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Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review
Securing Britain in an
Age of Uncertainty:
The Strategic Defence
Securing Britain in an
Age of Uncertainty:
The Strategic Defence and
Security Review
October 2010
Cm 7948
19.75
ISBN: 9780101794824
Printed in the UK for The Stationery Office Limited on
behalf of the Controller of Her Majestys Stationery Office
ID P002394077 10/10
Contents
Contents
Foreword............................................................................................................. 3
Planning Guidelines
Glossary............................................................................................................. 73
Foreword
Foreword
Foreword
Our country has always had global responsibilities and global ambitions. We have a proud history of
standing up for the values we believe in and we should have no less ambition for our country in the
decades to come. But we need to be more thoughtful, more strategic and more coordinated in the way
we advance our interests and protect our national security.
The difficult legacy we have inherited has necessitated tough decisions to get our economy back on track.
Our national security depends on our economic security and vice versa. So bringing the defence budget
back to balance is a vital part of how we tackle the deficit and protect this countrys national security.
Nevertheless, because of the priority we are placing on our national security, defence and security
budgets will contribute to deficit reduction on a lower scale than some other departments. The defence
budget will rise in cash terms. It will meet the NATO 2% target throughout the next four years. We
expect to continue with the fourth largest military budget in the world.
We are extraordinarily proud of everyone who works tirelessly on our behalf to keep us safe at home
and to protect our interests overseas our Armed Forces, police, intelligence officers, diplomats and
many others. As a nation we owe them an immense debt of gratitude. They are a fundamental part of
our sense of national identity. And it is vital for the security of future generations that these capabilities
are retained. But to retain their effectiveness, they must adapt to face the realities and uncertainties of the
21st Century.
We remain fully committed to succeeding in the difficult mission in Afghanistan, and there will as now be
extra resources to meet the full costs of that campaign. We face a severe terrorist threat that has origins
at home and overseas. Crucially, as the National Security Strategy sets out, we face an ever more diverse
range of security risks.
We must find more effective ways to tackle risks to our national security taking an integrated approach,
both across government and internationally, to identify risks early and treat the causes, rather than having
to deal with the consequences. That is why we have established a National Security Council to draw this
entire effort together. It is why, given the direct linkages between instability and conflict, our Department
for International Development will double its investment in tackling and preventing conflict around
the globe, consistent with the international rules for Official Development Assistance. Our approach
recognises that when we fail to prevent conflict and are obliged to intervene militarily, it costs far more.
And that is why we will expand our ability to deploy military and civilian experts together to support
stabilisation efforts and build capacity in other states, as a long-term investment in a more stable world.
We will continue to give the highest priority to tackling the terrorist threat, protecting our operational
capabilities, and reforming how we tackle radicalisation, while also reviewing all our counter-terrorism
powers to ensure we retain only those that are necessary to protect the public, thereby safeguarding
British civil liberties. We will act resolutely against both the threat from Al Qaeda and its affiliates and
followers, and against the threat from residual terrorism linked to Northern Ireland.
At home, we must become more resilient both to external threats and to natural disasters, like major
flooding and pandemics. We will establish a transformative national programme to protect ourselves in
cyber space. Over the last decade the threat to national security and prosperity from cyber attacks has
increased exponentially. Over the decades ahead this trend is likely to continue to increase in scale and
sophistication, with enormous implications for the nature of modern conflict. We need to be prepared as
a country to meet this growing challenge, building on the advanced capabilities we already have.
We have also re-assessed and reformed our approach in a wide range of other areas crucial to UK
national security including civil emergencies, energy security, organised crime, counter proliferation and
border security. We will maintain robust intelligence capabilities to contribute across the spectrum of
national security activity.
And we will reconfigure our Armed Forces to make them better able to meet the threats of the future.
Our Armed Forces admired across the world have been overstretched, deployed too often without
appropriate planning, with the wrong equipment, in the wrong numbers and without a clear strategy. In
the past, unfunded spending pledges created a fundamental mismatch between aspiration and resources.
And there was a failure to face up to the new security realities of the post Cold War world. The Royal
Navy was locked into a cycle of ever smaller numbers of ever more expensive ships. We have an Army
with scores of tanks in Germany but forced to face the deadly threat of improvised explosive devices in
Iraq and Afghanistan in Land Rovers designed for Northern Ireland. And the Royal Air Force has been
hampered in its efforts to support our forces overseas because of an ageing and unreliable strategic airlift
fleet. This is the result of the failure to take the bold decisions needed to adjust our defence plans to face
the realities of our ever-changing world.
This Review has started the process of bringing programmes and resources back into balance, making our
Armed Forces among the most versatile in the world.
In terms of the Army, in this age of uncertainty our ground forces will continue to have a vital operational
role. That is why we are determined to retain a significant, well-equipped Army. We will continue to
be one of very few countries able to deploy a self-sustaining, properly equipped brigade-sized force
anywhere around the world and sustain it indefinitely. As the Army is withdrawn from Germany, we will
reduce its heavy armour and artillery, although we will retain the ability to regenerate those capabilities
if need be. The introduction of new armoured vehicles, enhanced communications equipment and new
strategic lift aircraft, will make the Army more mobile and more flexible. It will be better adapted to face
current and future threats, with the type of equipment it needs to prevail in todays conflicts.
Battlefield helicopters will be vital for the range of missions set out in the National Security Strategy.
We will buy 12 additional heavy lift Chinook helicopters. We will extend the life of the Puma helicopter
to ensure that sufficient helicopters are available for our forces in Afghanistan. The Merlin force will be
upgraded to enhance its ability to support amphibious operations. Taken together with the continued
introduction of the Wildcat helicopters for reconnaissance and command and control purposes, this
programme will deliver a properly scaled and balanced helicopter force to support our troops into the
future.
Foreword
Members of the Territorial Army and the other Reserve Forces have performed outstandingly well in
Afghanistan, yet again demonstrating their great value. We need to make sure that they are organised to
deal with the threats of today, recognising that they were originally geared for a Cold War role. We will
want to look carefully at the ways in which some other countries use and structure their reserve forces,
and see what lessons we might usefully apply here. So we will conduct a review of our Reserve Forces. It
will examine whether they are properly structured to enable us to make the most efficient use of their
skills, experience and capabilities in the modern era.
