NAVAL

POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS
THE REQUIREMENT FOR U.S. ARMY SPECIAL FORCES
TO CONDUCT INTERROGATION
by
Michael J. Foote
June 2012
Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:
Third Reader:

Hy Rothstein
Kalev Sepp
Randy Burkett

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4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The Requirement for U.S. Army
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6. AUTHOR(S) Michael J. Foote
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13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)

Waterboarding, rendition, torture: each of these terms provides deeply negative

examples of the mishandling of detainees by various entities of the United
States government during the prosecution of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
In order to rectify these failures of the various systems within the U.S.
militarys detention framework, the Department of Defense (DoD) developed and
issued Field Manual 2-22.3 Human Intelligence Collector Operations. This new
doctrine has created restrictions that add unnecessary hours to the process of
exploiting detainees through tactical interrogation. Due to the autonomous
nature of their missions, the significance for U.S. Army Special Forces is
immense.
Tactical interrogation is a legal, viable, and necessary method of information
gathering on the battlefield. FM 2-22.3 has taken away USSFs capability to
exploit an immense pool of intelligence that could be critical in the current
conflicts. This thesis explores the limitations imposed by current doctrine and
discusses changes necessary to provide the skills, training, and legal
authorities that will allow Special Forces to use every appropriate resource to
be successful on the modern battlefield. Recommendations are provided regarding
training and doctrine to provide the proper authorities along with appropriate
checks and balances.
14.
SUBJECT
TERMS
Interrogation,
tactical
questioning, 15. NUMBER OF
intelligence, human intelligence, special forces, water PAGES
129
boarding, rendition, torture, field manual 2-22.3 Human
Intelligence
Collector
Operations,
irregular
warfare, 16. PRICE CODE
unconventional warfare, interrogator
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Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

THE REQUIREMENT FOR U.S. ARMY SPECIAL FORCES

TO CONDUCT INTERROGATION

Michael J. Foote
Major, United States Army
B.S., University of Oklahoma, 1999

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

June 2012

Author:

Michael J. Foote

Approved by:

Hy Rothstein
Thesis Advisor

Kalev Sepp
Second Reader

Randy Burkett
Third Reader

John Arquilla
Chair, Department of Defense Analysis
iii

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iv

ABSTRACT

Waterboarding,
provides

rendition,

deeply

detainees

negative

by

various

torture:

each

examples

entities

of
of

of

these

terms

the

mishandling

the

United

of

States

government during the prosecution of the wars in Afghanistan

and Iraq. In order to rectify these failures of the various
systems within the U.S. militarys detention framework, the
Department

of

Defense

(DoD)

developed

and

issued

Field

Manual 2-22.3, Human Intelligence Collector Operations. This

new doctrine has created restrictions that add unnecessary
hours

to

tactical
their

the

process

interrogation.

missions,

the

of

exploiting

Due

to

the

significance

detainees

autonomous

for

U.S.

through

nature

Army

of

Special

Forces is immense.
Tactical
necessary

interrogation

method

of

is

information

legal,

viable,

gathering

on

and
the

battlefield. FM 2-22.3 has taken away USSFs capability to

exploit

an

immense

pool

of

intelligence

that

could

be

critical in the current conflicts. This thesis explores the

limitations

imposed

by

current

doctrine

and

discusses

changes necessary to provide the skills, training, and legal

authorities that will allow Special Forces to use every
appropriate

resource

to

be

successful

on

the

modern

battlefield. Recommendations are provided regarding training

and doctrine to provide the proper authorities along with
appropriate checks and balances.

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vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

INTRODUCTION ............................................1
A.
OVERVIEW ...........................................1
1.
A History of Interrogation in Warfare .........4
2.
Current Doctrinal Inadequacies ................7
3.
The Growing Need for Intelligence and the
Restrictions Placed on Obtaining It ..........10
B.
PURPOSE ...........................................11
C.
METHODOLOGY .......................................13
D.
CHAPTER OUTLINE ...................................13

II. THE REQUIREMENT FOR INTERROGATION IN THE IRREGULAR

ENVIRONMENT ............................................15
A.
INTRODUCTION ......................................15
B.
CONFRONTING THE CHANGING THREAT ...................16
C.
THE REQUIREMENT FOR TACTICAL INTERROGATION ........20
D.
TIME AND FLEXIBILITY ..............................23
E.
SEPARATING OURSELVES FROM TORTURE .................26
F.
CONCLUSION ........................................30
III. WHY SPECIAL FORCES? ....................................33
A.
INTRODUCTION ......................................33
B.
WHY SF? ...........................................33
1.
The Mission ..................................35
a.
The SF Mission of Unconventional Warfare
(UW) ....................................36
b.
The SF Mission of Foreign Internal
Defense (FID) ...........................39
2.
The Men ......................................40
C.
UNLEARNING WHAT WE THINK WE KNOW ..................41
D.
CONCLUSION ........................................44
IV. CASE
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
V.

STUDIES ...........................................45
INTRODUCTION ......................................45
COL STUART A. HARRINGTON ..........................46
AN ODAS ABILITY TO SEIZE UPON OPPORTUNITY ........48
THE COST OF INSUFFICIENT TRAINING .................52
AN ODAS OPPORTUNITY LOST TO INADEQUATE TRAINING ..56

CONCLUSION .............................................59
A.
BEGIN WITH U.S. ARMY SPECIAL FORCES ...............60
B.
TRAINING ..........................................61
1.
Training Internal to SF ......................62
2.
Training Outside of SF .......................63
C.
THE ROAD AHEAD ....................................64
vii

LIST OF REFERENCES ..........................................67

APPENDIX A.

FM 2-22.3, CHAPTER 1 .........................71

APPENDIX B.
EXECUTIVE
ORDER
13491-ENSURING
LAWFUL
INTERROGATIONS .........................................87
APPENDIX C.

WITHOUT TORTURE BY HANNS SCHARFF .............93

APPENDIX D.
SUGGESTIONS FOR JAPANESE INTERPRETERS BASED
ON WORK IN THE FIELD BY SHERWOOD MORAN ...............107
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ..................................115

viii

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

CIA

Central Intelligence Agency

CNT

Counter-Narcotics Terrorism Mission

COMINT

Communications Intelligence

DoD

Department of Defense

ERB

Emergency Response Battalion

FID

Foreign Internal Defense

FM

Field Manual

FOB

Forward Operating Base

HIG

Highvalue Interrogation Group

HMMWV

High Mobility Multi-Wheeled Vehicle

HUMINT

Human Intelligence

IED

Improvised Explosive Device

IMINT

Imagery Intelligence

IP

Iraqi Police

IRA

Irish Republican Army

JCET

Joint Combined Exchange Training

MATA

Military Assistance Training Advisor

ODA

Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha

OEF

Operation Enduring Freedom

OIF

Operation Iraqi Freedom

POW

Prisoner of War

SERE

Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape

SF

U.S. Army Special Forces

SIGINT

Signals Intelligence

SOF

Special Operations Forces

SWAT

Special Weapons and Tactics Unit

TSCP

Theater Security Cooperation Plan

TECHINT

Technical Intelligence

TQ

Tactical Questioning

USMC

United States Marine Corps

USSOCOM

U.S. Special Operations Command

UW

Unconventional Warfare
ix

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would first like to thank my family for your support and
understanding

through

this

long

adventure

of

national

service. I would also like to thank the NPS Defense Analysis

faculty who have not only assisted me in navigating this
bend in the river, but for so heartily assuming the task
of

preparing

me

for

the
to

complex

battlefield.

Finally,

my

rough men.

De Oppresso Liber.

xi

problems

of

brothers-in-arms,

the

next

Orwells

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

xii

I.

A.

INTRODUCTION

OVERVIEW
Waterboarding,

rendition,

torture:

these

terms

are

synonymous with debates over the mishandling of detainees by

various entities of the United States government during the
prosecution of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In order to
improve
handling

the

failures

detainees

and

within

weaknesses
the

U.S.

of

processing

militarys

and

detention

system, the Department of Defense (DoD) developed and issued

Field Manual 2-22.3 Human Intelligence Collector Operations.
In January 2009, the new field manual became more than
military doctrine. It became the law of the land through the
signing

of

Executive

Order

13491-Ensuring

Lawful

Interrogations which highlighted the new field manual as the

single point of reference for any U.S. government agency
conducting

interrogation.

This

new

doctrine

is

an

over-

correction that obstructs units at the tactical level from

acquiring the intelligence needed for success in the current
irregular conflict.
Tactical
necessary
battlefield.

interrogation

method
The

of
new

is

legal,

information
manual

viable,

gathering

specifically

on

restricts

and
the
the

authority to interrogate enemy detainees to a very small

number of U.S. personnel. Because of their small number,
these personnel are posted only at major bases, often over
100 milessix hours by roadfrom the point of capture. The
requirement to move detainees to these specific personnel
for

exploitation

takes

valuable
1

time

that

allows

the

detainee to recover from the shock of capture, resulting in

a heightened state of awareness and an increased resistance
to questioning. Timeliness is critical to the information
the detainee possesses. Information decreases in value the
older it becomes, and FM 2.22-3 has created restrictions
that add unnecessary hours to the process of gathering and
exploiting detainees through interrogation.
The significance of this for U.S. Army Special Forces
(USSF) is immense. Special Forces soldiers are on the front
lines

of

numerous

conflicts

human intelligence (HUMINT).

around

the

globe,

gathering

By virtue of their training in

the language, the ethnography, and the history of various

regions, USSF personnel possess a better understanding of
the operational environment than any other element of the
DoD.

Consequently, there is pressure for USSF personnel to

provide

timely

intelligence

gained

firsthand

on

the

battlefield. USSF work in small, autonomous units with the

requirement to be operationally self-sufficient in all areas
to

include

all

available

resources

of

HUMINT

collection

capability. Inadvertently, FM 2-22.3 has taken away USSFs

authority to gather and exploit a vast pool of information
and intelligence that could be critical in the conduct of
the current struggle against terrorism and fundamentalism.
The U.S. government needs detailed information about
its adversaries, as well as a strategic and ethnographic
understanding of how the information fits together.1
is

particularly

critical

in

irregular

warfare,

HUMINT

but

U.S.

1 Robert Coulam, Approaches to Interrogation in the Struggle against

Terrorism: Considerations of Cost and Benefit, in Educing Information

Interrogation: Science and Art, ed. Robert Fein (Washington, DC:
National Defense Intelligence College, 2006), 8.

HUMINT networks are often weakest precisely in the regions

where terrorist and insurgent organizations that threaten
U.S. national interests tend to thrive. The effective use of
appropriate interrogation methods by USSF in these regions
could

provide

reliable

substantial

intelligence

operational,

and

focused

working

on

increase

available

strategic
by,

levels
with,

in

at
of

and

the

amount

the

of

tactical,

conflict.
through

USSF

is

indigenous

populations and is regionally aligned around geographical

and cultural areas of focus. These factors put USSF in a
critical

position

inherent

understanding

vital

to

information

gather
of

critical

different

important

to

information.

populations

commanders

and

Their

provides
decision

makers at all levels of conflict. Unfortunately, the new

doctrine presented in FM 2-22.3 denies USSF the capability
of gaining needed intelligence requirements through the use
of interrogation.
Some will argue that the current FM 2-22.3 doctrine has
improved

interrogation

operations

within

Iraq

and

Afghanistan. However, the maturity of these theaters lies in

stark

contrast

changing

to

the

environments

potentially

that

USSF

will

austere

and

rapidly

face

during

future

operations. These ambiguous environments are the specific

reason that USSF must be provided a clear, concise policy
granting the authority to conduct interrogation operations
around

the

globe.

