Final Flint Water Advisory Task Force Report 21march2016
Final Flint Water Advisory Task Force Report 21march2016
Eric
Rothstein,
CPA
Ken
Sikkema
Lawrence Reynolds, MD
2
1
March
2016
FINAL
REPORT
C o m m i s s i o n e d
b y
t h e
O f f i c e
o f
G o v e r n o r
R i c k
S n y d e r
S t a t e
o f
M i c h i g a n
Table
of
Contents
Executive
Summary
...........................................................................................................................
1
Summary
Statement
...............................................................................................................................
1
A
Series
of
Government
Failures
.............................................................................................................
1
FWATF
Membership,
Charge
and
Scope
of
Review
................................................................................
2
Acknowledgements
.................................................................................................................................
5
Findings
of
the
Task
Force
......................................................................................................................
6
Recommendations
of
the
Task
Force
....................................................................................................
10
Background
.....................................................................................................................................
15
Flint,
Michigan
......................................................................................................................................
15
Water
Crisis
..........................................................................................................................................
15
Summary
Timeline
of
Key
Events
..........................................................................................................
16
Regulatory
Context
...............................................................................................................................
22
Public
Health
Context
...........................................................................................................................
23
Roles
of
Government
Entities
in
the
Flint
Water
Crisis
.....................................................................
26
Michigan
Department
of
Environmental
Quality
(MDEQ)
..............................................................
26
Defined
Role
..........................................................................................................................................
26
Discussion
.............................................................................................................................................
27
Findings
.................................................................................................................................................
28
Recommendations
................................................................................................................................
29
Michigan
Department
of
Health
and
Human
Services
(MDHHS)
....................................................
30
Defined
Role
..........................................................................................................................................
30
Discussion
.............................................................................................................................................
31
Findings
.................................................................................................................................................
33
Recommendations
................................................................................................................................
34
Michigan
Governors
Office
...........................................................................................................
35
Defined
Role
..........................................................................................................................................
35
Discussion
.............................................................................................................................................
36
Findings
.................................................................................................................................................
38
Recommendations
................................................................................................................................
38
State-Appointed
Emergency
Managers
.........................................................................................
39
Defined
Role
..........................................................................................................................................
39
Discussion
.............................................................................................................................................
39
Findings
.................................................................................................................................................
40
Recommendations
................................................................................................................................
41
City
of
Flint
...................................................................................................................................
42
Defined
Role
..........................................................................................................................................
42
Discussion
.............................................................................................................................................
43
Findings
.................................................................................................................................................
44
Recommendations
................................................................................................................................
45
Genesee
County
Health
Department
(GCHD)
................................................................................
46
Defined
Role
..........................................................................................................................................
46
Discussion
.............................................................................................................................................
46
Findings
.................................................................................................................................................
48
Recommendations
................................................................................................................................
48
U.S.
Environmental
Protection
Agency
(EPA)
Oversight
and
the
Lead
and
Copper
Rule
.................
48
Defined
Role
..........................................................................................................................................
48
Discussion
.............................................................................................................................................
50
Findings
.................................................................................................................................................
52
Recommendations
................................................................................................................................
52
Issues
Presented
by
the
Flint
Water
Crisis
........................................................................................
53
The
Reality
of
Environmental
Injustice
..........................................................................................
54
Discussion
.............................................................................................................................................
54
Findings
.................................................................................................................................................
55
Recommendations
................................................................................................................................
55
Perspectives
from
Flint
.................................................................................................................
55
Flint
Recovery
/
Remediation
........................................................................................................
56
Recommendations
................................................................................................................................
57
State-Wide
Initiatives
...................................................................................................................
58
Recommendations
................................................................................................................................
58
Conclusions
.....................................................................................................................................
62
APPENDIX
I:
Flint
Water
Advisory
Task
Force
(FWATF)
APPENDIX
II:
FWATF
Letters
APPENDIX
III:
Interviewee
Listing
APPENDIX
IV:
Questions
of
Lockwood,
Andrews,
&
Newnam
APPENDIX
V:
Detailed
Timeline
APPENDIX
VI:
Abbreviations
and
Acronyms
Executive Summary
Summary
Statement
The
Flint
water
crisis
is
a
story
of
government
failure,
intransigence,
unpreparedness,
delay,
inaction,
and
environmental
injustice.
The
Michigan
Department
of
Environmental
Quality
(MDEQ)
failed
in
its
fundamental
responsibility
to
effectively
enforce
drinking
water
regulations.
The
Michigan
Department
of
Health
and
Human
Services
(MDHHS)
failed
to
adequately
and
promptly
act
to
protect
public
health.
Both
agencies,
but
principally
the
MDEQ,
stubbornly
worked
to
discredit
and
dismiss
others
attempts
to
bring
the
issues
of
unsafe
water,
lead
contamination,
and
increased
cases
of
Legionellosis
(Legionnaires
disease)
to
light.
With
the
City
of
Flint
under
emergency
management,
the
Flint
Water
Department
rushed
unprepared
into
full-
time
operation
of
the
Flint
Water
Treatment
Plant,
drawing
water
from
a
highly
corrosive
source
without
the
use
of
corrosion
control.
Though
MDEQ
was
delegated
primacy
(authority
to
enforce
federal
law),
the
United
States
Environmental
Protection
Agency
(EPA)
delayed
enforcement
of
the
Safe
Drinking
Water
Act
(SDWA)
and
Lead
and
Copper
Rule
(LCR),
thereby
prolonging
the
calamity.
Neither
the
Governor
nor
the
Governors
office
took
steps
to
reverse
poor
decisions
by
MDEQ
and
state-appointed
emergency
managers
until
October
2015,
in
spite
of
mounting
problems
and
suggestions
to
do
so
by
senior
staff
members
in
the
Governors
office,
in
part
because
of
continued
reassurances
from
MDEQ
that
the
water
was
safe.
The
significant
consequences
of
these
failures
for
Flint
will
be
long-lasting.
They
have
deeply
affected
Flints
public
health,
its
economic
future,1
and
residents
trust
in
government.
The
Flint
water
crisis
occurred
when
state-appointed
emergency
managers
replaced
local
representative
decision-making
in
Flint,
removing
the
checks
and
balances
and
public
accountability
that
come
with
public
decision-making.
Emergency
managers
made
key
decisions
that
contributed
to
the
crisis,
from
the
use
of
the
Flint
River
to
delays
in
reconnecting
to
DWSD
once
water
quality
problems
were
encountered.
Given
the
demographics
of
Flint,2
the
implications
for
environmental
injustice
cannot
be
ignored
or
dismissed.
The
Flint
water
crisis
is
also
a
story,
however,
of
something
that
did
work:
the
critical
role
played
by
engaged
Flint
citizens,
by
individuals
both
inside
and
outside
of
government
who
had
the
expertise
and
willingness
to
question
and
challenge
government
leadership,
and
by
members
of
a
free
press
who
used
the
tools
that
enable
investigative
journalism.
Without
their
courage
and
persistence,
this
crisis
likely
never
would
have
been
brought
to
light
and
mitigation
efforts
never
begun.
Direct and indirect economic impacts of the Flint water crisis include, for example, financial consequences to
individuals
and
homeowners;
impacts
on
economic
development
opportunities
and
on
the
revenue
base
for
public
services;
and
the
costs
of
exacerbated
requirements
for
water
infrastructure
repair
and
rehabilitation
as
well
as
long-
term
public
health
and
social
services.
infrastructure
damage
are
a
litany
of
questionable
decisions
and
failures
related
to
several
issues
and
events,
including,
but
not
limited
to:
Decisions
related
to
the
use
of
the
Flint
River
as
an
interim
water
supply
source.
Inadequate
preparation
(for
example,
staffing,
training
and
plant
upgrades)
for
the
switch
to
full-time
use
of
the
Flint
Water
Treatment
Plant
using
the
Flint
River
as
the
primary
water
supply
source.
Inadequate
and
improper
sampling
of
distribution
system
water
quality,
potentially
in
violation
of
the
Safe
Drinking
Water
Act.
Intransigent
disregard
of
compelling
evidence
of
water
quality
problems
and
associated
health
effects.
Callous
and
dismissive
responses
to
citizens
expressed
concerns.
Persistent
delays
in
coordinating
appropriate
responses
to
the
resultant
public
health
crises
once
irrefutable
evidence
of
exposure
and
poisoning
was
presented.
We
cannot
begin
to
explain
and
learn
from
these
eventsour
chargewithout
also
highlighting
that
the
framework
for
this
decision-making
was
Michigans
Emergency
Manager
Law.
This
law
replaces
the
decision-making
authority
of
locally
elected
officials
with
that
of
a
state-appointed
emergency
manager.
While
one
must
acknowledge
that
emergency
management
is
a
mechanism
to
address
severe
financial
distress,
it
is
important
to
emphasize
that
the
role
of
the
emergency
manager
in
Flint
places
accountability
for
what
happened
with
state
government.
Our
complete
findings
and
recommendations
are
provided
throughout
this
report
and
also
are
summarized
at
the
close
of
this
Executive
Summary.
They
are
formulated
to
offer
specific
measures
to
better
safeguard
public
health,
enhance
critical
water
system
infrastructure,
improve
governmental
decision-making
and
regulatory
oversight,
and
mitigate
the
many
negative
health
and
economic
effects
facing
the
people
of
Flint.
We
hope
that
our
findings
and
recommendations
serve
as
a
guide
and
template
for
remediation
and
recovery
in
Flint,
and
for
safeguarding
the
health
and
well-being
of
residents
across
our
state.
Paragraph summaries of the FWATF members backgrounds and experience are provided as Appendix I.
o City
of
Flint
o Genesee
County
Health
Department
(GCHD)
o United
States
Environmental
Protection
Agency
and
the
Lead
and
Copper
Rule
Issues
Presented
by
the
Flint
Water
Crisis
o The
Reality
of
Environmental
Injustice
o Perspectives
from
Flint
o Flint
Recovery
o State-Wide
Recommendations
Before
completing
this
report,
the
Task
Force
issued
three
interim
letters
to
Governor
Snyder
offering
findings
and
recommendations
requiring
immediate
response,
as
follows:4
1. The
first
letter,
issued
December
4,
2015,
identified
our
concerns
about
coordination
of
response
measures
and
the
need
for
a
framework
to
measure
results
and
clearly
delineate
responsibilities
for
continuing
actions
to
protect
public
health.
2. The
second
letter,
issued
December
29,
2015,
addressed
the
critical
and
urgent
need
to
establish
responsibility
and
ensure
accountability
for
what
happened
in
Flint.
3. Our
third
letter,
issued
January
21,
2016,
addressed
the
need
for
the
state
to
engage
the
scientific
experts
who
overcame
state
and
federal
agency
intransigence
to
expose
the
lead
poisoning,
and
similarly
to
engage
trusted,
scientific
experts
drawn
from
independent
institutions
to
address
the
implications
of
the
Legionellosis
outbreak.
In
conducting
our
interviews,
we
have
had
complete
independence
and
largely5
unfettered
access
to
local,
state
and
federal
government
personnel.
Interview
subjects
were
not
compelled
to
participate
in
our
review,
and
the
FWATF
held
no
subpoena
or
judicial
enforcement
powers.
We
are
grateful
to
the
parties
involved
for
their
forthright
willingness
to
discuss
the
events
that
transpired
and
their
perspectives.
We
acknowledge
that
other
reviews
and
investigations
are
taking
place,
some
with
tools
that
the
FWATF
did
not
have,
such
as
the
subpoena
and
judicial
enforcement
powers
mentioned
above.
We
appreciate
and
support
these
reviews
because
the
magnitude
of
this
tragedy
warrants
deep
and
detailed
investigation.
It
is
our
hope
that
these
or
other
reviews
examine
certain
issues
we
had
neither
the
time
nor
investigative
tools
to
fully
explore,
and
that
fell
outside
our
immediate
scope
given
the
accelerated
timeframe
for
our
information
gathering
and
rendering
of
judgments.
These
issues
include,
but
are
not
limited
to:
State
approval
and
permitting
of
the
Karegnondi
Water
Authority
(KWA)
in
a
region
that
had
ample
water
supply
and
treatment
capacity,
yet
faced
economic
distress
sufficient
to
warrant
emergency
management
in
its
two
largest
urban
centers.
The
appropriate
role
of
regulatory
agencies
and
the
water
utility
industry
in
addressing
the
dangers
presented
by
widespread
use
of
lead
in
public
and
private
plumbing
systems.
The FWATFs interim letters to Governor Snyder are provided as Appendix II.
The
FWATF
was
not
successful
in
scheduling
an
interview
with
representatives
of
the
firm
Lockwood,
Andrews,
&
Newnam
(LAN)
despite
several
requests.
LAN
requested
that
questions
be
submitted
to
them
in
writing,
and
the
questions
we
submitted
are
included
in
Appendix
IV.
As
of
the
time
of
publication,
the
FWATF
has
not
received
responses
to
these
questions.
Historically,
regulatory
agencies
and
the
water
utility
industry
at
large
have
been
reluctant
to
address
these
dangers
beyond
use
of
corrosion
control
treatment.6
Though
the
industry
now
endorses
strengthening
of
the
Lead
and
Copper
Rule
and
ultimate
replacement
of
lead
service
lines
(LSLs),7
the
industry
has
not
(with
notable
exceptions)
been
proactive
in
reducing
risk
through
full
LSL
replacement
programs
and
has
highlighted
utility
customers
obligations
to
manage
lead
risks
on
private
property.
While
the
recommendations
of
the
National
Drinking
Water
Advisory
Council
(NDWAC)
advance
objectives
of
full
LSL
replacements,
enhanced
monitoring,
and
improved
public
education,
concerns
persist
about
accountability,
oversight
and
enforcement.8,
9
Protocols
for
environmental
compliance
enforcement
when
EPA
has
delegated
primacy
(authority
to
enforce
federal
law)
to
state
agencies,
yet
retains
ultimate
responsibility
for
protection
of
public
health
and
management
of
environmental
risks.
Budgets
for
public
health
activities
at
federal,
state,
and
local
levels
to
ensure
that
highly
skilled
personnel
and
adequate
resources
are
available.
The
consequences
of
under-
funding
include
insufficient
and
inefficient
responses
to
public
health
concerns,
which
have
been
evident
in
the
Flint
water
crisis.
The
need
for
greater
clarity
on
local
and
state
processes
and
procedures
for
declaring
emergencies
in
response
to
man-made
catastrophes
(in
contrast
to
natural
disasters).
The
efforts
of
local,
state,
and
federal
emergency
operations
teams
in
Flint
beginning
in
Historically,
water
industry
groups
have
maintained
that
removing
lead
from
water
and
plumbing
systems
is
not
necessary
and
would
involve
significant
difficulty
and
expense
(see,
for
example,
Controlling
Lead
in
Drinking
Water,
Water
Research
Foundation,
2015).
Notably,
when
EPAs
Lead
and
Copper
Rule
(LCR)
was
published
in
1991,
it
required
replacement
of
entire
LSLs,
and
in
1994
the
water
industry
sought
in
court
to
limit
this
requirement
to
only
the
publicly
owned
portions
of
service
lines
(40
F.3d
1266,
AWWA
vs.
EPA,
1994).
In
response,
EPA
revised
the
LCR
in
2000
to
allow
for
partial
service
line
replacementa
practice
the
CDC
later
maintained
was
associated
with
increases
in
blood
lead
levels
(Important
Update:
Lead-Based
Water
Lines,
Howard
Frumkin,
MD;
CDC,
May
2010).
The
water
industry
historically
has
focused
on
controlling
lead
exposure
risks
through
use
of
chemical
corrosion
control
methods
and
has
offered
a
number
of
related
studies
(as
compiled
in
Lead
and
Copper
Corrosion:
An
Overview
of
WRF
Research,
Jonathan
Cuppett,
Water
Research
Foundation,
updated
January
2016).
The
American
Water
Works
Association
(AWWA)
also
has
published
communications
guides
on
lead-in-water
issues
(see,
for
example,
Communicating
About
Lead
Service
Lines:
A
Guide
for
Water
Systems
Addressing
Service
Line
Repair
and
Replacement,
AWWA,
2014;
and
Strategies
to
Obtain
Customer
Acceptance
of
Complete
Lead
Service
Line
Replacement,
AWWA,
2005).
Yet
industry
guidance
has
taken
the
position
that
managing
lead-related
risks
associated
with
LSLs
and
plumbing
fixtures
on
private
property
is
largely
the
utility
customers
responsibility.
Many
water
utilities
have
not
informed
customers
proactively
(if
at
all)
about
the
presence
of
LSLs.
As
a
result,
customers
generally
have
limited
awareness
of
the
potential
need
to
take
action
to
protect
themselves
from
lead
in
drinking
water.
7
See,
for
example,
AWWA
press
release:
AWWA
Board
supports
recommendation
for
complete
removal
of
lead
service
lines,
March
8,
2016.
8
For
example,
there
are
concerns
that
the
voluntary,
customer-initiated
sampling
approach
recommended
by
the
NDWAC
will
substantially
decrease
public
water
systems
ability
to
track
presence
of
lead
over
time,
identify
emerging
public
health
threats,
and
inform
LSL
replacement
programs.
For
more
information
on
additional
concerns,
see,
for
example,
Strength
of
New
EPA
Lead
Rule
Depends
on
Accountability,
by
Brett
Walton,
Circle
of
Blue,
February
10,
2016,
www.circleofblue.org/2016/world/strength-of-new-epa-lead-rule-depends-on-accountability/.
9
NDWAC
and
water
utility
industry
representatives
have
highlighted
concerns
about
the
significant
financial
resources
and
time
required
to
effect
full
LSL
replacement,
suggesting
the
need
to
support
reasonable
yet
aggressive
scheduling
of
LSL
replacement
through
both
enforcement
measures
(within
the
LCR)
and
resource
commitments
of
local,
state
and
federal
entities.
Acknowledgements
The
FWATF
would
not
have
been
able
to
complete
its
work
without
the
support
of
many
individuals
and
organizations
that
dedicated
their
time,
resources
and
passion
to
facilitate
our
review.
We
are
indebted
to
the
Michigan
State
Universitys
Center
for
Local
Government
Finance
and
Policy
for
their
administrative
support
and
insights,
particularly
with
regard
to
Michigans
emergency
manager
laws;
and
to
Chris
DeWitt
of
DeWitt
Communications
for
keeping
the
task
force
informed
regarding
media
coverage.
We
have
been
aided
by
technical
insights
from
individuals
in
the
water
utility
and
public
health
communities,
too
numerous
to
name
individually
here,
who
have
educated
us
on
a
broad
range
of
issues.
Where
we
have
accurately
stated
the
technical
attributes
of
specific
issues,
it
reflects
on
their
guidance.
We
are
responsible
for
any
technical
inaccuracies
or
unintentional
misstatements
of
fact.
Perhaps
most
notably,
we
are
deeply
indebted
to
the
members
of
the
Flint
community
and
safe
drinking
water
and
public
health
advocates
who
ultimately
entrusted
us
with
profound
expressions
of
their
frustrations,
concerns,
perspectives
and
hopes
for
the
future.
We
are
especially
thankful
to
Flint
residents
for
giving
voice
to
the
searing
personal
costs
that
are
too
often
muted
in
the
discourses
about
public
policy
implications.
We
are
acutely
aware
that
as
we
are
a
task
force
commissioned
by
the
State
of
Michigan,
their
forthrightness
was
a
leap
of
faith
given
what
happened
in
Flint.
We
hope
that
our
report
honors
their
trust,
advances
their
hopes
for
the
future,
and
helps
ensure
that
Michigan
communities
are
safer.
10
The
FWATF
recommended
to
the
Governors
office
that
an
emergency
be
declared
as
early
as
November
2015
and
issued
its
first
letter
to
the
Governor
on
December
4,
2015
noting
the
acute
need
for
more
effective
coordination
of
activities.
to
the
water
supply
switch
rather
than
to
assume
that
the
problems
might
be
related
to
the
switch.
F-11. Communication
and
coordination
among
local
and
state
public
health
staff
and
leadership
regarding
Legionellosis
cases
in
2014-2015
was
inadequate
to
address
the
grave
nature
of
this
outbreak.
The
fact
that
these
cases
occurred
while
there
were
several
simultaneous
concerns
about
quality
and
safety
of
water
in
Flint
should
have
caused
public
health
staff
and
leadership
at
local
and
state
levels
to
coordinate
their
actions
to
ensure
a
prompt
and
thorough
investigation.
Michigan
Governors
Office:
F-12. Ultimate
accountability
for
Michigan
executive
branch
decisions
rests
with
the
Governor.
F-13. The
Governors
knowledge,
and
that
of
Governors
office
staff,
of
various
aspects
of
the
Flint
water
crisis
was
compromised
by
the
informationmuch
of
it
wrongprovided
by
MDEQ
and
MDHHS.
F-14. The
Governors
office
continued
to
rely
on
incorrect
information
provided
by
these
departments
despite
mounting
evidence
from
outside
experts
and
months
of
citizens
complaints
throughout
the
Flint
water
crisis,
only
changing
course
in
early
October
2015
when
MDEQ
and
MDHHS
finally
acknowledged
the
extent
of
the
problem
of
lead
in
the
public
water
supply.
F-15. The
suggestion
made
by
members
of
the
Governors
executive
staff
in
October
2014
to
switch
back
to
DWSD
should
have
resulted,
at
a
minimum,
in
a
full
and
comprehensive
review
of
the
water
situation
in
Flint,
similar
to
that
which
accompanied
the
earlier
decision
to
switch
to
KWA.
It
was
disregarded,
however,
because
of
cost
considerations
and
repeated
assurances
that
the
water
was
safe.
The
need
to
switch
back
to
DWSD
became
even
more
apparent
as
water
quality
and
safety
issued
continued
and
lead
issues
began
to
surface
in
2015,
notwithstanding
reassurances
by
MDEQ.
F-16. The
Flint
water
crisis
highlights
the
risks
of
over-reliancein
fact,
almost
exclusive
relianceon
a
few
staff
in
one
or
two
departments
for
information
on
which
key
decisions
are
based.
F-17. Official
state
public
statements
and
communications
about
the
Flint
water
situation
have
at
times
been
inappropriate
and
unacceptable.
State-Appointed
Emergency
Managers:
F-18. Emergency
managers,
not
locally
elected
officials,
made
the
decision
to
switch
to
the
Flint
River
as
Flints
primary
water
supply
source.
F-19. Treasury
officials,
through
the
terms
of
the
local
emergency
financial
assistance
loan
executed
by
the
Flint
emergency
manager
on
April
29,
2015,
effectively
precluded
a
return
to
DWSD
water,
as
Flint
citizens
and
local
officials
were
demanding,
without
prior
state
approval.
F-20. The
role
of
the
emergency
managers
in
Flint
(in
combination
with
MDEQs
failures)
places
primary
accountability
for
what
happened
with
state
government.
F-21. Emergency
managers
charged
with
financial
reform
often
do
not
have,
nor
are
they
supported
by,
the
necessary
expertise
to
manage
non-financial
aspects
of
municipal
government.
F-22. Michigans
Emergency
Manager
Law
and
related
practices
can
be
improved
to
better
ensure
that
protection
of
public
health
and
safety
is
not
compromised
in
the
name
of
financial
urgency.
City
of
Flint:
F-23. Flint
Public
Works
personnel
were
ill-prepared
to
assume
responsibility
for
full-time
operation
of
the
Flint
WTP
and
distribution
system.
F-24. The
Flint
Water
Treatment
Plant
(WTP)
and
installed
treatment
technologies
were
not
adequate
to
produce
safe,
clean
drinking
water
at
startup
of
full-time
operations.
Flints
lack
of
reinvestment
in
its
water
distribution
system
contributed
to
the
drinking
water
crisis
and
ability
to
respond
to
water
quality
problems.
F-25. Flint
Public
Works
personnel
failed
to
comply
with
LCR
requirements,
including
the
use
of
optimized
corrosion
control
treatment
and
monitoring
for
lead.
Flint
personnel
did
not
identify
residences
with
LSLs,
secure
an
adequate
number
of
tap
water
samples
from
high-risk
homes,
or
use
prescribed
sampling
practices
(for
example,
line
and
tap
flushing
methods
and
sample
bottle
sizes).
F-26. Flint
Public
Works
acted
on
inaccurate
and
improper
guidance
from
MDEQ.
F-27. Many
communities
similarly
rely
on
MDEQ
to
provide
technical
assistance
and
guidance
on
how
to
meet
regulatory
requirements.
In
the
case
of
Flint,
MDEQ
assistance
was
deeply
flawed
and
lax,
which
led
to
myopic
enforcement
of
regulations
designed
to
protect
public
health.
F-28. The
emergency
manager
structure
made
it
extremely
difficult
for
Flint
citizens
to
alter
or
check
decision-making
on
preparations
for
use
of
Flint
River
water,
or
to
receive
responses
to
concerns
about
subsequent
water
quality
issues.
Genesee
County
Health
Department
(GCHD):
F-29. Communication,
coordination
and
cooperation
between
GCHD,
the
City
of
Flint
and
MDHHS
were
inadequate
to
protect
Flint
residents
from
public
health
threats
resulting
from
inadequately
treated
Flint
River
water.
F-30. The
rate
of
follow-up
on
children
with
elevated
blood
lead
levels
through
January
2016
was
unacceptable,
illustrating
a
low
level
of
coordination
between
GCHD
and
MDHHS
and
insufficient
resources
devoted
to
this
task.
F-31. Management
of
the
Flint
River-sourced
water
supply
may
have
contributed
to
the
outbreaks
of
Legionellosis
in
2014
and
2015
in
Genesee
County.
Although
the
definitive
cause
of
the
outbreaks
is
uncertain
at
the
time
of
publication,
GCHD
and
MDHHS
did
not
notify
the
public
of
the
outbreaks
in
a
timely
fashion
in
order
to
urge
caution.
United
States
Environmental
Protection
Agency
(EPA):
F-32. EPA
failed
to
properly
exercise
its
authority
prior
to
January
2016.
EPAs
conduct
casts
doubt
on
its
willingness
to
aggressively
pursue
enforcement
(in
the
absence
of
widespread
public
outrage).
EPA
could
have
exercised
its
powers
under
Section
1414
and
Section
1431
of
the
SDWA
or
under
the
LCR,
40
CFR
141.82(i).
F-33. Despite
the
clear
intent
of
the
LCR,
EPA
has
accepted
differing
compliance
strategies
that
have
served
to
mute
its
effectiveness
in
detection
and
mitigation
of
lead
contamination
risks.
These
strategies
have
been
adopted
at
water
systems
and
primacy
agencies
across
the
country.
Though
there
may
be
some
ambiguity
in
LCR
rule,
none
of
it
relates
to
what
MDEQ
should
have
done
in
Flint.
There
was
and
remains
no
justification
for
MDEQ
not
requiring
corrosion
control
treatment
for
the
switch
of
water
source
to
the
Flint
River.
F-34. EPA
was
hesitant
and
slow
to
insist
on
proper
corrosion
control
measures
in
Flint.
MDEQ
misinformation
notwithstanding,
EPAs
deference
to
MDEQ,
the
state
primacy
agency,
delayed
appropriate
intervention
and
remedial
measures.
F-35. EPA
tolerated
MDEQs
intransigence
and
issued,
on
November
3,
2015,
a
clarification
memo
on
the
LCR
when
no
such
clarification
was
needed.
Issues
Presented
by
the
Flint
Water
Crisis:
F-36. The
Flint
water
crisis
is
a
clear
case
of
environmental
injustice.
10
screening
for
lead
and
appropriate
follow-up
should
occur
in
childrens
primary
care
medical
homes.
R-11. Strive
to
be
a
national
leader
in
monitoring
and
responding
to
exposure
of
children
to
lead
by
converting
the
Childhood
Lead
Poisoning
Prevention
Program
(CLPPP)
from
passive
collection
of
test
results
into
an
active
surveillance
and
outreach
program.
R-12. Improve
screening
rates
for
lead
among
young
children
through
partnerships
with
county
health
departments,
health
insurers,
hospitals,
and
healthcare
professionals.
R-13. As
the
state
authority
on
public
health,
and
as
the
organization
that
conducted
the
epidemiologic
study
of
Legionellosis
cases
in
Genesee
County
in
2014-15,
take
responsibility
for
coordinating
with
GCHD
and
CDC
to
protect
Michigan
residents
from
further
outbreaks
of
Legionellosis.
R-14. In
cases
of
switches
in
drinking
water
supplies
in
the
future,
assume
that
outbreaks
of
Legionellosis
cases
may
be
related
to
changes
in
water
source
and
communicate
the
potential
risk
to
the
public,
rather
than
assuming
and
communicating
the
opposite.
Michigan
Governors
Office:
R-15. Expand
information
flow
to
the
Governor
so
that
information
providing
the
foundation
for
key
decisions
comes
from
more
than
one
trusted
sourceand
is
verified.
R-16. Create
a
culture
in
state
government
that
is
not
defensive
about
concerns
and
evidence
that
contradicts
official
positions,
but
rather
is
receptive
and
open-minded
toward
that
information.
View
informed
opinionseven
if
critical
of
state
governmentas
an
opportunity
for
re-assessing
state
positions,
rather
than
as
a
threat.
R-17. Ensure
that
communications
from
all
state
agencies
are
respectful,
even
in
the
face
of
criticism,
and
sensitive
to
the
concerns
of
diverse
populations.
R-18. The
Governor
must
assume
the
leadership
of,
and
hold
state
departments
accountable
for,
long-term
implementation
of
the
recommendations
in
this
report,
including
but
not
limited
to
the
need
for
cultural
changes
across
multiple
state
agencies,
the
need
for
health
mitigation
and
LSL
replacement
in
Flint,
and
the
need
for
a
funding
strategy
to
address
replacement
of
LSLs
statewide.
R-19. Review
budget
requests
for
MDEQ
to
ensure
adequate
funding
is
provided
to
the
ODWMA.
EPA
audit
and
interviews
indicate
that
Michigans
drinking
water
program
might
have
one
of
the
lowest
levels
of
financial
support
within
EPA
Region
V
while
having
one
of
the
largest,
if
not
the
largest,
number
of
community
water
systems
to
regulate.
State-Appointed
Emergency
Managers:
R-20. Review
Michigans
Emergency
Manager
Law
(PA
436)
and
its
implementation,
and
identify
measures
to
compensate
for
the
loss
of
the
checks
and
balances
that
are
provided
by
representative
government.
R-21. Consider
alternatives
to
the
current
emergency
manager
approachfor
example,
a
structured
way
to
engage
locally
elected
officials
on
key
decisions;
an
Ombudsman
function
in
state
government
to
ensure
that
local
concerns
are
a
factor
in
decisions
made
by
the
emergency
manager;
and/or
a
means
of
appealing
emergency
manager
decisions
to
another
body.
11
R-22. Ensure
proper
support
and
expertise
for
emergency
managers
to
effectively
manage
the
many
governmental
functions
of
a
city.
Decisions
on
matters
potentially
affecting
public
health
and
safety,
for
example,
should
be
informed
by
subject
matter
experts
identified
and/or
provided
by
the
state.
City
of
Flint:
R-23. Establish
and
fund
a
team
of
subject
matter
experts
in
water
system
operations
(treatment
and
distribution
system
management)
to
support
and
train
water
system
personnel,
guide
safe
system
operation
under
current
conditions,
and
prepare
for
successful
conversion
to
KWA.
R-24. Implement
a
programmatic
approach
to
Flint
WTP
and
distribution
system
operations,
maintenance,
asset
management,
water
quality,
capital
improvements
and
public
engagement
(including
risk
communication)
to
ensure
that
the
disparate
ongoing
efforts
to
address
Flint
water
system
infrastructure
needs
are
coordinated,
fully
documented,
and
structured
to
sustain
high-quality
potable
water
service
over
the
long
term.
R-25. Implement
a
robust
public
engagement
and
involvement
program
in
conjunction
with
the
anticipated
conversion
to
KWA-delivered
water
and
provide
for
regular
reporting
to
the
Flint
Water
Inter-Agency
Coordinating
Committee
(FWICC).
Genesee
County
Health
Department
(GCHD):
R-26. Improve
follow-up
on
public
health
concerns
between
GCHD,
MDHHS
and
the
City
of
Flint
now
and
in
the
future,
to
effect
timely,
comprehensive,
and
coordinated
activity
and
ensure
the
best
health
outcomes
for
children
and
adults
affected.
R-27. Presume
that
the
risk
of
Legionella
may
remain
elevated
in
the
Flint
water
distribution
system
and
must
take
appropriate
steps
with
public
and
private
partners
to
monitor
and
mitigate
that
risk
as
concerns
about
water
quality
continue
in
the
City
of
Flint.
R-28. Coordinate
with
state
officials
(MDHHS)
and
with
local
healthcare
professionals
and
healthcare
institutions
in
Genesee
County
and
the
City
of
Flint
to
mitigate
the
risk
of
Legionellosis
in
2016
and
beyond.
United
States
Environmental
Protection
Agency
(EPA):
R-29. Exercise
more
vigor,
and
act
more
promptly,
in
addressing
compliance
violations
that
endanger
public
health.
R-30. In
collaboration
with
the
NDWAC
and
other
interested
partners,
clarify
and
strengthen
the
LCR
through
increased
specificity
and
constraints,
particularly
requirements
related
to
LCR
sampling
pools,
sample
draw
protocols,
and
LSL
replacementsand,
more
generally,
strengthen
enforcement
protocols
with
agencies
delegated
primacy.
R-31. Engage
Michigan
representatives
in
ongoing
LCR
revisions
and
development
of
enforcement
protocols
at
EPA
and
MDEQ.
12
13
R-43. Use
the
occasion
of
the
Flint
water
crisis
to
prompt
local
and
state
re-investment
in
critical
water
infrastructure,
while
providing
mechanisms
to
advance
affordability
and
universal
access
to
water
services.
R-44. Prioritize
health
matters
across
all
state
agencies
with
establishment
of
a
new
Cabinet-
level
post
focused
on
public
health.
14
Background11
Flint,
Michigan
The
beleaguered
history
of
Flint,
Michigan
over
the
last
several
decades
is
well
known,12
yet
some
facts
are
particularly
important
to
provide
context
for
our
findings
and
recommendations.
The
City
of
Flint
has
suffered
dramatic
declines
in
population.
From
a
peak
of
more
than
200,000
in
1960,
Flints
population
had
fallen
below
100,000
residents
by
2014.
Since
2000,
Flint
has
lost
over
20
percent
of
its
population.13
Of
the
remaining
residents,
approximately
57
percent
are
Black
or
African
American.
14
Poverty
is
endemic
in
Flint,
with
41.6
percent
of
the
population
living
below
federal
poverty
thresholds2.8
times
the
national
poverty
rate.
The
median
value
of
owner-occupied
housing
is
$36,700,
roughly
one-fifth
of
the
national
average.
15
Crime
plagues
the
community;
for
2013,
Flints
crime
index
was
811
as
compared
to
a
national
average
of
295.16
Even
before
the
Flint
water
crisis,
Genesee
County
(in
which
Flint
is
the
largest
population
center)
exhibited
poor
health
statistics.
In
a
2015
study,
the
county
ranked
81st
out
of
82
Michigan
counties
in
health
outcomes.
It
ranked
78th
in
length
of
life,
81st
in
quality
of
life,
77th
in
health
behaviors,
78th
in
social
and
economics
factors,
and
75th
in
physical
environment
measures.
Only
the
quality
of
clinical
care,
for
which
the
county
ranked
22nd,
is
not
a
cause
of
acute
community
concern.17
Water
Crisis
The
Flint
Water
System
was
first
organized
in
1883
under
private
ownership,
and
the
City
purchased
the
water
system
in
1903.
Before
1967,
Flint
treated
Flint
River
water
at
its
Water
Treatment
Plant
(WTP).
To
ensure
adequacy
and
reliability
of
water
supplies,
in
1967
Flint
signed
a
long-term
water
supply
contract
with
the
Detroit
Water
and
Sewerage
Department
(DWSD).
From
1967
through
2014,
the
Flint
WTP
served
as
an
emergency
backup
to
DWSD-supplied
water.
As
such,
the
Flint
WTP
was
not
operated
on
an
ongoing
day-to-day
basis,
but
rather
four
times
per
year
to
maintain
readiness
as
an
emergency
backup.
The
WTP
was
also
upgraded
periodically
to
keep
it
ready
for
use
as
an
emergency
backup.
11
The
series
of
events
and
decisions
that
led
to
the
Flint
water
crisis
are
(now)
well
documented,
thanks
to
the
tireless
efforts
of
local
activists
and
journalists.
In
addition,
the
public
record
has
been
supplemented
by
the
release
of
e-mails
and
other
documents
by
the
Governors
office
and
key
state
agencies.
We
are
indebted
to
this
construction
of
a
substantial
public
record.
We
believe
that
this
public
record,
in
combination
with
insights
obtained
through
our
interview
process,
provides
more
than
ample
basis
for
our
findings
and
recommendations.
12
For
extensive
information
on
Flints
economic
decline
and
troubled
circumstances,
see
the
report
and
endnotes
provided
in
Long-Term
Crisis
and
Systemic
Failure:
Taking
the
Fiscal
Stress
of
Americas
Older
Cities
Seriously:
Case
Study,
Flint
Michigan,
by
Eric
Scorsone,
Ph.D.
and
Nicolette
Bateson,
Michigan
State
University
Extension,
September
2011.
13
BiggestUSCities.com,
www.biggestuscities.com/city/flint-michigan
14
U.S.
Census,
Quickfacts
for
Flint,
Michigan
and
the
United
States,
www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/00
15
Ibid
16
City-Data.com,
www.city-data.com/crime/crime-Flint-Michigan.html
17
County
Health
Rankings,
www.countyhealthrankings.org/app/michigan/2015/rankings/genesee/county/outcomes/overall/snapshot
15
DWSD
provided
water
to
Flint
under
a
35-year
contract
signed
on
December
20,
1965.
The
initial
contract
term
expired
in
2000
and
renewed
each
year
unless
it
was
terminated
by
either
party.
As
one
of
DWSDs
wholesale
customers,
Flint
was
subject
to
the
terms
and
rate-setting
practices
applicable
to
all
of
DWSDs
wholesale
customer
communities.
During
the
final
10
years
that
Flint
received
contractual
service
from
DWSD,
the
average
annual
increase
in
water
charges
to
Flint
was
6.2
percent.
DWSDs
water
supply
has
been
treated
for
corrosion
control
for
over
20
years
and
is
deemed
optimized
for
corrosion
control
treatment.
On
April
16,
2013,
after
a
symbolic
Flint
City
Council
vote
that
accompanied
the
Flint
emergency
managers
decision,
the
City
joined
the
Karegnondi
Water
Authority
(KWA),
which
had
been
established
to
develop
a
raw
water
supply
pipeline
from
Lake
Huron.
After
being
advised
of
the
City
of
Flints
intent,
DWSD
notified
the
City
of
the
termination
of
its
then-current
water
supply
contract
terms,
effective
April
2014.
DWSD
and
the
City
of
Flint,
both
under
emergency
management,
continued
unsuccessfully
to
negotiate
alternative
water
supply
terms.
Although
the
State
of
Michigan
was
in
control
of
both
cities
at
the
time,
efforts
to
arrive
at
an
agreement
between
the
parties
during
the
final
year
of
service
to
the
City
of
Flint
ultimately
failed.
In
April
2014,
the
City
of
Flint
began
treating
Flint
River
water
at
the
Flint
WTP
on
a
full-time
basis
and
distributing
the
treated
water
to
its
customers.
A
critical
element
of
that
treatment
corrosion
control,
as
required
under
EPAs
Lead
and
Copper
Rule
(LCR)was
(incorrectly)
determined
by
MDEQ
not
to
be
required
immediately;
instead,
Flint
could
complete
two
6-month
monitoring
periods
and
MDEQ
would
then
determine
whether
corrosion
control
was
necessary.
Soon
after
the
City
began
distributing
treated
water
from
the
Flint
WTP,
Flint
residents
began
to
complain
about
its
odor,
taste
and
appearance.
Numerous
water
quality
problems
and
operational
challenges
resulted
in
water
quality
violations
related
to
E
coli
contamination
and
disinfection
by-products
(total
trihalomethanes
or
TTHMs).
Ultimately,
the
corrosiveness
of
the
drinking
water
leached
lead
from
pipes
and
plumbing
fixtures,
and
it
may
have
increased
the
likelihood
of
water
contamination
with
Legionella.
18
Bouffard K. Hospital ties Legionellosis to Flint water. Detroit News, January 23, 2016,
www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/2016/01/22/legionnaires-bacteria-found-tests-mclaren-medical-centers-
water/79183428/.
19
Appendix
V
provides
a
further,
more
detailed
timeline
that
attempts
to
synthesize
numerous
timelines
developed
by
other
sources,
including
local
media
and
government
agencies.
16
4. March
26,
2013:
Stephen
Busch/MDEQ
e-mails
MDEQ
Director
Dan
Wyant
with
Liane
Shekter
Smith
and
other
MDEQ
staff
copied,
with
warnings
about
public
health
risks
associated
with
Flint
River
water.
5. March
28,
2013:
State
Treasurer
Andy
Dillon
e-mails
Governor
Snyder
notifying
him
of
his
approval
of
Flint
joining
Karegnondi
Water
Authority
(KWA)
and
MDEQ
concurrence.
6. April
16,
2013:
Flint
Emergency
Manager
(EM)
Ed
Kurtz
signs
agreement
with
KWA
and
informs
the
State
Treasurer
that
the
City
will
join
KWA
(decision
officially
announced
May
1,
2013).
7. April
17,
2013:
DWSD
issues
letter
to
Flint
notifying
termination
of
contract
to
provide
water
service.
Negotiations
continue
to
establish
alternative
contractual
arrangements
for
DWSD
service
to
Flint.
8. June
26,
2013:
Flint
EM
Ed
Kurtz
authorizes
a
sole-source
contract
with
the
firm
of
Lockwood,
Andrews,
&
Newnam
(LAN)
for
professional
engineering
services
to
place
the
Flint
Water
Treatment
Plant
(WTP)
into
operation
using
the
Flint
River
as
a
primary
drinking
water
source.
9. March
26,
2014:
Stephen
Busch/MDEQ
e-mails
Liane
Shekter
Smith
and
Richard
Benzie/MDEQ
on
clarifying
what
Flint
will
be
required
to
do
before
beginning
full-time
Flint
WTP
operation.
10. April
16-17,
2014:
Michael
Glasgow/Flint
Utilities
Department
e-mails
MDEQ,
noting
unpreparedness
of
Flint
WTP
and
apparent
political
pressure
to
start
distributing
water.
11. April
29,
2014:
Flint
EM
Darnell
Earley
notifies
Detroit
EM
that
Flint
has
switched
water
supply
sources
to
the
Flint
River.
Genesee
County
Drain
Commission
remains
as
a
non-
contract
customer
of
DWSD.
12. July
1,
2014:
Flint
begins
first
6-month
monitoring
period
for
lead
and
copper
in
drinking
water.
13. August
15,
2014:
E.
coli
bacteria
violation
in
water
sampled
from
the
Flint
distribution
system
leads
to
local
boil
water
advisory.
14. September
10,
2014:
MDEQ
requests
pre-emptive
operational
evaluation
for
disinfection
byproducts
called
trihalomethanes
(THMs).
15. October
1,
2014:
MDEQ
submits
briefing
paper
to
Governor's
office
re:
City
of
Flint
drinking
water
situation
(boil
water
notices).
Genesee
County
Health
Department
(GCHD)
expresses
concern
to
Flint
Public
Works
regarding
increased
incidence
of
cases
of
Legionellosis
since
April
2014,
and
the
possible
relationship
to
use
of
the
Flint
River
as
the
water
supply.
MDHHS
epidemiology
staff
expresses
concern
but
there
is
no
further
state-
level
evaluation.
16. October
13,
2014:
General
Motors
(GM)
announces
that
it
will
cease
to
use
Flint
WTP-
sourced
water
for
its
Flint
Engine
Operations
facility
until
the
KWA
connection
is
completed,
due
to
corrosion
concerns
related
to
the
chloride
levels
in
water
from
the
Flint
WTP.
MDEQ
notes
chloride
in
Flint
WTP-treated
water
is
within
public
health
guidelines.
17. October
14,
2014:
Valerie
Brader,
State
Deputy
Legal
Counsel
and
Senior
Policy
Advisor,
e-
mails
Governors
Chief
of
Staff
Dennis
Muchmore
and
other
top
aides
arguing
for
a
return
to
DWSD
because
of
water
quality
problems.
Michael
Gadola,
then
the
Governors
Legal
Counsel,
responds
by
agreeing
with
Brader.
Brader
and
Rich
Baird,
another
senior
aide
to
17
the
Governor,
then
discuss
the
idea
with
Emergency
Manager
Darnell
Earley,
who
maintains
the
water
quality
problems
can
be
solved
and
it
would
be
cost-prohibitive
to
return
to
DWSD.
18. December
16,
2014:
MDEQ
notifies
Flint
of
initial
quarterly
violation
of
SDWA
Disinfection
Byproducts
(total
trihalomethane,
or
TTHM)
requirements.
19. December
31,
2014:
First
6-month
round
of
LCR
monitoring
ends.
Using
100
samples
not
necessarily
drawn
from
highest
risk
homes
(as
the
LCR
intends),
the
90th
percentile
lead
level
result
is
6
parts
per
billion
with
2
samples
above
action
levels
for
lead
(15
parts
per
billion). Given
the
6
ppb
result,
Flint
is
disqualified
from
being
exempted
and
will
have
to
implement
corrosion
control
treatment
under
the
LCR,
irrespective
of
subsequent
6-
month
monitoring
results.
MDEQ
fails
to
properly
advise
Flint
WTP
of
this
regulation.
20. January
12,
2015:
In
response
to
water
quality
concerns,
the
state
installs
water
coolers
in
state
offices
in
Flint,
and
state
employees
are
given
the
option
in
their
offices
to
use
bottled
water
and
provide
bottled
water
to
visitors.
21. January
27,
2015:
MDHHS
epidemiology
staff
member
contacts
Genesee
County
Health
Department
(GCHD)
to
recommend
that
they
construct
a
map
of
Legionellosis
cases
and
correlate
them
to
the
Citys
water
service
area.