The immense contribution of our highly professional Special Forces is necessarily largely unreported. We
are investing more in them to increase their effectiveness even further.
In terms of the Royal Navy, we will complete the construction of two large aircraft carriers. The
Government believes it is right for the United Kingdom to retain, in the long term, the capability that only
aircraft carriers can provide the ability to deploy air power from anywhere in the world, without the
need for friendly air bases on land. In the short term, there are few circumstances we can envisage where
the ability to deploy airpower from the sea will be essential. That is why we have, reluctantly, taken the
decision to retire the Harrier aircraft, which has served our country so well. But over the longer term, we
cannot assume that bases for land-based aircraft will always be available when and where we need them.
That is why we need an operational carrier. But the last Government committed to carriers that would
have been unable to work properly with our closest military allies. It will take time to rectify this error, but
we are determined to do so. We will fit a catapult to the operational carrier to enable it to fly a version
of the Joint Strike Fighter with a longer range and able to carry more weapons. Crucially, that will allow
our carrier to operate in tandem with the US and French navies, and for American and French aircraft
to operate from our carrier and vice versa. And we will retain the Royal Marine brigade, and an effective
amphibious capability.
We are procuring a fleet of the most capable, nuclear powered hunter-killer submarines anywhere in
the world. They are able to operate in secret across the worlds oceans, fire Tomahawk cruise missiles
at targets on land, detect and attack other submarines and ships to keep the sea lanes open, protect the
nuclear deterrent and feed strategic intelligence back to the UK and our military forces across the world.
We will complete the production of the six Type 45 destroyers at 1 billion a ship, one of the most
effective multi-role destroyers in the world. We will embark on a new programme of less expensive,
modern frigates, more flexible and better able to take on todays naval tasks of tackling drug trafficking,
piracy and counter-terrorism.
We will retain and renew our independent nuclear deterrent the United Kingdoms ultimate insurance
policy in this age of uncertainty. As a result of our value for money review, we will reduce the number
of operational launch tubes on the submarines from 12 to eight, and the number of warheads from
48 to 40, in line with our commitment vigorously to pursue multilateral global disarmament. This will
help reduce costs by 750 million over the period of the spending review, and by 3.2 billion over the
next ten years. Initial Gate a decision to move ahead with early stages of the work involved will be
approved and the next phase of the project will start by the end of this year. Main Gate the decision to
start building the submarines is required around 2016. It is right that the United Kingdom should retain
a credible, continuous and effective minimum nuclear deterrent for as long as the global security situation
makes that necessary.
In terms of the Royal Air Force, by the 2020s it will be based around a fleet of two of the most
capable fighter jets anywhere in the world: a modernised Typhoon fleet fully capable of air-to-air and
air-to-ground missions; and the Joint Strike Fighter, the worlds most advanced multi-role combat jet.
The fast jet fleet will be complemented by a growing fleet of Unmanned Air Vehicles in both combat
and reconnaissance roles. Our fast jets will be backed up the most modern air-to-air refuelling aircraft,
extending their reach and endurance. The strategic air transport fleet will be enhanced with the
introduction of the highly capable A400M transport aircraft. Together with the existing fleet of C17
aircraft, they will allow us to fly our forces wherever they are needed in the world. Our new Rivet Joint
aircraft will gather vital intelligence. In this year in which we remember the 70th Anniversary of the Battle
of Britain, the RAF has a vital continuing role.
All too often, we focus on military hardware. But we know from our many visits to Afghanistan and to
military units around our country, that ultimately it is our people that really make the difference. As a
country, we have failed to give them the support they deserve. We are putting that right, even in the
very difficult economic circumstances we face. We will renew the military covenant, that vital contract
between the Armed Forces, their families, our veterans and the country they sacrifice so much to
keep safe. Each and every one of us has a responsibility to do more to support the men and women of
our Armed Forces. We must never send our soldiers, sailors and airmen into battle without the right
equipment, the right training or the right support. That objective has been a fundamental guiding principle
of this Review, and it is one to which this Government will remain absolutely committed.
David Cameron
Prime Minister
Nick Clegg
Deputy Prime Minister
Part One
Introduction
1.1 This Strategic Defence and Security Review
is long overdue. It is the first time that a UK
government has taken decisions on its defence,
security, intelligence, resilience, development and
foreign affairs capabilities in the round. It sets out
the ways and means to deliver the ends set out in
the National Security Strategy. It links judgements
on where to direct effort and focus the available
resources, to choices on which risks and policies
to prioritise. It sets a clear target for the national
security capabilities the UK will need by 2020, and
charts a course for getting there.
1.2 The challenge is to deliver this while heavily
engaged in Afghanistan; with inherited national
security budgets in overdraft; and in the midst of
the biggest financial crisis in a generation. Restoring
a strong economy is critical to sustaining the
effectiveness of our national security institutions. It
is therefore right that those institutions contribute
to tackling the deficit. However, we have been
clear that savings will not be made at the expense
of our core security: national security budgets have
been given relative protection in the Spending
Review. Operations in Afghanistan will be
protected and given priority. A cross-government
approach has ensured intelligent pruning of older
capabilities less well adapted to high priority
current and future risks; and encouraged the
design of more integrated, efficient and effective
plans in key areas like counter-terrorism, conflict
prevention and cyber security. However, the
unanticipated scale of the budgetary overextension has also made painful, short-term
measures unavoidable.
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intelligence assets to support the core military, diplomatic and domestic security and resilience
requirements set out below, and our economic prosperity.
security within its overall objective of poverty reduction, with the Department for International
Development focussing significantly more effort on priority national security and fragilestates
civilian and military stabilisation capabilities that can be deployed early together to help countries
avoid crisis or deal with conflict
targeted programmes in the UK, and in countries posing the greatest threat to the UK, to stop
people becoming terrorists.