The

vast

uncertainty

of

irregular

operational environments alone highlights the need for this

clarity of policy. The U.S. government cannot afford to
simply

hope

USSF

soldiers

will

correctly

interpret

the

obscure laws and shifting intents regarding interrogation

during the conduct of combat operations across the globe.
3

Failure to grant these authorities and provide the necessary

doctrine

and

training

contradicts

the

expectation

for

increased actionable intelligence. This not only wastes the

abilities

of

USSF

operators,

it

is

invites

potential

detainee abuses.
1.

A History of Interrogation in Warfare

Interrogating prisoners for intelligence is as old as

the practice of warfare itself. Example after example lie
within

the

books

of

martial

history

where

intelligence

gained through interrogation shifted the outcome of battles,

campaigns,

and

interrogations

wars.
of

Information

captured

Hittite

gathered
spies

from

saved

the

Pharaoh

Ramesses IIs ancient Egyptian army at Kadesh in 1274 BC.2

The Romans were able to erase the threat of a Carthaginian
conquest of Rome at the battle of the Metaurus River when
Gaius Claudius Nero learned of Hasdrubals plan to join
forces with his brother Hannibal through the interrogation
of captured Carthaginian couriers during the Second Punic
War.3
The

importance

of

intelligence

gained

from

interrogations has been highlighted by military strategists

throughout history. Sun Tzu stresses that: What is called
foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits, nor from

2 Francis Dvornik, Origins of Intelligence Services: The Ancient Near

East, Persia, Greece, Rome, Byzantium, the Arab Muslim Empires, the
Mongol Empire, China, Muscovy (Camden,NJ: Rutgers University Press,
1974), 12-14.
3 David Kahn, Hitlers Spies: German Military Intelligence in World
War II (New York: Macmillan, 1978), 27.

gods,

nor

by

analogy

with

past

events,

nor

from

calculations. It must be obtained from men who know the

enemy situation.4
Swiss General Henri Jomini describes the interrogation,
along with a system of espionage and reconnaissance, as one
of the most reliable sources of intelligence available to
commanders.

He goes on to stress that interrogation of

prisoners can yield positive results only when conducted by

intelligent personnel who can so frame their questions as
to

elicit

important

information.6

Generals

Sheridan,

McClellan, and Meade shared this view as evidenced through

their personal involvement in the systematic and thorough
examination of captured prisoners during the American Civil
War.7
After 4,000 years of warfare, the wars of the twentieth
century brought about a paradigm shift that would forever
alter

the

importance

of

intelligence

and

the

role

of

interrogation. By dividing intelligence into two categories,

David Kahn illustrates that physical intelligence is derived
from things (i.e., bodies of troops, the sound of artillery)
and

verbal

intelligence

is

derived

from

words

(i.e.,

report on enemy morale, an intercepted order). Understanding

the

differences

and

the

interconnectedness

of

the

two

provides for intelligence supremacy. Prior to World War I,

physical

intelligence

provided

the

preponderance

of

4 Sun Tzu, The Art of War (Oxford: University Press, 1963), 145.
5 Michael Handel, Masters of War: Classic Strategic Thought (London:
Routledge, 2001), 249.
6 Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini, The Art of War (London: Stackpole
Books, 1992), 270.
7 Steven M. Kleinman, The Promise of Interrogation v. the Problem of
Torture, Valparaiso University Law Review 43 (2009): 1580.

intelligence
War,

for

leaders

in

conflict.

conditions

shifted

to

foster

intelligencespecifically

prisoner

During

the

Great

of

verbal

interrogations.

Verbal

collection

intelligence was now more important than physical because it

gave commanders time time to prepare, time to react, time
to plan.8
The increasing value placed on verbal intelligence by
the end of World War I vaulted interrogation to a new level.
This resulted in the development of successful American,
British, and German interrogation programs during World War
II

that

demonstrated

information

that

can

the
be

potential
obtained

treasure

from

the

trove

of

systematic,

outcome-oriented approach to interrogation that relied far

more on finesse than on force.9

After the war, the world

became focused on nuclear conflict and the Cold War shifting

intelligence

priorities

again

to

the

physicalmonitoring

massed forces and counting ICBM sites through satellites and

signal

technology.

The

potential

for

interrogation

as

source of intelligence became lost in the shadows of the

various new disciplines of TECHINT.10

Unfortunately, the

failures of the sophisticated technologies in weapons and

intelligence to appropriately counter the enemy in irregular
conflicts, such as Vietnam and Somalia, were ignored by a
system designed to fight conventional wars between nations.
As the United States entered the wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq, the reports of abuses at Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo Bay,

8 Kahn, Hitlers Spies, 40.

9 Kleinman, The Promise of Interrogation v. the Problem of Torture,
1587.
10 Kleinman, The Promise of Interrogation v. the Problem of
Torture, 1578.

and various rendition sites served as the impetus for a

long-overdue examination of the role of interrogation as a
necessary and critical instrument in the current irregular
fight and the importance of meshing HUMINT with TECHINT.11
2.

Current Doctrinal Inadequacies

Previous to the release of FM 2-22.3 in September 2006,

the

U.S.

Army

operated

under

FM

34-52

Intelligence

Interrogation (original release May 1987, revised September

1992).

Arguably a reasonable reference for interrogation of

a conventional enemy on a conventional battlefield, FM 34-52

was based on methods designed around experiences from World
War II and the Cold War. It targeted the interrogation of
large

groups

of

young

enemy

soldiers

with

limited

information and life experience by U.S. soldiers who were

likewise

young,

with

limited

experience.

Interrogations

would occur at various levels starting at the brigade level

and ending in a theater-level POW camp. While FM 34-52 is
criticized for being too Cold War in application, one of
its primary strengths was that it provided a basic framework
for battlefield interrogation by any soldier. It did not
limit the authority of most soldiers at the tactical level
of

the

battlefield

to

conduct

interrogation.12

The

following excerpt from FM 2-22.3 demonstrates that the new

doctrine has removed this authority:
Interrogations may only be conducted by personnel
trained
and
certified
in
the
interrogation

11 Kleinman, Interrogation v. Torture, 1578.

12 James A. Stone, David P. Shoemaker, and Nicholas R. Dotti,
Interrogation: World War II, Vietnam, and Iraq (Washington DC: National
Defense Intelligence College, 2008), 166.

methodology, including personnel in MOSs 97E,

351M (351E), or select others as may be approved
by DOD policy.13
The

basis

investigations

for

that

this

were

doctrine

conducted

grew

in

the

from
wake

the

of

the

prisoner abuses that took place at Abu Ghraib prison in late

2003.

These

investigations

found

the

conditions

that

allowed for the abuse of the detainees were created by a

lack of clear policy that was amplified by outdated doctrine
and continually changing memorandums. The doctrine guiding
interrogators and soldiers did not address many of the most
difficult situations soldiers were repeatedly faced with on
the ground.14
The
chaired

Independent
by

Central

former

Panel

on

Secretary

Intelligence

DoD

of

James

Detention

Defense

Schlesinger,

and

Operations,
Director

conducted

of
and

produced the most thorough report to date on detention and

interrogation operations taking place in Iraq (Operation
Iraqi

Freedom,

OIF)

and

Afghanistan

(Operation

Enduring

Freedom, OEF).

Released in August 2004, the panel states in

its

The

findings,

current

doctrine

and

procedures

for

detaining personnel are inadequate to meet the requirements

of these [OIF/OEF] conflicts based on the vastly different
circumstances in these conflicts.15
issue

in

April

2005

with

the

The DoD addressed this

announcement

that

new

interrogation manual would be produced to replace FM 34-52.

13 FM 2-22.3 Human Intelligence Collector Operations, paragraph 1-20,

1-8.
14 Stone, et al., Interrogation, 164.
15 DoD Detention Operations Panel, 53.

Unfortunately,

during

the

18

months

it

took

the

pentagon to produce FM 2-22.3 Human Intelligence Collector

Operations,

the

vast

majority

of

the

findings

from

the

investigations of 2004 that dealt with operations at the

tactical level were not implemented. Recommendations for
more specialists for detention/interrogation operations to
include linguists, interrogators, and human intelligence,
along with the need to place special and early emphasis on
detention operations during Counter-Insurgency campaigns and
Stability Operations in which familiar concepts of front and
rear areas may not apply, were simply not included within
the

new

doctrine.16

Rather

than

outlining

or

detailing

doctrine that could be used by tactical units to adapt

standard operating procedures regarding the detaining of
individuals for intelligence during irregular warfare, the
new manual was overly specific and inflexible dictating that
a

very

small

number

of

specially

trained

and

certified

individuals were the only personnel authorized to conduct

interrogation operations.17

While the interrogation schools

operated by the U.S. Army and Marine Corps continue to

produce

interrogators

fundamentals

of

who

tactical

are

highly

interrogations

skilled
to

in

the

effectively

gather intelligence and information, the schools just cannot

produce enough graduates to fill the need for interrogation
skills at the lowest tactical levels. This strict definition
took away the capability of almost every tactical level
soldier to gain intelligence and information including USSF
beyond

the

limited

capacity

of

immediate

tactical

16 DoD Detention Operations Panel, 90.

17 FM 2-22.3 Human Intelligence Collector Operations, paragraph 1-20,

1-8.

questioning. None of the investigations cited tactical level

units detaining individuals as being the root of abuse or
mistreatment.18
level

of

Yet even with data demonstrating a similar

abuse

between

units

trained

and

untrained

in

detention and interrogation operations, the new doctrine

excludes

all

untrained

soldiers

from

conducting

these

operations. Additionally, the recommendation of implementing

a professional ethics program that would equip soldiers
with a sharp moral compass for guidance in situations often
riven with conflicting moral obligations for all personnel
who may be engaged in detention operations, from point of
capture to final disposition.19
still

no

doctrine

that

Four years later, there is

addresses

training

USSF

(or

infantrymen) for detention and/or interrogation operations.

While the adverse effects this has had on operations within
Iraq

and

Afghanistan

are

visible,

the

restrictions

are

highlighted even more so in the irregular environments where

USSF operates elsewhere.
3.

The Growing Need for Intelligence

Restrictions Placed on Obtaining It

and

the

The need for HUMINT has dramatically increased in the

new threat environment of asymmetric warfare.20

National

leaders and military commanders consistently turn to USSF

for

actionable

intelligence

against

enemy

targets

credible information regarding regional atmospherics.

and
At

no point in the foreseeable future will this change, as the

United States faces widely dispersed terrorist and insurgent
18 Stone, et al., Interrogation, 165.
19 DoD Detention Operations Panel, 91.
20 DoD Detention Operations Panel, 64.

10

networks that cannot be identified simply through monitoring

training sites and equipment concentrations via signal or
imagery intelligence.21

However, because of decisions made

to limit interrogation to certified personnel, based on

what appears to be the fear of potential detainee abuse, a
vast source for gathering information and intelligence has
been placed off-limits to USSF.
In 2004, the Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention
Operations

released

its

findings

and,

regrettably,

the

doctrine put into place by FM 2-22.3 contradicts the panels

findings in multiple areas. The panel found that there was a
shortfall of properly trained human intelligence personnel
to do tactical interrogation at all levels, and qualified
interrogators
centers.22
The

were

in

short

supply

at

larger

detention

In its final recommendations, the panel states,

nation

needs

more

specialists

for

detention/

interrogation operations, and yet the doctrine put forth

within FM 2-22.3 specifically labels thousands of potential
HUMINT
task.23

collectors

as

being

unauthorized

to

conduct

this

Where FM 34-52 allowed for all soldiers to conduct

interrogations according to the standards of international

law, the pendulum has now swung too drastically in the
opposite direction.
B.