22. January
2015
(date
unclear):
Staff
from
Genesee
County
hospitals,
MDHHS,
MDEQ
and
GCHD
meet,
and
MDHHS
Director
Nick
Lyon
directs
GCHD
to
conduct
and
complete
its
evaluation
of
the
causes
of
the
increased
Legionellosis
cases
that
had
begun
to
occur
in
2014.
23. January
27,
2015:
FOIA
request
sent
by
GCHD
environmental
hygienist
James
Henry
to
Flint
DPW
and
Flint
Mayor
for
information
on
water
treatment
to
support
the
countys
investigation
of
Legionellosis
cases.
24. January
30,
2015:
Brad
Wurfel/MDEQ
e-mails
Dave
Murray,
Governor
Snyders
deputy
press
secretary,
re:
Legionella,
saying
said
he
didnt
want
MDEQ
Director
Wyant
to
say
publicly
that
the
water
in
Flint
is
safe
until
we
get
the
results
of
some
county
health
department
traceback
work
on
42
cases
of
Legionellosis
in
Genesee
County
since
last
May.
25. February
25,
2015:
LeeAnne
Walters
contacts
EPA
Region
V
regarding
high
levels
of
lead
(104
ppb)
found
in
drinking
water
at
her
home.
26. February
26,
2015:
Initial
EPA-MDEQ
correspondence
regarding
elevated
lead
in
sample
collected
from
LeeAnne
Walters's
house.
Jennifer
Crooks/EPA
speculates
Flint
River
water
chemistry
is
leaching
contaminants
from
pipes;
this
prompts
the
EPAs
initial
query
of
MDEQ
about
whether
optimized
corrosion
control
treatment
(OCCT)
is
in
place
at
the
Flint
WTP.
27. February
26,
2015:
Mike
Prysby/MDEQ
emails
Jennifer
Crooks/EPA
indicating
that
all
other
samples
in
the
monitoring
period
for
July
1,
2014
through
December
31,
2014
are
below
the
EPA
action
level
of
15
ppb.
28. February
27,
2015:
Miguel
Del
Toral/EPA,
in
e-mails
to
MDEQ
and
EPA
staff,
mentions
possibility
of
biasing
lead
results
low
by
collecting
samples
after
flushing
water
through
the
taps;
asks
again
about
Flint
OCCT,
saying
"they
are
required
to
have
OCCT
in
place."
18
29. February
27,
2015:
Stephen
Busch/MDEQ
e-mails
Jennifer
Crooks
and
Miguel
Del
Toral/EPA
saying
that
the
90thpercentile
is
6
ppb
for
the
monitoring
period
7/1/14-
12/31/14
and
that
Flint
has
an
optimized
corrosion
control
program,
and
talks
about
EPA
regulations
requiring
targeted
sample
pool
to
focus
on
highest
risk
homes.
30. March
3,
2015:
In
response
to
local
complaints
regarding
drinking
water
quality
and
related
health
effects,
Flint
EM
Ambrose
cites
$12
million
in
costs
associated
with
returning
to
DWSD.
31. March
12,
2015:
Stephen
Busch/MDEQ
e-mails
colleagues
stating
that
there
is
no
confirmation
of
Legionella
in
the
water
supply.
No
test
data
are
provided
to
substantiate
this
statement.
32. March
13,
2015:
Brad
Wurfel/MDEQ
e-mails
Harvey
Hollins/Governors
office
and
Dan
Wyant/MDEQ
noting
uptick
in
Legionellosis
cases,
placing
responsibility
for
follow-up
on
GCHD,
and
discounting
GCHD
environmental
hygienist
Jim
Henrys
concerns
about
a
possible
relationship
between
uptick
in
Legionellosis
and
change
in
water
source.
33. March
13,
2015:
Stephen
Busch/MDEQ
e-mails
Jim
Henry/GCHD
stating
there
is
unlikely
to
be
Legionella
at
the
Flint
WTP,
but
that
water
main
breaks
and
leaks
may
permit
entry
of
Legionella
into
the
water
supply.
Busch
advises
contacting
MDHHS,
but
does
not
himself
contact
MDHHS.
34. March
30,
2015:
MDEQ
notifies
Flint
of
results
of
first
6-month
lead
and
copper
monitoring
period
(July-December
2014)
showing
6
ppb
result.
35. March
31,
2015:
Jennifer
Crooks/EPA
corresponds
with
MDEQ
regarding
a
conference
call
that
focused
on
increased
cases
of
Legionellosis.
36. April
25,
2015:
Miguel
del
Toral/EPA
e-mails
Pat
Cook/MDEQ,
questions
how
a
large
water
system
can
be
deemed
to
have
optimal
corrosion
control
without
treatment,
cites
federal
regulations
that
provide
the
only
two
scenarios
for
large
systems
to
be
deemed
to
have
optimized
corrosion
control,
and
shows
that
Flint
does
not
meet
either
of
the
two
scenarios.
37. April
27,
2015:
Miguel
Del
Toral/EPA
e-mails
Tom
Poy/EPA
and
other
colleagues
stating
that
Pat
Cook/MDEQ
has
confirmed
the
Flint
WTP
has
no
corrosion
control
treatment
(CCT),
which
is
very
concerning
given
the
likelihood
of
lead
service
lines
in
the
city.
38. April
27,
2015:
Laurel
Garrison/CDC
e-mails
GCHD
stating
that
the
Legionellosis
outbreak
in
Genesee
County
is
very
large,
one
of
the
largest
in
the
past
decade.
39. April
27,
2015:
Miguel
Del
Toral/EPA
visits
LeeAnne
Walterss
house
to
inspect
plumbing
and
deliver
sampling
bottles.
40. April
27,
2015:
Pat
Cook
and
Stephen
Busch/MDEQ
exchange
e-mails
complaining
about
Del
Toral/EPA's
questions
on
corrosion
control
treatment.
41. May
29,
2015:
MDHHSs
Surveillance
of
Infectious
Diseases
and
Epidemiology
team
produces
a
report
regarding
Legionellosis
cases
in
Genesee
County
in
2014-2015;
the
conclusion
of
the
report
is
that
the
outbreak
is
over.20
20
Of
the
Legionellosis
cases
in
2014-2015,
42
percent
had
healthcare
(hospital)
contact;
47
percent
had
contact
with
the
Flint
water
supply.
The
report
indicates
that
the
lack
of
clinical
specimens
from
patients
prohibited
19
42. June
24,
2015:
Miguel
Del
Toral
(EPA)
provides
Tom
Poy/EPA
his
Interim
Report:
High
Lead
Levels
in
Flint,
Michigan,
summarizing
information
and
concerns
about
lead
levels
in
drinking
water
in
Flint.
43. June
10,
2015:
EPA/MDEQ
conference
call
includes
discussion
of
the
fact
that
Flint
does
not
have
CCT
in
place.
44. June
25,
2015:
Adam
Rosenthal/MDEQ
e-mails
Mike
Glasgow
and
Brent
Wright/Flint
Utilities
Department
(copying
Mike
Prysby
and
Stephen
Busch/MDEQ)
reminding
them
that
61
more
lead
and
copper
samples
need
to
be
collected
and
sent
to
the
lab
by
June
30,
2015,
and
that
they
are
will
be
[sic]
below
the
AL
[action
level]
for
lead.
As
of
now
with
39
results,
Flints
90th
percentile
is
over
the
AL
for
lead.
45. July
7,
2015:
MDEQ
is
contacted
by
the
American
Civil
Liberties
Union
regarding
a
draft
letter
from
Miguel
Del
Toral/EPA
to
LeeAnne
Walters
that
raises
concerns
about
possible
leaching
of
lead
from
service
lines
without
appropriate
corrosion
control.
46. July
10,
2015:
Susan
Hedman/EPA
Region
5
(based
in
Chicago)
writes
to
Flint
Mayor
Walling
to
say
that
EPA
will
work
with
MDEQ
on
issues
related
to
lead
in
water.
47. July
22,
2015:
Governor
Snyders
chief
of
staff
Dennis
Muchmore
e-mails
director
of
MDHHS
expressing
that
many
members
of
the
Flint
community
are
raising
concerns
about
water
but
feel
they
are
not
being
heard.
48. July
23,
2015:
Linda
Dykema/MDHHS
e-mails
Deputy
Director
of
Population
Health
and
Community
Services
Susan
Moran
and
others
at
MDHHS
(though
not
Director
Lyon)
stating
that
she
has
corresponded
with
MDEQ
and
that
there
has
been
no
change
in
compliance
regarding
Flint
water
quality
and
appropriate
state
and
federal
law,
and
that
Miguel
Del
Toral/EPA
acted
outside
of
his
authority
(these
are
MDEQ
talking
points).
49. July
24,
2015:
In
response
to
Muchmore
e-mail,
Brad
Wurfel/MDEQ
writes,
The
bottom
line
is
that
the
residents
of
Flint
do
not
need
to
worry
about
lead
in
the
water
supply,
and
MDEQ
recent
sampling
does
not
indicate
eminent
[sic]
health
threat
from
lead.
Muchmore
responds,
Thanks.
50. July
28,
2015:
MDHHS
epidemiologist
Cristin
Larder
finds
that
childrens
blood
lead
tests
conducted
in
summer
2014
lie
outside
the
control
limit
compared
with
prior
years
and
that
this
finding
does
warrant
further
investigation.
On
the
same
day,
CLPPP
data
manager
Robert
Scott
analyzes
the
data
over
a
5-year
period
and
concludes
that
water
was
not
a
major
factor.
Later
that
day,
CLPPP
manager
Nancy
Peeler
concludes
that
the
lack
of
persistently
elevated
blood
lead
levels
in
children
in
Flint
beyond
the
summer
months
indicates
no
connection
to
the
change
in
water
in
Flint
in
2014.
Larder
then
receives
email
communication
from
Peeler:
Peeler
has
concluded
from
CLPPP
data
and
communicated
with
MDHHS
leadership
that
there
is
no
problem
with
children's
lead
levels
in
Flint.
51. August
27,
2015:
Virginia
Tech
professor
Marc
Edwards
releases
his
first
set
of
findings
regarding
tests
of
water
in
Flint.
Over
half
of
48
samples
have
lead
levels
of
more
than
5
parts
per
billion
(ppb)
and
30
percent
of
samples
have
lead
levels
greater
than
15
ppb.
testing
that
could
have
made
a
definitive
link
to
the
water
supply
as
a
source
of
Legionella.
It
indicates
that
there
should
be
vigilance
in
2015
regarding
possible
new
cases
of
Legionellosis,
including
collection
of
clinical
specimens.
20
52. August
31,
2015:
EPA/MDEQ
conference
call:
second
6-month
monitioring
test
results
for
January
1-July
31,
2015
indicate
90th
percentile
at
11
ppb.
It
is
determined
that
CCT
is
needed
and
implementation
steps
are
delineated.
53. August
31,
2015:
Brad
Wurfel/MDEQ
raises
concerns
about
Professor
Edwardss
tests
and
accompanying
media
coverage
to
MDEQ,
Muchmore,
Harvey
Hollins,
Dave
Murray
and
Sara
Wurfel
of
Governors
office.
There
is
no
apparent
communication
with
MDHHS
regarding
this
issue.
54. September
8,
2015:
Virginia
Tech
posts
to
FlintWaterStudy.org
sample
testing
results
on
252
samples
of
300
sample
kits
provided.
The
Virginia
Tech
researchers
concluded
that:
mathematically,
even
if
the
remaining
48
samples
returned
have
non-detectable
lead...
FLINT
HAS
A
VERY
SERIOUS
LEAD
IN
WATER
PROBLEM.
Of
the
252
water
samples,
101
have
lead
in
excess
of
5
ppb.
Flints
90th
percentile
in
Edwards
survey
was
25
ppb.
Several
samples
were
over
100
ppb
and
one
of
the
samples
as
over
1,000
ppb.
55. September
9-12,
2015:
MDHHS
begins
to
develop
educational
program
materials
for
the
public
regarding
reducing
the
risk
of
lead
exposure
for
children,
in
response
to
media
coverage
of
Professor
Edwardss
water
testing
results.
56. September
22,
2015:
Dr.
Mona
Hanna-Attisha,
director
of
the
pediatric
residency
program
at
Hurley
Medical
Center,
contacts
Robert
Scott/MDHHS
to
request
access
to
the
states
childhood
lead
testing
records.
This
is
a
similar
request
to
one
filed
by
Professor
Edwards
several
weeks
before,
to
which
the
state
had
yet
to
respond.
No
data
are
shared.
57. September
23,
2015:
Nancy
Peeler/MDHHS,
director
of
the
states
Childhood
Lead
Poisoning
Prevention
Program
(CLPPP),
e-mails
Robert
Scott/MDHHS
to
consider
re-
running
the
analysis
that
had
been
conducted
in
July,
and
asks
for
formal
epidemiologic
help.
Later
that
day,
Mikelle
Robinson/MDHHS
writes
to
colleagues
that
the
Governors
office
briefing
maintains
that
Flint
water
does
not
represent
an
imminent
public
health
problem.
58. September
24,
2015:
Dr.
Hanna-Attisha
presents
her
findings
about
children
tested
for
lead
in
a
press
conference
at
Hurley
Medical
Center,
reporting
that
the
proportion
of
children
with
elevated
blood
lead
levels
has
increased
since
the
switch
to
the
Flint
River
water
source
in
April
2014.
MDHHS
issues
comments
emphasizing
differences
between
the
Hurley
analysis
and
preceding
internal
analyses
by
MDHHS
that
were
not
shared
publicly.
That
same
day,
Robert
Scott/MDHHS
writes
in
an
internal
memo
that
he
sees
patterns
in
blood
lead
levels
similar
to
what
Dr.
Hanna-Attisha
has
reported.
59. September
28,
2015:
MDHHS
Director
Nick
Lyon
calls
for
analysis
of
the
blood
lead
levels
in
order
to
make
a
strong
statement
with
a
demonstration
of
proof
that
the
blood
lead
levels
seen
are
not
out
of
the
ordinary.
No
such
analysis
is
ever
provided.
Later
that
day,
Governor
Snyder
is
briefed
by
staff
that
the
Flint
water
system
is
in
compliance.
60. September
29,
2015:
The
Detroit
Free
Press
publishes
an
analysis
of
Flint
blood
lead
tests,
concluding
that
Dr.
Hanna-Attishas
analysis
is
correct.
GCHD
issues
a
health
advisory
regarding
the
water
quality.
Governor
Snyders
office
contacts
Director
Wyant
and
Director
Lyon
to
consider
emergency
responses.
61. October
1,
2015:
MDHHS
issues
a
statement
confirming
Dr.
Hanna-Attishas
analysis.
62. October
16,
2015:
Flint
switches
back
to
DWSD
as
source
of
drinking
water
for
the
city.
21
Regulatory
Context
The
federal
Safe
Drinking
Water
Act21
(SWDA)
was
enacted
in
1974
and
governs
regulation
of
drinking
water
throughout
the
United
States.
It
has
been
amended
multiple
times
since
its
enactment,
most
recently
in
2015.
From
the
United
States
Environment
Protection
Agency
(EPA)
website:
The
Act
authorizes
EPA
to
establish
minimum
standards
to
protect
tap
water
and
requires
all
owners
or
operators
of
public
water
systems
to
comply
with
these
primary
(health-related)
standards.
The
1996
amendments
to
SDWA
require
that
EPA
consider
a
detailed
risk
and
cost
assessment,
and
best
available
peer-reviewed
science,
when
developing
these
standards.
State
governments,
which
can
be
approved
to
implement
these
rules
for
EPA,
also
encourage
attainment
of
secondary
standards
(nuisance-related).22
Michigan
enacted
the
state
Safe
Drinking
Water
Act
(PA
399)
in
1976.
It
establishes
state
authority
for
regulating
drinking
water
supplies
in
Michigan.
It
also
provides
the
statutory
basis
for
the
EPAs
delegation
to
the
Michigan
Department
of
Environmental
Quality
(MDEQ)
to
implement
the
federal
SWDA,
including
the
Lead
and
Copper
Rule
(LCR).
Lead and Copper Rule
The
Lead
and
Copper
Rule
(LCR),
promulgated
in
1991,23
falls
under
the
SDWA.
Short-term
revisions,
prompted
following
the
incidence
of
elevated
lead
levels
in
the
District
of
Columbias
water
distribution
system,
were
published
in
the
Federal
Register
in
2007.24
From
the
guidance
to
the
states
on
the
rule:
The
goal
of
the
LCR
is
to
provide
maximum
human
health
protection
by
reducing
lead
and
copper
levels
at
consumers'
taps
to
as
close
to
the
[Maximum
Contaminant
Level
Goals]
MCLGs
as
is
feasible.
To
accomplish
this
goal,
the
LCR
establishes
requirements
for
community
water
systems
(CWSs)
and
non-transient
non-community
water
systems
(NTNCWSs)
to
optimize
corrosion
control
and
conduct
periodic
monitoring.
Systems
are
required
to
perform
public
education
when
there
are
lead
action
level
exceedances
at
more
than
10
percent
of
the
taps
that
are
sampled,
treat
source
water
if
it
contributes
significantly
to
lead
and
copper
levels
at
the
tap,
and
replace
lead
service
lines
in
the
distribution
system
if
the
lead
level
at
the
tap
continues
to
exceed
the
action
level
after
optimal
corrosion
control
and/
or
source
water
treatment
has
been
installed.25
The
MCLG
for
lead
in
water
is
0
milligrams
per
liter
(mg/L);
the
action
level
requiring
public
notification
of
exceedance
is
0.15
mg/l
(also
expressed
as
15
parts
per
billion).
Large
water
systems,
defined
as
those
serving
over
50,000
people,
were
required
to
have
optimal
corrosion
control
treatment
(OCCT)
by
1997.
The
rule
requires
large
water
systems
that
have
met
21
25
22
the
OCCT
requirements
through
the
installation
of
corrosion
control
treatment
to
continue
to
operate
and
maintain
that
treatment.26
Currently,
EPA
is
in
the
process
of
reviewing
and
revising
the
LCR
through
its
established
rulemaking
procedures.
40
CFR
141.82
(g)
Continued
operation
and
monitoring.
All
systems
optimizing
corrosion
control
shall
continue
to
operate
and
maintain
optimal
corrosion
control
treatment,
including
maintaining
water
quality
parameters
at
or
above
minimum
values
or
within
ranges
designated
by
the
State
under
paragraph
(f)
of
this
section,
in
accordance
with
this
paragraph
for
all
samples
collected
under
141.87(d)
through
(f).
27
Citations
offered
in
Elevated
Blood
Lead
Levels
in
Children
Associated
With
the
Flint
Drinking
Water
Crisis:
A
Spatial
Analysis
of
Risk
and
Public
Health
Response,
by
Mona
Hanna-Attisha,
MD,
MPH;
Jenny
LaChance,
MS;
Richard
Casey
Sadler,
PhD;
and
Allison
Champney
Schnepp,
MD,
American
Journal
of
Public
Health,
November
2015.
28
For
a
discussion
of
the
prevalent
use
of
lead
in
the
United
States
and
the
lead
industrys
conduct
in
light
of
the
determination
of
its
toxicity,
see
Lead
Wars:
The
Politics
of
Science
and
the
Fate
of
America's
Children
(2013),
by
Gerald
Markowitz
and
David
Rosner,
who
are
interviewed
on
National
Public
Radios
Fresh
Air
in
a
March
3,
2016
episode
titled,
America's
'Lead
Wars'
Go
Beyond
Flint,
Mich.:
It's
Now
Really
Everywhere.
Known
as
the
reference
level
as
stated
by
the
federal
Centers
for
Disease
Control
and
Prevention.
29
23
These
improvements
have
largely
been
attributed
to
reductions
in
lead
paint
in
households
rather
than
reductions
in
lead
exposure
through
drinking
water.
In
Michigan,
routine
blood
lead
level
checks
are
recommended
for
children
1
to
2
years
old
who
live
in
communities
that
are
known
to
have
historically
high
proportions
of
children
with
levels
at
the
reference
level
or
higher,
and
for
all
children
with
Medicaid
health
coverage.
For
the
past
decade,
Flint
has
been
one
of
14
Michigan
communities
that
have
been
identified
by
MDHHS
as
focus
communities
because
of
historically
high
levels
of
children
with
elevated
blood
lead
levels.
Local
and
state
health
agencies
are
responsible,
in
coordination
with
childrens
healthcare
providers
(physicians,
nurse
practitioners,
etc.),
for
following
up
on
elevated
blood
lead
levels.
Appropriate
follow-up
includes:
o Providing
advice
to
families
regarding
increasing
the
nutritional
quality
of
the
childs
diet
to
increase
the
amount
of
foods
with
high
levels
of
iron,
calcium,
and
vitamin
C;
o Rechecking
blood
lead
levels
within
3
to
6
months
to
see
whether
the
level
has
decreased
below
5
micrograms
per
deciliter,
and
continuing
interventions
and
re-testing
at
this
interval
to
assure
progress;
and
o Performing
in-home
assessments
for
environmental
sources
of
lead
(for
example,
lead
paint,
lead
in
dust)
for
children
with
blood
lead
levels
of
10
micrograms
per
deciliter
or
more.30
Of
note,
before
the
Flint
water
crisis,
in-home
assessments
did
not
routinely
include
testing
of
drinking
water
as
a
potential
source
of
lead
exposure.
Legionella
Infections
caused
by
Legionella
bacteria
can
cause
relatively
mild
illness
in
generally
healthy
adults
but
can
cause
life-threatening
illness
and
even
death
in
elderly
and
immune-compromised
patients.
Such
infections
almost
never
occur
in
children.
Legionellosis,
the
name
given
to
infections
caused
by
Legionella
bacteria,
has
been
recognized
since
the
1970s
as
often
occurring
in
environments
with
self-contained
air
supply
systems
(such
as
healthcare
facilities)
during
non-
winter
months
when
cooling
towers
for
air
conditioning
can
serve
as
breeding
grounds
for
the
bacteria.
Historically,
Legionellosis
is
fatal
in
approximately
10
percent
of
cases.
Legionellosis
is
a
reportable
disease,
meaning
that
infections
with
Legionella
must
be
reported
to
local
and
state
public
health
authorities.
Public
health
specialists
known
as
epidemiologists
conduct
analyses
of
cases,
especially
when
the
pattern
of
cases
exceeds
historical
levels
in
a
given
jurisdiction.
Prior
to
the
switch
to
the
Flint
River
as
a
source
of
drinking
water
in
2014,
the
number
of
cases
of
Legionellosis
in
Genesee
County
had
not
exceeded
10
cases
per
year
for
several
years.
From
June
2014
to
March
2015,
there
were
45
cases
of
Legionellosis
in
Genesee
County,
with
5
deaths.
This
was
described
by
an
expert
from
the
CDC
in
2015
as
one
of
the
largest
[outbreaks
of
Legionellosis]
in
the
past
decade.
About
40
percent
of
the
cases
had
known
exposure
to
30
Prior
to
the
Flint
water
crisis,
environmental
assessments
were
not
performed
for
children
with
blood
lead
levels
of
5
to
9
micrograms
per
deciliter,
but
only
for
children
with
blood
lead
levels
of
10
micrograms
per
deciliter
or
higher.
24
possible
healthcare
sources
of
Legionella;
almost
50
percent
of
cases
had
known
exposure
to
Flint
River-sourced
water
supply.31
According
to
the
MDHHS
report
issued
on
May
29,
2015,
it
was
not
possible
for
the
state
epidemiologists
to
draw
definitive
conclusions
that
the
change
in
water
supply
was
related
to
the
outbreak
of
disease,
given
the
lack
of
clinical
specimens
of
Legionella
from
patients
diagnosed
with
the
disease
in
2014-15.
It
is
speculated
that
clinical
respiratory
specimens
(sputum)
were
not
available
because
antibiotic
treatment
was
started
presumptively
after
a
positive
urine
test
for
Legionella,
rendering
any
subsequent
specimens
indeterminate.
Although
urine
specimens
can
confirm
a
diagnosis
of
Legionellosis,
urine
specimens
cannot
be
used
for
determining
the
source
of
Legionella.
Subsequent
data
reported
publicly
by
MDHHS
on
January
21,
2016,
indicated
that
there
were
42
additional
cases
of
Legionellosis
from
May
2015
through
October
2015,
with
4
deaths.32
Taking
the
2014-15
data
together
with
additional
2015
data,
MDHHS
reported
that
36
percent
of
cases
likely
were
exposed
to
Flint
River-sourced
drinking
water,
and
that
again
there
were
too
few
clinical
specimens
to
draw
definitive
conclusions
about
contaminated
water
as
the
source
of
infection
in
these
cases.
At
the
time
of
this
report,
the
pattern
of
an
abrupt
increase
in
cases
of
Legionellosis
in
Genesee
County
in
2014-15
that
occurred
after
a
shift
to
the
Flint
River
strongly
implicates
the
water
source
and
treatment
of
the
water
as
a
potential
cause
of
higher
Legionellosis
case
incidence.
EPA
experts
Del
Toral
and
Lytle
have
suggested
that
the
treated
water
from
Flint
WTP
has
disrupted
the
previously
stable
lining
and
biofilm
of
water
lines
to
such
an
extent
that
chlorine
in
the
water
supply
has
been
excessively
depleted.
Del
Toral
also
suggested
that
the
flushing
of
fire
hydrants
may
have
stripped
the
biofilm
and
released
bacteria
(Legionella)
that
the
biofilm
had
contained.
If
true,
this
may
have
led
to
a
situation
where
Legionella
may
grow
more
abundantly
than
in
a
distribution
system
conveying
properly
treated
drinking
water.
Unfortunately,
these
are
hypotheses.
Definitive
data
for
the
analysis
of
cases
in
2014
and
2015
are
not
available,
so
it
is
not
possible
to
be
conclusive
about
the
cause.
Nonetheless,
great
concern
should
remain
about
the
clustering
of
cases
among
patients
potentially
exposed
in
healthcare
facilities
in
the
City
of
Flint
and
cases
among
individuals
whose
homes
receive
water
from
the
Flint
WTP.
MDHHS
and
GCHD
have
indicated
that
they
will
have
a
high
level
of
vigilance
in
monitoring
for
cases
of
Legionellosis
in
2016.
They
have
reminded
healthcare
professionals
treating
patients
in
Genesee
County
to
obtain
appropriate
clinical
(respiratory)
specimens
in
suspected
cases
of
Legionellosis
before
initiating
treatment.
This
cooperation
between
public
health
and
medical
professionals
will
be
crucial
to
identifying
the
cause
of
future
Legionellosis
cases
in
Genesee
County
and
controlling
outbreaks
in
the
future.
In
addition,
a
team
of
scientists
from
multiple
31
Some of these cases had exposure to both Flint River water and to healthcare facilities.
32
Twenty-two
of
the
42
cases
reported
from
May-October
2015
had
known
healthcare-related
exposures
in
the
two
weeks
prior
to
development
of
symptoms,
and
21
of
these
were
from
the
same
healthcare
facility.
Sixteen
of
the
42
cases
of
Legionellosis
in
Genesee
County
from
May-October
2015
were
in
individuals
who
had
neither
exposure
to
a
healthcare
facility
nor
exposure
to
Flint
River-sourced
water.
25
Michigan
universities
is
expected
to
test
Flint
drinking
water
in
2016
to
assess
whether
conditions
in
the
system
created
an
environment
that
heightened
the
likelihood
of
Legionella
contamination.
Sustaining Michigans Water Heritage: A Strategy for the Next Generation, Draft for Public Review, June 4, 2015.
Prepared
by
the
Michigan
Office
of
the
Great
Lakes,
in
collaboration
with
Michigan
Department
of
Environmental
Quality,
Michigan
Department
of
Natural
Resources,
Michigan
Department
of
Agriculture
and
Rural
Development,
and
Michigan
Economic
Development
Corporation,
p.
6.
34
www.michigan.gov/deq/0,1607,7-135-3313_3675_3691---,00.html
26
system
water
quality,
and
overall
utility
management.
ODWMA
historically
has
taken
a
collaborative
approach
with
public
water
suppliers,
offering
guidance
on
technical
requirements
for
compliance
with
environmental
regulations.
Discussion
MDEQ
is
responsible
for
ensuring
that
community
water
systems
comply
with
the
SDWA.
According
to
EPA
Region
V,
ODWMA,
which
was
originally
within
the
state
Department
of
Community
Health,
has
more
community
water
systems
to
regulate
than
other
Region
V
states.
Additionally,
while
all
states
water
system
regulators
in
Region
V
are
stretched
financially,
Michigan
is
particularly
challenged
because
fees
to
operate
the
program
are
generally
lower
than
fees
charged
by
other
states,
requiring
the
state
to
rely
more
heavily
on
general
funds
and
federal
revenue.
For
a
variety
of
reasons,
MDEQ
discounted
use
of
the
Flint
River
as
a
permanent
water
source
in
2013.
However,
it
did
agree
to
use
of
the
river
as
a
temporary
source,
conditioned
upon
completion
of
identified
improvements
to
the
Flint
Water
Treatment
Plant
(WTP).
Flint
was
granted
two
permit
modifications
in
April
2014
that
allowed
the
treatment
plant
to
operate
full-
time
with
the
Flint
River
as
the
water
source.
In
advance
of
the
City
of
Flints
conversion
from
DWSD
water
supply
to
use
of
Flint
River
water,
MDEQ
had
multiple
communications
and
meetings
with
Flint
Utilities
Department
staff
and
their
consultants.
A
plan
of
treatment
of
Flint
River
water
was
discussed
and
covered
numerous
issues
including
dosing
of
chemicals,
use
of
polymers,
and
unit
process
performance.
When
asked
by
Flint
water
plant
personnel
about
adding
phosphate
in
the
treatment
process,
as
DWSD
does
for
corrosion
control,
MDEQ
said
that
a
corrosion
control
treatment
decision
would
be
made
after
two
6-month
monitoring
periods
were
conducted
to
see
if
corrosion
control
treatment
was
needed.
Similarly,
distribution
system
operations
requirements
were
outlined,
including
sampling
and
testing
for
compliance
with
the
LCR
that
involved
obtaining
tap
water
samples
from
high-risk
residences.
ODWMA
anticipated
that
use
of
Flint
River
water
would
be
problematic35
but
deferred
to
state
emergency
manager
decisions
to
proceed.36
Subsequently:
o MDEQ
advised
Flint
WTP
staff,
in
contradiction
to
longstanding
federal
policy
under
the
LCR,
that
corrosion
control
treatment
was
not
required.
o MDEQ
did
not
require
appropriate
sampling
of
tap
water
quality
as
mandated
by
the
LCR.
o MDEQ
obstinately
used
water
quality
test
results
based
on
flawed
sampling
and
insisted
on
the
accuracy
of
the
erroneous
data.
o MDEQ
dismissed
expressed
concerns
of
Flint
residents,
elected
officials,
and
external
subject
matter
experts
(as
well
as
EPA).
35
Internal
March
26,
2013
MDEQ
e-mail
(Busch
to
Wyant,
Shekter
Smith,
and
others)
noting,
among
other
points:
Continuous
use
of
the
Flint
River
at
such
demand
rates
would:
Pose
an
increased
microbial
risk
to
public
health
(Flint
River
vs.
Lake
Huron
source
water),
Pose
an
increased
risk
of
disinfection
by-product
(carcinogen)
exposure
to
public
health
(Flint
River
vs.
Lake
Huron
source
water),
Trigger
additional
regulatory
requirements
under
the
Michigan
Safe
Drinking
Water
Act.
36
Internal
March
27,
2013
MDEQ
e-mail
(Sygo
to
Busch)
noting,
among
other
points:
As
you
might
guess
we
are
in
a
situation
with
Emergency
Financial
Managers
so
its
entirely
possible
that
they
will
be
making
decisions
relative
to
cost.
The
concern
in
either
situation
is
that
a
compliant
supply
of
source
water
and
drinking
water
can
be
supplied.
27
o MDEQ
inaccurately
reported
information
about
Flints
corrosion
control
to
EPA,
stating
that
Flint
had
an
optimized
corrosion
control
program
when,
in
fact,
it
was
not
employing
corrosion
control
treatment.
o MDEQ
deferred
requiring
Flint
to
implement
CCT
until
after
the
second
6-month
monitoring
period
was
completed
and
showed
lead
levels
of
11
ppb,
though
EPA
advised
MDEQ
to
require
Flint
to
have
CCT
as
early
as
April
2015.
o MDEQ
waited
on
legal
opinions
about
SDWA
compliance
requirements
and
delayed
admission
of
its
incorrect
interpretation
of
SDWA
compliance
requirements
for
(at
least)
2
months.
o MDEQ
insisted,
even
after
compelling
evidence
of
lead
poisoning
of
children
was
presented,
that
Flint
water
quality
met
applicable
SDWA
standards.
o MDEQ
failed
(for
more
than
a
year)
to
work
with
MDHHS
leadership
and
staff
to
ensure
an
appropriate
and
comprehensive
public
health
response
to
repeated
requests
to
address
health
concerns
related
to
drinking
water.
MDEQ
continued
to
insist
the
water
was
safe
and
met
all
federal
requirements,
and
discouraged
any
statements
that
would
imply
that
the
water
was
not
safe.
The
obvious
question
that
MDEQ,
along
with
the
City
and
its
consultants,
should
have
asked
was:
What
will
happen
without
corrosion
control
treatment?
Similarly,
they
could
have
asked
why
a
less
corrosive
source
of
water
(Lake
Huron
water)
would
be
required
to
have
corrosion
control
treatment,
but
not
the
more
corrosive
Flint
River
source.
In
Flint,
the
more
corrosive
water
source
ultimately
destroyed
the
protective
scaling
on
pipes
and
plumbing
that
orthophosphate
addition
had
provided
through
the
water
supplied
by
DWSD.
Findings
The
FWATF,
as
stated
in
our
second
letter
to
Governor
Snyder,37
places
primary
responsibility
for
the
Flint
water
crisis
on
the
MDEQ,
and
specifically
its
ODWMA.
This
finding
is
based
on
numerous
interviews
and
reviews
of
publicly
available
documents.
Nothing
in
our
subsequent
interviews
or
our
review
of
thousands
of
pages
of
related
documents
has
dissuaded
us
from
this
fundamental
conclusion.
We
found
that:
F-1. MDEQ
bears
primary
responsibility
for
the
water
contamination
in
Flint.
F-2. MDEQ,
specifically
its
ODWMA,
suffers
from
cultural
shortcomings
that
prevent
it
from
adequately
serving
and
protecting
the
public
health
of
Michigan
residents.
F-3. MDEQ
misinterpreted
the
LCR
and
misapplied
its
requirements.
As
a
result,
lead-in-water
levels
were
under-reported
and
many
residents
exposure
to
high
lead
levels
was
prolonged
for
months.
Specifically:
o MDEQs
misinterpretation
of
the
LCR
and
lack
of
due
caution
resulted
in
the
decision
not
to
require
corrosion
control
upon
the
switch
to
the
Flint
River
but,
rather,
to
begin
two
consecutive
6-month
water
quality
monitoring
periods.
o MDEQ
failed
to
promptly
require
corrosion
control
even
after
the
initial
6-month
monitoring
period
results
were
received
and
90th
percentile
lead
sampling
results
were
at
6
ppb,
which
would
have
disqualified
Flint
from
being
exempted
from
See
Appendix
II
for
copies
of
the
FWATFs
letters
to
Governor
Rick
Snyder.
37
28
Recommendations
R-1. Implement
a
proactive,
comprehensive
cultural
change
program
within
MDEQ,
specifically
its
ODWMA,
to
refocus
the
department
on
its
primary
mission
to
protect
human
health
and
the
environment.
MDEQ
should
aspire
to
become
a
national
leader
through
a
proactive
program
designed
to
detect
and
address
contaminants
in
public
water
supplies
in
a
timely
manner.38
o ODWMA
should
heighten
its
focus
on
protection
of
public
health
and
provide
technical
assistance
to
advance
public
water
system
performance.
o Technical
assistance
should
not
be
oriented
toward
defining
minimum
requirements
to
achieve
technical
compliance
with
regulatory
requirements.
o In
the
event
that
regulatory
requirements
are
ambiguous,
ODWMA
should
default
to
public
health
protection.
38
For
example,
in
the
case
of
lead
detection,
ODWMAs
program
should
have
adopted
water
quality
sampling
procedures
that
maximized
the
potential
for
detection
by
identifying
high-risk
homes,
prohibiting
pre-flushing
of
service
lines,
and
improving
sample
draw
procedures.
29
o MDEQs
program
restructuring
should
address
the
findings
of
this
and
other
program
and
incident
reviews,
and
commit
to
transparent,
accessible
reporting
on
implementation
of
associated
recommendations.
R-2. Establish
an
apprenticeship/certification
program
for
MDEQ
ODWMA
employees
that
requires
direct,
hands-on
experience
with
public
water
system
operations.
MDEQ
ODWMA
employees
responsible
for
water
system
regulation
and
SDWA
enforcement
should
be,
or
have
access
to,
certified
operators
and
subject
matter
experts
(including,
for
example,
those
at
EPA).
R-3. Strengthen
SDWA
enforcement,
most
notably
for
the
LCR.
The
state
has
the
ability
to
strengthen
its
own
enforcement
of
the
SDWA
and
not
wait
for
action
to
occur
at
the
federal
level:
o Reiterate
(and
clarify
where
necessary)
appropriate
sampling
procedures,
and
establish
them
in
rule
revisions
or
guidelines
such
that
they
are
clear
for
all
to
understand.
Provide
resources
for
public
water
systems
to
obtain
authoritative
guidance
in
the
event
of
questions
or
concerns.
o Make
water
sample
test
results
required
under
the
Lead
and
Copper
Rule
available
to
the
public
while
protecting
personally
identifiable
information.
R-4. Participate
in
the
Flint
Water
Inter-Agency
Coordinating
Committees
(FWICCs)
work
team
established
to
oversee
conversion
from
DWSD-supplied
to
KWA-delivered
water.
MDEQ
should
draw
from
that
work
to
revise
its
policies
and
procedures
for
approval
of
water
treatment
and
distribution
system
operating
regimens,
particularly
when
source
water
changes
are
contemplated.
R-5. Participate
in
EPAs
ongoing
review
and
revision
of
the
LCR,
conveying
lessons
learned
from
the
Flint
water
crisis.39
39
40
Created
from
the
combination
of
the
Department
of
Community
Health
and
Department
of
Human
Services
in
2015.
41
For example, promoting and facilitating childhood vaccination against diseases such as measles and influenza.
42
For
example,
conducting
screening
programs
to
identify
individuals
who
have
developed
cancer
so
that
they
can
receive
appropriate
medical
care.
30
and
health
conditions
through
a
wide
variety
of
efforts.
For
instance,
MDHHS
is
recognized
for
a
high-quality
system
of
tracking
childhood
vaccination
through
the
Michigan
Care
Improvement
Registry
(MCIR).
MCIR
allows
state
officials
to
assess
childrens
vaccination
levels
on
a
regular
(weekly)
basis,
and
to
identify
neighborhoods
and
schools
where
vaccination
levels
may
be
so
low
that
outbreaks
of
vaccine-preventable
diseases
are
possible.
As
a
result,
MDHHS
can
then
communicate
with
healthcare
professionals
who
administer
vaccines,
and
with
parents
of
children
who
are
not
up-to-date
on
their
vaccinations,
to
encourage
them
to
protect
their
children
against
disease.
MCIR
is
a
very
positive
example
of
the
public
health
function
of
MDHHS.
In
the
case
of
Flint,
however,
MDHHSs
response
to
two
public
health
concerns,
related
to
lead
exposure
and
cases
of
Legionella
infection,
did
not
meet
the
agencys
own
standard
of
performance.
Discussion
Childrens Exposure to Lead in Drinking Water
MDHHS
includes
the
Childhood
Lead
Poisoning
Prevention
Program
(CLPPP),
which
is
responsible
for
tracking
the
results
of
all
childrens
blood
lead
tests,
and
the
Healthy
Homes
program,
which
is
responsible
for
coordinating
remediation
of
homes
when
high
levels
of
environmental
lead
exposure
are
found
for
a
child
with
an
elevated
blood
lead
level.
All
blood
lead
tests
conducted
in
the
state
must
be
reported
to
CLPPP,
under
state
law.
For
many
years,
CLPPP
has
functioned
as
a
registry
of
blood
lead
tests,
comparing
aggregate
results
at
the
state
level
in
the
most
recent
year
to
levels
in
prior
yearstypically
in
annual
reports
released
in
the
summer
following
the
end
of
a
given
calendar
year.
The
primary
outcomes
reported
have
been
the
proportions
of
children
with
blood
lead
levels
10
micrograms
per
deciliter
and
proportions
with
blood
lead
levels
5
micrograms
per
deciliter.
For
more
than
a
decade,
CLPPP
has
also
specifically
tracked
local
lead
testing
results
in
14
focus
communities
known
to
have
higher
proportions
of
children
with
elevated
blood
lead
levels
than
in
other
communities
in
Michigan.
Flint
is
one
such
focus
community.
The
CLPPP
operated
under
the
assumption
that
children
with
elevated
blood
lead
levels
were
being
managed
by
their
respective
healthcare
professionals.
Therefore,
no
urgency
was
given
to
performing
the
comparisons
that
they
published
in
annual
reports,
which
were
posted
online
without
any
public
announcements.
For
this
reason,
there
is
no
evidence
that
MDHHS
conducted
an
analysis
of
blood
lead
levels
in
2014
prior
to
late
July
2015,
after
Governor
Snyders
chief
of
staff
Dennis
Muchmore
wrote
to
MDHHS
officials
expressing
concern
about
many
complaints
from
Flint
residents
about
water
quality
in
Flint.
On
July
28,
2015,
a
MDHHS
epidemiologist
(Larder)
performed
a
classic
epidemiologic
analysis
of
2014
blood
lead
test
data
versus
prior
years
and
found
a
concerning
pattern
of
elevated
levels
in
Flint.
On
the
same
day,
the
CLPPP
data
manager
(Scott)
compared
data
over
the
preceding
5
years
and
concluded
that
the
2014
data
were
not
substantially
different
than
several
preceding
years.
Scotts
analysis
was
fundamentally
flawed
because
he
failed
to
consider
that
the
proportions
of
children
with
high
blood
lead
were
declining
over
the
years
2011-2013,
and
therefore
2014
levels
represented
a
clear
deviation
from
the
improving
trend
in
previous
years.
For
unclear
reasons,
these
conflicting
conclusions
of
Scott
and
Larder
were
not
elevated
to
higher
levels
of
authority
within
MDHHS.
Rather,
the
explanation
that
there
was
no
difference
(from
a
data
manager
rather
than
an
epidemiologist)
was
allowed
to
persist
for
another
2
months.
Messages
from
other
MDHHS
officials
over
that
subsequent
time
period
indicated
that
they
were
31
aware
of
the
MDEQ
narrative
that
the
water
in
Flint
was
safe
and
did
not
present
an
imminent
public
health
problem.
By
September
2015,
Dr.
Mona
Hanna-Attisha
released
her
analysis
of
blood
lead
tests
performed
at
Hurley
Medical
Center,
showing
that
childrens
blood
lead
levels
were
clearly
abnormal
at
a
higher
rate
than
in
prior
years.
Of
note,
Dr.
Hanna-Attisha
and
Professor
Marc
Edwards
of
Virginia
Tech
had
formally
requested
release
of
CLPPP
data
from
MDHHS
(Scott)
in
previous
weeks
and
months,
but
had
never
received
such
data,
leading
Dr.
Hanna-Attisha
to
analyze
data
from
Hurley
Medical
Center
only.
When
the
Hurley
data
were
released,
MDHHS
issued
statements
indicating
that
the
Hurley
data
were
analyzed
using
different
methodology
than
the
state
would
employ,
and
MDHHS
did
not
endorse
the
Hurley
findings.
A
few
days
later,
MDHHS
Director
Lyon
sent
a
memo
to
MDHHS
staff
asking
them
to
make
a
strong
statement
with
a
demonstration
of
proof
that
the
blood
lead
levels
seen
are
not
out
of
the
ordinary.
Within
a
few
days,
MDHHS
epidemiologists
had
re-analyzed
the
data
and
reversed
course,
agreeing
publicly
with
the
Hurley-
based
analysis
by
October
1,
2015.
Subsequently,
MDHHS
changed
its
approach
and
began
to
analyze
blood
lead
level
data
in
the
CLPPP
database
on
a
basis
closer
to
real
time.
In
a
series
of
reports
released
approximately
every
2
weeks
since
November
2015,
MDHHS
has
communicated
with
the
public
regarding
the
proportion
of
children
in
Flint
with
blood
lead
tests
5
micrograms/deciliter.
This
is
a
promising
step
in
transparency
and
timeliness.
However,
excessive
and
likely
harmful
lead
exposure
already
has
occurred
for
hundreds
and
perhaps
thousands
of
children
in
Flint,
and
it
is
now
MDHHSs
responsibility
to
follow
up
with
comprehensive
secondary
prevention.
MDHHS
reports
that
about
200
children
in
Flint
are
known
to
have
had
childhood
lead
levels
5
micrograms/deciliter
when
they
were
tested
since
April
2014
(the
month
of
the
water
switch
to
the
Flint
River).
This
number
of
children
is
likely
a
profound
underestimate
of
the
number
of
children
exposed;
based
on
Census
estimates
and
Medicaid
records,
the
number
of
children
under
6
years
old
living
in
the
City
of
Flint
is
approximately
10,900.
Given
the
known
risks
of
lead
neurotoxicity
for
young
children,
appropriate
near-term,
middle-term,
and
long-term
follow-up
for
children
exposed
to
lead
in
Flint
will
include:
Neurodevelopmental
assessments,
Timely
access
to
early
childhood
education,
Behavioral
assessments
and
interventions
in
preschool
years,
Educational
assessments
in
preschool
and
school
years
accompanied
by
appropriate
learning
support,
and
o Appropriate
counseling
and
medical
therapy
to
address
attentional
and
behavioral
concerns
at
school
age
and
into
adolescence.
Such
comprehensive
approaches
to
secondary
prevention
for
children
in
Flint
are
consistent
with
a
model
framework
for
medical
and
public
health
response
proposed
by
Dr.