3. Exert influence to exploit opportunities and manage risks. To deliver this we require:
a Diplomatic Service that supports our key multilateral and bilateral relationships and the
obligations that come from our status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a
leading member of NATO, the EU and other international organisations
a Foreign and Commonwealth Office-led global overseas network that focuses on safeguarding
the UKs national security, building its prosperity, and supporting UK nationals around the world
coordinated cross-government effort overseas to build the capacity of priority national security
and fragile states to take increasing responsibility for their own stability
strategic military power projection to enhance security, deter or contain potential threats, and
support diplomacy.
4. Enforce domestic law and strengthen international norms to help tackle those who threaten
the UK and our interests, including maintenance of underpinning technical expertise in key
areas. To deliver this we require:
law enforcement capability to investigate and where possible bring to justice terrorists and the
most seriously harmful organised criminal groups impacting on the UK
retention of our chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear science and technology capabilities
that contribute to counter-proliferation and our response to the potential use of such materials
by terrorist or state actors.
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5. Protect the UK and our interests at home, at our border and internationally, to address
physical and electronic threats from state and non-state sources. To deliver this we require:
security and resilience of the infrastructure most critical to keeping the country running
(including nuclear facilities) against attack, damage or destruction
crisis management capabilities able to anticipate and respond to a variety of major domestic
emergencies and maintain the business of government
enhanced central government and Armed Forces planning, coordination and capabilities to help
deal with the most serious emergencies.
collective security through NATO as the basis for territorial defence of the UK, and stability of our
European neighbourhood, as well as an outward-facing EU that promotes security and prosperity
advantage valued by key allies, especially the United States, such as our intelligence capabilities and
highly capable elite forces
greater sharing of military capabilities, technologies and programmes, and potentially more
specialisation, working with key allies, including France, and based on appropriate formal
guarantees where necessary
a Defence Industrial and Technology policy that seeks to secure the independence of action we
need for our Armed Forces, while allowing for increased numbers of off-the-shelf purchases and
greater promotion of defence exports.
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Part Two
Defence
Context
2.2 Afghanistan remains the main effort of Defence.
We have in the region of 9,500 members of the
Armed Forces operating in Afghanistan as part of
a UN-mandated, NATO-led mission of 47 nations.
They are helping to deliver a stable Afghanistan able
to maintain its own security and to prevent Afghan
territory from again being used by Al Qaeda or
other terrorists as a base from which to plot and
launch attacks on the UK and our allies. President
Karzais stated objective is that the Afghan National
Security Forces will lead and conduct military
operations across Afghanistan by the end of 2014.
The international community has the right strategy
in place to support that aim. In 2015, the UK will
have reduced force levels significantly and our
troops will no longer be in a combat role, as we
move to a long-term defence relationship focussed
on training and capacity-building.
2.3 In the meantime, the Government is fully
committed to ensuring that the campaign is
properly resourced, funded and equipped. The
nature of the campaign will continue to evolve,
and we will regularly review the requirement for
troops and capabilities. We will ensure that we
provide our Armed Forces in Afghanistan with
the full range of training and equipment they need
and we will not take steps that could affect the
confidence and commitment of our people serving
there or their families supporting them at home.
15
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Our approach
Principles
2.10 We will take a new approach to developing
and employing the Armed Forces, consistent with
the key elements of the adaptable posture set out
in Part One.
section4.D
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18
Operations
For planning purposes, operations are divided into:
standing commitments, which are permanent operations essential to our security or to support
key British interests around the world
intervention operations, which are short-term, high-impact military deployments, such as our
deployment to Sierra Leone in 2000
stabilisation operations, which are longer-term mainly land-based operations to stabilise and
resolve conflict situations primarily in support of reconstruction and development and normally
in partnership with others, such as our continuing contribution to coalition operations in
Afghanistan.
non-enduring operations, which last less than six months, typically requiring a force to be
deployed and then withdrawn without replacement. Examples might include evacuation of UK
citizens (as in Lebanon in 2006) or a counter-terrorist strike operation
enduring operations, which last for more than six months and normally require units to carry out
a tour of duty and then be replaced by other similar units.
These descriptions help us to structure and scale our forces, rather than to plan for specific
operations. In reality there is considerable overlap between types of operation and our forces must
be flexible enough to adapt.
interventions
or alternatively:
or:
19
20
(Frigates/Destroyers)
Submarines
Lower Readiness
One off
Enduring
MaritimeTaskGroup
Surface Ships
(Frigates /
Destroyers)
(Frigates /
Destroyers)
MultiRole
Brigade
MultiRole
Brigade
MultiRole
Brigade
MultiRole
Brigade
Combat
Ready
FastJets
Combat
Ready
FastJets
Combat
Ready
FastJets
AircraftCarrier ; Amphibious
Ships;Submarines;MineHunters;
Frigates;Destroyers
Land
SpecialForces;
ExplosiveOrdnance
Disposal;
CBRNdefenceunits
Special
Forces
Air
CombatReady
FastJets
CombatReady
FastJets
Reserves
Increasing Readiness
High Readiness
16
3
Air Assault Commando
Brigade
Brigade
(Frigates /
Destroyers)
Reserves
Reserves
Extended
Readiness
2nd Aircraft
Carrier;
Amphibious Ship
MultiRole
Brigade
LandForce
Elements
Reserves
The future force is structured to give us the ability to deploy highly capable assets quickly when we need to,
but also to prepare a greater scale and range of capability if required. The aim is to do so affordably and in a
way that minimises demands on our people. Five concepts are central to achieving the optimal effect:
Readiness. We will hold a small number of our most capable units at high readiness. Doing so imposes
additional costs in terms of preparation and training, maintaining equipment ready to go, and having on
standby the enablers needed to deploy it rapidly. It places considerable demands on the personnel held at
high readiness and their families. The majority of our forces are held at graduated levels of lower readiness,
conducting their routine training cycle or recovering from deployment or periods of higher readiness,
making fewer demands on our equipment and stocks and under less constant pressure.
Reconstitution. We will hold some capabilities at what is known as extended readiness. The capabilities will
not be available for operations in the short term but will be capable of being reconstituted if we have strategic
notice of possible, but low probability, events to which we might have to respond to protect our national
security. So for example, we will place elements of our amphibious capability in extended readiness rather
than remove them from the force structure entirely.