PURPOSE
Any discussion of interrogation must begin with the

simple

reality

that

its

purpose

21 DoD Detention Operations Panel, 64.

22 DoD Detention Operations Panel, 63.
23 DoD Detention Operations Panel, 90.

11

is

to

gain

reliable

intelligence that will help protect the United States, U.S.

forces, and U.S. interests abroad.24

Even the notorious

KUBARK Counterintelligence Interrogation Manual, produced by

the CIA in 1963, defines interrogation as, no more than
obtaining

needed

questions.25
the

information

through

responses

to

The purpose of this thesis is not to debate

definition

of

torture,

or

detainee

rights

commonly

attached to discussions on interrogation, but to examine the

role of interrogation as a critical tool in the current
irregular

conflict

interrogation

and

doctrine

to
and

highlight
policy

the

shortcomings

specifically

for

of

USSF

soldiers (and arguably other soldiers) and to demonstrate

the need for USSF to receive interrogation training based on
their doctrinally assigned core missions of unconventional
warfare

(UW)

and

foreign

internal

defense(FID).

It

is

because of these irregular core missions, which are specific

to USSF, that interrogation must become an organic skill to
the

Special

Forces.

While

the

need

for

tactical

interrogation exists within conventional units, the skills

and

authorities

required

could

be

supplemented

if

these

units were placed within an irregular conflict on a case by

case

basis.

The

need

for

USSF

Soldiers

to

conduct

interrogation based on mission requirements currently exists

around

the

globe.

The

inability

of

USSF

to

hold

and

interrogate detainees adversely affects the collection of

reliable, actionable intelligence.

24 Department of Defense, Final Report of the Independent Panel to

Review DoD Detention Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, 2004), 61.

25 Central Intelligence Agency, KUBARK Counterintelligence

Interrogation (Washington DC: 1963), 1,

http://www.gwu.edu/%7Ensarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB122/CIA%20Kubark%201-60.pdf
(accessed 1 March, 2011.)

12

C.

METHODOLOGY
The necessity of USSF to possess the authority and

receive training to conduct interrogations will be presented

based on their mission, the exercises and operations they
conduct, and the variations and types of enemy currently
being

faced.

Various

DoD

reports

will

also

be

used

to

emphasize some shortfalls in U.S. interrogation doctrine and

practices

that

doctrine.

Case

address

the

studies

inadequacies

will

be

used

of
to

the

current

support

the

identified need for USSF to gain the training and authority

to conduct interrogations. These cases will provide insight
how current doctrine, policy, and a lack of proper training
have handicapped the tactical level intelligence gathering
of USSF.
D.

CHAPTER OUTLINE
Chapter II will highlight the need for USSF to possess

interrogation skills, and the authority to use those skills

inorder to accomplish current doctrinal missions. Chapter
III provides several case studies that serve to illuminate
the need for USSF to receive the necessary training and
authority to conduct tactical interrogation. These studies
provide insight as to how current doctrine, policy, and lack
of training have handicapped tactical level intelligence
collection
requirement

by

increase,

USSF.

for
Chapter

USSF
IV

Acknowledging
to

collect

provides

the

fact

information

recommendations

that
will
to

the
only

alter

current doctrine and authorities to provide the skills and

training to facilitate USSF success on the modern irregular
battlefield. Interrogation should be introduced to the SF
13

Qualification

course,

select

personnel

should

receive

additional training and certification upon arrival at the

operational

groups,

and

doctrine

should

be

altered

to

provide authority for USSF to conduct interrogation with

appropriate checks and balances.

14

II. THE REQUIREMENT FOR INTERROGATION IN THE

IRREGULAR ENVIRONMENT

A.

INTRODUCTION
There is no doubt that the scandal surrounding the

treatment of prisoners of Abu Ghraib was a turning point for

the

United

States.

The

public

reaction

forced

national

leaders to discuss the issues of prisoner detention and

interrogation they had previously avoided addressing. It
brought into focus the consequences of mishandling detainees
and intelligence by various entities of the U.S. government
during the prosecution of the conflicts following Al Qaedas
attack

on

America

in

2001.

In

order

to

remedy

these

failures and weaknesses of the various systems within the

U.S. militarys detention framework, the DoD developed and
issued

new

doctrine

in

FM

2-22.3

Human

Intelligence

Collector Operations. Highly restrictive in nature, this new

doctrine severely limited the ability of all tactical units
to gather HUMINT through interrogation at a time when these
units

were

facing

an

ever-increasing

irregular

form

of

conflict.
The primary threat facing the United States has changed
significantly since September 11, 2001.

It is now irregular

in nature and requires a fundamental reexamination of how

intelligence is collected.

26

In irregular warfare, the U.S.

government needs detailed operational information about its

adversaries

as

well

as

deep

strategic

and

cultural

understanding of how the information fits together within a

26 DoD Detention Operations Panel, 64.

15

larger mosaic.

27

HUMINT is critical in irregular warfare,

but U.S. HUMINT networks are commonly weakest precisely in

the regions where terrorist and insurgent organizations that
threaten U.S. national interests tend to thrive. Information
derived

from

interrogations

is

vital

component

of

HUMINT.28

USSF are designed to operate and thrive in the

irregular

environment.

their normal.

Unlike

conventional

units,

it

is

The use of interrogation by USSF in these

regions would provide a substantial increase in the amount

of

reliable

and

actionable

information

available

at

the

tactical, operational, and strategic levels of conflict.

B.

CONFRONTING THE CHANGING THREAT

Terrorists and insurgents present new challenges to the

United States because the variations in their organizational

structures,

methods

methodology

differ

threats

national

the

of

communication,

significantly
security

from

apparatus

and
the
was

operational
conventional
designed

to

identify and defeat. Groups are decreasingly bound to a

single geographic location or state and operate utilizing
methods that make them difficult to observe and penetrate.29
This new threat has highlighted the increased need for the
HUMINT capabilities at the tactical level. To understand the
criticality

of

HUMINT

in

the

United

States

current

struggle, the nature of the threat and conflict the nation

is facing now and will likely face in the future must be
understood.

27 Coulam, Interrogation in the Struggle against Terrorism, 8.

28 DoD Detention Operations Panel, 64.
29 DoD Detention Operations Panel, 64.

16

Simply by comparing their definitions, one can identify

the important difference in the nature of conventional and
irregular warfare. One is focused on open conflict to defeat
an enemys military forces; the other seeks to gain control
and influence over a target population. Where an enemy can
be

defeated

simply

overwhelming

through

firepower

on

an
the

efficient

application

conventional

of

battlefield,

irregular warfare requires the altering of the political

variables among the target population to the point where the
enemy becomes ineffectual.30

This does not require defeat

of an enemy through attrition, but requires an understanding

of the population to gain the trust and cooperation of the
population

on

which

the

enemy

relies

on

for

survival.

Because irregular warfare remains the weapon of the weak,

military action to defeat them does not pose the challenge
in this type of conflict.31
irregular

enemy

consists

The problem of defeating an

largely

in

finding

him.32

Understanding the differences in the nature of these two

forms of warfare highlights the alterations that must take
place within the U.S. intelligence system for success.
Intelligence is required for success in all forms of
warfare.
conducting

Yet,

because

irregular

it

is

the

operations,

decisive

factor

intelligences

in
role

increases in importance in this type of environment.33

On

30 Edward N. Luttwak, Notes on Low-Intensity Warfare, Parameters

XIII (1983): 16.
31 Lewis H. Gann, Guerrillas in History (Stanford: Hoover Institution
Press, 1971), 91.
32 Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency,
Peace-keeping (Great Britain: Stackpole Books, 1971), 95.
33 Mao Tse-tung, On Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Praeger Press,1961),

22.

17

the conventional battlefield, intelligence is often based

primarily on technical intelligence, focused on monitoring
massed forces and equipment at known military locations.34
While

this

is

conventionally

effective
in

against

relatively

an

opponent

linear

manner,

operating
it

lacks

effectiveness in irregular warfare. Irregular warfare is

fought by an unconventional enemy who strikes at a time and
location of his choosing when the likelihood of success is
weighted

heavily

in

his

favor.35

These

enemies

operate

through widely dispersed networks. While the irregular enemy

appears, at first glance, to have the tactical advantage,
further inspection demonstrates this advantage comes instead
from his informational superiority. This underscores the
importance of intelligence in irregular warfare. Once the
enemy

is

identified,

it

becomes

matter to dispose of him.36

comparatively

simple

Yet, with all of the United

States superiority in military technology and weaponry, the

most

vital

weapon

in

the

U.S.

arsenal

might

be

interrogation.37
Accordingly, the problem of defeating an irregular foe
lies primarily in finding him. Thus, the importance of good
intelligence and information cannot be overstated and often
the only source of that information lies with the enemy
himself.38

Moreover, the nature of the irregular foe means

34 DoD Detention Operations Panel, 64.

35 Mao, On Guerrilla Warfare, 22.
36 Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 95.
37 Mark Bowden, The Dark Art of Interrogation, The Atlantic Monthly
Online, October 2003, URL:
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2003/10/bowden/2791/,
accessed 28 May 2011.
38 Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 95.

18

the potential intelligence is also highly perishable. While

massed

forces

require

time

to

redeploy,

guerrillas

or

insurgents can seem to vanish in seconds. Intelligence must

come from the local population and the combining of that
intelligence with information derived from interrogations of
high- and low-level detainees is an important component of
HUMINT.39

Information gained from the population assists in

understanding

the

operational

environment.

This

is

significant difference between conventional and irregular

warfare because a piece of information that is meaningless
in conventional warfare, such as a local civic leaders
personal

relationships,

can

be

essential

to

gaining

the

support of a specific population.

In

irregular

populations

warfare,

mentality

is

the

understanding

arguably

more

of

important

than

understanding the enemys disposition. The prospects of an

insurgent

group

or

terrorist

network

depend

upon

the

attitude of the population. The willingness of a population

to aid the enemy by providing information and supplies, or
by

withholding

paramount.40
operational

information
Gaining

areas

an

from

the

accurate

historical,

counterinsurgent
understanding

political,

and

of

is
an

economic

matters will allow for success because an irregular enemy

can

only

survive

with

the

coerced, of the masses.41

be

used

to

gain

and

support,

passive,

active,

or

HUMINT is a resource that should

confirm

an

accurate

knowledge

and

understanding of these subjects. Interrogation conducted at

39 DoD Detention Operations Panel, 64.

40 B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy (New York: Praeger, 1967), 378.
41 Hart, Strategy, 379.

19

the

point

of

information

capture,

along

with

would

provide

critical

better

aspects

of

military
political,

economic, technical information about the enemy and local

population.42

This intelligence and information assists in

separating the population from the enemy resulting in the

population

feeling

secure

enough

to

provide

additional

information. Therefore, proper interrogation at the lowest

level combined with information gained through other means
of

HUMINT

is

critical

to

gaining

popular

support.

Information superiority will bring victory and that can only

be obtained through a constant and consistent interaction
with all components of the local population.
In his writings, Mao states that the army must become
one with the people so that they see it as their own army.
Debriefing is one tool that allows for this interaction to
take

place

with

friendly

or

neutral

population.

Interrogation is another tool that allows for that same

interaction with a hostile population. Unfortunately, at a
time when the current conflict requires additional HUMINT to
accurately identify and illuminate the enemy at the local
level in order to most effectively separate them from the
population, the doctrine presented in FM 2-22.3 denies the
vast majority of U.S. soldiers the capability and authority
to do so.
C.

THE REQUIREMENT FOR TACTICAL INTERROGATION

The unique aspect of interrogation that sets it apart

from

other

means

of

intelligence

collection

is

that

it

allows for the gathering of intelligence through direct and

42 Kleinman, Interrogation v. Torture, 1583.

20

continuous contact with the enemy.43

interpretation

of

images

or

It does not require

codes.