Mona
Hanna-Attisha
at
Hurley
Medical
Center.
o
o
o
o
Despite
the
unmistakable
connection
between
the
quality
of
drinking
water
and
public
health,
there
is
no
liaison
between
MDEQ
and
MDHHS
to
ensure
that
complaints
or
concerns
about
water
are
brought
to
the
attention
of
MDHHS
staff
in
a
timely
fashion
to
prompt
investigative
action.
The
lack
of
a
liaison
function
within
state
government
also
adversely
affected
the
response
to
cases
of
Legionellosis,
as
described
below.
32
Findings
F-6. MDHHSs
lack
of
timely
analysis
and
understanding
of
its
own
data
on
childhood
blood
lead
levels,
along
with
its
reliance
on
MDEQ
and
reluctance
to
share
state
data
with
Dr.
Mona
Hanna-Attisha
and
Professor
Marc
Edwards,
prolonged
the
Flint
water
crisis.
F-7. MDHHS
bears
ultimate
responsibility
for
leadership
and
coordination
of
timely
follow-up
efforts
in
Flint
and
across
the
state
regarding
childhood
lead
poisoning.
While
local
entities
(for
example,
healthcare
professionals,
GCHD,
health
insurance
plans)
are
partners
in
efforts
to
protect
children
from
lead
poisoning,
MDHHS
has
the
lead
role
and
failed
to
exercise
its
responsibility.
F-8. The
consequences
of
lead
exposure
for
Flint
residents
are
expected
to
be
long-term
and
will
necessitate
sustained
investments
in
education,
public
and
mental
health,
juvenile
justice,
and
nutrition
needs
over
the
next
10
to
20
years.
This
may
have
been
related
to
delays
in
reporting
between
local
healthcare
professionals,
GCHD,
and
MDHHS.
43
33
F-9. Too
few
children
in
Michigan
are
screened
for
lead
through
routine
blood
tests
as
recommended
for
children
ages
1
and
2.
Statewide
screening
goals
for
children
enrolled
in
Medicaid
are
met
in
very
few
instances
at
the
county
level
or
within
Medicaid
health
plans.
This
lack
of
information
leaves
parents,
healthcare
professionals,
and
local
and
state
public
health
authorities
uninformed
about
the
possibility
of
lead
poisoning
for
thousands
of
Michigan
children.
F-10. Coordination
between
MDEQ
and
MDHHS
was
inadequate
to
properly
address
the
public
health
issues
related
to
water
quality
in
Flint.
Communication
was
infrequent,
and
when
it
did
occur,
the
default
position
was
to
conclude
that
the
health
problems
were
not
related
to
the
water
supply
switch
rather
than
to
assume
that
the
problems
might
be
related
to
the
switch.
F-11. Communication
and
coordination
among
local
and
state
public
health
staff
and
leadership
regarding
Legionellosis
cases
in
2014-2015
was
inadequate
to
address
the
grave
nature
of
this
outbreak.
The
fact
that
these
cases
occurred
while
there
were
several
simultaneous
concerns
about
quality
and
safety
of
water
in
Flint
should
have
caused
public
health
staff
and
leadership
at
local
and
state
levels
to
coordinate
their
actions
to
ensure
a
prompt
and
thorough
investigation.
Recommendations
R-6. Establish
policies
and
procedures
at
MDEQ
and
MDHHS
to
ensure
input
by
health
experts
and
scientists
when
permit
decisions
may
have
a
direct
impact
on
human
health.
R-7. Establish
and
maintain
a
Flint
Toxic
Exposure
Registry
to
include
all
the
children
and
adults
residing
in
Flint
from
April
2014
to
present.
The
Flint
Toxic
Exposure
Registry
will
serve
as
an
authoritative
reference
source
of
information
(including
contact
details
[for
example,
primary
contact
information,
back-up
contact
information,
and
preferred
mode
of
contact])
for
purposes
of
timely
health
assessments
in
the
short-term
and
long-term,
as
well
as
subsequent
communication
regarding
policies
and
scientific
findings.
Timely
assessments
will
include
clinical
evaluations
and
re-evaluations
in
healthcare
settings,
appropriate
follow-up
conducted
by
public
health
professionals,
and
longitudinal
assessments
of
the
impact
of
environmental
exposure
on
childrens
and
adults
health
(including
among
pregnant
women).
R-8. Re-establish
the
Michigan
Childhood
Lead
Poisoning
Prevention
and
Control
Commission.
The
Commission
would
perform
a
comprehensive
review
of
the
states
lead
poisoning
prevention
program;
evaluate
the
effectiveness
of
the
program,
including
its
ability
to
satisfy
federal
law
requiring
that
100
percent
of
all
young
children
enrolled
in
Medicaid
be
screened
with
a
blood
lead
test;
and
make
recommendations
for
the
programs
improvement.
The
Commission
would
also
conduct
public
hearings,
review
information
from
other
sources,
and
study
other
states
experiences.
The
Commission
must
also
develop
short-
and
long-range
strategic
recommendations
for
childhood
lead
poisoning
prevention
and
control
in
Michigan.
R-9. Ensure
that
MDHHS
is
transparent
and
timely
in
reporting
and
analysis
of
aggregate
data
regarding
childrens
blood
lead
levels.
MDHHS
data
regarding
lead
levels
shall
be
provided
34
to
individuals
and
organizations,
based
on
their
expertise,
upon
request
and
in
cases
when
the
interpretation
of
data
by
MDHHS
is
questioned.
R-10. Establish
a
more
aggressive
approach
to
timely
clinical
and
public
health
follow-up
for
all
children
known
to
have
elevated
blood
lead
levels,
statewide.
MDHHS
should
expand
its
local
efforts
and
partnerships
to
accomplish
this
goal.
Whenever
possible,
routine
screening
for
lead
and
appropriate
follow-up
should
occur
in
childrens
primary
care
medical
homes.
R-11. Strive
to
be
a
national
leader
in
monitoring
and
responding
to
exposure
of
children
to
lead
by
converting
the
Childhood
Lead
Poisoning
Prevention
Program
(CLPPP)
from
passive
collection
of
test
results
into
an
active
surveillance
and
outreach
program.
Performance
of
the
surveillance
program
should
be
reported
to
the
public.
MDHHS
should
be
prepared
to
amplify
its
efforts
if
performance
targets
are
not
met.
R-12. Improve
screening
rates
for
lead
among
young
children
through
partnerships
with
county
health
departments,
health
insurers,
hospitals,
and
healthcare
professionals.
R-13. As
the
state
authority
on
public
health,
and
as
the
organization
that
conducted
the
epidemiologic
study
of
Legionellosis
cases
in
Genesee
County
in
2014-15,
take
responsibility
for
coordinating
with
GCHD
and
CDC
to
protect
Michigan
residents
from
further
outbreaks
of
Legionellosis.44
R-14. In
cases
of
switches
in
drinking
water
supplies
in
the
future,
the
state
must
assume
that
outbreaks
of
cases
of
Legionellosis
may
be
related
to
changes
in
water
source
and
should
communicate
the
potential
risk
to
the
public,
rather
than
assuming
and
communicating
the
opposite.
Specific steps should include: (a) anticipate the risks of Legionellosis infections going forward; (b) take timely steps
to
minimize
those
risks
in
Flint
drinking
water
by
working
with
EPA,
MDEQ
and
Flint
WTP;
(c)
coordinate
with
healthcare
facilities
to
minimize
risks
of
healthcare
facility-acquired
Legionellosis;
(d)
communicate
with
the
public
about
steps
being
taken
and
cases
of
Legionellosis
that
occur.
35
Discussion
The
Flint
water
crisis
occurred
during
Governor
Snyders
tenure.
The
Governor
and
his
office
were
directly
involved
in
some
aspects
of
the
crisis
and
briefed
on
some
of
the
major
decisions
surrounding
Flint
drinking
water.
Emergency
managers
that
he
appointed
made
key
decisions
that
led
to
and
prolonged
the
crisis.
He
appointed
the
directors
of
the
three
state
departments
MDEQ,
MDHHS,
and
Treasurythat
bear
differing
degrees
of
responsibility
for
what
happened.
The
Governor
and
the
Governors
office
must
rely
heavily
on
information
from
state
departments
to
make
decisions,
set
directions,
and
take
action.
In
this
case,
the
individuals
and
departments
on
which
the
Governor
relied
for
guidance
provided
wrong
information,
particularly
on
the
issues
related
to
lead
in
the
drinking
water
and
elevated
blood
lead
levels
in
children.
In
particular,
two
state
agencies
attempted
to
dismiss
and
discredit
credible
evidence
of
threats
to
public
health.
MDEQ
did
not
acknowledge
the
true
extent
of
the
Flint
water
problems
until
late
September
2015.
Likewise,
MDHHS,
which
misread
its
own
data
on
childrens
blood
lead
levels
in
Flint,
did
not
inform
the
Governor
of
lead
poisoning
related
to
use
of
the
Flint
River
as
a
water
source
until
late
September
2015.
However,
Governor
Snyder
and
certain
executive
staff
members
were
aware
before
late
September
2015
of
several
issues
that
are
noteworthy
and
relevant.
For
example:
o The
Department
of
Treasury
approved
the
Flint
emergency
managers
decisions
(supported
by
Flint
City
Council)
to
switch
to
KWA
after
negotiations
across
two
entities
under
emergency
management
failed.
Members
of
the
Governors
staffand
the
Governor
himselfparticipated
in
some
of
those
discussions.
o The
Governors
office
received
citizen
complaints
and
was
well
aware
of
numerous
press
stories
about
water
quality
problems
as
early
as
May
2014
and
continuing
throughout
2015.45,46
o The
decision
by
General
Motors
(GM)
in
October
of
2014
to
use
Flint
Township
water
instead
of
Flint
WTP-sourced
water
for
its
Flint
Engine
Operations
facility
was
not
only
known
to
executive
staff
members
of
the
Governor,
but
was
also
cited
as
a
reason
to
switch
back
to
DWSD
(see
below).
o In
late
January
2015,
at
least
one
member
of
the
Governors
office
was
informed
that
concerns
were
being
raised
in
the
MDEQ
about
the
Legionellosis
outbreak
in
Genesee
County
and
possible
connection
to
the
Flint
water
supply.47
o In
March
2015,
at
least
one
of
the
Governors
office
staff
members
was
advised
of
the
Legionellosis
outbreak
in
Flint
and
local
health
department
concerns
of
a
potential
link
to
the
Flint
water
conversion.48
45
This
was
subsequent
to
Department
of
Treasurys
approval
of
the
Flint
emergency
managers
decision
to
contract
with
LAN
to
upgrade
the
Flint
WTP
to
treat
water
from
the
Flint
River
as
the
primary
drinking
water
supply,
instead
of
purchasing
water
from
DWSD.
46
The
October
1,
2014
MDEQ
briefing
paper
to
Governor's
office
regarding
City
of
Flint
drinking
water
situation
(boil
water
notices)
ascribes
problems
to
aged,
inadequately
maintained,
cast
iron
pipe
in
the
distribution
system.
47
See
January
30,
2015
e-mail
from
Brad
Wurfel/MDEQ
to
Dave
Murray,
Governor
Snyders
deputy
press
secretary,
re:
Legionella.
36
o In
March
2015,
the
Governors
chief
of
staff
proposed
buying
and
distributing
bottled
water
in
Flint
because
of
citizen
concerns
about
water
quality.
o In
mid-summer
2015,
an
aide
to
Governor
Snyder
arranged
for
the
donations
of
water
filters
to
be
distributed
in
Flint
to
address
concerns
about
water
quality.
o In
mid-summer
2015,
the
Governor
and
senior
staff
discussed
Flint
water
issues;
lead
was
apparently
part
of
those
discussions.
The
switch
to
the
Flint
River
as
the
primary
source
of
drinking
water
for
the
City
of
Flint
occurred
in
late
April
2014.
On
October
14,
2014,
after
citizen
complaints
about
the
waters
odor,
color
and
taste49
and
the
decision
by
GM
to
leave
the
Flint
water
system,
two
key
executive
staff
members
traded
emails
suggesting
that,
given
these
problems,
it
was
time
to
switch
back
to
DWSD
for
Flints
drinking
water.
Other
executive
staff
members
received
these
emails,
and
according
the
Governors
chief
of
staff
at
the
timethe
Governor
was
informed
of
the
concern
and
the
suggestion.
A
phone
conversation
occurred
between
key
staff
members
Valerie
Brader
and
Rich
Baird
and
the
Flint
emergency
manager
about
the
suggestion.
The
emergency
manager
assured
these
Governors
office
staff
members
that
the
water
quality
problems
were
not
of
a
permanent
nature
and
asserted
that
it
would
be
too
costly
to
switch
back
to
DWSD.
That
conversation
ended
any
serious
discussion
about
switching
back
to
DWSD
at
that
time.
The
suggestion
to
switch
back
to
DWSD
was
revisited
in
mid-summer
2015.
However,
MDEQ
continued
to
provide
reassurances
that
the
treated
water
reaching
homes
in
Flint
was
both
safe
and
in
compliance
with
SDWA
requirements.
These
continuing
reassurances,
as
well
as
the
cost
issue,
apparently
prevented
any
systemic
or
comprehensive
review
of
the
water
situation
in
Flint.
According
to
Governor
Snyder,
it
was
not
until
after
September
28,
2015,
that
he
was
personally
advised
that
MDEQ
and
MDHHS
had
been
wrong
for
months
about
the
reality
of
lead
in
the
water
and
childrens
blood
lead
levels.
Discussions
about
the
Flint
water
situation
were
also
conducted
in
the
context
of
overarching
discussions
about
financially
distressed
cities
served
by
emergency
managers,
and
Flint
in
particular.
Flint
water
issues
were
a
focal
point
for
senior
staff
and
were
discussed
with
the
Governor.
Considerable
frustration
was
apparent
due
to
new
issues
arising
just
as
immediate
problems
seemed
on
the
road
to
improvement.
Continued
reliance
on
MDEQ
drove
poor
decisionsor
the
lack
of
decisions.
As
the
Flint
water
crisis
unfolded,
certain
state
agencies
perceived
need
to
defend
the
original
decision
to
switch
to
the
Flint
River
and
resist
a
return
to
DWSD
resulted
in
public
relations
and
communications
efforts
that
have,
at
times,
been
inappropriate.
In
the
spring
and
summer
of
2015,
for
example,
this
perceived
need
to
defend
a
flawed
decision
manifested
itself
in
attempts
by
MDEQ
and
MDHHS
to
discredit
accurate
information
on
lead
in
drinking
water
and
elevated
blood
lead
levels
provided
by
outside
experts.
Citizen
concerns
were
at
times
derided
and
dismissed,
in
spite
of
the
fact
that
various
members
of
the
Governors
staff
had
expressedand
were
expressingconcerns
about
the
water
situation
in
Flint
at
the
same
time.
48
See
March
13,
2015
E-mail
from
Brad
Wurfel/MDEQ
to
Harvey
Hollins/Governors
office.
Though
not,
at
that
time,
related
to
lead
or
TTHMs.
49
37
To
some
extent,
inappropriate
official
public
relations
efforts
continue
to
this
day.
Even
as
the
state
is
aggressively
engaged
in
mitigation
efforts
in
Flint,
the
statement
that
the
Flint
water
crisis
was
a
local,
state,
and
federal
failure
implies
that
blame
is
attributable
equally
to
all
three
levels
of
government.
Primary
responsibility
for
the
water
contamination
in
Flint
lies
with
MDEQ.
In
addition,
at
the
time
of
the
water
crisis,
Flint
was
under
the
control
of
state-appointed
emergency
managers,
who
made
key
decisions
that
contributed
to
the
crisis.
Because
of
these
two
facts,
the
state
is
fundamentally
accountable
for
what
happened
in
Flint.
Though
delayed,
we
acknowledge
and
support
the
many
steps
the
Governor
has
taken
to
date
to
address
the
implications
of
lead
in
the
Flint
water
supplythe
state
declaration
of
emergency,
the
establishment
of
both
the
Flint
Water
Inter-Agency
Coordinating
Council
and
Mission
Flint,
additional
funding
for
addressing
the
health
issues
faced
by
lead-poisoned
children
in
Flint,
partial
reimbursement
for
water
bills
paid
during
the
time
of
lead
contamination,
and
progress
on
a
plan
to
replace
LSLs.
Findings
F-12. Ultimate
accountability
for
Michigan
executive
branch
decisions
rests
with
the
Governor.
F-13. The
Governors
knowledge,
and
that
of
Governors
office
staff,
of
various
aspects
of
the
Flint
water
crisis
was
compromised
by
the
informationmuch
of
it
wrongprovided
by
MDEQ
and
MDHHS.
F-14. The
Governors
office
continued
to
rely
on
incorrect
information
provided
by
these
departments
despite
mounting
evidence
from
outside
experts
and
months
of
citizens
complaints
throughout
the
Flint
water
crisis,
only
changing
course
in
early
October
2015
when
MDEQ
and
MDHHS
finally
acknowledged
the
extent
of
the
problem
of
lead
in
the
public
water
supply.
F-15. The
suggestion
made
by
members
of
the
Governors
executive
staff
in
October
2014
to
switch
back
to
DWSD
should
have
resulted,
at
a
minimum,
in
a
full
and
comprehensive
review
of
the
water
situation
in
Flint,
similar
to
that
which
accompanied
the
earlier
decision
to
switch
to
KWA.
It
was
disregarded,
however,
because
of
cost
considerations
and
repeated
assurances
that
the
water
was
safe.
The
need
to
switch
back
to
DWSD
became
even
more
apparent
as
water
quality
and
safety
issued
continued
and
lead
issues
began
to
surface
in
2015,
notwithstanding
reassurances
by
MDEQ.
F-16. The
Flint
water
crisis
highlights
the
risks
of
over-reliancein
fact,
almost
exclusive
relianceon
a
few
staff
in
one
or
two
departments
for
information
on
which
key
decisions
are
based.
F-17. Official
state
public
statements
and
communications
about
the
Flint
water
situation
have
at
times
been
inappropriate
and
unacceptable.
Recommendations
R-15. Expand
information
flow
to
the
Governor
so
that
information
providing
the
foundation
for
key
decisions
comes
from
more
than
one
trusted
sourceand
is
verified.
R-16. Create
a
culture
in
state
government
that
is
not
defensive
about
concerns
and
evidence
that
contradicts
official
positions,
but
rather
is
receptive
and
open-minded
toward
that
38
Discussion
Owing
to
significant
declines
in
economic
vitality
and
substantial
outmigration
since
(at
least)
the
1990s,
Flint
was
first
placed
in
financial
receivership
under
an
emergency
financial
manager
between
2002
and
2004.50
Since
2011,
the
City
has
been
under
some
form
of
state-ordered
and
controlled
emergency
financial
management.51
During
this
time,
four
different
EMs
have
served
for
varying
lengths
of
time,
one
serving
twice.52
Our
interviews
confirmed
the
EMs
reported
to
and
interacted
regularly
with
Treasury
officials.
They
discussed
issues
such
as
public
safety,
staffing
requirements,
and
financial
matters.
The
EMs,
working
through
Treasury,
also
would
contact
other
state
agencies
for
assistance
on
a
regular
basis,
such
as
the
State
Police
on
law
enforcement
matters.
50
51
In
2011,
PA
72
was
replaced
by
PA
4,
which
amplified
the
powers
of
an
appointed
EM.
The
voters
repealed
PA
4
in
November
2012,
but
a
subsequent
statute
was
passed
by
the
legislature
in
December
2012:
PA
436
of
2012.
That
statute
is
not
subject
to
a
voter
referendum
and
has
been
in
effect
since
March
2013.
52
Ed
Kurtz
served
as
Flints
emergency
financial
manager
under
PA
72
of
1990
from
May
2002
to
2004;
Michael
Brown
was
appointed
in
December
2011
under
PA
4;
Ed
Kurtz
became
EM
again
in
August
2012;
Michael
Brown
was
reappointed
again
in
June
2013;
Darnell
Earley
replaced
Brown
In
October
2013;
Jerry
Ambrose
replaced
Earley
in
January
2015;
and
Ambrose
left
in
April
2015
when
control
over
the
citys
finances
was
assigned
to
a
city
administrator
under
the
supervision
of
a
Receivership
Transition
Advisory
Board.
39
Numerous
decisions
were
made
between
December
2011
and
April
2015
that
had
some
impact
on
the
decision
to
use
the
Flint
River
as
the
primary
source
of
drinking
water
for
the
City
of
Flint.
Various
state-appointed
EMs
served
during
this
timeframe
and
it
was
these
EMs
who
made
these
decisions,
not
locally
elected
officials.
Although
it
is
true
that
some
locally
elected
officials
supported,
acknowledged,
embraced,
and
even
celebrated
some
of
the
decisions,
the
decisions
were
not
theirs
to
make.
The
state-appointed
EMs
made
the
decisions.
Specifically,
Flint
EM
Ed
Kurtz
authorized
use
of
the
Flint
River
as
a
water
source
for
Flint,
as
clearly
indicated
by
his
approval
of
a
sole-source
contract
for
the
engineering
firm
Lockwood,
Andrews,
&
Newnam
(LAN)
to
prepare
the
Flint
WTP
for
full-time
treatment
of
Flint
River
water.
Darnell
Earley
was
the
incumbent
Flint
EM
and
presided
over
the
switch
of
water
sources
in
April
2014.
He
and
later
EM
Jerry
Ambrose
were
in
place
during
periods
when
citizens
requested
a
return
to
DWSD
because
of
health
problems
they
were
experiencing.
Neither
Darnell
Earley
nor
Jerry
Ambrose
seriously
considered
a
return
to
DWSD
in
part
because
MDEQ,
local
staff
and
their
consultants
assured
the
EMs
that
the
water
quality
problems
were
manageable
and
that
there
was
nothing
seriously
wrong
with
the
water.53
In
March
2015,
nearly
one
year
after
the
source
water
conversion,
Jerry
Ambrose
stated
that
a
reconnection
to
DWSD
would
cost
the
City
$10.1
million
per
year
and
that
water
purchases
could
be
as
high
as
$1
million
per
monthessentially
asserting
that
it
was
unaffordable.54
In
any
event,
the
facts
in
this
case
point
to
the
reality
that
state
government,
as
the
entity
in
charge
of
Flint
decision-making,
failed
to
protect
the
health
of
the
citys
residents.
Regardless
of
any
successes
of
the
EM
process
in
other
Michigan
cities,
this
failure
must
force
us
to
review
the
EM
law
and
the
general
approach
to
financial
problems.
Government
approaches
to
cities
in
fiscal
distress
must
balance
fiscal
responsibility
with
the
equally
important
need
to
address
quality
of
life,
economic
development,
and
infrastructure
maintenance
and
provision.
Findings
F-18. Emergency
managers,
not
locally
elected
officials,
made
the
decision
to
switch
to
the
Flint
River
as
Flints
primary
water
supply
source.
F-19. Treasury
officials,
through
the
terms
of
the
local
emergency
financial
assistance
loan
executed
by
the
Flint
emergency
manager
on
April
29,
2015,
effectively
precluded
a
return
to
DWSD
water,
as
Flint
citizens
and
local
officials
were
demanding,
without
prior
state
approval.
The
Emergency
Manager
Law
is
predicated
on
the
provision
that
any
ongoing
accumulated
local
government
deficit
is
resolved
prior
to
the
termination
of
receivership
(P.A.
436
of
2012).
As
the
city
of
Flint
neared
the
end
of
its
Emergency
Manager
status
in
March
2015,
the
city
still
retained
an
$8
million
accumulated
deficit
in
the
General
Fund.
To
resolve
this
accumulated
deficit,
the
state
and
the
Flint
EM,
with
the
concurrence
of
Flints
City
Council,
signed
an
emergency
loan
agreement
between
the
City
of
Flint
and
53
See,
for
example,
"City
of
Flint
Water
System
Update
with
Questions
and
Answers,"
February
16,
2015,
posted
to
City
of
Flint
website
at
www.cityofflint.com/wp-content/uploads/Water-Sysytem-FAQ-Update-2-16-151.pdf,
as
confirmed
in
FWATF
interviews
of
Flints
former
EMs.
54
40
Michigans
Local
Emergency
Financial
Assistance
Loan
Board
for
nearly
$8
million.55
This
emergency
loan
included
a
provision
that
the
City
of
Flint
could
not,
without
prior
state
approval,
return
to
DWSD
or
lower
water
rates.
F-20. The
role
of
the
EMs
in
Flint
(in
combination
with
MDEQs
failures)
places
primary
accountability
for
what
happened
with
state
government.
Trying
to
assign
responsibility
to
an
individual
EM
for
the
decision
to
use
the
Flint
River
is
pointlessand
the
answer
ambiguous.
One
EM
set
it
in
motion,
another
presided
over
the
actual
event,
and
two
EMs
did
not
seriously
entertain
reversing
the
decision
in
the
face
of
public
protest.
The
latter
refusals
were
for
simple
reasons:
they
received
expert
advice
that
the
water
was
safe
to
drink,
and
they
concluded
that
switching
back
to
DWSD
would
be
too
costly.
We
believe
the
larger
issue
is
one
of
accountability.
Who
is
accountable
for
the
decisions
made
by
the
EMs
in
Flint?
We
believe
the
state
must
assume
that
accountability.
If
the
state
does
not
assume
that
responsibility,
given
the
role
the
state
has
in
both
the
appointment
of
EMs
and
the
line
of
accountability
to
the
Department
of
Treasury,
then
no
accountability
exists
at
all.
F-21. EMs
charged
with
financial
reform
often
do
not
have,
nor
are
they
supported
by,
the
necessary
expertise
to
manage
non-financial
aspects
of
municipal
government.
F-22. Michigans
Emergency
Manager
Law
and
related
practices
can
be
improved
to
better
ensure
that
protection
of
public
health
and
safety
is
not
compromised
in
the
name
of
financial
urgency.
The
EM
Law
is
predicated
on
the
concept
that
a
local
financial
crisissuch
as
that
which
occurred
in
Flint
in
2011is
due
to
the
inability
of
local
officials
to
address
the
problem.
The
EM
is
supposed
to
be
able
to
better
handle
the
situation,
make
better
and
faster
decisions,
and
resolve
the
crisis.
The
EM
law
states
[t]hat
the
fiscal
stability
of
local
governments
is
necessary
to
the
health,
safety,
and
welfare
of
the
citizens
of
this
state
and
it
is
a
valid
public
purpose
for
this
state
to
assist
a
local
government
in
a
condition
of
financial
emergency.56
The
EM
is
deemed
necessary
not
only
to
resolve
the
fiscal
problem
but
also
to
protect
the
public
health
and
safety.
Yet
in
the
case
of
Flint,
while
other
state
and
local
officials
were
involved,
EMs
were
at
the
heart
of
decision-making
processes
that
prolonged
lead
exposure
occasioned
by
MDEQs
failure
to
prescribe
appropriate
treatment
for
the
Flint
water
system.
Recommendations
R-20. Review
Michigans
Emergency
Manager
Law
(PA
436)
and
its
implementation,
and
identify
measures
to
compensate
for
the
loss
of
the
checks
and
balances
that
are
provided
by
representative
government.
55
Note
that
the
Resolution
presented
to
Flint
City
Council
by
the
Flint
EM,
Resolution
150302.1,
contained
no
information
regarding
the
DWSD
and
water
rates
conditions
contained
in
the
emergency
loan.
56
41
City of Flint
Defined
Role
As
the
owner
of
its
public
water
system,
the
City
of
Flint
has
responsibility
for
compliance
with
the
SDWA
under
Act
399.
These
responsibilities
include
ensuring
proper
design,
construction,
operations
and
maintenance,
so
that
contaminants
in
tap
water
do
not
exceed
the
standards
established
by
law.
The
City
is
required
to
employ
properly
certified
water
operators
that
are
trained
and
experienced
to
operate
the
treatment
and
distribution
system.
The
City
must
test
its
water
routinely
for
specified
contaminants
and
report
the
results
to
MDEQ.
If
a
water
system
is
not
meeting
these
standards,
it
is
the
water
suppliers
responsibility
to
notify
its
customers
when
there
is
a
problem
with
water
quality.57
With
a
planned
change
in
water
source,
it
is
the
Citys
responsibility
to
carefully
plan
and
test
water
treatment
techniques,
ensure
staff
is
knowledgeable
about
treatment
protocols,
and
monitor
distribution
system
water
quality.
We
note
that
decisions
affecting
these
responsibilities,
particularly
those
that
had
financial
implications,
were
ceded
to
Flints
EMs
throughout
the
course
of
the
Flint
water
crisis.
57
Quotes
are
from
the
MDEQs
Outline
of
Flint
Drinking
Water
Issues
for
Flint
Water
Task
Force,
p.3.
42
Discussion
City
of
Flint
Public
Works
executive
leadership
and
staff
were
immediately
responsible
for
treating
Flint
River
water
and
for
monitoring
water
quality
in
the
distribution
system.
SDWA
compliance
is
the
obligation
of
the
public
water
supplier,
and
it
is
their
hands
that
public
trust
is
placed.
Flint
was
responsible
for
ensuring
that
its
WTP
was
adequately
upgraded
and
tested
to
perform
full-time
operations,
that
operations
staff
members
were
adequately
trained
and
familiar
with
treatment
processes,
that
the
treatment
technologies
used
were
adequate
to
produce
safe
drinking
water,
and
that
the
water
quality
throughout
the
distribution
system
(all
the
way
to
consumers
taps,
in
the
case
of
the
LCR)
was
in
compliance
with
regulatory
requirements,
as
confirmed
using
appropriate
sampling
procedures.
These
standards
of
practice
were
not
met
in
Flint.
The
City
relied
on
Flint
Utilities
Department
staffs
limited
experience,
consultant
advice,
and
most
substantially
MDEQ
for
technical
support.
In
this
respect,
Flint
was
similar
to
many
communities
in
Michigan
that
rely
on
MDEQ
for
technical
assistance
and
advice
on
regulatory
compliance
requirements.
However,
in
Flint,
that
reliance
was
tragically
misplaced.
Our
interviews
underscored
several
troubling
aspects
of
the
inexorable
drive
to
leave
the
DWSD
system
and
use
the
Flint
River
as
an
interim
supply
source
for
drinking
water.
Most
obviously,
the
parties
simply
failed
to
adequately
appreciate
(or
signal)
the
complexities
involved
in
treating
Flint
River
water,
or
the
potential
implications
of
water
chemistry
changes
to
the
citys
water
distribution
network.
We
note
that
Flint
endured
a
series
of
water
quality
threatsfrom
E
coli
contamination
to
high
total
trihalomethane
(TTHM)
levelsthat
could
have
been
prevented.
Increased
lead
exposure
and
increased
incidences
of
Legionellosis
likely
are
the
most
serious
health
consequences
of
a
sustained
period
of
water
quality
problems
that
clearly
overwhelmed
Flint
staff.
At
best,
consultant
support
for
Flint
River
water
treatment,
and
later
for
redress
of
distribution
system
water
quality
problems,
focused
on
specific
issues
without
adequate
consideration
for
latent
public
health
dangers.
The
Flint
Utilities
Department
personnel
were
under-trained,
inexperienced
with
full-time
plant
operations,
and
ill-prepared
to
manage
complex
water
chemistry
issues.
We
note
that
selected
staff
members
conveyed
concerns
as
events
unfolded,
only
to
have
those
concerns
discounted.
Several
aspects
of
the
situation
are
particularly
troubling.
o Less
than
one
month
before
startup
of
full-time
Flint
WTP
operation,
MDEQ
was
uncertain
about
its
requirements
for
the
transition.
MDEQ
staff
noted
internally
that
Flint
would
face
complexities
in
treating
Flint
River
water
and
challenges
with
full-time
operation
of
the
dated
WTP.58
o It
is
not
clear
that
Flints
resident
consulting
engineers,
LAN,
had
adequate
expertise
and
experience
with
river
water
treatment,
yet
the
firm
was
engaged
through
a
sole-source
contract.59
58
See, for example, Stephen Busch e-mail of March 26, 2014 and his e-mail of exactly one year earlier.
59
LAN
representatives
were
not
made
available
for
interview.
Questions
were
provided
in
writing
and
sent
to
LAN
(and
are
included
in
Appendix
IV);
responses
were
not
received
prior
to
publication
of
this
report.
43
o Flint
WTP
operators
were
hired
too
late
in
plant
ramp-up
efforts
to
enable
full-time
staffing,
which
precluded
adequate
training
on
plant
operations.
o MDEQ
misinterpreted
the
Lead
and
Copper
Rule
(LCR)
in
determining
that
corrosion
control
treatment
was
not
necessary
with
commencement
of
full-time
WTP
operation.
Neither
Flint
Utilities
Department
staff
nor
their
consulting
engineers
were
given
either
to
question
this
misinterpretation,
or
to
institute
rigorous
distribution
system
water
quality
monitoring
to
safeguard
against
corrosion-causing
water
quality
issues.
We
note
that
Flint
WTP
supervisory
personnels
expressed
concerns
regarding
readiness
to
begin
full
time
operationsincluding
appropriate
LCR-mandated
samplingand
these
concerns
went
unheeded.60
However,
it
seems
clear
that
these
concerns
were
voiced
in
an
environment
that
was
unreceptive
to
reconsideration
of
the
Citys
chosen
course,
mandated
by
its
EMs.61
We
also
are
dismayed
by
the
inadequate
and
technically
flawed
efforts
Flint
Utilities
Department
personnel
undertook,
based
on
MDEQs
instructions,
to
assess
distribution
system
water
quality.
As
a
result,
Flints
water
quality
sampling
was
fundamentally
flawed,
giving
false
assurances
and
an
untenable
basis
for
MDEQs
claims
that
Flints
system
was
delivering
safe
water.
The
series
of
missteps
and
outright
errors
is
well
documented,62
including
sampling
of
pre-flushed
lines,
use
of
narrow-mouthed
bottles,
and
perhaps
most
egregiously
failure
to
select
high-risk
homes
for
testing,
as
required
by
the
LCR.
It
is
hard
not
to
attribute
this
conduct
to
a
misguided
objective
of
securing
nominal
LCR
compliance
irrespective
of
what
conditions
might
actually
exist
in
the
homes
of
Flint
residents.
Also
troubling,
though
not
altogether
uncommon
among
U.S.
water
systems,
is
Flints
admission
that
it
had
not
conducted
a
census
of
LSLs
as
required
by
the
LCR.
Without
this
information,
Flint
was
not
in
a
position
to
identify
high-risk
homes
to
properly
monitor
lead
levels
and
comply
with
the
LCR.
In
summary,
while
we
cannot
begin
to
explain
or
excuse
MDEQs
transgressions
in
its
oversight
of
the
conversion
to
the
Flint
River
water
supply,
the
Flint
Public
Works
role
in
the
crisis
appears
attributable
to
an
inexperienced
and
poorly
resourced
organization
struggling
to
take
on
enormous,
untenable
responsibilities.
Flints
EM,
relying
on
sole-sourced
consultant
support,
held
responsibility
for
ensuring
adequate
staffing,
training,
and
preparation
for
conversion
of
Flints
drinking
water
source.
Those
responsibilities
were
not
met.
Findings
F-23. Flint
Public
Works
personnel
were
ill-prepared
to
assume
responsibility
for
full-time
operation
of
the
Flint
WTP
and
distribution
system.
60
April
17,
2014
e-mail
from
Flint
Utilities
Departments
Michael
Glasgow
to
Adam
Rosenthal,
Mike
Prysby,
and
Stephen
Busch
at
MDEQ.
61
See,
for
example,
April
24,
2014
e-mail
from
Daugherty
Johnson,
City
of
Flint
Utilities
Administrator,
and
Mike
Prysby
and
Stephen
Busch/MDEQ,
including
Flint
Public
Works
Director
Howard
Croft.
62
See,
for
example,
COMMENTARY:
MDEQ
Mistakes
and
Deception
Created
the
Flint
Water
Crisis,
September
30,
2015,
Siddhartha
Roy,
Flintwaterstudy.org,
and
February
27,
2015
e-mail
from
Miguel
Del
Toral/EPA
to
MDEQ:
If
systems
are
pre-flushing
the
tap
the
night
before
collection
of
LCR
compliance
samples
(MDEQ
still
provides
these
instructions
to
public
water
systems)
this
clears
particulate
lead
out
of
the
plumbing
and
biases
the
results
low
by
eliminating
the
highest
lead
values.
44
F-24. The
Flint
WTP
and
installed
treatment
technologies
were
not
adequate
to
produce
safe,
clean
drinking
water
at
startup
of
full-time
operations.
Flints
lack
of
reinvestment
in
its
water
distribution
system
contributed
to
the
drinking
water
crisis
and
ability
to
respond
to
water
quality
problems.
F-25. Flint
Public
Works
personnel
failed
to
comply
with
LCR
requirements,
including
the
use
of
optimized
corrosion
control
treatment
and
monitoring
for
lead.
Flint
personnel
did
not
identify
residences
with
LSLs,
secure
an
adequate
number
of
tap
water
samples
from
high-risk
homes,
or
use
prescribed
sampling
practices
(for
example,
line
and
tap
flushing
methods
and
sample
bottle
sizes).
F-26. Flint
Public
Works
acted
on
inaccurate
and
improper
guidance
from
MDEQ.
F-27. Many
communities
similarly
rely
on
MDEQ
to
provide
technical
assistance
and
guidance
on
how
to
meet
regulatory
requirements.
In
the
case
of
Flint,
MDEQ
assistance
was
deeply
flawed
and
lax,
which
led
to
myopic
enforcement
of
regulations
designed
to
protect
public
health.
F-28. The
EM
structure
made
it
extremely
difficult
for
Flint
citizens
to
alter
or
check
decision-
making
on
preparations
for
use
of
Flint
River
water,
or
to
receive
responses
to
concerns
about
subsequent
water
quality
issues.
Recommendations
R-23. Establish
and
fund
a
team
of
subject
matter
experts
in
water
system
operations
(treatment
and
distribution
system
management)
to
support
and
train
water
system
personnel,
guide
safe
system
operation
under
current
conditions,
and
prepare
for
successful
conversion
to
KWA.
In
addition
to
creating
water
quality
problems,
the
switch
to
the
Flint
River
may
have
precipitated
conditions
in
Flints
water
system
that
increase
the
potential
for
Legionella
to
occur.
With
warmer
temperatures
in
2016,
there
is
a
heightened
need
for
multi-agency
coordination
on
testing
of
the
Flint
water
system
for
the
presence
of
Legionella,
and
on
public
health
monitoring
for
the
incidence
of
Legionellosis
and
determinations
of
sources.
R-24. Implement
a
programmatic
approach
to
Flint
WTP
and
distribution
system
operations,
maintenance,
asset
management,
water
quality,
capital
improvements
and
public
engagement
(including
risk
communication)
to
ensure
that
the
disparate
ongoing
efforts
to
address
Flint
water
system
infrastructure
needs
are
coordinated,
fully
documented,
and
structured
to
sustain
high-quality
potable
water
service
over
the
long
term.
Though
not
the
subject
of
the
FWATFs
review,
it
is
apparent
that
the
Flint
water
utility
faces
acute
financial
challenges
due
to
earlier
financial
management
practices,
as
well
as
successful
challenges
to
EM-ordered
rate
increases.
These
circumstances
impose
an
unprecedented
context
for
establishing
defensible
water
rates
and
collection
practices
in
a
community
that
was
already
facing
difficult
water
affordability
challenges.
Careful
financial
planning
and
management
will
be
required
to
secure
and
effectively
deploy
external
funding
assistance,
and
to
gradually
stabilize
water
system
revenues
to
sustain
water
utility
operations
over
the
long
term.
This
must
be
complemented
by
an
effective
public
education
and
engagement
program,
and
innovative
water
affordability
strategies
to
advance
universal
access
to
potable
water
service.
45
R-25. Implement
a
robust
public
engagement
and
involvement
program
in
conjunction
with
the
anticipated
conversion
to
KWA-delivered
water
and
provide
for
regular
reporting
to
the
Flint
Water
Inter-Agency
Coordinating
Committee
(FWICC).
Discussion
In
summer
2014,
after
the
change
of
water
source
for
the
City
of
Flint,
there
were
two
public
health
problems
that
arose
within
the
jurisdiction
of
GCHD:
exposure
to
lead
and
exposure
to
Legionella.
Exposure
to
Lead
In
contrast
to
Legionellosis,
which
has
involved
GCHD
as
a
front-line
responder,
GCHD
was
not
extensively
involved
in
responding
to
exposure
of
children
to
lead
from
the
Flint
water
supply.
Elevated
blood
lead
level
records
are
maintained
as
part
of
a
regularly
updated
listing
of
test
results
by
MDHHS
in
the
statewide
Childhood
Lead
Poisoning
Prevention
Program
(CLPPP).
GCHD
was
involved
as
a
coordinating
organization
for
conducting
tests
and
relaying
test
results
to
the
state.
Clinicians
are
responsible
for
testing
childrens
blood
for
lead
in
early
childhood
on
a
routine
basis.
Health
insurance
plans
(especially
those
that
contract
with
state
Medicaid)
are
responsible
for
encouraging
families
and
clinicians
to
have
children
screened
at
the
appropriate
ages
and
then
following
up
with
children
whose
blood
lead
levels
are
elevated.
GCHD
would
get
involved
for
children
with
elevated
lead
levels
that
prompted
in-home
assessments
of
possible
sources
of
environmental
lead
exposure.
46
Since
the
switch
to
the
Flint
River,
a
higher
proportion
of
children
in
Flint
have
had
elevated
lead
levels
that
would
prompt
in-home
assessments.
Several
aspects
of
the
GCHD-MDHHS
response
are
noteworthy:
o GCHD
was
overwhelmed
with
the
need
for
in-home
assessments,
and
MDHHS
supported
training
and
placement
of
outreach
nurses
in
GCHD
to
supplement
its
workforce.
o GCHD
had
been
asked
only
to
reach
out
to
pregnant
women
who
might
have
had
lead
exposure,
rather
than
performing
their
usual
in-home
assessment
duties.
MDHHS
tasked
an
outside
firm
with
performing
the
in-home
assessments.
o As
of
late
January
2016,
only
about
one-fifth
of
children
known
to
have
had
elevated
blood
lead
levels
in
Flint
since
April
2014
had
received
in-home
environmental
assessments
(including
water
testing).
Legionella
After
the
switch
to
the
Flint
River
in
2014,
the
Flint
Utilities
Department
began
flushing
water
mains
citywide
to
address
brown-colored
water
resulting
from
corrosion
of
pipes
in
the
distribution
system.
Many
fire
hydrants
ran
for
days,
which
may
have
disrupted
the
biofilm,
a
slime
coating
(which
is
distinct
from
the
scaling
provided
by
corrosion
control
treatment)
on
the
inside
surface
of
the
water
mains
and
water
service
lines.
When
the
biofilm
was
disrupted,
Legionella
and
other
bacteria
may
have
been
released.
In
addition,
EPA
experts
Del
Toral
and
Lytle
believe
that
corroding
pipes
likely
absorbed
chlorine
in
the
water,
leading
to
extremely
low
chlorine
levels
that
were
insufficient
to
kill
Legionella
in
the
water.
Also,
given
the
small
population
in
Flint
compared
to
the
large
water
distribution
system
developed
to
serve
the
citys
larger
population
in
decades
past,
water
likely
pooled
in
the
system
for
excessively
long
periods,
providing
an
ideal
environment
for
bacterial
growth.
As
noted
above,
several
cases
of
Legionellosis
occurred
in
patients
who
likely
were
exposed
to
Legionella
in
healthcare
facilities.
McLaren
Medical
Center
in
Flint
responded
to
the
incident
by
hiring
a
Legionella
expert,
spending
$300,000
for
systems
to
eliminate
the
bacteria,
and
changing
practices
on
their
wards
to
instruct
patients
not
to
take
showers
(because
aerosols
can
spread
Legionella).
During
this
timeframe,
the
City
of
Flint
(Mayor
Dayne
Walling,
EM
Jerry
Ambrose
and
others)
asserted
the
water
was
safe.
Even
while
outbreak
investigations
were
ongoing,
GCHD
and
MDHHS
did
not
issue
a
bulletin
to
the
medical
community
or
the
public.
The
Legionella
expert
hired
by
the
hospital
and
other
water
quality
experts
cannot
dismiss
the
possibility
of
a
link
between
the
Legionellosis
outbreaks
and
lack
of
proper
corrosion
control
and
disinfection
in
the
Citys
water
system.
In
Flint,
neither
the
Flint
EM
nor
his
appointed
City
Administrator,
GCHD,
or
MDHHS
fully
disclosed
the
Legionellosis
outbreak
to
local
medical
professionals
or
the
general
public.
Moreover,
this
outbreak,
which
is
always
associated
with
water
supplies,
was
not
communicated
by
MDEQ
with
sufficient
urgency
to
the
Governors
office.
In
contrast,
New
York
City
experienced
an
outbreak
of
Legionellosis
attributed
to
several
hospital
cooling
systems
in
different
parts
of
the
city
in
summer
2015.
Public
health
officials
made
47
announcements
to
City
residents
about
the
cases
and
the
outbreak
was
reported
in
the
media,
along
with
health
advice
for
the
public.
Findings
F-29. Communication,
coordination
and
cooperation
between
GCHD,
the
City
of
Flint
and
MDHHS
were
inadequate
to
protect
Flint
residents
from
public
health
threats
resulting
from
inadequately
treated
Flint
River
water.
F-30. The
rate
of
follow-up
on
children
with
elevated
blood
lead
levels
through
January
2016
was
unacceptable,
illustrating
a
low
level
of
coordination
between
GCHD
and
MDHHS
and
insufficient
resources
devoted
to
this
task.
F-31. Management
of
the
Flint
River-sourced
water
supply
may
have
contributed
to
the
outbreaks
of
Legionellosis
cases
in
2014
and
2015
in
Genesee
County.
Although
the
definitive
cause
of
the
outbreaks
is
uncertain
at
the
time
of
publication,
GCHD
and
MDHHS
did
not
notify
the
public
of
the
outbreaks
in
a
timely
fashion
in
order
to
urge
caution.
Recommendations
R-26. Improve
follow-up
on
public
health
concerns
between
GCHD,
MDHHS
and
the
City
of
Flint
now
and
in
the
future,
to
effect
timely,
comprehensive,
and
coordinated
activity
and
ensure
the
best
health
outcomes
for
children
and
adults
affected.