Reinforcement. Reserve Forces will contribute to each element of the future force. They provide additional
capacity when regular forces are deployed at maximum effort. But they also provide specialists who it
would not be practical or cost-effective to maintain within the regular forces and who can be used to
augment smaller operational deployments medical reservists play a vital role in Afghanistan, for example.
Regeneration. We will maintain the ability to regenerate capabilities that we plan not to hold for the
immediate future. This will require plans to maintain technical expertise, keep skills and training going, and
work with allies and partners who do hold such capabilities and with whom we can, for example, exchange
personnel. We will have the capability to fly fast jets off maritime platforms when the new carrier and Joint
Strike Fighter enter service, but the capability will not be maintained when Harrier is retired so we will
need a plan to regenerate it.
Dependency. We rarely deploy alone. We and our NATO Allies consciously depend on each other for
particular capabilities. For example, the UK does not have its own theatre missile defence capability, while we
have capabilities that are highly valued by coalition partners such as mine counter-measures vessels. Part Five
sets out our willingness and intention to deepen operational cooperation and potentially rely more on others
when it makes sense to do so. We also depend for some capabilities on the market for example, we do not
hold all the shipping capacity we need since it is more efficient and effective to charter it when we need it.
This flexible approach will allow us more effectively to counter the threats we are most likely to face today
while maintaining the ability to respond to different threats in the future.
Naval Forces
2.A.3 In the maritime environment, Future Force
2020 will be able to provide: nuclear Continuous
At Sea Deterrence; maritime defence of the UK
and its South Atlantic Overseas Territories; an
enduring presence within priority regions of the
world to contribute to conventional deterrence
and containment; powerful intervention capabilities
from our surface and submarine fleets; the ability
to land forces from the sea by helicopter and
over-the-beach with protective vehicles and
supplies from specialist ships; and the ability to
command UK and allied naval forces at up to
TaskForce level.
2.A.4 Capabilities will include:
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Aircraft carriers
Decisions on defence equipment require judgements on what our Armed Forces will need 20 to
30 years from now. That is particularly true for large warships like carriers and the fast jets that
fly offthem. The previous Administration ordered two new carriers three times the size of our
existing ones. It planned to equip them from a combat air fleet of around 150 fifth generation Joint
Strike Fighters. This 20 billion programme was crowding out other important investment in the
Armed Forces.
The National Security Council has therefore looked hard at the strategic, industrial and financial
aspects of this programme, and has taken a number of difficult but necessary decisions to achieve
by the 2020s an adaptable and effective carrier-strike capability in balance with the rest of the
Armed Force structure. The key conclusions are:
carriers were designed principally to meet Cold War threats on the high seas, with short-range
jets providing air defence for a naval task group, without the ability to interoperate aircraft with
our key allies and whose primary mission was anti-submarine warfare. A Queen Elizabeth-class
carrier, operating the most modern combat jets, will give the UK the ability to project military
power more than 700 nautical miles over land as well as sea, from anywhere in the world.
Both the US and France, for example, have used this freedom of manoeuvre to deliver combat
airpower in Afghanistan from secure carrier bases in the Arabian Gulf and Indian Ocean. This
capability will give the UK long term political flexibility to act without depending, at times of
regional tension, on agreement from other countries to use of their bases for any mission we
want to undertake. It will also give us in-built military flexibility to adapt our approach over the
50 years of the carriers working life. In particular, it provides options for a coercive response to
crises, as a complement or alternative to ground engagements. It contributes to an overall Force
Structure geared towards helping deter or contain threats from relatively well-equipped regional
powers, as well as dealing with insurgencies and non-state actors in failing states.
We will need to operate only one aircraft carrier. We cannot now foresee circumstances in
which the UK would require the scale of strike capability previously planned. We are unlikely
to face adversaries in large-scale air combat. We are far more likely to engage in precision
operations, which may need to overcome sophisticated air defence capabilities. The single carrier
will therefore routinely have 12 fast jets embarked for operations while retaining the capacity to
deploy up to the 36 previously planned, providing combat and intelligence capability much greater
than the existing Harriers. It will be able to carry a wide range of helicopters, including up to 12
Chinook or Merlin transports and eight Apache attack helicopters. The precise mix of aircraft
will depend on the mission, allowing the carrier to support a broad range of operations including
landing a Royal Marines Commando Group, or a Special Forces Squadron conducting a counterterrorism strike, assisting with humanitarian crises or the evacuation of UK nationals.
A single carrier needs to be fully effective. As currently designed, the Queen Elizabeth will not
be fully interoperable with key allies, since their naval jets could not land on it. Pursuit of closer
partnership is a core strategic principle for the Strategic Defence and Security Review because it
is clear that the UK will in most circumstances act militarily as part of a wider coalition. We will
therefore install catapult and arrestor gear. This will delay the in-service date of the new carrier
from 2016 to around 2020. But it will allow greater interoperability with US and French carriers
and naval jets. It provides the basis for developing joint Maritime Task Groups in the future. This
should both ensure continuous carrier-strike availability, and reduce the overall carrier protection
requirements on the rest of the fleet, releasing ships for other naval tasks such as protection of
key sea-lanes, or conducting counter- piracy and narcotics operations.
The strike needs to be made more capable. Installing the catapult and arrestor will allow the
UK to acquire the carrier-variant of Joint Strike Fighter ready to deploy on the converted carrier
instead of the short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) variant. This version of the jet has a
longer range and greater payload: this, not large numbers of aircraft, is the critical requirement
for precision strike operations in the future. The UK plans to operate a single model of JSF,
instead of different land and naval variants. Overall, the carrier-variant of the JSF will be cheaper,
reducing through-life costs by around 25%.
The current, limited carrier-strike capability will be retired. We must face up to the difficult
choices put off by the last Government. Over the next five years combat air support to
operations in Afghanistan must be the over-riding priority: the Harrier fleet would not be able
to provide this and sustain a carrier-strike role at the same time. Even after 2015, short-range
Harriers whether operating from HMS Illustrious or HMS Queen Elizabeth would provide
only a very limited coercive capability. We judge it unlikely that this would be sufficiently useful in
the latter half of the decade to be a cost-effective use of defence resources.