It

does

not

require

humans to deduce the supposed meanings and importance of

passively collected information. Interrogation provides the
opportunity to determine exactly what was meant by a certain
phrase in response to a question. Any uncertainties from
questioning,

and

other

questions

that

flow

from

the

responses, can be addressed directly and immediately by the

individual being interrogated.
The feeling of omniscience provided throughout the Cold
War and since by the imagery, signal, and communications
intelligence assets available to the United States today has
decreased

the

importance

of

gaining

HUMINT

through

interrogations in some circles. Despite the lack of these

technologies in World War II, many commanders even then
failed to see the benefit of tactical interrogation on the
battlefield, especially in the Pacific Theater. Early in the
war, U.S. units captured very few enemy POWs. Commanders
were reluctant to risk their men simply to capture Japanese
soldierssoldiers they were convinced would never disclose
valuable intelligence.44

Through a slow process led by U.S.

military interrogators within the tactical units, commanders

began to realize the advantage that information taken from
prisoners provided them on the battlefield.
One of the most successful interrogators in the Pacific
theater,

Major

experiences

as

Sherwood
an

Moran,

interrogator

USMC,
(he

wrote

preferred

of

his

the

term

interviewer) on Guadalcanal that, we snatched prisoners

43 Kleinman, Interrogation v. Torture, 1585.
44 Stone et al., Interrogation: WWII, VN, and Iraq, 71.

21

right off the battlefield while still bleeding, and the

snipers were still sniping, and interviewed them as soon as
they were able to talk.45

Moran dispelled the standard

U.S. attitude of the day that only the most severe coercive
measures of interrogation would convince a captured Japanese
soldier to divulge information. Moran believed strong-arm
tactics simply did not work.46

Using his successes to

demonstrate

tactical

the

effectiveness

of

interrogation,

Moran was able to establish a program that placed a large

emphasis

on

Japanese

culture

and

psychology,

language

expertise, and the humane treatment of Japanese POWs.47

The

effectiveness of this interrogation program was highlighted

during the landing on Saipan and Tinian, when interrogators
had indentified the entire Japanese order of battle within
the first 48 hours of fighting.48

The effectiveness of

interrogation was again demonstrated when the interrogation

programs implemented by the U.S. Army and Navy were credited
with shortening the war in the Pacific by 2 years.49
Tactical

interrogation

has

been

stressed

by

great

military leaders throughout time. Sun Tzu stressed that,

foreknowledgemust be obtained from men who know the enemy
situation.50 Jomini declares interrogation is one of the
most

reliable

sources

of

intelligence

available

45 Sherwood F. Moran, Major, U.S. Marine Corps, Suggestions for

Japanese Interpreters Based on Work in the Field, 17 July 1943,
http://www.w-z.com/articles/article023.pdf (accessed 6/5/2011).
46 Stephen Budiansky, Truth Extraction, Atlantic Magazine, June
2005, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2005/06/truthextraction/3973/ (accessed 5/6/20011).
47 Stone et al., Interrogation: WWII, VN, and Iraq, viii.
48 Budiansky, Truth Extraction.
49 Stone et al., Interrogation: WWII, VN, and Iraq, 17.
50 Sun Tzu, The Art of War (Oxford: University Press, 1963), 145.

22

to

commanders.

51

In the current irregular struggle that must

be fought at the local level, the United States cannot

afford to restrict the use of interrogation as a tool for
the tactical commander. There is a clear need for tacticallevel interrogation to provide information on the location
of the next ambush or the enemy snipers hide to protect the
forces on the ground. If interrogation is held only to
operational and strategic level commanders, the tactical
units operating under those commanders will never function
at

level

adequately

of

efficiency

understand

high

their

enough

to

environment

allow
and

them

defeat

to
the

enemy.
D.

TIME AND FLEXIBILITY

The system of rapid interrogation and site
exploitation would turn an initial operation into
one or two more the same night.
Konrad Troutman, Senior Intelligence
Officer for USSOCOM
Timeliness is critical in all aspects of intelligence.

This holds as true for strategic level intelligence as it

does for intelligence at the tactical level. The maximum
opportunity for gathering intelligence from a detainee comes
in the first hours after detention through interrogation,
before

other

determine

that

members

of

the

their

network

has

enemy
been

organization
breached.

can

Once

suspect is known to be in custody, his intelligence value

51 Michael Handel, Masters of War: Classic Strategic Thought (London:

Routledge, 2001), 249.

23

falls.52

In

its

findings,

The

Independent

Panel

on

DoD

Detention Operations states,

Interrogations
provide
commanders
with
information about enemy networks, leadership, and
tactics. Such information is critical in planning
operations. Tactically, detainee interrogation is
a fundamental tool for gaining insight into enemy
positions, strength, weapons, and intentions.
Thus, it is fundamental to the protection of our
force in combat.53
What
these

current

tactical

doctrine

fails

commanders

often

to

acknowledge

need

this

is

that

information

immediately. They do not have the time required to move a

detainee to a DoD-approved facility and wait for a DoDcertified interrogator (who only knows the details about the
detainee that the tactical unit provides) to conduct an
interrogation and then produce and send his report back to
the

original

unit.

During

OIF,

some

detainees

were

in

custody for as long as 90 days before being interrogated for

the first time.54
FM 2-22.3, however, completely ignores the necessity
for tactical units to secure detainees at their level to
gain

and

exploit

any

available

tactical

intelligence

themselves. In Iraq and Afghanistan, tactical commanders

understood the need to exploit the unique local knowledge
possessed

by

detainees.

These

commanders

kept

detainees

longer than doctrine allowed in order to gather details

regarding

religious

and

tribal

affiliations

and

local

politics, despite not being properly trained or resourced to

52 Bowden, The Dark Art of Interrogation.
53 DoD Detention Operations Panel, 65.
54 DoD Detention Operations Panel, 67.

24

most effectively do so. The time with the tactical unit

provided

the

clarification,

opportunity
and

for

additional

confirmation

of

questioning,

details.

Tactical

commanders were also concerned that information obtained in

higher-level interrogation facilities would not be returned
to the tactical unit.55

This concern is validated through

the Independent Panel on DoD Detention Operations findings

that

there

were

number

of

interrelated

factors

that

limited the intelligence derived from interrogations, most

notably, a shortfall of properly trained HUMINT personnel
and

short

supply

of

qualified

and

experienced

interrogators at all levels.56

Rather

than

identifying

these

needs

and

providing

training to support these operations, FM 2-22.3 focuses on

the necessity of rapid evacuation of all detainees for
their interrogation at the strategic and operational levels
regardless of the fact that very few detainees have decisive
information.57

By emphasizing the bottom-up movement of

detainees, nothing was done to address the complete lack of

top-down information flow as to intelligence and information
gained in these interrogations.58

Even more disturbing was

the restriction on who could conduct interrogations. Only a

few

certified

personnel

were

authorized

to

interrogate,

placing this critical tool out of the hands of tactical

commanders

regardless

of

the

Independent

Panels

acknowledgement that Tactically, detainee interrogation is

a fundamental tool for gaining insight into enemy positions,
55 DoD Detention Operations Panel, 66-67.
56 DoD Detention Operations Panel, 63.
57 FM 2-22.3, D-4.
58 Stone et al., Interrogation: WWII, VN, and Iraq, 141.

25

strength, weapons, and intentions. Thus, it is fundamental

to the protection of our force in combat.59
The DoD has inadequately attempted to rectify this by
emphasizing the use of tactical questioning (TQ).
defined

as

the

expedient

initial

TQ is

questioning

for

information of immediate tactical value. TQ is generally

performed by soldiers on patrols, but can be done by any DoD
personnel.60

Not only is TQ limited in the depth of its

questions, it is also restricted by time allotted. Detainees

are to be evacuated from the combat zone to a detention
facility within the minimum time after capture.61

This

highlights the weakness of current doctrine in irregular

warfare as it allows only professional interrogators to
conduct intelligence interrogations and leaves every other
U.S. service member on the battlefieldfrom a truck driver
to an SF intelligence sergeantwith only the tool of TQ.
E.

SEPARATING OURSELVES FROM TORTURE

[The] barbarous custom of whipping men suspected
of having important secrets to reveal must be
abolished. It has always been recognized that
this method of interrogation, by putting men to
the torture, is useless. The wretches say
whatever comes into their heads and whatever they
think one wants to believe. Consequently, the
Commander-in-Chief forbids the use of a method
which is contrary to reason and humanity.
Napoleon Bonaparte, during the French
military campaign in Egypt, 1798.62
59 DoD Detention Operations Panel, 65.
60 FM 2-22.3, 1-7.
61 FM 2-22.3, D-4.
62 Stone et al., Interrogation: WWII, VN, and Iraq, 141.

26

Torture.

It

works

at

least

on

some

level.

According to Bill Cowan, a Marine officer who served in

Vietnam, It worked like a charm.

When he captured an

uncooperative Vietcong soldier who could warn of ambushes or

lead them to the enemy, wires were attached to the man's
scrotum with alligator clips and electricity was produced
out of a 110-volt generator.

The minute the crank started

to turn, he was ready to talk. We never had to do more than

make it clear we could deliver a jolt. It was the fear more
than the pain that made them talk.63
Old war stories like Cowans and Hollywood action films
have taught the average American that simply roughing up a
detained criminal will get him to talk. More importantly,
when a U.S. soldier hears public comments by the president
that coercive interrogations have a proven track record of
keeping America safe, most would assume that the evidence
supporting coercive techniques must be compelling.64

The

facts show that this is simply not true. While torture might
be redefined as coercive means or enhanced interrogation
techniques, noncoercive interrogations have been much more
successful and reliable in obtaining accurate information
than coercive interrogations.65

Torture simply compels the

detainee, through any means necessary, to perform an action

63 Bowden, The Dark Art of Interrogation.

64 President George W. Bush, Presidents Radio Address, The White

House, 8 March 2008,

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/03/20080308.html
19 July 2008).

(accessed

65 MAJ Mike Mourouzis, Non-Coercive Interrogations, currently

awaiting publishing, 2011.

27

he

would

not

otherwise

commit

under

his

own

volition.66

There is nowhere in the U.S. government or morale code where

this is justified.
Coercive
compliance

interrogations

does

waterboarding,

not

can

ensure

prolonged

produce

reliable

standing,

compliance,
information.

forced

nudity,

but
The

sleep

deprivation, and exposure to extreme temperatures were all

the products of those seeking to terrorize rather than to
obtain truthful information.67
under

torture

or

go

into

If a person does not die

shock,

he

will

typically

say

anything to get the torture to stop; even if some true

statements are made, the interrogator will usually not be in
a position to know which statement is true.68
particularly

troublesome

for

interrogators

This is

attempting

to

gather actionable intelligence rather than a confession.69

Jim

Auld,

arrested

under

suspicion

of

being

an

Irish

Republican Army (IRA) terrorist, who was tortured and then

found to be innocent, states,
I
would
have
told
anybody
anything.
The
interrogations were nothing for me because I
wasnt in a position to tell them what they
wanted to know. I admitted to being in everything
but the crib [with the baby Jesus in the manger],
and if they asked me I would have said, Yes, the
crib as well, Im in the background of it there,
because I was just so frightened.70

66 Kleinman, Interrogation v. Torture, 1583.

67 Kleinman, Interrogation v. Torture, 1586.
68 Skerker, An Ethics of Interrogation, 210.
69 Bowden, The Dark Art of Interrogation.
70 John Conroy, Unspeakable Acts, Ordinary People (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2000), 4.

28

Any truthful information obtained during interrogations

involving torture is almost always corrupted by false data,
false admissions, and unfounded speculations, all introduced
by the individual being interrogated simply out of a desire
to

stop

the

techniques

terror

is

or

that

pain.71

rarely

is

The

problem

with

the

information

these
gained

worthwhile and never is it worth the cost of becoming a

nation

that

condones

and

conducts

torture.