R-27. Presume
that
the
risk
of
Legionella
may
remain
elevated
in
the
Flint
water
distribution
system
and
must
take
appropriate
steps
with
public
and
private
partners
to
monitor
and
mitigate
that
risk
as
concerns
about
water
quality
continue
in
the
City
of
Flint.
R-28. Coordinate
with
state
officials
(MDHHS)
and
with
local
healthcare
professionals
and
healthcare
institutions
in
Genesee
County
and
the
City
of
Flint
to
mitigate
the
risk
of
Legionellosis
in
2016
and
beyond.
It
is
not
clear
whether
the
switch
back
to
DWSD
in
October
2015
and
subsequent
addition
of
corrosion
control
will
change
the
conditions
for
Legionella
growth
in
the
Flint
water
distribution
system.
In
addition,
the
strong
predominance
of
cases
linked
to
healthcare
exposure
at
one
particular
hospital
in
Flint
underscores
the
critical
importance
of
appropriate
and
timely
antiseptic
use
by
healthcare
facilities
to
reduce
the
risk
of
Legionellosis.
To
facilitate
appropriate
collection
of
Legionella
specimens
that
will
permit
tracing
of
Legionella
species
in
the
setting
of
any
further
outbreaks,
healthcare
professionals
in
Genesee
County
should
be
vigilant
and
err
on
the
side
of
collecting
respiratory
specimens
before
initiating
therapy
in
cases
of
presumed
Legionellosis.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Oversight and the Lead and
Copper Rule
Defined
Role
EPA
has
responsibility
under
the
Safe
Drinking
Water
Act
to
set
and
enforce
health-based
drinking
water
quality
standards.
EPA
establishes
National
Primary
Drinking
Water
Regulations
that
set
enforceable
maximum
contaminant
levels
in
drinking
water
and
prescribe
treatment
48
requirements.
Each
standard
also
includes
requirements
for
water
systems
to
test
for
contaminants
in
the
water
to
make
sure
standards
are
achieved.
EPA
regulates
public
water
systems
through
its
Public
Water
System
Supervision
(PWSS)
program.
From
the
description
of
that
program:
EPAs
and
states
primary
means
of
monitoring
public
water
system
compliance
with
the
SDWA
and
its
implementing
regulations
is
the
review
and
evaluation
of
analytical
results
of
water
samples
collected
by
public
water
systems.
These
reports
provide
the
water
systems
and
regulators
with
the
data
they
need
to
ensure
that
drinking
water
monitoring
is
ongoing
and
that
the
drinking
water
standards
are
being
met.
When
results
indicate
that
a
contaminant
is
present
at
a
level
that
exceeds
standards,
states
and
EPA
work
with
public
water
systems
to
take
steps
to
prevent
or
remove
the
contaminants,
and
notify
consumers
so
that
they
can
make
informed
choices.63
EPA
is
required
to
oversee
the
regulatory
actions
of
state
and
local
agencies
and
ensure
that
local
public
water
suppliers
adhere
to
the
standards
set
under
the
SDWA.64
The
SDWA
authorizes
the
EPA
to
delegate
primary
enforcement
responsibilities
to
the
states.
Forty-nine
states,
including
Michigan,
have
this
delegated
authority.
While
the
states
are
delegated
regulatory
primacy,
there
are
two
sections
of
the
SDWA
that
give
EPA
authorization
to
act:
a. Sec.
1414
of
the
Act
says
that
when
the
agency
finds
a
public
water
system
out
of
compliance,
the
EPA
must
notify
the
state
and
public
water
system
of
the
violation.
If
after
30
days
the
state
has
not
commenced
enforcement
action,
then
the
EPA
must
issue
an
order
to
comply.
In
the
case
of
Flint,
EPA
did
not
use
this
authority
as
required
by
the
SDWA.
b. Sec.
1431
of
the
Act
grants
emergency
powers
to
the
EPA
when
the
Administrator
is
aware
of
a
contaminant
or
threat
which
may
present
an
imminent
and
substantial
endangerment
to
the
health
of
persons,
and
that
appropriate
state
and
local
authorities
have
not
acted
to
protect
the
health
of
such
persons,
the
EPA
Administrator
may
take
such
actions
as
he
or
she
may
deem
necessary
in
order
to
protect
the
health
of
such
persons.
The
EPA
used
this
authority
when
it
issued
its
emergency
order
on
January
21,
2016.
Lead
and
Copper
Rule:
The
Lead
and
Copper
Rule
(LCR)
is
intended
to
protect
public
health
by
reducing
lead
and
copper
in
drinking
water
at
customers
taps.
For
the
rule
to
be
effective,
and
for
lead
and
copper
contamination
to
be
detected,
water
sampling
practices
must
be
rigorous.
Ample
industry
guidance65
emphasizes
the
requirements
for
this
rigor,
which
include
selecting
residences
at
high
63
64
www.epa.gov/compliance/safe-drinking-water-act-sdwa-compliance-monitoring
Before
the
federal
EPA
was
established,
states
regulated
drinking
water.
The
SDWA
kept
that
regulatory
structure
in
place
and
assigned
EPA
oversight
responsibility
for
state
regulatory
activities.
65
See,
for
example,
A
Field
Comparison
of
Sampling
Protocols
for
Measuring
Lead
in
Drinking
Water,
Porter,
A.,
M.
Del
Toral,
and
M.
Schock.
In
Proceedings,
Water
Quality
Technology
Conference,
Long
Beach,
CA,
November
3-7,
2013,
American
Water
Works
Association,
Denver,
CO
(2013).
49
risk
for
lead
exposure,
prohibiting
pre-flushing
and
aerator
removal,
and
observing
minimum
stagnation
times.
More
fundamentally,
public
water
systems
must
identify
the
LSLs
in
their
service
areas,
advise
customers
of
their
presence
and
potential
implications,
and
facilitate
full
service
line
replacements
in
the
event
of
action
level
exceedances.
The
LCR
also
requires
public
water
systems
to
minimize
lead
and
copper
levels
in
drinking
water
by
controlling
corrosion
in
the
distribution
system,
which
is
achieved
by
implementing
corrosion
control
treatment
(CCT).
Unfortunately,
despite
the
clarity
of
its
intent,
the
LCRs
language
has
been
subject
to
various
interpretations
from
one
state,
and
one
water
system,
to
another.
Though
MDEQs
misinterpretations
may
be
among
the
most
egregious
examples
of
lax
and
myopic
compliance
practices,
there
are
pronounced
concerns
that
the
effectiveness
of
the
rule
has
been
compromised.66
EPA
is
in
the
process
of
reviewing
and
revising
the
LCR
through
its
established
rulemaking
procedures.
While
the
states
are
delegated
regulatory
primacy,
40
CFR
141.82(i)
gives
the
EPA
Regional
Administrator
authority
to
review
treatment
decisions
made
by
a
state
and
issue
federal
treatment
determinations
consistent
with
the
LCR.
Discussion
Prior
to
Flints
water
supply
conversion,
EPAs
delegation
of
primacy
for
enforcement
of
the
SDWA
in
Michigan
had
been
challenged
by
a
series
of
disagreements
and
concerns
over
compliance
requirements
and
sampling
practices.67
These
were
heightened
with
the
series
of
events
that
precipitated
the
water
crisis.
EPA
Region
V
was
first
notified
of
a
potential
problem
in
Flint
by
resident
LeeAnne
Walters,
who
called
to
inform
them
of
the
high
lead
level
(104
ppb)
found
in
her
drinking
water.
In
early
2015,
EPAs
Miguel
Del
Toral
worked
with
Walters
to
diagnose
water
quality
problems
at
her
residence.
During
this
time,
EPA
inquired
(repeatedly)
about
CCT
at
the
Flint
WTP,
advised
MDEQ
that
the
LCR
unambiguously
requires
CCT,
and
were
told
incorrectly
that
Flint
had
an
optimized
corrosion
control
program.
In
this
timeframe,
EPA
was
trying
to
determine
whether
the
high
lead
levels
at
LeeAnne
Walterss
house
represented
an
isolated
or
system-wide
problem.
Ultimately,
it
required
LeeAnne
Walterss
inquiry
of
Flint
Utiliites
Department
personnel
for
EPA
to
learn
that
Flint
did
not
have
CCT
in
place.
It
took
2
months
from
EPAs
first
inquiry
for
MDEQ
to
acknowledge
that
Flint
was
not
implementing
CCT.
Given
this
information,
EPA
tried
to
convince
MDEQ
by
persuasion
and
forthright
referencing
to
the
LCR
that
Flint
needed
to
add
CCT
(as
DWSD
had
been
doing
for
decades)
However,
MDEQ
was
entrenched
in
its
(incorrect)
position
that
two
6-month
monitoring
periods
are
allowed
before
a
decision
on
CCT
is
required.
MDEQ
forestalled
imposing
the
requirement
for
CCT
pending
issuance
of
a
legal
opinion.
66
See,
for
example,
Dr.
Yanna
Lambrinidous
dissenting
opinion
on
long-term
revisions
for
the
LCR,
submitted
to
the
EPA
National
Drinking
Water
Advisory
Council
in
October
2015
(EPA
NDWAC
LCR
WG,
Dissenting
Opinion,
Oct.
2015),
www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-11/documents/ndwaclcrstatementofdissent.pdf;
and
the
Northeast-Midwest
Institutes
Elin
Betanzos
article,
Clarifications
Needed
to
Strengthen
the
Lead
and
Copper
Rule
Working
Groups
Recommendations
for
Long
Term
Revisions
to
the
Federal
Lead
and
Copper
Rule,
November
17,
2015,
www.nemw.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/NEMWI-LCR-recommendations.pdf.
67
FWATF
interviews
with
Miguel
Del
Toral.
Also
see
April
27,
2015,
e-mail
exchanges
among
MDEQs
Cook,
Busch
and
Prysby
regarding
Del
Torals
question
on
corrosion
control
treatment.
50
EPA
was
similarly
hampered
by
poor
information
derived
from
Flints
flawed
water
quality
sampling
for
LCR
compliance.
Not
only
did
MDEQ
persist
in
prescribing
sampling
methods
that
limited
opportunities
for
detection
of
lead
contamination,
it
did
not
ensure
that
a
proper
sample
pool
was
obtained
from
the
Flint
system.
The
first
6-month
monitoring
period
results
showed
the
90th
percentile
lead
level
results
to
be
6
ppb,
and
the
second
6-month
monitoring
period
results
showed
the
90th
percentile
to
be
11
ppb.
Both
of
these
outcomes
fell
beneath
the
lead
action
level
of
15
ppb.
Unfortunately,
because
of
the
flawed
sampling
pool
and
sampling
techniques,
the
extent
of
the
lead
problem
was
under-reported.
It
came
to
light
in
September
2015
with
the
results
of
Dr.
Marc
Edwardss
lead
sampling
program.
After
testing
252
water
samples
taken
in
Flint,
the
90th
percentile68
of
Dr.
Edwards
samples
was
found
to
be
25
ppb,
and
more
than
100
samples
had
lead
over
5
ppb.
Even
given
the
Citys
flawed
sampling
program,
EPA
staff
did
become
aware
of
the
potential
risks
in
April
2015
when
MDEQs
failure
to
require
CCT
was
revealed,
and
EPA
leadership
was
advised
of
acute
concerns
in
an
interim
report
by
Miguel
del
Toral
in
June
2015:
In
effect,
the
City
of
Flint
stopped
providing
treatment
used
to
mitigate
lead
and
copper
levels
in
the
water.
In
accordance
with
the
Lead
and
Copper
Rule
(LCR),
all
large
systems
(serving
greater
than
50,000
persons)
are
required
to
install
and
maintain
corrosion
control
treatment
for
lead
and
copper.
In
the
absence
of
any
corrosion
control
treatment,
lead
levels
in
drinking
water
can
be
expected
to
increase.
The
lack
of
mitigating
treatment
is
especially
concerning
as
the
high
lead
levels
will
likely
not
be
reflected
in
the
City
of
Flint's
compliance
samples
due
to
the
sampling
procedures
used
by
the
City
of
Flint
for
collecting
compliance
samples.69
However,
with
the
exception
of
the
strident
e-mails
and
interim
report
by
Del
Toral,70
EPA
refrained
from
elevating
concerns
or
taking
action.
EPA
did
not
insist
on
implementation
of
CCT
between
the
end
of
April
2015,
when
it
learned
CCT
was
not
in
place,
and
July
21,
2015,
when
the
second
round
of
LCR
monitoring
results
ended
MDEQs
misinformed
interpretaton
of
the
LCR.
Only
after
broad
public
revelation
of
the
magnitude
of
the
crisis
and
of
MDEQs
multiple
failuresand,
not
coincidentally,
the
opportunity
to
garner
positive
recognitiondid
EPA
exercise
its
authority
under
the
SDWA
and
issue
its
Emergency
Order
on
January
21,
2016.
EPA
did
not
cause
the
problem
in
Flint,
and
it
was
EPA
employees
(in
particular
Del
Toral)
who
asserted
the
need
for
Flint
to
have
CCT
in
place.
Unfortunately,
EPA
was
not
insistent
or
forceful
enough
to
prompt
MDEQ
to
require
Flint
to
add
CCT
for
almost
3
months
after
EPA
was
aware
of
its
absence.
This
needlessly
extended
the
time
during
which
Flint
residents
were
exposed
to
corrosive
drinking
water
with
potentially
high
levels
of
lead.
Finally,
EPA
entertained
and
acquiesced
to
MDEQs
request
for
a
legal
opinion
regarding
the
long-
standing
and
well-understood
requirement
for
corrosion
control,
ultimately
issuing
a
clarification
memo
on
LCR
compliance
requirements
that
suggested
ambiguities.
68
th
For
a
discussion
of
the
arithmetic
related
to
calculation
of
the
90
percentile,
see
the
YouTube
video:
How
to
calculate
Flint's
90th
percentile
lead
level
with
EMU
math
professor
Chris
Gardiner,
www.youtube.com/watch?v=9pql00zr700&feature=em-share_video_user.
69
Interim
Report:
High
Lead
Levels
in
Flint,
Michigan,
by
Miguel
del
Toral,
transmitted
to
Thomas
Poy,
Chief,
Ground
Water
and
Drinking
Water
Branch,
on
June
24,
2015;
p.
2.
70
See,
for
example,
Miguel
Del
Torals
e-mail
to
Jennifer
Crooks
MDEQ
dated
April
25,
2015.
51
Findings
F-32. EPA
failed
to
properly
exercise
its
authority
prior
to
January
2016.
The
agencys
conduct
casts
doubt
on
its
willingness
to
aggressively
pursue
enforcement
(in
the
absence
of
widespread
public
outrage).
EPA
could
have
exercised
its
powers
under
Section
1414
and
Section
1431
of
the
SDWA
or
under
the
LCR,
40
CFR
141.82(i).
F-33. Despite
the
clear
intent
of
the
LCR,
EPA
has
accepted
differing
compliance
strategies
that
have
served
to
mute
its
effectiveness
in
detection
and
mitigation
of
lead
contamination
risks.
These
strategies
have
been
adopted
at
water
systems
and
primacy
agencies
across
the
country.
Though
there
may
be
some
ambiguity
in
LCR
rule,
none
of
it
relates
to
what
MDEQ
should
have
done
in
Flint.
There
was
and
remains
no
justification
for
MDEQ
not
requiring
corrosion
control
treatment
for
the
switch
of
water
source
to
the
Flint
River.
F-34. EPA
was
hesitant
and
slow
to
insist
on
proper
corrosion
control
measures
in
Flint.
MDEQ
misinformation
notwithstanding,
EPAs
deference
to
MDEQ,
the
state
primacy
agency,
delayed
appropriate
intervention
and
remedial
measures.
F-35. EPA
tolerated
MDEQs
intransigence
and
issued,
on
November
3,
2015,
a
clarification
memo
on
the
LCR
when
no
such
clarification
was
needed.
Recommendations
R-29. Exercise
more
vigor,
and
act
more
promptly,
in
addressing
compliance
violations
that
endanger
public
health.
R-30. In
collaboration
with
the
NDWAC
and
other
interested
partners,
clarify
and
strengthen
the
LCR
through
increased
specificity
and
constraints,
particularly
requirements
related
to
LCR
sampling
pools,
sample
draw
protocols,
and
LSL
replacementsand,
more
generally,
strengthen
enforcement
protocols
with
agencies
delegated
primacy.71
The
LCR
should
be
modified
to
address
a
host
of
issues
that
have
been
the
subject
of
ongoing
debate
and
were
tragically
exemplified
by
the
Flint
water
crisis.
In
particular,
the
LCR
should
be
revised
to:
o Unambiguously
require
optimized
corrosion
control
treatment
as
a
default
practice
for
all
large
public
works
systems,
and
consider
extending
this
requirement
to
small
and
medium-sized
public
water
systems.72
EPA
should
remove
any
loopholes
or
flexible
provisions
that
could
be
misinterpreted
as
allowing
utilities
to
defer
or
avoid
corrosion
control,
as
was
done
in
Flint.
Optimized
corrosion
control
will
continue
to
be
important
in
the
long
term,
even
after
LSLs
are
replaced,
due
to
other
sources
of
lead
in
the
distribution
system
such
as
lead
solder
and
brass
fixtures.
71
For
a
further
discussion
of
opportunities
to
strengthen
the
LCR,
see
Dr.
Yanna
Lambrinidous
dissenting
opinion
on
long-term
revisions
for
the
LCR,
submitted
to
the
EPA
National
Drinking
Water
Advisory
Council
in
October
2015
(EPA
NDWAC
LCR
WG,
Dissenting
Opinion,
Oct.
2015),
www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-
11/documents/ndwaclcrstatementofdissent.pdf.
72
The
current
LCR
language
requires
corrosion
control
for
small
and
medium-sized
systems
only
if
water
testing
indicates
action
level
exceedances,
and
it
allows
cessation
of
treatment
if
subsequent
testing
is
below
action
levels.
EPA
should
define
procedures
for
small
and
medium-sized
systems
to
safeguard
public
health
and
water
quality
through
evaluation
of
corrosion
control
treatment
requirements.
52
o Reiterate
(and
clarify)
lead-in-water
tap
monitoring
and
sampling
protocols
to
ensure
that
lead
sampling
will
capture
the
worst-case
lead
levels
in
the
highest
risk
homes,
as
the
LCR
intends.
o Clarify
requirements
for
full
LSL
replacement,
avoiding
or
eliminating
language
that
allows
utilities
to
count
a
LSL
as
replaced
if
water
from
a
service
line
tests
under
the
lead
action
limit
in
a
one-time
sample.
o Ban
partial
LSL
replacements,
which
have
been
found
by
the
CDC
to
increase
risks
of
elevated
blood
lead
levels.
In
addition,
the
15
ppb
lead
action
level
in
the
LCR
should
be
revisited
given
that
It
is
widely
acknowledged
that
no
lead
is
safe,
and
that
the
CDC
recently
lowered
its
10
micrograms/deciliter
blood
lead
level
of
concern
to
a
5
micrograms/deciliter
reference
level.
Also,
the
LCR
should
call
for
frequent
and
accessible
public
outreach
and
education
on
lead-in-water
risks,
including
instructions
on
steps
consumers
can
take
to
protect
themselves.
The
LCR
should
require
utilities
to
provide
customers
with
explicit
and
urgent
public
notification
of
lead
risks
associated
with
activities
that
may
cause
physical
disturbance
of
LSLs;
inform
customers
when
a
LSL
is
present
at
their
home;
and
provide
customers
clear
information
on
how
to
request
testing
of
lead-in-water
levels
in
their
homes.
Perhaps
most
fundamentally,
the
LCR
should
mandate
proactive,
full
replacement
of
LSLs73
in
a
manner
that
appropriately
balances
risks
and
financial
impacts.
The
LCR
should
require
LSL
replacements
to
be
explicitly
incorporated
into
water
utilities
renewal
and
replacement
programs
with
required
(and
monitored)
timelines
that
preclude
undue
(multi-decade)
delays
in
replacements.
R-31. Engage
Michigan
representatives
in
ongoing
LCR
revisions
and
development
of
enforcement
protocols
at
EPA
and
MDEQ.
EPA
is
conducting
a
process
to
define
revisions
to
the
LCR,
which
provides
an
opportunity
to
clarify
ambiguities
in
requirements
and
to
strengthen
measures
to
protect
public
health
and
safety.
State
and
local
representatives,
chastened
by
Flints
experience,
should
participate
in
this
revision
process
and
ensure
lessons
learned
are
clearly
and
effectively
communicated
to
decision-makers,
including
the
National
Drinking
Water
Advisory
Council
and
EPA.
This
recommendation
is
consistent
with
recommendations
of
the
Lead
and
Copper
Rule
Working
Group:
Report
of
the
Lead
and
Copper
Rule
Working
Group
To
the
National
Drinking
Water
Advisory
Council,
August
24,
2015.
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-01/documents/ndwaclcrwgfinalreportaug2015.pdf
53
the
Flint
water
crisis,
evoke
collective
empathy
for
the
Flint
community,
and
speak
to
the
opportunties
for
the
crisis
to
improve
the
conduct
and
performance
of
government.
From
the
Environmental
Justice
Plan
for
the
State
of
Michigan
and
Department
of
Natural
Resources
and
Environment,
December
17,
2010:
The
term
"environmental
justice"
is
defined
in
Executive
Directive
No.
2007-23
as
follows:
Environmental
justice
means
the
fair,
non-discriminatory
treatment
and
meaningful
involvement
of
Michigan
residents
regarding
the
development,
implementation,
and
enforcement
of
environmental
laws,
regulations,
and
policies
by
this
state.
The
two
"pillars"
of
environmental
justice,
thus,
are
the
fair
treatment
of
all
people
and
providing
for
meaningful
public
involvement
in
government
decision-
making.
From
the
U.S.
EPA
(www3.epa.gov/environmentaljustice):
Environmental
Justice
is
the
fair
treatment
and
meaningful
involvement
of
all
people
regardless
of
race,
color,
national
origin,
or
income
with
respect
to
the
development,
implementation,
and
enforcement
of
environmental
laws,
regulations,
and
policies.
EPA
has
this
goal
for
all
communities
and
persons
across
this
Nation.
It
will
be
achieved
when
everyone
enjoys
the
same
degree
of
protection
from
environmental
and
health
hazards
and
equal
access
to
the
decision-making
process
to
have
a
healthy
environment
in
which
to
live,
learn,
and
work.
75
There
is
ample
evidence
that
the
lead
poisoning
crisis
is
one
in
a
series
environmental
injustices
visited
on
the
citizens
of
Flint.
See,
for
example,
The
Racist
Roots
of
Flints
Water
Crisis,
by
Julia
Craven
and
Tyler
Tynes,
54
Findings
F-36. The
Flint
water
crisis
is
a
clear
case
of
environmental
injustice.
Recommendations
R-32. Issue
an
Executive
Order
mandating
guidance
and
training
on
Environmental
Justice
across
all
state
agencies
in
Michigan,
highlighting
the
Flint
water
crisis
as
an
example
of
environmental
injustice.
The
state
should
reinvigorate
and
update
implementation
of
an
Environmental
Justice
Plan
for
the
State
of
Michigan.
55
For
well-intentioned
parents,
there
is
a
need
for
significant
sensitivity
and
expertise
as
they
struggle
to
address
and
understand
the
guilt
and
depression
that
derive
from
unknowingly
exposing
their
children,
based
on
the
hollow
reassurances
of
those
appointed
and
elected
at
city
and
state
levels
that
the
water
was
safe.
For
non-English-speaking
Flint
residents,
equally
subject
to
the
toxic
effects
of
lead
and
related
psychological
trauma,
communications
and
instructions
regarding
water
use
were
not
available,
especially
for
those
not
literate
in
their
native
language.
The
sight
of
uniformed
state
troopers
and
National
Guardsmen
entering
neighborhoods
in
convoys
with
flashing
lights
frightened
many
who
did
not
open
their
doors
to
accept
filter
or
water
distributions.
Initial
requirements
for
identification
scared
many
families
away
from
distribution
sites.
There
has
been
no
provision
for
necessary
medical
and
behavioral
services
for
undocumented
residents,
regardless
of
age.
There
is
fear
that
those
presenting
for
extensive
medical
services
will
be
deported,
potentially
dividing
families.
While
there
are
several
organizations
that
provide
services
regardless
of
status,
it
is
essential
that
trusted
members
of
the
community
can
vouch
for
those
organizations
and
help
with
appropriate
documents
which
are
unfamiliar
to
local
service
providers.
Among
African
American
seniors,
the
protracted
Flint
water
crisis
echoes
the
tragic
Tuskegee
syphilis
study
and
the
decision
not
to
treat
smallpox
among
freedmen
in
the
aftermath
of
the
American
Civil
War.
From
this
perspective,
it
is
noted
that
measuring
blood
lead
levels
without
removing
the
sources
of
lead
from
the
environmentin
this
case,
lead-tainted
waterappears
the
equivalent
of
using
Flints
children
(and
adults)
as
human
bioassays.
From
the
perspective
of
Flint
community
leaders,
these
consequences
are
traumatic
and
contribute
to
a
dynamic
that
requires
care
and
interventions
as
for
any
survivors
of
a
traumatic
event.
These
interventions
must
occur
for
individuals,
neighborhoods
and
the
community.
Leaders
must
work
to
counter
the
doubtful
views
of
many
residents
that
public
health
and
political
systems
do
not
have
the
will
to
sustain
primary
prevention
but,
rather,
are
willing
to
consign
some
people
by
virtue
of
their
home
address
to
the
long-lasting
neurodevelopmental
and
health
impacts
of
lead
exposure.
Flint
will
have
to
engage
in
self-care
and
healing
as
it
dissects
the
implications
of
what
has
occurred
and
is
reminded
of
how
much
further
we
must
go
to
become
a
just
society.
56
Recommendations
Our
final
recommendations
look
beyond
the
most
immediate
challenges
of
the
unsustainable
and
expensive
bottled
water
and
filter
distribution
program
that
was
needed,
but
clearly
must
serve
as
an
interim
emergency
response.
We
offer
the
following
mid-term
and
long-term
Flint-specific
recommendations:
R-33. Sustainably
fund
the
Flint
Water
Inter-Agency
Coordinating
Committee
(FWICC)
to
provide
adequate
resources
to
engage
supporting
sub-committees
for
delivery
of
public
health
and
water
system
services.
The
FWICC
has
been
charged
with
developing
an
incident
action
plan;
reviewing
our
recommendations;
establishing
routine
protocols
for
communications
at
the
local,
executive
and
legislative
levels;
making
recommendations
regarding
the
health
impacts
of
the
affected
population;
and
assessing
the
status
of
infrastructure
and
determining
feasible
actions
for
upgrading
Flints
water
system.76
The
FWICC
also
should
ensure
transparent,
public
reporting
of
the
status
of
various
Flint-related
measures,
including
the
sources
and
uses
of
local,
state
and
federal
funds.
Charitable
organizations
should
be
asked
to
provide
accounting
of
their
Flint-related
activities
to
facilitate
comprehensive
reporting
and
information
dissemination
on
available
services.
R-34. Clarify
and
effectively
communicate
the
roles
and
work
of
the
City
of
Flint,
Flint
Water
Inter-Agency
Coordinating
Council
and
Mission
Flint.
While
many
of
the
current
efforts
and
investigations
are
critically
important
to
safeguard
Flint
residents,
address
immediate
challenges,
and
further
establish
accountability,
the
FWICC
and
Mission
Flint
are
now
in
place
to
work
with
the
City
of
Flint
in
coordinating
sustained
service
delivery
and
remediation
measures.
These
entities,
and
accompanying
committees
and
work
teams,
have
complementary
roles
and
responsibilities
that
should
be
clearly
delineated
and
communicated
to
all
Flint
residents.
Communication
must
include
efforts
to
reach
Flint
residents
for
whom
English
is
not
the
primary
language,
and
residents
whose
literacy
in
any
language
is
limited.
The
status
of
the
projects
and
programs
that
these
entities
are
shepherding
should
be
clearly
communicated
and
measured
against
aspirational
goals
and
objectives.
R-35. Through
collaboration
among
MDHHS,
GCHD,
local
healthcare
professionals,
and
health
insurance
plans,
ensure
100
percent
clinical
and
environmental
follow-up
with
Flint
families
whose
children
have
been
found
to
have
elevated
blood
lead
levels
since
April
2014,
and
work
together
to
ensure
that
such
follow-up
occurs
in
childrens
medical
homes.
For
the
majority
of
>200
children
residing
in
Flint
and
known
to
have
elevated
blood
lead
levels
(5
micrograms
per
deciliter)
from
April
2014
to
present,
appropriate
clinical
and
public
health
follow-up
has
not
been
timely.
Such
limitations
in
follow-up
reflect
a
lack
of
coordination
among
state
and
county
public
health
authorities,
health
insurance
plans,
local
healthcare
professionals,
and
parents.
These
children,
and
others
who
have
elevated
76
Drawn
from
January
11,
2016
Press
Release:
Gov.
Rick
Snyder:
Flint
Water
Interagency
Coordinating
Committee
will
support
long-term
needs
in
Flint.
57
blood
levels
on
testing
after
this
report
is
issued,
will
need
long-term
monitoring
and
access
to
a
support
services
that
include
focused
public
health,
nutrition
and
educational
services.
R-36. Offer
all
children
listed
in
the
recommended
Flint
Toxic
Exposure
Registry
timely
access
to
age-appropriate
screening
and
clinically
indicated
follow-up
for
developmental
and
behavioral
concerns
by
licensed
healthcare
professionals,
as
well
as
access
to
early
childhood
education
and
nutrition
services.
Importantly,
all
children
in
the
recommended
Flint
Toxic
Exposure
Registry
are
at
risk
for
toxic
lead
exposure,
even
if
they
were
not
screened
for
blood
lead
levels
during
the
time
period
of
April
2014
to
present.
Therefore,
all
children
listed
should
have
access
to
the
same
screening
and
appropriate
follow-up
services
as
children
who
were
found
to
have
elevated
blood
lead
levels.
R-37. Consider
establishing
a
dedicated
subsidiary
fund
in
the
Michigan
Health
Endowment
Fund
to
facilitate
funding
of
health-related
services
for
Flint.
The
Michigan
Health
Endowment
Fund
(MHEF)
statute
created
eight
areas
of
focus
for
the
fund,
including
several
that
are
pertinent
to
the
Flint
water
crisis.
The
MHEF
focuses
on
access
to
healthy
food
(known
to
offset
childrens
absorption
of
environmental
lead),
wellness
programs
(such
as
those
known
to
encourage
primary
and
secondary
prevention),
access
to
mental
health
services
(such
as
behavioral
therapy
for
children
adversely
affected
by
lead
exposure),
and
foodborne
illness
prevention
(such
as
averting
exposure
to
lead
in
food
prepared
with
lead-contaminated
drinking
water).
Given
the
substantial
overlap
between
the
focus
areas
of
the
fund
and
the
areas
of
short-
and
long-
term
activity
for
the
people
of
Flint,
it
is
appropriate
to
establish
a
subsidiary
fund
that
would
be
administered
to
facilitate
funding
of
health-related
services
for
children
and
adults
in
the
Flint
Toxic
Exposure
Registry.
Because
Michigan
has
been
successful
in
securing
federal
funds
to
expand
Medicaid
coverage
for
persons
under
age
21
years
in
Flint,
the
subsidiary
MHEF
Fund
would
be
designed
to
focus
on
facilitating
and
supporting
services
not
explicitly
covered
by
Medicaid.
The
Fund
should
also
provide
funding
to
support
timely
and
transparent
evaluation
of
the
health
impact
of
these
supplementary
services
for
the
people
of
Flint.
R-38. Establish
a
comprehensive
Flint
public
health
program,
coordinated
with
county
and
state-level
public
health
initiatives,
that
can
serve
as
a
model
for
population
health
across
the
state.
This
program
should
provide
assessment,
interventions,
and
support
not
only
regarding
the
health
effects
of
water
contamination
but
also
more
broadly
regarding
the
health
effects
of
chronic
economic
hardship
and
other
social
determinants
of
poor
health.
State-Wide Initiatives
Beyond
remediation
of
the
impacts
inflicted
upon
Flint,
outstanding
issues
and
lessons
learned
from
the
Flint
water
crisis
provide
an
opportunity
to
improve
public
water
supplies
and
coordination
of
institutions
charged
with
safeguarding
public
health.
Recommendations
Our
recommendations
include:
58
R-39. Conduct
an
investigative
review
of
the
development
and
approval
of
the
Karegnondi
Water
Authority
and
of
the
City
of
Flints
commitments
to
KWA
water
purchases.
The
development
of
the
KWA
and
the
decision
by
the
City
of
Flint
to
join
it
is
complicated
by
an
array
of
factors
related
to
regional
water
system
capacities,
utility
capital
project
contracting
and
financing,
and
local
control
over
the
implementation
of
facilities
to
promote
economic
development.
As
noted,
issues
related
to
state
approval
and
permitting
of
the
KWA
are
beyond
the
scope
of
our
review.77
However,
the
specific
attributes
of
the
decisions
related
to
KWA
warrant
investigative
review.
We
note:
o State
and
local
officials
repeatedly
characterized
Genesee
County
and
Flint
leadership,
including
Flints
emergency
managers,
as
adamant
in
their
promotion
of
KWA
and
desire
for
independence
from
DWSD.
o Several
firms,
each
with
ties
to
the
respective
and
effectively
competing
parties,
issued
conflicting
studies
as
to
the
merit
of
KWA.
Independent
review
was
requested
of
MDEQ,
an
agency
ill-equipped
to
render
judgments
regarding
economic
feasibility.
o Contracting
related
to
Flints
water
purchase
commitments
and
to
use
of
the
Flint
WTP
on
an
interim
basis
were
effected
through
action
of
Flints
emergency
managers.
An
entity
with
proper
tools
and
resources,
such
as
the
Michigan
Attorney
General
or
the
U.S.
Attorneys
office,
should
do
a
complete
and
thorough
review
of
the
development
and
approval
of
KWA
and
of
the
City
of
Flints
commitments
to
KWA
water
purchases.
R-40. Institute
a
school
and
daycare
water
quality
testing
program
(which
could
serve
as
a
model
for
the
U.S.),
administered
collaboratively
by
MDEQ
and
MDHHS,
that
includes
appropriate
sampling
and
testing
for
lead
contamination
for
all
schools
and
childcare
centers
in
the
state
and
effective
reporting
of
test
results.
Drinking
water
and
water
available
for
food
preparation
in
schools
and
may
be
sources
of
lead
and
other
hazards
for
school
children.
Currently,
federal
and
state
regulations
do
not
require
city,
county
or
state
authorities
to
routinely
test
water
in
school
buildings.
Furthermore,
there
is
no
state
law,
guidance
or
regulation
regarding
testing
of
drinking
water
in
various
childcare
and
pre-school
settings
(children
below
kindergarten-age).
Michigan
should
institute
a
school
and
day
care
water
quality
testing
program,
administered
collaboratively
by
MDEQ
and
MDHHS,
that
includes
appropriate
sampling
and
testing
for
lead
contamination
in
all
schools
and
childcare
centers
in
the
state.
Findings
from
such
testing
should
be
made
available
to
all
parents
of
children
enrolled
in
the
facilities
where
testing
is
performed.
If
lead
is
discovered
through
this
testing,
immediate
remediation
of
the
situation
(for
example,
replacement
of
LSLs
and
lead-
containing
fixtures)
must
be
required.
School
testing
requirements
also
should
be
applied
to
licensed
day
care
settings
across
the
state,
given
that
young
children
are
at
the
highest
risk
of
profound
health
effects
from
lead
exposure.
77
These
issues
may
(and
perhaps
should)
prompt
general
inquiry
into
how
utility
regulation
may
better
promote
regional
optimization
of
infrastructure
investments.
59
A
Safe
Water
in
Schools
for
Health
(SWISH)
program78
would
include
regular
testing
(and
re-testing)
of
tap
water
at
school
and
licensed
day-care
facility
faucets
and
water
fountains
for
regulated
contaminants
and
for
bacteria
growth
(like
Legionella)
known
to
be
contained
in
plumbing
systems.
For
schools
found
to
have
unsafe
water,
the
program
would
provide
funding
and
implementation
support
for
either
lead
pipe
replacements
or
installation
of
filters
capable
of
treating
the
water
to
federal
standards.
The
program
could
establish
goals
to
install
high-quality
water
fountains
that
facilitate
effective
water
quality
monitoring
(as
well
as
student
use
with
refillable
bottles).
For
some
schools,
this
program
could
include
the
participation
of
science
programs
and
students,
working
with
independent
testing
laboratories.
In
any
event,
all
water
quality
testing
results
should
be
posted
both
at
the
facilities
and
online,
and
communicated
to
parents.
R-41. Develop
a
model
LSL
replacement
program
and
funding
mechanisms
for
financing
work
on
private
property.
Notwithstanding
the
water
industrys
historical
reluctance
to
advocate
for
full
LSL
replacements,
the
state
should
develop
a
funding
mechanism
and
program
to
evaluate
and
replace
LSLs
statewide,
recognizing
that
some
communities
already
have
replaced
their
LSLs.79
The
state
should
develop
a
model
statewide
LSL
replacement
program
that
could
serve
as
a
national
model,
in
collaboration
with
EPA,
with
the
following
attributes:
Requirement
for
developing
censuses
of
LSLs
in
utility
service
areas
that
are
accessible
on
utility
systems
computerized
Geographical
Information
Systems
(GIS)
and
asset
management
systems.
Censuses
should
be
comprehensive,
covering
full
lengths
of
service
lines
and
ownership
status,
and
be
made
publicly
available
to
facilitate
satisfaction
of
customer
queries.
Evaluation
of
lead
line
conditions
and
associated
risks
(placing
high
priority
on
replacements
of
lines
to
high-risk
properties
(for
example,
schools,
childcare
centers,
hospitals,
older
neighborhoods
and
residences
of
vulnerable
populations).
Programming
of
full
LSL
replacements
in
federal-
and
state-sponsored
public
housing.
Provision
of
health
risk
information
to
customers
with
LSLs
when
homeowners
are
presented
with
the
option
to
pay
for
the
private
part
of
their
LSL
replacement.
Explicit
incorporation
of
LSL
risk
considerations
in
utility
renewal
and
replacement
programs
to
enable
orderly,
yet
expeditious,
full
LSL
replacement
(including
replacement
of
LSLs
on
private
property).
Establishment
or
enhancement
of
funding
mechanisms
to
facilitate
full
LSL
replacements
by:
o Reviewing
strategies
used
by
other
communities
and
approaches
to
addressing
funding
of
improvements
on
private
property;
78
These
recommendations
are
drawn
from
(and
reflect
our
substantive
concurrence
with)
recommendations
offered
by
Peter
Gleick,
president
of
the
Pacific
Institute,
and
Professor
Marc
Edwards,
Virginia
Tech.
See
One
step
to
help
restore
trust
in
Flint,
Detroit
Free
Press,
March
6,
2016.
79
Information
on
industry
experience
and
perspectives
is
provided
in
Strategies
to
Obtain
Customer
Acceptance
of
Complete
Lead
Service
Line
Replacement,
American
Water
Works
Association,
2005.
60
Refer
to
Water
production
and
distribution
in
the
Netherlands,
Andr.
Struker,
Waternet,
Jan
Vreeburg,
KWR,
Jan
Peter
van
der
Hoek,
Delft
University,
Waternet,
February
2016
presentation
to
Flint
Water
Inter-Agency
Coordinating
Committee.
81
61
Conclusions
The
conclusion
we
made
in
December
2015
that
primary
responsibility
for
causing
the
Flint
water
crisis
rests
with
the
MDEQ
has
only
been
substantiated
by
our
subsequent
interviews
and
research.
This
final
report,
however,
documents
the
failings,
shortcomings
and
problems
in
other
agencies
and
entities
as
well,
such
as
MDHHS,
GCHD,
the
local
water
treatment
plant,
the
EM
structure,
the
Governors
office,
and
the
U.S.
EPA.
These
failures
reflect
the
discounting
of
profound
public
health
concerns
and
indifference
to
Flint
residents
plight.
The
value
in
documenting
what
went
wrong
is
not
to
ascribe
blame
for
blames
sake,
but
to
establish
the
foundation
for
moving
forward,
both
in
Flint
and
throughout
the
state.
The
state
clearly
must
respond
with
dedicated
and
systematic
attention
to
health
concerns
for
people
of
Flint.
But
it
also
has
the
opportunity
to
demonstrate
that
lessons
have
been
learned
from
the
Flint
experienceas
traumatic
as
it
has
been
and
will
continue
to
beand
develop
model
infrastructure
renewal
and
public
health
programs
that
will
serve
all
Michigan
residents
for
generations
to
come.
Flint
residents
and
their
fellow
Michigan
citizens
deserve
no
less.
82
See,
for
example,
Blue
Ribbon
Panel
on
Affordability
Final
Report,
City
of
Detroit,
2016,
www.detroitmi.gov/brpa.
62
December 7, 2015
On Wednesday, November 18, 2015, the Flint Water Advisory Task Force met with representatives of
the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) and the Michigan Department of Health
and Human Services (MDHHS) to discuss elements of the 10-point Action Plan designed to address
various issues related to the ongoing public health protection challenges precipitated by lead in the Flint
water supply. These discussions were held at our request as part of our task to make recommendations
to prevent a similar occurrence in Flint or elsewhere, and also to monitor ongoing mitigation efforts.
Subsequent to those meetings, on Tuesday, November 24, 2015, members of the Task Force
participated in a conference call with yourself, members of the Administration, and representatives of
these agencies to discuss the progress to date on the 10-point Action Plan, as well as several other
related issues.
We want to acknowledge the steps that have already been taken to implement the action plan,
specifically in the areas of outreach efforts to facilitate blood lead testing for children, communication
with health care providers in the Flint community about the importance of testing children for lead, and
the training of additional public health nurses in the Genesee County Health Department. We do
believe, however, that additional steps need to be taken to reach additional children for blood lead
testing, assure proper follow-up with children found to have elevated blood lead levels, and to continue
water testing. We will continue to assess state and local efforts and make recommendations regarding
specific steps that we believe are warranted.
One primary concern we have at this point is that the current efforts appear to be taking place in the
absence of a larger project coordination framework that measures results and clearly delineates
responsibilities for continuing actions to protect public health. We believe the state is best positioned to
facilitate this larger framework, which should address the following:
1. The need for MDHHS and MDEQand, possibly, other state agencies--to set goals for actions in
collaboration with local and federal agencies and organizations.
2. The need for a set of corresponding timelines for the goals.
3. The need to establish responsibility for meeting the goals in a timely fashion and for
contingency plans for the state if the goals are not being met.
4. The need for clear, regular communication with the Flint community and stakeholder groups
regarding action steps and updates.
We also believe it important that a single person or entitypotentially independent of any one
particular state agency and mutually agreeable to this Task Force and you, Governorbe established to
provide effective coordination of ongoing activities and reporting on the status of mitigation measures.
For this, we also believe a readily understood dashboard should be developed that reports on the
goals, timelines and assignments. This will enable members of the Flint community, public health
providers, and state agencies to know about the status of the Flint water crisis mitigation program, as
well as promote coordination and accountability. The Task Force is prepared to assist in the
development of that dashboard.
We believe it is vitally important that trusted members of the Flint community be engaged in
communication on this issue, as well as the distribution of information conveyed by our suggested
dashboard reporting. Accordingly, in advance of our final report, we would like to ensure the
independent coordinator suggested above engage trusted community groups to begin rebuilding
community trust in state actions.
We appreciate your personal interest in this issue, commitment to assisting the Task Force in our
review, andmost importantlycommitment to ensuring that the full measure of state resources are
brought forward to protect the public health in Flint and throughout the state.
Respectfully yours,
This
minimalist
approach
to
regulatory
and
oversight
responsibility
is
unacceptable
and
simply
insufficient
to
the
task
of
public
protection.
It
led
to
MDEQs
failure
to
recognize
a
number
of
indications
that
switching
the
water
source
in
Flint
wouldand
didcompromise
both
water
safety
and
water
quality.
The
MDEQ
made
a
number
of
decisions
that
were,
and
continue
to
be,
justified
on
the
basis
that
federal
rules
allowed
those
decisions
to
be
made.
ODWMA
must
adopt
a
posture
that
is
driven
not
by
this
minimalist
technical
compliance
approach,
but
rather
by
one
that
is
founded
on
what
needs
to
be
done
to
assure
drinking
water
safety.
A
culture
change
must
occur
within
ODWMA.
It
must
be
driven
by
a
mission
that
is
aspirational
regarding
the
role
of
the
MDEQ
in
ensuring
the
safety
and
the
quality
of
Michigans
drinking
water.
We
believe,
and
have
expressed
to
MDEQ
Director
Dan
Wyant,
that
as
a
Great
Lakes
State,
Michigan
should
aspire
to
have
the
safest
drinking
water
in
the
nation,
rather
than
merely
aiming
for
technical
compliance
with
regulatory
requirements.
Failure
in
Substance
and
Tone
of
MDEQ
Response
to
the
Public
Throughout
2015,
as
the
public
raised
concerns
and
as
independent
studies
and
testing
were
conducted
and
brought
to
the
attention
of
MDEQ,
the
agencys
response
was
often
one
of
aggressive
dismissal,
belittlement,
and
attempts
to
discredit
these
efforts
and
the
individuals
involved.
We
find
both
the
tone
and
substance
of
many
MDEQ
public
statements
to
be
completely
unacceptable.
In
a
real
way,
the
MDEQ
represents
the
public,
including
the
very
individuals
it
treated
dismissively
and
disrespectfully
in
public
statements.
We
recognize
that
the
agency
might
disagree
with
the
opinions
of
others
on
a
variety
of
issues,
including
testing
protocol,
interpretation
of
testing
results,
the
requirements
of
federal
law
and
rules,
and
other
matters.
What
is
disturbing
about
MDEQs
responses,
however,
is
their
persistent
tone
of
scorn
and
derision.
In
fact,
the
MDEQ
seems
to
have
been
more
determined
to
discredit
the
work
of
otherswho
ultimately
proved
to
be
rightthan
to
pursue
its
own
oversight
responsibility.
Failure
in
MDEQ
Interpretation
of
the
Lead
and
Copper
Rule
The
federal
Lead
and
Copper
Rule
(LCR)
is
central
to
what
happened
in
Flint,
because
that
rule,
at
least
theoretically,
is
designed
to
prevent
lead
and
copper
contamination
of
drinking
water.
