European

Security
&Defence

ES&D

a 7.90

2/2016

International Security and Defence Journal

April 2016 www.euro-sd.com ISSN 1617-7983

Defending
the Gulf

The Obama Legacy and Beyond

Submarine Weapons and Sensors

The 2016 presidential campaign in the United States is

dominated by foreign and security policy.

New developments will influence the future balance of

the worlds naval forces.

country focus: Sweden

P o l i t i c s A r m e d F o r c e s P r o c u r e m e n t Te c h n o l o g y

When youre in a hostile environment, miles from a safe landing

area, the last thing you need is a question mark about reliability.
I had complete confidence in the EJ200 engines,
allowing me to focus on the combat task.
UK RAF Wing Commander in Libya

The EJ200: the engine

that gets you home.

Photo: Eurofighter / Geoffrey Lee

With cutting-edge technology and

unrivalled build quality, the EJ200
has proven time and again to be
the most reliable engine in its class.
To find out how our marketleading design and maintenance
concept ensure that you will
always be able to fulfil your
operational requirements,
visit us at www.eurojet.de

Editorial

The UK Does not Follow

an Isolated Avenue
The declared compromise which David
Cameron snatched from the Heads of
State and Government of the other 27
EU Member States in a 30-hour negotiation marathon enables him to plead for
the remaining of his country in the Union while saving face. While he hurried
to a cabinet meeting in London before
announcing the date for the Brexit Referendum, the consternated heads of
the EU bureaucracy tried to keep their
composure. What matters is that all
stayed at the negotiating table, meant
Council President Donald Tusk, as if hostile conflict parties had come together
to cautiously agree upon a ceasefire.
Commission President Jean-Claude
Juncker gave free rein to his ironic vein:
The UK has always enjoyed a certain
special status in the EU. Todays agreement once again underlined it.
In David Camerons interpretation, this
agreement is however more than just
the continuation of a tradition that allowed the British, as also some other
Member States, to claim certain exceptions from a few rules for themselves.
Rather, it marks a red line which the EU
cannot trespass if the United Kingdom
is to remain further under its roof. We
shall never join the euro. We shall never
be part of a euro rescue programme,
never be part of a passport-free area,
of a European army or a European superstate, made Cameron unmistakably
clear in a press conference. The majority
of the British citizens seems to support
this position not to allow any further undermining of the national sovereignty by
Brussels. On 23 June, they will now have
a choice. Do they consider the agreement achieved in Brussels to be reliable
enough to still vote against an exit from
the EU? Or do they fear that it is no
more than a tactic trick to continue pursuing the integration process after the
referendum? So far, it seems as if the
electors will follow the recommendation
of the Prime Minister and most British
businesses and shy away from the risk
of a Brexit. However, it is no longer

only left-wing or right-wing populists

that would like to turn their back on the
EU. Six government members support
the campaign for an exit. They have
been joined by the popular London Lord
Mayor Boris Johnson who is seen as a
possible successor to Cameron. He is
still concerned about further centralisation of competences by the EU and the
creeping superimposition of British law
by European legislation.
The EU is well advised not to underestimate the symbolic effect of the
agreement reached with London. A
conspicuous question mark has been
put behind the certainty with which a
further progressing integration toward
a European Federal State in Brussels was
masqueraded as a dictate of historical
reason. In this respect, the UK is not
treading its own particular path. Also in
many other Member States, scepticism
has grown as to whether Europe is still
on the right track. Almost everywhere in
Europe, the political landscape has seen
tectonic shifts in recent years. In a few
countries, this has even had an effect
on the composition and orientation of
governments. This trend is also accompanied by new evaluations as to the role
of the EU and in what direction it is to
develop. Nevertheless, it is principally not
questioned per se. Its economic effort
to effectively promote the wealth of the
Europeans through the single market is
undisputed. One does not need to fear a
return to national eccentricity in this area.
In other areas, however, it is difficult for
it to provide a comparable proof of its
achievements, not least in the field of defence, for which NATO alone can provide
an answer to current crises. The citizens
primarily still view national parliaments
and governments as democratically legitimated, which they also hold responsible
for the internal and external security of
their country. The EU will not fail. Because things are politically desirable only
if they are also feasible, the EU will have
to redefine its role.
Peter Bossdorf

April 2016 European Security & Defence

Content
Short and Very Short Range Air Defence

Insertion of Special Forces

SHORAD and VSHORAD systems are used to engage

low-altitude air threats, primarily helicopters and
low-flying close air support. An overview of systems
in use and new developments
Page 57

In recent years the nature of warfare has changed

dramatically. Military units, equipment and standard
operating procedures are being constantly adapted to
address new threats.
Page 60

Security Policy

10 Europe and NATO

The Need to Take Responsibility
Ton van Loon

16 The Obama Legacy and Beyond

Foreign Policy in the 2016 US Presidential Elections
Sidney E. Dean
Country Focus: Sweden

22 Back on Track
Swedish Security Alignment
Thomas Bauer

27 Swedish Defence in a Changing

42 10 Years of System Life Cycle Management in NATO

Peter Janatschek

47 Military Training Shifting Priorities

Trevor Nash
Armament & Technology

49 Defence Programmes & Requirements in the

Gulf States
David Saw

53 TIGER Combat Helicopter

Multinational Capability Enhancement
Markus Lnnig

57 Short and Very Short Range Air Defence

Security Environment
Micael Bydn

Doug Richardson

31 We plan to operate GRIPEN E until at least,

Tim Guest

and most likely beyond 2040.

Interview with Major General Mats Helgesson,
Chief of Staff of the Swedish Air Force

34 At the FMV we manage around

800 programmes each year.

Interview with Lieutenant General Gran
Mrtensson, Director General, FMV

36 A New Security Environment: Implications

for the Swedish Defence Industrial Base
Robert Limmergrd
Armed forces

38 The Slovak Armed Forces and New Dynamics

in Global Security
Milan Maxim

European Security & Defence April 2016

60 Successful Insertion Needs the Best Tools

63 PIRANHA 5 The New 8x8 Armoured Vehicle
for the Spanish Army
Nuria Fernndez

industry & markets

67 Submarine Weapons and Sensors

Trends and Developments
Bob Nugent

73 Combat Aircraft in Europe

Multiple Markets and Multiple Choices
David Saw

78 We expect to provide much more local content in

our projects and products.
Interview with Hseyin Avar, Head, Department
of Land Platforms, Turkish Undersecretariat for
Defense Industries (SSM)

Country focus: Sweden

Viewpoint from
15 Athens: On the verge of explosion
Dimitrios Angelopoulos
21 
Copenhagen: I have no plan B1
But Has There Ever Been a Plan A?
J. Bo Leimand

COLUMNS

3 Editorial
6 Periscope
23 Masthead
80 Firms & Faces
82 Preview

Security Policy
Armed Forces
Procurement
Defence Industry

Pages 22-37

New Small Drone Looks

Like a Hawk
(df) The Spanish company EXPAL has developed and integrated a small UAV with
the shape of a bird of prey: SHEPHERD. This
is an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) with
multiple applications in the fields of defence and security, mainly in observation,
surveillance and protection missions. The
SHEPHERD takes the role of an advanced
observer and in combination with EXPALs
TECHFIRE information system for indirect
fire support, gives many additional options
to military users. Its great capacity to glide
and its silent engine make it almost imperceptible in this type of mission. SHEPHERD
is equipped with cameras and a geolocation software that enhances it to accom-

plish observation and surveillance operations such as, border control, fire-fighting
and counter drug trafficking.

First Australian AEGISEquipped Air Warfare

Destroyer

(Photo: Australia Defence)

Periscope

(df) Lockheed Martins Integrated Test

Team (ITT) begins AEGIS combat system integration and testing aboard the Royal Australian Navys (RAN) first AEGIS-equipped
Air Warfare Destroyer (AWD), HMAS
HOBART. This milestone represents a significant step towards Australias HOBART
class destroyers joining the AEGIS international fleet. The HOBART class destroyers
are being built under Australias SEA 4000
programme, which will ultimately deliver

three advanced multirole ships. These

ships will be Australias first ships to be
equipped with Lockheed Martins AEGIS
Weapon System including the SPY-1D(V)
radar. When paired with the MK 41 Vertical
Launching System, AEGIS is capable of delivering missiles for every mission and threat
environment in naval warfare. The RAN
has received the Lockheed Martin AEGIS
Baseline 8 configuration, which integrates
commercial-off-the-shelf technology and
open architecture into the combat system.

Type 26 Global
Combat Ship

(Photo: BAE Systems)

(df) The UK Ministry of Defence has awarded BAE Systems a 590 million contract
to progress the Type 26 Global Combat
Ship programme. This decision follows
the UK Governments commitment in the

Strategic Defence and Security Review to

buy eight of the advanced anti-submarine
warfare ships. Effective from April 2016,
the 15-month contract extends the current demonstration phase ensuring continued momentum to further mature the
detailed design of the Type 26 ships and
to manufacture key equipment for the first
three ships. These highly advanced ships
will help keep Britain safe and support our
shipbuilding industry, Defence Secretary
Michael Fallon said. Investing in them is
part of our plan to increase defence spending so our armed forces have the most
modern equipment they need. The Type
26 Global Combat Ship will in time replace
the Type 23 frigates. Globally deployable,
it will be capable of undertaking a wide
range of roles from high intensity warfare
to humanitarian assistance, either operating independently or as part of a task force.
6

European Security & Defence April 2016

Sweden Refurbishes 262

Combat Vehicles 90

(Photo: BAE Systems)

(df) The Swedish government has awarded HB Utveckling AB, a joint venture between BAE Systems Bofors AB, part of
BAE Systems Weapons Systems, and BAE
Systems Hgglunds AB, a contract to refurbish 262 Combat Vehicles 90 (CV90)
for the Swedish Army. The companys

work will include refurbishing the chassis

and upgrading the vehicles survivability
and turrets, as well as enhancing combat
system performance. Together, these efforts will help increase the vehicles lifespan in support of Army capabilities. The
Swedish Army has a fleet of 509 CV90s.
Other countries currently using the vehicle
are Norway, Denmark, Finland, Estonia,
the Netherlands, and Switzerland. Work
starts immediately with deliveries beginning in 2018 and running through 2020.
CV90 is a family of Swedish tracked combat vehicles designed by FMV, BAE Systems
Hgglunds, and BAE Systems Weapons
Systems, with more than 4 million engineering hours contributing to the development of this advanced Infantry Fighting
Vehicle (IFV). The Swedish version of the
IFV is outfitted with a turret equipped with
a 40 mm automatic cannon.

Electro-Magnetics (HPEM). This allows

controlling the electronics of mini-drones
by using electromagnetic pulses to cause
mission abort. Regardless of the control
method used (autonomous or radiocontrolled), the mini-drone becomes inoperable when hit by a HPEM pulse at
distances of up to several hundred meters
and triggers the fail-safe function. Diehls
counter-UAS system offers the possibility
of scalable range and the ability to intercept entire swarms of mini-drones simultaneously. It has proven its reliability during the G7 summit in Elmau. Diehls HPEM
systems do not cause harm to individuals
and have already been used for stopping
cars and protecting large events like the
Olympic Games.

FREEDOM Class LCS

(df) The U.S. Navy has awarded an industry team led by Lockheed Martin a contract
for one fully funded FREEDOM class Littoral
Combat Ship (LCS). The contract award includes funding for seaframe construction,
systems integration and testing. LCS 25 will
be the 11th ship procured under the 2010
block buy contract and the 13th Freedomclass variant overall. LCS 25 is scheduled for
delivery to the Navy in 2020. The Lockheed
Martin-led industry team is currently in
full-rate production of the FREEDOM class
variant, and has delivered three ships to the
U.S. Navy as of now. There are seven ships
in various stages of construction at Fincantieri Marinette Marine, with three more in
long-lead production. The first two ships,

Close Combat Symposium

19-21July 2016 Defence Academy of the UK, Shrivenham

Protection against
Mini-Drones

(Photo: Diehl Defence)

(df) Easy to acquire but hard to fight: minidrones are a growing threat to military
and police forces and to political meetings
and mass events. In the past countermeas-

ure systems based on interference with

radio signals and GPS jamming/spoofing.
Nowadays, this does not provide reliable
protection. Diehl Defence has developed
a countermeasure based on High-Power

For details please visit www.symposiaatshrivenham.com/cc

April 2016 European
Security & Defence
email [email protected]
or call +44(0)1793
785648
Follow us on Twitter

@SympatShriv

Periscope

Kuwait Signs Contract for

28 Eurofighter TYPHOONs

(Photo: Eurofighter)

(jh) The contract signature for 22 single-seat

and six twin-seat aircraft followed the announcement of an agreement between the
State of Kuwait and the Italian Government
for the procurement of the aircraft on 11
September 2015. The aircraft will be delivered according to Tranche 3 standard and
will be equipped with the E-Scan radar.

2022 FIFA World Cup. Although the development has been paid for by the State
of Qatar Reiner Stemme company retains
the full marketing rights.

Third Nation Orders AW159

Navy Helicopter
(df) Finmeccanica has been awarded a contract to supply the Philippine Navy with two
AgustaWestland AW159 helicopters. The
aircraft will be built in and delivered from
the United Kingdom in 2018. The order,
valued over 100M, includes training and
multi-year support and adds to those of the
United Kingdom and the Republic of Korea,
bringing the total orders for AW159s to 72.
The two helicopters will be primarily dedicated to anti-submarine warfare and anti(Photo: Finmeccanica)

ment of Defense to acquire STINGER air-toair missiles made by Raytheon. As part of the
deal, India will receive 245 Stinger air-to-air
missiles along with launchers and engineering support. Indias STINGER acquisition is
part of a 2.7 billion deal with the U.S. that
includes combat helicopters, weapons, radars and electronic warfare suites. The
combination of supersonic speed, agility,
highly accurate guidance and control system and lethal warhead makes STINGER a
combat proven capability against helicopters, UAVs, cruise missiles and fixed-wing
aircraft. STINGER not only has a surface-toair capability from land and sea, but also an
air-to-air capability that can be integrated
into most fixed- or rotary-wing platforms.
India joins nations around the globe who
recognize that air-to-air STINGER can be a
key component of attack and light attack
helicopter mission configurations, said
Duane Gooden, Raytheon Land Warfare
Systems vice president. STINGER significantly improves the ability of the aircraft to
successfully perform todays missions while
countering existing threats.

USS FREEDOM and USS FORT WORTH, have

demonstrated the FREEDOM variants value
to the fleet with two successful operational
deployments to Southeast Asia, sailing
since delivery more than 180,000 nautical
miles combined. The FREEDOM variants
steel monohull design is based on a proven,
survivable design recognized for its stability and reliability. With 40% reconfigurable
shipboard space, the hull is ideally suited to
accommodate additional lethality and survivability upgrades.

Stemme Introduces ISR

Aircraft

India Acquires Combat

Proven Missiles
(df) The Indian Ministry of Defence has
signed an agreement with the U.S. Depart8

(jh) The German company Reiner Stemme

Utility Air Systems introduced the new
Q01 reconnaissance aircraft at Schnhagen airport near Berlin in March. The
sensor platform has been developed on
(Photo: J. Hensel)

The contract confirms the State of Kuwait

as the eighth customer in the programme
and as the third customer in the Gulf Region
next to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and
the Sultanate of Oman.
Speaking on behalf of the consortium and
its Eurofighter partner companies the CEO
of Eurofighter, Volker Paltzo, said: We are
delighted to officially welcome the State of
Kuwait as a new member of the Eurofighter
family. The confirmation of this order is further testament of the growing interest in the
Eurofighter TYPHOON in the Gulf Region. It
will enable Kuwait to benefit from the critical mass being developed in the Gulf and
the many advantages that it brings to an
air force in terms of interoperability, training
and in-service support.
Since entry into service of the first Eurofighter TYPHOON at the end of 2003, more than
470 aircraft have been delivered to six nations: Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy,
Spain, Austria and Saudi Arabia. The Kuwait
order follows an order by Oman in December 2012 for twelve aircraft. Eurofighter
Typhoon is currently in service at 22 operational units and up to now, the whole fleet
has completed more than 330,000 flying
hours worldwide.

order to the armed forces of Qatar as

an OPV (Optionally Piloted Vehicle) which
can either be flown by a pilot on board
or remotely controlled from a ground
station via a data link. The aircraft is
powered by a 3l diesel engine and has
been laid out for ATOL operations (Automatic Take-Off and Landing). The Emirate of Qatar has 17 systems on order,
and the first prototype has successfully
completed its maiden flight, equipped
with a camera, an electro-optical sensor
and a radar from Thales. The aircraft is
10m long, has a wing span of 20m. and
a payload capacity of 1,000kg., of which
up to 680kg. can be used in support of
a flight time of up to 50 hours. Operational applications planned by the Qatari
forces include border and sea space surveillance and reconnaissance as well as
surveillance missions in the scope of the

European Security & Defence April 2016

surface warfare roles. The helicopters will

also be capable of performing other roles including search and rescue, maritime security
and maritime surveillance. The AW159 is a
latest generation, multi-role, multi-mission,
maritime and utility helicopter. Designed
as successor to the LYNX, which still holds
the 400 km/h world speed record, the new
model further expands its naval capabilities
and performance. The AW159 features a
state-of-the-art cockpit with four large displays as well as integrated avionics and mission systems allowing the crews enhanced
capability and operational effectiveness.

Swiss Combat Training

Centres Operated by RUAG
(gwh) Following a contract from the Federal
Office for Defence Procurement (armasuisse), RUAG Defence will continue operating
the combat training centres in Switzerland
for the next five years. The contract includes
management, operation of the centres system platforms, technical service, logistics,
infrastructure and property management.
These centres are state-of-the-art training
facilities equipped with the latest systems
for simulating soldiers, weapon systems
and buildings integrated in different combat
environments. The systems include trainas-you-fight training in a realistic environment, providing optimal preparation to soldiers for any future deployment, and also
includes vehicles and MOUT infrastructure.

Since its establishment in 1988, FNSS has

become one of the leading manufacturer and supplier of tracked and wheeled
armoured combat vehicles and their
weapon systems for the Turkish and allied
armed forces with its tailored, reliable, and
affordable land combat system solutions.
Up to day, FNSS has completed deliveries of over 2,700 tracked vehicles, some
produced based on technology transfer
programmes in various countries. Today,
FNSS operates three major production
sites worldwide.
The project portfolio of FNSS includes:
The delivery of 270 ACV-15 and ACV19 tracked armoured combat vehicles
each for the Malaysian armed forces.
The vehicles were produced locally in
Malaysia based on technology transfer
by FNSS.
The production of 257 8x8 vehicles
each for Malaysian Army. The serial
production is currently ongoing at the
DRB-HICOM Defence Technologies
SdnBhd (DEFTECH) facilities in Malaysia. The required technologies are
transferred by FNSS. This is the largest
defence export contract of the Turkish
defence industry.
The sales and modernisation of M113
tracked vehicles for the Philippines.

(Photo: FNSS)

FNSS: Projects in Southeast Asia

cific missions numerous AAABs can
be coupled together to cross wider
distances. AAB is
in the inventory
of Turkish Armed
Forces. AACE is an
amphibious, armoured, tracked,
combat earthmover designed for
the preparation of river banks during river
crossing missions. It is capable of performing bulldozing, rough grading, excavating,
hauling, and scraping operations. As opposed to standard heavy-duty vehicles;
AACE can increase its working capacity by
taking in soil into its ballast canister. The ballast canister can be discharged any time, as
necessary. FNSS also designs and produces:
25 mm, 12.7 mm and 40 mm stabilised
one manned turrets and 30 mm manned
and unmanned turrets. Its Sharpshooter
one-manned turret is being used by Turkish
Armed Forces and by a number of export
customers, including Malaysia.
Today, FNSS is a recognised land systems
design house for the Turkish Ministry of
National Defence's Undersecretariat for
Defence Industries (SSM), as well as allied
countries.

The development of a medium-weight

tank with PT Pindad, a facility owned
by the Indonesian Government.
Beside tracked and wheeled armoured
combat vehicles, the FNSS product range
also includes engineering vehicles such as
the Armored Amphibious Assault Bridge
(AAAB) and the Amphibious Armored
Combat Earthmover (AACE). As a ferry,
the AAAB system can transport a MLC 21
tracked vehicle, while a two-bay ferry AAAB
is capable of carrying MLC70 T vehicles. By
deploying the ramps, which are carried
by AAABs hydraulic crane, and coupling
three AAABs from ramp to ramp, MLC100
W vehicles can be transported on rivers or
lakes. When 12 AAAB systems are coupled
together from ramp to ramp, it can form a
150 m bridge suitable for the crossing of
MLC100 W and MLC70 T vehicles. For spe-

New Brochure
Armoured Infantry Fighting
Vehicle Puma

Concept

AIFV Puma Procurement and Service

Use Control under One Umbrella
Oliver Mader
At present, the Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle (AIFV) Puma is the largest individual project for
the German land forces and one of the most important defence projects of the Bundeswehr. The
AIFV Puma will soon supersede the Marder AIFV, which has been in service for 42 years now. Due
to its performance, the AIFV Puma is about to set new standards in many areas.

Content:
Concept
System
Technologies
Integrated Logistic Support/Training
Future Trends

The implementation of the AIFV Puma project lies within the responsibility
of the Federal Office of Bundeswehr
Equipment, Information Technology
and In-Service Support (BAAINBw).
As public purchaser, it enters into
agreements with contractors and

(Source: WTD 41)

variety of coordinated organizational measures and processes

is required in order to lead a defence
project from the first ideas and concepts to a qualified weapon system,
which can be operated safely and is
accepted by its users. The basic frame-

for operational viability of the former

in-service support offices. This new,
end-to-end responsibility with regard
to Bundeswehr equipment from
project implementation and procurement to service use control to disposal
permits more effective and shorter
processes.

Project development
overview

S005 production vehicle during a driving test at the Bundeswehr

Technical Center for Ground Vehicle Systems, Engineer and General
Field Equipment (WTD 41)

work for this is laid down in the revised Customer Product Management
(CPM, rev.) Procedures for Requirement Identification, Procurement and
In-Service Support in the Bundeswehr.

Author:
TRDir Dr. Oliver Mader
AIFV Puma Deputy Project
Manager, BAAINBw K5.2

in close coordination with the future

user and industry performs compliance demonstration with the support
of its technical centers and research
institutes. In October 2012, the BAAINBw was established in the course
of the Bundeswehr reorientation. It
combines the procurement activities
of the former Federal Office of Defense Technology and Procurement
as well as the material responsibility

Already in 1996, the first requirements

for the realization of a new armored
infantry fighting vehicle were formulated and basic conceptual ideas were
developed. In the year 2000, the project was transferred into the CPM. The
analysis phase was concluded in the
year 2002 with the approval of the
Final Functional Requirement (FFR).
In this document, the requirements
of the user (in this case the German
Army) were laid down formingConc
the baept
sis for the subsequent risk reduction
phase. The aim of this risk reduction
phase was the development of a complete system demonstrator including
the proof of productibility and performance in accordance with the Final
Functional Requirement. To this end,
a development/risk reduction phase
contract was concluded between the
public purchaser and the company
Projekt System & Management GmbH
(PSM). At the end of 2005,
the comTeam
of auth ors
plete system demonstrator
was preof the Fede
Dire
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ener al for
Plan ning istry of Defe nce,
At the end of 2004, The
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AIFV Puma
during the
integrated
compliance
demonstrat
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Published in cooperation with the Association of

the German Army (Frderkreis Deutsches Heer e.V.)
Defence Technology Review 4/2014

102 pages, English

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(Photo: PSM)

(Defence
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 S ecurit y P o lic y

Europe and NATO

The Need to Take Responsibility
Ton van Loon

In 2014 Europe had to come to terms with the fact that not all of its neighbours are always nice.
The Russian invasion of the Ukraine and the shooting down of flight MH17 pointed out emphatically
that the illusion of eternal, and most of all cost-free, peace in Europe was just that: an illusion.

bility. The influx of refugees and the impact

of terrorist attacks (culminating in Paris and
Brussels) show that security cannot be seen
only in geographical terms. Instability and
war in the Middle East and in Africa have an
immediate impact on Europe. ISIS or Boko
Haram barbarism coupled with utterly corrupt and often equally barbaric regimes
have resulted in mass migration towards
Europe. We could have seen this coming

(Photo: dpa)

eace is not for free and requires hard

work and financial commitment. In the
words of Dutch defence minister Jeannine
Hennis: Security comes at a price. And
our need for security justifies paying that
price. At some point, we may be forced
to act militarily in order to remain secure
on the European continent1. Does this
imply a return to the Cold War? Of course
not, but it does mean that there is a need

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant propaganda photo showing

masked militants in Syria

for a geographical defence of Europe, or

in other words that Article 5 of NATO
is not obsolete. European NATO nations
suddenly realise that old-school NATO is
still very much needed.
On the other hand, 2015 put the focus on
another threat to European peace and sta-

Au th o r
Lieutenant General (retd.) Ton van
Loon started his military career in the
Dutch Army in 1977. He commanded
on operations as a battalion commander in Kosovo (1999) an as a major general in Southern Afghanistan
(2006/2007). Before his retirement in
2013 he commandedI. German Netherlands Corps.

10

but we preferred to remain in a state of

denial or, in the words of Thomas Gray,
Ignorance is bliss. The immediate impact
of instability means we have to rethink
how, and more importantly why we get
involved.
European interests are not merely geographic in nature and therefore its defence
can also not be seen solely in geographical
terms. Not only the refugee problem but
also access to natural resources, freedom
of navigation and of course terrorist safe
havens are all very legitimate security concerns that are not necessarily geographic
in nature. Frans Timmermans, current
Vice Chairman of the European Commission, said in 2014 that if we fail to export
stability, we will sooner rather than later
import instability and if that happens it

European Security & Defence April 2016

will threaten not only our economy but all

of our values2. Even he, probably, did not
predict the speed at which his comments
would become true. The consequence is
that while most missions outside NATO
have been seen as wars of choice, now
they are becoming wars of necessity.
Nations have become used to doing crisis
response operations out of choice, and
with limited engagement in both time and
volume. To deal with the instability affecting our nations directly, it is very likely that
stabilization missions will be needed for
a longer period of time and with much
greater resolve. Politicians like to focus on
short term problems that can be resolved,
but the speed at which instability is now
being imported will demand discussion on
longer-term solutions. After ISAF it was
often heard that NATO (nations) have lost
their appetite for such big involvement.
That is probably true; but the choice is not
ours anymore. We do not pick the crisis,
the crisis imposes itself upon us.
NATO, and especially its European nations
need to recognize that it needs military
capabilities that can deal with both geographical, old school threats but also
with new school, complex threats. It is
not a good idea to differentiate between
(national or collective) defence forces and
crisis response forces. We need to have
forces that can serve our security interests across the entire spectrum.
The biggest change in the European
mindset that must occur is the understanding, not only in words but also in
deeds, that Europe must invest in its own
security to defend its territory but also
its wider security interests. Si vis pacem,
para bellum.

Solidarity
The most crucial elements in collective
defence are solidarity and cohesion. Article 5 of NATO revolves around the idea
that an attack on one is an attack on all.
During the Cold War no-one doubted the

(Photo: Andreas Steindl)

Secur it y P o lic y

Spanish Forces in NRF exercise Steadfast Jaguar 2006

idea and that was the defining deterrent

against an attack. In the 25 years after
the fall of the Berlin wall Europe starting cashing in on the peace dividend.
The arguments used to reduce defence
spending not only resulted in insufficient funding of military capabilities but
also in a common belief that NATO collective defence was not so relevant any
more. In the public opinion and in main
stream politics NATO became obsolete
and also a separate entity. If there was a
threat, which no-one saw as very realistic, NATO would take care of it, so the
individual nations did not need to spend
money on their own capabilities. This NATO became more and more synonymous
with the US, resulting in an enormous
capability gap. Today this gap is so big
that Europe basically cannot deal with its
own security threats without the Americans leading. European investment in its
own security is also a precondition for
US engagement in Europe; if we are not
willing to take care of our own security,
how can we expect others to do so? It is
very unlikely that the US will continue to
serve as the policeman of the world
especially if Europeans remain reluctant
to do anything for themselves.
The introduction of the NRF back in 2002
was an attempt to improve (European)
nations capabilities. In the early days this
idea of providing a tool for transformation was certainly a step in right direction,
however nations started looking at the
NRF as the default tool to deal with crisis
which again allowed nations to step away
from their own responsibilities. Because
the US did not become heavily involved
in the NRF very often the capabilities also
proved to be marginal. The same risk ex-

ists with the VJTF, the idea of providing

a spearhead force collectively can only
function if the rest of the spear follows.
To stay with the metaphor, it will also
only be effective with a strong athlete (or
warrior) wielding the spear.
This attitude of treating NATO as a separate entity for which nations only take
limited responsibility has had a negative
effect on the public perception of NATOs
collective defence. In summer 2015 Pew
Research Centre published a survey on
NATO public opinion3. The survey asked
NATO member publics, among others, if
they believed that their country should
come to the aid of another member nation if that nation was attacked. Shockingly, in only two nations a majority replied yes and both these countries are
not European. This lack of solidarity is a
real threat because it does take away the
foundation of collective deterrence and
no European nation will be able to protect itself on its own.
At the Wales Summit in 2014 all 28 nations agreed to reverse the trend of declining defence budgets and raise them
over the coming decade. It is now time
to put our money where our mouth is.
We cannot carry on hiding behind the
Americans; we must recognize that NATO
is all 28 nations. Communitate valemus.

Interdependency
Operations will always have to be conducted in close partnership with other
nations. Even for the US developing a
coalition is the preferred course of action, while for the rest of NATO it is simply
a fact of life. The German CHOD back
in 2012 stated that if national deploy-

ment is the exception and multinational

cooperation the rule, this should be taken
into account in procedures and also in
exercises4. Without smarter defence Europe will become even more dependent
on the US.
The capabilities needed to deal with crises either to defend European territory
or wider interests can only be provided
collectively. It is just not realistic to assume that the necessary capabilities can
be provided by nations on their own. It
is important to realize that true national
independence is vastly more expensive.
Since it is highly unlikely that defence
spending will increase, dependence on
other nations is the norm: multinational
cooperation is no longer a choice, it is
a fact.
The second element that all crises have
in common is their complex or hybrid
nature. In March 2015 at the EU interparliamentary meeting in Riga, Federica
Mogherini, High Representative of the
European Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy, talked about the new security challenges posed by the so-called
4th generations warfare, a hybrid war,
which is manifested as a combination of a
use of irregular and conventional military
methods as well as elements from cyber,
economic and information warfare, and
political pressure.
The need for a comprehensive approach in crisis operations is evident.
Lessons learned from Afghanistan and
other recent operations indicate that
the more attention is given to the build
phase the higher the effectiveness of
military involvement. Clearing and holding can be done (primarily) by the military but the building needs to be done

April 2016 European Security & Defence

11

(Photo: defensiekrant)

Secur it y P o lic y
Churchill once said: never let a good
crisis go to waste. Europe currently has
more than enough crises to provide a
window of opportunity for change.