Coercive

interrogations are rarely necessary for gaining actionable

intelligence.72
Because the United States current conflicts are each
irregular in nature, the importance of good intelligence and
information cannot be emphasized enough during discussion on
this

topic.

This

intelligence

must

come

from

the

local

population and torture will only serve to drive it away.

Countries that use coercive interrogation techniques have
not solved their problems of insurgency and terrorism, but
those that have abandoned or never used them have reaped
more

success.73

example,

adopted

The

British

coercive

in

Northern

interrogations

Ireland,
of

for

terrorist

suspects. An IRA Commander reported that these interrogation

methods were the best recruiting tools the IRA ever had.74
In

conflict

where

victory

will

be

obtained

by

altering the feelings of the population away from supporting

the enemy, counterproductive does not begin to describe
71 Kleinman, Interrogation v. Torture, 1585.
72 Kleinman, Interrogation v. Torture, 1587.
73 Mary Ellen OConnell, Affirming the Ban on Harsh Interrogation,
Ohio State Law Journal 66 (2005): 1262-1263.
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/lawjournal/issues/volume66/number6/oconnell.pdf
(accessed 3/7/2011).
74 OConnell, Affirming the Ban on Harsh Interrogation, 1262-1263.

29

the harm that torture does to a nations reputation. The

mere perception of the use of torture can significantly harm
a nations reputation. Because it allowed itself to dabble
in

coercive

techniques

considered

torture,

Americas

reputation has been tarnished. The damage from Abu Ghraib

will

affect

throughout

the

the

United

Middle

States

East.

for

years,

Terrorist

especially

recruitment

has

increased and foreign governments are hesitant to cooperate

with

the

United

States.75

While

Bill

Cowans

alligator

clips may have worked in the short run, the Viet Cong won
the war. The United States cannot afford to be shortsighted
and

ethically

misaligned

as

it

continues

to

fight

the

current conflicts around the globe. It cannot successfully

fight a war against terrorism while applying a terrorist
tactic.
F.

CONCLUSION
The enemy is changing. The United States can no longer

afford to primarily focus on monitoring massed forces and

equipment through technical means without the benefit of
exploiting

HUMINT

networks

as

well.

The

enemy

is

now

operating in widely dispersed networks and utilizing methods

of

communication

and

operational

techniques

that

differ

significantly from the conventional threats the national

security
HUMINT

apparatus

was

capabilities

designed

must

be

to

identify

adapted

and

and

defeat.

altered

to

effectively illuminate and counter these new threats. And

yet counter to this, doctrine mandated and enforced through
an executive order completely restricts the vast majority of

75 Skerker, An Ethics of Interrogation, 211.

30

U.S. service members conducting operations in support of

national

interests

around

the

globe.

One

of

the

most

accessible and potentially valuable sources for this exact

type of intelligence, the interrogation of detainees is now
off limits on the front line.

31

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

32

III. WHY SPECIAL FORCES?

A.

INTRODUCTION
Special

Forces

soldiers

are

on

the

front

lines

of

numerous irregular conflicts around the globe. They possess

both the ability to gather HUMINT and a high understanding
of

the

operational

environment

militarily

and

socially.

Because of these abilities, there is immense pressure for SF

soldiers to provide timely intelligence gained firsthand
from

the

battlefield.

National

political

and

military

leadership must not, however, make the mistake of simply

granting

USSF

the

authority

to

conduct

tactical

interrogations without providing the necessary training. The

following

sections

discussing

the

interrogation

show

extreme

the

need

difference

training

(how

to

for

this

training

by

between

the

defensive

resist

interrogation)

currently conducted by USSF and the offensive interrogation

training (how to conduct interrogation) needed to conduct
effective

interrogations,

the

necessity

to

reinforce

national policy that clearly bans all coercive interrogation

methods,

and

the

operational

requirement

to

conduct

interrogations in irregular warfare.

B.

WHY SF?
No

soldier

has

better

understanding

of

his

operational environment than those in Special Forces. The

focus on local customs, cultures, and language inherent in
USSF allows for the development of information networks that
provide details on all aspects of local life from enemy
33

troop movements to the political standings of a village

based on tribal affiliations. The core missions of UW and
FID require a high level of autonomy and self-sufficiency
allowing USSF to operate in an extremely agile manner based
on the needs of the indigenous forces are working with. With
this autonomy and the speed at which they operate, the
requirement

to

transport

every

detainee

to

certified

interrogator at the operational or strategic level degrades

effectiveness.
USSF operates worldwide. Due to the mission to train
various entities of other nations, it is an organization
focused

on

working

by,

with,

and

through

indigenous

populations and is formed around geographical and cultural

areas

of

support

of

focus.

USSF

continually

the

Theater

Security

conducts

missions

Cooperation

Plan

in

(TSCP)

conducting Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) exercises

and Counter Narco-Terrorism (CNT) missions everywhere from
Algeria to Mongolia and Columbia to Jordan. The nature of
these operations not only put USSF in the right locations to
gather needed information on local capabilities and threats,
but

their

understanding

of

the

region

and

population

provides additional context concerning which information is

important

to

commanders

and

decision

makers

at

the

operational and strategic levels of conflict.

USSF has often provided a platform for the testing and
evaluating new tactics and technologies for their potential
adaptation
allows

for

by

larger

the

new

components
item

to

be

of

the

U.S.

thoroughly

Army.

stressed

This
and

modified prior to a full investment being made. Applying

this same model to the practice of tactical interrogation
34

would allow for the training and execution of interrogation

to be evaluated by USSF and if successful those skills and
authorities could be transferred to conventional tactical
level units that need this skill on a case by case basis
when tasked to operate in an irregular environment.
1.

The Mission

In a recent interview, MG Bennet Sacolick, Commander of

the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and
School,

clearly

described

the

mission

of

the

U.S.

Army

Special Forces,
We're the only force specifically trained and
educated to train and work with indigenous
forces. Not hunting them down and killing them,
but
working
with
them
to
build
partner
capacityWe're not designed to hunt people down
and kill them. We have that capability and we
have
forces
that
specialize
in
that.
But
ultimately what we do that nobody else does is
work with our indigenous partner nations.76
Training partner forces to increase their effectiveness
is the reason USSF was created. USSF focuses its training
skills

through

the

execution

of

two

primary

missions:

Foreign Internal Defense (FID) and Unconventional Warfare

(UW).

Each of these missions centers around working by,

with, and through an indigenous force to either support a

government in power, FID, or to counter a government in
power, UW.

By receiving training on proper interrogation

techniques,

USSF

could

better

influence

the

conduct

of

interrogations conducted by their partner forces on JCETs

76 Christian Lowe, SF Trying to Adjust Army Doctrine, May 31, 2011,
http://www.military.com/news/article/May-2011/sf-trying-to-adjust-armydoctrine.html (accessed 6/1/11).

35

and CNTs. This training would not only improve the standing
of the USSF providing the training with its partner force,
but would often provide the only opportunity for a U.S.
entity

to

techniques

influence
because

the

USSF

host

are

often

nations
the

interrogation

only

U.S.

force

foreign security forces are ever exposed to. Knowledge of

proper

interrogation

techniques

would

increase

the

legitimacy of partner forces and undermine the narrative of

the enemy.
a.

The SF
(UW)

Nothing

Mission

provides

of

Unconventional

clearer

example

Warfare

of

the

requirement for USSF to possess interrogation skills and the

authority to conduct interrogations than its core mission of
Unconventional Warfare (UW).

UW is defined as:

Activities conducted to enable a resistance

movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or
overthrow a government or occupying power by
operating
through
or
with
an
underground,
auxiliary and guerrilla force in a denied area.77
UW is the primary reason for the existence of USSF
as an organization within the U.S. armed forces. UW is an
element of IW, but it takes place solely within an area
under enemy or unfriendly control. The intent of U.S. UW
efforts is to exploit a hostile powers political, military,
economic, and psychological vulnerabilities by developing
and

sustaining

resistance

forces

to

accomplish

U.S.

77 Training Circular 18-01 Special Forces Unconventional Warfare,

January 2011, 1-1.

36

strategic objectives.78
Alpha

(SFODA)

conducting

For an SF Operational DetachmentUW

alongside

guerrilla

force

against a hostile government, FM 2-22.3 is unrealistic. It

would be impossible for the SFODA to evacuate every detainee
from deep inside denied enemy territory for interrogation
simply because of the risk to force and mission in a denied
area. Most of these detainees would possess tactical level
information that would be of limited use at higher levels.
Any form of intelligence and analytical support coming from
the slower moving operational and strategic levels of the
unconventional conflict would be too far removed to keep up
with the details and rapidly changing realities that are
required

to

keep

the

guerrillas

and

SFODA

alive

and

operating efficiently.
Cohesive integration with the guerrilla force is
critical for mission success in the UW environment. The
members of the SFODA are considered outsiders and rely on
the local guerrillas and their support networks for security
and

supplies.

In

turn,

the

SFODA

members

provide

the

guerrillas training on tactical level tasks. Information is

critical in this environment and with current doctrine an
SFODA is handicapped by an inability to gather intelligence
through the means of interrogations. The SFODA also has no
training on conducting interrogations so they are unable to
properly advise their guerrillas on proven interrogation

78 Training Circular 18-01 Special Forces Unconventional Warfare,

January 2011, 1-1.

37

techniques. The option of attaching a trained interrogator

to the SFODA prior to their infiltration would only be seen
as a hindrance.79
In his book, An Ethics of Interrogation, Michael
Skerker makes the following statement specifically about
interrogators operating in a UW environment:
For interrogators to be successful in UW, the
need to either accompany troops in the fieldwhere they can direct, or act closely in concert
with
the
ranking
officer
to
direct,
the
investigative aspects of the mission including
tactical
screening,
document
recovery,
and
searches after a site has been securedTroops in
the field as well as interrogators need to be
better trained in the investigative aspects of
unconventional
warfare,
which
in
particular
theaters will involve intensive cultural training
so that they are better able to distinguish
genuinely suspicious behavior from behavior that
is normal in the local behavior.80
USSF easily conducts each of these tasks: they
live in the field beside their indigenous force, understand
local cultures, possess the training to effectively exploit
tactical successes, and have the knowledge and resources to
validate local information. Skerker goes on to say, Critics
will object that extra training costs money, but ineffective
operations born of inadequate training are costlier.81

If

USSF already possess many of the required skills to be

79 It could be argued here that attaching an interrogator to a

Special Forces Detachment would be no different than attaching a U.S.

Air Force TAC-P. U.S. Army interrogators, however, to not possess any
of the additional tactical capabilities that SOF personnel such as TacPs are proficient in. Even if they did possess these capabilities, the
interrogator would not be educated or trained in conducting UW
operations.
80 Skerker, An Ethics of Interrogation, 181.
81 Skerker, An Ethics of Interrogation, 181.

38

effective UW interrogators and leadership at every level

expects detailed information about the enemy from USSF, can
the U.S. government afford the price of not teaching this
skill to UW forces?
b.

The SF Mission of Foreign Internal Defense

(FID)

Defined as Participation by civilian and military

agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken
by another government or other designated organization to
free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness,
insurgency, terrorism or other threats to its security, FID
is the U.S. governments support to a host nation to assist
with internal defense and development to promote its growth
and protect itself from both internal and external security
threats.82

The capabilities that SF employ to perform its

FID mission are those inherent to its UW mission; only the

operational

environment

is

changed.

FID

operation

can

include any number of tasks including training and advisory

assistance,

humanitarian

assistance,

psychological

operations, and even combat operations. The need for these

tasks will vary from nation to nation. One host nation may
request assistance to combat drug trafficking, while another
may desire counterinsurgency training. The overall goal for
a FID mission, however, does not change: to assist the host
nation in combating internal threats while increasing its
legitimacy and influence over its population.
While FID can be conducted by conventional forces,
it is a core mission for USSF.