The
federal
LCR
calls
for
optimized
corrosion
control
treatment,
which
the
MDEQ
did
not
require
in
the
switch
to
the
Flint
River.
Prior
to
the
switch,
MDEQ
staff
instructed
City
of
Flint
water
treatment
staff
that
corrosion
control
treatment
(CCT)
was
not
necessary
until
two
six-month
monitoring
periods
had
been
conducted.
The
need
for
CCT
would
be
evaluated
after
the
results
from
those
two
monitoring
periods
were
reviewed.
The
decision
not
to
require
CCT,
made
at
the
direction
of
the
MDEQ,
led
directly
to
the
contamination
of
the
Flint
water
system.
The
MDEQ
seems
to
have
taken
different
positions
on
whether
it
faithfully
followed
the
LCR
in
the
Flint
situation.
It
first
maintained
that
it
followed
the
LCR,
then
stated
that
it
did
not
follow
the
rule
properly,
and
most
recently
claimed
that
a
federal
memorandum
issued
by
the
US
EPA
in
early
November
2015
suggests
that
the
original
MDEQ
interpretation
was
possibly
correct.
We
are
not
convinced.
Even
the
MDEQs
latest
interpretation
of
the
US
EPAs
November
memorandum
is
overly
legalistic
and
misunderstands
the
intent
of
the
LCR,
which
is
to
minimize
risks
of
lead
and
copper
exposure
for
human
health.
We
believe
ODWMAs
single-minded
legalistic
focus
is
the
heart
of
the
problem,
and
it
is
part
of
the
technical
compliance
culture
described
above.
ODWMA
should
not
be
basing
its
actions
solely
on
a
legally
possible
interpretation
of
the
LCR.
It
should
be
focusing
on
how
to
protect
Michigans
citizens
from
lead
in
drinking
water.
We
met
with
MDEQ
Director
Wyant
on
December
16,
2015,
to
discuss
these
issues,
as
well
as
many
others.
We
note
his
substantial
agreement
with
many
of
our
conclusions,
particularly
as
it
relates
to
the
regulatory
failure
and
the
abysmal
public
response
of
his
agency.
It
is
our
understanding
that
he
has
drawn
similar
conclusions
in
his
own
evaluation
of
the
MDEQs
role
in
the
Flint
water
crisis.
At
the
same
time,
it
was
disappointing
to
hear
his
weak
defense
of
the
CCT
decision
based
on
the
EPAs
November
2015
memorandum.
We
are
not
finished
with
our
work.
Other
individuals
and
entities
made
poor
decisions,
contributing
to
and
prolonging
the
contamination
of
the
drinking
water
supply
in
Flint.
As
an
example,
we
are
particularly
concerned
by
recent
revelations
of
MDHHSs
apparent
early
knowledge
of,
yet
silence
about,
elevated
blood
lead
levels
detected
among
Flints
children.
We
also
feel
it
important
to
further
review
local
government
decision
processes
under
emergency
management.
Our
final
report
will
highlight
and
discuss
those
concerns,
among
many
others,
to
provide
some
context
to
a
comprehensive
series
of
recommendations.
As
stated
earlier
in
this
letter,
however,
we
believe
that
establishing
responsibility
is
a
critical
and
urgent
need,
and
one
that
should
not
wait
for
our
final
report
in
2016.
Individuals
and
agencies
responsible
must
be
held
accountable
in
a
timely
fashion.
It
is
our
hope
that
the
heightened
awareness
of
the
dangers
of
lead
poisoning
can
be
an
opportunity
to
make
Michigan
safer,
particularly
for
its
children.
Drinking
water
must
be
recognized
as
a
potential
source
of
health
risk
exposure
when
water
lines
and
fixtures
containing
lead
are
disturbed
or
compromised.
Proper
testing,
not
only
in
high-risk
areas
but
also
in
facilities
serving
children
(e.g.,
schools),
must
be
considered.
Facilitating
long-term
financing
of
a
model
public
health
program,
and
also
replacement
of
lead-containing
water
service
lines
and
fixtures,
would
enable
Michigan
to
realize
a
positive
lasting
legacy
from
the
tragedy
of
the
Flint
water
crisis.
Our
final
report
will
address
some
of
these
issues.
The
City
of
Flints
water
customersfellow
Michigan
citizenswere
needlessly
and
tragically
exposed
to
toxic
levels
of
lead
through
their
drinking
water
supply.
They
deserve
a
commitment
to
properly
assess
responsibility
and
ensure
accountability.
They
also
deserve
a
commitment
to
needed
mitigation
in
both
the
short
and
long
term.
The
Flint
water
crisis
never
should
have
happened.
Having
failed
to
prevent
it,
state
government
should
coordinate
a
sustained,
public-health-focused
response
to
remedy,
to
the
fullest
extent
possible,
the
impacts
on
the
Flint
community.
Respectfully
yours,
Flint
Water
Advisory
Task
Force:
Matt
Davis
Chris
Kolb
Larry
Reynolds
Eric
Rothstein
Ken
Sikkema
Establish an inter-disciplinary work group comprising subject matter experts drawn from
respected public utility associations and institutions of higher learning in Michigan and
elsewhere (including Marc Edwards of Virginia Tech), to oversee the conversion to KWAsupplied raw water.
Flint water system. The explicit focus of FWSSAT activities will be lead and Legionella;
however, the FWSSAT may include other considerations in its work.
The FWSSAT will be invested with the responsibility of declaring when the public water
supply in Flint is safe for routine consumption. The FWSSAT will employ the most
rigorous scientific standards, using a sampling strategy that is designed to optimize
detection of water contamination in home, school, and child-care settings, and
healthcare environments. All schools and healthcare facilities must be included in the
sampling approach. Rigorous sampling of residences and child-care settings (whether
centers or in-home) will also be implemented, using any and all available information
about lead water service lines. In addition, if a homeowner or renter whose dwelling
has not been included in sampling wishes to have the dwelling included, they will also
be sampled. The sampling efforts and reporting process of the FWSSAT will be fully
transparent to the public; results of testing should be published on local, state, and
federal (EPA) websites.
To assure the re-building of community trust and assure sufficient expertise for future
water quality and safety, the FWSSAT should partner with local (Flint Water Treatment)
and state (MDEQ) personnel in its activities. The FWSSAT should have an interdisciplinary advisory committee that includes local community leaders, local and state
officials, national scientific authorities regarding water quality and safety and public
health, and the leader of the interagency state effort regarding the Flint water crisis.
When the FWSSAT advisory committee is satisfied that the FWSSAT scientific
procedures have thoroughly assessed water quality and safety in Flint residences,
schools and child care settings, and healthcare facilities and found the water to be
sufficiently free of contamination, then the committee will advise the public of the
findings. The FWSSAT will then organize the transfer of responsibility to local and state
authorities to sustain the sampling and reporting methods thereafter, including the
conversion to KWA raw water in the future.
We also believe that a forthright response to the Legionella outbreak must similarly engage
trusted, scientific experts drawn from independent institutions. Accordingly, we recommend:
The Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (MHHS) should make a formal
request to the federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) for assistance in
assessing the outbreak of Legionnaires disease in Flint, if they have not already done so.
MHHS, working with CDC, should develop a strategy for improving prevention, rapid
detection, and timely treatment of cases of Legionellosis in Michigan in 2016 and
beyond. While the MDHHS evaluation of the dozens of cases of Legionellosis in 2014
and 2015 has strongly suggested a link to the shift to drinking water from the Flint River
in 2014, further and more intensive evaluation of clinical isolates (i.e., samples from
infected patients) is necessary to understand the route(s) of transmission from
contaminated water to humans. The unique set of outbreak circumstances in the
setting of a change in water source strongly indicates that support from federal public
The state should specifically request federal support from the CDC and, as
appropriate, additional federal experts and agencies to advise and assess Flint
healthcare facilities and Flint-based healthcare providers regarding: (a) appropriate
application and timely re-application of biocides to air treatment systems and cooling
towers in all healthcare facilities in Flint, in order to prevent colonization with
Legionella; and (b) proper assessment and timely diagnosis of Legionella among patients
in Flint who present with characteristic signs and symptoms and have a history of
potential exposure to contaminated water. Of note, the risk of resurgent Legionellosis
in Spring 2016 is on the horizon; the first cases of Legionellosis in the 2014 and 2015
outbreaks were diagnosed in June and May, respectively, and Legionella is known to be
much more common in the spring, summer, and fall than in the winter months. Time is
of the essence.
MDHHS should work with its federal partners to assure that investigative efforts related
to Legionella regarding quality and safety of water are conducted in coordination with
the FWSSAT described above. Furthermore, MDHHS should regularly communicate its
findings to the Flint community regarding its efforts to prevent, detect, and treat cases
of Legionella until case levels return to pre-2014 levels.
We expect that these measures will provide members of the Flint community with assurance
that the quality of their tap water is being appropriately monitored and that forthcoming
announcements that Flints tap water is safe to drink are well-founded. Notwithstanding
earnest state agency actions, we believe that the engagement of independent subject matter
experts, whether to assess drinking water quality or public health concerns, is critical to
overcome, over time, the understandable skepticisms that prevail in the Flint community.
We hope that you will receive these recommendations in the same spirit with which they are
offered to advance the recovery and reinvigoration of the Flint community.
Respectfully,
Last Name
1
2
Kildee
Ananich
3
4
5
6
Snyder
Muchmore
Baird
Hollins
7
8
9
10
11
Dillon
Workman
Saxton
Byrne
Sampson
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
Ambrose
Earley
Kurtz
Brown
Weaver
Walling
Henderson
Freeman
20
21
22
23
24
25
Lundquist
Brown
Croft
Johnson
Wright
Glasgow
26
27
28
Mays
Overton
Shariff
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
Wyant
Sygo
Creagh
Krisztian
Anderson
Shekter
Smith
Rosenthal
First
Name
Organization
Federal
and
State
Office
Holders
/
Key
Officials
Daniel
T.
U.S.
House
of
Representatives
James
Michigan
State
Senate
Michigan
Governor's
Office
Rick
Michigan
Governor's
Office
Dennis
Michigan
Governor's
Office
Rich
Michigan
Governor's
Office
Harvey
Michigan
Governor's
Office
Michigan
Department
of
Treasury
Andy
Treasury
Department
Wayne
Treasury
Department
Thomas
Treasury
Department
Randall
Treasury
Department
Jeremy
Treasury
Department
Flint
Emergency
Managers
-
Office
Holders
Jerry
City
of
Flint
Darnell
City
of
Flint
Ed
City
of
Flint
Michael
City
of
Flint
Karen
City
of
Flint
Dayne
City
of
Flint
Natasha
City
of
Flint
Josh
City
of
Flint
City
of
Flint
Staff
and
Consultants
Jody
City
of
Flint
Inez
City
of
Flint
Howard
City
of
Flint
Daugherty
City
of
Flint
Brent
City
of
Flint
Mike
City
of
Flint
Flint
Community
Melissa
Flint
Citizen
Allan
Flint
Citizen
Nayyirah
Flint
Citizen
Michigan
Department
of
Environmental
Quality
Dan
MDEQ
Jim
MDEQ
Keith
MDEQ
George
MDEQ
Madhu
MDEQ
Liane
MDEQ
Adam
MDEQ
Last
Name
Busch
Prysby
38
39
40
41
42
43
Lyon
Becker
Wells
Larder
Lasher
Moran
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
Hyde
Crooks
Hedman
Kaplan
Del
Toral
Porter
Blair
Poy
51
52
53
54
Betanzo
Edwards
Sullivan
McElmurry
54
55
56
57
Hanna-Attisha
Valacak
Doerr
Henry
58
59
Guyette
Fonger
59
60
61
62
63
Wright
O'Brien
Jansen
Wolfson
Koesters
First
Name
Organization
Stephen
MDEQ
Mike
MDEQ
Michigan
Department
of
Health
and
Human
Services
Nick
MDHHS
Tim
MDHHS
Eden
MDHHS
Cristin
MDHHS
Geralyn
MDHHS
Susan
MDHHS
US
EPA
Tinka
EPA
Jennifer
EPA
Susan
EPA
Bob
EPA
Miguel
EPA
Andrea
EPA
Rita
EPA
Tom
EPA
Technical
Experts
-
WQ
and
Lead
Elin
Northeast-Midwest
Institute
Marc
Virginia
Tech
Laura
Kettering
University
Shawn
Wayne
State
University
Public
Health
Community
Mona
Hurley
Medical
Center
Mark
Genesee
County
Health
Dept.
Kay
Genesee
County
Health
Dept.
-
Board
of
Health
James
Genesee
County
Health
Dept.
Media
Curt
ACLU
Ron
MLive
KWA
-
DWSD
Jeff
GCDC
John
GCDC
Dave
GCDC
William
GLWA
/
DWSD
Laurie
GLWA
/
DWSD
Lockwood,
Andrews
and
Newnam
Flint
Water
Advisory
Task
Force
Questions
February
22,
2016
1. Please
describe
your
firms
experience
with
drinking
water
treatment
facilities,
specifically
related
to
drinking
water
quality,
treatment
of
river
water
supply,
disinfection
and
disinfection
byproduct
management,
corrosion
control,
and
startup
for
full-time
operation.
2. Please
describe
your
firms
experience
with
distribution
system
management,
including
corrosion
control,
disinfection
and
DBP
management,
and
Legionella
management.
3. Please
provide
the
scope
of
work
for
your
engagements
related
to
preparing
the
Flint
Water
Treatment
Plant
for
full-time
operation,
as
well
as
any
subsequent
engagements.
4. Please
describe
the
procurement
processes
used
for
contracting
these
scopes
of
service.
Please
provide
copies
of
relevant
proposals
and
contracts.
5. Please
provide
a
narrative
describing
LANs
involvement
with
City
of
Flint
and
MDEQ
staff
throughout
your
engagement
with
the
City
related
to
full-time
operation
of
the
Flint
Water
Treatment
Plant.
6. Please
provide
a
list
of
your
findings
and
recommendations
to
address
the
various
water
quality
problems
that
occurred
following
startup
of
full-time
operation
of
the
Flint
Water
Treatment
Plant.
7. Please
provide
your
subjective
assessment
of
the
condition
and
technologies
at
the
Flint
Water
Treatment
Plant
and
distribution
system
prior
to
full-time
operation
of
the
plant.
8. Please
identify
all
team
members
(including
LAN
staff
and
any
subconsultants)
who
worked
on
the
project
to
prepare
the
Flint
Water
Treatment
Plant
for
full-time
operation.
Describe
their
respective
roles
on
the
project
and
their
experience.
If
any
other
staff
or
consultants
were
engaged
for
guidance
or
review,
please
include
those
individuals
as
well.
9. Please
describe
the
reporting
structure
(both
LANs
project
team
reporting
structure
and
its
reporting
relationship
to
City
of
Flint
staff
and
Emergency
Manager)
for
LANs
work
on
the
Flint
Water
Treatment
Plant,
specifically
for
preparations
for
full-time
operation
of
the
plant.
10. Please
provide
a
copy
of
any
deliverables
prepared
to
support
full-time
operation
of
the
Flint
Water
Treatment
Plant,
including
the
plan
of
treatment
that
was
reviewed
with
MDEQ.
11. Please
review
your
discussions
with
the
City
of
Flint
utility
staff
and
MDEQ
regarding
Flint
River
water
chemistry
and
treatment
requirements,
specifically
relating
to:
a. Anticipated
treatment
challenges
related
to
use
of
Flint
River
b. Prospective
disinfection
requirements
and
options
for
management
of
DBPs
c. Corrosion
control
12. Please
describe
the
decision-making
processes
related
to
treatment
requirements,
specifically
with
regard
to
corrosion
control
treatment.
13. What
was
the
nature
of
the
discussions
regarding
Lead
and
Copper
Rule
compliance
requirements?
14. Did
LAN
identify
requirements
for
Lead
and
Copper
Rule
compliance
in
advance
of
discussions
with
MDEQ?
15. Did
LAN
express
any
concerns
or
cautions
with
respect
to
MDEQs
interpretation
of
Lead
and
Copper
Rule
requirements
for
water
treatment?
16. What
were
the
outcomes
of
discussions
with
MDEQ
regarding
treatment
requirements,
specifically
regarding
compliance
with
Lead
and
Copper
Rule
requirements?
17. Please
outline
your
interactions
with
other
consultants
and
suppliers
working
on
the
Flint
Water
Treatment
Plant,
both
during
preparation
for
and
after
startup
of
full-time
operation,
including
Rowe
Professional
Consultants,
Veolia
and
any
others.
18. Please
describe
LANs
involvement
with
the
City
of
Flints
Technical
Advisory
Committee.
Please
provide
copies
of
any
presentations
or
handouts
offered
in
the
context
of
the
Technical
Advisory
Committee
discussions.
19. Please
offer
any
key
points
or
information
not
already
provided
that
you
think
would
be
of
value
in
addressing
the
causes
of
the
Flint
water
crisis
and
avoiding
similar
situations
in
the
future.
Please
provide
any
recommendations
to
address
prospective
Flint
water
system
needs.
20. Please
offer
any
key
points
or
information
not
already
provided
that
you
think
would
be
of
value
in
addressing
the
causes
of
the
Flint
water
crisis
and
avoiding
similar
situations
in
the
future.
Please
provide
any
recommendations
to
address
prospective
Flint
water
system
needs.
Date
Event
Flint's
water
system
is
organized
and
built
under
private
ownership
as
the
Flint
Water
Works
Company,
pumping
raw
water
from
the
Flint
River
to
customers
City
of
Flint
purchases
water
utility
($262,500)
and
converts
it
to
a
Municipally
1903
Owned
Corporation
1883
1967
1991
2000
Sources
Brochure
provided
to
FWATF
by
City
of
Flint
City
of
Flint
invests
in
capital
improvements
to
the
water
utility
($12.5M)
including
improved
water
storage,
treatment
and
pumping.
"Polyphosphate
is
added
in
small
"The
Water
Supply
of
Flint,
Michigan"
(brochure)
Brochure
provided
to
FWATF
by
City
of
Flint
amounts
to
lessen
the
corrosion
of
water
pipe
when
in
contact
with
the
cold
water,"
p.
11
City
of
Flint
executes
long-term
water
supply
contract
with
Detroit
Water
and
Contract
referenced
in
"Detroit
Water
and
Sewerage
Department
-
dwsd.org/downloads_n/about_dwsd/history/complete_history.p
Sewerage
Department
(DWSD)
and
begins
receiving
water
from
DWSD.
Flint
Water
The
First
300
Years,"
posted
to
DWSD
website
df
Treatment
Plant
(WTP)
subsequently
is
converted
to
a
backup
supply
source
EPA
issues
Lead
and
Copper
Rule
(LCR)
to
control
lead
and
copper
in
drinking
water LCR
history
and
current
rule
posted
to
EPA's
website
www.epa.gov/dwreginfo/lead-and-copper-rule
Timeline/Analysis/Recommendations
(July
15,
2010),
prepared
by
Flint
water
supply
contract
with
DWSD
expires
Information
provided
to
FWATF
DWSD
Wholesale
Customer
Outreach
Team
2001 DWSD
and
Flint
enter
into
contract
negotiations
-
subsequently
suspended
July
2002
Reference
Document
"The
Water
Supply
of
Flint,
Michigan"
(brochure)
3/12/16
3/12/16
Under
Michigan's
Public
Act
72
of
1990,
Flint
is
placed
under
an
Emergency
Financial
MLive
(Nov.
10,
2011):
"What
happened
last
time?
A
look
back
at
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2011/11/what_happened_l
Manager
(EFM)
until
2004.
Ed
Kurtz
is
appointed
Flint
EFM
Flint's
2002
state
takeover"
(Mostafavi)
ast_time_a_look.html
January 2007
Accessed
3/12/16
bridgemi.com/2016/02/flint-water-disaster-timeline/
3/12/16
3/20/16
2008
June
3,
2008
June
12,
2008
July
16,
2008
September
3,
2008
GCDC
requests
negotiation
with
DWSD
for
water
supply
contract;
requests
short-
term
contract
due
to
ongoing
evaluation
of
long-term
needs
DWSD
issues
response
to
GCDC
negotiation
request
(referenced
in
July
16,
2008
letter)
Flint
advises
DWSD
that
GCDC
will
represent
its
interests
in
negotiations
GCDC
and
DWSD
meet
on
water
supply
contracting
Mercado/DWSD letter
Letter
from
Williamson
&
Wright
to
Detroit
Deputy
Mayor
Adams Information
provided
to
FWATF
Meeting
Summary
-
Project
Innovations
Information
provided
to
FWATF
2009
February
11,
2009
GCDC
submits
permit
application
for
85-mgd
surface
water
withdrawal
from
Lake
Huron
DWSD
offers
partnership
arrangement:
GCDC
fund
Flint
loop
north
of
Oakland
border
($200
million)
and
obtain
40%
reduction
on
service
rates
www.michigan.gov/documents/deq/deq-wb-dwehs-wateruse-
gcdcwwpermitapp_280312_7.pdf
3/12/16
3/19/16
Date
Event
June
2009 DWSD
and
SOCWA
file
comments
opposing
GCDC
withdrawal
permit
application
June
25,
2009 GCDC
announces
plans
to
build
$600
million
water
system
June
25,
2009
"Lake
Huron
Water
Supply
Study
-
Karegnondi
Water
Authority
(KWA)
Executive
Summary"
issued
July
10,
2009 DWSD
Interim
Director
Pamela
Turner
publishes
Letter
to
Editor
in
MLive
August
13,
2009 Foster
Group
provides
observations
on
GCDC
cost
analysis
re:
KWA
August
28,
2009 MDEQ
issues
permit
to
GCDC
for
85-mgd
Lake
Huron
withdrawal
for
KWA
September
2009 "Lake
Huron
Water
Supply
-
KWA
Preliminary
Engineering
Report"
issued
Reference Document
Sources
Accessed
3/20/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
2010
MLive
(Feb.
25,
2010):
"Another
View:
Detroit
Water
and
Sewerage
wants
to
work
with
leaders
in
Genesee
and
Lapeer
counties"
(Letter
from
Pamela
Turner/DWSD)
www.MLive.com/opinion/flint/index.ssf/2010/02/another_view_
detroit_water_and.html
3/12/16
3/12/16
May 14, 2010 MLive reports on GCDC contract with political consultant Sam Riddle
3/12/16
February 22, 2010 DWSD posts letter to potential KWA partners (Flint, Genesee, Lapeer)
DWSD
and
GCDC
meet
to
negotiate
water
supply
contract.
Notes
re:
contract
June
17,
2010 termination:
"Does
not
mean
DWSD
will
not
continue
to
provide
water
but
rates
will
Meeting
summary
-
Project
Innovations
reflect
stranded
cost
charge
to
protect
the
system"
"2013
Consumer
Confidence
Report"
posted
to
GCDC
website.
MLive
(July
10,
2010):
"Genesee
County
drain
commissioner's
new
July
10,
2010 GCDC
issues
Consumer
Confidence
Report
supporting
KWA
pipeline
water
quality
report
focuses
on
benefits
of
building
new
water
pipeline"
(Fonger)
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2010/05/drain_commission
er_paid_sam_ri.html
Information
provided
to
FWATF
www.gcdcwws.com/images/contentImages/file/2014%20Water%
20Color-WE.pdf
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2010/07/genesee_county_
drain_commissio_10.html
3/12/16
Report:
www.scribd.com/doc/64381765/Analysis-of-the-Flint-River-as-a-
Permanent-Water-Supply-for-the-City-of-Flint-July-2011
Appendices:
www.scribd.com/doc/64382181/Analysis-of-the-Flint-River-as-a-
Permanent-Water-Supply-for-the-City-of-Flint-July-2011-
Appendices-1-to-8
3/12/16
www.michigan.gov/documents/treasury/Flint-
GovernorsDetermination-11-8-11_417435_7.pdf
1/31/16
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2011/08/flint_water_sewer
_rates_increa.html
3/12/16
2011
Report
is
completed
for
City
of
Flint
on
feasibility
of
using
Flint
WTP
and
Flint
River
as
primary
water
supply.
Notes
Flint
River
water
will
require
more
treatment
than
"Analysis
of
the
Flint
River
as
a
Permanent
Water
Supply
for
the
July
1,
2011
Lake
Huron
water;
recommends
capital
improvements
and
projects
capital
and
City
of
Flint,"
prepared
by
Rowe
and
LAN
operating
costs
(including
phosphate
addition)
www.michigan.gov/documents/treasury/Flint-
GovernorsDetermination-11-8-11_417435_7.pdf
www.michigan.gov/documents/treasury/Flint-
GovernorsDetermination-11-8-11_417435_7.pdf
www.freep.com/pages/interactives/flint-water-crisis-timeline/
1/31/16
1/31/16
3/12/16
Date
Event
Michael
Brown
replaces
Ed
Kurtz
as
City
of
Flint
EFM.
Brown
lays
off
high-ranking
December
1,
2011 City
Hall
appointees
and
eliminates
pay
for
mayor
and
city
council
(which
he
later
partially
restored)
Reference Document
Sources
Accessed
3/12/16
2012
Gov.
Snyder
delivers
statewide
public
safety
message
from
Flint
City
Hall
to
March
7,
2012 announce
plan
including
reopening
Flint
lockup
and
boosting
state
police
patrols
in
Flint
Judge
grants
temporary
restraining
order
against
any
action
by
EM
Brown
pending
March
15,
2012 lawsuit
filed
by
city
employee
Sam
Mum
(head
of
AFSCME
Local
1600)
alleging
state
violated
Open
Meetings
Act
in
appointing
him
Ingham
County
Circuit
Court
Judge
Rosemarie
Aquilina
rules
in
favor
of
Muma,
March
20,
2012
removing
Brown
from
office
and
restoring
power
to
the
mayor
and
city
council
March
26,
2012 Michigan
Court
of
Appeals
reinstates
Brown
as
Flint
EM
April
24,
2012 City
of
Flints
Fiscal
Year
2013
budget
passed
by
an
executive
order
Flint
Department
of
Public
Works
(DPW)
Director
Howard
Croft
sends
letter
to
District
Engineer
Mike
Prysby,
MDEQ
Office
of
Drinking
Water
and
Municipal
Assistance
(ODWMA),
stating
KWA
"has
the
potential
to
be
a
major
factor
in
our
May
9,
2012
regions
economic
development...
The
City
of
Flint
is
pleased
to
be
a
partner
in
the
process
and
we
pledge
to
offer
our
assets
to
support
the
development.
We
appreciate
your
technical
support
as
we
develop
our
components
of
the
project.
Flint
City
Council
President
Scott
Kincaid
files
lawsuit
against
City
seeking
to
repeal
May
24,
2012
recent
(Sep.
2011
and
May
2012)
increases
in
water
and
sewer
rates
August 8, 2012
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2012/03/gov_snyder_unvei
ls_public_safe.html
3/12/16
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2012/03/emergency_mana
ger_restraining.html
3/12/16
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2013/06/hes_back_a_timel
ine_of_michael.html
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2012/03/flint_emergency_
manager_reinst.html
www.cityofflint.com/wp-
content/uploads/Reports/FinPlanFY13pdf.pdf
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
bridgemi.com/2016/02/flint-water-disaster-timeline/
3/12/16
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2012/05/lawsuit_filed_agai
nst_flint_by.html
3/12/16
Emergency
Manager
Brown
further
increases
water
rates
by
12.5
percent
and
sewer
Emergency
Manager
Order
No.
31
-
Water
and
Sewer
Rate
rates
45
percent,
and
ratifies
Sep.
2011
increases.
(Appeals
court
subsequently
Increases,
posted
to
City
of
Flint
website
3/12/16
www.cityofflint.com/wp-content/uploads/CityPDF/031.pdf
invalidates.)
With
this
increase,
Flint
water
customers
had
seen
a
"110
percent
Referenced
in
MLive
(June
19,
2015):
"Flint
council
members
want
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/06/flint_council_me
increase
in
their
average
water
and
sewer
rates
since
January
2011"
water
customers
refunded,
lawsuit
settled"
(Fonger)
mbers_say_city.html
Flint
EM
Brown
sends
letter
to
DWSD
for
permission
to
begin
blending
Flint
River
Department
of
Treasury
timeline
(dated
Sep.
28,
2015),
included
in
somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p
water
with
treated
water
from
DWSD.
Letter
indicates
MDEQ
is
supporting
this
3/12/16
Gov.
Snyder's
e-mails
released
Jan.
20,
2016
(pp.
93-94/274)
df
option,
which
would
save
City
$2
million
to
$3
million
annually
State
appeals
court
dismisses
Kincaid
lawsuit
challenging
recent
Flint
water
and
MLive
(July
2,
2012):
"State
appeals
court
dismisses
Flint
water
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2012/07/appeals_court_dis
3/12/16
sewer
rate
increases
rate
lawsuit"
(Longley)
misses_flint.html
Ed
Kurtz
(who
served
as
Flint
EFM
from
2002
to
2004)
replaces
Brown
as
Flint
EFM,
after
Brown
has
to
exit
because
the
state's
EM
law,
Public
Act
4,
is
officially
NBC25
News
(Aug.
8,
2012):
"Ed
Kurtz
returns
to
Flint
as
nbc25news.com/news/local/ed-kurtz-returns-to-flint-as-
3/12/16
suspended
due
to
referendum
to
repeal
it.
Kurtz
appoints
Brown
as
Flint
City
emergency
manager"
emergency-manager?id=785990
Administrator
MLive
(Sep.
10,
2012):
"Flint
City
Council
members
sue
emergency
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2012/09/flint_city_council_
Flint
City
Council
files
suit
against
Kurtz's
appointment
as
EFM
3/12/16
financial
manager
Ed
Kurtz"
(Longley)
members_sue.html
Flint
EFM
Ed
Kurtz
sends
letter
to
DWSD
requesting
written
permission
to
Department
of
Treasury
timeline
(dated
Sep.
28,
2015),
included
in
somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p
3/12/16
implement
the
blending
option.
Approval
is
requested
by
October
1,
2012
Gov.
Snyder's
e-mails
released
Jan.
20,
2016
(pp.
93-94/274)
df
Analysis
by
Flint
Finance
Director
suggests
annual
cost
to
purchase
water
from
Department
of
Treasury
timeline
(dated
Sep.
28,
2015),
included
in
somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p
3/12/16
DWSD
will
steadily
increase
to
$23M
per
year
by
fiscal
year
2020
Gov.
Snyder's
e-mails
released
Jan.
20,
2016
(pp.
93-94/274)
df
Department
of
Treasury
retains
Tucker,
Young,
Jackson
and
Tull
(TYJT)
to
evaluate
Department
of
Treasury
timeline
(dated
Sep.
28,
2015),
included
in
somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p
3/12/16
KWA
proposal
to
the
City
of
Flint
Gov.
Snyder's
e-mails
released
Jan.
20,
2016
(pp.
93-94/274)
df
Michigan
voters
overturn
state's
EM
Law
(Public
Act
4)
in
referendum.
Kurtz
remains
MLive
(Nov.
7,
2012):
"Flint
gains
public
safety
millage,
loses
3/12/16
as
Flint's
EFM
under
Public
Act
72
emergency
manager
law"
(Longley)
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2012/11/flint_gains_public_safety_mill.html
Flint
EFM
Kurtz
sends
letter
to
State
Treasurer
Andy
Dillon
indicating
that
a
proposal
Department
of
Treasury
timeline
(dated
Sep.
28,
2015),
included
in
somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p
from
DWSD
is
expected,
but
that
the
initial
assessment
shows
switching
to
KWA
is
in
3/12/16
Gov.
Snyder's
e-mails
released
Jan.
20,
2016
(pp.
93-94/274)
df
the
best
interest
of
the
City
of
Flint
MLive
(Dec.
12,
2012):
"Michigan
House
approves
new
emergency
Michigan
legislature
approves
new
EM
law
3/12/16
manager
legislation"
(Eggert)
www.MLive.com/news/index.ssf/2012/12/michigan_house_approves_new_em.html
Date
Event
Reference Document
Sources
Accessed
2013
January
23,
2013
February
6,
2013
March
2013
Prysby/MDEQ
e-mails
Liane
Shekter
Smith,
head
of
ODWMA,
and
other
colleagues
re:
feasibility
of
Flint
switching
to
Flint
River.
I
agree
that
the
city
should
have
concerns
of
fully
utilizing
the
Flint
River
(100%)
for
the
following:
the
need
to
soften,
As
reported
in
Bridge
Magazine
(Feb.
4,
2016):
"Disaster
Day
by
bridgemi.com/2016/02/flint-water-disaster-timeline/
the
potential
for
more
advanced
treatment
after
next
round
of
crypto
monitoring,
Day:
A
detailed
Flint
crisis
timeline"
available
capacity
in
Flint
River
at
100-year
low
flow,
residuals
management
(disposal
of
lime
sludge).
TYJT
issues
final
report
to
Department
of
Treasury
on
comparison
between
KWA
www.scribd.com/doc/131442949/City-of-Flint-Water-Supply-
"City
of
Flint
Water
Supply
Assessment,"
prepared
by
TYJT
and
DWSD,
raising
concerns
about
KWA
cost
estimates
and
system
governance
Assessment-Final-Report-February-6-2013
DWSD
contacts
City
of
Flint
to
begin
direct
negotiations
on
contract
extension.
Department
of
Treasury
timeline
(dated
Sep.
28,
2015),
included
in
somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p
Multiple
options
are
provided
to
Flint
EFM
Kurtz
Gov.
Snyder's
e-mails
released
Jan.
20,
2016
(pp.
93-94/274)
df
Flint
City
Council
approves
resolution
to
buy
water
from
KWA
and
contract
with
"Amended
Resolution
to
Purchase
Capacity
from
Karegnondi
KWA
to
build
a
pipeline
from
Lake
Huron
to
Genesee
County.
Council
votes
7-1
to
somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p
Water
Authority"
included
in
Gov.
Snyder's
e-mails
released
Jan.
leave
DWSD
and
go
to
KWA
for
water
supply.
Council's
vote
is
not
binding;
final
df
20,
2016
(pp.
142-3/274)
decision
to
switch
from
DWSD
to
KWA
is
Treasurer
Dillon's
Genesee
County
Drain
Commissioner
Jeffrey
Wright
issues
statement
praising
Flint
media.wix.com/ugd/60e74e_474a2f7e6f0902948ba9327284c796
Press
release
posted
online
City
Council
for
approving
resolution
to
join
KWA
01.pdf
Busch/MDEQ
e-mails
MDEQ
Director
Wyant
with
Shekter
Smith
and
other
MDEQ
As
reported
in
Bridge
Magazine
(Feb.
4,
2016):
"Disaster
Day
by
bridgemi.com/2016/02/flint-water-disaster-timeline/
staff
copied,
warning
about
Flint
River
water
quality
and
microbial/DBP
risks
Day:
A
detailed
Flint
crisis
timeline"
Sygo/MDEQ
e-mails
Busch
re:
Flint
River
water
source
switch.
As
you
might
guess
As
reported
in
Bridge
Magazine
(Feb.
4,
2016):
"Disaster
Day
by
we
are
in
a
situation
with
Emergency
Financial
Managers
so
its
entirely
possible
bridgemi.com/2016/02/flint-water-disaster-timeline/
Day:
A
detailed
Flint
crisis
timeline"
that
they
will
be
making
decisions
relative
to
cost."
Treasurer
Dillon
e-mails
Gov.
Snyder
recommending
support
for
Flint's
decision
to
As
reported
in
Bridge
Magazine
(Feb.
4,
2016):
"Disaster
Day
by
bridgemi.com/2016/02/flint-water-disaster-timeline/
join
KWA
Day:
A
detailed
Flint
crisis
timeline"
MLive
(March
27,
2013):
"Ed
Kurtz
expected
to
remain
Flint's
State
of
Michigan's
new
EM
law,
Public
Act
436,
takes
effect;
Kurtz
remains
in
place
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2013/03/ed_kurtz_expecte
emergency
manager
through
June
30
as
new
state
law
takes
effect
as
Flint
EM
d_to_stay_be_f.html
Thursday,
March
28"
(Adams)
City
of
Flint
enacts
resolution
signed
by
EM
Kurtz,
City
Attorney
and
Finance
Director
"By
the
Emergency
Manager:
Resolution
to
Purchase
Capacity
Attachment
5
-
MDEQ
documentation
provided
to
FWATF
Nov.
6,
to
purchase
capacity
from
KWA
from
Karegnondi
Water
Authority"
2015
Letter
from
EM
Kurtz
to
Treasury
referenced
in
letter
of
approval
somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p
Flint
EM
Kurtz
requests
state
approval
of
Flint
purchasing
capacity
from
KWA
from
Treasurer
Dillon,
included
in
Gov.
Snyder's
e-mails
released
df
Jan.
20,
2016
(p.
140/274)
Detroit
Free
Press
(February
2016):
"How
Flint's
Water
Crisis
DWSD
issues
statement
that
Flint's
water
supply
plan
will
not
save
money
www.freep.com/pages/interactives/flint-water-crisis-timeline/
Unfolded"
(Dixon)
State
Treasurer
Andy
Dillon
authorizes
Flint
EM
Kurtz,
pursuant
to
Section
12(3)
of
Letter
of
approval
from
Treasurer
Dillon
included
in
Gov.
Snyder's
somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p
PA
436
of
2012,
to
enter
into
a
contract
with
KWA
if
a
final
offer
from
DWSD
is
e-mails
released
Jan.
20,
2016
(p.
140/274)
df
either
not
received
or
rejected
in
good
faith
based
upon
specific
objections
DWSD
(McCormick)
letter
to
Flint
EM
Kurtz
and
KWA.
reason.com/assets/db/14537555551018.pdf
DWSD
provides
a
best
and
final
offer
to
the
City
of
Flint,
representing
20%
savings
ThinkProgress
(Jan.
25,
2016):
"Leaked
Documents
Undermine
thinkprogress.org/health/2016/01/25/3742625/documents-
compared
to
KWA
proposal
Official
Story
Of
Flint
Water
Crisis"
(Israel)
michigan-contradict-flint-narrative-snyder/
Analyses
by
Flint
EM
Kurtz,
MDEQ
and
Treasurys
Office
of
Fiscal
Responsibility
Department
of
Treasury
timeline
(dated
Sep.
28,
2015),
included
in
somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p
independently
conclude
that
the
KWA
option
is
cheaper
for
the
City
of
Flint
Gov.
Snyder's
e-mails
released
Jan.
20,
2016
(pp.
93-94/274)
df
GCDC
Commissioner
Wright
and
Flint
EM
Kurtz
issue
joint
statement
re:
why
KWA
is
www.gcdcwws.com/images/contentImages/file/Press%20Release
Press
release
posted
to
GCDC
website
preferable
to
DWSD's
final
offer
.Official.Final%20Decision%20on%20KWA.pdf
Flint
EM
Kurtz
signs
agreement
with
KWA
and
informs
State
Treasurer
Dillon
that
Department
of
Treasury
timeline
(dated
Sep.
28,
2015),
included
in
somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p
the
City
will
join
KWA
(decision
officially
announced
May
1,
2013)
Gov.
Snyder's
e-mails
released
Jan.
20,
2016
(pp.
93-94/274)
df
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
Date
Event
May
1,
2013 GCDC
announces
rejection
of
DWSD's
final
offer
and
partnership
with
KWA
May
29,
2013 Kurtz
sends
Gov.
Snyder
resignation
letter
indicating
July
3,
2013
will
be
his
last
day
June
1,
2013 KWA
begins
construction
on
pipeline
project
City
of
Flint
decides
to
use
the
Flint
River
as
a
water
source,
per
Gov.
Snyder
June
2013
timeline
Flint
EM
Kurtz
signs
resolution
that
allows
Flint
to
hire
the
engineering
firm
June
26,
2013 Lockwood,
Andrews,
and
Newnam
(LAN)
to
prepare
Flint
WTP
for
full-time
operation
using
Flint
River
as
primary
drinking
water
supply
source
June 2013
Flint
notifies
MDEQ
of
intent
to
operate
Flint
Water
Treatment
Plant
full
time
using
Flint
River
for
drinking
water
June
26,
2013 Michael
Brown
is
again
appointed
by
Gov.
Snyder
as
Flint
EM
Groundbreaking
for
KWA
begins.
City
of
Flint
also
requests
DEQ
approval
for
full-
June
26,
2013
time
use
of
the
Flint
WTP
with
Flint
River
water
as
source
June
28,
2013 KWA
hosts
Pipeline
Groundbreaking
Ceremony
Financing
Contract
between
City
of
Flint
and
KWA
is
approved,
effective
August
1,
2013
(document
is
signed
by
EM
Michael
Brown)
City
of
Flint,
Genesee
County,
MDEQ
and
LAN
representatives
meet
at
Flint
WTP
to
discuss
feasibility
of
using
Flint
River
as
a
temporary
water
supply
source
while
June
29,
2013
waiting
for
KWA
to
come
online.
Flint
DPW
and
Finance
Department
recommend
using
the
Flint
River
as
a
temporary
water
source.
June
28,
2013
Flint
EM
Kurtz
submits
"City
of
Flint
Financial
&
Operating
Plan,
Third
Update"
(and
EM
Kurtz's
closing
memorandum)
to
MI
Treasury
Dept.
Reference Document
Sources
Accessed
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
July 2013
City
of
Flint
begins
testing
Flint
River
water
treatment
at
Flint
WTP
"to
see
if
the
river
could
adequately
supply
drinking
water
during
KWA
pipeline
construction"
MLive
(July
23,
2015):
"Flint
River
now
an
option
for
drinking
water
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2013/07/city_readying_wat
following
Detroit's
termination
of
contract"
(Adams)
er_plant_to_t.html
3/12/16
July 8, 2013
City
of
Flint
retains
Lockwood
Andrews
&
Newnam
(LAN)
engineering
firm
to
get
the
Citys
WTP
up
and
running
while
KWA
pipeline
is
built
3/12/16
September 2013
3/12/16
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2013/09/michael_brown_r
esigns_as_flint.html
3/12/16
www.flintneighborhoodsunited.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/COf-TTHM-Data.pdf
3/12/16
2014
KWA
Board
of
Directors
adopts
Resolution
2014-01,
authorizing
KWA
to
bond
for
February
19,
2014
water
line
construction
on
behalf
of
City
of
Flint
3/12/16
1/31/16
3/12/16
Date
March
7,
2014
April 9, 2014
Event
Reference Document
Sources
Flint
EM
Earley
sends
letter
to
Sue
McCormick/DWSD
explaining
that
the
City
of
Attached
as
Ex.
10
to
ACLU
Michigan's
November
16,
2015
letter
www.aclumich.org/article/flint-residents-sue-city-state-over-lead-
Flint
has
"actively
pursued
using
the
Flint
River
as
a
temporary
water
source"
announcing
federal
lawsuit
drinking-water
instead
of
accepting
DWSD's
offer
to
provide
water
to
the
City
Busch/MDEQ
e-mails
Shekter
Smith
and
Benzie/MDEQ
re:
uncertainty
on
startup
requirements
for
Flint
WTP.
...
I
would
like
to
make
sure
everyone
is
on
the
same
page
on...
what
Flint
will
be
required
to
do
in
order
to
start
using
their
plant
full
As
reported
in
Bridge
Magazine
(Feb.
4,
2016):
"Disaster
Day
by
bridgemi.com/2016/02/flint-water-disaster-timeline/
time...
starting
up
for
continuous
operation
will
carry
significant
changes
in
Day:
A
detailed
Flint
crisis
timeline"
regulatory
requirements
so
there
is
a
very
gray
area
as
to
what
we
consider
for
startup.
MDEQ
issues
Flint
WTP
construction
permits
for
full
time
operation
enhancements
Attachment
9
-
MDEQ
documentation
provided
to
FWATF
Nov.
6,
MDEQ
Construction
Permits
W141025
and
W141026
W141025
and
W141026
2015
Flint
laboratory
and
water
quality
supervisor
Michael
Glasgow
e-mails
Adam
Rosenthal/MDEQ
requesting
information.
""I
am
expecting
changes
to
our
Water
Quality
Monitoring
parameters,
and
possibly
our
DBP
on
lead
&
copper
monitoring
As
reported
in
Bridge
Magazine
(Feb.
4,
2016):
"Disaster
Day
by
bridgemi.com/2016/02/flint-water-disaster-timeline/
plan
Any
information
would
be
appreciated,
because
it
looks
as
if
we
will
be
Day:
A
detailed
Flint
crisis
timeline"
starting
the
plant
up
tomorrow
and
are
being
pushed
to
start
distributing
water
as
soon
as
possible"
Glasgow/Flint
e-mails
Rosenthal,
Prysby
and
Busch/MDEQ.
If
water
is
distributed
from
this
plant
in
the
next
couple
of
weeks,
it
will
be
against
my
direction.
I
need
www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-water-
Detroit
Free
Press
(February
13,
2016):
"E-mails:
Flint
water
plant
time
to
adequately
train
additional
staff
and
to
update
our
monitoring
plans
before
I
crisis/2016/02/12/e-mails-flint-water-plant-rushed-into-
was
rushed
into
operation"
(Egan,
Spangler,
Shamus)
will
feel
we
are
ready.
I
will
reiterate
this
to
management
above
me,
but
they
seem
operation/80300220/
to
have
their
own
agenda."
Water
service
from
DWSD
officially
ends.
City
of
Flint
also
conducts
two
separate
Department
of
Treasury
timeline
(dated
Sep.
28,
2015),
included
in
somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p
public
forums
regarding
the
use
of
Flint
River
water,
upgrades
to
Citys
water
system
Gov.
Snyder's
e-mails
released
Jan.
20,
2016
(pp.
93-94/274)
df
and
overall
cost
of
switch
to
KWA
media.wix.com/ugd/60e74e_7126cbc7d5cb453f94d0549a370298
MDEQ
approves
KWA
permit
for
Intermediate
Pump
Station
MDEQ
Permit
142023
d9.pdf
Accessed
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
Busch/MDEQ
e-mails
Brad
Wurfel/MDEQ
re:
proposed
talking
points
for
the
water
switch
ceremony
to
be
held
in
two
days.
Suggests:
While
the
Department
is
satisfied
with
the
Citys
ability
to
treat
water
from
the
Flint
River,
the
Department
As
reported
in
Bridge
Magazine
(Feb.