Capabilities Development

The Netherlands uses the same artillery gun as Germany (PzH2000)

but because of modifications the 18 Dutch guns are no longer
interchangeable with the Germans.

12

military culture. Military leaders need to

understand that they cannot make decisions without involving others. Their effectiveness depends heavily on interaction
with other, non-military, actors. In the
words of General USMC James Mattis: if
you cannot create harmony across service
lines, across coalition and national lines,
and across civilian/military lines, you really
need to go home because your leadership
in todays age is obsolete.6
The same applies to national policies. Nations need to realize that national sovereignty is important but has its limitations.
Most European NATO nations can very
sovereignly decide to say NO, saying yes
is much less a sovereign decision because
that depends on others saying yes as well.
The good news is that the understanding that something needs to be done
urgently is widely shared. Winston

(Photo: U.S. Air Force)

(primarily) by non-military actors. This

implies that military actions need to be
carefully nested with actions by other actors and logically this implies a need for
dialogue between all involved actors. NATO now commonly talks about its contribution to the comprehensive approach,
indicating that it is not the military that
should be in the lead.
The consequence of the need for a wider
structure within which the military contribution must fit, is the fact that military action is dependent on actions by others. If
the building does not take place the clear
and hold cannot be very effective. The
military then taking over the responsibility
for the building as well is not a preferable
solution. The PRTs in ISAF worked better
if they had a strong civilian, development
and diplomatic, involvement. On the other
side of the spectrum building something
without creating and keeping a secure
environment also does not work well. Development without security and especially
spending development money without accountability can even be counterproductive5. The military can be the enabler for
other actors but needs to realize that these
other actors will provide the decisive effect.
A potential Russian threat to NATO would
have a hybrid nature. It is very unlikely that
Russia would use military force alone if it
were to attack NATO. In this sense it is
highly unlikely that the Cold War scenario
will ever return. Dealing with such a hybrid
threat would also involve other actors for
instance to deal with a dissatisfied Russian
minority that could be exploited. Thinking
about comprehensive approach, and NATO contribution, is therefore not obsolete.
On the contrary it is more important than
ever that we develop solid mechanisms for
cross domain synergy.
The new paradigm therefore is interdependency which requires a change in

The debate about building a European

military, or not, is not the most important
issue. Europe needs to improve capabilities before we talk about how to best
organize these capabilities. Since in the
short term the dependence on the Americans will remain, it is probably better to
build capabilities in NATO. In Afghanistan
the coalition effort was often referred to
as US and NATO, perhaps we can come
to Europe and NATO to deal with the
challenges confronting primarily Europe.
Assuming that European nations will
follow up on their promise in Wales to
increase defence spending the question
is then of course: On what should they
spend their money? The only way Europe
can build capabilities that can provide a
real European alternative to overreliance
on Americas leadership is through combined efforts. NATOs website says7:
In these times of austerity, each euro,
dollar or pound sterling counts. Smart
Defence is a cooperative way of thinking
about generating the modern defence
capabilities that the Alliance needs for
the future. In this renewed culture of cooperation, Allies are encouraged to work
together to develop, acquire, operate
and maintain military capabilities to undertake the Alliances essential core tasks
agreed in NATOs Strategic Concept.
That means harmonising requirements,

A U.S. Air Force technical sergeant establishes satellite communications

with the tactical operations centre during a dismounted patrol in
Afghanistan. The U.S. Mission Partner Network and the NATO Future
Mission Network will expand the coalition interoperability capabilities
of the Afghan Mission Network.

European Security & Defence April 2016

Secur it y P o lic y

Areas for Improvement

The most obvious area where interdependence has to lead to a rethink of
capabilities is command and control.

Interdependency requires a different way

of organizing command, from a vertical,
command-driven approach to a more
horizontal, networked approach. Systems
supporting such fundamentally different
thinking about command need to be:
Firstly, multinational in design. If we
know we can only operate in multinational teams then why do we persist in
building expensive C2 systems nationally? Not only does this cost money, it also
is a waste of valuable training time. At the
operational level of command (Corps and
above) every staff officer will work in a
multinational setting because virtually all
HQs at that level are multinational.
Secondly, much more open than todays
systems. To work in a networked environment we need to able to talk to each
other. In the US military the development
of a Mission Partner Environment (MPE)
which replaces what was known as Future Mission Network (FMN) is a step in
that direction. Based on experience in
Afghanistan (Afghanistan Mission Network) the idea is to build a system ena-

(EATC) is a good example of substantially increasing capabilities by working

together. A similar approach could also
be used to provide logistic capabilities.
The NATO Joint Logistic Support Group
(JLSG) concept provides a framework but
needs real capabilities such as container
handling equipment, forklift trucks and
all the other less sexy logistical equipment without which no operation can
even begin. Enablers are also needed in
the intelligence field. This involves surveillance tools such as RPVs and satellites
but also HUMINT. Because of the hybrid nature of most, if not all, conflicts,
CIMIC or CMI is also a crucial enabler
that requires investment. Perhaps the
area in which improvements are needed
urgently is the cyber domain. Not only
to defend against cyber-attacks but
also to understand how social media is
used, and abused, to influence people.
Cyber surveillance will have to become
part of intelligence and info-ops. Research and capability development in
the cyber domain is essential, which also
(Photo: EATC)

pooling and sharing capabilities, setting

priorities and coordinating efforts better.
National efforts to build capabilities
should be coordinated. If every nation
buys new main battle tanks but no medevac helicopters the shortfalls will not
be addressed. Coordination is also necessary to avoid every nation defining their
own requirements resulting in the procurement of the same helicopter (NH90)
in a multitude of different versions which
then is 4 times more expensive than its
US competitor (BLACKHAWK). The same
applies to modifications to the same
equipment that make seamless exchange
no longer possible. The Netherlands
uses the same artillery gun as Germany
(PzH2000) but because of modifications
the 18 Dutch guns are no longer interchangeable with the Germans. This has
an effect on ammunition, on spare parts
and of course on training, all adding to
the costs.
Quick successes can be achieved without
great effort, if national procurement is
coordinated at an early stage. This however requires a more humble approach
towards procurement. The concept of
smart buyer suggesting military procurement agencies need to know all
there is to know about the equipment
that is going to be procured was a good
idea when nations were buying large
quantities (hundreds if not thousands)
of pieces of equipment. With the much
lower numbers procured today it is very
unlikely that every single nation can have
all the knowledge needed to really buy
smart. It is much more likely that because
everyone wants something else we will
be buying very costly equipment that is
even more expensive to operate because
small numbers automatically mean high
costs for spare parts. Military equipment
needs to meet different requirements of
course but are they really that different
for every nation and do we really need a
military solution for every problem? Utilizing existing technology and coordinating requirements make so much sense it
is hard to explain why it does not happen
more often.
Until now multinational procurement cooperation was mainly seen as a way to
reduce costs. That also needs to change.
More bang for the buck is clearly a good
thing but we need more bang not less
buck.

The European Air Transport Command (EATC) is a good example of

substantially increasing capabilities by working together.

bling commanders to work with partners

(other nations and other actors) in a common security domain.
It would be a big step towards real capabilities to combine forces in Europe if we
could decide to build ONE functioning
CIS system. Interdependence requires a
change in mindset, away from national
and military stovepipes. Of course some
things will need to remain secret but being able to communicate should not suffer from unnecessary secrecy.
The second big improvement would
be a substantial increase in enablers.
The European Air Transport Command

involves a less naive approach to internet

security.
At this point it is also important to underline that increasing defence spending at
the expense of development or diplomacy is not a good idea. Comprehensiveness
is the only way forward, defence without
development makes as little sense as development without defence. Hardcore
defenders of strict separation between
the military and other actors need to realize that much more can be done by synchronizing efforts. The current refugee
crisis cannot be dealt with by defending
the borders, or by building walls, alone.

April 2016 European Security & Defence

13

(Photo: EU)

Secur it y P o lic y

The refugee crisis most of all shows how nationalist,

even provincial, our thinking has become.

At the height of the crisis, even last October, WFP was not able to raise all the
funds needed to feed the Syrian refugees
in the region8. When refugees in an area
are not receiving enough to survive we
should not be surprised that they try to
move somewhere else.
Europe needs to repair, at least partially,
undue reductions in the military. High
end fighting units are needed, on land,
at sea and in the air. The idea that a light,
gendarmerie-style force would meet all
our needs is misguided. Air defence, antisubmarine warfare, air-to-air combat are
all back on the table but without enablers
none of these can make a real difference.
The same is true for cross-domain coordination, because without comprehensiveness the effect of military involvement
will be limited. Investing in capable CMI
units is another way of providing muchneeded enabling capabilities. Nations
that provide critical enablers might provide less glamorous capabilities but in the
end these capabilities will decide if a mission is possible or not.

White Papers
Predicting the future has unsurprisingly
proven to be very difficult. Attempting
to define the threats and then calculating the capabilities needed to deal with
them has not been very successful. On
one hand, threats change at such a pace
that planning ahead has just not been
possible. But often the wish was father
to the thought, risks that resulted in high
costs could easily be written down to accommodate yet another budget cut. The
problem with the military is that it is very
hard to explain why a capable military
is needed when the enemy is not at the
14

gates. But if the enemy shows up it is too

late to build up the military. That fundamental dilemma will not go away. White
papers need to acknowledge that we
can never predict exactly what is needed:
flexibility is therefore a cornerstone for
any security policy.
The current German white paper process
uses a series of meetings with stakeholders (participation meetings) in which the
basis is laid for a broad public acceptance for an effective military. Interestingly these stakeholder meetings look at
defence from various angles, asking the
question What do we want defence to
do? from different perspectives.9 Asking
the question could be a big step towards
developing consensus on the capabilities
required. Broad discussion on this topic
can also lead to a much better public understanding of the role of the military.

Conclusion
The modern world changes at such a
tempo that it is very hard to plan ahead.
A few cardinal points remain, however:
Future military capabilities will have to
rely on others. Joint, multinational and
interagency must be elements of any defence development programme.
Interdependency requires a fundamental change in mindset, focussing much
more on enabling than on commanding.
Without enablers nothing works: military capability development must take
that into account.
Perhaps the most important certainty is
that having a credible military is the best
guarantee that we will not need to use
it. Such a credible deterrent can however
only be built together, and that, today, is
the biggest problem. The refugee crisis

European Security & Defence April 2016

most of all shows how nationalist, even

provincial, our thinking has become. The
New-Years eve events in Cologne, Hamburg, Stuttgart, Zrich and even Helsinki
have primarily led to a call to build higher
walls along national boundaries instead
of trying to think about the origin of the
problem. How is it possible that young
men in this day and age believe they can
get away with this kind of behaviour?
The outrage is not that this happened in
Europe but that we only care if it does.
Europe needs to reinvent itself around
its values and needs to understand that
retreating behind iron curtains or Dutch
dykes does not work.
However, recognizing that Europe as a
concept is currently at a popularity low,
this is probably not going to happen soon
and it is even less likely that a single European defence concept can be developed. Given this sobering fact, it would
still make sense to have the development
of European abilities as a cornerstone of
every white paper. In recent operations
the military have often functioned as a
catalyst or the crucial enabler, perhaps
leading by example could work here
as well. Maybe every new white paper
should have a paragraph about how the
development of European capabilities is
going to be achieved.
Finally, which capabilities we need might
be a less relevant question then how do
we achieve them. Do we need new submarines? Probably yes, but do we really
need three northern European nations
developing their own, different submarines? If we build the same one, spare
parts can be shared, development costs
reduced, through-life costs minimised
and training executed together... It is just
a thought. 
L
Footnotes
1 Speech during the Future Force Conference
in March 2015
2 Free translation from Dutch of the HJ Schoo
lecture by Frans Timmermans on 2 September 2014.
3 http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/06/10/1nato-public-opinion-wary-of-russia-leeryof-action-on-ukraine/
Note: not all NATO nations were included.
4 Translated from speech given by General
Volker Wieker, October 2012, Bundeswehr
Tagung Strausberg. Original in German:
Wenn der nationale Einsatz die Ausnahme
und das Wirken im multinationalen Verbund die Regel ist, mssen unsere Curricula
das in der Ausbildung bercksichtigen und
die internationalen Verfahren im Fhrungsprozess zu Grunde legen.
5 See among others. Linda Polman, The Crisis
Caravan, Metropolitan Books, September
2010.
6 Quoted from http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/
fp/mission_command_fp.pdf
7 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_84268.htm
8 http://www.wfp.org/emergencies/syria
9 http://www.bmvg.de

Viewpoint from
Athens

On the verge
of explosion
Dimitrios Angelopoulos
M.Sc.
Advisor on Defence and
Security issues

ollowing the EU-Turkey agreement, European Union foreign

ministers have given Greece a three-month ultimatum to remedy deficiencies in controlling the influx of migrants, mostly from
Turkey. The European Commission is threatening to remove Greece
from the Schengen Zone of visa-free travel if Greece fails to remedy
the problem by mid-May.
The deficiencies found by the European Commission are that
Greece failed to properly register and fingerprint migrants when
they arrived at the Greek islands in the Aegean Sea.
The agreement finalises the one-for-one principle that EU leaders and Turkey provisionally agreed on 7 March: all new irregular
migrants crossing from Turkey into Greek islands will be returned
to Turkey; and for every Syrian returned to Turkey from Greek islands, another Syrian will be resettled from Turkey to the EU. This
temporary link between resettlement and return is feasible up to a
limit of 72,000 using the EUs existing resettlement and relocation
commitments, under which respectively 18,000 and 54,000 places
remain available.
Another measure adopted to try to slow the flow of migrants from
Turkey to Greece is being taken not by the European Union but by
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATOs job will not
be about stopping or pushing back refugee boats, according
to NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg. Instead, they will be
primarily tasked to provide Turkish and Greek coastguards and the
EU border agency Frontex with information on human trafficking
and criminal networks operating in the eastern Mediterranean.
Defence Minister Kammenos announced that Hellenic army and air
force engineers will assist in setting up hotspots on the islands of
Lesbos, Chios, Kos, Samos and Leros. Dozens of relocation centres
have also been established, mainly at ex-army camps on the Greek
mainland, administered and guarded by the army.
Fights among stranded refugees in Piraeus and in Idomeni, Lesbos
and Chios, are a daily issue between Afghans and Syrians with occasional serious injuries. More than 55,000 refugees and migrants
are stranded in Greece after the Balkan countries closed their borders to the massive influx of refugees. The recent terrorist attack in
Brussels makes the issue more complicated.
Greeces financial crisis is in a kind of remission, as it has been out of
the headlines for a while. But Greece still owes 200 billion euros in
loans and 50% of young people are unemployed. Capital controls
on banks are still in place, and Greek people can only withdraw a

maximum of 60 Euros per day from their bank accounts. So the

financial crisis is far from over, and the mixture of the financial crisis
and the refugee crisis has the potential to be explosive.
The stand-off between the government and international lenders continues. After almost six months of talks, the situation is
still unresolved. Greece has implemented only about half of the
measures it signed up to last summer, say European Union (EU)
officials. The representatives of the troika the European Commission, IMF and European Central Bank (ECB) returned to
Athens intending to reach a deal that would unlock another sizeable tranche of bail-out funding, enabling Greece to repay 9.3
billion ($12.8 billion) of bonds maturing in May, and start planning
a return to the international financial markets with a modest bond
issue later this year.
As a result of the huge economic and financial crisis, Greeces defence expenditures have been reduced from 3.1% of GDP to the
current figure of 2.1% of GDP. But this is actually a 29% reduction
in relative terms and an additional reduction in absolute terms because it is connected to a smaller GDP. It is also argued that 73% of
Greeces defence budget is for personnel costs alone. That figure
is pre-crisis: the current figure according to the International
Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) is 57%.
The Greek parliament has passed the 2016 budget featuring tax
increases and spending cuts demanded by international lenders
under the cash-strapped countrys third bailout package.
The 2016 budget foresees 5.7 billion (USD 6.2 billion) in public spending cuts, including 500 million (USD 543 million) from
defence and 1.8 billion (USD 1.95 billion) from pensions. It also
comprises tax hikes of over 2 billion (USD 2.17 billion).
The governmental coalition led by Prime Minister Tsipras and
composed of the leftist Syriza and the right-wing junior coalition
partner ANEL, lead by Defence Minister Panos Kammenos is not
capable of managing the refugee and financial crisis issues, while
the main opposition party New Democracy, led by Kyriakos Mitsotakis, does not contribute any significant proposals that might
resolve the problems a fact that continuously strengthens the
Golden Dawn far right party.
The Greek people have suffered a lot during the last six years because of the enforced austerity measures and the huge unemployment, and they are now completely desperate: Greece is on the
verge of exploding...
April 2016 European Security & Defence

15

 Secur it y P o lic y

The Obama Legacy and Beyond

Foreign Policy in the 2016 US Presidential Elections
Sidney E. Dean

Traditionally, foreign policy plays a subordinate role during United States presidential elections. There have
been exceptions. Dwight Eisenhower was elected in 1952 partly because of his campaign pledge to end the
Korean War. Vietnam War protests marked the campaigns of 1968. But by and large American voters have
displayed much greater interest in economic policy and so-called social issues (encompassing everything
from race relations to abortion rights). In this vein, foreign or security policy experience and expertise have
rarely been vital attributes for presidential candidates.

The 9/11 Factor

Then came 9/11. Americans had long assumed that, with the exception of nuclear
missiles, United States territory was immune

Photo: Us Coast Guard

he last person elected president with

a strong foreign policy portfolio was
George H.W. Bush in 1988. During his reelection campaign in 1992 President Bush
emphasised his expertise, remarking that

Before 9/11 Americans had long assumed that, with the exception of
nuclear missiles, United States territory was immune to attack.

his opponents sum foreign policy experience consisted of eating at the restaurant
chain International House of Pancakes.
That opponent Bill Clinton defeated
Bush by a six percent margin.

Au th o r
Sidney E. Dean is President
of Transatlantic Euro-American
Multimedia LLC.

16

to attack. The last hostile act of any significance had been the British burning of Washington DC during the War of 1812. This
sense of security was stripped away on 11
September 2001. The public, normally skeptical of excessive foreign engagement and
reluctant to engage in major military conflicts, elevated national security to a new
priority. The spectre of weapons of mass
destruction in the hands of rogue states
and terrorists became magnified beyond reality. This popular sentiment prompted even

European Security & Defence April 2016

reluctant legislators to support the blanket

authorisation of military action which led to
the Iraq invasion of 2003.
However, by 2007/2008 popular criticism
of the Iraq War was growing. Barack Obama was able to leverage this dissatisfaction.
While his expertise and experience clearly
lay with domestic issues, Senator Obamas
campaign placed considerable focus on
foreign policy. He emphasised the fact that
he had publicly opposed the Iraq War even
before his election to the US Senate. During
his campaign he conducted a high-profile
eight nation tour ranging from Afghanistan
to the United Kingdom, including a muchpublicised rally in Berlin designed to show
American voters that he could communicate effectively with foreign nations. Major
tenets of candidate Obamas foreign policy
platform included: an orderly withdrawal
of military forces from Iraq, while continuing to combat al Qaeda and the Taliban;
strengthening the US armed forces by
adding 92,000 ground troops, while being
more selective about when and where to
actually use military force; globally securing
nuclear weapons and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
and (re-)building alliances and partnerships
to cooperatively address the challenges of
the 21st century. Obamas multilateralist
approach to diplomacy specifically stated
that the United States, despite its superpower status, should subordinate itself fully
to international law and should deal with
foreign nations as sovereign equals.

Foreign Policy Shaped by

Events
During his first term in office President
Obama initially pursued this multilateralist
agenda, and attempted to improve relations with Russia and the Islamic world as

Photo White House

Secur it y P o lic y

US President Barack Obama and and the Russian President Dmitry

Medvedev signed the New START treaty in Prague, Czech Republic,
on 8 April 2010.

ise to withdraw during Obamas first term

in office. This was extremely controversial
at home, with many lawmakers criticising
the withdrawal. By 2014 was forced to reverse course, sending more than 3,000 US
soldiers back into Iraq, this time to combat
ISIS. Developments in Afghanistan followed
a parallel course; in October of last year the
president formally declared an open-ended
US troop presence in that country. Even apparent successes such as the international
nuclear accord with Iran have proven to
be two-edged swords, with Iran continuing to conduct unauthorised missile tests
forcing Obama to impose new sanctions
against Iran within weeks of lifting previous
sanctions. Not surprisingly, the presidents
critics in Washington lost no opportunity

The Obama Legacy

Ironically, Obamas foreign policy has been
attacked by both the left and the right.
While he did significantly reduce the US
military presence in Afghanistan and Iraq,
the continued deployment of thousands of
advisors, trainers and anti-terrorism specialists has disappointed supporters who
hoped for a complete end to US involvement here. The same goes for his expanded
deployment of drone strikes to kill suspected terrorists. For their part, Republicans
have spent the past seven years criticising
what they perceive as a lack of leadership
and assertiveness, calling his foreign and
security policy indecisive and hesitant.
The presidents supporters counter, praising Mr. Obama as a leader who thinks before he acts and who rejects short-term or
simplistic responses to complex challenges. Yet it cannot be denied that President
Obama has repeatedly vacillated, reversing
course on issues or seeing himself forced to
act after prolonged reluctance. His unfortunate evaluation of ISIS as a JV (i.e. junior league) threat still haunts him today. He
initially opposed intervention in the Libyan
civil war, but was persuaded to change his
position by the concerted efforts of British Prime Minister David Cameron, French
President Francois Hollande, and Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton. Was this a case of
supporting allies, or a case of failed leadership? Given the subsequent destabilisation
of Libya, Obamas initial skepticism regardPhoto: USAF

well as with traditional allies. Phrases such

as reset and new beginning were deliberately chosen to describe the administrations early foreign policy initiatives.
But like most presidents before him, Barack
Obama learned that the best of intentions
will founder upon the shoals of reality. Relations with Russia reached a high point
in 2010, culminating in the new START
accords and Russian transit corridors for
American military supplies destined for
Afghanistan. By 2013 a distinct chill set in
over President Putins repressive policies at
home and increasing assertiveness abroad,
culminating in the 2014 Crimea invasion.
The Middle East proved even more challenging. The last US forces left Iraq in December 2011, fulfilling the campaign prom-

to denounce the nuclear accord and the

return of frozen Irani assets, describing the
treaty as a victory for Americas enemies.

An F-16 Fighting Falcon from the 480th Fighter Squadron preparing for take-off from Spangdahlem Air Base
in support of Operation Odyssey Dawn in March 2011. US President Obama initially opposed intervention in
the Libyan civil war.
April 2016 European Security & Defence

17

Photo: johnkasich.com

Secur it y P o lic y
ing beyond control. Overall this approach
reflects a conviction that the United States,
as superpower, remains strong enough
that it can afford to bide its time rather
than act rashly. Or to paraphrase Theodore
Roosevelt: walk softly, carry a big stick, but
only use it when necessary.

2016 The National Security

Elections

Photo: Picture Alliance/ap

Of the three remaining Republican candidates only Governor John

Kasich has notable expertise in security matters.

Donald Trumps views have been relegated to the radical fringe by almost
all conservative foreign policy experts, but his public appeal endures.

ing intervention seems justified. And while

his refusal to become directly involved in
the Syrian civil war seems the responsible
position, his wavering regarding supplies
and training for democratic anti-Assad rebels contributed to a power vacuum ultimately filled by Islamist groups.
Of course this all begs the question: would
a more assertive foreign policy over the
past seven years have benefitted the United
States or its allies? Or would such a policy
have escalated crises which have to date
been contained at lower levels of intensity?
President Obama despite the idealistic
tone of his first campaign and early years
in office has largely displayed a flexible
approach, adjusting positions as necessity dictates. US interests and resources
are weighed carefully before decisions are
made. He has routinely balanced assertiveness such as his attempt to build an East
18

Asian coalition to contain Chinese expansionism, or his deployment of additional

military forces to Europe to dissuade Russian aggression with continued efforts at
cooperation with Moscow, Beijing and others on issues of common or global concern.
His foreign policy can best be categorised
as Realpolitik, tempered by a basic Leitmotif that it is better to err on the side
of caution. The latter might be a personal
attribute of the man Barack Obama, but it
is certainly influenced by his conviction that
insufficient reflection and excessive activism contributed to the 2003 invasion of Iraq
and to the post-invasion setbacks. History
might find that President Obama missed
opportunities to act quickly and eliminate
a growing threat. It might equally find that
he resisted numerous temptations to act
rashly, and thereby prevented mediumscale conflicts from automatically escalat-

European Security & Defence April 2016

The 2016 presidential campaign continues

to be dominated by foreign and security
policy. Chinese and Russian assertiveness,
constant violence by ISIS and other extremist organisations, and the flood of refugees
from the Middle Eastern war zone continue
to focus the publics attention. International trade and economic policy has also
taken a prominent spot, especially given
the protectionist policies espoused by contenders Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders.
Through mid-March the presidential candidates had conducted a total of 20 debates.
The word war was mentioned an average of 24 times per debate! Peace was
mentioned twice per contest. China was
mentioned a total 178 times, Russia 122
times. The so-called Islamic State takes the
prize, with a total of 351 references during
20 debates.
Recent polls indicate that foreign policy
(which is frequently conflated with national
security) is now one of the top priorities
for voters, especially among Republicans.
Ongoing terrorist attacks keep popular interest high. Following the Paris attacks of
November 2015 a Reuters poll found that
terrorism had replaced the economy as top
concern for American voters. This was confirmed after the 22 March attacks in Brussels, when a poll by Morning Consult found
24 percent of respondents named national
security their highest priority, a jump of
seven percentage points. Tolerance for
radical measures is rising in tandem with
the level of popular fear. A Reuters/Ipsos
poll released on 30 March found that 63
percent of Americans replied that torture
would be justified to extract information
from suspected terrorists. This is a significant escalation from 2014, when only 45
percent of US citizens expressed this view.

Republican Foreign Policy

Platforms
Ironically, voters concern for foreign policy
does not translate to a preference for experience or subject matter expertise. Republican candidates with the best credentials or the most developed foreign policy
platforms e.g. Senators Lindsay Graham
and Marco Rubio were eliminated in the

primaries. Of the three remaining contenders only Governor John Kasich has notable
credentials (although best known as a fiscal
expert, he served 18 years on the House
Armed Services Committee), and he is trailing his opponents by a wide margin.
Donald Trumps views which range from
seizure of Iraqi oil fields to dissolution of
NATO and use of nuclear weapons on European soil have been relegated to the
radical fringe by almost all conservative
foreign policy experts. Former generals,
diplomats, and former defence and foreign policy officials from past Republican
administrations almost unanimously repudiate Trump as uninformed, unqualified,
and dangerous. Still, his simplistic (and
unfounded) mantra that America doesnt
win anymore, coupled with demands for
European, Asian and Middle Eastern allies
to pay for US military operations resonate
with voters who know little about international affairs.
Senator Ted Cruz is more nuanced than
Trump, but advocates an extremely aggressive foreign policy based on assertive US leadership, a massive increase
in defence spending, and repudiation of
compromise (his top foreign policy priority
is to annul the Iran nuclear accords). Nu-

Photo: dpa

Securit y P o lic y
merous statements such as
his plan to carpetbomb ISIS
selectively point to gaps in
his knowledge of foreign and
military affairs. Like Trump,
Cruz has expressed his willingness to tolerate dictators such
as Assad and Gaddafi. While
Cruz pledges to stand up for
American allies and interests,
he summarises his philosophy:
We need to judge each challenge through the simple test
of what is best for America. Because what is best for America
is best for the world.
John Kasichs foreign policy
platform is considerably more
mainstream than his rivals. At
times his statements are contradictory. He opposes nationbuilding and active democratisation of other countries, saying
the US should stay out of civil
wars and not act as the worlds
Senator Ted Cruz is more nuanced than Trump, but
policeman. On the other hand
advocates an extremely aggressive foreign policy.
he criticises President Obama
for not ousting Assad. Kasich advocates
and Middle Eastern partners. While regardthe use of US ground forces to combat ISIS,
ing the Syrian refugee crisis as primarily a
but only in a coalition including European
European problem, he favours working

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April 2016 European Security & Defence

19

 Secur it y P o lic y
demanding other nations pay the United
States for security services rendered, or
threatening economic consequences if nations such as China fail to agree to Wash-

Isolationist. All three would likely introduce

tensions into current alliances and partnerships, to varying degrees and in different
ways.

Photo: senate.gov

with Europe to solve the issue while jointly

standing up for common values. In Asia, he
advocates tougher sanctions on North Korea and sharing conventional missile technology with Japan and South Korea. He
seeks cooperation with China in order to
restrain Pyongyang, but advocates a robust
US naval presence to deny Beijings claims
to the South China Sea.

Democratic Foreign Policy

Platforms

Rolling the Dice

Together the five remaining candidates
represent four schools of foreign policy.
While Donald Trumps world vision lacks
cohesion, his platform does display one
consistent thread: money. Trump believes
economic interests and deals are the
key to foreign policy issues, whether it be
20

Senator Bernie Sanders campaign presents a comparatively limited

foreign and defence platform.
Photo: Picture Alliance/Newscom

Senator Bernie Sanders campaign emphasises socio-economic issues while presenting a comparatively short foreign and
defence platform. He supports President
Obamas deployment of additional forces
to Europe, and advocates working with
NATO to secure eastern European allies
against Russian aggression. Overall he advocates cuts to defence spending, including
spending on nuclear forces and decreasing Americas overseas military presence,
and believes European allies should contribute more to the joint defence. Military
operations should be conducted in strong
coalitions with European and other allies.
Sanders opposes further NATO expansion
on the grounds it would be provocative toward Russia.
Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is
the most experienced candidate regarding
foreign affairs a fact she consistently highlights. Her expertise extends to defence
policy. During her years in the Obama cabinet Clinton was frequently known to express more hawkish views than the defence
secretary. She continues this assertiveness
during the presidential campaign. Among
other things she has advocated imposing a
no-fly zone over Syria despite the presence
of Russian military forces in that country a
position shared by her Republican opponents but opposed by Sanders. She consistently emphasises the need for Washington
to lead globally. She remains a strong advocate of the US commitment to NATO,
and calls for a strong allied response to
Russian aggression. While emphasising the
need for an assertive foreign policy she has
stated that security should not be achieved
at the expense of democratic values and
human rights.

Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is the most experienced

candidate regarding foreign affairs.

ingtons demands. Columnist Charles Krauthammer, a leading conservative analyst

of US politics, has categorised Trump as
a Neo-Mercantilist because of his fixation
on money as a political force. Ted Cruzs
uncompromising stance is clearly Unilateralist. Bernie Sanders foreign policy is
built around his domestic socio-economic
platform; energy and resources should be
dedicated to domestic reforms, while numerous trade and economic cooperation
agreements would be endangered. Sanders can be classified as (at least borderline)

European Security & Defence April 2016

Kasich and Clinton, by contrast, represent

a blend of Realist/Multilateralist schools. As
president, either would pursue a traditional
foreign policy, guided first and foremost by
US interests and Washingtons global power status. Either candidate seems poised
to keep the United States engaged with
the world, maintaining alliances and commitments. While Kasich and Clinton have
both criticised aspects of Barack Obamas
foreign policy, their platforms indicate they
would pursue modified by generally consistent policies.
L

Viewpoint from
Copenhagen

J. Bo Leimand

I have no plan B But Has There Ever

Been a Plan A?
1

he young sergeants and lieutenants have always been told to

have a plan B when the planning for a patrol or an attack as
experience shows that nothing ever goes as planned. This wisdom
should also be valid for our politicians. However, apparently it is not.
Every time a new crisis shows up the first question is always: Where
has that come from?, following which the fire-fighting starts. The
last months have really been a lecture on poor handling of the crisis
here in Europe. The more intelligent newspapers at least here in
Denmark try to describe how we ended up in this situation, what
should be done now and what should be done in the future. This
reminds me of LTC Hal Moore, 1st Battalion, 7th US Cavalry. He was
in a fierce fight with the Vietcong in Ia Drang Valley, the LZ X-Ray.
When asked about his periods of seeming withdrawal, Moore said
that he had been reflecting, asking himself three questions: What
is happening? What is not happening? How can I influence the action? This is the essence of strategic leadership2.
What will be the consequences of this lack of leadership? There
might be two options and they are not that beautiful. One is as described by Samuel P. Huntington in his book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. Already in 1992 Huntington described the hypothesis that peoples cultural and religious
identities would be the primary source of conflict in the post-Cold
War world. Is this what we are witnessing today? The other option
is the collapse of the welfare state known as the Nordic model. This
is a concept of governance in which the state plays a key role in the
protection and promotion of the economic and social well-being
of its citizens. It was established in 1933 by the Danish Minister for
Social Welfare, Mr. Steincke, before immigrants, refugees and the
1951 Geneva Convention were in the daily news from sunrise to
sunset. Why does this matter right now in Copenhagen?
From a purely economical view the taxpayers money can only be
spent once and a member state of EU has to follow strict budget
rules. The dilemma arises when you want to buy new equipment
for your armed forces like fighter aircraft, lorries, armoured person-

nel carriers, etc. Should you spend your money on this or should
you spend all the money on integration and welfare? At the same
time, the US Government is telling its NATO partners that they
should spent at least 2% of their BNP while the New York Times
and others are telling the whole world that the Danes are the cruellest people on earth and should do much more for the immigrants.
At one point one nearly felt guilty for the war in Syria and the other
hot spots in the Middle East.
What does all this mean in a defence context? The Danish defence
policy is historically based upon four-year long political agreements
between a broad coalition of parties. The current one has to be
renewed in 2017. Now you can read in various articles that perhaps
we should wait to decide on major defence investments until we
have the new agreement in place as this might also describe the
overall threats against Denmark and thereby indicate what kind
of equipment is to be procured. When Denmark started to look
at and to invest development money into the Joint Strike Fighter
programme in 1998 the international situation was quite different.
There was a tendency towards out of area operations, whereas
today we are faced with operations close to or inside the NATO
area of responsibility. This might mean that we have to tailor our
equipment to new scenarios again. Looking at the fighter competition in Denmark the question is if we should buy a small number of
the very expensive F-35, or if we should get a good deal on the F-18
with 100 % offset compensation, or if we just should let the Danish Home Guard take care of our territorial defence. The answer is
blowing in the wind and maybe the decision makers have both a
plan A and a Plan B. As Winston Churchill once said:
Now this is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end.
But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning.
1 German Chancellor Angela Merkel in the German TV talk show Anne Will on
28 February 2016.
2 Pp. 46-47 in HOPE is not a METHOD by Gordon R. Sullivan & Michael V. Harper
(1997)

April 2016 European Security & Defence

21

country focus: Sweden

Back on Track

Swedish Security Alignment

Thomas Bauer

No other European country has struggled so much with its internal security political identity and orientation in recent years than Sweden. Overall, the Scandinavian area may rather lie on the edge of the new
confrontation line between the West and Russia under President Putin as perceived by the global public.
Nevertheless, with the Russian manoeuvres in the Baltic Sea region, Sweden has felt the concomitants of
Moscows new excessive drive for recognition directly on its doorstep. Time for a stock analysis.

on the banks of the Barents Sea. Officially

announced in the NATO-Russia Council as
a counterterrorism manoeuvre, with Zapad
2013, Moscow in fact wanted to prove
the revived clout of Russian alliances for
operations with geostrategic reach. Critical voices in Poland, the Baltic States and
in Scandinavia accused Moscow of having launched an attack on the Western
neighbouring states of the Baltic Sea. The
massive appearance of landing troops and
special units in co-ordination with heavy
bomber units, submarine hunters and marine units with the latest guided missiles
underpinned the accusations.

Since then, there has been a heated debate

in Sweden about whether the implemented departure of the Swedish Armed Forces
(SAF) in the 1990s from their primary mission of territorial defence to a containment
policy in the context of international operations like in Afghanistan or in Libya was
not a mistake. The operational readiness
was strongly questioned by the pessimistic
prognoses of its own senior officers up to
the High Command and the prospect of
improvement does not seem very bright
on account of the tensed budget situation. For this reason, with the beginning of
the Ukraine conflict in February 2014, the

Photo: MoD Russia

isturbing signals have been heard in

the Baltic Sea region for a few years.
And what is meant with this are not the
alleged submarine sightings that have been
fuelling speculations about Russian activities in the Swedish territorial waters in the
media time and time again. Rather, it is the
official statements and announcements
from Moscow that have been increasingly causing concern to the government
in Stockholm. In September 2013, Russia and Belarus had jointly mobilised over
70,000 soldiers for the six-day large-scale
manoeuvre Zapad 2013 which was carried out both in the Baltic Sea region and

In September 2013, Russia and Belarus had jointly mobilised over 70,000 soldiers for the Zapad 2013 in the
Baltic Sea region and on the banks of the Barents Sea.

22

European Security & Defence April 2016

Masthead
Photo: Swedish armed forces

European Security & Defence

Issue 2/2016
ISSN 1617-7983 www.euro-sd.com
Published by
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A company of the Tamm
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Around 120 LEOPARD 2 combat MBTs (stridsvagn 122) are in use with
the Swedish land forces.
Photo: Swedish armed forces

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VISBY Class corvettes

Swedish government under Minister President John Fredrik Reinfeldt decided to elaborate a programme with which, through a
significant increase of the defence budget,
investment funds for the procurement of
new weapon systems, like combat aircrafts
or submarines, were to be released.
The debate about a new orientation had
already flared up in 2012 and could be
reduced to three key points: the dealing
with the increasingly aggressive appearance of Russia in the Baltic Sea region, the
obviously lacking operational readiness
of the Swedish Armed Forces, and the
question of the maintenance of Swedish
neutrality and the status of a block-free
state in view of the fragile regional and
global security situation. In essence, the

question was how such a substantial deterioration of the military power of the
country could happen within a few years.
But this question could be answered relatively fast. Like many other European
states after the fall of the Berlin Wall and
the end of the Cold War, Sweden had
simply taken a break from dealing with
the strategic orientation of the armed
forces. At the end of the 1990s, the then
commander-in-chief, General Owe Wictorin, tried to combine urgently needed
reforms with budget cuts adjusted to
the state budget, an attempt which, like
in so many other European states, was
doomed to failure. An article by the Gatestone Institute published in 2015 appropriately sums up the development,

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23

Photo: Swedish armed forces

The submarines of the GOTLAND class (shown here) will successively by replaced by new A26 submarines from
Saab Kockums.

In the fall of 1998, General Wictorin had

his plan for the historical transformation all
worked out. But his big mistake was that
he had not grasped that the politicians had
now identified defense as an area ripe for
major budget cuts. [...] Then everything just
unraveled. In 2000, the Swedish Parliament

made a new decision on defense, to cut the

budget by half. Compared to 1985, there
was now only fifteen percent as many
Army combat units, one tenth as many
local defense units, half as many Home
Guardsmen, half of the Air Force and one
quarter of the Navy. The modern Swedish

FMVs T&E Land Systems organisation

manages and carries out independent
evaluation and validation of land combat
systems. The major locations for facilities and resources of T&E Land Systems
are situated in the south-western part
of Sweden, close to the cities of Skvde
and Karlsborg. The T&E Test Centre in
Karlsborg is located directly on the western shore of the large lake Vttern. If required, the impact area can be moved to
the lake, resulting in an extended firing
range (over 58 km).
T&E Land Systems have more than seventy years of experience of advanced
tests on components, units and complete systems related to vehicles and
weapon systems in various demanding
environments. Passive and active ballistic The Karlsborg Test Range offers
protection, as well as IED and mines are one of the largest catch boxes in
tested. Tests can be carried out in the the world at (25m x 20m x 35m).
actual environment in which the weapon
systems are to be applied, as prescribed
by the customer, which creates invaluable realistic conditions. In the climate chamber,
environmental tolerance and mechanical testing are performed.
Furthermore, T&E Land Systems also operate the lvdalen Firing Range, in an undisturbed part of mid-Sweden. The lvdalen Range is 540 km with a 700 x 1000 m
large hardened impact area, which is the natural target site for tracked and monitored
firings, both inert and live. lvdalen is ideally suited for the evaluation of long-range
artillery, armed vehicle systems, large IED and mine tests but also for gun, missile and
rocket firings from helicopters, as well as training and exercises with live EW-system
and threats. The maximum firing range is about 42 km and the maximum detonation
weight is 1000 kg of TNT.

24

European Security & Defence April 2016

Photo: FMV

Karlsborg Test Ranges (T&E Land Systems)

military, built up over a hundred years, was

scrapped in ten or eleven years.
In January 2013, the then commander-inchief General Sverker Granson outlined a
downright catastrophic picture of the condition of the SAF, according to which the
combined land, sea and air forces were not
in a position to defend the country in one
location longer than one week.

Shrinking Stock
A peculiarity of the Swedish Armed Forces
is their direct subordination to the government, and not as usual in many other states, to a Minister of Defence. This
makes it a near administrative authority
whose commander-in-chief in times of
peace and in times of war takes over the
function of a four-star general with the
title verbeflhavaren. This excludes the
Swedish king in spite of his appearance
on official occasions in general or admiral uniform from the order and command
structure. From the formerly 100,000
operational land, sea and air forces soldiers at the beginning of the 1990s, the
total number of troops has sunk to below 35,000. With the departure from
compulsory military service in 2010, the
number of operational reservist associations, and with it the homeland security
units, has also been decreasing year after year. The land armed forces currently
include barely 16,000 men and women.
Ten years ago, on the other hand, there
were still over 40,000 soldiers. Regarding the heavy units, the combat power of
the Swedish land armed forces is based
on around 120 LEOPARD 2 combat tanks
that are run under the name stridsvagn
122. In addition, there are over 500 units
of the Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicles stridsfordon 90, which contrary to

country focus: Sweden

national air transport squadron of NATO
with its C-17 GLOBEMASTER III, which is
stationed in Hungary.
Photo: Riksdagen

the export variants of the model manufactured by BAE Systems Hgglund, are
equipped with a 40 mm gun from Bofors

Swedens Defence Policy 2016 to 2020 bill of 2015 was supported by

almost all parties in the Swedish Parliament.

instead of the 25 mm cannon. The Patria

AMV, of which currently around 110 units
operate in the Swedish armed forces, with
the option of 100 additional units in the
future, is also used. In the area of protected transport vehicles, Sweden relies
on the bandvagn 206, which, with over
1,500 units, constitutes the largest volume
land system of the Swedish Armed Forces
and whose peculiarity lies in the conception as front and rear part of the vehicle.
The vehicle is especially designed for the
conditions of the almost impassable terrain in Swedish forests. The Bv 2006 is
used in different versions, e.g. as medical,
equipment and command vehicle as well
as, as pansarvrnsrobotbandvagn 2063
equipped with the weapon systems TOW
and BILL, anti-tank vehicle. The standard
infantry weapon is the Ak 5 (FN FNC) and
the export version of the G3 produced by
Heckler & Koch, which is operated under
the name Ak4 in Sweden.
At the end of the Cold War, the air force,
which currently show a force level of
around 7,000 soldiers, also experienced
a significant reduction. Sweden currently
operates with approximately 80 machines
of type Saab JAS 39 GRIPEN C/D, which as
multiple-role aircraft, perform tasks in the
area of air defence as well as being used as
bombers. For the expansion of air defence,
60 machines of type JAS 39 GRIPEN E were
ordered in 2014, which are to be deployed
until 2018. As far as the air transport forces
are concerned, Sweden can only fall back
on a handful of HERCULES C-130H. Further
capacities can be requested via the inter-

The Swedish sea forces are fully oriented to

the protection of the coast and territorial
waters as regards command and equipment, which, with a coastline of 3,218 kilometres in total, constitutes a significant
challenge. Hence,
corvettes and minesweepers dominate
the picture as far as
surface vessels are
concerned. Besides
the four corvettes
of the STOCKHOLM
and GTEBORG
class, the first three
of a total of five corvettes of the new
VISBY class are already deployed. The
ships are launched
by Saab Kockums in
Malm. In 1999, in
spite of serious concerns of the government in Stockholm
due to the loss of
national influence
on a strategically
important defence
industry capacity,
the formally statecontrolled Kockums
Naval Solutions was
acquired by German shipyard HDW,
which in turn was
taken over by Thys-

senKrupp in 2005. Due to considerable

internal quarrels about the strategic orientation of the company and the economic
risk within the framework of development
work on a new submarine type for the
Swedish marine, which was perceived as
too high, Saab and ThyssenKrupp agreed
upon Kockums Werft being taken over
by Saab in July 2014. The concerns on
the part of ThyssenKrupp about the A26
programme proved true, at least in part.
For the Swedish marine, it is a far cry from
the originally planned commissioning until
2018. The new submarines were originally
supposed to successively replace the vessels of the GOTLAND class and the even
older SDERMANLAND class. Due to considerable cost overruns in the programme
and the difficult political constellation as
a result of the change of government in
Sweden in October 2014, there have been
repeated delays regarding the contractual
determination on the acquisition of new
submarines. The lengthy process up to the
sale of Kockums to Saab was an additional
contributory factor which explains that a
contract on the procurement of two vessels
of type Saab Kockums A26 was only concluded in summer 2015. The vessels should
be commissioned between 2022 and 2024

The natural first choice for real-world testing in Europe

April 2016 European Security & Defence

25

country focus: Sweden

Defence Against Aggression

and Close Cooperation
It is no wonder that many people have
high expectations of a new orientation
of the Swedish defence policy for the
coming years as well as of the reformulated Military Strategy Doctrine (MSD).
The Swedens Defence Policy 2016 to
2020 bill of 2015 supported by almost
all parties in the Swedish Parliament sets
a clear focus on the protection of state
sovereignty and integrity of the country as
well as on the preparation of possible crisis and war scenarios. In this connection,
besides a significant increase of expenditures, the stationing and deployment of
modern weapon systems and well trained
combat forces must also occur throughout the country: The defence bill now
presented to parliament states that the
Swedish Armed Forces, with other parts
of the Swedish society, alongside political,
diplomatic and economic means, constitutes a threshold against armed attack, or
the use of military force to exert pressure
on Sweden. A credible military capability to defend against armed aggression
contributes to a peace and our political
freedom. Our security policy also requires
a defence force that is able to work alongside others. The Swedish Declaration of
Solidarity requires that we must be able to
provide as well as receive support, civilian
and militarily.
The Military Strategy Doctrine picks up on
these considerations and thereby stresses
the necessity to ensure the defence of the
country also via closer international and European co-operation. This includes the Nordic Defense (NORDEFCO) partner nations
Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Norway and
the NATO member states Estonia, Latvia
and Lithuania. NORDEFCO was founded in
2009 as an organisation for the establishment and expansion of security policy and
military relationships in the Scandinavian
region and also has a Military Coordination Committee besides a Politicial Steering
Committee. At the same time, the organisation also took over the duties of predecessor organisations going back to the 1960s
regarding the joint training of Scandinavian
units for international operations within the
framework of the United Nations (NORDCAPS) or armament co-operation (NOR26

DAC). Before adopting the MSD, there had

been many critical voices, which, based on
the established NORDEFCO co-operation
and the experiences from Swedens participation in the Nordic Battlegroup set up in

the envisaged strengthening of multilateral

and bilateral co-operation within a security
and defence policy context. Thereby it becomes apparent, like in many similar discussions in the other European states, that a

Photo: MoD DK

and may not exceed the budget of $1.2

billion in total. With a length of 62 metres
and a displacement of 1,800 tonnes, they
constitute a milestone in submarine development. The newly developed Genuine
Holistic Stealth Technology (GHOST) will
make the vessels almost invisible.

Regional security challenges were discussed by the Nordic defence

ministers meeting in Copenhagen on 30 and 31 March 2016. From
left: Swedish Minister of Defence Peter Hultqvist, Norwegian Minister
of Defence Ine Eriksen Sreide, Danish Minister of Defence Peter
Christensen, the Finnish Minister of Defence Jussi Niinist, and Director
of Department for Security and Defence for Iceland Arnor Sigurjnsson.

January 2008, were calling for a membership option of the country in NATO in the
middle term. An advocate of this request is
Hans Wallmark. He is spokesman for foreign defence policy in the Moderate Party
and member of the Defence Committee of
the Parliament in Stockholm. In a contribution for DefenceNews in March 2016, he
reiterated the demand of his party, besides
an increase in defence expenditures, to
also stand up for a speedy membership in
the North Atlantic Alliance. We hold the
belief that having Sweden in NATO would
strengthen security in the Baltic region.
Having Sweden outside the alliance just
increases uncertainty. A Sweden in NATO
would also give us more influence over the
security issues that concern us, and a place
at the table where the decisions that affect
us are made. Sweden needs a road map for
NATO membership.

Outlook
With the documents on defence policy of
the country and the Military Strategy Doctrine published in 2015, the first important
steps to increase military operational readiness in the long term were taken. It is now
a matter of consistently following this path
of reversion to ones own capacities and

European Security & Defence April 2016

merely national orientation is ruled out as

a solution, because suitable questions and
solutions to the increasingly complex conflict situation of security policy challenges
can only be found and implemented within
a strong European Network. To what extent a membership of Sweden in NATO
should be considered as necessary cannot
be answered in a short-term and politically charged debate. The already proven
co-operations within the framework of
NORDEFCO, the Nordic Battlegroup and
with individual NATO member states have
opened up opportunities for the further
expansion of operational readiness and
fighting power which can also be implemented without a permanent membership in the North Atlantic Alliance. On the
other hand, it is much more important
for Stockholm to deal more intensively
with the design of a strategic narrative
adjusted to the regional conditions and
individual possibilities, which opens up
long-term perspectives for the safeguarding of its own security policy interests and
European stability as a whole. Thus, the
strongly decimated armed forces could
be steered back into the right waters and
make a greater contribution to ensuring
and projecting the security policy identity
of the country.
L

country focus: Sweden

Swedish Defence in a Changing

Security Environment
Micael Bydn

This year represents a turning point for the Swedish defence. The armed forces have embarked on the implementation of a new defence policy adopted in the light of the deteriorating security situation in the Baltic Sea region. This is fundamentally driven by Russias destabilising behaviour both politically and militarily, where Russias continuous illegal annexation of Crimea and the Russian involvement in eastern Ukraine
represent the greatest challenge to the European security order.

we face in the European neighbourhood,

and in Syria and Iraq, points towards long
term destabilisation.

curity challenges of today and tomorrow.

The political guidance for the new defence
orientation is framed in the Swedish dePhoto: Swedish Armed Forces

hese tensions have spilled over to our

immediate neighbourhood, whose
strategic importance has heightened, most

The Supreme Commander in talks with young Swedish infantry soldiers

notably in the Baltic Sea region, but also

increasingly in the Arctic. The new defence
orientation marks a heavier focus on the
neighbourhood in contrast to the last decades emphasis on international operations.
At the same time, Sweden will continue its
international engagement. The challenges

Au th o r
General Micael Bydn
is the Supreme Commander of
the Swedish Armed Forces

Contemporary conflicts are increasingly

complex. Increasingly, armed forces depend on the societies they serve, which
are more interconnected and vulnerable.
Modern warfare must be able to meet
the full-spectrum of threats, ranging from
influence operations and subversion to
high-intensity warfare. Armed forces also
need to achieve joint effects across all domains including information and cyber. The
Swedish Armed Forces have thus accelerated their comprehensive reform effort
aiming to build a robust and agile force
which can respond effectively to the se-

fence bill for the period 2016-2020 that the

Parliament approved last year. After two
decades of successive reductions, it sets a
new trend by significantly increasing the
defence spending by approximately 11 per
cent over the next five years. The bill calls for
a renewed regional focus with emphasis on
national defence. It reflects the gravity of
the deteriorated military-strategic situation
and demonstrates a broad political support
and commitment for Sweden to contribute
to the stability in the Baltic Sea region.
In essence, the Swedish defence policy
rests on two fundamentals that are closely

April 2016 European Security & Defence

27

Photo: Swedish Armed Forces

The Swedish Armed Forces have 15 Sikorsky UH-60 BLACK HAWK in

their inventory. The aircraft was also used for MEDEVAC missions in
Afghanistan.

interlinked: To reinforce our military capabilities and to build security by deepening

cooperation with other countries and organisations. Furthermore, the bill calls for
a renewed and modernised total defence
concept, which refers to the readiness and
joint operational planning of both civilian
and military agencies. The total defence
concept applied during the Cold War, but
was dormant during the 1990s. Its reactivation is vital, both due to the emergence of
hybrid threats, but also owing to the fact
that the society has changed significantly
the last decades with increasing vulnerabilities and dependencies. To remedy this
requires close coordination between all actors engaged in total defence.
The overall priority for the Swedish Armed
Forces is thus to enhance the war fighting
capabilities of all three services both in
terms of equipment and personnel. The
recruitment and retention of qualified
women and men is absolutely essential,
and investments are made to this end.
Professionalising the armed forces helps
us to maintain the quality of soldiers, sail28

ors and airmen that contemporary conflict

requires.
On the Army side, tanks and infantry combat vehicles will be upgraded and new
mortars acquired. The Navy will receive
additional personnel, a reinforced antisubmarine warfare capability, and two corvettes will be upgraded. Continued investments will be made for air defence, including fighter aircraft, JAS39 Gripen, as well
as short- and medium-range surface-to-air
missiles. Additional investments will be
made in updating the core of the defence
force, such as personal equipment, communication equipment, radar and weapon
systems, as well as trucks and other equipment and logistics.
We will also add an additional light mechanised battalion to the defence structure. On
the island of Gotland, we are re-establishing regular army units, including a mechanised company, an armoured company,
and command and control elements. Some
home guard battalions will be equipped
with mortars. Pending additional political
guidance, the Swedish Armed Forces will

European Security & Defence April 2016

develop an active cyber capability, including Computer Network Attack (CNA).

Security in and around the Baltic Sea is indivisible and interlinked in a security complex. Swedens security and defence policy
is firmly anchored in the principle that security is built on cooperation and solidarity
with others. The practical implication is that
Sweden must have the ability to provide
and receive military support. Therefore, we
must fulfil our responsibility to strengthen
our national capabilities and maintain a
high level of interoperability, while solidifying the Swedish security doctrine.
This is why we further enhance our already
extensive international military cooperation. Our Nordic and Baltic neighbours
are naturally close partners, but we are
also deepening our collaborations with
the United States, Poland and other countries, as well as in the European Union,
in the OSCE, as a close partner to NATO,
and globally through the UN. A unified response to the events challenging European
and global security is integral.
Our relationship with Finland is of particular importance. It is driven by the political
aim to have a unified response option in
addition to national contingency plans.
The practical bilateral cooperation includes
establishment of secure communications
at all levels, mutual use of naval base infrastructure and air bases, as well as the
development of combined units, such as a
naval task group.
The transatlantic link is crucial to European
security, and even more so today. To this
end, we intensify our long standing bilateral defence cooperation with the United
States. The United States is naturally a key
partner to Sweden and a vital actor in the
Baltic Sea region. The main areas for Swedish-US cooperation include interoperability,
training and exercises, armament, research
and development, and multilateral operations.
Our partnership with NATO remains essential, and we continue to enhance it. It
provides a unique structure for interoperability, and contributes to the overall development of the Swedish Armed Forces.
Tested tools like the Planning and Review
Process (PARP) and the Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC) continue to serve a
valuable purpose, and our participation in
the NATO Response Force (NRF) remains a
key component of our cooperation.
The Enhance Opportunities Programme
(EOP) is the main vehicle for continued
development of our cooperation. It is a
flexible and useful platform based on the
principle of taking the individual partners
capacities and needs as point of departure.
Notably, Sweden pursues deepened co-

operation on political dialogue, exercises,

training, capability development and information exchange.
The deteriorating security environment in
and around the Baltic Sea region has also
an effect on our cooperation with NATO.
The policy framework is still that of partnership, but the practical content is under
transition as the Alliances centre of gravity
is shifting from international crisis management to operations and exercises on its borders. NATO has a key role to contribute to
stability in our region. Among the strategic
initiatives that have already been employed
within the EOP with relevance for the Baltic Sea region are political dialogue, intelligence sharing, and coordination of training
and exercises. Access to the most advanced
NATO exercises has long been a Swedish
priority, and is just as important today.
Training and exercises are top priorities to
develop our capabilities and reinforce the
weave of international partnerships in the
Baltic Sea region. When we step up our exercises nationally and together with others we strengthen our preparedness and
signal our resolve to keep our vicinity stable
and secure. In 2017 the biggest capstone
exercise in decades will be conducted to
advance the Swedish Armed Forces joint
capability, at the same time as we are pre-

Photo: Reddit.com

country focus: Sweden

Swedish soldiers in Mali posing with their AK5 assault weapons

Highest Survivability and Combat

Proven Technology

EAGLE 4x4/6x6

IRB

gdels.com

Defense Solutions for the Future

paring for our contribution to NATOs high

visibility exercise TRIDENT JUNCTURE 18.
Already today, Swedish forces conduct exercises with international partners at different complexity levels almost on a daily
basis.
While we are readjusting our focus to national defence, our commitment to global
peace and security remain. Swedish forces
are deployed in a multitude of challenging missions internationally, most notably
in Mali in MINUSMA and in northern Iraq
in the international coalition against Daesh.
Even if the application of our resources certainly needs to be balanced, international
and regional security as well as military capability and interoperability are strengthened through international missions. The
experience gained in Afghanistan, Mali,
and Iraq, outside the Horn of Africa, and
elsewhere, substantiates this claim.

Photo: Anders Lejczak

country focus: Sweden

Swedish JAS 39 GRIPEN fighters during the operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR

over Libya in 2011

In order to respond to the new strategic

context and the new defence policy, the
Swedish Armed Forces have developed a

Vidsel Test Range

Photo: FMV

Founded in 1958, the Vidsel Test Range is Europes largest overland test and training
area offering defence organisations and industry a complete testing experience all
the year round. Its strength lays in the expanse where it is located; the remotest part
of northern Sweden, in a region which is almost unpopulated. The missile range is
1,650 km, restricted ground space 3,300 km and the restricted airspace over land
is 8000 km.

Helicopter test at the Vidsel Test Range.

Due to the size and the varied terrain, the Vidsel Test Range is able to stage comprehensive test scenarios providing full combat loop with unlimited combinations of situations, supporting maximum surprise factor to train evasive manoeuvring. There are
a large number of target areas allowing live firing, customised targets and extensive
infrastructure within the test area. The range offers both real threats and simulator /
emitters that can be freely deployed within the range.
An impressive array of instrumentation including optical and radar tracking systems,
high-speed cameras and telemetry systems including electronic warfare capabilities
and both static and mobile air and ground-based targets are available. Whether it
is air-to-air, air-to-ground, ground-to-air and surface-to-surface testing, electronic
warfare, UAV deployment, testing and evaluation or training and exercises, Vidsel
is the place. Furthermore, Vidsel provides accommodation, spacious hangar and
preparation facilities, mechanical and electrical workshops, ready accessibility by air
and land, a full complement of rescue and security services as well as comprehensive
guest office facilities, open broadband internet access and mobile phone coverage.

30

European Security & Defence April 2016

new military-strategic doctrine that sets

our direction for the coming five years. The
key part lies in its military-strategic concept
that contains the central idea on how the
armed forces should be employed to respond to more complex threats.
The core of the military strategic concept is
straightforward. We defend Sweden and
the countrys interests, our freedom and
the right to live the life of our choice. First
and foremost, the Swedish Armed Forces
shall constitute a threshold deterring attacks of all forms. The cost of attacking,
or by other means impacting Sweden,
should be clear to all. This is ensured by
strategic intelligence, well-trained troops
with a high level of readiness, cooperation
with our partners and our strong will to
defend ourselves. The foundation of our
defence concept is that we are defensive
at the strategic level. In peacetime and in
crisis, our actions will be proactive and robust aiming at being de-escalatory. Our
robust actions will provide a direct threshold increasing the costs of escalation.
In wartime, we will balance our actions
between offence and defence to ensure
endurance and freedom of manoeuvre.
Any aggressor will immediately be engaged by high-readiness forces to ensure
our freedom of manoeuvre. Subsequently,
defence operations will be executed either
in decisive operations together with partners or alone over a long period of time to
wear down the aggressor.
In closing, in response to the rapidly changing security environment, the Swedish
Armed Forces are reinforcing our military
capability and deepening ties with international partners. The need to respond to
more complex threats also requires close
cooperation with civilian agencies. Building on the Swedish collaborative security
policy, our new military-strategic doctrine
suggests a proactive posture in our region
together with partners.
L

country focus: Sweden

Photo: Swedish Air Force

We plan to operate GRIPEN E until at

least, and most likely beyond 2040.
Interview with Major General Mats Helgesson,
Chief of Staff of the Swedish Air Force

ESD: What is your assessment of Swedens current security-political situation

considering the increased level of Russian
activities in your countrys direct and indirect neighbourhood?
Helgesson: We have seen a significant increase of Russian activities over the Baltic
Sea during the last few years.
Following the collapse of the Berlin Wall the
disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991
the presence of Russian Armed Forces in
the region decreased dramatically. Flights
with Russian bombers more or less went
down to zero in numbers. This reduction
of Russian military presence continued for
many years. After the war in Georgia 2008
we have noticed an increase of exercises
and other activities in our region.
Today, we consider the Russian exercise
pattern similar to what we could experience during the Cold War. Our assessment
is that it is a clear trend from the Russian
side to regain their military capabilities
over the Baltic Sea.
Overall, our political assessment of the
Nordic and Baltic Sea region is characterised by stability, dialogue and cooperation.