This new carrier-strike policy is consistent with the Strategic Defence and Security Reviews
overall approach of holding defence capabilities at different levels of readiness appropriate to the
strategic context. It makes strategic sense to focus on developing a more effective and appropriate
carrier-strike capability to deal with the uncertain evolution in type and scale of potential threats
from various states in the next decade and beyond. To provide further insurance against
unpredictable changes in that strategic environment, our current plan is to hold one of the two new
carriers at extended readiness. That leaves open options to rotate them, to ensure a continuous UK
carrier-strike capability; or to re-generate more quickly a two-carrier strike capability. Alternatively,
we might sell one of the carriers, relying on cooperation with a close ally to provide continuous
carrier-strike capability. The next strategic defence and security review in 2015 will provide an
opportunity to review these options as the future strategic environment develops. Retaining this
flexibility of choice is at the core of the Governments adaptable approach.
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Land Forces
2.A.6 In the land environment, Future Force 2020
will be able to provide: light, specialist forces for
short-duration interventions; sufficient multi-role
forces to provide flexibility for larger or more
complex intervention operations or to undertake
enduring stabilisation operations; a contribution to
our standing commitments including defending the
South Atlantic Overseas Territories and UK tasks
such as bomb disposal; and the ability to command
UK and coalition forces at up to theatre level.
2.A.7 Capabilities will include:
Air Forces
2.A.9 In the air environment, Future Force 2020
will be able to provide: air defence of the UK and
its South Atlantic Overseas Territories; a credible
and capable combat air presence to contribute
to conventional deterrence and containment; an
expeditionary combat air contribution to enduring
land operations; strategic and tactical airlift; and
other air power capabilities, including ISTAR,
helicopters and RAF Regiment ground units.
2.A.10 Capabilities will include:
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Reserves
2.A.12 Members of the reserve forces are
performing outstandingly well in Afghanistan.
There is a strong case for reviewing whether our
reserve forces are properly structured for the type
of conflict we envisage undertaking in future so
that we make best use of the skills, experience and
capabilities of our Reservists whilst at the same
time moving towards a more efficient structure.
We will therefore undertake a six month study
into the future role and structure of the Reserves
which will be undertaken by the leadership of
the regular and reserve forces. We will maintain
the important role of the tri-Service cadet and
university units.
Specialist capabilities
2.A.13 Our capabilities in each of the three
environments maritime, land and air and our
ability to integrate them and ensure they operate
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Overseas bases
We will maintain our network of permanent joint operating bases, including: in Gibraltar; in the
Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus; British Forces South Atlantic Islands, based on the Falkland Islands
and Ascension Island and maintaining a regular presence in South Georgia and South Sandwich
Islands; and on Diego Garcia in British Indian Ocean Territory. These bases give us and in some cases
our allies wide geographical reach and logistic support hubs for deployed forces. They will continue
to be central to our ability to deploy military force around the world and respond to changing
strategic circumstances.
We will also maintain our training areas in Canada, Kenya and Brunei. These help prepare our forces
for operations. They are also concrete manifestations of our close and valued defence relationships
with these countries.
The UK currently also has a major military presence in Germany, with 20,000 service personnel
and their families based there. For more than 50 years the Federal Government has supported
the British military presence providing essential training and operational opportunities as well as
basing. The presence of the British military has played an important role in demonstrating Alliance
solidarity, and has also been a symbol of steadfast UK-German friendship. But there is no longer any
operational requirement for UK forces to be based there, and the current arrangements impose
financial costs on the UK, disruption on personnel and their families and opportunity costs in terms
of wider Army coherence. We therefore aim to withdraw all forces from Germany by 2020.
B. Our people
2.B.1 But these plans will only be effective if
we retain and develop high-quality and highly
motivated people. Our military advantage is, and
will remain, based on the skills, dedication and
professionalism of our personnel. Service men
and women accept the right and duty to apply
lethal force, and face through combat the risk of
death or life-changing injury. This principle sets the
Armed Forces apart from other professions.
2.B.2 In reorganising Defence we must properly
plan and provide a balance between equipment
and people. Our plans for the Armed Forces and
MOD civil servants are set out at section 2.D.
We recognise that the cumulative impact of the
changes in this Review will be difficult for our
people and their families.
29
30
C. Industry
2.C.1 We will ensure that our Armed Forces
are provided with the equipment and support
they require when they need it in the UK and on
operations. At the same time, we expect defence
expenditure to demonstrate value for money. Our
relationship with industry is crucial to achieving
both objectives. But MOD spending also has a
broader economic impact MOD spent nearly
19 billion in 2009 with UK suppliers and it has
been estimated that some 300,000 UK jobs are
supported by defence spending and exports.
Industrial policy provides the link between these
key issues.
D. Transition
2.D.1 The decisions set out in this Review will
require a major and challenging programme
of change, made more difficult by the financial
and operational context. We will carry out this
transition responsibly, ensuring that our operations
in Afghanistan are prioritised, maintaining at all
times forces capable of responding to crises and
retaining as far as possible the ability to regenerate
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32
communications
Personnel transition
2.D.6 We plan to make total reductions of around
17,000 service personnel by 2015:
Bases
2.D.10 For generations, up and down the country,
many communities have given outstanding support
to the Armed Forces. Nowhere is this truer than
in Portsmouth and Devonport. Although the
measures set out in this White Paper will require
some changes at both locations, we will have a
continuing requirement to sustain both bases.
In the longer-term, the two new carriers will be
based in Portsmouth.
2.D.11 The rationalisation in Army command
structures and the reductions in, for example,
tanks and heavy artillery will eliminate the
requirement for some locations and reduce the
infrastructure required at others. Our current
estate is widely dispersed across the UK in a
manner which owes more to history than to
its efficient use. This dispersal creates costs
and reduces stability for service personnel. We
therefore intend to use the opportunity of these
major changes to develop a more coherent and
cost-effective solution.
2.D.12 In particular, we aim to accelerate the
re-basing of our forces from Germany, ending
the legacy UK Armed Forces presence. There
are currently 20,000 personnel in Germany,
many accompanied by families, and the basing
arrangements impose significant disruption
to personnel, opportunity costs in terms of
wider Army coherence, and financial costs on
the Department (for example, through health,
education and allowances). We therefore aim to
return half our personnel in Germany to the UK
by 2015 and the remainder by 2020.