4,
2016):
"Disaster
Day
by
April
23,
2014
looks
forward
to
the
long
term
solution
of
continued
operation
of
the
City
of
Flint
Day:
A
detailed
Flint
crisis
timeline"
Water
Treatment
Plant
using
water
from
the
KWA
as
a
more
consistent
and
higher
quality
source
water.
bridgemi.com/2016/02/flint-water-disaster-timeline/
3/12/16
bridgemi.com/2016/02/flint-water-disaster-timeline/
3/12/16
City
of
Flint
officially
switches
its
water
source
to
the
Flint
River,
using
Flint
WTP
for
treatment,
and
hosts
changeover
ceremony,"
public
event
marking
the
transition
April
25,
2014
to
use
of
Flint
River
water.
MDEQ
information
shows
that
transition
complete
by
May
2015
MDEQ
e-mail
dated
April
28,
2014
describing
Flint
WTP
startup
ceremony
on
April
25.
MLive
(April
25,
2014):
"Closing
the
valve
on
history:
Flint
cuts
water
flow
from
Detroit
after
nearly
50
years"
(Adams).
City
of
Flint
press
release
included
in
Snyder
e-mails
released
Jan.
20,
2016
(p.
15)
3/12/16
MLive
(May
13,
2014):
"Kincaid,
Flint
residents
take
water
rate
lawsuit
to
federal
court"
(Fonger)
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2014/05/kincaid_flint_resid
ents_take_w.html
3/12/16
bridgemi.com/2016/02/flint-water-disaster-timeline/
3/12/16
Flint
EM
Earley
notifies
Detroit
EM
that
Flint
has
switched
water
supply
sources
to
the
Flint
River.
GCDC
remains
as
a
non-contract
customer
of
DWSD
City
Council
President
Scott
Kincaid
and
two
other
Flint
residents
file
suit
re:
City
of
May
4,
2014
Flint
water
rates
in
federal
court
Jennifer
Crooks/EPA
e-mails
colleagues
Mindy
Eisenberg,
Thomas
Poy
and
Tinka
Hyde/EPA
re:
concerns
about
Flint
drinking
water
expressed
by
resident
Lathan
Jefferson.
"Flint
River
quality
is
not
great,
but
there
is
a
surface
water
treatment
May
15,
2014
plan
producing
water
that
is
currently
meeting
SDWA
standards...
his
doctor
says
the
rash
is
from
the
new
drinking
water...
He
has
no
interest
in
speaking
with
Mike
Prysby;
he
doesnt
trust
anyone
in
MI
government."
Date
Event
Resident
complaints
intensify
re:
water
quality;
Flint
WTP
operators
boost
use
of
lime
to
address
hardness
concerns
Adam
Rosenthal/MDEQ
e-mails
Mike
Glasgow/Flint
confirming
no
orthophosphate
June
17,
2014
monitoring
is
necessary
at
Flint
WTP,
since
no
orthophosphate
is
being
added
June
2014
July 1, 2014 Flint begins first 6-month monitoring period for lead and copper in drinking water
Reference Document
Sources
MLive
(June
12,
2014):
"City
adding
more
lime
to
Flint
River
water
as
resident
complaints
pour
in"
(Fonger)
MLive
(Feb.
17,
2016):
"Flint
water
crisis
unfolds
in
key
officials'
emails
through
the
years"
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2014/06/treated_flint_river
_water_meet.html
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2016/02/see_flint_water_c
risis_unfold.html#4
mi.gov/documents/snyder/FlintWaterTimeline_FINAL_511424_7.
pdf
www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2015/10/10/missed-
opportunities-flint-water-crisis/73688428/
media.wix.com/ugd/60e74e_cc139234530f4fca8bbfb8768ef25d4
a.pdf
media.wix.com/ugd/60e74e_d1b6e185aadc4cb4adbaf737e9421a
96.pdf
July 29, 2014 MDEQ approves KWA permit for 12-mile transmission main
City
of
Flint
issues
boil
water
advisory
due
to
E.
coli
bacteria
violation
(Localized
August
15,
2014 System
Boil
Water
Advisory);
City
increases
flushing
of
water
mains
and
boosts
chlorine
disinfectant
use.
Advisory
lifted
Aug.
20,
2014
Second
boil
water
advisory
is
issued
due
to
coliform
bacteria
detected
in
drinking
September
5,
2014 water
(expanded
on
Sept.
7,
2015);
City
boosts
chlorine
use
again.
Advisory
lifted
Sep.
9,
2014
September
10,
2014
October
2014
October
1,
2014
November 1, 2014
November
1,
2014
November
7,
2014
Accessed
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
1/31/16
1/31/16
7
Date
Event
Reference Document
MLive
(Jan.
8,
2015):
"Flint
report
says
getting
water
from
Detroit
is
possible
but
would
cost
$4
million
just
to
reconnect"
(Fonger)
City
of
Flint
begins
hydraulic
modeling
to
"help
identify
locations
of
bad
valves"
Flint
Water
System
Timeline,
posted
on
City
of
Flint
website
MDEQ
notifies
Flint
of
initial
quarterly
violation
of
SDWA
Disinfection
Byproducts
MDEQ
Letter:
Violation
Notice
-
MCL
for
TTHM
Operational
(TTHM)
requirements
Evaluation
-
TTHM,
4th
Quarter
2014
Monitoring
Period
Flints
GM
engine
plant
switches
off
its
water
supply
from
Flint's
water
system,
Detroit
Free
Press
(Oct.
11,
2015):
"Chemical
testing
could
have
drawing
water
instead
from
neighboring
Flint
Township
predicted
Flint's
water
crisis"
(Wisely,
Erb)
First
6-month
round
of
lead
and
copper
monitoring
(per
MDEQ's
interpretation
of
MDEQ
Letter:
City
of
Flint
-
Lead
and
Copper
Monitoring
of
LCR)
ends.
Results
due
from
City
of
Flint
to
MDEQ
on
January
10,
2015.
100
samples
Drinking
Water
Taps,
dated
March
30,
2015;
MDEQ
e-mail
dated
within
90th
percentile
lead
level,
6
ppb;
2
samples
above
lead
action
level
Feb
27,
2015
Sources
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/01/flint_report_says_
going_back_t.html
www.cityofflint.com/public-works/city-water-system-timeline/
www.cityofflint.com/wp-content/uploads/City-of-Flint-Violation-
Notice-MCL-TTHM-12_16_14.pdf
www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2015/10/10/missed-
opportunities-flint-water-crisis/73688428/
Accessed
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
2015
January
2015
January
1,
2015
January
2,
2015
January 7, 2015
January 7, 2015
January
9,
2015
January
12,
2015
Officials
from
Genesee
County
hospitals,
MDHHS,
MDEQ,
GCHD
meet
re:
Legionellosis
outbreak
in
Flint.
MDHHS
Director
Nick
Lyon
directs
GCHD
to
conduct
Information
provided
by
Flint
Water
Advisory
Task
Force
and
complete
its
evaluation
of
causes
of
the
increased
cases
City
of
Flint
begins
second
6-month
monitoring
period
for
lead
and
copper
in
mi.gov/documents/snyder/FlintWaterTimeline_FINAL_511424_7.
Gov.
Snyder's
Flint
Water
timeline
(released
Jan.
2016)
drinking
water
pdf
City
of
Flint
issues
press
release
and
mails
notice
to
water
customers
stating
the
City
Department
of
Treasury
timeline
(dated
Sep.
28,
2015),
included
in
somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p
water
system
exceeds
maximum
contaminant
level
(MCL)
for
total
trihalomethanes
Gov.
Snyder's
e-mails
released
Jan.
20,
2016
(pp.
93-94/274)
df
(TTHMs),
which
are
disinfection
byproducts
Michigan
Department
of
Technology,
Management
and
Budget
announces
www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-water-
Detroit
Free
Press
(January
29,
2016):
"Amid
denials,
state
workers
installation
of
water
coolers
in
Flint's
State
Office
Building.
"The
coolers
will
be
crisis/2016/01/28/amid-denials-state-workers-flint-got-clean-
in
Flint
got
clean
water"
(Egan)
provided
as
long
as
the
public
water
does
not
meet
treatment
requirements."
water/79470650/
Richard
Benzie/MDEQ
e-mails
colleagues
re:
discussion
of
Flint
water
issues
with
State
Representative
Sheldon
Neely
(D-Flint)
and
others.
"...there
appears
to
be
a
As
reported
in
Bridge
Magazine
(Feb.
4,
2016):
"Disaster
Day
by
bridgemi.com/2016/02/flint-water-disaster-timeline/
significant
(I
think
they
used
the
word
complete)
loss
of
public
confidence
in
the
Day:
A
detailed
Flint
crisis
timeline"
drinking
water
quality
in
Flint"
University
of
Michigan-Flint
alerted
city
officials
that
it
found
elevated
lead
levels
in
Detroit
Free
Press
(Feb.
2016):
"How
Flint's
Water
Crisis
Unfolded"
two
locations
on
campus,
prompting
the
school
to
shut
off
some
drinking
fountains
www.freep.com/pages/interactives/flint-water-crisis-timeline/
(Dixon)
and
add
water
filters
to
others
mi.gov/documents/snyder/FlintWaterTimeline_FINAL_511424_7.
DWSD
offers
to
reconnect
to
Flint
and
waive
$4
million
connection
fee
Gov.
Snyder's
Flint
Water
timeline
(released
Jan.
2016)
pdf
MDEQ
staff
(Prysby,
Shekter
Smith,
Benzie,
numerous
others)
communicate
via
e-
mail
re:
decision
to
provide
water
coolers
at
Flint's
State
Office
building.
Some
As
reported
in
Bridge
Magazine
(Feb.
4,
2016):
"Disaster
Day
by
bridgemi.com/2016/02/flint-water-disaster-timeline/
discussion
re:
how
this
decision
will
affect
Flint
residents'
perceptions
of
drinking
Day:
A
detailed
Flint
crisis
timeline"
water
safety,
and
how
the
decision
will
"make
it
more
difficult...
for
ODWMA
staff"
Gov.
Snyder
announces
that
Jerry
Ambrose,
who
previously
served
as
Flint's
finance
MLive
(Jan.
13,
2015):
"Jerry
Ambrose
named
Flint's
fourth
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/01/jerry_ambrose_ta
and
administration
director,
will
replace
Earley
as
Flint
EM
emergency
manager
as
Darnell
Earley
heads
to
Detroit"
(Adams) pped_as_next_e.html
Flint
DPW
posts
water
system
FAQs
re:
bacteria
and
TTHM
issues
in
Flint
water,
and
"City
of
Flint
Water
System
Questions
and
Answers,"
dated
www.cityofflint.com/wp-content/uploads/CoF-Water-System-
decision
to
switch
to
Flint
River
as
temporary
water
supply
January
13,
2015
QA.pdf
City
of
Flint
holds
public
meeting
re:
disinfection
byproducts
and
bacteria;
residents
Attachment
17
-
MDEQ
documentation
provided
to
FWATF
Nov.
City
of
Flint
-
Public
Forum
Agenda
attend,
bringing
containers
of
water
from
their
taps.
LeeAnne
Walters
shows
6,
2015.
MLive
(Jan.
21,
2015):
"Officials
say
Flint
water
is
getting
better,
samples
of
discolored
water
taken
from
her
taps
on
Jan.
15
and
Jan.
21,
2015,
to
EM
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/01/state_water_offici
but
many
residents
unsatisfied"
(Fonger)
Ambrose
als_tell_fli.html
Shekter
Smith/MDEQ
e-mails
colleagues
re:
Flint
water
supply
.
"...when
Flint
As
reported
in
Bridge
Magazine
(Feb.
4,
2016):
"Disaster
Day
by
decided
to
leave
Detroit
and
operate
using
the
River,
our
role
wasnt
to
tell
them
bridgemi.com/2016/02/flint-water-disaster-timeline/
Day:
A
detailed
Flint
crisis
timeline"
our
opinion;
only
what
steps
would
be
necessary
to
make
the
switch
Walling
says
decision
to
use
Flint
River
water
was
made
by
former
EM
Earley
[who
MLive
(Jan.
23,
2015):
"Flint
water
problems:
Switch
aimed
to
save
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/01/flints_dilemma_h
later
disputes
this
statement]
$5
million
--
but
at
what
cost"
(Fonger)
ow_much_to_spe.html
GCHD
environmental
health
supervisor
James
Henry
e-mails
colleagues
re:
inability
to
obtain
information
from
local
and
state
officials
needed
to
investigate
connection
Detroit
Free
Press
(Feb.
9,
2016):
"Flint
e-mails:
CDC
voiced
www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-water-
of
Flint
water
system
to
Legionellosis
outbreak.
"Initially
the
water
plant
was
concerns
over
Legionnaires'
actions"
(Dolan,
Anderson,
Egan,
crisis/2016/02/09/flint-e-mails-state-city-appear-unable-share-
cooperative,
but
since
the
beginning
of
November
they
have
not
responded
to
Wisely)
info/80028820/
multiple
written
and
verbal
requests"
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
Date
Event
Reference Document
Sygo
and
Shekter
Smith/MDEQ
e-mail
re:
Flint
water
quality
problems.
Shekter
As
reported
in
Bridge
Magazine
(Feb.
4,
2016):
"Disaster
Day
by
January
29,
2015 Smith
identifies
the
problem
as
corrosion
across
the
distribution
system
rather
than
Day:
A
detailed
Flint
crisis
timeline"
a
"premise
plumbing"
issue
Brad
Wurfel/MDEQ
e-mails
Dave
Murray,
Governor
Snyders
deputy
press
secretary,
re:
Legionella,
saying
said
he
didnt
want
MDEQ
Director
Wyant
to
say
publicly
that
Detroit
News
(Feb.
26,
2016):
"Legionnaires
fear
led
staffer
to
January
30,
2015 the
water
in
Flint
is
safe
until
we
get
the
results
of
some
county
health
department
warn
against
calling
water
safe"
(Oosting)
traceback
work
on
42
cases
of
Legionnaires
disease
in
Genesee
County
since
last
May
February
1,
2015
February
2,
2015
February
3,
2015
February
4,
2015
February
6,
2015
February
6,
2015
February
10,
2015
Sources
www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-water-
crisis/2016/02/09/flint-e-mails-state-city-appear-unable-share-
info/80028820/
mi.gov/documents/snyder/FlintWaterTimeline_FINAL_511424_7.
pdf
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/01/flint_extends.html
3/12/16
3/12/16
bridgemi.com/2016/02/flint-water-disaster-timeline/
3/12/16
www.detroitnews.com/story/news/michigan/flint-water-
crisis/2016/02/26/flint-legionnaires-safe-water-wyant-
snyder/80966744/
3/19/16
Briefing
memo
is
prepared
for
Gov.
Snyder
on
Flint
water
situation,
including
info
on
residents'
complaints
about
water
quality,
Mayor
Walling's
call
for
assistance,
and
somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p
Gov.
Snyder's
e-mails
released
Jan.
20,
2016
(pp.
54-62/274)
MDEQ
"backgrounder"
downplaying
health
risks.
Wurfel:
"It's
not
like
an
imminent
df
threat
to
public
health"
City
of
Flint
DPW
issues
letter
to
customers
offering
testing
for
discoloration,
taste
www.cityofflint.com/wp-content/uploads/2015_02_02-Water-
Letter
posted
to
City
of
Flint
website
and
odor
Test-Letter.pdf
Gov.
Snyder
awards
Flint
$2
million
to
find
leaks
in
city
water
lines
and
replace
a
MLive
(Feb.
3,
2015):
Governor
Awards
Flint
$2
million
for
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/02/governor_awards
wastewater
incinerator,
part
of
state's
$8
million
Distressed
Cities
program
Troubled
Water
System:
Mayor
Says
More
is
Needed
(Fonger)
_flint_2_millio.html
Flint
resident
LeeAnne
Walters
shows
Flint
City
Council
a
video
documenting
rashes
Detroit
Free
Press
(Feb.
2016):
"How
Flint's
Water
Crisis
Unfolded"
www.freep.com/pages/interactives/flint-water-crisis-timeline/
on
her
son's
skin,
attributed
to
drinking
water
(Dixon)
Liz
Murphy,
assistant
to
Flint
EM,
and
Prysby/MDEQ
exchange
e-mails
re:
other
As
reported
in
Bridge
Magazine
(Feb.
4,
2016):
"Disaster
Day
by
Michigan
systems
that
treat
river
water,
and
a
source
water
assessment
for
Flint
bridgemi.com/2016/02/flint-water-disaster-timeline/
Day:
A
detailed
Flint
crisis
timeline"
River
Flint
ABC
affiliate
(ABC12)
posts
report
on
independent
testing
showing
water
www.abc12.com/flintwaterworries/headlines/ABC12-Investigates-
ABC12
(Feb.
6,
2015):
"What's
in
your
water?"
(Elliott)
quality
is
within
EPA
limits
for
TTHMs
Whats-in-your-water-291074071.html
www.cityofflint.com/2015/02/10/flint-hires-international-urban-
City
of
Flint
retains
Veolia
sole-source
to
provide
additional
review
and
Press
release
posted
to
City
of
Flint
website
water-experts-of-veolia-north-america-to-assess-citys-water-
recommendations
on
water
system
issues/
GCDC
epidemiologist
Shurooq
Hasan
e-mails
outside
expert
about
47
Legionellosis
Detroit
Free
Press
(Feb.
9,
2016):
"Flint
e-mails:
CDC
voiced
www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-water-
cases
diagnosed
in
Flint
in
2014,
almost
four
times
the
number
in
2013.
"We
have
concerns
over
Legionnaires'
actions"
(Dolan,
Anderson,
Egan,
crisis/2016/02/09/flint-e-mails-state-city-appear-unable-share-
expanded
our
investigation
to
include
the
city
water
supply"
Wisely)
info/80028820/
City
of
Flint
posts
second
Flint
Water
FAQ
document,
stating
that
Flint
water
is
safe
"City
of
Flint
Water
System
Update
with
Questions
and
Answers,"
www.cityofflint.com/wp-content/uploads/Water-Sysytem-FAQ-
to
drink
dated
February
16,
2015
Update-2-16-151.pdf
Referenced
in
EPA-MDEQ
e-mail
correspondence
dated
February
Attachment
18
-
MDEQ
documentation
provided
to
FWATF
Nov.
EPA
collects
additional
samples
at
LeeAnne
Walters's
home
26,
2015
6,
2015
Mike
Glasgow/Flint
DPW
tests
water
in
LeeAnne
Walters's
home
and
finds
high
lead
Detroit
Free
Press
(Feb.
2016):
"How
Flint's
Water
Crisis
Unfolded"
www.freep.com/pages/interactives/flint-water-crisis-timeline/
levels
(104
ppb).
She
contacts
Chicago
offices
of
EPA
to
discuss
(Dixon)
EPA/MDEQ
e-mails
included
in
chronological
compilation
of
e-
Initial
e-mail
correspondence
between
EPA
(Crooks,
Del
Toral,
Poy)
and
MDEQ
mails
from
FOIA
requests,
created
by
Roy/Edwards
and
posted
to
flintwaterstudy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/MDEQ-USEPA-
(Busch,
Prysby)
re:
elevated
lead
in
sample
collected
February
18,
2015
at
LeeAnne
Flint
Water
Study
website.
Final.pdf
Walters's
home.
Initial
inquiry
made
re:
corrosion
control
treatment
(OCCT)
at
Flint
E-mail
correspondence
between
Mrs.
Walters
and
City
of
Flint
Attachment
18
-
MDEQ
documentation
provided
to
FWATF
Nov.
WTP.
Crooks:
"WOW!!!
Did
he
find
LEAD!
104
parts
per
bilion"
dated
Feb.
19-26,
2015;
Consumer
Notice
of
Results;
Official
6,
2015
Laboratory
Report.
Busch/MDEQ
e-mails
colleagues
Shekter
Smith
and
Benzie
in
response
to
Crooks
As
reported
in
Bridge
Magazine
(Feb.
4,
2016):
"Disaster
Day
by
email.
As
indicated
by
Mike
and
Adam
the
city
is
meeting
90th
percentile.
Not
sure
bridgemi.com/2016/02/flint-water-disaster-timeline/
Day:
A
detailed
Flint
crisis
timeline"
why
region
5
[EPA]
sees
this
one
sample
as
such
a
big
deal
Accessed
3/12/16
1/31/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
Date
Event
Reference Document
Sources
flintwaterstudy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/MDEQ-USEPA-
In
continued
e-mail
correspondence,
Del
Toral/EPA
voices
concern
re:
possibility
Chronological
compilation
of
MDEQ
e-mails
from
FOIA
requests,
Final.pdf
February
27,
2015 that
City
of
Flint's
lead
sampling
protocol
(pre-flushing)
is
biasing
lead
results
toward
created
by
Roy/Edwards
and
posted
to
Flint
Water
Study
website
Attachment
19
-
MDEQ
documentation
provided
to
FWATF
Nov.
the
low
side.
Asks
again
about
OCCT
at
Flint
WTP
6,
2015
flintwaterstudy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/MDEQ-USEPA-
Busch/MDEQ
responds
to
Del
Toral/EPA
saying
that
the
City
of
Flint
"Has
an
Chronological
compilation
of
MDEQ
e-mails
from
FOIA
requests,
Final.pdf
February
27,
2015 Optimized
Corrosion
Control
Program,"
LeeAnne
Walters's
house
is
"not
part
of
the
created
by
Roy/Edwards
and
posted
to
Flint
Water
Study
website
Attachment
20
-
MDEQ
documentation
provided
to
FWATF
Nov.
City's
established
sample
site
pool"
and
the
residence
has
PVC
plumbing
6,
2015
Accessed
3/12/16
3/12/16
March 3, 2015
In
response
to
complaints
re:
drinking
water
quality
and
related
health
effects,
Flint
EM
Ambrose
claims
costs
will
increase
$12
million
with
return
to
DWSD
service.
He
MLive
(June
5,
2015):
"Lawsuit
seeks
end
to
Flint
River
drinking
provides
memo
to
Deputy
State
Treasurer
Wayne
Workman
stating
reconnection
to
water,
return
to
Detroit"
(Fonger)
DWSD
will
cost
the
City
$10.1M/year
and
water
could
be
as
high
as
$1M/month
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/06/lawsuit_seeks_en
d_to_flint_riv.html
3/12/16
March 4, 2015
www.cityofflint.com/public-works/water-advisory-committees/
3/12/16
3/12/16
March
5,
2015 MDEQ
issues
second
Disinfection
Byproducts
quarterly
violation
notice
March
5,
2015
Officials
in
Governor's
Office
and
MDEQ
begin
discussing
providing
water
filters
to
Flint
citizens
March 5, 2015
Citizens
Advisory
Committee
(CAC),
hosted
by
City
of
Flint,
holds
its
first
meeting;
includes
58
members
representing
various
interests
www.cityofflint.com/public-works/water-advisory-committees/
3/12/16
Harvey
Hollins/Governor's
Office
meets
with
Flint
EM
and
DEQ
officials
to
discuss
possible
solutions
to
Flint
water
issues
MLive
(Feb.
17,
2016):
"Flint
water
crisis
unfolds
in
key
officials'
emails
through
the
years"
-
provides
screen
capture
of
e-mail
referring
to
meeting
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2016/02/see_flint_water_c
risis_unfold.html#4
3/12/16
Crooks/EPA
e-mails
Busch,
Prysby
and
Benzie/MDEQ
saying
she
has
been
March
10,
2015 inundated
with
citizen
e-mails
referred
to
her
from
the
White
House
about
Flint
water
quality
problems
bridgemi.com/2016/02/flint-water-disaster-timeline/
3/12/16
bridgemi.com/2016/02/flint-water-disaster-timeline/
3/12/16
Benzie/MDEQ
e-mails
colleagues
Shekter
Smith,
Busch
and
Prysby
re:
thoughts
for
a
As
reported
in
Bridge
Magazine
(Feb.
4,
2016):
"Disaster
Day
by
plan
of
action
on
Legionellosis
response
Day:
A
detailed
Flint
crisis
timeline"
bridgemi.com/2016/02/flint-water-disaster-timeline/
3/12/16
Busch/MDEQ
e-mails
colleagues
Shekter
Smith,
Prysby
and
Benzie
re:
Legionella.
As
reported
in
Bridge
Magazine
(Feb.
4,
2016):
"Disaster
Day
by
March
12,
2015 there
is
no
evidence
or
confirmation
of
Legionella
coming
directly
from
the
Water
Day:
A
detailed
Flint
crisis
timeline"
Treatment
Plant
or
in
the
community
water
supply
distribution
system
at
this
time.
bridgemi.com/2016/02/flint-water-disaster-timeline/
3/12/16
March 9, 2015
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
10
Date
Event
March
19,
2015 City
of
Flint
responds
to
61
questions
posed
by
CAC
in
March
5
meeting
Henry/GCHD
e-mails
Busch/MDEQ
re:
investigation
of
Legionellosis
outbreak
in
March
19,
2015 Flint,
again
requesting
MDEQ
collaboration
and
providing
documentation
of
previous
requests
Flint
City
Council
votes
7-1
to
end
Flint
River
service
and
return
to
Detroit
water
service;
the
vote
is
non-binding
since
Flint
is
under
EM
control.
Flint
EM
Ambrose:
"It
is
incomprehensible
to
me
that...
Flint
City
Council
would
want
to
send
more
March
23,
2015
than
$12
million
a
year
to
the
system
serving
Southeast
Michigan,
even
if
Flint
rate
payers
could
afford
it.
(Lake
Huron)
water
from
Detroit
is
no
safer
than
water
from
Flint."
EPA
learns
that
Genesee
County
Health
Department
is
investigating
uptick
in
March
26,
2015 Legionellosis
in
the
county,
including
Flint;
an
EPA
official
questions
whether
it
is
related
to
switch
to
Flint
River
water
March
27,
2015
LeeAnne
Walters's
son
is
tested
for
blood
lead
levels;
results
are
above
CDC's
5
ug/dl
"threshold
of
concern"
Reference Document
3/12/16
bridgemi.com/2016/02/flint-water-disaster-timeline/
3/12/16
www.freep.com/pages/interactives/flint-water-crisis-timeline/
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
bridgemi.com/2016/02/flint-water-disaster-timeline/
MLive
(March
24,
2015):
"Emergency
manager
calls
City
Council's
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/03/flint_emergency_
Flint
River
vote
'incomprehensible'"
(Fonger)
manager_calls.html
3/12/16
Detroit
Free
Press
(Feb.
2016):
"How
Flint's
Water
Crisis
Unfolded"
www.freep.com/pages/interactives/flint-water-crisis-timeline/
(Dixon)
3/12/16
Flint
Water
Study
website
(Sep.
30,
2015):
"COMMENTARY:
MDEQ
flintwaterstudy.org/2015/09/commentary-mdeq-mistakes-
Mistakes
and
Deception
Created
the
Flint
Water
Crisis"
(Roy)
deception-flint-water-crisis/
3/12/16
MDEQ
notifies
Flint
of
results
of
first
6-month
lead
and
copper
monitoring
period
Gov.
Snyder's
Flint
Water
timeline
(released
Jan.
2016)
(July-December
2014)
showing
6
ppb
result
Crooks/EPA
e-mails
Busch,
Prysby
and
Shekter
Smith/MDEQ
re:
EPA
conference
call
on
Legionella
in
Flint.
Cites
Del
Toral's
statement
that
the
city's
aggressive
pre-
As
reported
in
Bridge
Magazine
(March
1,
2016):
"Flint
crisis
March
31,
2015
flushing
before
lead
testing
may
be
contributing
to
favorable
conditions
for
timeline:
Part
2"
Legionella
in
disribution
system
MDEQ
sends
Flint
LT2
Surface
Water
Treatment
Rule
Letter
re:
monitoring
requirements
for
Cryptosporidium,
E.
Coli
and
turbidity
Flint
proposes
installation
of
Granular
Activated
Carbon
filter
media
to
reduce
April
6,
2015
disinfection
byproducts
MDHHS
hosts
conference
call
regarding
Legionella,
but
the
subject
matter
and
April
7,
2015 participants
are
not
clear.
It
was
suggested
that
there
was
a
communication
plan
in
preparation,
but
no
indication
that
public
communication
happened
as
a
result
Del
Toral/EPA
e-mails
Cook/MDEQ
again
to
ask
re:
Flint
corrosion
control
treatment.
April
23,
2015 Cook/MDEQ,
in
follow-up
message
to
Busch
&
Prysby/MDEQ:
"Other
than
sampling
EPA-MDEQ
e-mail
correspondence
dated
April
23-24,
2015
for
Pb/Cu,
I
don't
think
Flint
is
doing
anything
regarding
corrosion
control"
mi.gov/documents/snyder/FlintWaterTimeline_FINAL_511424_7.
pdf
3/12/16
bridgemi.com/2016/03/flint-crisis-timeline-part-2/
3/12/16
3/12/16
Accessed
bridgemi.com/2016/02/flint-water-disaster-timeline/
April 3, 2015
Sources
3/12/16
3/20/16
11
Date
Event
Reference Document
Sources
Del
Toral/EPA
visits
LeeAnne
Walters's
house,
inspects
plumbing
and
finds
it
is
lead- Flint
Water
Study
website
(Sep.
30,
2015):
"COMMENTARY:
MDEQ
flintwaterstudy.org/2015/09/commentary-mdeq-mistakes-
April
27,
2015
free;
leaves
sample
bottles
and
provides
Marc
Edwards/Virginia
Tech's
contact
info Mistakes
and
Deception
Created
the
Flint
Water
Crisis"
(Roy)
deception-flint-water-crisis/
Cook,
Busch
and
Prysby/MDEQ
exchange
e-mails
re:
Del
Toral/EPA's
question
on
Detroit
Free
Press
(Feb.
14,
2016):
"State
MDEQ
didn't
take
Flint
corrosion
control
treatment.
Busch:
"If
he
continues
to
persist,
we
may
need
Liane
www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2016/02/13/state-
water
concerns
seriously"
(Shamus)
or
Director
Wyant
to
make
a
call
to
EPA
to
help
address
his
over-reaches.
Cook:
"I
deq-flint-water-concerns/80332954/
Also
as
reported
in
Bridge
Magazine
(Feb.
4,
2016):
"Disaster
Day
agree,
the
constant
second
guessing
of
how
we
interpret
and
implement
our
rules
is
bridgemi.com/2016/02/flint-water-disaster-timeline/
by
Day:
A
detailed
Flint
crisis
timeline"
getting
tiresome."
Laurel
Garrison/CDC
e-mails
GCHD
officials
re:
concern
over
Legionellosis
outbreak
in
Flint.
Indicates
that
city
and
state
officials
allegedly
were
not
supplying
needed
Detroit
Free
Press
(Feb.
9,
2016):
"Flint
e-mails:
CDC
voiced
www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-water-
information
for
the
countys
investigation.
"We
are
very
concerned
about
this
concerns
over
Legionnaires'
actions"
(Dolan,
Anderson,
Egan,
crisis/2016/02/09/flint-e-mails-state-city-appear-unable-share-
Legionnaires
disease
outbreak
Its
very
large,
one
of
the
largest
we
know
of
in
the
Wisely)
info/80028820/
past
decade,
and
community-wide,
and
in
our
opinion
and
experience
it
needs
a
comprehensive
investigation.
Michigan
Office
of
the
Auditor
General
announces
planned
performance
audit
of
Office
of
Auditor
General
letter
to
MDEQ
Director
Wyant,
dated
audgen.michigan.gov/wip/wip761032015.html
MDEQ-Office
of
Drinking
Water
and
Municipal
Assistance
April
28,
2015.
Notice
of
audit
posted
to
OAG
website
To
resolve
an
$8
million
accumulated
deficit
in
Flint's
General
Fund,
the
State
Treasurer
and
Flint
EM,
with
the
concurrence
of
Flint
City
Council,
sign
an
emergency
loan
agreement
between
the
City
and
Michigan's
Local
Financial
Emergency
Loan
Agreement,
signed
by
EM
Ambrose
and
Treasurer
Document
provided
to
FWATF
Assistance
Loan
Board
for
nearly
$8
million.
The
loan
agreement
includes
a
Khouri,
dated
April
29,
2015
provision
that
the
city
of
Flint
cannot,
without
prior
state
approval,
return
to
DWSD
or
lower
water
rates.
Press
release:
"Gov.
Rick
Snyder:
City
of
Flint
ready
to
move
Gov.
Snyder
announces
control
of
City
of
Flint's
finances
has
been
returned
to
www.michigan.gov/snyder/0,4668,7-277-57577_57657-353433--
forward
as
financial
emergency
resolved"
posted
to
State
of
MI
Mayor
and
City
Council
under
supervision
of
Receivership
Transition
Advisory
Board
,00.html
website
LeeAnne
Walterss
water
samples
are
sent
to
Virginia
Tech
for
analysis.
Average
lead
Flint
Water
Study
website
(Aug.
24,
2015):
"Hazardous
Waste-
May
2015 level
is
2,429
ppb
lead,
the
high
was
13,200
ppb,
and
even
after
25
minutes
levels
of
Lead
found
in
a
Flint
households
water"
(Roy)
flushing
the
water
never
dropped
below
200
ppb
Cook/MDEQ
responds
to
Del
Toral/EPA
re:
inquiries
about
Flint
corrosion
control,
indicating
MDEQ
is
delaying
decision
pending
completion
of
second
6-month
E-mail
from
Cook/MDEQ
to
Del
Toral/EPA
dated
May
1,
2015,
May
1,
2015 monitoring
period
in
June
2015.
Says
that
since
Flint
will
be
switching
water
source
included
in
chronological
compilation
of
MDEQ
e-mails
from
FOIA
in
another
year,
"requiring
a
[corrosion
control]
study
at
the
current
time
will
be
of
requests
(Roy/Edwards)
posted
to
Flint
Water
Study
website
little
to
no
value"
May
6,
2015 City
replaces
service
line
at
212
Browning
with
EPA
onsite
May
7,
2015
Crooks/EPA
e-mails
MDEQ
re:
EPA
visit
to
LeeAnne
Walters's
home
to
deliver
sampling
bottles
for
lead/copper
analyses
and
observe
plumbing
systems
May
14,
2015 MDEQ
approves
GCDC
permit
for
surface
water
impoundment
to
feed
KWA
WTP
Second
meeting
of
City
of
Flint/Veolia
Technical
Advisory
Committee.
Meeting
May
20,
2015 notes:
""Some
attention
has
shifted
to
lead
and
copper
concerns"
-
no
further
mention
of
lead
issue
EPA/MDEQ
e-mail
correspondence
continues
re:
results
of
additional
sampling
at
May
26,
2015
Walters's
home
and
at
2
additional
homes
connected
to
same
water
service
line
May
28,
2015 New
samples
show
improved
water
quality
at
LeeAnne
Walters's
residence
Coalition
for
Clean
Water
in
Flint
and
others
file
lawsuit
in
Genesee
County
Circuit
Court
seeking
order
for
Flint
to
return
to
DWSD
service
Jim
Collins/MDHHS
e-mails
GCHD
officials
saying
he
spoke
with
officials
at
federal
June
8,
2015 Centers
for
Disease
Control
and
Prevention
that
morning
about
the
Legionellosis
issue.
He
then
chastises
county
officials
for
talking
to
CDC
without
state
approval
June
5,
2015
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/17/16
3/12/16
flintwaterstudy.org/2015/08/hazardous-waste-levels-of-lead-
found-in-a-flint-households-water/
3/13/16
flintwaterstudy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/MDEQ-USEPA-
Final.pdf
3/13/16
EPA
e-mail
correspondence
dated
May
26-27,
May
28
and
June
2,
Attachment
28
&
29
-
MDEQ
documentation
provided
to
FWATF
2015;
laboratory
reports
attached
Nov.
6,
2015
As
reported
in
Bridge
Magazine
(Feb.
4,
2016):
"Disaster
Day
by
bridgemi.com/2016/03/flint-crisis-timeline-part-2/
Day:
A
detailed
Flint
crisis
timeline"
Accessed
www.michigan.gov/documents/mdhhs/Genesee_Co_Legionnaires
_Disease_Investigation_Ex_Summary_FINAL_510722_7.pdf
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/06/lawsuit_seeks_en
d_to_flint_riv.html
www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-water-
crisis/2016/02/09/flint-e-mails-state-city-appear-unable-share-
info/80028820/
1/31/16
1/31/16
3/12/16
3/17/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
12
Date
Event
June
9,
2015 MDEQ
issues
third
Disinfection
Byproducts
quarterly
violation
notice
Michigan
Semi-Annual
Conference
Call
is
held
with
EPA,
DNR
and
MDEQ.
EPA
June
10,
2015 recommends
that
MDEQ
offer
technical
assistance
to
Flint
on
managing
water
quality
issues,
including
lead
Michigan
Court
of
Appeals
reverses
Genesee
County
Circuit
Court
dismissal
of
June
12,
2015 Kincaid
rate
lawsuit,
claiming
City
didn't
follow
the
proper
process
for
raising
rates
and
improperly
spent
the
funds
collected
Press
conference
held
at
UAW
Region
1D
post
with
Councilman
Kincaid
and
June
15,
2015
attorney
Val
Washington
urging
City
to
negotiate
on
water
and
sewer
rates
U.S.
District
Judge
Stephen
J.
Murphy
III
denies
Coalition
for
Clean
Water
in
Flint's
June
23,
2015
motion
for
the
preliminary
injunction
without
prejudice
Del
Toral/EPA
provides
his
"Interim
Report:
High
Lead
Levels
in
Flint,
Michigan"
to
June
24,
2015 his
supervisor,
Poy/EPA.
Report
expresses
numerous
concerns
re:
lead
levels,
sampling
methodology,
and
lack
of
corrosion
control
treatment
at
Flint
WTP
Reference Document
Sources
MDEQ
Letter:
Violation
Notice
-
MCL
for
TTHMs,
2nd
Quarter
2015
Attachment
30
-
MDEQ
documentation
provided
to
FWATF
Nov.
Monitoring
Period
6,
2015
J.
Crooks/EPA
e-mail
dated
July
1,
2015,
with
notes
from
June
10
flintwaterstudy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/MDEQ-USEPA-
conference
call;
notes
posted
final
July
28,
2015.
E-mail
and
notes
Final.pdf
are
included
in
chronological
compilation
of
MDEQ
e-mails
from
Attachment
31
-
MDEQ
documentation
provided
to
FWATF
Nov.
FOIA
requests
(Roy/Edwards)
posted
to
Flint
Water
Study
website 6,
2015
MLive
(June
12,
2015):
"Appeals
Court
breathes
new
life
into
Flint
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/06/appeals_court_sid
water
rebate
lawsuit"
(Fonger)
es_with_flint.html
MLive
(June
15,
2015):
"Flint
councilman
urges
city
to
negotiate
end
to
water
rate
lawsuit"
(Fonger)
MLive
(June
23,
2015):
"Judge
won't
force
Flint
to
return
to
buying
Detroit
water"
(Fonger)
"Memorandum:
High
Lead
Levels
in
Flint,
Michigan
-
Interim
Report,"
prepared
by
M.
Del
Toral
and
transmitted
to
T.
Poy.
Per
Curt
Guyette/ACLU
(interview
with
FWATF
Dec.
10,
2015),
Del
Toral
provided
report
to
Walters
and
she
provided
it
to
Guyette.
Interim
report
is
available
on
Flint
Water
Study
website.
Final
report
issued
Nov.
2015
is
also
posted
to
ACLU-MI
website
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/06/flint_councilman_
urges_city_to.html
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/06/judge_says_flint_
doesnt_have_t_1.html
flintwaterstudy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Miguels-
Memo.pdf
Accessed
3/13/16
3/13/16
3/13/16
3/13/16
3/17/16
EPA
e-mails
MDEQ
as
preface
to
conference
call
scheduled
for
July
21,
2015,
re:
elevated
lead
and
corrosion
control;
mentions
Del
Toral
report
3/13/16
Second
6-month
round
of
lead
and
copper
monitoring
ends.
Results
due
from
Flint
Included
in
chronological
compilation
of
MDEQ
e-mails
from
FOIA
flintwaterstudy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/MDEQ-USEPA-
to
MDEQ
July
10,
2015
requests
(Roy/Edwards)
posted
to
Flint
Water
Study
website
Final.pdf
3/13/16
July
1,
2015
July
2,
2015
July 2, 2015
July 7, 2015
July 9, 2015
July 9, 2015
Gov.
Snyder
asks
MDEQ
and
MDHHS
about
Flint;
both
report
nothing
unusual
or
Detroit
Free
Press
(Feb.
2016):
"How
Flint's
Water
Crisis
Unfolded"
www.freep.com/pages/interactives/flint-water-crisis-timeline/
widespread
occurring,
Flint
complying
with
LCR,
elevated
blood
levels
are
seasonal (Dixon)
EPA
Region
5
Water
Division
Director
Tinka
Hyde
tells
MDEQ
that
Region
5
is
Gov.
Snyder's
Flint
Water
timeline
(released
Jan.
2016)
mi.gov/documents/snyder/FlintWaterTimeline_FINAL_511424_7.
"concerned
about
the
lead
situation"
but
acknowledges
second
round
of
monitoring
Detroit
Free
Press
(Feb.
2016):
"How
Flint's
Water
Crisis
Unfolded"
pdf
is
under
way
(Dixon)
www.freep.com/pages/interactives/flint-water-crisis-timeline/
EPA
Region
5
Administrator
Susan
Hedman
writes
Mayor
Walling
to
say
that
EPA
"Highlights
of
Marc
Edwards
FOIA,"
posted
to
Flint
Water
Study
flintwaterstudy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Virginia-Tech-
will
work
with
MDEQ
on
issues
related
to
lead
in
water.
"it
would
be
premature
to
website
FOIA-EPA.pdf
draw
any
conclusions"
based
on
draft
EPA
memo
regarding
lead
Included
in
chronological
compilation
of
MDEQ
e-mails
from
FOIA
ACLU
reporter
Curt
Guyette
contacts
MDEQ
regarding
Del
Toral's
draft
Interim
flintwaterstudy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/MDEQ-USEPA-
requests,
created
by
Roy/Edwards
and
posted
to
Flint
Water
Study
Report
Final.pdf
website
flintwaterstudy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/MDEQ-USEPA-
Chronological
compilation
of
MDEQ
e-mails
from
FOIA
requests
MDEQ
Public
Information
Officer
Karen
Tommasulo
emails
Wurfel/MDEQ
as
Final.pdf
(Roy/Edwards)
posted
to
Flint
Water
Study
website
Michigan
Public
Radio
begins
picking
up
on
the
ACLU
reports
concerning
Flint
lead-
www.freep.com/story/opinion/columnists/nancy-
Detroit
Free
Press
(Oct.
22,
2015):
"MDEQ
e-mails
show
stunning
in-water
issue.
"Apparently,
it
is
going
to
be
a
thing
now.
kaffer/2015/10/21/indifference-characterized-state-approach-
indifference
to
Flint
peril"
(Kaffer)
flint-water/74289430/
The
Nation
(July
16,
2015):
"In
Flint,
Michigan,
Overpriced
Water
is
www.thenation.com/article/in-flint-michigan-overpriced-water-is-
ACLU-Michigan
reporter
Curt
Guyette
breaks
story
of
concerns
about
lead
in
Flints
Causing
People's
Skin
to
Erupt
in
Rashes
and
Hair
to
Fall
Out"
causing-peoples-skin-to-erupt-and-hair-to-fall-out/
drinking
water
by
detailing
the
June
24
EPA-Del
Toral
memo,
reporting
the
high
lead
(Guyette)
Attachment
33
-
MDEQ
documentation
provided
to
FWATF
Nov.
levels
in
LeeAnne
Walterss
water,
and
exposing
the
lack
of
corrosion
control
in
Flint
E-mail
from
B.
Wurfel/MDEQ
dated
July
9,
2015
is
included
in
6,
2015.
drinking
water
treatment
chronological
compilation
of
MDEQ
e-mails
from
FOIA
requests
flintwaterstudy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/MDEQ-USEPA-
(Roy/Edwards)
posted
to
Flint
Water
Study
website
Final.pdf
Susan
Hedman/EPA
Region
5
(based
in
Chicago)
writes
to
Flint
Mayor
Walling
to
say
As
reported
in
Bridge
Magazine
(Feb.
4,
2016):
"Disaster
Day
by
bridgemi.com/2016/03/flint-crisis-timeline-part-3/
that
EPA
will
work
with
MDEQ
on
issues
related
to
lead
in
water
Day:
A
detailed
Flint
crisis
timeline"
3/20/16
3/12/16
1/31/16
3/13/16
3/20/16
3/13/16
3/13/16
3/20/16
13
Date
July
13,
2015
August 4, 2015
August 7, 2015
Event
Reference Document
Sources
Michigan
Radio
quotes
Wurfel's
reassurances
in
story
on
EPA
memo.
"Let
me
start
here
anyone
who
is
concerned
about
lead
in
the
drinking
water
in
Flint
can
relax
Michigan
Radio
(July
13,
2015):
Leaked
internal
memo
shows
michiganradio.org/post/leaked-internal-memo-shows-federal-
It
does
not
look
like
there
is
any
broad
problem
with
the
water
supply
freeing
up
federal
regulators
concerns
about
lead
in
Flints
water"
(Smith)
regulator-s-concerns-about-lead-flint-s-water#stream/0
lead
as
it
goes
to
homes."
MDEQ
issues
construction
permit
to
Flint
for
Granular
Activated
Carbon
filter
media
Attachment
34
-
MDEQ
documentation
provided
to
FWATF
Nov.
MDEQ
Construction
Permit
W151055
W151055
6,
2015
EPA
and
MDEQ
hold
conference
call
re:
LCR
implementation
and
Flint;
EPA
informs
"Notes
on
Call
with
MDEQ
on
July
21,
2015
-
MDEQ
MDEQ
of
its
interpretation
of
LCR.
EPA
wants
corrosion
control
implemented
in
Implementation
of
LCR
Rule
and
Flint
Issues,"
included
in
flintwaterstudy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/MDEQ-USEPA-
Flint,
but
MDEQ
believes
this
is
premature,
per
e-mail
from
Shekter
Smith/MDEQ
to
chronological
compilation
of
MDEQ
e-mails
from
FOIA
requests,
Final.pdf
Hyde/EPA
later
the
same
day
requesting
EPA
concurrence
on
MDEQ
approach
created
by
Roy/Edwards
and
posted
to
Flint
Water
Study
website
Gov.