ESD: What is your perception of the Swedish Air Forces current status in terms of
human resources, training and materiel?
Do you have a wish list / list of priority objectives?
Helgesson: I can, as the Commander of
the Swedish Air Force, proudly state that
I have highly skilled, professional, and ef-

fective officers, NCOs, soldiers and civilians. Regarding our equipment and level
of technology, I am confident. The systems
we operate in the Swedish Air Force are in
many ways top shelf equipment. However,
to only focus on superiority in technology
or numbers is irrelevant for a relatively small
country such as Sweden. For us, the objective must be to excel at an operational and
tactical level, and that begins with skilled
personnel and adequate training.
I would argue war fighting is not about
making wishes, its about acting. How you
act is what really matters. Its how you fight
with available means that count, not what
capabilities you might have in theory. Operational effects are the result of our doings.
When it comes to priorities, the Swedish
Government and our Supreme Commander have been very precise. The first and utmost priority is to enhance the capabilities
for every war fighting unit in the Swedish
Armed Forces. My job is to boost the skills
of our Air Force and make sure that we
remain a compelling fighting force. That
starts with getting the right individuals
Photo: Jerry Gunner

Major General Mats Helgesson was

appointed Chief of Staff of the
Swedish Air Force on 1 October 2015
as the successor of General Micael
Bydn, the current Chief of Defence.
In this interview he addresses current considerations against the background of a changing security-political environment.

The policy pursued by Russia, on the other

hand, is unpredictable and destabilising. It
is inconceivable that a military conflict in
our region would only affect one country.
A separate military attack directly targeting Sweden remains unlikely.
I believe that the presence of our armed
forces in the area and our relevance when
it comes to operational capability alone or
together with a partner is of highest importance for the effect of deterrence against
an adversary. One substantial action we
have done is that we have increased the
number of scrambles with our GRIPEN
QRA by almost 50 percent between 2012
and 2013, which has been continued at the
same level during the following years.

18 NH-90 helicopters are on order to the Swedish Air Force. Shown here
is the first aircraft for Sweden taxiing at Airbus Helicopters facility in
Marignane, France, in 2014.
April 2016 European Security & Defence

31

The 12th International Symposium

on Protection against Chemical
and Biological Warfare Agents
with

Exhibition of Chemical and

Biological Defence Equipment
8 - 10 June 2016, Stockholm

Opening remarks by

Margot
Wallstrm
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Foto: Kristian Pohl/ Regeringskansliet

Speakers at the opening session

Ms. Angela Kane, former UN High repr. for
Disarmament Affairs
Dr. John Walker, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, UK,
Arms Control and Disarmament Research Unit
Mr. Alan King, Interpol

Keynote speakers
Emerging threats & risks/Disarmament and non-proliferation
OPCW speaker to be confirmed
Education and training for CBRN environments
Colonel Vratislav Osvald,
NATOs Joint Centre of Excellence (COE), Vykov
Medical management
Erik R. Svendsen, PhD MS
Medical University of South Carolina,
Charleston, SC, USA
Detection and on-site analysis
Dr. Augustus Way Fountain III, Acting Dir. R&T, ECBC,
Aberdeen Proving Ground, USA
Identification and forensic analysis
Dr. Robert Bull, FBI
The programme is updated continously at www.cbw.se.

Stockholmsmssan is
located in lvsj, 10 min
from city by commuter
train. It offers a wide
range of great solutions
for delegates, exhibitors
and guests.

We accept sponsors to this event. If you are interested

in sponsoring this event, please contact us for further
discussions.

www.cbw.se

32

mp@
European Security & Defence
April
2016foi.se
cbwsy

because no matter how you look at it, the people are the true power
of the Swedish Air Force.
Having a broad spectrum of capabilities is, of course, demanding for
a small organisation like the Swedish Air Force. Our greatest limitation
of our concern will be our persistence in time
ESD: Can you elaborate on the subject of military cooperation with
other air forces, both in the Nordic region and elsewhere?
Helgesson: The Swedish security policy has significantly changed during the last decades. It has shifted from Sweden as a military non-aligned
nation, aimed at neutrality in war to a membership in EU 1995 with
a Swedish declaration, in 2009, of solidarity and international cooperation. Today, Sweden is a member of the EU but still not a member
of NATO. However, we have participated in the Partnership for Peace
programme since 1994. When it comes to Swedish national defence
planning, we more or less took a strategic timeout during roughly 10
years, beginning at the end of the 90s. During that time Swedish security
policy was mainly focused on the participation in international operations. The Swedish Armed Forces became interoperable. For instance,
Sweden sent military units to the Balkans, Afghanistan and Africa. One
example of the Air Force is the deployment of GRIPEN fighters to Libya
in the scope of Operation Unified Protector in 2011. That was the Air
Forces second foreign deployment in history. The first was in 1961 when
we sent the flying barrels to Kongo.
Today, there is a clear focus on regaining national defence planning,
while maintaining defence forces with capabilities built upon interoperability. Therefore it is sound that we continue to foster our already established cooperation with many other air forces. The Nordic cooperation
has been active for many years. One outstanding example is Exercise
Arctic Challenge (ACE), which is held every second year and has become
one of the biggest exercises in Europe. It constitutes the successful evolution from a mere Nordic cooperation concept to an exercise attracting
many other nationalities. We are planning to deploy to the US and participate in exercise RED FLAG in 2018 for the 4th time. Our cooperation
with the USAF is very valuable for many reasons.
I regard the Swedish Air Force as an effective force with many capabilities but with limited full-war fighting persistence in time. Thats
one of the reasons why we need to be able to fight more or less fully
integrated with other nations when Sweden as a nation calls out for
support or we offer our help to someone else.
ESD: What are the lessons learned from the GRIPEN deployment to
Libya in 2011, both in terms of military cooperation with other allies
and performance of the aircraft?
Helgesson: The Swedish Air Force made a contribution to Operation
Unified Protector over Libya in 2011. From April to October we deployed
roughly 100 airmen and 5 GRIPEN fighters to Sicily. Sweden provided
mainly with tactical air reconnaissance to implement UN resolution
1973, with the primary focus on the protection of civilians.
With the participation in the operation over Libya under a UN mandate
Sweden showed that we are a relevant partner with an adequate professional and highly interoperable capability. What I can confirm after our
evaluation of our performance is that we have done the right things during the last decade. We applied necessary technical modifications to the
GRIPEN fleet in order to enhance interoperability, and we have also provided crucial interoperability training for our units through, for instance,
participation in challenging international exercises like RED FLAG.
ESD: Does the Swedish Air Force have any plans for a GRIPEN replacement programme?
Helgesson: In my opinion the GRIPEN A/B was relevant for the defence of Sweden. The GRIPEN C/D performs adequately today, but
we need a GRIPEN E to remain operationally relevant after 2025. The
Swedish Air Force is currently planning for an Initial Operational Ca-

Photo: Saab

country focus: Sweden

pability (IOC) in 2023 and Full Operational
Capability (FOC) in 2027 with the next
generation fighter GRIPEN E. We plan to
operate GRIPEN E until at least, and most
likely beyond 2040.
There has been a parliamentary investigation about the Swedish air defence beyond
2040 .When we look into the crystal
bowl we predict future military operations
to be executed in a more complex environment. The traditional arenas, air, land and
sea tend to blur into each other in a much
more overleaping way. Future combat systems replacing the GRIPEN and others must
be designed based on a genuine integrated
foundation. However, we do not yet have
any dedicated plans for the replacement of
the GRIPEN fleet with any other systems.
The TAURUS KEPD 350 standoff missile during GRIPEN test flights

ESD: Although Sweden provided means

to fund the development of the KEPD 350
TAURUS weapon system, the system has
not been introduced by the Swedish Air
Force. Can you comment on the subject?
Helgesson: Sweden, SAAB, has partly participated in the development of KEPD 350
TAURUS. SAAB has test flown the missile
with the GRIPEN in the early 2000s. This
was done during a time when we were
retiring the BK90 (cluster bomb) and in-

vestigating a long-range air-to-ground

capability. The TAURUS was identified
as one of the options at that time. There
have not been any decisions for the procurement of the missiles in the past, but
in the latest Government Bill Defence
Review 2015 for the time period 2016
to 2020, there is an opening to acquire
long-distance cruise missiles in the future.
However, the decision will only be taken

in 2020 or thereafter and there have not

been any preferred missile solutions. It is a
capability we lack today and if the ongoing change of the security-political situation in our surroundings continues I would
appreciate a capability long-range cruises
missile capability which adds to the overall
threshold effect.
The questions were asked by Jrgen
Hensel and Ulrich Renn.

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www.diehl-aerosystems.com

A Joint Diehl Thales Company

country focus: Sweden

At the FMV we manage around

800 programmes each year.
Photo: FMV

Lieutenant General Gran

Mrtensson was assigned the
position of Director General of the

Interview with
Lieutenant General
Gran Mrtensson,
Director General, FMV

Swedish Defence Materiel Administration FMV with effect from

1 February 2016. In this interview

riel administration FMV is competent, well

organised, and we have project management at top level. At the same time, we
are struggling with the same challenges
as everyone else and each one of these
challenges is on my priority list: consolidate business, delivery in time, keep up
support to the armed forces in a changing
security environment, long term competence sourcing, to name but a few.

he considers current activities and

comments on programmes and
requirements.

ESD: You have only been in this position

since 01 February 2016. What is your perception of the FMVs current status in terms
of human resources, organisation and programme management skills? Do you have a
wish list / list of priority objectives?
Mrtensson: A few years ago I was the
Chief of Armed Forces Training and Procurement in the Armed Forces and my
opinion of the FMV has not changed
since then. The Swedish Defence Mate-

Photo: Saab

ESD: Please would you briefly elaborate

on the role, organisation and duties of
the FMV? Is the FMV comparable to other
defence procurement organisations like
the French DGA or the German BAAINBw?
Mrtensson: Yes, there are differences
when you compare FMV with DGA, BAAINBw and other agencies, but perhaps
more similarities. As the FMV is the Swedish procurement agency for the Swedish
Armed Forces, our portfolio includes the
support in the early phases of all projects,
as well as support and services in support
of life cycle management.

ESD: To what extent does the FMV assume

responsibility for the R&D share of armament programmes? Do you have R&D personnel of your own?
Mrtensson: The main provider for R&D to
the Armed Forces is the research institute
FOI and the FMV is one of their main customers. We do not perform R&D directly
but, of course, some of our personnel are
working with requirements and coordination in this area, as well as keeping us updated regarding the development in several
areas. One of the platforms is EDA, another
Garteur, to name but a few.
ESD: What are the most important defence programmes currently executed by
the FMV? What in average is the annual budget available for defence materiel
investments in Sweden?
Mrtensson: The most important, or at
least the most costly, defence programmes
currently executed by the FMV are the Gripen and the new submarine programmes.
Other important upcoming programmes
include ground-based air defence, a new
artillery system (ARCHER) and the midlife
upgrade of CV 90 and our LEOPARD 2
main battle tanks (Stridsvagn 122). Total
annual budget for defence materiel investments is approximately 8,5 billion SEK.

Based on a six-nation development effort the IRIS-T short-range air-to-air

missile has been selected by ten countries. Sweden uses the air-launched
version with the GRIPEN fleet, whereas the surface-launched air defence
variant is subject to current procurement.

34

European Security & Defence April 2016

ESD: What is the status of the new Swedish

submarine programme?
Mrtensson: On track and on schedule.
Two subs of the GOTLAND Class in for
halftime modification with scheduled de-

Photo: U.S. Navy

country focus: Sweden

Two of the three GOTLAND Class submarines are undergoing halftime

modification. Commissioned in 1996 they are the first-ever conventional
submarines equipped with the STIRLING air-independent propulsion
system.

liveries in 2018 and 2019. Two new Class A26 submarines will be
delivered to the Armed Forces in 2024 and 2025.
ESD: Which of your current programmes are carried out in international partnerships with other national or multinational procurement
organisations?
Mrtensson: We have a number of international programmes,
current and planned. Current programmes include the IRIS-T
short-range air-to-air missile and the BVR missile METEOR. We
have procured heavy vehicles in partnership with Norway and
we have recently delivered tug boats which where procured in
cooperation with the Netherlands. And of course, the Gripen
system is in itself an international cooperation looking at current
user nations and future partners.
To conclude, there is a very long list of international partnerships at
all levels, not only in the high profile programmes.

around 800 programmes each year. High

tech projects pose special challenges. They
often circle around the question on how to
provide the armed forces with systems that
do not yet exist. But not all programmes are
large, and the not-so-large programmes
bring along their own challenges.
A few years ago almost every nation in
the EU and in NATO decreased its defence budget. Not so now, so we and
everybody else have to find solutions to
the hard issues of supply security.
The questions were asked by
Jrgen Hensel

From CQB to
semi-sniping capability
in a split second!

ESD: Are there defence procurement efforts executed in the scope

of public-private partnerships?
Mrtensson: Yes, there are; for example the Flight Physiological
Centre FPC which is managed and operated by QinetiQ.
ESD: What advice can you give to a foreign defence contractor who
wants to enter into a business relationship with the FMV and the
Swedish Armed Forces?
Mrtensson: Study our website for our contracts notices on www.eavrop.com. Be known for cost effective, delivery in time and security
of supply.

Photo: Ibarl

ESD: Are there any materiel requirements from the Swedish Armed
Forces that constitute long term future challenges for the FMV?
Mrtensson: Yes, of course. As I mentioned before we have the same
challenges as other nations in the EU or in NATO. At the FMV we manage

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country focus: Sweden

A New Security Environment:

Implications for the Swedish Defence
Industrial Base
Robert Limmergrd

Photo: SOFF

The security environment in Europes eastern neighbourhood has

deteriorated dramatically in recent years. Russias aggression toward
Ukraine shows that the country has a low threshold for the use of
military force and is willing to use military means to redraw Europes
borders.

n intensified military exercise pattern

in Swedens immediate vicinity combined with a comprehensive reformation
of the Russian Armed Forces has recently
forced Sweden to increase its defence
expenditures. The ability to deal with,
amongst others, remotely-operated weapons, cruise missiles, cyber operations as
well as unmanned systems, is deemed to
require added strength.
The recent change in Swedens external
security environment has been described
as a new normal that will continue over
a longer period of time. This will also have
an impact on Swedish defence companies
in their relationship to the home market. I
can see at least four long-term trends on
the horizon.
Firstly, as a consequence of the new security environment the defence industrial
base will constitute an increasingly important component of Swedens defence
capability. Entry to international materiel

cooperation activities to develop new defence technologies is based on access to a

strong national defence industrial capacity.
The strive for new technology is currently
being driven swiftly by, for example, various measures and countermeasures related
to Anti-Access Area Denial (A2AD). The
added value of having access to a qualified defence industrial base that may grant
Swedish participation in this technological
development is therefore of growing significance.
Secondly, the new security environment will
also mean greater demands being placed
on industry to demonstrate a security of
supply for the products and services they

Au th o r
Robert Limmergrd is the Secretary
General of the Swedish Security and
Defence Industry Association SOFF
(Skerhets- och Frsvarsfretagen)

36

European Security & Defence April 2016

The Swedish Security and

Defence Industry Association
(SOFF)
SOFFs overall objective is that security
and defence enterprises in Sweden
should have the best preconditions
possible to develop and operate successfully. In essence this entails two
courses of action: long-term effort in
addressing market access and trading
conditions, and working with upcoming promotional processes and activities. The Association consists of approximately 70 member companies of
whom 54 are SME-companies. Saab
group is the biggest member of the
Association. The member companies
represent about 95 percent of the collective turnover of the defence industrial base in Sweden. SOFF is a member
of the ASD, NATO Industrial Advisory
Group and maintains a close dialogue
with its Nordic sister organisations
AFDA (Finland), FAD (Denmark)
and FSi (Norway) via for example
NORDEFCO. http://soff.se/en/

provide for varying levels of conflict. Some

companies may need to give an account of
their subcontractor chains which in many
cases are of a global character. It may also
create higher costs for the customer if the
subcontractor needs to be deselected due
to security considerations. It is to be expected that new principles and forms of
contract for security of supply between
defence industry and defence authorities
and agencies will need to be developed in
the near future.
Thirdly, the new security environment may
also result in placing demands on industry to continuously upgrade and integrate
new technology in various platforms and
systems delivered to the Swedish Armed
Forces. The Swedish Armed Forces have
for example pointed out that the need for
dealing with duel situations will increase
in parallel with the capability to respond
to a qualified opponent. In so doing, the
technological content and performance of
the platforms and systems become all the
more important compared to the era when
the Swedish Armed Forces mainly were focused on peace support operations.
Fourthly, the security environment contributes to an increased need for international
cooperation both for the Swedish Armed
Forces and the defence industry. Above all,
there is a growing requirement for intensified military-technological cooperation
with the United States, world leaders in this
development. For example, the USA invests
seven times as much in military-related research and development (R&D) than all EU
member states combined. A strong transatlantic link is thus of paramount importance both for the Swedish government
and for Swedish defence companies.
The new security environment will thus, as
noted, pose some changes for the Swedish industrial base. However, it is rather
well placed to meet the above challenges.

Photos: ESD archives

country focus: Sweden

More than 60% of the Swedish defence industrys turnover is generated in export. Best sellers include the GRIPEN combat aircraft with
five export customers and the CV90 AIFV which, apart from Sweden, has
been introduced into the armies of Denmark, Finland, The Netherlands,
Norway and Switzerland.

Sweden has, in relation to its population,

a defence and security industry that from
an international perspective is both competent and competitive. Few countries are
able to independently develop the types
of advanced services and products in their
entirety that we can in Sweden.
The industrial base cover system platforms
in all domains such as fighter aircraft, naval
surface vessels, submarines and land sys-

tems. This is rather unique for a country

of 9.7 million people. Furthermore it also
produces numerous subsystems such as,
for example, intelligent ammunition, IT systems, sensors as well as niche products and
services.
Consequently the defence industrial base
is also exceptionally research intensive. Approximately 16 percent of the combined
annual turnover of SEK 30 billion that it

generates is reinvested into R&D. In other

words, the industry contributes around
SEK 7 billion of self-financed or customerfinanced funds to R&D. This qualifies the
industrial base as one of the most researchintensive technology sectors, in relation to
its turnover, in Sweden. Much of the selffinanced R&D is based on revenues from
export which constitutes more than 60
percent of the turnover for the Swedish
defence industrial base.
Yet today, the technological driver is much
stronger outside the defence market than
within it, which is why it is of great importance to monitor areas such as simulation, new energy sources, nanotechnology/
electronics, robotics, autonomous systems,
new materials, quantum information, and
new manufacturing technologies. Consequently, there are expanding ties and
several joint projects between traditional
Swedish defence companies and commercial companies in order to take advantage
of the rapid technological advancements
commonly associated with the fourth industrial revolution.
A sound understanding of technology
brings with it the capability to counter
and prevent a technological breakthrough
that can threaten the security of society.
For Sweden it will be important to increase
research within a growing number of potentially disruptive areas and, in particular,
to see how new technology can affect the
threat, risks and vulnerability to society and
its citizens.
To meet this demand, Sweden needs to
monitor technological development globally
in order for us to be able to cooperate with
the foremost players in the world which, in
turn, can contribute to a stronger innovative thinking, highly skilled engineers, and a
strong science and technology base all in
international partnership.
L

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 Arm ed Fo rc e s

The Slovak Armed Forces and New

Dynamics in Global Security
Milan Maxim

In 2014 Europe once again became a theatre for an armed conflict.

We have been witnessing a violation of territorial integrity of Ukraine.
There has been continued effort put on destabilisation of that country
by military and non-military means.
those institutions that played a key role in
meeting the criteria for admission of Slovakia into NATO in 2004. Simultaneously, the
Slovak armed forces have been subject to
accelerated strategic transformation from
a robust and unsustainable structure focussed on individual defence to a smaller
interoperable military organisation fully
integrated into NATOs collective defence
system and capable of multiple out of area
deployments.
With this in mind, it is my pleasure to present perspectives of the long-term development of the Slovak armed forces in the
broader context of Slovakias NATO and EU
membership.

he security situation in the Middle East,

namely Iraq and Syria, is described as
critical. Thousands of people in Africa have
died in aftermath of epidemic Ebola. Those
issues along with growing international terrorism, illegal migration and other security
threats are reasons to assess the global security environment as increasingly dynamic
and even more unpredictable than ever
before.
The Slovak Republic was created in 1993.
From its very first days of independence
Slovakia, looking for security guarantees,
has pro-actively helped to solve security crises under UN auspices in different regions
of the world. It is critical to understand that
the success story of the Slovak Republic
a young and dynamic Central European
country is undoubtedly linked with security guarantees provided by Slovakias
full integration into Euro-Atlantic security
institutions. The Slovak Ministry of Defence
and the Slovak armed forces were among

Au th o r
Lieutenant General Milan Maxim
has been Chief of the General Staff
of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic since 6 May 2014.

38

New Dynamics in the Global

Security Environment
New dynamics in the global security environment are probably comparable only to
the period shortly after the collapse of communism in Europe. It is not easy to predict
the long-term effects of the recent situation in Ukraine on the future of Europes
security. We do not know what will be the
outcomes of recent developments in Iraq
and Syria or the future of failing African
states such as South Sudan or Somalia.
Certainly, these dynamics are generating
new security challenges that we are currently facing. However, it is a matter for discussion whether it is feasible to tackle these
new challenges with the same resources
allocated to defence and security in times
when the security environment was relatively stable and easier to predict. Moreover, restrictive fiscal measures imposed on
the defence sector in order to deal with
economic crises between 2008 and 2010
are frequently still in place. Despite the fact
that the economic crisis does not pose a
further threat to economic stability of the
European countries, it impacts on national
defence budgets probably do not allow any
substantial breakthrough from Europes

European Security & Defence April 2016

everlasting fragility: chronic neglect of its

military power. In 2011, in his speech at
the 47th Munich Security Conference, former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh
Rasmussen stated that European countries
risk a divided and weaker Europe as they
continue to drastically reduce their defence
expenditures. He expressed his view that
the global economic crisis might be followed by security crises unless European
countries stop to dismantle their defence
potential. At that time, no one probably
even considered a scenario in which Europe, while still weakened by consequences of a deep economic crisis, has to face to
a hybrid war on its territory with thousands
of dead and wounded and tens of thousands of internally displaced persons.
In 2014, Slovakia found itself in to date
an unprecedented security reality. Ukraine,
one of Slovakias neighbours that has been
confronted with the violation of its territorial integrity, is facing a deep security and
economic crisis. For several reasons, the
current crisis in Ukraine has direct impacts
on our security. Therefore, Ukraine is seen
as a key indicator country for the security
of Slovakia. Both countries share a common border of 98 km. This is not significant
from a geographical point of view. However, since that border also constitutes an
external border of the EU, it is of strategic
importance for both Slovakia and the EU.
This border is often challenged by illegal migration and cross-border organised crime.
Many of the displaced people from crises
regions in the Middle East also try to reach
the West using the Slovak Ukrainian border. Almost 100 per cent of Slovakias oil
and gas imports travel across the border
with Ukraine. A significant amount of Russian oil and gas supplies to Europe flows
across this border as well. Due to the fact
that Russian weapon systems are still present in the inventory of the Slovak armed
forces the sanctions put on Russia by the
EU address the issue of our dependence

on Russian military supplies with great urgency. It should be of no surprise that the
immediate security challenges Slovakia is
facing since the outbreak of the crisis in
Ukraine are as follows:
Guarantee of oil and gas supplies to
Slovakia,
Reduce dependence of the Slovak
Armed Forces on Russian weapon systems and spare parts and
Counter increased risk of illegal migration and weapons proliferation.
Immediately after the crisis in Ukraine the
Slovak authorities implemented a set of
pre-emptive measures to raise situational
awareness. Within these complex measures the armed forces of the Slovak Republic have reinforced their ability to properly
react to any development in connection
with the crisis in Ukraine. Slovak authorities have analysed all potential scenarios
based on an option of massive humanitarian crisis in Ukraine. In the autumn of
2014, the Visegrd Group countries and
the USA exercised the Article 5 military operations in Eastern Slovakia, with the aim to
enhance operational coordination. In order
to support NATOs collective defence effort, our troops have also participated in
these sorts of exercises abroad. As part of
Slovakias comprehensive effort in supporting Ukraine, the Slovak armed forces have
opened their training facilities for more
than one hundred of Ukrainian demining
and EOD-experts. The Slovak Ministry of
Defence provided medical treatment for
Ukrainian citizens injured during the riots
in Kiev in the spring of 2014. Our disarmament and non-proliferation experts have
been involved in OSCE activities concerning
the crisis in Ukraine.
At the NATO Summit in Cardiff, our leaders
announced that Slovakia is ready to contribute to the strengthening of the defence
of NATOs eastern flank. In that context
we have already announced a decision to
augment our participation at the HQ Multinational Corps Northeast in Szczecin. But
from a Ukrainian viewpoint, the reverse
flow of gas from Slovakia to Ukraine is
probably the most substantial contribution
of the Slovak Republic to Ukraines security.
Now, Slovakia is able to support Ukraine by
supplying up to 10 billion of cubic metres
of gas per year.

Looking Back on Slovakias

NATO and EU Membership
Before I outline the long-term development
perspectives of the Slovak armed forces, allow me to share a brief summary of milestones of the Slovak militarys history with
you. On 01 January 1993 the Slovak Repub-

Photos: MoD Slovak Republic

Armed Fo rce s

Slovak soldiers during a training exercise

lic was established as a result of a peaceful

separation of former Czechoslovakia. On the
same day, the Army of the Slovak Republic
was established with its core task to defend
the Slovak Republic against an armed attack from abroad and to fulfil commitments
stemming from international treaties.
During the last 20 plus years the Slovak
armed forces have undergone several significant reforms. As a result from these reforms the robust post-Czechoslovak Army
was converted into a smaller defence force
capable of fast response operations. In
1994, only a year after its establishment,
the Slovak Republic joined the NATO Partnership for Peace Programme boosting
our ambition to join NATO. In 2001, a new
Long Term Development Plan of the Slovak Armed Forces was introduced forming a roadmap for the long-term capability
transformation. Slovakia joined NATO and
the European Union in 2004. New security and defence strategy were adopted by
the Slovak Parliament in 2005. Following
the new military professional service law,
the new military personnel management
was implemented. Professional military service fully replaced conscription in 2006. In
2009, Slovakia entered the Eurozone and

replaced the Slovak crown with the euro as

the national currency. Following the global
financial and economic crises the Slovak
Ministry of Defence launched a Strategic
Defence Review (SDR) in 2010. That was a
logical step motivated by the long-standing
reduction of the Slovak defence budget.
The Defence White Paper of the Slovak
Republic was completed in 2013 and new
long-term capability development plans
have been introduced.
The Ministry of Defence and the Slovak
Armed Forces were among the key players
in enabling Slovakias NATO membership in
2004. By joining NATO, Slovakia gained exclusive access to security guarantees based
on the principles of collective defence of
the Alliance. Our security, stability and
prosperity are directly linked with the security, stability and prosperity of our allies.
Thanks to this Slovak the economy can take
advantage of considerable growth. The termination of conscription has allowed Slovak citizens to take full advantage of their
right to study and work anywhere in the
world according to their priorities. I would
like to stress that within those 20 plus years
we have managed to transform our armed
forces from an excessive and hard-to-sus-

April 2016 European Security & Defence

39

 Armed Fo rce s

Slovak armed forces made valuable contributions to the ISAF mission in

Afghanistan

tain post-Czechoslovak Army to a leaner

and more sustainable, fully professional
Slovak defence Force capable of deployment with minimum caveats.
The Slovak armed forces have been engaged in crisis response operations from the
very first day of their existence. However, our
full NATO membership has often been associated with the Slovak public and with lower
demands for military deployments abroad.
The contrary is the case. Our involvement in
crisis response operations has been steadily
growing while the capacity of the armed
forces has repeatedly been lowered.
Since 1993 the Slovak troops have participated in more than 30 military deployments
in 21 countries on 3 continents including NATO, UN, EU and OSCE operations
and missions. As of today, Slovak military
personnel are performing their duties in
Afghanistan, Cyprus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Middle East and Georgia. During
the last decade, the ISAF operation in Afghanistan was the centre of gravity for the
Slovak armed forces. Our troops worked
together with Dutch, American and later
with Australian comrades in the Uruzgan
Provincial Reconstruction Team. The Slovak
special operations units operated in different regions of Afghanistan, predominantly
mentoring and supporting the Afghan
Army. Our infantry units did a great job by
providing force protection for the Kandahar Airfield. The Slovak EOD team earned
appreciation from our allies and partners
in ISAF, performing their duties in the lifethreatening environment of the Kandahar
province. We continue with our support to
Afghanistan beyond the ISAF mission. In
40

December 2014, the Slovak Armed Forces deployed a new contingent of military
mentors to the Resolute Support Mission.
In the following months, we will be part of
NATOs collective effort to support the Afghan national security forces mainly in the
arena of capability development for special
operations. After we concluded our multiyear involvement in NATOs KFOR mission
in 2010, the EU mission ALTHEA became
our priority in the Balkans. Today, we play
the leading role in this mission. I am very
proud of our soldiers who have met all the
demanding operational requirements at
home and abroad with great honour. They
deserve our respect and recognition. Unfortunately, the active participation of Slovakia in crisis response operations resulted
in casualties. The ultimate sacrifice of those
who lost their lives in the line of duty will
not be forgotten.
The admission of Slovakia to NATO and the
EU, the long-term involvement of Slovak
troops in global crisis management operations together with continuing austerity
measures as a result of the global economic crisis have significantly determined the
long-term transformation efforts of the
Slovak armed forces.

