Lessons Learned From SFAR 88

The document discusses lessons learned from SFAR 88, which mandated safety reassessments of fuel tank systems in response to a 1996 Boeing 747 accident. It describes the findings from the accident investigation and the new requirements imposed by SFAR 88. The key lesson is that aircraft systems should be designed to require at least three failures to cause a catastrophic event like fuel tank ignition.

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Lessons Learned From SFAR 88

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Poshak Prasad Gnawali

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Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd

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Aircraft Systems Design: Lessons Learned from SFAR 88

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Publications

http://papers.sae.org/2003-01-2991/

Technical Papers

Aircraft Systems Design: Lessons Learned from SFAR 88

Paper #:

2003-01-2991

DOI:

10.4271/2003-01-2991

Citation:

Malley, J., "Aircraft Systems Design: Lessons Learned from SFAR 88," SAE
Technical Paper 2003-01-2991, 2003, doi:10.4271/2003-01-2991.

Technical Paper

Published: 2003-09-08

Author(s): John A. Malley

Affiliated: RCS
Abstract:

On July 17, 1996, a 25-year old Boeing Model 747-100 series airplane
broke up in the air after takeoff from Kennedy International Airport in
New York. A National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigation
concluded the center wing tank exploded due to an unknown ignition
source. These findings culminated in two FAR amendments issued on
April 18, 2001. Amendment 25-102 renamed 25.981 as Fuel Tank
Ignition Prevention and added new requirements addressing ignition
source prevention and flammable vapor minimization within fuel tanks.
Amendment 21-78 introduced Special Federal Aviation Regulations
(SFAR) No. 88 which required a one-time safety reassessment of many
in-service fuel tank systems per the ignition source prevention
requirements of 25.901 and the amended 25.981. SFAR 88
mandated a review of fuel tank system service history to reveal ignition
sources in airplane fuel tanks due to unforeseen failure modes or
factors not considered at the time of original certification of the
airplane. SFAR 88 required qualitative and quantitative safety analyses
to show any anticipated latent failure condition did not leave the fuel
system one failure away from fuel tank ignition. These analyses also
identified all fuel system architecture and component design features
required to prevent ignition sources. These mandated analyses point to
the need for fuel system architectures that are more robust with
respect to unknown failure modes and latent failures. At a minimum, a
system should require three failures to get an ignition source.
Qualitative assessments of such architectures show reduced sensitivity
to unknown component failure modes and design, manufacturing or
maintenance errors. This approach generalizes to other aircraft systems
with catastrophic hazards and is the most general lesson learned from
the SFAR 88 experience.