. [51] It is inescapable from the standpoint
of reason and necessity that the authority to contract foreign loans and guarantees without
restrictions on payment or manner thereof coupled with the availability of the corresponding
appropriations, must include the power to effect payments or to make payments unavailing by
either restructuring the loans or even refusing to make any payment altogether.
More fundamentally, when taken in the context of sovereign debts, a buyback is simply
the purchase by the sovereign issuer of its own debts at a discount. Clearly then, the objection to
the validity of the buyback scheme is without basis.
Second Issue: Delegation of Power

Petitioners stress that unlike other powers which may be validly delegated by the
President, the power to incur foreign debts is expressly reserved by the Constitution in the
person of the President. They argue that the gravity by which the exercise of the power will
affect the Filipino nation requires that the President alone must exercise this power. They submit
that the requirement of prior concurrence of an entity specifically named by the Constitutionthe
Monetary Boardreinforces the submission that not respondents but the President alone and
personally can validly bind the country.
Petitioners position is negated both by explicit constitutional [52] and legal[53] imprimaturs,
as well as the doctrine of qualified political agency.
The evident exigency of having the Secretary of Finance implement the decision of the
President to execute the debt-relief contracts is made manifest by the fact that the process of
establishing and executing a strategy for managing the governments debt is deep within the
realm of the expertise of the Department of Finance, primed as it is to raise the required amount
of funding, achieve its risk and cost objectives, and meet any other sovereign debt management
goals.[54]
If, as petitioners would have it, the President were to personally exercise every aspect of
the foreign borrowing power, he/she would have to pause from running the country long enough
to focus on a welter of time-consuming detailed activitiesthe propriety of incurring/guaranteeing
loans, studying and choosing among the many methods that may be taken toward this end,
meeting countless times with creditor representatives to negotiate, obtaining the concurrence of
the Monetary Board, explaining and defending the negotiated deal to the public, and more often
than not, flying to the agreed place of execution to sign the documents. This sort of
constitutional interpretation would negate the very existence of cabinet positions and the
respective expertise which the holders thereof are accorded and would unduly hamper the
Presidents effectivity in running the government.
Necessity thus gave birth to the doctrine of qualified political agency, later adopted in Villena v.
Secretary of the Interior[55] from American jurisprudence, viz:
With reference to the Executive Department of the government, there is one
purpose which is crystal-clear and is readily visible without the projection of judicial
searchlight, and that is the establishment of a single, not plural, Executive. The first
section of Article VII of the Constitution, dealing with the Executive Department,
begins with the enunciation of the principle that "The executive power shall be
vested in a President of the Philippines." This means that the President of
the Philippines is the Executive of the Government of the Philippines, and no other.
The heads of the executive departments occupy political positions and hold office in
an advisory capacity, and, in the language of Thomas Jefferson, "should be of the
President's bosom confidence" (7 Writings, Ford ed., 498), and, in the language of
Attorney-General Cushing (7 Op., Attorney-General, 453), "are subject to the
direction of the President." Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the
various departments, their personality is in reality but the projection of that of the
President. Stated otherwise, and as forcibly characterized by Chief Justice Taft of the
Supreme Court of the United States, "each head of a department is, and must be,
the President's alter ego in the matters of that department where the President is
required by law to exercise authority" (Myers vs. United States, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep., 21
at 30; 272 U. S., 52 at 133; 71 Law. ed., 160).[56]
As it was, the backdrop consisted of a major policy determination made by then President
Aquino that sovereign debts have to be respected and the concomitant reality that
the Philippines did not have enough funds to pay the debts. Inevitably, it fell upon the Secretary
of Finance, as the alter ego of the President regarding the sound and efficient management of
the financial resources of the Government, [57] to formulate a scheme for the implementation of
the policy publicly expressed by the President herself.
Nevertheless, there are powers vested in the President by the Constitution which may not
be delegated to or exercised by an agent or alter ego of the President. Justice Laurel, in
his ponencia in Villena, makes this clear:

Withal, at first blush, the argument of ratification may seem plausible under the
circumstances, it should be observed that there are certain acts which, by their very
nature, cannot be validated by subsequent approval or ratification by the President.
There are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief Executive of
the Nation which must be exercised by him in person and no amount of approval or
ratification will validate the exercise of any of those powers by any other person.
Such, for instance, in his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim
martial law (PAR. 3, SEC. 11, Art. VII) and the exercise by him of the benign
prerogative of mercy (par. 6, sec. 11, idem). [58]
These distinctions hold true to this day. There are certain presidential powers which arise out of
exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the suspension of fundamental
freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of executive prerogatives over those exercised by
co-equal branches of government. The declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power notwithstanding the judicial
determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this special class that demands the exclusive
exercise by the President of the constitutionally vested power. The list is by no means exclusive,
but there must be a showing that the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and
exceptional import.
We cannot conclude that the power of the President to contract or guarantee foreign debts
falls within the same exceptional class. Indubitably, the decision to contract or guarantee foreign
debts is of vital public interest, but only akin to any contractual obligation undertaken by the
sovereign, which arises not from any extraordinary incident, but from the established functions
of governance.
Another important qualification must be made. The Secretary of Finance or any
designated alter ego of the President is bound to secure the latters prior consent to or
subsequent ratification of his acts. In the matter of contracting or guaranteeing foreign loans,
the repudiation by the President of the very acts performed in this regard by the alter ego will
definitely have binding effect. Had petitioners herein succeeded in demonstrating that the
President actually withheld approval and/or repudiated the Financing Program, there could be a
cause of action to nullify the acts of respondents. Notably though, petitioners do not assert that
respondents pursued the Program without prior authorization of the President or that the terms
of the contract were agreed upon without the Presidents authorization. Congruent with the
avowed preference of then President Aquino to honor and restructure existing foreign debts, the
lack of showing that she countermanded the acts of respondents leads us to conclude that said
acts carried presidential approval.
With constitutional parameters already established, we may also note, as a source of
suppletory guidance, the provisions of R.A. No. 245. The afore-quoted Section 1 thereof
empowers the Secretary of Finance with the approval of the President and after consultation [59] of
the Monetary Board, to borrow from time to time on the credit of the Republic of the Philippines
such sum or sums as in his judgment may be necessary, and to issue therefor evidences of
indebtedness of the Philippine Government. Ineluctably then, while the President wields the
borrowing power it is the Secretary of Finance who normally carries out its thrusts.
In our recent rulings in Southern Cross Cement Corporation v. The Philippine Cement
Manufacturers Corp.,[60] this Court had occasion to examine the authority granted by Congress to
the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) Secretary to impose safeguard measures pursuant to
the Safeguard Measures Act. In doing so, the Court was impelled to construe Section 28(2),
Article VI of the Constitution, which allowed Congress, by law, to authorize the President to fix
within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff
rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within
the framework of the national development program of the Government. [61]

While the Court refused to uphold the broad construction of the grant of power as
preferred by the DTI Secretary, it nonetheless tacitly acknowledged that Congress could
designate the DTI Secretary, in his capacity as alter ego of the President, to exercise the
authority vested on the chief executive under Section 28(2), Article VI. [62] At the same time, the
Court emphasized that since Section 28(2), Article VI authorized Congress to impose limitations
and restrictions on the authority of the President to impose tariffs and imposts, the DTI Secretary
was necessarily subjected to the same restrictions that Congress could impose on the President
in the exercise of this taxing power.
Similarly, in the instant case, the Constitution allocates to the President the exercise of the
foreign borrowing power subject to such limitations as may be provided under law.
Following Southern Cross, but in line with the limitations as defined in Villena, the presidential
prerogative may be exercised by the Presidents alter ego, who in this case is the Secretary of
Finance.
It bears emphasis that apart from the Constitution, there is also a relevant statute, R.A.
No. 245, that establishes the parameters by which the alter ego may act in behalf of the
President with respect to the borrowing power. This law expressly provides that the Secretary of
Finance may enter into foreign borrowing contracts. This law neither amends nor goes contrary
to the Constitution but merely implements the subject provision in a manner consistent with the
structure of the Executive Department and the alter ego doctine. In this regard, respondents
have declared that they have followed the restrictions provided under R.A. No. 245, [63] which
include the requisite presidential authorization and which, in the absence of proof and even
allegation to the contrary, should be regarded in a fashion congruent with the presumption of
regularity bestowed on acts done by public officials.
Moreover, in praying that the acts of the respondents, especially that of the Secretary of
Finance, be nullified as being in violation of a restrictive constitutional interpretation, petitioners
in effect would have this Court declare R.A. No. 245 unconstitutional. We will not strike down a
law or provisions thereof without so much as a direct attack thereon when simple and logical
statutory construction would suffice.
Petitioners also submit that the unrestricted character of the Financing Program violates the
framers intent behind Section 20, Article VII to restrict the power of the President. This intent,
petitioners note, is embodied in the proviso in Sec. 20, Art. VII, which states that said power is
subject to such limitations as may be provided under law. However, as previously discussed, the
debt-relief contracts are governed by the terms of R.A. No. 245, as amended by P.D. No. 142 s.
1973, and therefore were not developed in an unrestricted setting.
Third Issue: Grave Abuse of Discretion and
Violation of Constitutional Policies
We treat the remaining issues jointly, for in view of the foregoing determination, the general
allegation of grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondents would arise from the purported
violation of various state policies as expressed in the Constitution.
Petitioners allege that the Financing Program violates the constitutional state policies to promote
a social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people
from poverty,[64] foster social justice in all phases of national development, [65] and develop a selfreliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos; [66] thus, the
contracts executed or to be executed pursuant thereto were or would be tainted by a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Respondents cite the following in support of the propriety of their acts: [67] (1) a Department of
Finance study showing that as a result of the implementation of voluntary debt reductions
schemes, the countrys debt stock was reduced by U.S. $4.4 billion as of December 1991; [68] (2)
revelations made by independent individuals made in a hearing before the Senate Committee on
Economic Affairs indicating that the assailed agreements would bring about substantial benefits
to the country;[69] and (3) the Joint Legislative-Executive Foreign Debt Councils endorsement of