Transformation of the Slovak

Armed Forces
We see the long-term capability development of the Slovak Armed Forces as a
continuous process that needs to reflect
long-term trends in the development of
the global security environment as well as
trends in military strategy and technology.

European Security & Defence April 2016

Simultaneously and without any doubt,

that process is challenged by a variety of
short-term security and economic issues
that might have positive and negative effects on military capability development.
It is challenging to formulate an estimate of
what security challenges Slovakia might face
in 20 years from now. As we saw in Ukraine
in 2014, it is not as easy to do that even
looking at the next couple of months. I am
quite confident that the authors of the Long
Term Development Plan of the Slovak armed
forces in 2001 did not consider a scenario
in which Slovakia (since 2008 a member of
the Euro Zone) would face severe effects
of the global financial and economic crisis
comparable only with the economic crisis of
the 1930s. In 2001, hardly any of them envisaged that the Alliance, that Slovakia was
preparing to join at that time, would be deploying and sustaining tens of thousands
of troops in combat and stabilisation operations across Europe, Asia, and the Mediterranean and the Pacific.
With respect to recent security risks in Europe, our short-term goal is to preserve
the current level of defence potential in
Slovakia. In 2013, the Slovak Government approved the Defence White Paper
of the Slovak Republic. In that strategic
document, the Ministry of Defence set
the long-term development goal for the
Slovak armed forces: to be a credible and
quickly deployable military organisation
prepared at any time to decisively and effectively fulfil its mission when protecting,
supporting, defending and enforcing the
security interests of Slovakia. The basis of
our strategy in reaching that goal constitutes a comprehensive transformation of
tactical units (battalion and below) in line
with NATO standards and is closely linked
to main armament modernisation projects.
We also aspire to put more stability into the
management of our military personnel in
order to motivate highly qualified key military leaders and specialists to serve in the
armed forces for longer time than today.
Moreover, we are working on the optimisation of our command and control system
in order to solidify its capability to react
appropriately in the event of crises.
The most significant progress we currently
see is observed in the arena of armament
modernisation. The Defence White Paper
of the Slovak Republic has identified significant delays in the modernisation projects
for main weapon systems. Technologically
outdated and unreliable Soviet-type weapon systems are among the main difficulties
that have considerably limited our efforts to
achieve our transformational goals already
set in 2001. Therefore, I am glad to see
promising progress made by the Ministry of

The Future of International

Military Cooperation
Every individual country has to deal with the
question of what policy should be applied
at both national and NATO levels so that the
struggle to generate more security with the
same resources can really bring reasonable
results in terms of a stronger defence for
the Alliance. From a long-term perspective,
continuation of a less coordinated and nationalised approach to the development of
the whole spectrum of military capacities
may cause irreversible damage to the future
defence posture of the Alliance.
I am fully convinced that recent developments in the security environment will be
of even more importance to broad regional military cooperation. One of the most
frequent discussions within NATO and EU
applies to the idea of pooling and sharing
of military capabilities. From an economic
point of view it undoubtedly makes sense
assuming that to pool and share capabilities
does not mean lowering national capability
development goals. Therefore, we should
look for new perspectives as to pooling and
sharing of military capabilities within NATO
and EU. We should continue to promote

Photo: photocommunity.de

Slovakias MiG-29 FULCRUM are earmarked to be replaced by modern

Western fighters.
Photo: wikipedia

Defence as to gradual replacement of Soviet-type weaponry. In 2014, we managed

to finalise the acquisition of the C27J SPARTAN transport aircraft that is to replace Soviet-type AN 26 aircrafts. We are also working on options for the replacement of our
Mig-29 FULCRUM combat aircraft, Mi-17
HIP transport helicopters and air traffic control radar systems. As far as our land forces
are concerned, we are on track with the
gradual replacement of personal weapons
and logistic equipment. I strongly believe
that the Ministry of Defence will soon reach
a decision to launch major re-equipment
projects for our land forces.
The development of long-term capabilities
of the Slovak armed forces belongs to fundamental pre-requisites for the provision of
security to our country and its citizens. Our
general objective is to continuously develop
our national military capability and thus to
contribute to the common defence and
potential of the Alliance. Through reinforcement of our national defence we contribute to reinforcing the defence of our allies.
It is the assumption of a new dynamic in
Europes security and resulting risks to the
security of the Slovak Republic that will initiate new strategic discussion on the transformation of the Slovak armed forces. Nevertheless, I firmly believe that in the coming
years we will be witnessing gradual increase
of military expenditures in Slovakia and continuity of major rearmament efforts.

The Mil-17 and its derivatives shown here is an aircraft in service with
the Egyptian Government are undoubtedly among the most reliable
multi-purpose rotary-wing aircraft ever built in the Soviet Union. The
Slovak Air Force still operates 14 Mil-17 and one Mil-8 helicopter.

regional defence cooperation with the aim

to sustain and to enhance nationally owned
core military capabilities. Concurrently,
within the NATO and EU we should seek
for a robust set of commonly resourced,
commonly developed, commonly trained
and commonly employed strategic enablers. Those two lines of comprehensive
and closely coordinated capability development should allow European countries
to sustain their core national military capabilities while strengthening NATOs and
Europes overall defence capacity.
Slovakia, together with the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland, is a member of the
Visegrd Group. Let me use this opportunity to highlight recent achievements as an
example of intensifying regional defence
cooperation. In 2016, the Visegrd Group
countries will provide their first common
EU Battlegroup. This will constitute the first
milestone in long-standing bilateral and
multilateral military co-operation among
those central European countries. Working with lessons learned from building the
V4 EU Battlegroup the Visegrd Group
countries agreed on a long-term vision
for deepening their defence cooperation.
According to this vision practical defence
cooperation among the Visegrd Group
countries shall focus on three critical areas:

Capability development, procurement

and defence industry;
Establishment of multinational military
units;
Education, training and exercises.
Furthermore, the Visegrd Group heads of
government tasked their defence ministers
to further enhance the V4 defence cooperation by exploring the possibilities of forming a permanent V4 modular force which
could be used as a Visegrd contribution
to NATO and EU rapid reaction forces as
well as in crisis management operations.
Common V4 training and exercise strategy
should support V4 ambitions regarding
building V4 common capabilities.
In conclusion, let me state that a firm
anchoring of Slovakia into Euro-Atlantic
security structures offers our nation a
unique historical opportunity to develop
as an independent and democratic society. The Slovak armed forces will continue
to contribute to solving security crises
where necessary thus accomplishing its
mission, when defending and enforcing
the security interests of Slovakia. And, facing recent dynamics in the global security
environment we will continue with our
transformational efforts with the aim to
prepare the Slovak armed forces for future
security challenges.
L

April 2016 European Security & Defence

41

 Armed Fo rce s

10 Years of System Life Cycle

Management in NATO
Peter Janatschek

The aim of System Life Cycle Management (SLCM) is to optimise

defence capabilities taking into account performance, cost, schedule,
quality, operational environments, integrated logistic support
and obsolescence over the life cycle of the system.

ATO SLCM in its present form is the

result of an evolutionary development
which started a long time ago. In the early
nineties the first generation of armament
systems that had been developed and produced in the scope of multinational efforts
like the MRCA TORNADO entered service. NATO and the nations involved soon
recognised the need for multinational guidance, not only for operations but also for
logistic support.
Furthermore, the development of multinational standards and specifications
commenced and it became evident that
complex armament systems needed effective information technology support
throughout development and production
as well as during their entire life cycle,
involving both industry and the armed
forces as the users.

industrial pillar was headed by the NATO Industry CALS Group (NICG), subsidised and
in existence under NIAG until the end of the
year 2000, supported by the NICG-Executive Group. The governmental side of the
NATO CALS Organization was directed by
the NATO CALS Management Board. Representatives of participating nations who

2. POLICY STATEMENT
2.1. To achieve an integrated approach to the delivery of defence related capabilities
for NATO operations, it is Alliance policy that Nations and NATO Authorities apply the
principles of Systems Life Cycle Management as elaborated in this policy document.
2.2. The North Atlantic Council (NAC) approves the NATO Policy for Systems Life Cycle
Management. The Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) is its
custodian.
3. AIM
3.1. The aim of SLCM is to optimise defence capabilities taking into account performance, cost, schedule, quality, operational environments, integrated logistic support
and obsolescence over the life cycle of the system.
3.2. The NATO Policy for Standardisation calls for the use of civil standards to the maximum practicable extent. ISO/IEC 15288, Systems Engineering System Life Cycle
Processes, is already in use in several Nations and provides a general framework that
is neutral to extant individual Nations Acquisition Processes. Following this guidance,
NATO will use ISO/IEC 15288 as the basis for implementing SLCM.
3.1. I recommend the NATO Policy for SLCM as a basis to enable the contributors to
the fulfillment of NATO military capabilities to work together to achieve efficient and
timely delivery of military systems that meet the military needs at affordable cost.

The Long Way from Cals to

Slcm
In 1989 NATO recognised the need to address defence system life cycle management and support issues in a coordinated
approach and manner. Following a NATO
Industry Armaments Group (NIAG) prefeasibility study on Computer Aided Logistics
Support (CALS) (later renamed to Continuous Acquisition and Life Cycle Support) and
work in AC/301 Standardization of Materiel and Engineering Practices the creation
of the NATO CALS Organization was decided by CNAD late in 1993. The NATO CALS
Organization under CNAD consisted of a
governmental and an industrial pillar. The

Au th o r
LTC (ret) Peter Janatschek is the
Managing Director of the CALS
Forum Deutschland (CFD) logistics
association.

42

The NCMB led a CNAD-initiated NATO

Working Group on Life Cycle Management. It identified that through adoption
of Life Cycle Management (LCM) principles,
NATO could develop more integrated, efficient, and customer-oriented processes.
The ISO 15288 Standard on System Life
Cycle Management was proposed to provide the framework. After the 1999 CNAD
tasking the NCMB examined options for a
transition of CALS activities. In May 2001
the CNAD endorsed the transition of NATO
CALS to a CNAD Partnership Group for Defence System Life Cycle Integration (CPG
LCI) which met in November 2001 for the
first time as AC/325. At their autumn meet-

4. Unless I hear to the contrary by 16.00 hours on 13 January 2006, I shall

assume Council approval of this policy.
(Signed) Jaap de Hoop Scheffer
NATO SLCM Policy Statement

had signed the NATO CALS MoU were the

voting members. Other NATO and NonNATO nations as well as representatives
from other NATO agencies participated as
observers. The NCMB provided direction to
the NATO CALS Office (NCO) as the permanent workforce. The NCO was resourced by
the MoU nations and was situated at the
NATO headquarters.

European Security & Defence April 2016

ing in the year 2000 the NIAG agreed to

support the new CPG LCI by establishing
an Industrial Life Cycle Integration Group
(ILCIG).
AC/327, the Life Cycle Management
Group, was formed in 2003 following
the merger of four former groups, AC/250
on Quality Assurance, AC/301 on Standardisation of Materiel and Engineering

Armed Fo rce s
The NATO Policy for Standardization calls
for the use of civil standards to the maximum practicable extent. ISO/IEC 15288,
Systems Engineering System Life Cycle
Processes, is already in use in several nations and provides a general framework
that is neutral to extant individual nations
acquisition processes. Following this guidance NATO will use ISO/IEC 15288 as the
basis for implementing SLCM. This allows
for traditional acquisition as well as for iterative developments and procurement
cycles where necessary for the implementation of required capabilities.
As a main group subordinate to the Conference of National Armaments Directors
(CNAD), the Life Cycle Management Group
(LCMG) AC/327 is responsible for NATO
policies, processes, procedures, methods
and agreements in support of the conception, development, production, acquisition,
SLCM system concept

Practices, AC/313 on Acquisition Practices

and AC/325 on Life Cycle Integration. This
merger followed the 2002 review of NATO
committees conducted under the direction
of the Deputy Secretary General when the
opportunity was taken to form a Life Cycle
Management Group under CNAD. The title
CNAD Partnership Group (CPG) originated
in 1997 when those groups in CNAD fully
open to Partner Nations participation were
so designated.
The period after 2002 has also been a time
of transformation in NATO, with a new
military command structure being established, the formation of Allied Command
Transformation (ACT) and Allied Command
Operations (ACO), emphasis on NATOs capability needs for new operations out of
area, and enlargement in NATO membership in 2004 to 26 member nations.

SLCM stages covering the execution of a programme

SLCM Policy and

Organisation
In June 2006 the North Atlantic Council
(NAC), the highest authority in NATO, approved the NATO Policy for Systems Life
Cycle and directed the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) to be
its custodian.
The NATO Policy for SLCM presents the
principles and objectives of SLCM and how
these may be implemented in NATO and by
whom. The aim is to promote the acquisition of military systems for NATO that fulfil
the full range of through-life requirements
in a cost-effective manner. The significance
of this aim becomes apparent when it is understood that through-life costs of military
systems greatly exceed the initial development and procurement costs.

SLCM meeting structure

April 2016 European Security & Defence

43

 Armed Fo rce s
use, support and retirement of defence and
security systems, services and equipment
to meet NATO life cycle, quality and interoperability requirements. At present it is
supported by 28 nations.

Mission
The mission of AC/327 Life Cycle Management Group is to provide the means to optimise the defence and security capabilities
of NATO member nations and Partnership
for Peace (PFP) nations developed, nationally or multi-nationally, and cooperatively,
in terms of performance, interoperability,
sustainability and cost by facilitating and
encouraging:
Appropriate standardisation of life cycle
management policies, processes, procedures, methods.
Effective and disciplined life cycle management of systems, services and equipment.
Appropriate interoperability of systems,
services and equipment.

Vision
The LCMG vision is commonality, consistency and completeness within NATO in
the fulfilment of the life cycle, quality and
interoperability requirements of NATO capabilities. In other words this means that
the right equipment, well maintained
and supported, has to be handed over
to the operator at the right time and

Relationship between NATO programme, system-of-interest and military

capability

at the lowest possible whole-life cost.

In order to further define this vision, three
goals were identified that highlight specific
target areas upon which the NATO SLCM
organisation focus in working towards the
future state:
Current and future operations are well
supported and sustained, in terms of
both NATO capabilities and NATO nations industrial capabilities.
NATO, national and multinational armaments programmes are effective and efficient, supported by sound and appropriately consistent policies, processes,
standards and tools.

SLCM document framework

44

European Security & Defence April 2016

NATO and member nations armed forces are supported by sound national and
regional industrial bases that are capable of effective partnering, pooling and
sharing through appropriately common
policies, processes, standards and tools.

Objectives
In support of achieving this vision, two major objectives have been identified:
Systems employed in NATO-led operations have appropriate standardisation
and technical interoperability enabling
seamless operational interoperability
and supportability.
NATO and the nations are able to seamlessly collaborate in systems development, acquisition and support through
the application of appropriately consistent and common policies, processes,
standards and tools.
The LCMG can establish up to nine subordinate working groups as required for the
conduct of its work. Working groups may
be permanent (domain) or non-permanent depending on the tasks assigned.
As of March 2016, the following five working groups have been active:
Working Group 1 on NATO
Programme Processes
Responsible for NATO policies, methods,
procedures, guidance and agreements
concerning NATO programme processes;
Working Group 2 on Quality
Responsible for NATO policies, methods, procedures and agreements concerning NATO life cycle quality, standardisation, development, updating and
application of STANAGs, STANRECs and
AQAPs on the basis of the concept of
quality assurance in the acquisition of
defence products;

Armed Fo rce s
Working Group 3 on Life Cycle Costs
Responsible for developing standardisation recommendations related to life
cycle costing, to capture new NATO and
national sources of expertise;
Working Group 6 on Environmental
Engineering and Testing (EE&T)
Responsible for providing guidelines on
the management of environmental testing of defence materiel, to characterise
and define joint environments during
storage, transportation, handling, deployment and use, and to standardise
environmental test, analyse, verification and guideline procedures.
Working Group 7 on Configuration
Management
Responsible for NATO policies, methods, procedures and agreements concerning NATO life cycle configuration
management.

SLCM Products
The LCMG and its working groups together
with the participating nations have developed and published a large number of
SLCM agreements and documents:
STANAGs and STANRECs on SLCM,
Quality, Environmental Testing, Calibration, Obsolescence, Naval Paints,

STANAG 4728 System Life Cycle Management

Configuration Management, Electronic Components, R&M, Packaging, Fire

Assessment of Materials, Engineering
Documentation, Product Life Cycle
Support;
Allied Publications that support these
STANAGs, plus additional Guidelines for
Life Cycle Costing, Risk Management,
UID, ILS, Joint Procurement, Project
Management;
Training packages that accompany
many of these areas and publications.

Decision Support for

System Life Cycle
Management
Increase capability and readiness with control
over total ownership cost. www.systecon.se

Opus Suite is the complete tool set for simulation,

optimization and cost analysis of technical systems,
their operations and logistics support. Its used by
defence authorities and industry leaders world wide
to develop cost effective solutions and to predict
and evaluate how different decisions will impact
performance, sustainability and life cycle cost.

This SLCM Document Library is part of the

public E-Library of NATO.

The Way Ahead

SLCM in NATO looks into a promising future. In STANAG 4728 participating nations agree to apply the system life cycle
management framework in armaments
projects supporting NATO capabilities.
In addition to the work presently ongoing two important areas should be men-

 Armed Fo rce s

Alliance Future Surveillance

and Control (AFSC)

tioned. Life cycle management is part of

five distinct capability areas of the NATO
Supportand ProcurementAgency (NSPA)
and the Alliance Future Surveillance and
Control (AFSC) will use the LCM Model
of Stages and Processes as the basis to
identify and document stakeholder requirements

A number of promising options foreseen to satisfy those requirements in

later stages
A high-level plan for the potential AFSC
concept stage
AFSC project group of allied representatives reporting to CNAD and providing
governance against an agreed pre-concept stage plan

The E-3A, probably the most effective

NATO capability for more than 60 years of
service, providing airborne early warning
and control and supporting many other
mission areas, will retire around 2035.
Bearing in mind that there are long timelines to design, procure and field systems,
planning for a follow-on system (Alliance
Future Surveillance and Control (AFSC)
must start as early as possible. Looking at
the NATO SLCM activities and the SLCM
products NATO recognised soon that
there is an available and already approved
framework for programme management
within NATO, which can serve as a valuable help and methodology for structuring and planning programmes in the preconcept stage.
Based on AAP-20 NATO PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK (NATO
Life Cycle Model) a tailored approach
to identify and document stakeholder requirements was started in 2015 with the
following aims:
Three staff-level working groups leading day-to-day efforts in order to define
requirements.
Generic military requirements at a lower
level of granularity with the aim to propose options and solutions.

NATO Support and

Procurement Agency (NSPA)
In April 2015 the NATO Support Agency (NSPA) became the NATO Support
and Procurement Agency. This change
marked the expansion of agency capabilities to include all aspects of systems
procurement from initial acquisition
throughout sustainment, which means
throughout the whole life cycle of the
system.
NSPA is now even more effectively positioned to offer the full range of design,
acquisition, logistics and procurement support services for complete weapon systems
across five distinct capability areas:
Systems procurement and life cycle
management,
Support to operations and exercises,
Strategic transport and storage,
Logistic services and project management,
Fuel management.

Conclusion
After a long development and evolution,
NATO Systems Life Cycle Management in
its present organisation and with its products has been and still is an indispensible
factor contributing considerably to NATOs
and nations efforts to develop and field the
needed capabilities to meet their strategic
objectives. Being responsible for developing
and implementing NATO policies, processes, procedures, methods and agreements
in support of the conception, development,
production, acquisition, use, support and
retirement of defence and security systems,
services and equipment to meet NATO life
cycle, quality and interoperability requirements, NATO SLCM enables multi-national
co-operation for the delivery of interoperable and affordable military capabilities to
ensure and improve NATO forces effectiveness over the whole spectrum of current
and future operations.
L

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Phone: +49 228 350087-0
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Email: [email protected]
www.mittler-report.de
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Next generation submarine

The first programme on procuring modern submarines to replace the four Walrus serving in
the Swedish Navy, known as the A26 programme, has been cancelled in February 2014. Then
in December 2014 an agreement between
Saab and Damen Shipyards was announced
to jointly develop, offer and build the next

decisions to strengthen NAtO

(df) The defence ministers of the NATO
countries have taken several decisions to
strengthen the Alliances collective defence. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said the decisions would ensure
that we have the right forces, in the right
place, at the right time. The ministers
agreed on the implementation of a so
called Spearhead Force.
Also the NATO Response Force will be enhanced. The Defence Ministers agreed on

the size and scope of a new very high readiness force or Spearhead Force. We decided that this very high readiness force will
consist of a land brigade of around 5,000
troops. These will be supported by air,
sea and special forces, said Stoltenberg.
He explained the Spearhead Force would
be backed up by two more brigades as a
rapid reinforcement capability in case of
a major crisis. Altogether, the enhanced
NATO Response Force will count up to
around 30,000 troops.

The defence ministers also decided to

immediately establish six command and
control units in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland and Romania.
www.nato.int

Roketsan

NORdeFCO plans more cooperation border defence cooperation. Also Sweden from Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania
(df) The Nordic Defense Cooperation
(NORDEFCO), consisting of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and actual chaired
by Sweden, wants to improve the collective border defence by installing a cross-

Goldstein new General Manager

NAMeAdSMA

(Photo: Renault

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(df) Col. Michael T. Goldstein of the German Air Force was assigned the position
of General Manager of the NATO Medium
Extended Air Defense System Management Agency (NAMEADSMA) on 01 February 2015. He took over the responsibilities from Gregory Kee, who had been the
agencys General Manager since November 2008. Goldstein joined the German Air
Force on 01 July 1975 and completed the

It support for Norwegian logistics

(gwh) The Swedish International Financial
Services company (IFS) has rolled out the
IFS applications to cover additional Navy
personnel, now supporting 2,500 users
in the Armed Forces with mission-critical
configuration management, MRO, and logistics.
The Norwegian Armed Forces (Air Force,
Army, and Navy including the Coast Guard)
have been using IFS Applications since

is pushing forward an initiative to form

a modular Nordic-Baltic battle group
(NBBG), that could be seen as a counterpart of the EU Nordic Battle Group (NBG),
that is led by Sweden with soldiers coming

and Norway.
The aims of the Swedish initiatives are to
give more protection to areas, such as Arctic region or Baltic Sea.
www.government.se

Improved HAWK Officer Course at the GAF

Air Defense School, Ft. Bliss, Texas, in 1981.
Later, Goldstein served as a platoon leader
Hawk at the 4th Battery SAM Battalion 34
in Manching, later Head of Patriot Scenario Generation Seciton, GAFADS, Ft. Bliss,
Texas. Other assignments included Deputy
System Manager Patriot at the Federal Ministry of Defence for almost three years. On
01 August 2012 Goldstein became Director
Technical Integration at NAMEADSMA, followed by the position as Deputy General

Manager
&
Director
Technical Integration on
01 July 2014
and now General Manager & Director Technical
I nte g rat i o n
NAMEADSMA.
http://meads-amd.com/

1999 for military logistics including configuration management, document and

spare parts management, maintenance,

repair, overhaul (MRO), and supply chain.

The Navys recent decision to cover additional users means that IFSs industry solution will empower more personnel working
deployed on one of its vessels or on land.
The solution is distributed between vessels
and onshore sites, also offering integration
with the government finance and HR system.
www.forsvaret.no
www.ifsworld.com

MITTLER REPORT VERLAG GMBH Baunscheidtstrae 11 53113 Bonn Germany

Fax: +49 228 35 00 871 [email protected] www.mittler-report.de
46

European Security & Defence April 2016

FN Herstal)

Published by
Mittler Report Verlag GmbH
A company of Tamm Media Group

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Layout: davis creativ media GmbH, Bonn,

Germany
Photo front page: Matthias Kabel

The Swedish version of the main battle tank

Leopard has additional protection, including
overall coverage, mine protection, an extra
bomblet protection for the turret, a modern
command system and an improved fire-control system.
At the moment the Swedish Armed Forces
plan further improvements and uses of the
Leopard. Especially the communication systems and a weight reduced armour system are
in the focus. Elements of the Leopard 2A7, in
service at the German Armed Forces, will be
included.
Additionally Sweden purchased three Leguan
bridge layers on Leopard 2 chassis. In this variant, the Leguan is capable of laying a 26 metre
bridge or two 14 metre bridges independent
of each other, whose MLC 80 (approx. 70 tonnes) load capacity can be used by even heavy
equipment.
Dorothee Frank

technology

Issue 2 / 2015

n)

editor-in-Chief: Dr. Peter Bossdorf

deputy editor-in-Chief: Henning Bartels
Managing editors: Dorothee Frank (newsletter) and Stephen Barnard (magazine)
editors: Gerhard Heiming (gwh), Yuri Laski (yl)

Modification of the Leopard

Roketsa

eSd Spotlight
Email newsletter of the bimonthly magazine
European Security & Defence (ESD)

Issu e 2 / 2015

(Photo:

MAStheAd

(Photo: NATO)

IDEX Preview

The Swedish government ordered 60 JAS Gripen E (plus 10 as option) with scheduled delivery from 2018 to 2027. Contrary to initial
plans all the future JAS Gripen E will be newbuilt fighters and not upgrades of existing Gripen C. The first flight of the pre-production
JAS Gripen E is expected within this year.
The JAS Gripen E will be slightly larger than
the predecessors. Giving place to an increase
of the fuselage tank with the new and bigger
nose bearing most of the main gear. The company Saab stated, that the new fighter has an
increase of 40% in internal fuel capacity.
Apart from this two additional weapon stations have been installed. The JAS Gripen E
will also have a new landing gear, modern sensor configuratuions like the Selex Skyward-G
infrared search and track (IRST) turret or the
advanced interrogation friend-or-foe suite.

(Photo: NAMEADSMA)

Industry

(Photo: FMV)

Next generation of the JAS Gripen

Sweden

Alternatively, there is a subscription order form on the magazines website at www.euro-sd.com.

(Photo: Diehl Defence)

Technology

Content

generation submarines
(NGU)
for Sweden.
The new
submarines will base on the Type 612 submarines,
that Saab Kockums has built for the Royal Australian Navy.
But there will be changes, since the Australian submarine has 4,000 tonnes and the Swedish NGO programme is heading for a 3,000
tonnes submarine with some elements of the
cancelled A26 programme included.
The first of the five Swedish submarines is
planned to be operating by 2023.

Trucks Defense)

Defence

Sweden not only chairs the Nordic Defense

Cooperation (NORDEFCO), the Swedish Armed Forces have also several procurement
projects on schedule for 2015. The largest
three programmes comprise the development of the next generation of the JAS Gripen
fighter system (JAS E), the development of
the next generation submarine (NGU) and the
modification of the Leopard main battle tank
system.

(Photo: A. Khlopotov)

Issue 2 / 2015

Published by

Armed Fo rce s

Military Training Shifting Priorities

Trevor Nash

The militarys approach to how it undertakes its training is going

through a period of change. In part, this is due to a number of
factors that may be considered as those pulling training in a specific
direction and those that are pushing it.

Au th o r
Trevor Nash is the Editor of MTSN
and Janes Simulation & Training
Systems (JSTS) and providing simulation and training consultancy services
to industry and government organisations.

rently taking place. In essence, this argument asks how many live rounds should
a soldier fire; how many hours should a
pilot fly; or how many torpedoes should
a submariner fire for real compared to undertaking the same tasks in a virtual simulator? In short, is it worth spending $60,000
an hour to fly an F-16, or $1,000 in the
weapon systems trainer (WST)?
Photo: AU.Gov DoD

he pull factors are not particularly new

and include topics such as declining
defence budgets, environmental pressures and the need to counter a swathe
of diverse threats. It is perhaps the latter
that presents the biggest issue to modern
military planners. For a decade or more,
military forces have been engaged in lowintensity asymmetric operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan but following Russias annexation of Crimea and operations in Ukraine,
many European nations are re-focussing on
high-intensity armoured operations.
At the other end of the spectrum, the
attacks in Paris have led military forces,
particularly those of France and Belgium,
to adopt a para-military, home defence
posture. The challenge of training across
such a broad spectrum is considerable and
is presenting military planners with some
thorny issues as they adopt and procure
future training systems.
As to the push factors, modern technologies, especially those from the entertainment sector such as games and home
cinema applications, are certainly enhancing solutions in the virtual training market.
Companies such as Bohemia Interactive
Simulations (BISim) have taken serious
games-based training solutions to new
levels for virtual training while the home
cinema sector has spawned a range of
high-fidelity display technologies from
companies such as JVC and Sony that are
now commonly being used in the military
training market.
This growing fidelity within the virtual training domain is perhaps the key component
of live-virtual balance argument that is cur-

platforms and domains. The question remains though, just because we can, should
we? Military training is undertaken to enhance operational capability and effectiveness and with I-LVC, the real cost-benefits
are yet to be proven.
The costs associated with training using real
platforms has recently been highlighted by
the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF). The
RCAFs training philosophy is transitioning
from, one that relies on aircraft to one that
exploits new technologies to train aviators
in a simulation-focused system.
By 2025, the RCAF plans to have a training
strategy in place that will, leverage, live,
virtual and constructive domains within
a networked common synthetic environ-

Aircrew flying a mission in the C-130J Full-Flight Mission Simulator

during Coalition Virtual Flag 15

One approach that is gaining some momentum is the idea of integrating the live,
virtual and constructive (I-LVC) domains
into a single training environment. Originally conceived in the US and evaluated in
projects such as Boeings Project Alpine,
the I-LVC approach is workable but is it
credible? Can a range of different simulators, with different levels of fidelity and
different operating systems be networked
together to provide each operator with a
meaningful training experience within the
bounds of a fair fight?
The arguments for and against I-LVC continue to run and exercises such as Coalition
Virtual Flag and Blended Warrior highlight
the ability of technology to network across

ment The system will optimise the means

by which RCAF aviators achieve and maintain readiness, fully exploiting advances in
both technology and training methodologies.
To achieve that goal, the RCAF is going to
need the assistance of industry and it is
this relationship between industry and the
military that is vital in providing enhanced
training. Throughout the world, the repository of knowledge pertaining to training
and simulation is manifestly in the hands
of industry with the military staff system
creating a transitory presence in the training and simulation sector that sees the staff
officers responsible for simulation in post
for only a few years. Industry has the edge

April 2016 European Security & Defence

47

Photo: Zwilling

Armament & techn o log y

Rheinmetall Defence Electronics (RDE) runs the combat training centre GZ

of the German Army in the scope of a public-private partnership.

48

ture. Industry is under contract to provide

a specified training outcome and any spare
capacity can often be sold to third-parties
to the financial benefit of industry and the
military customer.
This partnership approach can be seen in
Brunei where CAE (60%), in partnership
with the Brunei Governments Ministry of
Finance (40%), runs the countrys MultiPurpose Training Centre (MPTC). Currently
housing simulators for the PC-7 and S-92,
a third device for the S-70 is to be installed
later this year.