Snyder's
Chief
of
Staff
Dennis
Muchmore
e-mails
MDHHS
director
Lyon
re:
community
concerns
about
lead
in
the
water.
"These
folks
are
scared
and
worried
mi.gov/documents/snyder/FlintWaterTimeline_FINAL_511424_7.
Gov.
Snyder's
Flint
Water
timeline
(released
Jan.
2016)
about
the
health
impacts
and
they
are
basically
getting
blown
off
by
us
(as
a
state
pdf
we're
just
not
sympathizing
with
their
plight)"
Linda
Dykema,
director
of
MDHHS
Division
of
Environmental
Health,
provides
detailed
response
to
the
Muchmore
inquiry
via
email
to
MDHHS
managers.
"DEQ
has
not
seen
a
change
in
the
citys
compliance
with
the
lead
rule
since
switching
to
Chronological
compilation
of
MDEQ
e-mails
from
FOIA
requests,
flintwaterstudy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/MDEQ-USEPA-
the
Flint
River
source
Regarding
the
EPA
drinking
water
official
quoted
in
the
press
created
by
Roy/Edwards
and
posted
to
Flint
Water
Study
website Final.pdf
articles,
the
report
that
he
issued
was
a
result
of
his
own
research
and
was
not
reviewed
or
approved
by
EPA
management.
He
has
essentially
acted
outside
his
authority"
Chronological
compilation
of
MDEQ
e-mails
from
FOIA
requests,
flintwaterstudy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/MDEQ-USEPA-
In
response
to
Muchmore's
July
22
e-mail,
Wurfel/MDEQ
writes,
The
bottom
line
is
created
by
Roy/Edwards
and
posted
to
Flint
Water
Study
website Final.pdf
that
the
residents
of
Flint
do
not
need
to
worry
about
lead
in
their
water
supply,
and
Detroit
News
(Jan.
7,
2016):
"Flint
crisis
response
delayed
for
www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/2016/01/07/flint-
DEQ's
recent
sampling
does
not
indicate
an
eminent
[sic]
health
threat"
months"
(Lynch)
emails/78410314/
MDEQ
prepares
e-mail
and
draft
letter
re:
Flint
90th
percentile
lead
determination
MDEQ
e-mail
correspondence
dated
July
20-21,
2015;
MDEQ
letter
Attachment
36
-
MDEQ
documentation
provided
to
FWATF
Nov.
at
11
ppb
and
City
of
Flint
requirement
to
add
corrosion
control
treatment
to
Flint
re:
Lead
and
Copper
Monitoring
dated
July
27,
2015
6,
2015
City
provides
MDEQ
its
original
LCR
report
documenting
lead
levels
measured
in
FOIA'd
information
on
Flint
Water
Study
website,
including
original
flintwaterstudy.org/2015/09/commentary-MDEQ-mistakes-
sampling
from
1/1/15
to
6/30/15.
LCR
report
is
later
"scrubbed"
after
Flint
meets
and
"scrubbed"
LCR
reports
deception-flint-water-crisis/
with
MDEQ
and
is
released
on
August
20,
with
two
high
lead
results
excluded
Flint
Water
Study
website:
"Chronology
of
MDHHS
E-mails
Cristin
Larder/MDHHS
e-mails
other
MDHHS
staff
indicating
blood
lead
levels
were
flintwaterstudy.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/MDHHS-FOIA-II-
pertaining
to
blood
lead
levels
of
kids
in
Michigan,
primarily
in
unusually
elevated
in
summer
2014
FINAL-For-Web.pdf
Flint
-
Part
II"
(Roy/Edwards)
Nancy
Peeler/MDDHS
sends
e-mail
confirming
analysis
shows
lead
levels
spiked
in
Attachment
37
-
MDEQ
documentation
provided
to
FWATF
Nov.
E-mail
correspondence
-
MDHHS
and
MDEQ,
dated
July
22-28,
July-September
2014,
but
"that
pattern
was
not
terribly
different
from
what
we
saw
6,
2015.
2015
in
the
previous
three
years"
flintwaterstudy.org
MDEQ
representatives
meet
with
City
of
Flint
representatives,
community
activists
MDEQ
e-mail
dated
August
10,
2014
documenting
meeting
notes
and
pastors,
and
LeeAnne
Walters
at
Gov.
Snyders
office
LeeAnne
Walters
and
Melissa
Mays
meet
with
MDEQ
officials
Shekter
Smith,
Busch
and
Wurfel
to
discuss
lead
in
water
problems.
Walters
and
Mays
report
Shekter
Flint
Water
Study
website
(Sep.
30,
2015):
"COMMENTARY:
MDEQ
Smith
said
Mr.
Del
Toral
has
been
handled
and
Flint
residents
would
not
be
Mistakes
and
Deception
Created
the
Flint
Water
Crisis"
(Roy)
hearing
from
him
again
Genesee
County
Circuit
Court
Judge
Hayman
issues
emergency
injunction
on
earlier
Flint
water
rate
increase
and
orders
City
to
roll
back
water
and
sewer
rates
by
35
MLive
(Aug.
7,
2015):
"Judge
orders
Flint
to
cut
water
rates
35
percent,
repay
its
water
and
sewer
fund
$15.7
million
transferred
in
2007
to
settle
a
percent
in
sweeping
injunction"
(Fonger)
sewer
overflow
claim,
and
immediately
stop
water
disconnections
and
liens
for
past-
due
bills
Poy/EPA
e-mails
Shekter
Smith
and
Busch/MDEQ
inquiring
re:
action
on
corrosion
Chronological
compilation
of
MDEQ
e-mails
from
FOIA
requests
control
in
Flint
(Roy/Edwards)
posted
to
Flint
Water
Study
website
MDEQ
notifies
Flint
of
lead/copper
monitoring
results
from
Jan-June
2015
Letter
to
Wright/Flint
from
Rosenthal/MDEQ
included
in
monitoring
period,
and
requires
City
to
install
corrosion
control
for
LCR
compliance.
chronological
compilation
of
MDEQ
e-mails
from
FOIA
requests
Indicates
Flint
has
6
months
to
fully
optimize
corrosion
control,
but
recommends
(Roy/Edwards)
posted
to
Flint
Water
Study
website
starting
phosphate
treatment
as
soon
as
possible
Accessed
3/13/16
3/13/16
1/31/16
3/13/16
3/13/16
3/13/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/13/16
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/08/flint_ordered_to_
cut_water_rat.html
3/13/16
flintwaterstudy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/MDEQ-USEPA-
Final.pdf
3/13/16
flintwaterstudy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/MDEQ-USEPA-
Final.pdf
3/13/16
14
Date
Event
Reference Document
Genesee
County
Circuit
Court
places
preliminary
injunction
on
prior
Flint
water
rate
MLive
(Aug.
17,
2015):
"Judge
signs
order
for
lower
Flint
water
August
17,
2015
increase
rates,
$15.7
million
payback"
(Fonger)
August
20,
2015
"Scrubbed"
LCR
report
for
City
of
Flint
is
provided
to
ACLU-MI
in
reponse
to
FOIA
request
EPA
and
MDEQ
hold
conference
call:
second
6-month
monitioring
test
results
for
August
31,
2015 January-July
2015
indicate
90th
percentile
at
11
ppb.
It
is
determined
that
CCT
is
needed
and
implementation
steps
are
delineated
Wurfel/MDEQ
e-mails
Busch,
Shekter
Smith,
Prysby
and
Director
Wyant/MDEQ,
August
31,
2015 copying
Gov.
Snyder
aides
Muchmore,
Hollins,
Murray
and
Sara
Wurfel.
Raises
concerns
about
Edwards/VT's
tests
and
accompanying
media
coverage
Genesee
County
Circuit
Court
certifies
class
in
class
action
lawsuit
on
Sept.
2011
August
31,
2015
water
rate
increase
Mayor
accepts
petition
calling
for
return
to
DWSD
service.
Administration
August
31,
2015 statements
cite
TTHM
compliance.
"Water
from
the
treatment
plant
is
significantly
better
now
and
comparable
with
Detroit's"
-
Henderson
August
31,
2015 Edwards/VT
reports
on
corrosive
lead
levels
City
of
Flint
announces
projected
loss
from
disconnect
moratorium
and
new
water
September
1,
2015 rates
incompliance
with
Court
order;
begins
sending
bills
with
reduced
rates
as
mandated
by
Judge
Hayman
VT
researchers
report
elevated
lead
levels
in
Flint
water,
communicating
that
the
corrosiveness
of
Flint
water
is
causing
lead
to
leach
into
residents'
water
through
September
2,
2015
pipes.
"...the
current
Flint
River
water
leaches
12X
more
lead
to
the
water
than
Detroit
water"
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/08/judge_certifies_cl
ass_action_l.html
Flint
Water
Study
website
(Sep.
30,
2015):
"COMMENTARY:
MDEQ
flintwaterstudy.org/2015/09/commentary-mdeq-mistakes-
Mistakes
and
Deception
Created
the
Flint
Water
Crisis"
(Roy)
deception-flint-water-crisis/
Marc
Edwards/Virginia
Tech
notifies
City
of
Flint
and
MDEQ
that
VT
has
begun
collecting
samples
for
a
water
quality
study
in
Flint
Sources
Accessed
3/13/16
3/12/16
flintwaterstudy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/MDEQ-USEPA-
Final.pdf
3/13/16
flintwaterstudy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/MDEQ-USEPA-
Final.pdf
3/13/16
flintwaterstudy.org/2015/08/analysis-of-water-samples-from-48-
flint-homes-to-date-for-lead-are-worrisome/
3/13/16
flintwaterstudy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/MDEQ-USEPA-
Final.pdf
3/13/16
flintwaterstudy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/MDEQ-USEPA-
Final.pdf
3/13/16
mi.gov/documents/snyder/FlintWaterTimeline_FINAL_511424_7.
pdf
1/31/16
flintwaterstudy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/MDEQ-USEPA-
Final.pdf
3/13/16
bridgemi.com/2016/03/flint-crisis-timeline-part-3/
3/12/16
MLive
(Aug.
31,
2015):
"Judge
OKs
class
action
lawsuit
for
Flint
water
customers
against
city"
(Fonger)
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/08/judge_certifies_cl
ass_action_i.html
3/13/16
MLive
(Aug.
31,
2015):
"Flint
mayor
accepts
petitions
but
not
call
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/08/flint_mayor_acce
to
end
use
of
Flint
River"
(Fonger)
pts_petitions.html
3/13/16
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/09/new_testing_sho
ws_flint_water.html
3/13/16
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/09/post_436.html
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/09/typical_flint_wate
r_bill_will.html
3/13/16
Flint
Water
Study
website
(Sep.
2,
2015):
"Flint
River
water
is
very
flintwaterstudy.org/2015/09/flint-rivers-water-is-very-corrosive-
corrosive
to
lead,
and
causing
lead
contamination
in
homes"
(Roy)
to-lead-and-causing-lead-contamination-in-homes/
3/13/16
15
Date
Event
Reference Document
Sources
flintwaterstudy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/MDEQ-USEPA-
Final.pdf
September 2, 2015
Anonymous
company
donates
1,500
kitchen
water
filters
to
Concerned
Pastors
for
Gov.
Snyder's
e-mails
(released
Jan.
20,
2016)
distribution
to
Flint
residents,
as
documented
in
Hollins
e-mail
to
Gov.
Snyder
September 3, 2015
Prysby/MDEQ
e-mails
Benzie/MDEQ
stating
that
City
administration
said
there
will
Chronological
compilation
of
MDEQ
e-mails
from
FOIA
requests
be
no
funding
restrictions
for
installing
corrosion
control
(Roy/Edwards)
posted
to
Flint
Water
Study
website
flintwaterstudy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/MDEQ-USEPA-
Final.pdf
September 2, 2015 MDEQ notifies Flint of return to compliance on Disinfection Byproducts (TTHM)
September 3, 2015
September 3, 2015
September 8, 2015
September
8,
2015
September
9,
2015
September 9, 2015
Croft/Flint
DPW
e-mails
state
and
local
officials
announcing
that
Flint
is
in
compliance
with
MI
SDWA
/
report
160+
lead
samples
since
switch,
remain
within
Chronological
compilation
of
MDEQ
e-mails
from
FOIA
requests
flintwaterstudy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/MDEQ-USEPA-
EPA
standards.
Note
expect
optimization
plan
within
4
months
by
1/1/2016
(faster
(Roy/Edwards)
posted
to
Flint
Water
Study
website
Final.pdf
than
other
cities)
MLive
(Sep.
3,
2015):
"Lower
TTHM
levels
put
Flint
in
compliance
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/09/lower_tthm_level
MLive
reports
on
compliance
with
TTHM
issues
but
also
notes
lead
concerns
with
Safe
Drinking
Water
Act"
(Fonger)
s_moves_flint.html
Edwards/VT
publishes
full
results
to
date
of
his
Flint
water
testing.
FLINT
HAS
A
Flint
Water
Study
website:
"Lead
testing
results
for
water
sampled
VERY
SERIOUS
LEAD
IN
WATER
PROBLEM.
Forty
percent
of
the
first
draw
samples
flintwaterstudy.org/information-for-flint-residents/results-for-
by
residents"
(Edwards,
Roy,
Rhoads).
Includes
link
to
lead
data
for
are
over
five
parts
per
billion
Several
samples
exceeded
100
ppb
and
one
sample
citizen-testing-for-lead-300-kits/
all
271
residences
sampled
at
that
point
collected
after
45
seconds
of
flushing
exceeded
1000
ppb."
Edwards/VT
e-mails
Mayor
Walling
re:
lead
in
water
issue.
"I
have
no
idea
what
As
reported
in
Bridge
Magazine
(Feb.
4,
2016):
"Disaster
Day
by
MDEQs
agenda
is,
but
based
on
their
press
releases
and
actions
to
date,
protecting
bridgemi.com/2016/03/flint-crisis-timeline-part-3/
Day:
A
detailed
Flint
crisis
timeline"
the
public
and
following
Federal
laws,
does
not
seem
to
be
a
priority."
MDHHS
begins
to
develop
educational
program
regarding
reducing
the
risk
of
lead
From
MDHHS
e-mails
posted
online
somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/dhhs.pdf
exposure
for
children,
in
response
to
media
coverage
of
Edwards/VTs
test
results
Wurfel/MDEQ
e-mails
Fonger/MLive
re:
Edwards's
test
results.
Virginia
Tech
researchers
only
just
arrived
in
town
and
(have)
quickly
proven
the
theory
they
set
Chronological
compilation
of
MDEQ
e-mails
from
FOIA
requests
out
to
prove...
offering
broad,
dire
public
health
advice
based
on
some
quick
testing
(Roy/Edwards)
posted
to
Flint
Water
Study
website
could
be
seen
as
fanning
political
flames
irresponsibly
Michelle
Bruneau/MDHHS
e-mails
Kory
Gretsch/MDHHS:
"if
we're
going
to
take
As
reported
in
Bridge
Magazine
(Feb.
4,
2016):
"Disaster
Day
by
action
it
needs
to
be
soon
before
the
Virginia
Tech
University
folks
scandalize
us
all" Day:
A
detailed
Flint
crisis
timeline"
Crooks/EPA
e-mails
Shekter
Smith/MDEQ
with
notes
from
Aug.
31,
2015
conference
call
re:
lead
in
water;
includes
action
plan.
"EPA
acknowledged
that
to
delay
Chronological
compilation
of
MDEQ
e-mails
from
FOIA
requests
installation
of
corrosion
control
treatment
in
Flint
would
likely
cause
even
higher
(Roy/Edwards)
posted
to
Flint
Water
Study
website
levels
of
lead
over
time
as
Flints
many
lead
service
lines
are
continuously
in
contact
with
corrosive
water"
State
Senator
Ananich
and
Representatives
Neeley
and
Phelps
send
questions
re:
Chronological
compilation
of
MDEQ
e-mails
from
FOIA
requests
Flint
lead-in-water
issue
to
Wyant/MDEQ
(Roy/Edwards)
posted
to
Flint
Water
Study
website
Dr.
Mona
Hanna-Attisha
contacts
Dr.
Lawrence
Reynolds
with
concerns
re:
childrens
blood
lead
levels
in
light
of
Edwards/VT's
findings.
She
convenes
Hurley
Medical
Center
(HMC)
Research
Team.
Dr.
Reynolds
contacts
MDHHS
Childhood
Information
provided
by
Dr.
Lawrence
Reynolds
Lead
Poisoning
Prevention
Program
(CLPPP)
with
data
request
for
Flint
EBLLs,
and
contacts
MDEQ
staffer
who
states
MDEQ
is
awaiting
a
letter
from
MDHHS
regarding
health
issues
and
action
Robert
Scott/MDHHS
obtains
Edwards/VT's
grant
proposal
to
the
National
Science
Foundation
for
funding
for
his
Virginia
Tech
/
Flint
Water
Study
and
forwards
it
to
As
reported
in
Bridge
Magazine
(Feb.
4,
2016):
"Disaster
Day
by
MDHHS
colleagues
Peeler,
Lishinski
and
Priem.
"Sounds
like
there
might
be
more
to
Day:
A
detailed
Flint
crisis
timeline"
this
than
what
we
learned
previously.
Yikes!
Crooks/EPA
sends
e-mail
to
MDEQ
confirming
that
EPA
did
not
directly
transmit
the
E-mail
from
J.
Crooks
to
MDEQ
draft
June
24,
2015
Interim
Report
memo
to
MDEQ
Accessed
3/13/16
3/12/16
3/13/16
3/13/16
3/13/16
3/13/16
3/12/16
3/19/16
flintwaterstudy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/MDEQ-USEPA-
Final.pdf
3/13/16
bridgemi.com/2016/03/flint-crisis-timeline-part-3/
3/12/16
flintwaterstudy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/MDEQ-USEPA-
Final.pdf
3/13/16
flintwaterstudy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/MDEQ-USEPA-
Final.pdf
3/13/16
bridgemi.com/2016/03/flint-crisis-timeline-part-3/
3/12/16
16
Date
September
11,
2015
Event
Reference Document
Sources
Accessed
3/13/16
3/13/16
3/13/16
3/12/16
3/13/16
3/13/16
3/13/16
3/13/16
17
Date
Event
Reference Document
Sources
Accessed
3/13/16
3/13/16
3/15/16
3/13/16
3/13/16
3/13/16
3/12/16
3/13/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
18
Date
September
28,
2015
Event
Reference Document
Sen.
Ananich
sends
letter
to
Gov.
Snyder
requesting
assistance
in
Flint
-
transition
to
Included
in
Gov.
Snyder's
e-mails
released
Jan.
20,
2016
(p.
safe
water
supply,
corrosion
control
treatment,
filters,
infrastructure
85/274)
MDHHS
Director
Nick
Lyon
e-mails
staff
in
his
department
for
help
refuting
VT/HMC
blood
lead
level
data.
I
need
an
analysis
of
the
Virginia
Tech/Hurley
data
and
their
conclusions.
I
would
like
to
make
a
strong
statement
with
a
demonstration
of
proof
As
reported
in
Bridge
Magazine
(Feb.
4,
2016):
"Disaster
Day
by
that
the
lead
blood
levels
seen
are
not
out
of
the
ordinary
and
are
attributable
to
Day:
A
detailed
Flint
crisis
timeline"
seasonal
fluctuations.
Geralyn
(Lasher)
is
working
on
this
for
me
but
she
needs
someone
in
public
health
who
can
work
directly
with
her
on
immediate
concerns/questions.
Valacek/GCHD
e-mails
Rashmi
and
Travis/MDHHS
requesting
confirmation
that
As
reported
in
Bridge
Magazine
(Feb.
4,
2016):
"Disaster
Day
by
blood
lead
levels
have
not
shown
significant
increase
since
switch
to
Flint
River
Day:
A
detailed
Flint
crisis
timeline"
water
supply
--
asks
again
the
following
day
Gov.
Snyder
is
copied
on
a
briefing
re:
Flint
lead
issue
that
states
the
water
system
is
As
reported
in
Bridge
Magazine
(Feb.
4,
2016):
"Disaster
Day
by
in
compliance.
Briefing
document
under-states
lead
sampling
results,
downplays
Day:
A
detailed
Flint
crisis
timeline"
problems
and
emphasizes
the
high
cost
of
replacing
lead
service
lines
Wurfel/MDEQ
states
in
National
Public
Radio
interview
that
Del
Toral's
draft
report
NPR
(Sep.
29,
2015):
"High
Lead
Levels
In
Michigan
Kids
After
City
was
the
work
of
a
"rogue
employee"
Switches
Water
Source"
(Hulett)
Detroit
Free
Press
publishes
their
own
analysis
of
state's
blood
lead
level
data,
Detroit
Free
Press
(Sep.
29,
2015):
"State
data
confirms
higher
saying
the
state's
data
actually
support
the
HMC
findings
blood-lead
levels
in
Flint
kids"
(Tanner,
Kaffer)
Executive
Director
to
the
Governor
Allison
Scott
e-mails
Snyder
aides
Muchmore,
As
reported
in
Bridge
Magazine
(Feb.
4,
2016):
"Disaster
Day
by
Agen,
Clement,
Wyant/MDEQ
and
Lyon/MDHHS
re:
meeting
to
discuss
emergency
Day:
A
detailed
Flint
crisis
timeline"
management
approach
for
Flint
situation
Lasher/MDHHS
circulates
to
colleagues
an
advisory
from
Genesee
County
that
demands
fresh
analysis
of
state
blood
level
data
and
threatens
to
seek
third-party
analysis
of
the
state
data
MDHHS
has
consistently
used
to
suggest
no
elevated
From
MDHHS
e-mails
posted
online
blood
lead
levels
due
to
the
Flint
water.
"I
understand
that
we
are
still
reviewing
the
data
but
the
county
has
basically
issued
a
ransom
date
that
they
want
this
information
by
tomorrow"
Lasher/MDHHS
e-mails
Peeler,
Eden
Wells
(state
CMO),
Scott/MDHHS
requesting
blood
lead
data
for
children
under
age
6,
to
compare
with
other
evaluations.
As
reported
in
Bridge
Magazine
(Feb.
4,
2016):
"Disaster
Day
by
Response
from
Linda
Dykema
to
Corinne
Miller,
Sara
LyonCallo
and
Eden
Wells
Day:
A
detailed
Flint
crisis
timeline"
discourages
"data
war"
Dr.
Hanna-Attisha
e-mails
Wells/MDHHS
with
updated
findings
on
blood
lead
levels
correlated
to
water
supply
switch;
Wells
asks
when
Hanna-Attisha
is
going
public
with
the
results.
Hanna-Attisha:
"...when
we
noticed
our
findings
and
the
glaring
correlation
to
elevated
water
lead
levels
in
the
same
locations
and
learned
that
corrosion
control
as
never
added
to
the
water
treatment,
we
ethically
could
not
stay
From
MDHHS
e-mails
posted
online
silent.
In
addition,
your
annual
elevated
blood
level
percentage
supports
our
findings
annual
decrease
(as
seen
nationally)
and
then
an
increase
post-water
switch.
We
also
knew
that
releasing
our
data
would
only
incite
a
data
war;
however,
the
more
we
dig,
the
more
alarming
the
results."
Included
in
Gov.
Snyder's
e-mails
released
Jan.
20,
2016
(p.
Gov.
Snyder
receives
a
detailed
timeline
for
Flint
water
issues
prepared
by
Treasury
102/274)
Genesee
County
issues
its
own
public
health
advisory
for
people
using
water
MLive
(Sep.
29,
2015):
"Genesee
County
joins
city
in
issuing
health
supplied
by
Flint
system
advisory
on
lead
in
Flint
water"
(Fonger)
Mayor
Walling
forwards
Wyant/MDEQ
an
e-mail
from
Fr.
Phil
Schmitter
that
states:
You
delayed
your
action
on
this
issue
for
an
inordinate
amount
of
time.
People
were
told
over
and
over
that
it
was
all
fine
I
no
longer
trust
the
city
on
this
issue.
As
reported
in
Bridge
Magazine
(Feb.
4,
2016):
"Disaster
Day
by
And
that
we
have
now
a
lead
problem
for
babies
and
children
is
unconscionable.
Day:
A
detailed
Flint
crisis
timeline"
Walling:
"I
dont
know
what
more
I
could
have
done
given
the
guidance
coming
from
EPA
and
DEQ
and
subsequently
city
staff
but
this
major
health
issue
did
come
up
anyway
and
our
community
is
paying
a
huge
price."
Sources
Accessed
somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p
df
3/12/16
bridgemi.com/2016/03/flint-crisis-timeline-part-3/
3/13/16
bridgemi.com/2016/03/flint-crisis-timeline-part-3/
3/13/16
bridgemi.com/2016/03/flint-crisis-timeline-part-3/
3/13/16
www.npr.org/2015/09/29/444497051/high-lead-levels-in-
michigan-kids-after-city-switches-water-source
www.freep.com/story/opinion/columnists/nancy-
kaffer/2015/09/26/state-data-flint-lead/72820798/
3/13/16
3/13/16
bridgemi.com/2016/03/flint-crisis-timeline-part-3/
3/13/16
somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/dhhs.pdf
3/13/16
bridgemi.com/2016/03/flint-crisis-timeline-part-3/
3/13/16
somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/dhhs.pdf
3/13/16
somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p
df
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/09/genesee_county_
also_issues_pub.html
3/12/16
3/13/16
bridgemi.com/2016/03/flint-crisis-timeline-part-3/
3/13/16
www.cityofflint.com/wp-content/uploads/Quarterly-Water-
Quality-Report_Oct-15.pdf
3/13/16
19
Date
Event
October 2015 Michigan Office of the Auditor General begins formal review of MDEQ ODWMA
October 1, 2015
October 1, 2015
October
1,
2015
October
1,
2015
October
1,
2015
October
1,
2015
October 2, 2015
October 2, 2015
State
CMO
Wells
confirms
HMC
blood
lead
level
data
(showing
greatly
increased
blood
lead
levels
in
some
Flint
neighborhoods).
After
a
comprehensive
and
detailed
"Blood
Lead
Levels
in
Flint
Talking
Points,"
dated
Oct.
5,
2015,
review
down
to
the
zip
code
level,
we
have
found
that
the
state
analysis
is
from
MDHHS
e-mails
posted
online
consistent
with
that
presented
by
Hurley.
Genesee
County
Board
of
Commissioners
and
GCHD
issue
Do
Not
Drink
Advisory
Public
Health
Emergency
Declaration
for
People
Using
the
Flint
for
Flint
water
using
the
Flint
River
as
a
source;
news
conference.
GCHD
declares
City
Water
Supply
with
the
Flint
River
as
the
Source
Public
Health
Emergency.
Flint
Mayor
Walling
issues
statement
on
advisory
saying
MLive
(Oct.
1,
2015):
"Don't
drink
Flint's
water,
Genesee
County
Flint
Water
customers
should
filter
their
water
before
drinking
it
leaders
warn"
(Johnson)
Private
and
public
sources
donate
$105,000
to
fund
5,000
water
filters
for
Flint
MLive
(Oct.
1,
2015):
"More
than
5,000
in
Flint
to
get
lead
water
residences;
to
be
distributed
to
"highest
risk
populations
first"
filters
following
donation"
(Adams)
MLive
reports
that
Flint
Water
stores
service
line
records
on
index
cards,
making
it
MLive
(Oct.
1,
2015):
"Flint
data
on
lead
water
lines
stored
on
difficult
to
identify
highest-risk
locations
for
lead
pollution
45,000
index
cards"
(Fonger)
Greater
Flint
chapter
ACLU
joins
petition
urging
EPA
to
order
Flint
to
reconnect
to
MLive
(Oct.
2,
2015):
"Petition
launched
for
EPA
intervention
in
DWSD
system
Flint
water
crisis"
(Emery)
Referenced
in
Gov.
Snyder's
e-mails
released
Jan.
20,
2016
(p.
DWSD
provides
proposal
for
reconnecting
Flint
to
DWSD
system
97/274)
Governor's
Office,
EPA
Region
5,
City
of
Flint,
MDEQ
and
MDHHS
hold
press
conference
announcing
Governors
Flint
10-point
Action
Plan
to
address
water
Press
release
-
"Gov.
Rick
Snyder:
Comprehensive
action
plan
will
system,
$1
million
for
water
filters,
and
anti-corrosion
treatment.
Governor's
press
help
Flint
residents
address
water
concerns";
press
conference
release
also
says
the
water
leaving
Flint's
system
is
safe
to
drink
but
families
with
announcement
lead
plumbing
in
their
homes
could
have
higher
lead
levels
Gov.
Snyder
requests
"clear
side
by
side
comparison
of
health
benefits
and
cost
of
Included
in
Gov.
Snyder's
e-mails
released
Jan.
20,
2016
(p.
GLWA
vs.
a
more
optimized
Flint
system"
in
e-mail
to
Muchmore
102/274)
October
2,
2015 GCHD
school
screening
water
samples
are
collected
for
lead
analysis
October
6,
2015
October
7,
2015
October
8,
2015
October
8,
2015
October
8,
2015
Reference Document
E-mails
indicate
Wyant/MDEQ
Director
will
update
Gov.
Snyder
daily
on
Flint
water
action
plan
announced
Oct.
2
State
Budget
Director
John
Roberts
outlines
$10.4
million
in
state
aid
to
implement
the
action
plan
of
October
2
Gov.
Snyder
holds
press
conference:
Flint
to
reconnect
to
Great
Lakes
Water
Authority/Detroit
Water
and
Sewerage
Department
City
of
Flint
develops
its
plan
to
reconnect
to
Detroit
Water
and
Sewerage
Department
Wyant/MDEQ
briefs
Gov.
Snyder
on
Flint
water
issues;
affirms
elevated
test
results
for
lead
in
water
at
Flint
schools
October 8, 2015 Detroit paper publishes editorial criticizing causes of/response to Flint water crisis
Sources
audgen.michigan.gov/wip/wip761032015.html
Michigan
Radio
(Oct.
20,
2015):
"Auditor
general
looking
into
state
michiganradio.org/post/auditor-general-looking-state-agency-
agency
responsible
for
monitoring
Flint
water"
(Carmody)
responsible-monitoring-flint-water#stream/0
somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/dhhs.pdf
Attachment
49
-
MDEQ
documentation
provided
to
FWATF
Nov.
6,
2015.
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/10/genesee_county_l
eaders_warn_do.html#incart_river_mobile
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/10/more_than_5000
_in_flint_to_get.html
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/10/flint_official_says
_data_on_lo.html
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/10/greater_flint_aclu
_holds_meeti.html
somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p
df
www.michigan.gov/som/0,4669,7-192-29701-366287--,00.html
Attachment
50
-
MDEQ
documentation
provided
to
FWATF
Nov.
6,
2015
somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p
df
Attachment
51
-
MDEQ
documentation
provided
to
FWATF
Nov.
6,
2015
somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p
df
somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p
df
Attachment
52
-
MDEQ
documentation
provided
to
FWATF
Nov.
6,
2015
somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p
df
www.freep.com/story/opinion/editorials/2015/10/08/flint-water-
crisis-obscene-failure-government/73578640/
Accessed
3/13/16
3/13/16
3/13/16
3/13/16
3/13/16
3/13/16
3/12/16
3/13/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/13/16
Detroit
Free
Press
publishes
article
with
details
on
corrosivity
of
Flint
River
water,
based
on
VT's
study.
"The
tests
showed
Flint
Water
without
added
phosphates
October
11,
2015
corroded
the
lead
at
19
times
the
rate
of
Detroit
water.
Even
when
phosphates
were
added,
it
corroded
at
16
times
the
rate
of
the
Detroit
water."
(DFP
10-11-15)
Detroit
Free
Press
(Oct.
11,
2015):
"Chemical
testing
could
have
predicted
Flint's
water
crisis"
(Wisely,
Erb)
www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2015/10/10/missed-
opportunities-flint-water-crisis/73688428/
3/13/16
October 13, 2015 MDEQ announces plans for statewide lead education campaign focused on schools
www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2015/10/13/lead-
water-flint-michigan-testing/73871480/
3/13/16
State
Legislature
authorizes
$9.35
million
to
help
City
of
Flint
pay
for
return
to
DWSD
water
system,
water
filters,
and
staff
at
schools
to
gauge
lead
exposure
October
14,
2015
(signed
by
Gov.
Snyder
Oct.
15).
C.S.
Mott
Foundation
pledges
another
$4
million
and
City
of
Flint
will
provide
additional
$2
million
Detroit
Free
Press
(Oct.
14,
2015):
"Michigan
House
OKs
$9.35M
to
www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2015/10/14/michiga
aid
in
Flint
water
crisis"
(Gray)
n-house-oks-915m-aid-flint-water-crisis/73932980/
DWSD
and
City
of
Flint
execute
water
supply
contract,
and
City
of
Flint
is
reconnected
to
DWSD
system
October
16,
2015 First
weekly
coordination
meeting
held
between
City
of
Flint
and
state
agencies
Flint
Water
Crisis
Timeline
3/13/16
20
Date
Event
MDEQ
meets
with
Flint
Schools
Superintendent
and
Genesee
County
Health
Department
EPA
announces
formation
of
Flint
Safe
Drinking
Water
Task
Force
to
provide
October
16,
2015
technical
expertise
to
MDEQ
and
City
of
Flint
Edwards/VT
e-mails
Wyant/DEQ,
state
legislators
and
Flint
residents
Walters
and
October
16,
2015
Mays
citing
inaccuracies
in
lead
sampling
and
communication
October
16,
2015
Reference Document
Sources
yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/0/A92DE629DB86E6668525
7EE000579593
flintwaterstudy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/MDEQ-USEPA-
Final.pdf
media.wix.com/ugd/60e74e_dc3d45b23fd5418fbb6ec65d0ad974
MDEQ
approves
GCDC
Water
Supply
System
permit
for
new
30-mgd
WTP
MDEQ
Permit
W151099
13.pdf
Detroit
News
(Oct.
19,
2015):
"Michigan
DEQ
vows
changes
in
Flint
www.detroitnews.com/story/news/environment/2015/10/18/de
MDEQ
Director
Dan
Wyant
issues
statement
saying
his
office
was
mistaken
in
how
it
water
crisis"
(Lynch)
q-mistakes/74198882/
interpreted
federal
rules
governing
corrosion
control
for
water
systems
the
size
of
MLive
(Oct.
19,
2015):
"DEQ
chief
says
state
used
wrong
federal
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/10/state_deq_flint_s
Flint;
also
says
ODWMA
chief
Shekter
Smith
is
being
reassigned
to
help
with
FOIA
water
rules
in
Flint
for
17
months"
(Fonger)
hould_have_be.html
requests,
and
is
being
replaced
by
interim
chief
Jim
Sygo
MLive
(Oct.
19,
2015):
"DEQ
replaces
water
official
after
state
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/10/top_state_water_
acknowledges
'mistake'
in
Flint"
(Fonger)
official_repla.html
U.S.
Rep.
Dan
Kildee,
D-Flint,
and
state
Senate
Minority
Leader
Jim
Ananich,
D-Flint,
MLive
(Oct.
21,
2015):
"Kildee,
Ananich
call
for
federal
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/10/kildee_ananich_ca
issue
separate
letters
to
Gina
McCarthy,
EPA
Administrator,
requesting
federal
investigation
into
Flint
water
crisis"
(Fonger)
ll_for_federa.html
review
of
MDEQ's
oversight
of
water
treatment
EPA's
Flint
Safe
Drinking
Water
Task
Force
provides
MDEQ
with
technical
comments
Posted
to
EPA
website
www.epa.gov/mi/flint-safe-drinking-water-task-force-activities
on
Draft
School
Sampling
Protocol
Press
release
-
"Gov.
Rick
Snyder
announces
Flint
Water
Task
Force
to
review
state,
federal
and
municipal
actions,
offer
michigan.gov/snyder/0,4668,7-277--367761--,00.html
Gov.
Snyder
announces
formation
of
Flint
Water
Advisory
Task
Force
to
complete
an
recommendations"
www.freep.com/story/news/politics/2015/10/21/task-force-
After-Action
Review
Detroit
Free
Press
(Oct.
21,
2015):
"Task
force
appointed
to
appointed-examine-flint-water-controversy/74342628/
examine
Flint
water
controversy"
(Gray)
Detroit
Free
Press
(Oct.
21,
2015):
"MDEQ
e-mails
show
stunning
www.freep.com/story/opinion/columnists/nancy-
Detroit
paper
publishes
column
on
MDEQ's
"stunning
indifference"
to
Flint
water
indifference
to
Flint
peril"
(Kaffer)
kaffer/2015/10/21/indifference-characterized-state-approach-
crisis
FOIA'd
information
is
also
provided
on
Flint
Water
Study
website flint-water/74289430/
EPA's
Flint
Safe
Drinking
Water
Task
Force
provides
MDEQ
technical
comments
on
Included
on
Safe
Drinking
Water
Task
Force
list
of
activities,
www.epa.gov/mi/flint-safe-drinking-water-task-force-activities
Flint
Corrosion
Control
Plan
posted
to
EPA
website
Former
Flint
EM
Earley
issues
statement
to
MLive
claiming
decision
to
switch
to
Flint
MLive
(Oct.
26,
2015):
"Ex-emergency
manager
says
local
leaders
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/10/ex-
River
as
supply
source
was
"a
local
decision
made
by
local
civic
leaders"
made
decision
to
use
Flint
River
water"
(Fonger)
emergency_manager_says_loca.html
MDEQ
issues
construction
permit
for
additional
corrosion
control
treatment
Attachment
54
-
MDEQ
documentation
provided
to
FWATF
Nov.
MDEQ
Construction
Permit
W151104
W151104
6,
2015
Attachment
55
-
MDEQ
documentation
provided
to
FWATF
Nov.
MDEQ
notifies
Flint
regarding
corrosion
control
treatment
operation
Letter
from
Prysby/MDEQ
to
Glasgow/Flint
6,
2015
EPA's
Flint
Safe
Drinking
Water
Task
Force
provides
MDEQ
technical
comments
on
Included
on
Safe
Drinking
Water
Task
Force
list
of
activities,
www.epa.gov/mi/flint-safe-drinking-water-task-force-activities
Flint
Corrosion
Control
Permit
and
cover
letter
posted
to
EPA
website
MLive
(Oct.
31,
2015):
"Letters
to
be
sent
to
Flint
parents
with
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/10/letters_to_be_sen
Flint
sends
letters
to
parents
providing
recommendations
of
GCHD
and
MDHHS
information
on
lead
testing"
(Emery)
t_to_flint_pa.html
MI
National
Action
Network
(NAN)
calls
for
special
court
for
offenders
who
November
2,
2015 consumed
water
contaminated
by
lead
poisoning
in
Flint.
Governor's
Office
notes
work
of
Flint
Water
Advisory
Task
Force
MLive
(Nov.
2,
2015):
"Al
Sharpton
group
wants
new
Flint
court
for
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/11/al_sharpton_grou
possible
lead
poison
victims"
(Fonger)
p_wants_specia.html
EPA
to
conduct
"full
review
of
actions
taken
to
address
drinking
water
quality
issues
in
Flint,"
with
results
by
end
of
week
of
Nov.
2nd
(MLive).
EPA
also
will
audit
November
3,
2015
MDEQ's
drinking
water
program,
which
"will
take
several
months"
(EPA
press
release)
EPA
releases
memo
indicating
differing
possible
interpretations
of
the
LCR
with
November
3,
2015 respect
to
how
OCCT
procedures
apply
to
this
situation
(new
water
source/new
water
treatment)
Karen
Weaver
defeats
incumbent
Dayne
Walling
in
Flint
mayoral
election;
takes
November
3,
2015
office
November
9,
2015
Accessed
yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/a5792a626c8dac098525735
900400c2d/9e26559c4478e1cb85257ef900617183!OpenDocume
nt
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/11/us_epa_tells_kild
ee_it_will_ca.html
www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-
11/documents/occt_req_memo_signed_pg_2015-11-03-
155158_508.pdf
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/11/karen_weaver_m
akes_history_ele.html
3/13/16
3/13/16
3/13/16
3/13/16
3/13/16
3/13/16
3/1/16
3/13/16
3/13/16
3/13/16
3/13/16
3/13/16
3/13/16
3/13/16
3/13/16
21
Date
Event
Reference Document
Sources
Accessed
3/13/16
3/12/16
3/12/16
3/13/16
3/13/16
3/13/16
3/13/16
3/13/16
3/13/16
3/13/16
3/13/16
3/13/16
3/12/16
3/13/16
3/12/16
3/13/16
3/13/16
3/13/16
3/13/16
22
Date
Event
Hearing
held
on
whether
City
has
violated
Genesee
County
Circuit
Court
order
to
reduce
water
and
sewer
rates
Reference
Document
MLive
(Nov.
25,
2015):
"Flint
water
customers
say
no
change
in
bills,
despite
court
order"
(Ridley)
Sources
Accessed
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/11/flint_residents_te
stify_on_wat.html
3/13/16
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/12/flint_in_talks_wit
h_regulators.html#incart_story_package
3/13/16
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/12/lead_levels_in_fli
nts_water_st.html
3/13/16
www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2015/12/03/election
s-board-rejects-latest-snyder-recall-petition/76712410/
3/13/16
www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2015/12/03/flint-kids-
lead-levels/76746474/
3/13/16
www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-01/documents/ftf-
4_task_force_comments_on_mdhhs_residential_sampling_protoc
ol_12-4-15.pdf
3/13/16
www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-water-
crisis/2016/02/09/flint-e-mails-state-city-appear-unable-share-
info/80028820/
3/13/16
Tamara
Brickey,
GCHD
public
health
division
director,
e-mails
other
county
health
officials
that
the
state
is
making
clear
they
are
not
practicing
ethical
public
health
Detroit
Free
Press
(Feb.
9,
2016):
"Flint
e-mails:
CDC
voiced
December
5,
2015 practice
re:
Legionella
outbreak.
Now
evidence
is
clearly
pointing
to
a
deliberate
concerns
over
Legionnaires'
actions"
(Dolan,
Anderson,
Egan,
cover-up
In
my
opinion,
if
we
dont
act
soon,
we
are
going
to
become
guilty
by
Wisely)
association.
www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-water-
crisis/2016/02/09/flint-e-mails-state-city-appear-unable-share-
info/80028820/
3/13/16
media.MLive.com/newsnow_impact/other/FWATF%20letter%20t
o%20Governor%20Snyder.pdf
1/31/16
City
of
Flint
in
talks
with
state
and
federal
regulators
to
determine
how
long
Flint
MLive
(Dec.
11,
2015):
"Flint
in
talks
with
regulators
over
length
of
December
2015 will
be
required
to
practice
treating
water
from
a
new
pipeline
before
selling
it
to
test
run
with
KWA
water"
(Fonger)
customers
Dr.
Edwards
makes
presentation
at
Hurley
Medical
Center
stating
that
Flint's
water
MLive
(Dec.
2,
2015):
"Flint
water
still
unsafe
without
lead
filters,
December
2,
2015 is
still
not
safe
to
drink
without
filtration
in
some
areas;
Mayor
Weaver
presents
him
professor
says"
(Fonger)
with
a
Certificate
of
Appreciation
MI
Board
of
Canvassers
again
rejects
petition
filed
by
Angelo
Scott
Brown
of
Detroit
Detroit
Free
Press
(Dec.
3,
2015):
"Push
to
recall
Snyder
over
Flint
December
3,
2015
to
recall
Gov.
Snyder;
Brown
says
he
will
try
again
water
crisis
stalls"
(Egan)
State
reports
that
blood
lead
levels
in
Flint
children
have
dropped,
with
the
rate
falling
to
3%
of
children
under
6,
based
on
results
from
1,361
children.
Dr.
Hanna- Detroit
Free
Press
(Dec.
4,
2015):
"State
says
blood-lead
levels
in
December
4,
2015
Attisha:
the
most
recent
data
does
not
capture
past
exposure,
so
it
provides
limited
Flint
kids
have
dropped"
(Erb)
information
on
the
population's
real
exposure
December
4,
2015
December 8, 2015
December 8, 2015
December 9, 2015
EPA's
Flint
Drinking
Water
Task
Force
releases
comments
on
MDHHS
residential
drinking
water
sampling
protocol
Testimony
continues
in
hearing
on
whether
City
has
violated
Genesee
County
Circuit
MLive
(Dec.
8.
2015):
"Daughter's
piggy
bank
makes
appearance
in
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/12/daughters_piggy_
Court
order
to
reduce
water
and
sewer
rates
Flint
water
rate
hearing"
(Ridley)
bank_makes_app.html
MLive
(Dec.
9,
2015):
"Flint
administrator
says
city
plans
to
add
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/12/flint_administrato
Mayor
Weaver
holds
first
Town
Hall
meeting;
Flint
City
Administrator
Henderson
third-party
water
testing"
(Fonger)
r_says_city_1.html#incart_river_index
announces
plan
to
start
independent
testing
for
lead
in
City
of
Flint
water
supply
MLive
(Dec.
10,
2015):
"Flint
will
pay
for
independent
water
tests,
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/12/flint_will_pay_for
added
phosphate
treatment"
(Fonger)
_independent.html
City
of
Flint
starts
adding
supplemental
phosphates
to
water
purchased
from
City
of
MLive
(Dec.
9,
2015):
"Flint
officials
say
they've
boosted
corrosion
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/12/flint_officials_say
Detroit
in
an
effort
to
rebuild
protective
coating
in
transmission
lines
control
agents
in
water"
(Fonger)
_theyre_boo.html#incart_river_index
MDEQ
issues
report
finding
lead
in
plumbing
system
at
Brownell
STEM
Academy
-
one
of
three
school
buildings
that
tested
above
federal
limits
for
lead.
Includes
MLive
(Dec.
10,
2015):
"More
lead
in
plumbing
found
at
Flint's
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/12/state_report_iden
quotes
from
Wurfel
attributing
high
lead
levels
to
"old
faucets
and
drinking
water
Brownell
school,
state
report
says"
(Fonger)
tifies_more_l.html#incart_river_index
fountains"
MDHHS
releases
latest
results
from
blood
lead
testing
conducted
in
Flint
since
Oct.
Included
in
Gov.
Snyder's
e-mails
released
Jan.