Their knowledge of the

82 Joint Publication 3-22 Foreign Internal Defense, 12 July 2010,

ix.

39

language, customs, and political situations of a particular

region increase their effectiveness in this mission. Most
often they are tasked with training and advising the host
nations

security

forces.

While

this

provides

the

opportunity to increase host nation capabilities, it often

ties USSF to a security units actions long after USSF are
gone. USSF could better influence interrogations conducted
by their partner forces during FID missions given training
on proper interrogation techniques. This would result in an
increased probability that the host nation force would use
these techniques after USSF had completed its mission, thus
increasing the legitimacy of the host nation government and
its

forces

nation

Providing

partner

forces

interrogation
would

training

provide

an

to

its

opportunity

host
to

influence the host nations interrogation techniques in a

way that enhances the legitimacy of that government.
2.

The Men

Over the past 70 years, various personal traits have

been identified within individuals who were considered to be
effective interrogators: intelligent, personable, tenacious,
worldly,

experienced,

humane,

and

managerial.83

The

abilities to cultivate and sustain productive relationships

and possess an aptitude toward culture and language appear
to be key.84

One would be hard pressed to find a USSF

commander who would not use most of these same traits to

describe his ideal Green Beret. The final common trait is an

83 Stone et al., Interrogation: WWII, VN, and Iraq, 141.

84 Stone et al., Interrogation: WWII, VN, and Iraq, 140.

40

exceptional

aptitude

for

dealing

with

ambiguity.85

Any

soldier who has deployed as a member of USSF is accustomed

to

operating

within

rapidly

changing

environments

under

minimal guidance. They were chosen due to their ability to

operate effectively in ambiguous situations. Because these
are the traits the SF Regiment uses to select it operators,
it could be argued that with training, USSF are likely to be
among the most effective interrogators in DoD.
C.

UNLEARNING WHAT WE THINK WE KNOW

Every member of the Special Forces Regiment is required

to successfully complete the Survival, Evasion, Resistance,

and Escape (SERE) course. Designed to give graduates the
skills needed to resist against the enemy during evasion and
following capture, it will no doubt prove to be priceless
training in the event that a soldier ever has to endure the
hardships of captivity. Despite the obvious importance of
this skill set to USSF given the inherent high risk of
capture during operations, not one USSF soldier has been
placed into a situation that required the implementation of
the defensive interrogation skills taught at SERE during the
combat of the past decade. Conversely, the vast majority of
USSF who have deployed over that same time period have
interacted in some manner or fashion with a detainee. Yet,
no portion of the current doctrine addresses training USSF
for interrogation operations.

85 Steven Kleinman, KUBARK Counterintelligence Interrogation Review:

Observations of an Interrogator, in Educing InformationInterrogation:

Science and Art, ed. Robert Fein (Washington DC: National Defense
Intelligence College, 2006), Kleinman, KUBARK Review in Educing
Information, 102.

41

Prior to discussing the reasons for USSF interrogation

training, a quick glance must be taken at the errors of
what

we

think

we

know.

SERE

training

includes

an

introduction to the process of interrogation. These periods

of

instruction

are

intense

and

often

violent

and

each

trainee will carry the lessons learned for a lifetime. But

these lessons are designed to teach a student how to resist
interrogation
conduct

it.

(both

coercive

Defensive

and

noncoercive),

interrogation

training,

not

like

to
that

experienced in SERE, is designed to help personnel withstand

the unique stresses of coercive interrogation to protect
information and avoid their becoming pawns in an adversarys
attempt to generate propaganda.86
understandably
studying

the

employed

by

spent

The U.S. government has

countless

hostile

and

dollars

coercive

totalitarian

regimes

and

man

interrogation
and

hostile

hours
methods

non-state

actors around the globe in order to better prepare service

members

to

endure

and

survive

if

captured.

However,

no

similar effort has ever been undertaken to prepare personnel

for

their

important

role

in

prisoners and detainees.87

understanding

in

the

gleaning

information

from

It is precisely this lack of

differences

between

defensive

interrogation training and effective interrogation skills

that lead USSF soldiers to inappropriately conduct tactical
questioning

in

just

the

same

manner

as

their

SERE

instructors did to them.

Interrogators within a totalitarian regime (and SERE
instructors)

are

working

toward

specific

end

86 Kleinman, KUBARK Review in Educing Information, 98.

87 Kleinman, KUBARK Review in Educing Information, 98.

42

state:

propaganda. Their methods, both coercive and noncoercive,

are focused on gaining data that can be used to promote the
cause

of

service

the

regime,

member

discredit

the

such

as

signed

admitting

to

war

U.S.

government.

USSF

confession

crime
are

in

by

order

focused

a
to

on

completely different end state: accurate information and

situational

understanding.

What

ultimately

informs

the

methodology employed to collect information from a source is

the nature of the information sought.88
true

understanding

of

the

desired

It is vital that a
end

state

of

an

interrogation is required.
Given

the

intelligence

immediate

and

the

and

current

future

requirements

misunderstanding

for

of

the

application of interrogation techniques, one can begin to

visualize how cases of detainee abuse come about. In study
after

study,

it

has

been

repeatedly

demonstrated

that

inadequate interrogation training and improper interrogation

protocols undoubtedly led to abuse of detainees.89
soldiers

must

be

trained

interrogation

in

necessary

fill

to

order

to

in

the

provide

intelligence

USSF

art

and

science

them

with

the

gaps

without

of

skills

having

to

reverse engineer their own experiences from SERE training.

Failure to do so while increasing the pressure on USSF to
provide accurate and actionable intelligence is courting
detainee abuse.

88 Kleinman, KUBARK Review in Educing Information, 100.

89 Michael Skerker, An Ethics of Interrogation (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 2010), 180.

43

D.

CONCLUSION
Because

of

their

missions

to

train

partner

nation

forces and execute UW, USSF need the training and authority
to

conduct

tactical

interrogation.

The

high

level

of

autonomy required to execute their core missions and their

continual
strategic

involvement
level

in

operations

tactical,
demand

it.

operational,
USSF

are

and

mature,

highly trained and carefully selected soldiers. The nation

increasingly turns to them to fill intelligence requirements
in light of current irregular threats. Leadership should
acknowledge that, without altering doctrine to allow USSF to
conduct tactical interrogation, the ever-expanding need for
accurate

and

actionable

intelligence

on

battlefield will not be effectively filled.

44

the

irregular

IV. CASE STUDIES

A.

INTRODUCTION
Despite a lack of formal interrogation training the

examples provided in the following case studies illustrate

the value and necessity of tactical level units to be able
to conduct interrogation at their level. First, then-CPT
Stuart Harrington was able to gain critical insight into the
irregular conflict he faced as an advisor in South Vietnam.
These insights provided him the knowledge to increase his
effectiveness through a better understanding of both his
enemy

and

his

allies.

Second,

SFODA

conducting

interrogations in support of its mission during Operation

Iraqi Freedom stumbles upon a detainee that is not only
willing to provide timely and accurate information, but who
will

eventually

work

insurgency.

These

intelligence

that

conflict

through

for

two
can

USSF

cases
only

tactical

to

combat

highlight

be

units

gained

the
the

in

conducting

an

growing
type

of

irregular

interrogation

operations. The final case illuminates the importance of

proper interrogation training when an untrained SFODA in
Afghanistan applies improper techniques during interrogation
that ultimately result in the death of a detainee. Each of
these cases occurred prior to the implementation of current
doctrine.
The final case study is from the authors experiences
as a SF ODA commander in Iraq following Abu Ghraib and the
implementation of FM 2-22.3
Operations.

The

conflict

Human Intelligence Collector

in
45

Iraq

had

shifted

from

conventional invasion, to an insurgency, to a civil war, and

by 2007 the country was again facing an insurgency. Other
than

the

initial

invasion,

all

of

this

conflict

fell

squarely into the realm of irregular warfare. Despite the

need for more information to succeed against the insurgents,
the new doctrine regarding interrogations outlawed this tool
from tactical commanders in the field. The examples provided
in the final case study demonstrate the negative effects
current doctrine has on tactical level units abilities to
gather the very information that increases their operational
effectiveness.
B.

COL STUART A. HARRINGTON

Then-CPT Stuart Stu Harrington arrived in Vietnam in

1971

following

short

break

in

service.

He

had

been

commissioned into the military intelligence branch of the

U.S. Army in 1967, completed an assignment in Berlin, and
then returned to civilian life. Bored with his new career
choice, Harrington reentered the Army knowing he would be
sent to Vietnam. In preparation for his assignment there, he
attended

the

Tactical

Intelligence

Officer

Course,

the

Military Assistance Training Advisor (MATA) course, and a

three-month course in Vietnamese.90
CPT Harrington was assigned to the Hau Nghia province
as a Phoenix Program advisor. His mission was to work with
the South Vietnamese Army and police units in the province
to

neutralize

any

Vietcong

insurgents

located

there.

Harrington soon lost faith in the ability of the Phoenix

90 Stuart A. Harrington, Silence was a Weapon: The Vietnam War in the

Villages (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982), xiv-xviii.

46

Program to succeed due to a lack of commitment on the part

of his South Vietnamese counterparts. It was at this time he
began

to

conduct

unilateral

debriefings

of

Vietcong

defectors armed with only his general intelligence training

on how to handle defectors. These interrogations not only
provided insight on Vietcong operations, but also provided
inspection

into

the

realities

of

why

the

Vietcong

were

fighting at all.91
Taking

advantage

program,

Herrington

Vietcong.

The

of

the

gained

Chieu

Hoi

access

interrogations

were

to

(Open

Arms)

numerous

former

conducted

in

manner

completely opposite of anything most of the former Vietcong

had

anticipated.

They

were

placed

in

hospitable

environment, provided refreshments, and were never treated

in a harsh or unfriendly manner. Herrington wore civilian
clothes and used a translator as little as possible. He
conducted
former

extensive

village

and

research
the

on

Vietcong

the

detainees

units

in

that

admitted
area

of

operation in order to demonstrate knowledge and therefore

decrease the probability of being misled.92
With

the

knowledge

occurring

militarily

Harrington

was

divulged

the

able
hidden

on
to

and

understanding

the
gain

ground

in

additional

realities

of

both

of
his

what

province,

information
sides

was

of

that
the

insurgency in Vietnam. The information revealed that South

Vietnamese government officials at the local levels chose
not to combat the Vietcong in their area out of fear of
condemnation by their own leadership, and the fear of being
91 Harrington, Silence was a Weapon, 9-18.
92 Harrington, Silence was a Weapon, 19-21.

47

targeted

by

the

Vietcong

for

assassination.

It

provided

social insights that depicted the Vietnamese as a people who

would never turn a fellow Vietnamese native (even if the
person was an enemy) over to a foreign invader, showed that
the Vietnamese way demanded contempt for foreigners be
concealed (even the South Vietnamese officers toward their
U.S.

advisors),

population

and

divulged

continually

that

shifted

the

sides

majority
to

of

whomever

the
they

believed was winning at the moment. Harrington also learned

the primary reason the Vietcong were able to gather the
support of, or at least be tolerated by, the population in
the

south

was

the

revulsion

over

the

South

Vietnamese

governments high level of corruption, opposition to its

land

reform

campaign,

and

the

mishandling

of

mandatory

relocation programs that had been dictated from Saigon. It

was the lack of ability by the Americans to understand the
importance of these non-military aspects of the conflict
that

caused

failures

counterinsurgency

in

implementing

initiatives

alongside

effective

their

South

Vietnamese allies.93
C.