E. Risk
2.E.1 We have assessed the risks associated
with this transition. We recognise that we will
be undertaking major change, while conducting
a challenging operation. The cumulative impact
will impose major strains upon personnel and
organisations. Some gaps in capabilities will create
temporary risks and vulnerabilities, particularly
where we are withdrawing one capability in
advance of its successors entry into service. And
the future is uncertain, so we might need to react
to the unexpected. We will manage these risks by:
33
34
36
Part Three
The Deterrent
37
38
Scale
3.11 The Government has concluded that we can
meet the minimum requirement of an effective
and credible level of deterrence with a smaller
nuclear weapons capability. We will therefore
cut the maximum number of nuclear warheads
onboard each deployed submarine from 48 to 40.
Together with improved stockpile management,
that will reduce our requirement for operationally
available warheads from fewer than 160 to no
more than 120. We will also reduce the number
of operational missiles on the Vanguard class
Replacement warheads
3.12 Since 2006, work has been progressing
in order to determine the optimum life of the
existing warhead stockpile and the range of
replacement options. Under the 1958 UK-US
Agreement for Cooperation on the Uses of
Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence Purposes (the
Mutual Defence Agreement) we have agreed on
the future of the Trident D5 delivery system and
determined that a replacement warhead is not
required until at least the late 2030s. Decisions
on replacing the warhead will not therefore be
required in this Parliament. This will defer 500
million of spending from the next 10 years. We
have also reached agreement with the US over the
size of the missile tubes in the new submarines;
this has enabled us to reduce the cost of the
submarine missile compartment by up to 250
million.
Submarines
3.13 We have reviewed the scope to extend the
life of the existing Vanguard class submarines and
have concluded that, with sufficient investment,
we can safely operate them into the late 2020s
and early 2030s. This affords us the opportunity
to adjust the build programme of the replacement
submarines to match, reducing cost in the shortterm with the aim of delivering the first new
submarine in 2028. Later this year detailed design
work on the new class of submarines will begin.
This will provide the information needed in order
to determine whether maintaining continuous at
sea deterrence would require four submarines,
or a fleet of only three. A decision on submarine
numbers would be required at the Main Gate
point of our acquisition programme, around 2016.
39
40
Part Four
Wider Security
Terrorism
Instability and conflict overseas
Cyber security
Civil emergencies
Energy security
Organised crime
Border security
Counter proliferation and arms control.
A. Terrorism
4.A.1 Terrorism is a Tier One risk in the National
Security Risk Assessment. The most significant
terrorist threat to the UK and its interests overseas
comes from the Al Qaeda senior leadership based
in the border areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan,
and their affiliates and supporters. The current
threat to the UK from international terrorism is
judged to be Severe, meaning that an attack in
this country is highly likely. The threat is becoming
more diverse as groups affiliated to and inspired
by Al Qaeda develop more autonomy in directing
operations. As such we are likely to see a more
unpredictable picture in the future, potentially with
more frequent, albeit less sophisticated attacks.
4.A.2 The threat from residual terrorism linked
to Northern Ireland is a growing concern. There
is a calculated campaign of violence from small
dissident republican groups. Despite continuing
political progress, their activities have increased
in the last 18 months and the security situation is
unlikely to improve in the short term. There have
been 37 attacks this year, compared with 22 in all
of 2009. The ongoing recruitment of experienced
terrorists and a younger generation will contribute
to a continued high level of threat in Northern
Ireland, as well as in Great Britain where the
threat level was recently raised from Moderate
to Substantial, meaning that an attack is a strong
possibility.
41
42
43
44
45
46
0.7%ODA/GNI
Tackleconictandinstability
OtherOfficial
DevelopmentAssistance
30%ofODAspend
22%ofODAspend
2010/11
2014/15
C. Cyber security
4.C.1 The risks emanating from cyber space
(including the internet, wider telecommunications
networks and computer systems) are one of the
four Tier One risks to national security (set out
in the National Security Strategy). These risks
include hostile attacks upon the UK from other
states, potential shortcomings in the UKs cyber
infrastructure, and the actions of cyber terrorists
and criminals (see box below). But cyber space
also creates opportunities for the UK Government
and British businesses, which will derive benefits
from the protection that effective cyber security
measures bring to the UK economy. These threats
and opportunities are likely to increase significantly
over the next five to 10 years, as our dependence
on cyber space deepens.
4.C.2 The rapidly changing nature of these threats
and opportunities to the UK demonstrates the need
for a flexible cyber security response, in line with the
principles of our adaptable posture and the National
Security Tasks and Planning Guidelines. That response
must be led by government, but in doing so we must
leverage the knowledge and resources of the private
sector including those parts of the private sector
that own and operate large elements of the critical
cyber infrastructure.
4.C.3 The Government will introduce a
transformative national cyber security programme
to close the gap between the requirements
of a modern digital economy and the rapidly
growing risks associated with cyber space. The
National Cyber Security Programme will be
supported by 650 million of new investment
over the next four years, working to one national
programme of activity with supporting strategies
in other departments. Successful delivery of this
transformative programme also depends on the
critical role that the private sector has to play;
our relationship with them must reflect a genuine
partnership where policy is co-designed so that
a credible national response can be delivered.
Through this programme, we will:
47
48
criminal groups have already registered over 9,500 Olympic Games-related web addresses
there was a 14% increase in online banking losses between 2008 and 2009
51% of all the malicious software threats that have ever been identified were identified in 2009
(see graph below showing the rise of this expanding form of cyber crime).
Numberofnewmalicioussoftwarethreats
2,895,802
3,000,000
2,500,000
2,000,000
1,656,227
1,500,000
1,000,000
624,267
500,000
0
20,547
18,827
69,107
113,025
2002
2003
2004
2005
140,690
2006
Year
2007
2008
2009
D. Civil emergencies
4.D.1 Civil emergencies, including natural
disasters, major accidents and malicious acts, can
threaten serious damage to the welfare of British
citizens or the environment. Two of the risks of
greatest concern are terrorism and cyber crime
(discussed in more detail in the sections above).