Photo: CAE

when it comes to simulation knowledge.

At the recent Defence Simulation, Education & Training (DSET) event in Bristol, UK,
Brigadier Mitch Mitchell, the Head of Technology School at the Defence Academy,
pointed out how industry and the military
must work more closely together, to exploit technologies and improve education
and training. He told his audience that,
simulation was essential to meet future
operational requirements, and recommended that the military and industry
should undertake joint training and education courses to understand each other
more.
One area where the training and simulation industry is taking a leading role is in
the area of training service provision. With
this approach, the military takes on the
responsibility of providing a turnkey training solution whereby the military customer
places industry under contract to provide
a given training outcome. That outcome
might be to provide X number of helicopter
pilots each year that are trained to a specific
prescribed standard.
There are various approaches to this training service provision model. The first is
the US Air Force aircrew training service
(ATS) approach whereby the Government
owns all of the simulators and training
infrastructure with industry providing instructors and simulator maintenance technicians. Examples of these programmes
include the USAF KC-135 ATS that is run
by CAE and the C-17 ATS supported by
L3 Link.
A similar approach has been taken by the
German Government in selecting an industry partner to run its Gefechtsbungszentrum (GZ) combat training centre in
Altmark. Rheinmetall Defence Electronics
(RDE) is currently half way through a four
year contract that is expected to be worth
70 million.
The other model is exemplified by the UK
public private partnership (PPP) model
whereby industry owns the synthetic training equipment, training equipment, instructors, maintenance staff and infrastruc-

automatic protest generated by a defeated

competitor after a contract award and the
lowest price technically acceptable (LPTA)
selection process.
In the case of the former, such protests
delay the eventual award of the contract
and thereby can prevent the military undertaking training for a given platform.
LPTA was initiated to reduce the opportunity for protests to arise by providing a
checkbox approach to meeting specified
technical standards. If all of the standards
were met, the company with the lowest
bid price would win. Sensible in theory but
many companies argue that such a procurement process does not allow for the
insertion of innovative technologies that
can improve training outcomes. In short,
LPTA procurements stifle innovation and
curtail flexibility.
As the military reflects on its future training requirements there is little doubt that
technologies such as serious games, highresolution displays and increased graphics processing power are pushing training
down the virtual route. The use of the virtual domain is clearly growing, as can be seen

Bruneis Multi-Purpose Training Centre (MPTC), run by CAE, is an another

example for partnership between industry and government.

The S-92 simulator highlights the potential of service-driven training centres. The
domestic business on the simulator comes
from Shell Brunei but around 75% of business revenues comes from third-party customers such as Bristow Helicopters Australia, China Southern Helicopters, CHC
(Australia) and in the near future, the Royal
Thai Air Force.
Once established, these training service
partnerships seem to work well and are
becoming increasingly popular throughout
the world; that is not to say that all is well
on the procurement front. In the US, two
issues seem to predominate; the apparently

European Security & Defence April 2016

by the RCAFs initiative, but live training is

still central to stimulating the psychological
and physiological senses.
Technology, after all, is just a means to an
end and as far as the military is concerned,
that end state is enhanced operational
effect. Training technologies need to be
matched to defined operational outcomes
and the expertise to achieve such ends
does not always lay with the military. Increasingly, simulation and training vendors
are the subject matter experts (SME) and it
is incumbent upon the military to recognise
that fact and work more harmoniously together.
L

A rmament & t echn o lo g y

Defence Programmes & Requirements

in the Gulf States
David Saw

Normally writing about the Gulf States regarding their defence

programmes and requirements is a matter of embracing conventional
wisdom. The conventional wisdom is that the Gulf States have a vast
amount of money, they have legitimate security concerns and they
are in the market for advanced defence equipment to meet those
concerns.

continued health of the global economy.

Defence equipment purchases by the Gulf
States sustain the defence industry in the
supplier countries and also provide them
with a means to influence the Gulf States.
The Gulf States can lock in further Western
support through the provision of basing
facilities. In November 2015 work started
on a new base for the UK Royal Navy in
Bahrain, the US Navy already has a presence in Bahrain, there are also US bases

Photos: US Air Force

urchasing defence equipment not only

gives them organic military capabilities, it also allows them to build security
relationships with supplier countries. These
relationships give them influence in the
supplier countries, offer them the potential to receive military assistance from supplier countries and more direct continued
support in terms of spares, upgrades and
training for the equipment they have purchased.

A Boeing F-15S of the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF), one of 72 supplied
between 1995 and 1999. More recently the RSAF has contracted to buy
84 new F-15SA aircraft, with the existing F-15S fleet to be upgraded to
the new configuration. Qatar has expressed an interest in acquiring up
to 73 Boeing F-15E aircraft.

All of this is a winning proposition for both

sides of the equation. The US, Europeans
and others need a stable security situation
in the Gulf due to the fact that oil and gas
from this region is seen as essential to the

Au th o r
David Saw is a specialist defence
writer based in Paris, France, and a
regular contributor to ESD.

go on to demolish the comfortable security

architecture of the Gulf: and in the wake
of the Arab Spring came ISIS. Iran, long a
major security concern for the Gulf Arabs,
also started flexing its muscles and priming
its surrogates to fight.
In a little over five years since the start of
the Arab Spring, the security and now
the economic challenges facing the Gulf
States have reached new levels of complexity. There is a whole litany of challenges
to be faced by security planners in the
Gulf. Threats include the Syrian Civil War,
ISIS, other flavours of political Islam, the
conflict in Yemen and Iranian ambitions in
Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and the Yemen. There
is also the potential for Iranian-inspired subversion in Bahrain or even Eastern Saudi
Arabia.
It is also becoming clear that the long-held
assumption that the US would always step
in as the eventual guarantor of security in
the Gulf is no longer reliable. On the one
hand the Obama administration seems
mesmerised by the possibility of achieving
some kind of understanding with Iran and
seems prepared to go out of its way to accommodate Tehran, a move watched with
suspicion in the Arab capitals. On the other
hand there is little evidence that the US will
go out of its way to support its regional
allies; the fact that they let Mubarak fall in
Egypt in 2011 hardly inspires much confidence. Even worse from the perspective
of the Gulf States is that the US appears
to be intent on handing back US$ 150 billion in Iranian assets that were previously
sanctioned to Tehrans control. Essentially
bolstering Iranian finances while the Arab
states are haemorrhaging money.

Disappearing Money

in Qatar, and in the United Arab Emirates

(UAE), plus a French naval base and other
military facilities in Abu Dhabi, UAE.
With these foreign bases, allied to the ability of the Gulf States to purchase whatever
equipment they might need to support
well developed indigenous military forces,
added to their considerable wealth, the security architecture of the region appeared
to be somewhat secure. Then in December
2010 the Arab Spring started, and would

There is a commonly held view that the

Gulf States are awash with money and
that conventional financial rules do not
apply to them. Unfortunately, this is not
true. In fact many of the Gulf States are
now having to confront significant financial problems. Problems that have both
social and security implications. The principle cause of this is the decline in the oil
price. In June 2014 a barrel of the benchmark West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude
oil was priced at US$ 105, by December
2014 the price had fallen to US$ 59 a barrel. By the close of trading on 20 January

April 2016 European Security & Defence

49

 Armament & techn o log y

A Lockheed Martin F-16E Block 60 fighter of the United Arab Emirates

Air Force (UAEAF), one of 80 F-16E/F Block 60 aircraft delivered between
2004 and 2007. The UAEAF intends to retire its Dassault MIRAGE 2000-9
fleet, potentially selling them to Iraq, prior to selecting a new combat
aircraft which could be the Dassault RAFALE.

years of fiscal reserves they can deal with

low prices. Iraq has a minimum oil price of
some US$ 75 a barrel, and it has no fiscal
reserves. Irans minimum oil price is around
US$ 80 a barrel, with fiscal reserves enough
for eight years. Oman has a minimum price
of around US$ 90 a barrel and five years of
fiscal reserves. Bahrain has a minimum oil
price in excess of US$ 100 per barrel and
has less than five years of fiscal reserves.
Then we have what might be a surprise for
(Foto: Archiv ES&T)

2016, the price for a barrel of WTI was

US$ 26.68.
This is an extraordinary decline by any
standards, and what is worse for oil producers is that forecasts for the remainder of
this year and into 2017 do not offer much
relief. According to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) Short-Term Energy Outlook (STEO), released on 12 January
2016, the average price of WTI in 2016 will
be US$ 38 per barrel and US$ 47 per barrel
in 2017 (the other oil price comparator is
Brent Crude and STEM suggests this will
run at US$ 40 per barrel in 2016 and US$
50 in 2017). The OECD-linked International
Energy Agency (IEA) laments a glut of oil in
the market which is not likely to disappear
in the short-term and inevitably this drags
down prices. Other forecasts have crude oil
prices in 2016 running substantially lower
than the EIA STEO figures.
Looking at oil prices in isolation means very
little, one needs to have context. The oil producing states have a minimum price per barrel at which they can balance their budgets.
These countries also have fiscal reserves that
they can call upon to carry them through
years of low oil prices. The problem comes

Kuwaiti M1-13 APCs and supporting infantry come ashore from a US

Navy LCAC during Exercise Eagle Resolve in March 2015. Traditionally
Kuwait has never been a big spender in terms of military equipment.
But an order for 28 combat aircraft TYPHOON has been awarded and
there are requirements to upgrade many land systems.

when the minimum oil price they need is

high and their fiscal reserves are low.
For Qatar the minimum oil price is US$ 50
a barrel, but they have 25 years of fiscal
reserves and so they can deal with low oil
prices for a while. Kuwaits minimum oil
price is in the region of US$ 60 a barrel,
but they also have 20-25 years of fiscal reserves. The UAE minimum oil price is in the
region of US$ 70 a barrel, although with 30
50

many people: Saudi Arabia has a minimum

oil price requirement of some US$ 105 per
barrel and has less than five years of fiscal
reserves.
Saudi Arabia finds itself caught in a financial trap of its own making and how it escapes from that trap will directly impact
security and stability in the Gulf. The Saudis
believed that they could rebalance the oil
marketplace, force out non-OPEC produc-

European Security & Defence April 2016

ers like the US who, thanks to fracking,

were gaining an increasing market share,
and then get the oil price back to a level
that met their needs. To achieve this they
flooded the market with oil, drove the price
down and then were horrified when they
discovered that the price kept on going
down. As noted above there was a glut of
oil on the market and the laws of supply
and demand cannot change that, not even
for Saudi Arabia.
Despite this, Saudi Arabia intends to keep
pumping oil as it believes that the market
will rebound in the direction that it intends.
Of course whether that is sound policy
remains to be seen. We know the Saudi
foreign reserves fell from US$ 746 billion
in August 2014 to US$ 647 billion at the
end of December 2015. We also know that
the Saudi currency, the riyal (SR), is coming
under a lot of pressure and that many expect the peg of US$ 1 to 3.75SR to become
unsustainable. Should the currency peg fail
the result will be a further reduction in oil
prices and even more pressure on the Saudi
economy.
Saudi Arabia is coming under enormous
financial pressure at precisely the wrong
time. According to the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Fact Book, Saudi
Arabia has a population of 27.752 million,
of whom more than 30% are non-Saudis
(there are an estimated 1.5 million Pakistanis alone in Saudi Arabia). As a means
of keeping internal dissent under control,
the Saudi government pays out enormous
sums in subsidies to Saudi citizens for housing, food, water, electricity and suchlike.
Even so, it believed that between two and
four million of the Saudi population are
below the poverty line; according to some
more recent reports it could be as many as
six million people. That is between 10%
and 30% of the population! Youth unemployment (ages 12 to 24) runs at 29.5%, yet
Saudi Arabia imports thousands of foreign
workers annually.

Photo: US DVIDS

Armament & techn o log y

from France and Russia were bankrolled
by Saudi money. That is not to ignore the
US$ 3 billion in Saudi money committed
to procurement for the Lebanese military
from France.

Choices

Photo: US DVIDS

A Column of Qatar Emiri Land Forces (QELF) AMX-10RC reconnaissance

vehicles during an exercise with US troops. QELF armour capabilities are
being upgraded with the arrival of the first of 62 LEOPARD 2A7 tanks
and 24 PZH 2000 self-propelled howitzers from KMW in Germany.

Saudi Arabia needs to cut the increasing

budget deficit, but can it take the risk of
reducing subsidy payments? It is unlikely to
want to cut defence and security spending
which account for 25% of the government
budget. Indeed, it intends to increase defence spending through to 2020 to provide
it with the systems and equipment necessary to counter regional threats such as
Iran. Elsewhere, current military operations
in Yemen are said to be costing US$ 6 billion a month (Saudi intervened in Yemen in
March 2015). Not only is the intervention
in Yemen expensive, but Saudi Arabia also
finds itself having to defend its own territory from Tactical Ballistic Missile (TBM) attack from SCUD and OTR-21 TOCHKA missiles from Yemen. To add to that you have
the cost of supporting Egypt: in 2014 Saudi
Arabia and the UAE are said to have primed
an aid package to Egypt worth some US$
20 billion. It is also believed that the recent
major defence purchases made by Egypt

Photo: US DVIDS

The Westland COMMANDO helicopter was acquired in three different

variants by Qatar (Mk.2A, Mk.2C and Mk.3) for transport, VIP and antishipping missions, a total of 12 entered service. The COMMANDO will
be replaced by the NH90, 12 TTH and 10 NFH variants are to be acquired
under the terms of a US$2.8 bn contract being negotiated.

The Saudi government finds itself in a situation where it is going to have to make
some very hard choices, as it has to cut government expenditure or it has to get more
money. As the oil price is unlikely to rise, it
appears that the government will seek to
impose tax increases to raise revenue. It is
also looking at a privatisation programme
for state assets, including the sale of shares
in the national oil company Saudi Aramco,
arguably the most important enterprise in
the Kingdom.
In these circumstances might it not have
seemed logical to pursue courses of action
that were subtle and would not spur dissent? Perhaps not, as on January 2, 2016,
the Saudi authorities executed 47 prisoners convicted of terrorist offences, many
of whom were al-Qaeda linked. However,
one of the executed was Saudi Shia cleric
Nimr al-Nimr. The Shia form between 10%
and 15% of the Saudi population and are
most numerous in the Eastern Province of
Saudi Arabia, the centre of the Saudi oil industry. The execution of al-Nimr was hardly
likely to keep the simmering tension in the
Eastern Province under control. Elsewhere,
the Saudi embassy in Iran was attacked after the execution of al-Nimr, leading the
Saudis to break diplomatic relations with
Iran on January 4, 2016. Subsequently Bahrain and Sudan broke relations with Tehran,

A US officer stands with a Royal Saudi Land Forces (RSLF) tank commander in front of a RSLF M60A3 tank. The RSLF has some 400 M60A3 tanks in
service and around 300 AMX-30 tanks in service; both of these vehicles
need replacing. However, both tanks have been used operationally by
the RSLF in Yemen.
April 2016 European Security & Defence

51

Key Areas
For the Gulf States the current security situation is extremely concerning, especially as
it comes at a time when their prime revenue generator oil is not delivering the
necessary funds. This does not mean that
the defence procurement environment in
the Gulf States is suddenly going to disappear; on the contrary there are numerous
major programmes on the horizon. The
challenge will be to understand the logic
behind these programmes.
Qatar provides an interesting example of
this. Remember at this point that Qatar is
not under any real financial pressure: the
Qatar Emiri Air Force (QEAF) has 24 Dassault RAFALE aircraft on order a significant
increase on their current fighter force of 14
Dassault MIRAGE 2000-5 EDA/DDA. It now
transpires that Qatar has requested up to
73 Boeing F-15E EAGLE aircraft, according to Senator Bob Corker, Senate Foreign
52

The Middle East has changed the fortunes of the Dassault RAFALE, firstly with Egypt who in February 2015 placed the first export order for the
type, with 24 signed for. Then in May 2015 Qatar signed for 24 RAFALE
aircraft, although the contract did not come into effect until December
2015. For France the next regional objective is to persuade the United
Arab Emirates to opt for RAFALE.
Photo: US DVIDS

while the UAE reduced the level of its diplomatic relations with Iran.
The end result of all of this is that the battle lines are clearly being drawn in the
Middle East. These battle lines are based
on the fundamental fissure in the Islamic
world between Sunni and Shia, with Saudi
Arabia acting as the champion of Sunni Islam and Iran as the champion of the Shia.
Saudi Arabia and the other Arab powers
look with great concern at Irans attempt
to have a Shia Crescent that encompasses
Iran, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. They see Iran
as an aggressive power that has territorial
ambitions, and as previously noted these
ambitions extend beyond the Shia Crescent
towards Bahrain, the Eastern Province of
Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Arab governments are also focussed on internal threats
such as al-Qaida, ISIS and the Muslim
Brotherhood, the UAE having been particularly abrupt on dealing with the Muslim
Brotherhood.
Yemen is where the Gulf States confront
Iranian-backed forces, with military contingents from Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain,
Qatar, Kuwait, Morocco, Jordan and Sudan
all involved. It is worth noting that the UAE
has established a brigade-strength force of
some 1,800 contract soldiers from Latin
America, mostly of Colombian-origin, that
it has recruited over the past few years, and
that around 480 of these were deployed
to Yemen in November 2015. The fact that
the UAE is using contract troops indicates
that they are casualty adverse. Involvement
in significant combat operations is expensive in terms of money and materiel, and
inevitably this will have a budgetary impact
in the Gulf States.

Photo: French Air Force

Armament & techn o log y

A Kuwaiti Army Ranger fast ropes from a Kuwait Air Force AS.322
SUPER PUMA helicopter during Exercise Eagle Resolve held with US
Forces in Kuwait in March 2015. Kuwaiti troops are now participating
with the armed forces of the other Gulf States in military operations
in the Yemen against Iranian-sponsored forces.

Relations Committee chairman, with the

request having remained unanswered for
some two years. Qatar would place a first
order for 36 aircraft and these would be delivered 42 months after contract signature.
Such a contract would preserve F-15 production at Boeing and help to keep Boeing
in the fighter manufacturing business.
One would have to ask how Qatar would
suddenly be able to generate the aircrew
for an initial purchase of 36 aircraft? bearing in mind that the F-15E has a crew of
two, on top of the 24 RAFALE that the
QEAF has on order. There are positive aspects though: if Qatar purchased 36 of 73
F-15s it would win an awful lot of friends
in Washington.
Another potential fighter sale that has been
waiting for final approval in Washington
is the acquisition of 28 Boeing F/A-18E/F
SUPER HORNET fighters by Kuwait, the purchase of the SUPER HORNET would be very

European Security & Defence April 2016

welcome to both Boeing and the US Navy.

The Kuwait Air Force (KAF) had previously
taken delivery of 40 Boeing F/A-18C/D aircraft between late 1991 and August 1993
(it intends that these aircraft will remain
in service until 2030). Yet last September
it appeared that the KAF was on course
to purchase 28 Eurofighter TYPHOON aircraft. Should it want to purchase both SUPER HORNET and TYPHOON then Kuwait
is perfectly capable of affording to do so.
However, the key is which purchase(s) will
benefit Kuwaiti security interests both in
terms of operational capability and diplomatic influence, and that will be the decisive factor.
These two combat aircraft programmes illustrate the complexity of the defence procurement scene in the Gulf. Money might
be harder to come by in the region, but
money is still available and requirements of
all types exist in profusion.
L

Armament & techn o log y

TIGER Combat Helicopter

Multinational Capability Enhancement
Markus Lnnig

Air-mobile forces of the army make a specific contribution to the over-

agility. In this respect, its firing power generally exceeds that of the enemys weapons on the ground. Its operations are only
restricted regarding its dwell time on site
and in the case of unfavourable geo factors
(flying weather).

all system of the German Armed Forces capabilities. In essence, it is

about the ability to use the air dimension for land operations in a combined armed forces and multinational context.

TIGER Programme in
Retrospect

support the ground forces in all deployment scenarios. Especially in initial operations they can make a major contribution to
establishing and maintaining control over
the air space, thus creating the condition
Pictures: Bundeswehr

ir mobility of the ground forces enables the commander to take control

and to react quickly and over long distances. Courses of action are increased in terms
of time and space.

The development of the TIGER combat helicopter started in the 1980s as

a bi-national project of Germany and
France. The objective was to jointly develop a modular basic helicopter for attack, reconnaissance and anti-tank deployments. Originally planned for a very
large number of units and linked to the
development of many new technology
areas, this project also reflected the motivation of European armament. After
the German reunification and associated
security policy changes, the programme
was adapted in the two countries both in
terms of quality and quantity.

The German TIGER Today

A German TIGER combat helicopter deployed to Afghanistan

In this context, the TIGER combat helicopter will remain the means for air-to-surface
effect in the German Army even in the long
run. In order to maintain and further optimise this high-grade capability, the TIGER
combat helicopter is being further developed within the scope of the four-nation
TIGER Capability Assurance Programme
(TIGER CAP).
Airborne weapon systems are of particular
operational importance because they can

Au th o r
LTC Markus Lnnig is the TIGER
Programme Manager in Branch II 3
of the German Army Concepts and
Capabilities Development Centre.

for further operations of ground and naval

forces.
The TIGER is currently the only airborne
weapon system of the German Army.
As an independent combat element, the
TIGER can operate in areas where weapon
systems on the ground cannot operate or
only to a limited extent (e.g. due to ground
conditions or infrastructure). In addition, it
can quickly reach its areas of deployment,
promptly close gaps in combat operations
or very quickly strengthen other elements
on the ground.
In large-scale offensive operations, the
TIGER enables the engagement of enemy
forces before they can have an impact on
own operations (remote areas deployment), thereby demonstrating the highest
effectiveness due to its high flexibility and

In 2005, the first German TIGER helicopters were delivered to the German-French
Training Centre in Le Luc (France) for pilot
training. Since then, the continuing intake,
necessary training, the simultaneous deployment testing, deployment preparation,
deployment realisation and follow-up have
determined the service.
The last TIGER is expected to be delivered
at the end of 2018. Due to the particular
aviation requirements regarding qualification, certification and approval of new developments and the associated necessary
lead time, the four TIGER user nations (Germany, France, Australia and Spain) decided
at the end of 2012 to embark on a common
path regarding its continued development.
The German TIGER combat helicopter
(unique feature: mast-mounted sight) was
developed to carry out the anti-tank-, escort- and missions in support of ground
troops.
Protection
A redundant design of critical systems as
well as electronic self-protection with laser, radar and missile approach warners

April 2016 European Security & Defence

53

 Armament & techn o log y

Overview
Flight time: 2.5 3.5 hours without external tanks, depending on the type of deployment, travel speed 120 knots
Four weapon stations, including
- two internal stations with either 12.7 mm GunPod HMP or 70 mm rocket sub-system
(RSS) with max. 19 rockets (high explosive) or launcher with four HOT anti-tank
guided missiles or launcher with four PARS 3 LR fire & forget anti-tank guided missiles
- two external stations with two STINGER air-to-air guided missiles each

sMG 12.7 mm
400 rounds
up to 1,500 m

4 x HOT 2/3
anti-tank missiles
up to 4,000 m

19 x 70 mm rockets
area targets
up to 6,000 m

2 x STINGER
anti-aircraft
fire & forget
up to 6,000 m

4x PARS 3 LR
anti-tank
fire & forget
up to 6,000 m

TIGER combat helicopter weapons fit today

and decoy systems against infrared-guided

guided missiles (flare) and radar-guided
missiles (chaff).
Sensors
Commander/gunner: OSIRIS mastmounted sight with daylight channel
(black-white) as well as thermal imaging
device and laser range finder, helmetintegrated night-vision devices.
Pilot: Pilot Sight Unit (PSU, a forward
looking infrared flight control system
(FLIR) and helmet-integrated night-vision devices.
As the only combat helicopter worldwide
the German TIGER is capable to switch
between night-vision device and FLIR in
the helmet system with hardly any delay
at night, i.e. between image intensification
and thermal imaging.
Communication
The German TIGER is fitted with a VHF
FM radio device, a UHF/VHF combined
device, as well as radio equipment in the
HF range. Furthermore, due to the opera54

tions support system, it is equipped with a

battlefield management system which can
exchange through radio data transmission
situation and order modifications or further
data with the ground station and the command post, respectively. This capability is
currently also a unique feature of the helicopter and, similar to the PSU functionality,
is expected to be also introduced by the
other TIGER nations in the future.
At the time of the planned service introduction, the TIGER MK I version was a
path-breaking weapon system, overall
an ambitious project with many technical innovations. It is also due to the large
number of technical innovations that the
service introduction of the TIGER was delayed significantly. Against the background
of a changed security policy environment
and new technical/tactical requirements,
the current capability profile of TIGER is no
longer optimized to fulfill all relevant tasks.
ASGARD
The ASGARD (Afghanistan Stabilisation
German Army Rapid Deployment) configu-

European Security & Defence April 2016

ration fulfilled the recognised deployment

capability requirements to a significant extend. For missions under the ISAF mandate
in Afghanistan some technical improvements were introduced. The ballistic protection of the crew was increased, a much
needed fourth radio (multiband including
SatCom/TacSat) was installed, the reliability
of the software was improved, and sand
filters for the engines as well the capability
for mission recording a legal requirement
was implemented. The experiences from
operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere
are positive. Twelve aircraft have been introduced in this configuration which serves
as the basis for continued developments.
TIGER Mk II
Training planning, deployment availability
as well as logistic supportability has been
significantly improved through a fleet of
identical aircraft. Based on the positive
operational experiences with the ASGARD
configuration and considering the directive of a feasible concept for necessary
individual measures, initiatives as well as
suggestions from the troops have been implemented in a harmonised package the
TIGER MK II.
An important feature of the TIGER Mk II
is the ASGARD design adoption. Further
improvements include:
Better precision of the 70 mm rockets
(semi active laser seeker);
Tiger Helicopter Outer Rockets (THOR),
which are capable to fire the 70 mm
rockets from external stations;
Laser protection (blinding and infrared
laser) for the crew;
Combat fuel tank to increase the operations range;
Commanders laser pointer for easier
cooperation with ground troops,
Further increased ballistic protection for
crews.
In this respect, all aircraft are converted
to ASGARD standard and the number of
aircraft is increased to 20 so-called ASGARD equipment units. The ASGARD
equipment unit comprises inter alia ballistic protection, the fourth radio and the
mission recording device.
The decision to procure 20 of these as part
of a total of 40 operational TIGER helicopters is in response to the rules of economic
efficiency. These aircraft can be equipped
and converted with little time and effort;
as a result, this will not impact flight operations because for each available TIGER
the equipment unit will remain available
for operations, whereby a demand-related
increase of the component sets is possible
at any time. Already in the standard conversion of the entire fleet to the ASGARD ver-

Armament & techn o log y

areas. Identical technical implementation
leads to significant direct and indirect saving options without losing capabilities.

Continued Development
Requirements

TIGER ASGARD in Afghanistan during mission preparation

sion, first obsolescences will be eliminated.

According to the current status, the conversion of the TIGER fleet will be carried out
from 2018 and completed in 2024.

Obsolescences
Obsolescence refers to the future, beginning, actual or apparent non-availability of
components, materials, resources, processes, services and/or know-how. The reason
for an obsolescence may lie in the technological ageing, a legal requirement or an
economic decision. Capability preservation
within the scope of obscolescence management is possible in several configuration
degrees.
The basic premise is that a capability is degraded unless the technical implementation is changed. In the 1980s, the anti-tank
capability could be best achieved with the
HOT anti-tank guided missile. On modern
battlefields, with the sensors and selfprotection systems of present and future
combat vehicles, the use of HOT does no
longer promise the desired results due to its
system parameters. HOT could be replaced
with a similar system incorporating all (tactical) parameters (range, operational procedure) in the scope of an obscolescence
management effort. Technically, this would
eliminate the obscolescence. However, the
anti-tank capability remains significantly
restricted and is further degraded over
time. Hence a more progressive approach
is necessary.

these foreseeable obscolescences cannot

be eliminated. Following this logic, the
TIGER CAP was launched with the Tiger
Capability Assurance Working Group (TCG)
in 2012. The members were the four TIGER
user nations. In the meantime, however,
Australia has decided to decommission the
TIGER fleet by mid of the 2020s due to
changed political strategies.
The objective is the preservation of capabilities and, where possible, capability expansion within the scope of a feasible concept.
The multinational approach is to support
highest possible advantages through synergy effects. The Tiger CAP shows very
clearly that the nations receive and would
like to expand the same capabilities in many

Based on the conception of the German

Armed Forces and the guidelines for future development, the following basic requirements for a combat helicopter can be
derived from a conceptual point of view.
Among others, a German TIGER combat
helicopter should:
Be ready for deployment within the
scope of initial operations, for operations to prevent international conflicts
and to master crises, for national defence as collective defence, for rescue,
evacuation and freeing of hostages
abroad, for use in operations of lower,
middle, and high intensity under the
climatic and geographical conditions
of the anticipated areas of operation
and for precise, selective and scalable
deployment against a broad range of
targets on the ground and in the air;
Be able to contribute to the support
of operations of land and naval forces,
support of operations of specialised and
special forces, for joint fire support, for
tactical air mobility of ground forces and
for establishing and maintaining control
of the air space;
Provide sufficient protection against an
anticipated spectrum of threats in the
area of operations;

TIGER Capability Assurance

Programme (CAP)
Until the mid of the 2020s, technologies
implemented in the TIGER helicopter will
become unavailable. This means that the
TIGER will continuously lose capabilities if

Aircraft lining up for an exercise

April 2016 European Security & Defence

55

 Armament & techn o log y

Show a high level of interoperability
and compatibility to provide its capabilities to a large number of users with
a high degree of efficiency in single or
combined operations of the German or
international armed forces ;
Show a high degree of modularity to
adjust, improve and expand the capabilities of the weapon system as economically as possible, and
Comply with the current legal and regulatory situation for the preservation of
security in the air space.