20,
2016
(pp.
246-
michigan.gov/snyder/0,4668,7-277--367761--,00.html
1.
39
of
1,386
adults
and
children
had
elevated
blood
lead
levels
since
Oct.
1,
2015 247/274)
Former
Flint
Mayor
James
Sharp
calls
for
federal
investigations
into
Flint
water
Detroit
Free
Press
(Dec.
11,
2015):
"Former
Flint
mayor
wants
feds
www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2015/12/10/former-
controversy
to
probe
lead
in
water"
(Egan)
flint-mayor-wants-feds-probe-lead-water/77088024/
Flint
Mayor
Weaver
declares
state
of
emergency
in
Flint
--
the
first
step
in
pursuing
MLive
(Dec.
15,
2015):
"Read
Flint
mayor's
state
of
emergency
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/12/read_flint_mayor
a
federal
disaster
declaration.
Declaration
says
the
damage
done
to
Flint
children
by
declaration
on
water
crisis"
_karen_weavers.html#incart_river_index
lead
exposure
is
irreversible,
creating
need
for
increased
spending
on
special
The
Guardian
(Dec.
15,
2015):
"Flint
mayor
declares
'manmade
www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/dec/15/michigan-mayor-
education,
mental
health
and
juvenile
justice
disaster'
over
lead-tainted
water
supply"
declares-manmade-disaster-lead-tainted-water-supply
3/13/16
3/13/16
3/13/16
3/13/16
3/12/16
3/13/16
3/13/16
23
Date
December
14,
2015
Event
Reference Document
Sources
Accessed
FEMA
sends
28,000
liters
of
water
to
Food
Bank
of
Eastern
Michigan,
for
distribution
to
partner
agencies
to
serve
Flint
residents
MLive
(Dec.
14,
2015):
"FEMA
sends
28,000
liters
of
bottled
water
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/12/fema_sends_thou
3/13/16
to
Flint
amid
lead
troubles"
sands_of_cases.html
media.MLive.com/newsnow_impact/other/15.12.15%20Flint%20
Gov.
Snyder
issues
response
to
FWATF's
Dec.
7
letter,
naming
Harvey
Hollins,
Letter
dated
Dec.
15,
2015
posted
online
by
MLive
Task%20Force%20Letter.pdf
director
of
Office
of
Urban
Initiatives,
to
lead
Flint
water
crisis
response,
with
Chris
MLive
(Dec.
17,
2015):
"Read
letters
from
governor,
task
force
on
3/13/16
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/12/read_letters_from
DeWitt
supporting
communications
Flint
water
crisis"
(Fonger)
_governor_tas.html#incart_river_index
EPA's
Flint
Drinking
Water
Task
Force
releases
recommendations
on
Flint
drinking
www.epa.gov/mi/flint-safe-drinking-water-task-force-
3/13/16
water
treatment
prior
to
switching
to
KWA
source
recommendations-regarding-flint-drinking-water-treatment
Press
release
described
in
MLive
(Dec.
17,
2015):
"Governor's
task
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/12/state_task_force_
FWATF
issues
press
release
re:
letter
to
Gov.
Snyder
and
response
force
on
Flint
water
crisis
releases
early
recommendations"
3/13/16
on_flint_wate.html#incart_river_index
(Fonger)
National
media
coverage
of
Flint
water
crisis
-
e.g.:
MSNBC's
Rachel
Maddow
Show
MSNBC
-
Rachel
Maddow
Show
(Dec.
19,
2015):
"Flint
toxic
water
www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/watch/toxic-water-
report
on
Flint
water
crisis
places
blame
on
Governor's
Office
and
"radical,
anti-
tragedy
points
directly
to
Michigan
Gov.
Snyder"
tragedy-points-directly-to-snyder-588635715518
3/13/16
democratic
policies";
The
Guardian
(US
edition)
article
describes
interview
with
Dr.
The
Guardian
(Dec.
17,
2015):
"Flint's
'toxic
soup'
polluted
water
www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/dec/17/flint-polluted-
Hanna-Attisha
worse
for
children
than
thought,
doctor
says"
water-toxic-lead-children-at-risk
Genesee
County
Board
of
Commissioners
Chairman
Jamie
Curtis
sends
letter
to
MLive
(Dec.
18,
2015):
"Genesee
County
chairman
says
he
can
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/12/genesee_county_
Mayor
Weaver
saying
he
is
authorized
to
forward
Flint's
request
for
disaster
3/13/16
send
Flint
disaster
request
to
governor"
(Fonger)
board_chair_say.html#incart_story_package
declaration
to
the
Governor's
Office
City
of
Flints
Emergency
Operations
Center
(EOC)
is
activated
to
begin
to
coordinate
www.cityofflint.com/2015/12/17/emergency-operations-center-
Announced
on
City
of
Flint
website
3/13/16
relief
efforts
activated/
"Elevated
Blood
Lead
Levels
in
Children
Associated
With
the
Flint
American
Journal
of
Public
Health
publishes
results
of
further
study
of
blood
lead
Drinking
Water
Crisis:
A
Spatial
Analysis
of
Risk
and
Public
Health
ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/abs/10.2105/AJPH.2015.303003
levels
by
Dr.
Hanna-Attisha
et
al.
New
research
further
details
the
rise
in
elevated
Response,"
available
via
AJPH
website.
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/12/health_journal_pu
3/13/16
blood
levels
that
was
documented
in
the
initial
study
released
Sep.
24
Described
in
MLive
(Dec.
21,
2015):
"Newly
published
study
gives
blishes_blood.html#incart_story_package
more
evidence
of
elevated
lead
in
Flint
kids"
(Fonger)
Genesee
County
Circuit
Court
Judge
Hayman
rules
city
can
continue
shutting
off
water
to
customers
who
haven't
paid
their
water
bill
since
September
2015
-
not
MLive
(Dec.
22,
2015):
"Questions
over
emergency
manager
law
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/12/questions_arise_r
3/13/16
others.
Also
says
City
must
apply
35%
rate
rollback
to
service
charges
as
well
as
arise
in
Flint
water
rates
lawsuit"
(Emery)
egarding_publ.html#incart_story_package
water
commodity
rates
Continued
national
media
coverage
of
Flint
water
crisis
-
e.g.,
Rachel
Maddow
show
CBS
News
(Dec.
22,
2015):
"New
study
links
tainted
water,
high
www.cbsnews.com/news/tainted-water-high-lead-levels-kids-flint-
reports
on
Flint
water
crisis;
CBS
News
reports
on
Dr.
Hanna-Attisha's
refined
study
3/13/16
lead
levels
in
kids
in
Flint,
Mich."
michigan/
of
blood
lead
levels
Auditor
General
issues
responses
to
questions
from
Sen.
Ananich
re:
Flint
water
crisis.
Notes
no
"major
infractions"
committed
by
MDEQ
but
also
notes
mistakes
-
Included
in
Gov.
Snyder's
e-mails
released
Jan.
20,
2016
(pp.
250-
michigan.gov/snyder/0,4668,7-277--367761--,00.html
3/13/16
corrosion
control
treatment
should
have
been
initiated
with
switch
to
Flint
River
as
264/274)
primary
water
supply,
Tier
1
sample
sites
not
verified,
etc.
FWATF
issues
letter
to
Gov.
Snyder
and
press
release
re:
initial
findings
from
its
www.scribd.com/doc/294248389/Flint-Water-Advisory-Task-
work;
puts
primary
blame
for
Flint
water
crisis
on
MDEQ
but
indicates
more
to
come
Link
to
letter
posted
in
Free
Press
article
(see
below)
3/13/16
Force-letter-to-Snyder
in
final
report
Gov.
Snyder
issues
apology
for
Flint
water
crisis
via
press
release
Press
release
posted
on
michigan.gov
www.michigan.gov/snyder/0,4668,7-277-57577_57657-372335--,00.html
3/13/16
www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2015/12/29/deq-
Detroit
Free
Press
(Dec.
29,
2015):
"Snyder
apologizes,
Wyant
director-wyant-resigns-over-flint-water-crisis/78027052/
resigns
in
Flint
water
crisis"
(Egan).
www.MLive.com/lansing-
MDEQ
Director
Wyant
and
Director
of
Communication
Brad
Wurfel
submit
their
MLive
(Dec
29-30,
2015):
"Director
Dan
Wyant
resigns
after
task
news/index.ssf/2015/12/deq_director_dan_wyant_resigns.html#i
3/13/16
resignations
force
blasts
MDEQ
over
Flint
water
crisis"
(Lawler);
"MDEQ
ncart_river_index
spokesman
also
resigns
over
Flint
water
crisis,
says
city
'didn't
feel
www.MLive.com/lansing-
like
we
cared'"
(Lawler)
news/index.ssf/2015/12/deq_spokesman_also_resigns_ove.html#
incart_river_index
24
Date
Event
December 29, 2015 Continued national media coverage of Flint water crisis
Reference Document
Sources
Accessed
www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/watch/michigan-
governor-apologizes-for-flint-water-593269827585
www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/dec/30/michigan-governer-
rick-snyder-very-sorry-about-water-supply-debacle
www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/rick-snyder-flint-water-lead-
poisoning_56830314e4b014efe0d9814f
www.wsj.com/articles/michigans-top-environmental-regulator-
resigns-over-flint-water-crisis-1451432226
3/13/16
www.cityofflint.com/2015/12/30/mayor-meets-with-county-chair-
over-incident-action-plan/
3/19/16
www.michigan.gov/snyder/0,4668,7-277-57577_57657-372399--
,00.html
3/13/16
2016
Newsweek
puts
Flint
water
crisis
atop
list
of
"nastiest
cases
of
toxic
discharge"
in
January
1,
2016
2015
January 5, 2016
Gov.
Snyder
declares
state
of
emergency
for
Genesee
County,
activating
the
State
Emergency
Operations
Center
www.newsweek.com/year-pollution-here-are-nastiest-cases-toxic-
discharge-2015-410766
mi.gov/documents/snyder/FlintWaterTimeline_FINAL_511424_7.
pdf
www.michigan.gov/deq/0,4561,7-135-3313_3675_73946-372653--
,00.html
www.michigan.gov/documents/snyder/2016-01-
05_Flint_Water_Governors_Declaration_Final_509966_7.pdf?201
60105162343
Gina
Balaya,
spokeswoman
for
the
U.S.
Attorney's
Office
in
Detroit,
said
Tuesday
her
Detroit
Free
Press
(Jan.
15,
2016):
"Snyder
declares
emergency
as
www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2016/01/05/us-
January
5,
2016 office
is
working
with
the
U.S.
Environmental
Protection
Agency
on
an
investigation
feds
probe
Flint
water"
(Egan)
attorneys-office-investigating-lead-flint-water/78303960/
of
the
Flint
water
situation
State
of
Michigan
launches
Joint
Information
Center
(JIC)
to
coordinate
public
Press
release
-
"State
of
Michigan
Joint
Information
Center
Now
www.michigan.gov/deq/0,4561,7-135-3313_3675_73946-372766--
January
6,
2016 information
from
the
State
Emergency
Operations
Center,
set
up
to
help
with
health
Operational"
,00.html
and
safety
issues
caused
by
lead
in
the
city
of
Flints
drinking
water
NBC
News
(Jan.
6,
2015):
"Drinking
water
crisis
in
Flint,
Michigan
www.nbcnews.com/nightly-news/video/drinking-water-crisis-in-
prompts
federal
investigation"
flint--michigan--prompts-federal-investigation-597142595942
January
6,
2016 Continued
national
media
coverage:
NBC
News,
MSNBC
MSNBC
Rachel
Maddow
(Jan.
6,
2015):
"Flint
toxic
water
draws
www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow/watch/flint-toxic-water-draws-
federal
scrutiny";
"State
dismissed
Flint
bad
water
test
concerns";
www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow/watch/state-dismissed-flint-
Guyette
interview
bad-water-test-concerns-597320259868
Michigan's
chief
medical
executive,
Dr.
Eden
Wells,
says
Flint
residents
should
either
Detroit
Free
Press
(Feb.
2016):
"How
Flint's
Water
Crisis
Unfolded"
January
7,
2016
www.freep.com/pages/interactives/flint-water-crisis-timeline/
use
lead
filters
or
drink
bottled
water
until
further
notice
(Dixon)
Genesee
County
Sheriff
Robert
Pickell
deploys
work
detail
and
staff
to
deliver
water
MLive
(Jan.
7,
2016):
"Genesee
County
Sheriff
uses
work
detail
to
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2016/01/work_detail_used
January
7,
2016
and
filters
to
homes
distribute
filters
in
Flint"
(Acosta)
_by_genesee_co.html
Continued
national
media
coverage
criticizing
state's
failure
to
provide
bottled
MSNBC
Rachel
Maddow
(Jan.
7,
2016):
"Water
donations
run
dry
www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow/watch/flint-water-donations-
January
7,
2016
water
and
water
filters
in
Flint,
no
action
from
Governor
Snyder"
run-dry--no-state-plan-598134339963
Gov.
Snyder
and
Mayor
Weaver
announce
formation
of
an
inter-agency
group
to
MLive
(Jan.
7,
2016):
"Flint
Mayor,
Gov.
Rick
Snyder
to
provide
city
www.MLive.com/lansing-
January
7,
2016 work
with
State
Emergency
Operations
Center
on
taking
action
to
improve
the
with
'suite
of
services'
following
water
crisis"
(Lawler)
news/index.ssf/2016/01/flint_mayor_gov_rick_snyder_to.html
situation
mi.gov/documents/snyder/FlintWaterTimeline_FINAL_511424_7.
January
8,
2016 Gov.
Snyder
and
Mayor
Weaver
meet
to
discuss
collaboration
Gov.
Snyder's
Flint
Water
timeline
(released
Jan.
2016)
pdf
MSP
Emergency
Management
Division
announces
water
resource
sites
established
mi.gov/documents/snyder/FlintWaterTimeline_FINAL_511424_7.
January
9,
2016
Gov.
Snyder's
Flint
Water
timeline
(released
Jan.
2016)
in
Flint
with
bottled
water,
filters
and
testing
kits
pdf
Gov.
Snyder
signs
Executive
Order
to
create
Flint
Water
Interagency
Coordinating
mi.gov/documents/snyder/FlintWaterTimeline_FINAL_511424_7.
January
11,
2016
Gov.
Snyder's
Flint
Water
timeline
(released
Jan.
2016)
Committee
to
work
on
long-term
solutions
to
the
Flint
water
situation
pdf
Gov.
Snyder
requests
FEMA's
assistance
in
coordinating
an
inter-agency
plan
and
mi.gov/documents/snyder/FlintWaterTimeline_FINAL_511424_7.
January
12,
2016
Gov.
Snyder's
Flint
Water
timeline
(released
Jan.
2016)
activates
Michigan
National
Guard
to
help
with
water
resources
distribution
pdf
3/13/16
1/31/16
3/13/16
3/13/16
3/13/16
3/13/16
3/13/16
3/13/16
3/13/16
3/13/16
1/31/16
1/31/16
1/31/16
1/31/16
25
Date
January
13,
2016
Event
Gov.
Snyder
and
MDHHS
announce
a
spike
in
Legionellosis
in
Flint
between
June
2014
and
Mar
2015,
which
may
be
linked
to
switch
to
Flint
River.
Spike
included
87
cases,
with
10
deaths,
in
18
months.
This
is
the
first
public
notification,
10
months
after
MDEQ
notified
Hollins
the
outbreak
coincided
with
switch
to
Flint
River
water
Gov.
Snyder
requests
Presidential
declaration
of
major
disaster
and
emergency
and
requests
federal
aid
Michigan
Attorney
General
Bill
Schuette
announces
he
has
opened
an
investigation
of
Flint
water
crisis
President
Obama
approves
declaration
of
emergency
and
request
for
federal
aid,
and
declines
request
for
declaration
of
major
disaster
MLive
reports
that
Genesee
County
Health
Dept.
officials
expressed
concern
re:
increase
in
Legionellosis
in
Oct.
2014
in
meeting
with
Flint
Water
Gov.
Snyder
delivers
State
of
the
State
address;
apologizes
for
Flint
water
crisis,
announces
release
of
his
own
e-mails
regarding
Flint
water,
and
commits
another
$28
million
in
short-term
for
more
filters,
bottled
water,
school
nurses,
intervention
specialists,
testing
and
monitoring
January 19, 2016 Flint Mayor Weaver meets with President Obama in Washington, DC
Reference Document
Sources
Accessed
www.MLive.com/news/detroit/index.ssf/2016/01/legionaires_dis
ease_spike_disc.html
3/13/16
mi.gov/documents/snyder/FlintWaterTimeline_FINAL_511424_7.
pdf
1/31/16
Detroit
Free
Press
(Feb.
2016):
"How
Flint's
Water
Crisis
Unfolded"
www.freep.com/pages/interactives/flint-water-crisis-timeline/
(Dixon)
mi.gov/documents/snyder/FlintWaterTimeline_FINAL_511424_7.
Gov.
Snyder's
Flint
Water
timeline
(released
Jan.
2016)
pdf
MLive
(Jan.
16,
2016):
"Public
never
told,
but
investigators
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2016/01/documents_show
suspected
Flint
River
tie
to
Legionnaires'
in
2014"
(Fonger)
_agencies_knew_o.html
3/13/16
1/31/16
3/13/16
New
York
Times
(Jan.
20,
2016):
"Gov.
Rick
Snyder
of
Michigan
Apologizes
in
Flint
Water
Crisis"
(Bosman,
Smith)
www.nytimes.com/2016/01/20/us/obama-set-to-meet-with-
mayor-of-flint-about-water-crisis.html?_r=0
3/13/16
Detroit
Free
Press
(Jan.
19,
2016):
"Obama
meets
Flint
mayor,
responds
to
lead
crisis"
(Spangler)
www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-water-
crisis/2016/01/19/flint-mayor-meet-white-house-
officials/79001256/
3/13/16
somcsprod2govm001.usgovcloudapp.net/files/snyder%20emails.p
df
3/12/16
www.usnews.com/news/us/articles/2016-01-20/michigan-
governor-on-flint-water-i-let-you-down
3/13/16
Class
action
lawsuit
is
filed
against
City
of
Flint
and
various
city
and
state
employees
Case
filed
in
Genesee
County
Circuit
Court
on
behalf
of
Melissa
Mays
and
other
Flint
residents
Gov.
Snyder
voluntarily
posts
his
e-mails
regarding
Flint
water
to
his
website
January
20,
2016
(Governor's
office
is
exempt
from
Michigan
FOIA)
Posted
to
Gov.
Snyder's
webpage
at
www.michigan.gov/snyder
US
News
&
World
Report
(Jan.
20,
2016):
"Michigan
Gov.
Rick
Snyder
is
asking
President
Barack
Obama
to
reconsider
his
denial
Gov.
Snyder
asks
President
Obama
to
reconsider
denial
of
federal
disaster
January
20,
2016
of
a
federal
disaster
declaration
to
address
the
drinking
water
declaration
crisis
in
Flint,
saying
its
severity
poses
an
'imminent
and
long-term
threat'
to
residents"
(Eggert/AP)
State
budget
office
asks
legislature
for
$28
million
to
aid
in
Flint
water
crisis;
House
MLive
(Jan.
20,
2016):
"Michigan
House
approves
$28M
in
January
20,
2016
approves;
heads
next
week
to
Senate
immediate
assistance
for
Flint"
(Lawler)
EPA's
Flint
Safe
Drinking
Water
Task
Force
provides
recommendation
that
all
January
20,
2016
Documented
posted
to
EPA
website
samples
for
lead
analysis
be
collected
using
wide-mouth
sample
bottles
CBS
News
(Jan.
20,
2016):
"Michigan
gov.:
We
don't
want
people
January
20,
2016 CBS
Evening
News
interviews
Gov.
Snyder
to
assume
Flint
water
is
safe"
Detroit
News
(Jan.
21,
2016):
"Obama
gives
$80
million
to
President
Obama
announces
$80
million
in
financial
aid
for
water
infrastructure
Michigan
for
Flint"
(Burke)
January
21,
2016 projects
in
Michigan,
including
Flint.
Money
is
being
provided
for
state's
revolving
MLive
(Jan.
23,
2016):
"$80
million
announced
in
connection
with
loan
fund,
not
as
an
appropriation
Flint
water
is
revolving
loan
fund"
NBC
News
(Jan.
21,
2016):
"EPA
Administrator
quits
over
Flint
January
21,
2016 EPA
Region
5
Director
Susan
Hedman
resigns,
effective
Feb.
1,
2016
water
crisis"
(Seville/Helsel)
EPA
issues
SDWA
Emergency
Order
saying
authorities
in
Michigan
failed
to
properly
respond
to
Flint
water
crisis
and
prescribing
various
actions
for
the
City
and
MDEQ.
PA
will
begin
testing
the
citys
water;
order
a
range
of
data
collection,
plans
and
January
21,
2016 reports
from
the
City
and
MDEQ;
and
form
an
Independent
Advisory
Panel
of
Order
posted
to
EPA
website
drinking
water
/
treatment
experts
and
community
members
to
recommend
next
steps.
EPA
Administrator
Gina
McCarthy
also
asks
EPA
inspector
general
to
conduct
independent
review
of
Region
5's
oversight
of
public
water
systems
MDEQ
Director
Creagh
responds
to
EPA
by
saying
they
will
comply,
but
questioning
Detroit
News
(Jan.
22,
2016):
"Michigan
questions
legality
of
EPA
January
22,
2016 McCarthy/EPA's
legal
authority
to
direct
MDEQ
in
Flint
response,
and
stating
MDEQ
directive
on
Flint"
(Oosting)
(includes
letter
response)
has
complied
with
all
EPA's
recent
demands
January
19,
2016
MDHHS
releases
data
showing
70%
of
people
who
contracted
Legionellosis
in
the
Flint
outbreak
were
exposed
to
Flint
water
2
weeks
before
their
symptoms
began
www.MLive.com/news/index.ssf/2016/01/michigan_house_appr
oves_28m_in.html
https://www.epa.gov/mi/flint-safe-drinking-water-task-force-
recommendations-regarding-wide-mouth-sampling-bottles
www.cbsnews.com/news/michigan-gov-at-least-100-kids-affected-
by-lead-in-flint-water/
www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/2016/01/21/stabeno
w-obama-gives-million-flint/79134306/
www.MLive.com/news/kalamazoo/index.ssf/2016/01/80_million_
announced_in_connec.html
www.nbcnews.com/storyline/flint-water-crisis/epa-administrator-
quits-amid-flint-water-crisis-n501561
3/13/16
3/18/15
3/13/16
3/13/16
3/13/16
www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-
01/documents/1_21_sdwa_1431_emergency_admin_order_0121
16.pdf
3/13/16
www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/2016/01/22/michigan-
questions-legality-epa-directive-flint/79202618/
3/13/16
www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-water-
crisis/2016/01/22/legionnaires-expert-blames-spike-cases-flint-
water/79203614/
3/13/16
26
Date
Event
FWATF
sends
letter
to
Gov.
Snyder
calling
for
him
to
engage
experts
versed
in
LCR
January
22,
2016 requirements,
including
Del
Toral/EPA,
and
a
work
group
including
Edwards/VT;
various
other
recommendations
re:
lead
sampling
and
control
Two
MDEQ
staffers
are
suspended
without
pay
pending
an
investigation.
The
January
22,
2016 employees
are
not
named
in
the
press
release
but
soon
are
identified
as
Stephen
Busch
and
Liane
Shekter
Smith
Gov.
Snyder
returns
additional
executive
powers
to
Flint's
mayor.
Mayor
Weaver
January
22,
2016 will
now
have
the
authority
to
appoint
the
city
administrator
and
all
department
heads.
Todays
action
is
the
next
step
in
transitioning
to
full,
local
control
in
Flint
January
22,
2016
Detroit
Free
Press
reports
that
hacker
group
Anonymous
has
launched
a
Flint
operation
and
is
calling
for
Gov.
Snyder
to
be
charged
with
manslaughter
Michigan
AG
Schuette
names
Todd
Flood
(defense
attorney
and
former
Wayne
County
assistant
prosecutor)
and
former
Detroit
FBI
bureau
chief
Andy
Arena
to
January
25,
2016 lead
investigation
into
potential
misconduct
in
office
concerning
Flint
water
crisis.
State
Rep.
LaTanya
Garrett
(D-Detroit)
files
petition
with
U.S.
AG
Loretta
Lynch
to
remove
Schuettes
office
from
Flint
water
investigation
citing
conflicts
of
interest
ACLU
Michigan,
NRDC
and
Concerned
Pastors
for
Social
Action
file
federal
lawsuit
January
27,
2016 against
city
and
state
officials
seeking
to
force
owners
and
operators
of
Flint's
water
system
to
comply
with
SDWA
Pastor
Edwin
Anderson,
Aline
Anderson
and
Beatrice
Boler
file
federal
lawsuit
January
31,
2016 against
city
and
state
officials
seeking
compensatory
and
punitive
damages
over
Flint
water
crisis
February
1,
2016
Michigan
Attorney
General
Schuette
says
his
office
"likely"
can't
defend
the
seven
MDEQ
workers
being
sued
over
Flint
water
crisis;
asked
federal
judge
to
decide
FBI
joins
federal
investigation
of
Flint
water
crisis,
which
also
involves
U.S.
February
2,
2016 Attorney's
office,
US
Postal
Inspection
Service
and
EPA
Criminal
Investigation
Division
February
2,
2016
$100
million
lawsuit
is
filed
against
McLaren
Flint
Hospital
and
State
of
Michigan
over
Flint
Legionellosis
cases,
on
behalf
of
four
who
contracted
the
disease
Reference Document
1/31/16
www.michigan.gov/snyder/0,4668,7-277-57577-374565--,00.html
3/13/16
www.michigan.gov/snyder/0,4668,7-277-57577_57657-374556--
,00.html
3/13/16
www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-water-
Detroit
Free
Press
(Jan.
22,
2016):
"State
on
high
cyber
alert
after
crisis/2016/01/22/activist-hacker-group-anonymous-starts-flint-
Anonymous
threat"
(Egan)
campaign/79157780/
3/13/16
www.thestate.com/news/nation-
world/national/article56583968.html
3/13/16
www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-water-
crisis/2016/01/31/deq-workers-need-find-own-lawyer-flint-
lawsuit/79608504/
3/13/16
NBC
News
(Feb.
2,
2016):
"FBI
Investigating
Flint's
Poisoned
Water
www.nbcnews.com/storyline/flint-water-crisis/fbi-investigating-
Crisis"
(Connor)
flint-s-poisoned-water-crisis-n509686
Detroit
Free
Press
(Feb.
2,
2016):
"Fieger
files
$100-million
suit
over
Flint
Legionnaires'
disease
cases"
(Wisely,
Dixon)
U.S.
Small
Business
Admnistration
approves
Gov.
Snyder's
request
to
aid
businesses
MLive
(Feb.
5,
2016):
"Businesses
affected
by
Flint
water
crisis
can
February
5,
2016 in
Flint
and
Genesee
County
affected
by
Flint
water
crisis.
SBA
will
provide
access
to
seek
disaster
loans
from
SBA"
(Emery)
federal
Economic
Injury
Disaster
Loans
for
small
businesses
EPA's
Flint
Safe
Drinking
Water
Task
Force
provides
recommendations
on
MDEQ's
February
5,
2016
Documented
posted
to
EPA
website
Draft
Sentinel
Site
Selection
Detroit
Free
Press
(Feb.
7,
2016):
"Hillary
Clinton:
What
happened
February
7,
2016 Democratic
presidential
candidate
Hillary
Clinton
visits
Flint
in
Flint
is
immoral"
(Gray,
Stafford)
Luke
Waid
and
Michelle
Rodriguez
file
federal
lawsuit
over
2-year-old
daughter's
February
8,
2016
Filed
in
U.S.
District
Court,
Eastern
District
of
Michigan
lead
poisoning
Detroit
Free
Press
(Feb.
9,
2016):
"Flint
issues
boil
advisory
after
water
main
break"
(Bethencourt)
3/13/16
www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-water-
crisis/2016/02/02/fieger-flint-lawsuit-mclaren-water-
crisis/79704852/
3/13/16
www.detroitnews.com/story/news/michigan/flint-water-
crisis/2016/02/03/flint-water-congressional-hearing/79728072/
www.nbcnews.com/storyline/flint-water-crisis/house-panel-chair-
vows-hunt-down-official-behind-flint-water-n510411
3/13/16
www.detroitnews.com/story/news/michigan/flint-water-
crisis/2016/02/03/snyder-water-bills/79753564/
www.michigan.gov/snyder/0,4668,7-277-57577_57657-376028--
,00.html
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2016/02/businesses_affect
ed_by_flint_w.html
www.epa.gov/flint/flint-safe-drinking-water-task-force-
recommendations-mdeqs-draft-sentinel-site-selection
www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-water-
crisis/2016/02/07/hillary-clinton-flint-campaign-stop/79902530/
www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-water-
crisis/2016/02/09/flint-residents-asked-boil-their-filtered-
water/80086916/
Gov.
Snyder
proposes
state
budget
for
FY
2017
that
includes
$195
million
to
address
MLive
(Feb.
10,
2016):
"Gov.
Rick
Snyder
proposes
$195M
for
Flint
www.MLive.com/news/index.ssf/2016/02/gov_rick_snyder_prop
February
10,
2016
Flint
water
crisis
water
as
protesters
call
for
his
removal"
(Lawler)
oses_195m.html
February
9,
2016 Flint
issues
boil
water
advisory
due
to
broken
water
main
Accessed
www.gongwer.com/public/fwatf-letter.pdf
Sources
3/13/16
3/13/16
3/13/16
3/18/16
3/13/16
3/18/16
3/18/16
27
Date
February
10,
2016
February
10,
2016
February
10,
2016
Event
Reference Document
Mayor
Weaver,
Dr.
Hanna-Attisha,
Yanna
Lambrinidou
and
others
address
House
MLive
(Feb.
10,
2016):
"Flint
mayor,
superintendent
ask
for
short
Democratic
Steering
and
Policy
Committee
in
D.C.
Gov.
Snyder
was
invited
but
and
long-term
water
crisis
help"
(Acosta)
declined
due
to
concurrent
state
budget
proposal
U.S.
House
of
Representatives
passes
H.R.
4470,
which
specifies
notification
Act
posted
to
congress.gov
website
requirements
for
lead
action
level
exceedances
in
public
water
systems
U.S.
Small
Business
Administration
opens
Flint
Business
Recovery
Center
to
aid
MLive
(Feb.
10,
2016):
"Help
center
opens
for
small
businesses
entrepreneurs
and
business
owners
affected
by
Flint
water
crisis
impacted
by
Flint's
water
crisis"
(Adams)
U.S.
District
Judge
John
Corbett
O'Meara
grants
request
by
state
attorneys
to
withdraw
from
representing
7
MDEQ
employees
who
are
being
sued
over
Flint
Detroit
Free
Press
(Feb.
11,
2016):
"AG's
office
freed
from
MDEQ
water
crisis,
due
to
conflict
of
interest.
State
lawyers
noted
the
MDEQ
employees
workers
in
Flint
water
case"
(Baldas)
will
still
get
lawyers
paid
for
by
the
state
Obama
administration
officials
tell
Democratic
members
of
Congress
they
anticipate
providing
a
Medicaid
expansion
that
will
cover
lead
blood-level
monitoring,
Detroit
Free
Press
(Feb.
12,
2016):
"Obama
administration
to
offer
behavioral
health
services
and
nutritional
support
for
children
and
pregnant
women
more
benefits
in
Flint"
(Spangler)
in
Flint
as
a
result
of
water
crisis
Gov.
Snyder
calls
U.S.
House
Oversight
and
Government
Reform
Committee
chair
Detroit
Free
Press
(Feb.
27,
2016):
"Snyder
to
testify
before
Chaffetz
to
offer
his
testimony
on
Flint
water
crisis
Congress
on
Flint
crisis"
(Spangler,
Dolan)
MDEQ
announces
plan
to
regularly
test
water
from
400
Flint
addresses
for
lead
over
Detroit
Free
Press
(Feb.
12,
2016):
"Flint
water
tests
to
track
next
8
weeks;
public
should
be
able
to
track
the
results
through
a
map
of
the
sites
change
in
lead
levels"
(Allen)
on
www.michigan.gov/flintwater
Department
of
Environmental
Quality:Part
1
(381MB
PDF)
|
Part
2
(206MB
PDF)
|
Part
3
(185MB
PDF)
|
Part
4
(227MB
PDF)
Department
of
Technology,
Management
and
Budget
(2.38MB
State
of
Michigan
activates
website
containing
numerous
e-mails
related
to
Flint
PDF)
water
crisis
Department
of
Health
and
Human
Services
(6.51MB
PDF)
Department
of
Agriculture
and
Rural
Development
(33KB
PDF)
Department
of
Treasury
(12.5MB
PDF)
Lawsuit
is
filed
against
LAN,
alleging
professional
negligence
in
preparing
Flint
WTP
NBC25
News
(Feb.
12,
2016):
"Engineering
firm
hired
to
fix
Flint
for
full-time
operation
water
plant
now
facing
multi-million
dollar
lawsuit"
(Moore)
Sources
3/18/16
www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/4470/text
3/18/16
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2016/02/help_center_open
s_for_small_bu.html
3/19/16
www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-water-
crisis/2016/02/11/ags-office-freed-deq-workers-flint-water-
case/80257552/
3/19/16
www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-water-
crisis/2016/02/12/obama-administration-offer-more-benefits-
flint/80298130/
3/19/16
www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-water-
crisis/2016/02/12/snyder-wants-testify-congress-flint/80290232/
3/19/16
www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2016/02/12/flint-
water-tests-track-lead-levels/80282428/
3/19/16
3/19/16
nbc25news.com/news/local/engineering-firm-hired-to-fix-flint-
water-plant-now-facing-multi-million-dollar-lawsuit
www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-water-
Gov.
Snyder
asks
for
expanded
Medicaid
support
for
about
15,000
Flint
residents
in
Detroit
Free
Press
(Feb.
14,
2016):
"Snyder
asks
for
more
Medicaid
crisis/2016/02/14/snyder-asks-more-medicaid-support-
the
wake
of
Flint
water
crisis
support
for
Flint"
(Bethencourt)
flint/80382696/
U.S.
Surgeon
General
Vivek
Murthy
visits
Flint
and
meets
with
150
local
doctors,
www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-water-
Detroit
Free
Press
(Feb.
15,
2016):
"U.S.
surgeon
general
to
Flint's
social
workers
and
students;
says
"trusted
voices"
need
to
impart
critical
nutrition
crisis/2016/02/15/us-surgeon-general-flint-crisis-dr-vivek-
trusted
voices:
Speak
up"
(Allen)
and
education
to
Flint
residents
murthy/80431666/
NAACP
announces
it
will
invite
"disruptive
civil
disobedience"
in
Flint
if
Gov.
Snyder
Detroit
Free
Press
(Feb.
15,
2016):
"NAACP
threatens
civil
www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-water-
does
not
produce
a
plan
within
30
days
for
replacing
the
city's
water
pipes
disobedience
over
Flint
pipes"
(Allen)
crisis/2016/02/15/naacp-president-flint-outrage/80416032/
www.foodandwaterwatch.org/news/lessons-flint-and-price-water-
Food
&
Water
Watch
releases
report
showing
Flint
residents
were
being
charged
Report
posted
to
Food
&
Water
Watch
website
privatization
more
for
water
than
any
other
customers
in
the
nation's
500
largest
community
MLive
(Feb.
16,
2016):
"Flint
water
rates
highest
in
country,
study
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2016/02/flints_water_rates
water
systems
claims"
(Ridley)
_highest_in.html
Detroit
Free
Press
publishes
Google
map
of
Flint
homes
that
have
tested
with
dangerously
high
lead
levels.
"666
addresses
with
levels
of
more
than
15
parts
per
Detroit
Free
Press
(Feb.
16,
2016):
"Flint
map:
See
666
homes
www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-water-
billion
of
lead
found
the
water.
That's
out
of
9,940
tests
taken
from
September
where
lead
levels
too
high"
(Allen)
crisis/2016/02/16/flint-lead-water-map/80445272/
through
Feb.
13"
2-page
report
posted
online
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/IN10446.pdf
Congressional
Research
Service
issues
report
stating
EPA
did
not
respond
to
Flint's
MLive
(Feb.
18,
2016):
"EPA
didn't
respond
to
Flint's
water
crisis
as
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2016/02/epa_didnt_respon
water
crisis
as
soon
as
it
could
have
soon
as
it
could
have,
report
says"
(Emery)
d_to_flints_wa.html
Governor's
Office
announces
it
has
contracted
with
Rowe
Professional
Services
to
MLive
(Feb.
16,
2016):
"Effort
to
replace
lead
water
pipes
www.detroitnews.com/story/news/michigan/flint-water-
update
a
recent
analysis
of
Flint's
water
pipes,
beginning
the
work
required
to
underway
in
Flint"
(Williams)
crisis/2016/02/16/lead-water-pipe-replacement-flint/80478866/
replace
lead
service
lines.
Federal
class
action
lawsuit
is
filed
on
behalf
of
Angela
McIntosh
and
other
Flint
PR
Newswire
(Feb.
17,
2016):
"Class
action
law
firm
and
personal
www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/class-action-law-firm-and-
water
crisis
victims.
While
other
lawsuits
have
been
filed,
no
case
has
yet
been
injury
Super
Lawyer
filed
lawsuit
on
behalf
of
thousands
of
Flint
personal-injury-super-lawyer-filed-lawsuit-on-behalf-of-thousands-
granted
class
action
status
by
any
state
or
federal
court
victims"
of-flint-victims-300221443.html
Accessed
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2016/02/flint_mayor_super
intendent_ask.html
3/19/16
3/19/16
3/19/16
3/19/16
3/19/16
3/19/16
3/19/16
3/19/16
3/19/16
28
Date
Event
Reference Document
RT.com
(Feb.
18,
2016):
"Flint
water
crisis:
Mayor,
governor
spar
over
timeline
to
replace
lead
pipes"
Mayor
Weaver
counters
state
lead
replacement
plan
with
Flint
Fast
Start
Plan,
Detroit
Free
Press
(Feb.
17,
2016):
"State
signs
agreement
for
Flint
February
18,
2016 working
with
Lansing
employees;
Gov.
Snyder
announces
grant
of
$2M
to
help
with
pipe
testing"
(Dolan)
pipeline
replacement
MLive
(Feb.
18,
2016):
"Flint
gets
$2
million
from
state
to
start
lead
service
water
replacements"
(Fonger)
U.S.
DHHS
Secretary
Sylvia
Burwell
visits
Flint;
announces
her
agency
will
provide
an
MLive
(Feb.
18,
2016):
"Additional
$500,000
in
federal
money
to
February
18,
2016
additional
$500,000
to
help
mitigate
potential
lead
damage
in
Flint
children
fight
lead
damage
in
Flint
children"
(Johnson)
Rev.
Jesse
Jackson's
Rainbow
PUSH
Coalition
and
Concerned
Pastors
for
Social
MLive
(Feb.
19,
2016):
"Flint
water
crisis
march
with
Jesse
Jackson
February
19,
2016
Action
organize
a
march
from
Metropolitan
Baptist
Tabernacle
to
Flint
WTP
draws
thousands"
(Acosta)
February
20,
2016
Mark
Pollins/EPA
sends
letter
to
MDEQ
and
Flint
officials
saying
they
are
not
doing
Letter
posted
to
EPA
website
enough
to
comply
with
SDWA
emergency
order
on
lead
contamination
Board
of
State
Canvassers
approves
petition
to
recall
Gov.
Snyder
over
Flint
water
crisis,
submitted
by
David
Bullock
Dr.
Marty
Kaufman/University
of
Michigan-Flint
says
in
press
conference
that
it
is
still
unknown
what
types
of
pipes
are
running
to
13,000
properties
in
Flint.
Thus
far,
February
22,
2016
4,376
locations
with
lead
pipes
have
been
identified;
records
do
not
exist
for
more
than
10,000
properties
February
22,
2016
MLive
(Feb.
22,
2016):
"Petition
to
recall
Gov.
Rick
Snyder
over
Flint
water
crisis
clears
Michigan
panel"
(Lawler)
Sources
www.rt.com/usa/332817-flint-water-pipe-replacement-pfcs/
www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-water-
crisis/2016/02/17/state-agreement-flint-pipe-testing/80470524/
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2016/02/governor_says_2-
million_grant.html
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2016/02/us_department_o
f_health_announ.html
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2016/02/flint_water_crisis_
march_with.html
www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-
02/documents/epa_letter_to_mdeq_and_city_of_flint_w_attach
ments_2.19.16.pdf
www.MLive.com/news/index.ssf/2016/02/petition_to_recall_gov
_rick_sn.html#incart_river_index_topics
MLive
(Feb.
22,
2016):
"Work
still
needed
to
identify
service
lines
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2016/02/work_still_needed
to
13,000
Flint
properties"
(Acosta)
_to_identify.html#incart_river_index_topics
MLive
(Feb.
22,
2016):
"Latest
Flint
water
tests
show
1
in
10
sites
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2016/02/latest_flint_water
still
exceed
federal
lead
limit"
(Fonger)
_testing_sho.html#incart_river_index_topics
www.detroitnews.com/story/news/michigan/flint-water-
Gov.
Snyder
announces
his
office
will
release
e-mails
his
staff
sent
or
received
dating
Detroit
News
(Feb.
22,
2016):
"Snyder:
Office
will
release
staff
crisis/2016/02/22/snyder-office-release-staff-emails-flint-
back
to
2011
re:
Flint
water
supply
switch
and
subsequent
contamination
emails
on
Flint
water"
(Livengood)
water/80771952/
MLive
(Feb.
22,
2016):
"Six
takeaways
on
Flint
water
crisis
from
www.mlive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2016/02/six_takeaways_on
Congressional
delegation
led
by
U.S.
Rep.
Dan
Kildee,
D-Flint
Township,
visits
Flint
Congressional
delegation"
(Acosta)
_flint_water_c.html#incart_river_index_topics
Michigan
CMO
Wells
announces
MDHHS
has
requested
Assessment
of
Chemical
CBS
Detroit
(Feb.
23,
2016):
"Federal
Officials
To
Probe
Rashes
detroit.cbslocal.com/2016/02/23/federal-officials-to-probe-rashes-
Exposure
from
U.S.
DHHS
to
assess
skin
rashes
reported
during
Flint
water
crisis
Amid
Flint
Water
Crisis"
(AP)
amid-flint-water-crisis/
State
lawmakers
announce
they
have
created
a
joint
committee
to
begin
formally
MLive
(Feb.
23,
2016):
"Flint
water
crisis
to
get
fresh
probe
by
www.MLive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2016/02/state_lawmakers_
reviewing
Flint's
ongoing
water
crisis
state
lawmakers"
(Ridley)
form_committee.html#incart_story_package
Ruth
Mott
Foundation
dedicates
$1
million
to
go
toward
short-
and
long-term
needs
MLive
(Feb.
24,
2016):
"Ruth
Mott
Foundation
gives
$1M
to
aid
in
www.mlive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2016/02/ruth_mott_founda
of
Flint
residents
exposed
to
lead
Flint
water
crisis"
(Adams)
tion_gives_1m.html#incart_river_index_topics
MLive
(Feb.
26,
2016):
"Gov.
Snyder
signs
$30
million
water
relief
www.mlive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2016/02/snyder_signs_30_
Gov.
Snyder
signs
$30
million
bill
to
provide
water
bill
relief
for
Flint
residents
bill
for
Flint"
(Johnson)
million_water.html
#JUSTICEFORFLINT
benefit
show
is
held
at
The
Whiting
in
Flint,
raising
more
than
MLive
(Mar.
1,
2016):
"Justice
for
Flint
benefit
show
raises
www.mlive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2016/03/justice_for_flint_b
$150,000
to
benefit
Flint
residents
$156,000
for
water
crisis
relief"
(Acosta)
enefit_show.html
Accessed
3/19/16
3/19/16
3/19/16
3/19/16
3/19/16
3/19/16
February 22, 2016 MLive reports some test sites still exceed federal limit for lead in water
3/19/16
3/19/16
3/19/16
3/19/16
3/19/16
3/19/16
29
Abbreviation
ACLU
AG
AJPH
AWWA
CAC
CCT
CDC
CLPPP
Cu
DBPs
DEQ
DHHS
DNR
DPW
DWSD
EBLL
EFM
ELL
EM
EPA
FAQs
FOIA
FWATF
FWICC
GCBOH
GCDC
GCHD
GCMS
GFHC
GM
HMC
KWA
LAN
LCR
LSL
MCIR
MCL
MDCH
MDEQ
MDHHS
mgd
NAN
Definition
American
Civil
Liberties
Union
Attorney
General
American
Journal
of
Public
Health
American
Water
Works
Association
Citizens
Advisory
Committee
Corrosion
control
treatment
Centers
for
Disease
Control
and
Prevention
Childhood
Lead
Poisoning
Prevention
Program
Copper
Disinfection
byproducts
Department
of
Environmental
Quality
Department
of
Health
and
Human
Services
Department
of
Natural
Resources
City
of
Flint
Department
of
Public
Works
Detroit
Water
and
Sewerage
Department
Elevated
blood
lead
level
Emergency
financial
manager
Elevated
lead
level
Emergency
manager
U.S.
Environmental
Protection
Agency
Frequently
Asked
Questions
Freedom
of
Information
Act
Flint
Water
Advisory
Task
Force
Flint
Water
Interagency
Coordinating
Committee
GCHD
Board
of
Health
Genesee
County
Drain
Commission
Genesee
County
Health
Department
Genesee
County
Medical
Society
Greater
Flint
Health
Coalition
General
Motors
Hurley
Medical
Center
Karegnondi
Water
Authority
Lockwood,
Andrews,
&
Newnam,
Inc.
Lead
Contaminant
Rule
Lead
service
line
Michigan
Care
Improvement
Registry
Maximum
Contaminant
Level
Michigan
Department
of
Community
Health
Michigan
Department
of
Environmental
Quality
Michigan
Department
of
Health
and
Human
Services
Million
gallons
per
day
National
Action
Network
NDWAC
NRDC
OAG
OCCT
ODMWA
O&M
Pb
ppb
SDWA
TAC
TTHMs
TYJT
UAW
g/l
VT
WTP