But the highest risk category includes a severe
influenza pandemic and major coastal or tidal
flooding which, if they were to occur, would have
a significant impact on the UK, threatening the
lives of citizens and damaging the economy. Risks
related to all kinds of civil emergency are likely to
remain at similar levels to now over the next five
years, but the longer term prospects are that the
likelihood and impact of some natural hazards will
increase with changes in the climate.
4.D.2 The National Security Tasks and Planning
Guidelines set out a cross-government approach
to tackling civil emergencies, from horizon scanning
to the identification of emerging risks, crisis
management capabilities and the enhancement of
the local and national response to emergencies.
It also sets out a range of requirements that fall
principally to the private sector. In line with this
approach, we will be introducing a number of
changes. Specifically, we will:
49
E. Energy security
4.E.1 The UK faces a range of risks related to our
ability to access secure, diverse and affordable
supplies of energy, which are essential to economic
stability and growth. These include political
instability in key energy countries, insufficient
investment in states that supply energy, and
imperfections in the functioning of global and UK
markets. As the box below suggests, these risks are
likely to intensify over the coming years, due to our
growing dependence on imports of fossil fuels at
the same time that global demand and competition
for energy is increasing.
150
100
50
2025
2020
2015
2010
2005
0
2000
Milliontonnesofoilequivalent
50
50
100
Businessasusual
(withoutlowcarbon
policiesintroduced)
Lowcarbon
51
52
F. Organised crime
4.F.1 Organised criminal activity poses a significant
and persistent threat to the UK public and
economy. At present, there are around 38,000
individuals involved in organised crime affecting
the UK, costing the economy and society between
20 billion and 40 billion per annum. It is likely
that the threat from organised crime will increase
over the next five years, in particular as new
technologies make it easier for criminals to hide
or disguise their communications and exploit new
opportunities.
4.F.2 The National Security Tasks and Planning
Guidelines set out the high level crossdepartmental core requirements for addressing
organised crime, including through the provision
of law enforcement capabilities targeting the most
harmful organised criminal groups.
4.F.3 In order to fulfil these requirements, we
will need to change our overarching approach to
tackling organised crime. There will be a particular
need to ensure that the resource allocated to
tackling organised crime is used as efficiently and
effectively as possible. The changes that will help
to put in place this new approach, which will be
driven by the revised UK Threat Assessment, are
set out below and will be brought together in the
G. Border security
4.G.1 The UKs border is the gateway for travel
and trade. Last year, more than 220 million people
UK police, security and immigration watch lists. It is a key element of our strategy to deliver robust
border controls and it supports our national counter-terrorism strategy. It helps to reduce the
threat of terrorist attacks, to disrupt cross border crime and to prevent abuses of the immigration
system. e-Borders enables the UK Border Agency, police and other agencies to target and identify
in advance persons of interest entering or leaving the UK and plan interventions. It currently
analyses the details of over 123 million passengers travelling into and out of the UK every year
(see graph overleaf). The e-Borders system has provided the capability to undertake checks
electronically both earlier and against more comprehensive watchlists than was previously possible.
This has led to more than 7,200 arrests for crimes including murder, rape and assault. It has also
helped track individuals connected to counter-terrorist investigations; led to fake British passports
being impounded; the seizure of illegal drugs and illicit tobacco; the identification of smugglers and
The effectiveness of the programme is best shown in its application to specific cases. Last year a
British man was wanted by the police after fleeing to Thailand because, while employed as a tax
advisor, he had transferred over 1.8 million from the account of an elderly care home resident
over a five year period. He attempted to return to the UK in July and was identified by e-Borders.
The police were alerted and the man was arrested on his arrival, convicted and sentenced to
53
LevelsofpassengerscreeningbyeBordersinadvanceoftravel*
140
Annualisednumberofpassengersscreened
byeBorders(millions)
54
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
2007
2008
Year
2009
2010
* Information used by e-Borders has been checked at the border for many years. e-Borders enables
this information to be checked against watchlists in advance of travel to help reduce the threat of
terrorism, crime and immigration abuse, and facilitate legitimate travel and trade.
55
56
58
Part Five
Bilateral cooperation
5.3 We intend to intensify our bilateral defence
and security relationships with a range of key
partners and on a range of security issues.
59
60
Multilateral engagement
5.9 The UK enjoys a central position in key
multilateral institutions such as the UN Security
Council and the international financial institutions,
61
62
successfully complete the mission of the NATOled International Security Assistance Force in
Afghanistan to help build the authority and
influence of the Government of Afghanistan
and pave the way for reconstruction and
effective governance
63
64
Part Six
Delivery in the UK
6.3 Better coordination in the UK will help us
to address threats to the public, institutions and
infrastructure, including by establishing:
65
66
Delivery overseas
6.4 We will better coordinate our activity overseas
to ensure that it is consistent and aligns fully
diplomatic, development, economic, defence
and intelligence engagement, underpinned
by appropriate resourcing. We will put more
emphasis on identifying and addressing potential
risks before they manifest themselves on our
shores or develop into wider threats to our
security, and take an integrated approach to
building stability overseas, as set out in section 4.B.
We will also improve coordination and focus by:
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the UKs overseas network
As part of an adaptable posture, the UK will continue to need an active foreign policy and strong
representation abroad. A genuine understanding of what is happening overseas requires people
on the ground. And effective influencing of governments, countries and organisations requires
face to face contact.