Way Ahead
The broad requirements to be met by the
future TIGER Mk III combat helicopter go
much beyond its current capabilities. In
order to formalise these further development needs, the TIGER Update Require-

Battlefield management system: retrofit of combat capabilities, integration of

tactical data links, integration with C
systems;
Navigation: memory, GPS stability;
Human machine interface: applies to all
aspects of the helicopter;
Cooperation with UAV: integration of
sensors, steering system;
Electronic combat: passive and active
protection measures;
Improved maintainability and reliability:
platform, sea-based deployment;
Improved avionics architecture: various
options.
These fields are not to be viewed as selfcontained, rather they show system-related
interdependencies, while it is up to each
nation within the framework of their own
specifications and goals to take part in
the TURS and to bring in their own char-

challenges, approval and costs. The close

monitoring of the study by the respective
consumers/nations is an inherent element
of the studys structure. Regular meetings
and workshops on e.g. Human Machine
Interface ensure that the interests and requirements of the nations are taken into
account to the maximum extent.
Particular emphasis has been put on the
preparations of the Translation Armed
Forces Industry or to put it simply Soldier Engineer. The use of external consultants as well as the drawing up of the
operational intent (mission-specific representation of the future deployment principles of the TIGER Mk III in a special software
tailored to the needs of the industry) are
part of this preliminary work of the Army
Concepts and Capabilities Development
Centre. Furthermore, personnel organisational measures have also been taken in
order to answer questions from industry as
quickly as possible.
Following the results of the architecture
study, the nations will have to decide on the
respective system architecture, i.e. which
capabilities are to be implemented and to
what extent. Thereby further steps by industry are to be monitored closely in order
to ensure a maximum level of commonality. The delivery of the first TIGER Mk III is
planned for 2024.

Summary

German and French TIGER enhancing similarities

ment Sheets (TURS) were developed and

formulated within the TCG with the respective national priorities. Thus, these
TURS are capability requests, of which
clearly over 50 different ones could be
worked out.
The TURS are classified according to different fields (with a few examples):
Communication: long-range and shortrange communication, radio data transmission;
Armament: range and precision, guidance control, impact at target, gun improvements;
Sensors: PSU, mast-mounted sight,
target illumination, passive coordinate
detection;
56

acteristics (must/should/can). This iterative

process makes it possible to implement
national interests and to benefit from the
experience of the others.
The interests of the German Army are represented by the Army Concepts and Capabilities Development Centre. Within the
scope of the holistic army development
concept, the German part of the TURS was
prepared and agreed with the other nations.
The TURS are the cornerstone for further
development work, whereby the next step
after July 2015 is the architecture study
in cooperation with industry. This study
is limited to 18 months and will provide
findings on feasibility, risks, technological

European Security & Defence April 2016

With the TIGER Mk III, the German Army

will clearly enhance its capabilities. The focus of the continued development is the
significant improvement of sensors, armament and communication, and hence of
the overall effectiveness. The TIGER Mk III
will be able to identify, record and evaluate
threats and targets faster. It will be integrated with different C systems and will
be able to communicate faster and more
reliably. As a result, it will be capable of
engaging the target spectrum with greater
precision, in a scalable manner and over a
longer distance, and at the same time operate effectively and efficiently.
The intended measures for the TIGER Mk III
are designed for mid-term implementation.
They mainly serve to preserve the deployment maturity (to a large extent through
the planned elimination of obsolescences).
The implementation will enable the TIGER
weapon system to meet the capability requirements of a German combat helicopter
to a large extent until 2040+. Only with
the implementation of these measures the
Army can take advantage of the full potential of the TIGER as a flexible operational
and future-oriented weapon system of the
land forces.
L

Armament & techn o log y

Short and Very Short Range Air Defence

Doug Richardson

Short-Range Air Defence (SHORAD) and Very Short-Range Air Defence (VSHORAD)
systems are small and mobile surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems intended to protect
targets from strike and close-support aircraft, helicopters and air-to-surface missiles,
or from observation by unmanned air vehicles.

of command and control network that can

assign targets to the system, and co-ordinate the fire of multiple launchers.
In many cases, the missile is one of the many
shoulder-fired man-portable air-defence
systems (MANPADS), so the effectiveness
of the system is limited by the light weight
of the missile (typically 10-12 kg) and the
Photo: USMC

uch small SAM systems offer no significant degree of area-protection; their role
is primarily that of point defence, although
a limited route protection capability does
exist. Typically a VSHORAD has a range of
around 3-4 km, while a SHORAD will have
a maximum range of 5-12 km.
A short article cannot provide details of all

Launching of an FIM-92A STINGER missile

the systems currently in service or under development, but will serve to show the range
of technical solutions available.
VSHORAD systems often take the form of
a pedestal-mounted light missile system.
These carry one or more ready-to-fire missiles, and most can be linked to some form

Au th o r
Following an earlier career in
engineering, Doug Richardson
is a defence journalist specialising
in topics such as aircraft, missiles,
and military electronics.

small warhead it carries (typically between 1

and 1.5 kg.). In some cases, designers have
opted to use a heavier custom-designed
missile such as the MBDA MISTRAL (19 kg),
NEX1 FUTURE CO Chiron/Singung (14kg),
the Saab Bofors RBS 70 (16.5 kg). This allows a greater maximum range and higher
engagement envelope, and the installation
of a warhead weighing up to 3 kg.
Most of these weapons use passive infrared (IR) homing, but like the followon BOLIDE version, the RBS70 uses laser
beam riding. Although not a widely-used
guidance method, laser-beam riding
is highly resistant to countermeasures.
The FIM-92 STINGER carries a 3 kg war-

head, heavier than that of most MANPADS,

so it is hardly surprising that the US weapon
has formed the basis of several multi-round
launch systems. Raytheon offers a tripodmounted STINGER system that combines
four ready-to-fire missiles with a high-magnification optical sight and a forward looking infrared (FLIR) tracking system suitable
for use at night and in bad weather. EADS/
LFK offers a simpler solution that mounts
two STINGER launchers on a tripod.
Mounting lightweight systems on a vehicle was an obvious way of fielding a mobile VSHORAD. First fielded in 1989, the
Boeing AVENGER is in service with the US
Army and US Marine Corps, and with at
least three export customers. It consists of a
High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) armed with a turret carrying
eight ready-to-fire STINGER missiles. These
weapons are aimed using an optical sight
or a forward-looking FLIR system, while a
laser rangefinder is used to confirm that
targets are within missile range. A single
M3P 12.7mm machine gun is available for
self-protection, and for use against targets
at very short range.
From 2000 onwards, many US-operated
systems were fitted with a Slew-To-Cue
(STC) targeting system able to use information received via datalink from the Forward
Area Air Defence (FAAD) C2I system to direct the turret towards a potential target.
The concept of mounting STINGER systems
on a vehicle was also adopted by other nations. Aselsan has developed two pedestalmounted STINGER configurations for the
Turkish armed forces. When mounted on
a LAND ROVER, the system is designated
ZIPKIN, while the M113A2-mounted variant
is known as ATILGAN. MBDAs European
vehicle-mounted Low-Level Air Defence
System (LLADS) consists of four STINGERs,
plus a FLIR or low-light TV and an optional
laser rangefinder, mounted on a Mercedes
Benz GD 250 all-terrain vehicle.
Japans Type 93 Kin-SAM mounts two fourround packs of Type 91 Kin-SAM MANPADS and an EO sensor on a KOHKIDOHSHA (4 4) high-mobility wheeled chassis,

April 2016 European Security & Defence

57

Photo: US Army

The warhead of the STINGER missile is heavier than that of most MANPADS, making the weapon a good basis for mobile VSHORAD systems
such as this Boeing AVENGER.

58

Radar-guided air-to-air missiles can also be

used in the surface-to-air role, but the resulting heavier and longer-ranged systems,
for example the Rafael SPYDER, can be considered outside of the scope of this article.
The former Soviet Union also saw the virtues of using passive IR guided missiles in
SHORAD systems. Like the earlier 9K31
STRELA-1 (SA-9 GASKIN), the KB TOCHMASH 9K35 STRELA-10 (SA-13 GOPHER)
was successful on the export market, winning orders from more than 20 nations. It is
a tracked system armed with four ready-tofire 9M37, 9M37M, 9M37MD, or 9M333

Photo: Saab

while Polands POPRAD launcher for the

indigenously-developed GROM MANPADS
can be installed on a ZUBR armoured vehicle or a Land Rover.
Rheinmetall Defence Electronics took the
concept of customer choice to a new level
when it developed its ASRAD system. This
can use a wide range of wheeled and
tracked vehicles, and be armed with between two and four ready-to-fire STINGER,
MISTRAL, IGLA-1, or RBS 70 missiles. The
ASRAD-R version developed in conjunction with Saab Bofors Dynamics uses the
BOLIDE.
China has developed a number of mobile systems based on the missiles from
its MANPADS systems. Based on an HMMWV look-alike, Poly Technologies FB-6A
is armed with four FN-6 missiles and a single 12.7 mm machine gun. Sensors include
an electro-optic system incorporating a TV
camera, thermal camera, and laser rangefinder.
China Aerospace Science and Industry
Corporation (CASIC) and China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO) teamed
to create the FLG-1, a NORINCO WZ
550/551-series chassis armed with four
QW-series MANPADS missiles, an electrooptical sensor package, and what is probably a surveillance radar.
China has also used the WZ 551D wheeled
6x6 chassis as the basis for a mobile SHORAD armed with four PL-9C SIDEWINDERclass air-to-air missiles. First marketed in
1989, it has been offered under the designations PILI and PEN LUNG.
The HMMWV chassis forms the basis of
Taiwans ANTELOPE, a system based not
on the Stinger but on the locally developed
TIEN CHIEN 1, a SIDEWINDER-class air-toair missile. The vehicle is fitted with a radar,
FLIR, and four ready-to-fire missiles.

Air Defence Alerting Device (ADAD). A

three-round Lightweight Multiple Launcher version is also available. STARSTREAK
has a flight speed of around Mach 3.5, and
delivers a payload of three laser-beam riding darts.
SHORAD missiles often weigh 50 kg or
more, offering a longer range, and carrying
a warhead that often weighs 10 kg or more.
Some, such as the MBDA RAPIER/JERNAS,
take the form of towed system, but a more
common solution is to mount the system
on a wheeled or tracked vehicle. This provides the ability to change position rapidly
in order to cope with a developing threat,
to reposition defence capability to protect
a temporary asset such as a refuelling or
regrouping area, or to keep up with rapidlymoving friendly forces. Where fixed assets
such as an airfield or command centre need
permanent protection, a SHORAD could be
installed on a shelter or other form of redeployable cabin, but in a world where SAM
systems are often singled out for early attack at the outbreak of hostilities, a vehiclemounted system seems a better solution.
The classic mobile SHORAD fielded from
the 1970s onwards included the Thales
CROTALE and CROTALE NG and MBDA/
Euromissile ROLAND. These used semiactive command to line-of-sight (SACLOS)
guidance, a scheme in which a guidance
system in the aiming unit detects any deviation between the missiles flight path and
the line-of-sight to the target, and sends the

Night firing with RBS 70 NG VSHORAD from Saab at a Live Demo in 2011

IR-guided missiles. Its longevity, and the

limited defence budgets of many users,
have prompted the development of several
upgrade schemes.
Thales Air Systems STARSTREAK entered
service in 1995 in its vehicle-mounted SelfPropelled High-Velocity Missile system
(SP HVM) form. This consists of an ALVIS
STORMER tracked vehicle fitted with a turret carrying eight ready-to-fire rounds, as
well as a roof-mounted Thales Optronics

European Security & Defence April 2016

radio commands needed to steer the missile

onto the line-of-sight to the target.
The nearest Soviet-era equivalent of these
West European missiles was the AlmazAntey 9K33 OSA (SA-8 GECKO). This
used radar-based command guidance, and
a similar scheme was retained for the vertically-launched Almaz-Antey TOR (SA-15
GAUNTLET).
Several nations have developed SHORAD
solutions that seem to have been derived

Photo: Thales

Graphic: Nudelman Precision Engineering Design Bureau

CROTALE NG seen here at the 2007 Paris Air Show was the final variant of this
widely-exported French SHORAD. It uses
the VT-1 missile developed by what was
then LTV Missiles and Electronics Group.

Photo: Russian Ministry of Defence

Photo: MBDA

Russia offers the widely-deployed STRELA-10 (SA-13 GOPHER) VSHORAD

system in the upgraded 10M4 version shown here.

The exact configuration of the FLAADS Land has

yet to be revealed, but will probably be similar to
the trials vehicle shown in this publicity photo.

from CROTALE. These include Chinas FM80 and FM-90, and Irans YA-ZAHRA. The
Iranian system may have been reverse-engineered from CROTALE hardware captured
from Iraq during the 1980 to 1988 Iran/Iraq
War, perhaps with the addition of technology from the FM-80.
An industrial team headed by what was
then the Special Products Division of Daewoo Heavy Industries (now Doosan Infracore) developed the CHUN MA (PEGASUS)
mobile SHORAD, and the system became
operational with the South Korean Army in
1999. It consists of a tracked vehicle with a
turret fitted with an E/F-band surveillance
radar, a Ku-band tracking radar, electrooptical sensors, and eight missiles. The turret is similar to that of the CROTALE NG,
but the missile is of new design. A version
based on a wheeled chassis has been offered for export.
When Russia moved a battery of S-400 TRIUMF (SA-21 GROWLER) SAMs to Syria
in November 2015 following the downing
of an Su-24 strike aircraft by Turkish F-16
fighters, its arrival caught the attention of
TV networks. Less attention was paid to
the deployment of the KBP 96K6 PANTSIR
(SA-22 GREYHOUND) SHORAD system

A Russian PANTSIR system (right) stands guard to protect

S-400 launchers (left).

to the same Syrian base. Initial TV reports

showed a basic PANTSIR, but later footage showed the presence of the much-improved 72V6-E4 combat vehicle, which has
a surveillance radar based on two phasedarray antennas mounted back-to-back. This
configuration was first reported as a new
variant developed for Algeria. In its earlier
form, PANTSIR is in service with at least ten
export customers.
In addition to being armed with 12 57E6
missiles, the turret of PANTSIR vehicles also
features two 30 mm 2A38M 30 mm cannon. This type of combined gun/missile armament has become a Russian speciality.
The earlier 2K22/2K22M TUNGUSKA (another KBP product) has four or eight readyto-fire 9M311 TREUGOLNIK missiles, plus
two twin-barrelled 30 mm 2A38M cannon.
Other countries have adopted combined
gun/missile systems. For example, Israels
MAHBET system consists of an M163 VULCAN Air Defense System (VADS) self-propelled anti-aircraft gun (SPAAG) version of
the M113 Armoured Personnel Carrier modified to add a four-round STINGER launcher
to the vehicles 20 mm GATLING gun turret.
One of the most interesting SHORAD currently under development is MBDAs Future

Local Area Air Defence System (FLAADS

Land), due to replace the current Rapier
Field Standard C. This uses the companys
Common Anti-air Modular Missile (CAMM),
a 99 kg weapon that will also arm the Royal
Navys SEA CEPTOR SAM system.
A truck-mounted launcher able to carry
twelve missiles was used for early test firings, and may indicate the likely configuration of the FLAAD land vehicle. The missile
is vertically launched. A cold-gas system is
used to eject it from the launch canister, a
feature that will minimise the launch signature. The systems command and control
facilities will have to interface with current
or planned surveillance radar systems via a
datalink, so each fire unit will have minimal
radio-frequency emissions that would betray its position to enemy elint sensors.
Once launched, the missile will perform a
turnover manoeuvre, ignite its rocket motor, then fly towards the target via inertial
guidance updated by a dual-band two-way
datalink. Terminal homing will be via a Kuband active-radar seeker.
The British Army is expected to begin training on the system in 2018. MBDA sees Australia, Brunei, Malaysia, and Switzerland as
potential near-term export customers. L

April 2016 European Security & Defence

59

 Armament & techn o log y

Successful Insertion Needs

the Best Tools
Tim Guest

In recent years the nature of warfare has changed dramatically.

Military units, equipment and standard operating procedures
are being constantly adapted to address new threats. Nowhere
are the changes more noticeable than amongst the worlds Special
Forces, who are called on increasingly to counter new threats,
from many directions.

Scene Setting

Intelligence, deception, security, equipment and rehearsals, are all elements of

an insertion that must be considered in the
planning phase and there are many more
factors beyond the scope of this short article.
Photo: UK MOD

Deep penetration by land, sea, or air is the

typical route into traditional Special Forces
(SF) mission territory. More recently, SF
units have had to place greater emphasis

and adapt their preparation and training

to counter terrorism scenarios in order
to prepare them to face perhaps the greatest current threat to modern societies and
democracies.
When inserting an SF unit into a hostile situation or territory, once all planning, preparation and rehearsals have taken place if
such are practical and if time permits deliberate insertions as opposed to rapid
response operations are the determining
factor. Arrival in theatre is the first, critical
operational phase. But whether a covert
operation in an urban scenario, or a more
overt air assault, some things never change
in the run-up to an operation. As an old
military adage goes: Prior planning and
preparation prevent p*** poor performance: there are still some fundamentals
that apply in any insertion scenario.
60

Photo: Vogo Engineering

One of four UK Royal Marines LCAC platforms

Good intelligence is vital and any SF team

must be provided with the very best in order to be able to plan a successful mission.
Maps, blueprints, aerial photographs, all
deliver vital details and even the help of
Google Street View in an urban setting,
or Google maps in a rural situation might
help; current and forecasted weather information will also be critical. And last, but
not least, information about enemy dispositions, numbers, locations, equipment and
capabilities is critical.
Another factor to consider in planning an
SF insertion is the use of deception, a key
element in the creation of surprise. Sun Tzu,
in The Art of War, could not have emphasised the importance of deception more.
He said that All warfare is based on deception; a series of his quotes emphasize how
this tactic is as important to any SF unit
planning an insertion today as it was when
these words were first written some 2,500
years ago.
If your opponent is of choleric temper,
seek to irritate him... Pretend to be weak,
that he may grow arrogant... If he is taking
his ease, give him no rest.
Your opponent is unprepared because
you have deceived him. He does not expect you because you have irritated him,
made him arrogant, and denied him the
rest required for him to regain his senses
and reconsider his vulnerable position.
Today, more and more SF insertions are
likely to be covert in their execution, due

The South Korean company Vogo Engineering has been developing

and manufacturing SDVs for many years. Here is the 35 knot, 10-man,
1.5 tonne SDV 1000.

European Security & Defence April 2016

Photo: U.S. Navy

Armament & techn o log y

Members of SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team Two (SDVT-2) prepare to launch

one of the teams SEAL Delivery Vehicles (SDV) from the back of the
Los Angeles Class attack submarine USS PHILADELPHIA (SSN 690) on a
training exercise.

to the nature of the threat. But no matter how good the SF manpower and how
precise their tactics, without the very best
equipment to support them in their task
there is a potential problem this expensive
manpower asset is unlikely to return.

Tactical Insertion
in a CT Scenario.
ESD spoke with Steve Heaword, Technical
Director at Crib Gogh and tropical capability advisor to Dstl in the United Kingdom.
Heaword told ESD that with modern terror-

ists today hiding in plain sight, amongst

urban populations, SF teams must do likewise, becoming part of the environment, if
possible. This is difficult in certain cultures
but adequate intelligence might allow to
insert an SF team into a safe house until
required to act. Heaword said that the days
of going into a situation with all guns blazing, with helicopters, etc, as a calling card
is an approach that, in Mogadishu for example, cost lives in what was expected to
be an easy operation.
Covert insertion is the only way for an
SF team, added Heaword, adding, The

The essential factor in warfare is speed.

Insertion may be quick or slow, shallow or deep, but the requirements will be met by air, ground and sea, or a
mixture of these, depending on the requirements for stealth or as also highlighted by Sun Tzu speed: The
essential factor in warfare is speed. Speed and stealth are not mutually exclusive. Very often a balance has to
be struck, and perhaps the main difference between modern SF operations and their predecessors is the limitedduration / full recovery aspect: months-long forays into hostile territory are difficult to countenance in a world of
modern communications and social networks, while the prospect of deployment without an exit plan is politically and socially far less acceptable than regime-changing invasion without an overall goal or an exit strategy.
It should also be mentioned although it is a separate discussion that the greatly enhanced capabilities of
modern SF over their predecessors comes with a greatly enhanced load to carry, and most Western armies
already load their regular troops to and beyond their physical limits. SF (and regular) planners must look at mechanical options for transporting those capabilities after delivery into theatre, whether in the form of traditional
small vehicles, unmanned mules or even an exo-skeleton solution.
Space precludes going into any significant detail, but while the basic principles of SF insertion have remained
largely unchanged over the years the details are very significantly different, driven by developments in electronics, material science and signature management capabilities. In the air, HALO parachute delivery benefits from
more advanced parachute design and materials, supported by better guidance and navigation systems and
enhanced survival equipment. Fixed wing aircraft profit from advanced coatings to deny radar lock, and can
offer the ability to fight either on the way in or out and can be made extremely quiet. Rotary wing alternatives
offer potentially more accurate delivery closer to an objective and the essential exit options. Recent developments in the hybrid world of tilt-rotors offer an interesting blend of capabilities.
On land the ubiquitous Land Rover has been largely replaced in first-world armies, but in numerous hot-spots
it remains a stripped-down stalwart, joined by up-armoured Land Cruisers and increasing numbers of much
smaller, often skeletonised assault vehicles and the like, mostly with 4 wheels but occasionally with 3 or even
2; and while the prospect of sending a lone officer into the anticipated big battlefields of Western Europe on a
single-cylinder motorcycle would never have been a realistic act of war, a group of motorcycle-mounted SF
is a very viable option in the modern asymmetrical mission spectrum.
Interestingly, despite the prevalence of land-based disputes in the 21st century, the most intriguing developments in terms of SF insertion options are being made in the naval realm. Possibly this is a consequence of
the US forces famous Pivot to Asia or perhaps it is just a reflection of the insurmountable lack of capability
in conventional land and air forces that NATO currently and enticingly offers for testing. Be that as it may, the
largely insurmountable problem of avoiding or disguising the wake of a moving surface ship has prompted
several submerged / submersible / semi-submersible development programmes to be launched around the
world: and while these platforms have applications extending deeply into the mission spectrum of SF they are
equally useful in the critical infrastructure / harbour / coastal protection role, and have clear applications for
offense, defence and deterrence... 
(SB)

only SF team that actually welcomes the

notoriety of no one knowing who they are
is the SBS. They are such a small outfit but
are hugely impressive and professional;
everything they do is covert. In an amphibious insertion they might go in using
a scuba re-breather tanks underwater; if
the mission is on land they will probably
be dropped off a considerable distance
from their objective and yomp the rest
of the way. Their approach to insertion is
extremely effective.

SF Assets Need the Best

Equipment Money can Buy
The more critical the job, the more critical
the equipment: the military must get the
best possible return on investment. ESD
understands that it costs between 30k
and 40k to train a standard British Army
infantry soldier and over 70k to train a
Royal Marine Commando. Each time either is sent to learn and qualify in a new
skill that investment increases. The cost
to train an SF operator is in the region of
3million. Not only does it make sense to
try and maximise the return on such an
investment, but it also makes absolute
sense to support such expensive troops
in their tasks with the best equipment
available.
According to Heaword, The problem is
that the equipment procurement people
do not always buy the best equipment for
the best troops. You should not look at
these men as an expendable item. They
simply are not expendable. You want to
use them and you will want to re-use them
again and again to get value for money
from your trained and honed human asset.
One possible solution is to permit SF personnel to source their own best kit,
with the caveat that allowing individuals
to buy what they want, if it is not government-supplied, can create different problems of its own. One major drawback is
a relative lack of knowledge; what the
guys like to use is not necessarily the
best kit to keep them alive. This requires
the supporting industry and media to
step up to the plate in terms of providing information and the soldiers and
operatives to do the same in terms of
seeking it out and receiving it. On the
other hand, for SF as well as for regular
troops, advertising what equipment you
want starts an information flow that ends
up with the information in the public domain and known to the very people to
be engaged. And of course, knowing
a certain piece of equipment is in service
allows the terrorist to adapt.
L

April 2016 European Security & Defence

61

 Armament & techn o log y

The US SOCOM Fleet Recovery

he Department of Defenses Fiscal Year
2016 budget request for SOCOM is almost double the FY 2014 request for US$
$37.4 M, at US$ 73.5M just for tactical
vehicle acquisition. The implication is that
much of SOCOMs existing fleet has been
used hard.
The Ground Mobility Vehicle (GMV) 1.1
programme accounts for much of the
requested amount, with GD OTS under
a US$ 562M, 7-year contract to develop
and manufacture the replacement for the
AM General M1165A1 Special Forces HMMWV. Full rate production is scheduled to
begin in 2016, with up to 1,300 vehicles
scheduled for delivery. GD is building GMV
1.1 on the basis of the FLYER 72 vehicle, giving scalability from 2,500lbs to 11,000lbs,
and transportability inside a CH-47 without
modification. This meets the DoD requirement for a fast, roll-on, roll-off capability
at speed. Work at GD is progressing on the
FLYER 60 platform, for which the company
is in its final year of a 3-year programme to
supply up to 10 vehicles under SOCOMs
Internally Transportable Vehicle (ITV) acquisition push. ITV is slightly smaller than
GMV 1.1, and fits inside a CV-22. It can
be equipped to execute various missions,
ranging from SAR to Light Assault, and
from Recce to Command to humanitarian
assistance.
The CV-22 is also able to carry Boeings
PHANTOM BADGER. Closely related to the
TROJAN RABBIT, launched on 1 April 2016,
14 of these vehicles can be carried in a C-17,
and two fit into a CH-47 or C-130, permitting the rapid application of significant
force. PHANTOM BADGER has been in production since late 2013 and continues to
attract potential export interest. Again, the
PHANTOM BADGER can support a range
of missions.
Continuing down the CV-22 transportable options, Polaris Defense has also been
building vehicles for SOCOM. Deliveries of
the DAGOR ultra-light combat vehicle began in 2014 to which ESD was introduced
in October 2015, at AUSA and since 2013
Polaris has been supplying both MRZR and
Lightweight Tactical All-Terrain Vehicles to
the Command. Every variant of Polaris Defenses military vehicle range is in service
with the US Special Forces, and the company also supplies over 20 foreign countries.
DAGOR can be underslung by CH-47, CH53 or UH-60 helicopter, and can carry up
to 3,250lbs cargo or 9 soldiers. As the latest
member of the Polaris Defense family it has

62

Photo: Boeing

Two PHANTOM BADGERs from Boeing fit into a CH-47 CHINOOK

been engineered to meet stringent requirements in terms of air transportability and

advanced off-road mobility, and designed
to be easy to maintain and to use.
British-Australian company Supacat continues to propose the LRV 400 Mk2, a lightweight reconnaissance vehicle intended for
Special Operations Forces. The earlier LRV
400 Mk1 was developed to fill the gap between quad bikes and the companys HMT
series, which includes the JACKAL, COYOTE and HMT EXTENDA. Available either
as a 4x4 or 6x6, the Mk2 is described as
a scaled-down version of JACKAL with
the same all-terrain performance, carrying
up to four people at speeds of up to 100
mph (162 kph) to an operational radius of
some 500 miles (800 km). The LRV 400
Mk2 fits inside a CH-47 CHINOOK fully
mission-ready.

The Expensive Option

The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) will
initially be used by the U.S. Army and U.S.
Marine Corps. However, the winner of
the JLTV competition, Oshkosh, says that
the vehicle is very well-suited to Special
Forces missions. Oshkosh was awarded
the contract in August 2015 and the GAO
has rejected protests filed by the defeated
bidders. JLTV is not cheap, especially fullyoutfitted, and although it is highly capable in all types of terrain, and able to be
equipped with comprehensive capabilities
it remains a relatively expensive option,
and one therefore for which export other
than through FMS might be limited.

European Security & Defence April 2016

The Oshkosh M-ATV remains in use with

U.S. SOF, to meet their specific requirements, including rapid egress, storage,
payload and visibility, and the M-ATV is
designed to accommodate a full C4ISR
suite as defined by the special forces. The
M-ATV is the smallest and most mobile of
the MRAP family, also built by Oshkosh.

The Economy Option?

A new Non-Standard Commercial Vehicle
(NSCV) contract from SOCOM was announced in May 2015, and RFPs are currently awaited. In February 2015, SOCOM
issued an RFI looking for details on vehicles
typically found in central Asia including
dual-cab pickups such as the Mitsubishi
L200, Toyota Hilux and Toyota Land Cruiser
79; sport utility vehicles, including the Land
Cruiser 76, 78 and 200; vans, such as the
Toyota Hiace; and saloon cars including the
Mitsubishi Lancer and Toyota Corolla and
Camry. Premium SUVs such as Land Rovers
and Range Rovers are not part of the RFI.
Having already built some 300 Hilux, Land
Cruiser 200 and Land Cruiser 70-series vehicles for SOF, Battelle is a prime contender,
and the company is able to meet all of the
numerous requirements listed in the RFI.
Also considering the requirement is Navistar
Defense, whose Special Operations Tactical
Vehicle Blended (SOTV-B), also seen at
AUSA 2015, looks like a standard, nondescript pickup truck but whose demure
appearance hides significant armour and
capabilities of interest to SOF hiding in
plain view... 
(sb)

Armament & techn o log y

PIRANHA 5 The New 8x8 Armoured

Vehicle for the Spanish Army
Nuria Fernndez

The PIRANHA 5 armoured Infantry fighting vehicle developed by

General Dynamics has been chosen by the Spanish Ministry of Defence
as the base platform for the future VBR 8x8 of the Army, a long awaited
programme that was finally launched in 2015.

security measures, situational awareness,

long-range vision, fuel efficiency for engines, and command and control.
General Dynamics-Santa Brbara Sistemas is
already working on the prototype required
by the Spanish Army. The original PIRAPhotos: author

he Spanish companies Santa Brbara Sistemas (a subsidary of General Dynamics

European Land Systems in Spain), Indra and
Sapa have received a first research and development (R&D) contract with a volume of
89.2 million (US $99 million) to conduct a

A Vehicle Designed for the

Future

A maximum level of protection against mines and IED (improvised

explosive devices) for the crew has been one of the main requirements
of the Spanish Army.

temporary joint venture named UTE VCR

8x8.
This R&D contract was signed last December. It provides for the delivery of five PIRANHA 5 vehicles within three years (20162018). The joint venture will have to develop
different technological projects related to

Au th o r
Nuria Fernndez is the editor of
the Spanish edition of the online
newsletter infodefensa and a regular
contributor to ESD.

Minister of Defence, the new vehicle of the

Army will be subject to export efforts as
100 percent Spanish. That means that the
Spanish joint venture will have the design
authority of the project.
The Ministry has also decreed that the programme must take advantage of the participation of other smaller national companies
that can provide highly specialised and innovative systems, such as Tecnobit in the
area of optronics.
The participation of these companies will
contribute to increase the national components of the new vehicle and, at the same
time, to ensure the production and engineering capabilities, considered strategic
capabilities for the Spanish defence sector.
As usual in so-called Special Armament
Programmes, the 8x8 vehicle contract will
be pre-financed by the Ministry of Industry,
which has a part of the budget assigned for
Support to Technological Innovation in the
Field of Defence.
On 31 July 2015 the Council of Ministers
approved the budget agreement between
the Ministry of Defence and the industry.
According to this agreement, the Ministry of
Industry anticipates 89.2 million in three instalments: 40.8 million in 2015, 30.6 million
in 2016 and 17.8 million in 2017. The Ministry of Defence will return these amounts
in 2018.