AN ODAS ABILITY TO SEIZE UPON OPPORTUNITY

Prior

to

the

Abu

Ghraib

scandal

and

the

doctrinal

changes that followed, tactical level units were allowed to

conduct interrogations. While these units were permitted by
the

doctrine

interrogate

and

policies

detainees,

most

in
had

place

at

not

been

the

time

provided

to
any

training on how to conduct these types of operations. The

following

case

study

highlights

the

93 Harrington, Silence was a Weapon, 24-32.

48

opportunities

this

doctrinal freedom presented to these tactical units and the

potential for increasing the information gained in this type
of

situation

through

the

implementation

of

an

offensive

interrogation training program.

After several months operating in the extremely fluid
combat environment of Iraq in late 2003, the ODA out of 10th
Special Forces Group (Airborne) had been in many situations
for which it was not specifically trained. Like any good
ODA, its members had adapted and improvised toward the goal
of success. Finding themselves with a continually growing
number of detainees and no outside support to question them,
the ODA naturally assumed the role of interrogators. Despite
having
having

no

training

been

on

the

conduct

specifically

tasked

of

interrogation,

to

conduct

or

them,

interrogations became an inherent and essential part of the

operational cycle:
1.

Gather information about a target

2.

Interdict the target

3.

Develop
information
from
the
interdiction
(interrogate detainees, conduct sensitive site
exploitation)

4.

Identify new targets from information provided by

the detainee and documents

Each step was dependent on the one previous to it. If

one was removed, or not completed, the ODA was relegated
back to step 1.94
Following an unsuccessful raid against an insurgent
arms dealer, the ODA found itself with a detainee from
Baghdad, Hadr, who appeared willing to provide information.
The team had conducted dozens of tactical interrogations in
94 Stone et al., Interrogation: WWII, VN, and Iraq, 173.

49

the field using various expedient methods with varied levels

of success, but on this night the detachment commander made
the decision to approach this interrogation differently.95
Rather

than

keep

the

detainee

uncomfortably

cold

and

confront him with a hostile barrage of questions inside a

dimly lit, hollowed-out building with the feel of a dungeon
as had been the case with past detainees, the ODA conducted
the

interrogation

in

their

basement.

It

was

the

most

American room in the house complete with TV, Playstation

II, and exercise equipment. Hadr was placed on the couch and
provided Iraqi tea, snacks, and cigarettes. He was shown
hospitality rather than aggression.96
Most importantly, the team had a plan. Not having to
rush Hadr to a detention facility allowed the team to choose
the time, location, environment, and detachment personnel
for conducting the interrogation. They were able to set the
environment

to

take

full

advantage

of

this

detainees

knowledge of the local social intricacies and determine if

he possessed information that would be of value at higher
levels. The plan worked. Hadr had been so taken by the ODAs
hospitality

and

interrogation

generosity

was

that

completely

the

filled

first
with

hour
his

of

the

providing

information on insurgent recruiting, IED tactics, and other

non-military

aspects

of

the

insurgency

with

minimal

questioning.97
The

ODA

then

directed

the

conversation

toward

the

targeted arms dealer. Hadr provided information on the arms

95 Stone et al., Interrogation: WWII, VN, and Iraq, 174,183.
96 Stone et al., Interrogation: WWII, VN, and Iraq, 184.
97 Stone et al., Interrogation: WWII, VN, and Iraq, 185.

50

dealers pattern of life, safe houses, and weapon cache

sites. He eventually volunteered to escort the ODA on a
mission

to

discussed.

physically
The

identify

interrogation

the
had

locations
not

only

he

had

provided

intelligence that assisted the ODA in capturing the arms

dealer, it had presented the opportunity to initiate the
operational cycle against additional targets in the area.98
Hadr returned to Baghdad continuing to supply information to
other

ODAs

provide

conducting

crucial

operations

information

on

there.
the

He

bombing

would
of

later

the

UN

building in August 2003.99

This experience is similar to that Stuart Harrington in
Vietnam and interrogators of World War II such as Hans
Scharff (see Appendix C) and Sherwood Moran (see Appendix
D).

While both Moran and Scharff operated in a completely

conventional

conflict,

the

methods

they

employed

with

legendary success would be extremely beneficial in irregular

warfare for both gathering intelligence and to increase the
legitimacy of the force in the eyes of the population by
conducting noncoercive interrogations. It must be remembered
that what is key to this case study is not the suggestion
that every detainee will turn completely based on positive
treatment, but that the ODA had the flexibility to employ
this technique, the ground knowledge to exploit Hadr, and
the chance to build a level of trust that allowed them to
turn a prisoner into a cooperative asset.

98 Stone et al., Interrogation: WWII, VN, and Iraq, 186.

99 Stone et al., Interrogation: WWII, VN, and Iraq, 190.

51

D.

THE COST OF INSUFFICIENT TRAINING

Early on during the war in Afghanistan, USSF firebases

were often the first stop for a detainee. From there the
detainee

faced

number

of

potential

fates:

release,

transfer to the local Afghan authorities, transfer to U.S.

detention facilities in Bagram or potentially Guantanamo
Bay. It was in these firebases that some USSF personnel
began conducting their own interrogations based on nothing
more than assumptions and physical violence. In late 2002,
high-ranking

Special

Operations

leadership

and

officials

with the International Committee of the Red Cross shared

expressed concern about a rash of reports highlighting an
extremely high level of physical abuse of detainees at these
firebases. It was during this time that one ODA from the
20th Special Forces Group (Airborne), ODA 2021 stationed at
Gardez firebase, allegedly tortured a detainee to death.100
The guidelines for holding detainees and conducting
interrogations had been issued to all the Special Forces
units

upon

deployment

to

Afghanistan.

The

commander

had

redistributed these same guidelines when reports of detainee

abuses

had

begun

to

appear

in

reporting.

Then

LTG

Dan

McNeill, commander of all U.S.-led forces in Afghanistan,

had stressed the need to segregate detainees with ties to Al
Qaeda

or

the

Taliban

for

instituted

96-hour

time

commanders

to

environment,

make
it

this

was

transportation
period

for

determination.

often

difficult

to

Bagram

tactical
In
to

the

and

level

irregular

determine

100 Kevin Sack and Craig Pyes, A Silence in the Afghan Mountains,

The LA Times, September 24, 2006, URL:

http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/la-natorture24sep24,0,6220615,full.story, accessed 6 June 2011.

52

detainees

level

of

involvement

with

these

groups.

Accordingly, latitude was given to the tactical commanders

to detain any suspects who pose a threat or who may have
intelligence value.

There was also some ambiguity with the

96-hour limit due to delays in transportation assets or

units hoping to extract additional intelligence.101
ODA

2021

appears

to

have

had

several

issues

that

climaxed in the death of a detainee due. Weak leadership and

a lack of understanding of their mission are apparent in the
reporting between the ODA and their higher headquarters. For
an organization tasked with working by, with, and through
the local Afghan political and military leadership to gain
the support and influence over the local population, the ODA
undermined their own efforts.102
It was on one of these raids that Jamal Naseer, an
eighteen-year-old Afghan army recruit, was detained along
with his brother, Parre, and six others. Following the raid
on March 5, 2003, the eight men were bound and hooded. The
detainees

were

transported

to

Gardez

firebase

where

the

physical abuse began immediately upon their arrival. Parre

claims to have been beaten, kicked, doused with cold water,
and forced to stay on his knees until we lost the sensation
in our legs and couldnt walk.103
Over

the

next

eleven

days,

the

detainees

were

questioned and abused while the ODA reported to its higher

101 Sack, A Silence in the Afghan Mountains.
102 Kevin Sack and Craig Pyes, Two Deaths Were a Clue That
Somethings Wrong, The LA Times, September 25, 2006, URL:
http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/la-natorture25sep25,0,7203657,full.story, accessed 6 June 2011.
103 Sack, Two Deaths Were a Clue That Somethings Wrong.

53

headquarters

that

lot

of

intelligence

was

being

generated and that the detainees were still undergoing

interviews.

These interviews consisted of rounds being

fired near the detainees heads, beatings with fists, boots,

and other items designed to deliver blunt trauma to the
body, and even the removal of toenails. The questioning that
went along with this torture appears to have been haphazard
and unplanned, ranging from local information on control of
the

roads

to

interaction

with

Al

Qaeda

leadership

and

international travel. Parre claims that, at one point, an

Afghan

interpreter

interrogators

the

pleaded
information

with

him

to

give

the

they

were

searching

for,

telling him to Just say anything to make them stop.104

According to military records, the ODA had determined
after the first two days that the detainees did not need to
be transported to Bagram, and yet the ODA leadership kept
possession of all eight men for an additional nine days.
During

this

time,

an

additional

two

men

were

detained,

beaten, and dunked into icy water to the point of nearly

drowning. Both were released the next day with a report to
the

ODAs

headquarters

that

the

two

men

had

been

cooperative.
Parre

claims

that

Jamal

had

been

subjected

to

the

harshest interrogation because, as the youngest of the eight

detainees, he was perceived as being the most vulnerable.
Jamal had complained to Parre during their detention about
pain in his back and kidneys and told him about being forced
to

stand

with

his

arms

and

legs

spread

apart

while

interrogators took turns beating him. On or around March 16,

104 Sack, Two Deaths Were a Clue That Somethings Wrong.

54

Jamal died. Parre was told by a member of the ODA that he

had died from an illnessa stomach ailment, not at the hands
of

the

Americans.105

He

claims

to

have

responded,

My

brother was healthy. His brain, his heart, his legs, he was
not sick. He had no history of sickness or injury in any
part of his body. He died because of your cruelty.

A local

hospital worker who prepared Jamals body for burial claims

it

was

completely

black

and

the

face

was

completely

swollen, as were his palms, and the soles of his feet were
swollen double in size.106
Following
district

Jamals

governor

to

death,

the

have

the

ODA

arranged

remaining

with

the

detainees

transferred to the local jail. A local physician examined

the prisoners. He claims the men were battered, bruised, and
had untreated, open wounds and Parres feet were black from
blunt-force trauma. The remaining seven detainees spent a
total of 58 days in captivity and no charges were ever filed
against

any

of

them.107

It

is

unclear

whether

the

ODA

gained any intelligence of any value during the detention

and torture of Jamal and the seven others.108

105 American Civil Liberties Union, Documents Obtained By ACLU

Describe Charges Of Murder And Torture Of Prisoners In U.S. Custody,

April 16, 2008, URL: http://www.aclu.org/national-security/documentsobtained-aclu-describe-charges-murder-and-torture-prisoners-us-custody,
accessed 6 June 2011.
106 Sack, Two Deaths Were a Clue That Somethings Wrong.
107 An investigation conducted by Afghan military prosecutors
speculated that the prolonged imprisonment was intended to give the
detainees wounds time to heal.
108 Sack, Two Deaths Were a Clue That Somethings Wrong.

55

E.

AN ODAS OPPORTUNITY LOST TO INADEQUATE TRAINING

The RKG-3 is an anti-tank hand grenade designed by the

Soviet Union during the cold war. It looks like a soup can
with a handle coming out of the bottom. What makes this
grenade so lethal is that, unlike normal hand grenades that
explode in a uni-directional manner, the RKG-3 has a shaped
charge that focuses the intensity of the explosive into a
single

point

of

impact.

This

allows

it

to

cut

through

armored vehicles that would deflect the fragmentation from a

normal hand grenade. By late 2007, these grenades had become
the weapon of choice for Iraqi insurgents targeting the U.S.
convoys running up and down the highways between FOBs. Their
lethality and effectiveness made locating the grenades and
anyone storing or employing them a top priority.
The ODA had verified through a local informant that Ali
had been selling RKG-3s out of his place of business. Ali
owned a small toy store located in the local bazaar area.
Once the location of Alis home and business were confirmed
through other sources, the ODA planned a raid with the Iraqi
SWAT on the home that would be followed by a raid on the toy
store. The front gate and door were unlocked, which allowed
the entire assault force to enter and secure the house
silently. Before Ali and his family could even comprehend
what was happening, 25 armed men suddenly appeared in their
house.