The National Security Council therefore agreed to maintain a global diplomatic network but
with a sharper focus on promoting our national security and prosperity. The aim is to protect UK
interests, addressing risks before they become threats, meeting new challenges as they emerge,
and embracing new opportunities, while doing better with less. We also recognise that we cannot
achieve long-term security and prosperity unless we uphold and promote our values in our
international relationships. To achieve this, the FCO will:
operate according to a new, more focussed, mandate: to safeguard the UKs national security,
build its prosperity, and support UK nationals around the world
maximise the economic opportunities provided by the network with a new emphasis on
commercial diplomacy including more effort on creating exports and investment; opening
improve coordination of all UK work overseas under the leadership of the Ambassador
mechanism to allow other government departments to co-locate with the FCO overseas to
increase efficiency
focus resources on those countries most important to our security and prosperity including by
establishing stronger bilateral relationships with a range of key partners such as India and China
and on supporting fragile states such as Afghanistan, Somalia and Yemen
continue to provide global coverage in a cost effective way by increasing efficiency and
developing new, more flexible forms of diplomacy including regional coverage from central
hubs, deploying mobile consuls across borders to reinforce our missions during serious consular
incidents or in response to seasonal tourist patterns, rapid deployment teams for reaching crises
quickly, and extending use of digital media to reach and influence more audiences
continue to support the BBC World Service and British Council which play unique roles in
promoting our values, culture and commitment to human rights and democracy.
the Cabinet Office and departments, using allsource analysis to advise the National Security
Council of emerging issues with implications for
UK interests, including through a biannual report
specifically on Countries at Risk of Instability, and
67
68
which support the development of forwardlooking defence and security policy, including by
engaging with thinkers outside government. We
will coordinate their work programmes better
and improve collaboration through the creation
of a more formal strategic thinking network
overseen by the National Security Adviser
Implementation
6.8 Lead ministers, accountable to the National
Security Council, will take responsibility for
coordinating priority areas of work to deliver
the national security tasks. They will work with
all departments with a stake in the issue. Lead
ministers will be supported by officials who will
lead work across government and in partnership
with others including the private sector, nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and
international partners, including by:
Leadministers,designated
officialsandbodies
responsibleforcoordinating
workonpriorityareas
CounterTerrorism
HomeSecretary
DirectorGeneral,Securityand
CounterTerrorism
HomeOffice
BorderSecurity
HomeSecretary
ChiefExecutive
UKBorderAgency
CivilEmergencies
SecurityMinister,HomeOffice
DirectorofCivilContingencies,
CabinetOffice
NationalSecuritySecretariat,
CabinetOffice
BuildingStabilityOverseas
ForeignPolicy
ForeignSecretary
DirectorGeneralPoliticalAffairs
ForeignandCommonwealthOffice
CyberSecurity
SecurityMinister,HomeOffice
DirectorofCyberSecurity,
CabinetOffice
NationalSecuritySecretariat,
CabinetOffice
SeriousOrganisedCrime
HomeSecretary
Director,StrategicCentrefor
OrganisedCrime
NationalCrimeAgency
EnergySecurity
EnergyandClimateChange
Secretary
DirectorGeneral,International
DepartmentforEnergy
andClimateChange
StateThreatsand
CounterProliferation
ForeignSecretary
DirectorGeneral,Defence
andIntelligence
ForeignandCommonwealth
Office
ClimateChangeandResource
Competition:SecurityImpacts
ForeignSecretary
DirectorGeneral,Europe
andGlobalisation
ForeignandCommonwealthOffice
DefenceAspectsofSDSR
DefenceSecretary
MODPermanentSecretary
andChiefofDefenceStaff
MinistryofDefence
Development
InternationalDevelopmentSecretary
DirectorGeneralProgrammes
DepartmentforInternational
Development
69
70
NationalSecurityCouncilstructure
NationalSecurityCouncil
Chair:PrimeMinister
PermanentMembers:DeputyPrimeMinister,theSecretaryofStateforForeignandCommonwealthAffairs,
theChancelloroftheExchequer,theSecretaryofState forInternationalDevelopment,
theHomeSecretary,theSecretaryofStateforDefence,theSecretaryofStateforEnergy and Climate Change,
ChiefSecretarytotheTreasury,CabinetOfficeMinisterofStateandtheSecurityMinister
NSC(Threats,Hazards
ResilienceandContingencies)
Chair:HomeSecretary
NSC(EmergingPowers)
Chair:ForeignSecretary
NSC(Nuclear)
Chair:PrimeMinister
NSC(Officials)
Chair:NationalSecurityAdviser
StrategicDefenceandSecurityReviewImplementationBoard
CabinetOfficechaired
ProgrammeBoards
ChairedbyresponsibleseniorofficialsacrossgovernmentreportingregularlytoImplementationBoard
72
Glossary
Glossary
Glossary
A300
A400M
Apache
ARRC
Astute
ASEAN
AU
African Union
AWACS
BIS
C17
C130
C3
Carrier Strike
CBRN
CCA
CCS
Challenger 2
Chinook
Civil Emergency
CNI
COBR
Conflict Pool
Joint DFID, FCO and MOD fund to support conflict prevention, security
sector reform and stabilisation
CONTEST
UK Counter-Terrorism Strategy
73
74
DCLG
DECC
Defence Engagement
DFID
EU
European Union
Extended Readiness
FCO
Five Eyes
FPDA
Frontex
G8
G20
GCC
GCHQ
GNI
H1N1
Harrier
IAEA
IEA
IED
IMF
Initial Gate
INSTINCT
Intervention
ISAF
ISTAR
JIC
JSF
Joint Strike Fighter. Future fast jet that can operate from aircraft carriers
JTAC
Main Gate
MDG
Merlin
Glossary
MOD
Ministry of Defence
MRA4
MSSG
Multi-Role Brigade
NATO
NCA
NMIC
NPT
NRA
NRR
NSA
NSC
NSRA
NSS
ODA
OECD
Ofgem
OPCW
OSCE
OSCT
P5
Pandemic
PJHQ
PRT
RAF
Rivet Joint
Sea King
Sentinel
SIS
SOCA
Process for establishing Government spending plans over the four years
from 2011/12 to 2014/15
SRT
75
76
Stabilisation (civilian)
Stabilisation (military)
Stabilisation Unit
Joint DFID, FCO and MOD unit on civilian stabilisation policy and
deployments
Standing Commitments
STOVL
Strategic Airlift
Submarine Enterprise
Performance Programme
TA
Territorial Army
Tactical Airlift
Task Group
Tomahawk
Tornado
Trident
Tristar
Type 45 Destroyer
Typhoon
UAV
UCAV
UKBA
UK Border Agency
UK Overseas Territory
UKTI
UN
United Nations
Vanguard
VC10
Warrior
Watchkeeper
WTO
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Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review
Securing Britain in an
Age of Uncertainty:
The Strategic Defence
and Security Review