the approval of the financing package containing the debt- relief agreements and issuance of a
Motion to Urge the Philippine Debt Negotiating Panel to continue with the negotiation on the
aforesaid package.[70]
Even with these justifications, respondents aver that their acts are within the arena of political
questions which, based on the doctrine of separation of powers, [71] the judiciary must leave
without interference lest the courts substitute their judgment for that of the official concerned
and decide a matter which by its nature or law is for the latter alone to decide. [72]
On the other hand, in furtherance of their argument on respondents violation of constitutional
policies, petitioners cite an article of Jude Esguerra, The 1992 Buyback and Securitization
Agreement with Philippine Commercial Bank Creditors,[73] in illustrating a best-case scenario in
entering the subject debt-relief agreements. The computation results in a yield of $218.99
million, rather than the $2,041.00 million claimed by the debt negotiators. [74] On the other hand,
the worst-case scenario allegedly is that a net amount of $1.638 million will flow out of the
country as a result of the debt package.[75]
Assuming the accuracy of the foregoing for the nonce, despite the watered-down parameters of
petitioners computations, we can make no conclusion other than that respondents efforts were
geared towards debt-relief with marked positive results and towards achieving the constitutional
policies which petitioners so hastily declare as having been violated by respondents. We
recognize that as with other schemes dependent on volatile market and economic structures,
the contracts entered into by respondents may possibly have a net outflow and therefore
negative result. However, even petitioners call this latter event the worst-case scenario. Plans
are seldom foolproof. To ask the Court to strike down debt-relief contracts, which, according to
independent third party evaluations using historically-suggested rates would result in substantial
debt-relief,[76] based merely on the possibility of petitioners worst-case scenario projection,
hardly seems reasonable.
Moreover, the policies set by the Constitution as litanized by petitioners are not a panacea that
can annul every governmental act sought to be struck down. The gist of petitioners arguments
on violation of constitutional policies and grave abuse of discretion boils down to their allegation
that the debt-relief agreements entered into by respondents do not deliver the kind of debt-relief
that petitioners would want. Petitioners cite the aforementioned article in stating that that the
agreement achieves little that cannot be gained through less complicated means like postponing
(rescheduling) principal payments,[77] thus:
[T]he price of success in putting together this debt-relief package (indicates) the
possibility that a simple rescheduling agreement may well turn out to be less
expensive than this comprehensive debt-relief package. This means that in the next
six years the humble and simple rescheduling process may well be the lesser evil
because there is that distinct possibility that less money will flow out of the country
as a result.
Note must be taken that from these citations, petitioners submit that there is possibly a better
way to go about debt rescheduling and, on that basis, insist that the acts of respondents must be
struck down. These are rather tenuous grounds to condemn the subject agreements as violative
of constitutional principles.
Conclusion
The raison d etre of the Financing Program is to manage debts incurred by the Philippines in a
manner that will lessen the burden on the Filipino taxpayersthus the term debt-relief
agreements. The measures objected to by petitioners were not aimed at incurring more debts
but at terminating pre-existing debts and were backed by the know-how of the countrys
economic managers as affirmed by third party empirical analysis.
That the means employed to achieve the goal of debt-relief do not sit well with petitioners
is beyond the power of this Court to remedy. The exercise of the power of judicial review is

merely to checknot supplantthe Executive, or to simply ascertain whether he has gone beyond
the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction but not to exercise the power vested in him or to
determine the wisdom of his act. [78] In cases where the main purpose is to nullify governmental
acts whether as unconstitutional or done with grave abuse of discretion, there is a strong
presumption in favor of the validity of the assailed acts. The heavy onus is in on petitioners to
overcome the presumption of regularity.
We find that petitioners have not sufficiently established any basis for the Court to declare
the acts of respondents as unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE the petition is hereby DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.