Ali

and

the

other

males

were

separated

for

identification and tactical questioning, while the women

were

placed

into

room

containing

the

still-sleeping

children. Tactical questioning and the search of the home

had

resulted

in

nothing

of

discovered.
56

significant

interest

being

The assault team loaded back into its vehicles with Ali
and two other men and prepared for the raid on the toy
store. A surveillance team had been put in place to watch
the bazaar to determine if the raid on Alis house would
cause anyone to panic and attempt to retrieve any hidden
evidence from the toy store. No movement had been observed
and

so

the

raid

force

moved

through

the

blacked

out

neighborhoods of Tikrit to secure the bazaar.

Two large steel doors that were secured by a huge
padlock covered the front of the toy store. Ali didnt have
the key with him and the demolitions expert on the ODA was
more than happy at the chance to remove the lock with high
explosives. After the lock was blown, the SWAT began to
search the toy store for anything that could be used as
evidence to hold Ali. During the search, two ODA members and
two SWAT members continued the tactical questioning of Ali
and the two other men from his house. Emotions were up.
These guys had access to the same RKG-3s that were killing
Americans. Two soldiers had been killed a few streets over
by the grenades less than a week earlier.
After a half-hour with no sign of anything resembling
an RKG-3, the SWAT began to ratchet up the questioning of
Ali. The ODA members, having nothing but their SERE training
to draw upon for experience in interrogations, increased
their

hostility

of

questioning

as

well.

The

tactical

questioning was now being conducted through the bad cop-bad

cop technique, but time was running short and the raid
force needed evidence. Just as the tactical questioning was
turning dangerously close to coercive means, one of the SWAT
members claimed that he had found something. In the air
57

conditioning unit attached to Alis toy store was a white

rice bag containing two Chinese 60mm mortar rounds and three
complete RKG-3s.
While coercive means were not used in this situation,
the

potential

for

them

is

easily

recognizable.

Training

provided to the ODA on how to properly interrogate would not

only have made them more effective, but would have allowed
them to train the Iraqi SWAT, who all too often demonstrated
a quick tendency to implement the coercive means they had
witnessed during Saddams rule. As with the previous case,
the doctrinally imposed timelines, the lack of access to
detainees, and the minimal amount of information passed back
to the tactical unit from the detention facility only create
additional

pressure

to

expedite

information.

58

the

gathering

of

V.

CONCLUSION

The United States entered the current conflicts with

interrogation doctrine built upon its experiences in World
War II and the Cold War. The U.S. government had failed to
conduct additional investigative research in the area of
offensive interrogation strategies since the 1960s.109 FM 222.3 was introduced to remedy the issues of abuse, but has
resulted in handicapping the abilities of those tactical
forces on the front lines that are most likely to require
intelligence simply for survival. The requirement placed on
these

forces

intelligence

to

provide

has,

however,

large

volumes

only

of

continued

actionable
to

steadily

increase over time.

Current

interrogation

doctrine

is

misfit

for

the

irregular conflicts the nation is facing around the globe

today. United States forces are not operating on a linear
battlefield,
effective

and

cannot

the
be

information
determined

they
by

need

counting

to

be

most

tanks

with

satellites. It must come from the population within which

the enemy hides and from the enemy himself in order to
effectively separate the population from the enemy. Most of
assortment of enemy personnel and local population who are
in the wrong place at the wrong time that are detained on
the

battlefield

intelligence,

but

will
they

possess
may

hold

little
a

to

piece

no
of

critical

the

larger

puzzle. Forcing each and every detainee to operational and

109 Robert Fein, U.S. Experience and Research in Educing

Information: A Brief History, in Educing InformationInterrogation:

Science and Art, ed. Robert Fein (Washington DC: National Defense
Intelligence College, 2006), xiii.

59

strategic

level

detention

facilities

for

interrogation

wastes the time and energy of the certified interrogators at

those

levels

and

detracts

from

their

interfacing

with

detainees who do possess critical intelligence. The fact

that detainees reach the higher-level detention facilities
with minimal data about their capture or background also
decreases the effectiveness of the interrogators at those
levels.
Rather than relying on doctrine and techniques designed
for

conventional

conflict

where

hundreds

of

young

interrogators with limited life experience will interrogate

hundreds of young prisoners with limited life experience and
tactical knowledge, changes must be made to restore the
flexibility

of

USSF

to

conduct

lawful

interrogation

and

provide them the tools to do so correctly. Adoption of these

changes will have a significant impact for DoD to gather
needed intelligence in the irregular conflicts of today and
the future.
A.

BEGIN WITH U.S. ARMY SPECIAL FORCES

Historically,

Special

Operations

Forces

(SOF)

have

provided a platform for the testing and evaluating tactics

and technologies that could be adapted later to fit the
larger

U.S.

Army.

This

allows

for

the

new

item

to

be

thoroughly stressed and modified prior to a full investment

being made towards issuing the item to the entire force.
Applying

this

same

model

to

the

practice

of

tactical

interrogation would allow for the recommendations included

in this thesis to be incorporated and adjusted to meet the
demands of USSF.

Conventional tactical level units that

need this skill based on being tasked to operate in an

60

irregular

environment

could

be

trained

and

granted

the

authority by exception and informed experience of USSF.

USSF possesses the need for this skill because of their
primary missions and the fact that they are designed to
operate primarily within the irregular environment in an
autonomous manner. USSF are more mature and trained to a
higher standard than their conventional counterparts. They
were selected to become USSF based on their ability to
operate within ambiguous situations. USSF already receives
training in language and ethnography, while learning how to
weave together the importance of the military, political,
economic,

and

domestic

issues

within

an

operational

environmentall key skills for a successful interrogator.

These details increase the potential for USSF to conduct
effective

interrogations

to

better

understand

what

information will assist at the tactical level and, more

importantly,

what

intelligence

information

needs

to

be

pushed to higher level decision makers.

B.

TRAINING
Training USSF for interrogation operations must begin

with the basics. These include noncoercive methods and the

ethical

foundation

to

properly

apply

them.

Noncoercive

methods are consistent with the legal and moral traditions

of the United States and, unlike coercive techniques and
torture, are proven methods of gaining timely, accurate, and
actionable intelligence. It will be key to demonstrate the
effectiveness of noncoercive techniques and the numerous
options available that are vastly opposite of what the USSF
personnel

learned

in

SERE.

Focus

must

be

placed

on

training for interrogations conducted to gather military

61

intelligence.

Interrogations

designed

to

this

end

vary

significantly from law enforcement interrogations. Current

efforts

are

underway

through

the

interagency

Highvalue

Interrogation Group (HIG) to review and update interrogation

concepts

and

skills

using

modern

scientific

research

methods. USSF should support this research and offer to

field test the processes the HIG recommends.
1.

Training Internal to SF

Interrogation training for USSF should begin during the

Special Forces Qualification Course. Based on the amount of
time USSF soldiers spend interacting with detainees in the
real world during the conduct of the current conflicts, the
procedures of handling detainees and the benefits they can
produce should be incorporated in this training course. This
training could easily be emphasized and utilized during the
courses unconventional warfare culmination exercise, Robin
Sage, adding to the realism and highlighting the benefits
of gathering HUMINT through tactical interrogation.
Once USSF personnel are assigned to their specific unit
within those who demonstrate a high propensity to conduct
effective tactical interrogations should be selected for
additional
these

training.

individuals

This

to

be

training
more

would

not

effective

at

only

allow

gathering

information through interrogation, but would provide them

the knowledge and skill to monitor and mentor other members
of their unit to ensure maximum efficiency of procedure and
deter

against

the

possibility

of

improper

interrogation

techniques being utilized. Based on discussions with former

interrogation
training

and

instructors,
instruction

the
needed
62

level
for

of
an

interrogation

ODA

to

conduct

interrogation operations effectively could be accomplished

in

as

little

as

five

days

with

two

weeks

being

optimal.110,111 To ensure all personnel remained cognizant of

the

most

current

and

correct

methods,

periodic

recertification would be required to remain certified to

conduct or assist with interrogation operations.
Implementing

interrogation

training

into

current

training could be easily accomplished. The addition of a

detainee/interrogation
training

plan

or

scenario
rotation

into

through

a
one

pre-deployment
of

the

Combat

Training Centers would take minimal resources. Inclusion of

this scenario would increase the realism of the training,
increase the opportunity to enhance its skills at acquiring
force protection information and assets, and would stress to
the trainees the importance of learning both intelligence
and information.
2.

Training Outside of SF

Training

on

any

subject

without

the

inclusion

of

expertise will only bring an organization to a certain level

of proficiency. To move beyond that point, experts must be
accessed. The use of internships allowing individual USSF
personnel who demonstrated an above average propensity for
conducting

interrogation

to

rotate

into

organizations

consisting of professional interrogators would accomplish

this goal.

110 Randy Burkett (National Intelligence Chair, Central Intelligence

Agency Representative, Naval Postgraduate School), in discussion with
the author, March 2011.
111 Steve Kleinman (Senior Advisor and Strategist, The Soufan Group),
in discussion with the author, March 2011.

63

Attaching

USSF

soldiers

to

U.S.

military

interrogation unit or a civilian organization such as the

HIG for a short amount of time would prove beneficial. USSF
would gain invaluable on the job training assisting in
actual

interrogations.

Learning

from

professional

interrogators would allow USSF to perfect their planning

processes

and

approach

techniques

increasing

their

proficiency and ability to gather intelligence when they

returned

to

their

unit

to

conduct

FID

or

UW

missions.

Additional assistance would only help the already overworked

interrogation organizations at the operational and strategic
levels allowing them to expend resources in a more targeted
manner. The USSF personnel would not only complete these
internship assignments as better interrogators, but they
would possess an increased understanding for the specific
pieces

of

intelligence

desired

by

higher

level

decision

makers.
C.

THE ROAD AHEAD

To conclude, the need for HUMINT by the U.S. government

in

the

current

irregular

conflicts

only

increases.

The

current doctrine, designed and implemented in response to

the mistreatment of detainees at Abu Ghraib and solidified
as law by issuance of an executive order, is having the
unintended consequence of inhibiting the U.S. Army Special
Forces ability to exploit an enormous pool of potential
intelligence by restricting the use of interrogation to a
mere

handful

of

certified

soldiers.

This

restriction

is

hampering units that operate at great distances from their

higher headquarters and increases the risk to U.S. forces.

64

Information

superiority

is

the

key

to

victory

in

irregular warfare and interrogation is needed to gain this

edge.

USSF

must

be

trained

on

the

art

and

science

of

interrogation and doctrine and policy must be changed to

grant

the

authorities

for

USSF

to

conduct

interrogation

operations on battlefields around the globe. The continued

denial of the ability and authority to exploit a prime
source of intelligence to units operating where the war is
being fought is a shortcoming that is degrading operational
capabilities. Failure to address this issue is degrading the
U.S.

militarys

ability

to

efficiently

and

effectively

succeed in the irregular warfare environment of today and

tomorrow.

65

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66

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APPENDIX A.

FM 2-22.3, CHAPTER 1

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APPENDIX B.

EXECUTIVE ORDER 13491-ENSURING LAWFUL

INTERROGATIONS

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APPENDIX C.

WITHOUT TORTURE BY HANNS SCHARFF

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APPENDIX D. SUGGESTIONS FOR JAPANESE INTERPRETERS

BASED ON WORK IN THE FIELD BY SHERWOOD MORAN
This document is no longer restricted. The version included
below was retyped in July 2003 from the authors original
document created by the Marine Corps Interrogator Translator
Teams Association and was only marked as RESTRICTED to add
to the authenticity of the reproduction.

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INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1.

Defense Technical Information Center

Ft. Belvoir, Virginia

2.

Dudley Knox Library

Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California

115