NHA 5 was designed by Mowag, the Swiss

branch of the company. Mowag has built
PIRANHA vehicles for more than 20 armies.
The US Armys STRYKER vehicle is also inspired by the PIRANHA family.
Indra is the main Spanish defence technology company, and Sapa offers a range
of products in the fields of transmissions,
control electronics, power electronics
and electrical machines. Upon completion of the evaluation and risk reduction
phases the Spanish Ministry of Defence
plans to sign an agreement to build 400
vehicles with a budget of US $1.5 billion.
According to Pedro Morens, the Spanish

With an estimated cost between 3.8 and

5.5 million, according to industry sources,
the PIRANHA 5 is a highly mobile, armoured
multi-role wheeled vehicle with a high payload and a large utilisable internal volume.
Also, Santa Brbara Sistemas (SBS) emphasise the vehicles growth potential and flexibility allowed for long service periods and
a reduction of maintenance and support
costs.
The vehicle is designed with the maximum
level of protection against mines and IED
(improvised explosive devices), one of the
main requirements of the Spanish Army
after 13 years in Afghanistan, and has a
modular adaptable integrated protection
layout which can be tailored according to
emerging threats.

April 2016 European Security & Defence

63

 Armament & techn o log y

In Spain, SBS has participated in every significant armoured vehicles contract for the last
50 years. As a result, the company has the
necessary R&D and production capabilities
for an entirely Spanish product. In addition
to that, it has the required staff and means
to provide full support services.

A Long Awaited Programme

PIRANHA V in APC configuration with machine gun and smoke launchers

With development starting in the 1970s, the PIRANHA family comprises

4x4, 6x6, 8x8 and 10x10 variants. Over 10,000 vehicles of this kind are in
global service today.

A modular and open architecture allows

for versatile systems integration in support
of different configurations. The system has
been laid out for the integration of an integrated starter generator (ISG) that can generate energy for the systems on board and,
at the same time, provide up to 100kw to
power military or civil facilities. In addition to
that, with a payload of up to 15 tons the vehicle has the necessary capacity to integrate
any required mission element.
Another feature of relevance is the high manoeuvrability thanks to an economic Fuel
Efficient Drive train System (FEDS) and the
high performance diesel engine according
to EURO III standard, which provide the expected power and operating ranges. The vehicle even has a growth potential for hybrid
boost power. In addition to that, the semiactive hydro-pneumatic suspension system
with height management control enables
highest mobility and excellent ride comfort
for the crew.
The PIRANHA 5 can be transported by land,
at sea and in the air, which makes it particularly suitable for rapid deployment operations.
64

The Spanish company also points out that

the PIRANHA belongs to a family of armoured vehicles tested in different scenarios
and operations and that it has incorporated
the lessons learned from its 20 users.

The VBR (Vehculo de Combate sobre Ruedas Spanish for wheeled armoured vehicle)
8x8 Programme has been long awaited by
the Spanish Army, which needs, in the short
term, to equip the new organic multitask
brigades (BOP) and, in the medium to long
long term, to replace the current wheeled
armoured vehicles (BMR) and even some
tracked vehicles like the M-113.
In 2009, the Ministry of Defence sent the
first Request for Information (RfI) to some
companies to collect updated information
on armoured 8x8 vehicles on the market.
At that time the Ministry had planned to
award contracts in several phases. In the first
phase, the forecast was to buy 300 vehicles
in three configurations: personnel carrier,
exploration and command and control. Other configurations recovery, mortar carrier,
communications, EOD or forward observer
would arrive in the following stages.
Nevertheless, the continuous reductions of
the defence budgets and the cuts in current expenses caused by the financial crisis
prompted that the launch of the programme
was postponed year after year.
Finally, in May 2015, the Ministry reopened
the programme with a new RfI sent to five
national and international companies: General Dynamics-Santa Brbara Sistemas, CIO
Iveco-Oto Melara, Nexter, Patria and the ARTEC consortium formed by Krauss-Maffei

The vehicle during performance tests. The rope cutter in front of the
open hatch is to support protection against IEDs.

European Security & Defence April 2016

Armament & techn o log y

national industry and reaching the level of
maturity required to enable their integration
into the 8x8 platform.
The launch of the VCR 8x8 programme,
together with the new F-110 frigates programme, marked the beginning of a new
investment cycle in Spain, according to
the Undersecretary of State to the Defence Commission in Congress during his
remarks to explain the new budgets. The
Undersecretary also asked the Parliament
for political consensus to protect investment in defence and endow the armed
forces with a more stable financial framework.
L

According to current plans the Spanish Army is to procure up to 400 VBR

type vehicles.

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11-12 May 2016

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Wegmann (KMW) and Rheinmetall.

The five companies had already
shown their proposals in response
to this requirement at several exhibitions and events in the months
before.
GD-SBS submitted a proposal for the
PIRANHA 5, the vehicle chosen some
weeks before by the Danish Ministry of Defence to replace the M-113
tracked vehicles.
The proposal by CIO Iveco-Oto Melara was the FRECCIA, an armoured
combat vehicle developed for the
Italian Army which had already provided proof of its value in operations.
The French company Nexter offered
the VBCI, a vehicle in service with
the French Army and also proven in
operations.
ARTECs bid was for the BOXER, a
vehicle ordered by the German and
Dutch Armies in 2006 (472 vehicles
in nine different configurations). And
Patrias candidate was the AMV (Armoured Modular Vehicle), an 8x8
vehicle with an excellent mobility
that can be produced on the base of
three different platforms.
Undersecretary of State for Defence
Pedro Argelles then insisted on the
contractor having the intellectual
property and design authority of the
vehicle in order to be able to modify
and export it without asking for permission from the original manufacturer.
After evaluation of the five proposals
in August the Ministry decided to ask
for more detailed offers from Santa
Brbara Sistemas, Indra and Sapa.
Months later, in December, the Ministry awarded the contract to the
three companies to develop different projects aimed at analysing the
viability of new technologies, incorporating strategic capabilities of the

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I ndustry & M ark e ts

Submarine Weapons and Sensors

Trends and Developments
Bob Nugent

It is an interesting time in the history of the submarine as a naval

weapon. In just over 100 years the submarine has gone from an
experimental auxiliary and scouting platform to one of the primary
(and in some navies the leading) components of fleet structures.

Au th o r
Bob Nugent is a Virginia-based
Affiliate Consultant for AMI International in Bremerton, WA, USA.

This 20-year sub spending forecast has increased by 50% (over US$100 billion) since
2010. This does not represent a rising tide
raising all boats phenomenon. Rather, navies are shifting resources away from other
platforms and capabilities to invest in new
Photo: US Navy

nd navies are accelerating efforts to

expand and improve their submarine
forces. The U.S. and Western Europe continue to lead in most aspects of submarine
weapons and sensor development, but the
gap is narrowing. Around the world the
submarine is gaining an increasing share of
naval shipbuilding and systems investment
a trend seen in global navies, emerging
regional powers, and even local and coastal
fleets.
At least two factors seem to be at work
here. The submarine retains its traditional
advantages of stealth and manoeuvrability
across a broad set of anti-ship, land strike
and strategic deterrence missions, making
it a very versatile platform providing high
operational return on investment.
And the increasing vulnerability of surface
ships magnified by technology developments in information technology, robotics
and materials also seems to be contributing to the surge in submarine acquisition.
Some measures of the growing importance
of the submarine in the world naval balance can be found in AMIs most recent 20
year naval ship acquisition forecasts. AMI
projects that over the next two decades,
spending on new submarine construction
(hulls and systems) will account for almost a
third of all global naval spend on new ships
through 2035. This translates into 368 new
nuclear and conventional submarines forecast to be acquired by 40 different countries over the next two decades. Of those,
124 (almost one third) are in the Asia-Pacific region, another 50 hulls are projected
for Russia, and over 30 for countries in the
Mid-East and North Africa.

and even Azerbaijan are all devoting time

and resources to consider how to add the
submarine dimension to their force structures. Others are recapitalizing existing sub
capability with modernisation programmes
countries such as Egypt and Peru.
The global submarine scene will continue
to show a pattern of increasing investment,
proliferation of operating navies, and diffusion of technical and tactical expertise. In
such a setting, developments in submarine
weapons and sensors will take on increasing importance in setting out qualitative
difference that are required for smaller na-

The USS CONNECTICUT (SSN 22), a SEAWOLF class attack submarine of

the US Navy

submarine programmes. And submarines

continue to represent the single most expensive type of warship to build, measured
on a ton-for-ton basis.
Moreover, forecasted growth in submarines is strongest in the firmest kinds of
planned spending programmes with detailed budgets and schedules, documented
requirements, and concept design/development work already underway.
The worlds largest navies continue be
the largest buyers of new subs the U.S.,
NATO, China, Russia and India together account for just over 50% of future new sub
acquisitions in the next 20 years.
That said the proliferation of planned submarine acquisitions will bring submarine
capability to new places. Countries like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Morocco, Myanmar,

vies to counter more numerous rivals. This

short article considers some trends in submarine weapons (missiles and torpedoes)
as well as developments in combat systems
that will influence the future balance of the
worlds submarine forces.

Submarine Weapons
Developments.
Submarine Missiles
The U.S. Navy has recognised a gap in
submarine-based anti-ship missiles and
is working to fill it. The Navys last sublaunched anti-ship missile the UGM-84A
HARPOON was retired in 1997. For almost 20 years the primary anti-ship weapon in the U.S. submarine force has been the
Mk 48 heavy torpedo. While an effective

April 2016 European Security & Defence

67

Photo: defensie.nl

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A Russian submarine of the KILO class

68

Submarine Anti-Air Missiles

As noted above, more submarines are coming into service around the world. And increasingly these submarines are operating
Photo: PLAN

evaluate all these options the Kongsberg/

Raytheon JSM, the Lockheed Martin Long
Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM), and the
modified TOMAHAWK. The competition
is expected to evaluate submarine and surface launch modes for these weapons.
Russia has invested heavily in submarinelaunched cruise missile capability, notably
the 3M-14 KALIBR missile designed for
submarines. The Russia Navys Project 636
diesel-electric submarine ROSTOV-ON

Chinese nuclear submarine

Graphics: Lockheed Martin

weapon, the Mark 48 has a much shorter

engagement range compared to anti-ship
missiles in service with many other navies
around the world.
U.S. programmes to address the gap in
submarine anti-ship missiles reflect several approaches. The first is a new build
research and development programme.
Lockheed Martin is developing a new
Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM)
under a programme funded by DARPA and
the U.S. Navy. The LRASM will initially be
tested in air- and surface-launched prototypes. However, given the submarine antiship missile gap concerns voiced by U.S.
Navy leadership, and a service-wide effort
to disperse striking power among a wider
set of platforms (the Distributed Lethality
operating concept), a sub-launched variant
of the LRASM is likely also being looked at.
Another approach is to modernise and add
capability to an operational missile system.
In this case the Raytheon TOMAHAWK
Land Attack Missiles (TLAM) represents a
potential option to add anti-ship striking
power to the submarine fleet. The U.S. Navy successfully tested a Block IV TLAM as an
anti-ship missile, hitting a moving target at
sea in 2015. The current Block IV TLAM in
service now is a weapon primarily intended
to strike fixed targets ashore, so would require some modification for the ASM role.
A third approach is to adapt the latest
generation of smaller anti-ship missiles developed in Europe for submarine use. One
promising option is a submarine version of
Norwegian company Kongsbergs operational NAVAL STRIKE MISSILE (NSM). Here
Kongsberg is working with companies in
Europe (fellow Norwegian firm Nammo
and UKs Babcock) as well as U.S. joint venture partner Raytheon.
Kongsbergs submarine variant of the NSM
modifies the F-35 JOINT STRIKE MISSILE
(JSM) variant to be launched from the
standard 533mm torpedo tube. A 2014
teaming arrangement between Kongsberg and Raytheon will offer the JSM to the
United States Navy for their Offensive AntiSurface Warfare (OASuW) requirement.
As the U.S. Navy plans competition for the
OAsuW program in 2017, it is expected to

into service, with ranges of up to 2,500 km

claimed by Russian sources. And the KALIBR is designed to operate from smaller displacement platforms like the Project 636,
successor to the widely exported KILO
class of conventional submarine.
Chinese moves to improve and expand its
submarine-launched missile capability have
also accelerated over the past decade and
represent a primary driver of increased naval
missile defence and anti-submarine capability investments, especially in the Asia-Pacific
region. Chinas submarine missile arsenal
has been enhanced with the widespread deployment of the submarine-launched YJ-18
having an assessed range of over 500 km.
The older YJ-82 submarine launched missile
has a range of under 40 km.

Lockheed Martins new Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) is designed to meet the needs of U.S. Navy and Air Force warfighters in a
robust anti-access/area-denial threat environment.

DON launched KALIBRs against Syrian

land targets from a position in the Mediterranean Sea in December, 2015. The KALIBR
is an updated variant of a missile that went

European Security & Defence April 2016

in the near shore EEZ and littoral environment, where aircraft (fixed wing and helicopters) pose a primary threat to submarine
operations.

Photo: Raytheon

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decisions. The IDAS is also described as capable of engaging small fast surface vessels
and land targets in near-shore locations.

Image: Kongsberg

Launching of a TOMAHAWK Land Attack Missiles (TLAM) Block IV from

Raytheon

Photo: ATLAS ELEKTRONIK

Kongsberg offers a submarine variant of its operational NAVAL STRIKE

MISSILE (NSM) to be launched from the standard 533mm torpedo tube.
The figure shows the NSM packaged in a torpedo tube canister with
folded wings. The available space in the canister behind the missile is
for a booster.

The SeaHake mod4 from ATLAS ELEKTRONIK

So while submarine-launched anti-ship

missiles are attracting a lot of attention,
programmes to develop new anti-air
missile capability for submarines are also
progressing. One example is the IDAS (Interactive Defence and Attack System for
Submarines) programme. German companies Diehl BGT Defence and ThyssenKrupp
70

Marine Systems are working on an IDAS capability to enable submerged submarines

to counter airborne ASW threats. The IDAS
missile is launched from a torpedo tube by
means of a specialised launching container.
The missile is guided in flight through a fibre optic cable to keep positive operator
control for target ID and final engagement

European Security & Defence April 2016

Submarine Heavyweight Torpedoes

While missiles are a focus of submarine
force modernisation around the world, the
long-range heavyweight torpedo remains
the main battery of most submarines
today, with active torpedo acquisition programmes continuing in many countries. European naval industry continues to lead in
the number and capability of heavyweight
torpedoes offered for domestic and export
submarine customers:
The BLACK SHARK ADVANCED (BSA)
produced by Whitehead SistemiSubacquei
(WASS) in cooperation with the Italian Navy
will replace the A-184 heavyweight torpedo
on the Italian Navys U212 class. The BSA
is also supplied to the Hellenic Navy (Type
U214), French Navy (BARRACUDA SSN,
ANDRASTA SSK), and SCORPENEs of the
Chilean Navy and Royal Malaysian Navy. The
BSAs range is about 50 km.
The F21 heavyweight torpedo jointly designed and produced by French company
DCNS and German ATLAS ELEKTRONIK is
expected to become operational this year.
The F21 is a dual-purpose torpedo that is
effective against submarines and surface
vessels. The F21 will replace the French submarine fleets F17 mod2 torpedo aboard
French nuclear attack and ballistic missile
submarines as well as conventional subs.
The torpedo is estimated to have a range
in excess of 50 km.
The SPEARFISH advanced heavyweight torpedo from BAE Systems uses a gas turbine
engine powered by Otto Fuel. The SPEARFISH is capable of ranges up to 48km at
low speeds.
Saabs Torpedo 62 (Torpedo 2000 for export)has a pump jet engine capable of
reaching targets over 40km away.
The ATLAS ELEKTRONIK DM2A4 SEEHECHT
is the primary weapon of German Navy
Type 212 submarines. The heavyweight
torpedo, weighing 1.37t, can be launched
from both submarines and surface ships.
While the DM2A4s and its updated export
version SeaHake mod4s primary engagement range is in the 50-75 km range, an
extended range variant of the torpedo has
achieved ranges of more than 140 km in a
2012 test firing.
The Mk48 ADCAP Mod 7 Common Broadband Advanced Sonar System (CBASS) developed by Lockheed Martinis a primary
submarine weapon system for the U.S. Navy. Australia, Canada, Brazil and the Royal
Netherlands Navy operate the Mk 48 as
well. The Mk 48 is also OTTO-fuelled and
can reach ranges of 50 km or more. The

Visit us at

UDT 2016
Booth A22

The New Chapter in Naval Supremacy

The SeaHake mod4 is the dual-purpose and fibre-optic wire-guided heavyweight torpedo that fully meets the
operational requirements of modern Navies.
It is specifically designed to meet the confined shallow and blue water environments of todays and future
naval scenarios. In our more than 130 year torpedo tradition SeaHake mod4 is the latest member of the highly
successful SeaHake family of torpedoes that started its evolution more than 45 years ago.

www.atlas-elektronik.com

... a sound decision

ATLAS ELEKTRONIK
A joint company of ThyssenKrupp and Airbus DS

Photo: HOBATOP

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U.S. Navy is currently planning to restart
production of the Mk48 some 15 years
since series production halted.

Submarine Sensor
Developments

UUV Offboard Sensors

Another option to overcome the tyranny
of weight and space that limit submarine sensor options especially on smaller
hulls-- is to remove some of these systems
from the submarine altogether. In this operational concept, the submarine is more
platform carrier than front end platform
itself akin to the aircraft/aircraft carrier
operational division of labour.
The US advanced defence research agency DARPA announced in early 2016 a programme to develop a sonar system on
board an unmanned underwater vehicle
that can be deployed from a submarine
to mitigate the limits of passive submarine sonar sensors. The Mobile Offboard
Clandestine Communications and Approach (MOCCA) programme seeks to
overcome two primary challenges of this
operational and technological concept:
secure communications and vehicle size.
That programme is slated to run over the
next 36-48 months.
72

Graphics: HDW

Towed Sonar Arrays for Smaller

Conventional Submarines
Industry leaders in submarine sensor systems are focusing new capability offerings
on the disadvantaged users who are
the bulk of the existing global inventory of
submarines conventional submarines displacing 3000t or less (full load). The power
and space limitations of these subs have
traditionally limited equipping them with
the towed passive arrays commonly fitted
on larger submarine types.
One example is the work by German company ATLAS ELEKTRONIK to reduce the
size of the handling system and total array volume required to stow aboard the
submarine. Compact modular towed array
handling systems, making use of recent
advances in manufacturing and materials technologies potentially offer smaller
submarines better towed array capabilities
compared to conventional hull-mounted
sonar suite.

3M 14E, the land attack variant of the KALIBR missile

The Interactive Defence and Attack System for Submarines from the
German companies Diehl BGT Defence and ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems
enables submerged submarines to counter airborne ASW threats.
Photo: DCNS

Weapons tend to get most of the attention

and funding when future submarine capability is discussed. However the accelerating
revolution in information processing, materials, and manufacturing techniques are
generating new approaches to submarine
sensors. Among the more notable developments:

The F21 heavyweight torpedo jointly designed and produced by French

company DCNS and German ATLAS ELEKTRONIK is expected to become
operational this year.

Accelerating Sensor and System

Modernisation with Open
Architecture
Another means to accelerate sensor and
combat systems performance is to tap into
commercial industry developments which
are recognised as outpacing tech refresh
rates possible within most defence acquisition systems.
The Navys Acoustic Rapid CommercialOff-The-Shelf Insertion (ARCI) -programme has taken this approach with sonar system modernisation. The programme

European Security & Defence April 2016

regularly refreshes central processors with

COTS computer technology and software.
ARCI processors handle data from the submarines spherical array, hull array, wide
aperture array, high-frequency arrays, and
towed arrays.
Given the success of the ARCI approach,
the hunt is on to apply the methodology
to other combat and weapons systems improvements. And this is true not only in the
submarine enterprise, but for other areas of
leading edge systems development such as
unmanned systems.
L

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Combat Aircraft in Europe

Multiple Markets and Multiple Choices
David Saw

Ever since the 1950s there has been one truth in heavyweight combat aircraft procurement, that while each succeeding generation of
combat aircraft offers more performance it comes in tandem with an
increase in costs, both in terms of procurement and sustainment.

Au th o r
David Saw is a specialist defence
writer based in Paris, France and a
regular contributor to ESD.

countries with combat aircraft acquisition

programmes at various different levels of
intensity. Our objective in this article is to
identify the European countries with viable
combat aircraft programmes and then look
Photo: US Air Force

he end result is that although one might

have better aircraft, one will almost certainly have fewer of them. Eventually this
brings one to a point where increases in
quality can fail to compensate for lack of
quantity.
There is nothing particularly shocking
about cost escalation in defence procurement, but in the context of the current
European combat aircraft marketplace
higher prices are coming at a time when
defence budgets are not over-endowed
with cash. Furthermore it must be remembered that many European nations have
been perfectly happy to seek to avoid
major defence procurement programmes
on the basis that there is no major league
threat. They have also not been that concerned by the decline in their military capabilities, as evidenced by the savage cuts
to the Netherlands Army armoured vehicle
fleets for example.
One must also note that popular opinion
in Europe has hardly been that supportive
of combat aircraft procurements. Something that was demonstrated most obviously in Switzerland with the TTE fighter
programme, where the plan to acquire 22
GRIPEN E fighters at a cost of US$ 3.27
billion, announced by the Swiss authorities
in 2011, was rejected by the Swiss public
in a referendum in May 2014. Although
rebuffed in their fighter procurement
plans in 2014, now, nearly two years on,
the Swiss military is looking once more at
a new fighter programme and intends to
start the groundwork shortly for the new
programme, with a view to entering the
competition phase in 2017.
Elsewhere in Europe there are a number of

that the possession of a viable defence capability might all of a sudden be a good
idea.
What this all means is that the European
combat aircraft marketplace of today cannot be characterised as predictable in any
way, shape or form. There are so many
factors, both political and economic, currently in play that the word complicated
appears to understate what is taking place.
We also have to remember that a key player
in this European combat aircraft drama is
not even European, and that key player is

A Lockheed Martin F-35A LIGHTNING II at Mountain Home Air Force

Base, Idaho, to use the range complexes around the base. The F-35 JOINT
STRIKE FIGHTER (JSF) has had a difficult development programme, yet
even so it should become a dominant combat aircraft in Europe over the
next few years.

at the aircraft that are most likely to meet

their needs. There is a caveat in all of this
though: the best laid defence procurement
plans rarely survive a collision with political realities. The global economic situation
is hardly that inspiring, should there be a
major economic downturn it is inevitable
that defence programmes will be cut. On
one hand, the refugee crisis sweeping Europe will impose significant, and in most
cases unanticipated, financial burdens on
European nations and the obvious place to
look in search of funds to cover this burden
is defence budgets. On the other hand, the
influence of people and events cannot be
underestimated. Vladimir Putins increasingly resurgent Russia has gone a long way
to convincing many European politicians

the United States. Therefore we have to

take into account the fact that whatever
happens in the US will have implications in
the European combat aircraft marketplace.

The Answer and the

Question
Before we get to US involvement in the European combat aircraft scene, it is necessary to look at European products that are
influential in the marketplace. In the 1970s,
air forces and aerospace companies started
work on a number of proposals aimed at
generating a new state-of-the-art combat
aircraft that could be built in a collaborative
manner. By the early 1980s this had evolved
into the Future European Fighter Aircraft

April 2016 European Security & Defence

73

Photo: Ilmavoimat

A trio of advanced combat aircraft over Langley-Eustis, Virginia:a French

Air Force Dassault RAFALE, with a Royal Air Force Eurofighter TYPHOON
FGR4 and a US Air Force Lockheed Martin F-22 RAPTOR. In the end the
RAPTOR proved too expensive for even the US Air Force, for RAFALE and
TYPHOON though opportunities for export still exist.

Photo: US Air Force

Photo: US Air Force

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Shown here at Red Flag 16-1 at Nellis

in Nevada, the Lockheed Martin F-16
remains one of the most successful
combat aircraft of the modern era. In a
European context it is in service with
Belgium, Denmark, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Poland and
Turkey. Lockheed Martin hopes the JSF
will repeat the success of the F-16.

The Boeing F/A-18A/B/C/D found three European customers in the

form of Spain, Finland and Switzerland. Finland acquired 64 F/A-18C/D
between 1995 and 2000, one of which is shown here. Finland is now
looking for an F/A-18C/D replacement under the HX fighter programme,
with contract award due in early 2021.

(FEFA) concept. Then in 1985 the European

collaborative approach broke into two. This
resulted in Britain, Germany, Italy and Spain
working together on the Eurofighter TYPHOON, while France developed a national
combat aircraft solution in the form of the
Dassault RAFALE. The Luftwaffe would
accept the first TYPHOON into service in
August 2003, with the French Navy having
taken the first RAFALE into service in December 2000. The other European combat
aircraft contender comes from Sweden in
the shape of the GRIPEN and once again
the initial work started at the end of the
1970s.The GRIPEN prototype flew in 1988,
with service entry in 1997.
For various reasons all three of these European combat aircraft took longer to
develop than initially envisaged and also
ended up being substantially more costly
than anticipated. These were contributing
74

factors to many of the customer nations

cutting the numbers of aircraft that they
had promised to order. Originally the Eurofighter programme was going to amount
to 620 aircraft split between the four partner nations, today orders from the partner
nations amount to 472 aircraft. However,
export sales have made a significant contribution to the programme, Austria with 15,
Oman with 12, Saudi Arabia with 72 and
a 28 aircraft order from Kuwait is perhaps
within touching distance.
RAFALE has also faced issues with its national customer and order numbers. Originally, France was looking at 286 RAFALEs,
but in the end the French Air Force committed to 132 RAFALE B/C, with the French
Navy taking 48 RAFALE M. Export success
proved elusive until 2015, when orders
were received from Egypt for 24 aircraft
and from Qatar for 24 aircraft, with India

European Security & Defence April 2016

announcing an intention to proceed for 36

aircraft, although negotiations to formalise
an order are still ongoing. Other international export opportunities, like the United
Arab Emirates (UAE), still exist for RAFALE
and the aircraft ought to be under consideration for the resurrected Swiss fighter
programme.
The GRIPEN is the lowest-cost European
contender. Sweden has ordered 204 aircraft, and since then the Czech Republic
(14 aircraft) and Hungary (14 aircraft) have
leased the GRIPEN. The first export customer for the GRIPEN was South Africa who acquired 28 aircraft. Since then Thailand has
acquired 12 and more recently Brazil opted
to order 36. Brazil was also the first order
for the advanced GRIPEN NG variant. Able
to offer both new build and second-hand
aircraft, GRIPEN still has a role to play in
ongoing European combat aircraft competitions, where this Swedish solution retains
significant cost advantages.

Meanwhile in America
To summarise, there are three credible European solutions to future heavy combat
aircraft requirements in Europe. However,
being European gives them no advantages
as far as current combat aircraft requirements are concerned. Indeed it is the US
industry that has numerous advantages in
many upcoming European combat aircraft

Photo: Saab

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A GRIPEN NG displaying an impressive load of IRIS-T and Meteor air-toair missiles and a GBU-16 PAVEWAY II laser-guided bomb. The GRIPEN
NG is being actioned to meet the needs of Brazil, but it also offers
future export customers a very credible combat aircraft choice.

competitions. Firstly, there is

the political strength of the
US, the lobbying power of its
industry and the economic/
industrial incentives that it
can bring to the table to take
into account. Then there is the
fact that the US is the incumbent combat aircraft supplier
in many European countries.
Plus, history indicates that the
US can land major deals in Europe at the expense of European competition.
Back in the 1970s the air
forces of Belgium, Denmark,
the Netherlands and Norway
joined together to form the European Participating Air Forces
(EPAF) grouping that would
work to jointly acquire a successor to the Lockheed F-104
Starfighter. In June 1975 it was
announced that the EPAF nations would acquire 348 General Dynamics (later Lockheed
Martin) F-16A/B aircraft, with
Belgium taking 116, Denmark
58, the Netherlands 102 and
Norway 72. These European
countries became the first
F-16 export customers, with
F-16 related work sustaining
the aerospace industry in the
four countries for a considerable period of time.
One could argue that the EPAF
F-16A/B order made the F-16
an international success story;
indeed, the four EPAF nations
eventually ordered 524 F-16A/
Bs between them. Turkey,
which would build many of
its F-16s, acquired 43 F-16C/D
Block 30, 117 F-16C/D Block
40 and 110 F-16C/D Block 50
aircraft with deliveries between
April 2016 European Security & Defence

75

An Italian Air Force Eurofighter TYPHOON of the 4th Stormo based at

Grosseto, Italy, participating in Red Flag 16-2 at Nellis in March 2016.
This was the first time Italian TYPHOON aircraft had participated in Red
Flag. Eurofighter war awarded a contract for 28 TYPHOON from Kuwait
in April 2016.

F/A-18 and others in US service. The aircraft also had international industrial participation: Britain was a Tier 1 partner, with
Italy and the Netherlands as Tier 2 partners,
with other original partner nations being
Australia, Canada, Denmark, Norway and
Turkey. The JSF was the programme that
was going break the link between more capability and cost. Not only was this aircraft
going to be more capable and affordable
for the users, its success was going to bring
a veritable bonanza of work to the aerospace industries in the US and the eight
original partner nations.
According to the then-JSF Program Executive Officer in an interview at the 2009 Paris
Air Show, the US and the eight partner nations were going to procure 3,000 aircraft
Photo: Royal Australian Air Force

1987 and 2012. Between 1989 and 2010

Greece would take delivery of 40 F-16C/D
Block 30, 40 F-16C/D Block 50 and 90 F16C/D Block 52. Poland would acquire a total of 48 F-16C/D Block 52 aircraft between
2006 and 2009, while Italy would lease 34
F-16A/B aircraft between 2003 and 2012,
with Portugal receiving 48 F-16A/B Block
15/Block 15OCU aircraft, both new and US
surplus, from 1994 to 1999. Between 1979
and 2012 European / NATO nations would
acquire 1,032 new F-16A/B/C/D aircraft.
Although the F-16 became the dominant
presence in terms of combat aircraft in
Europe, one should not ignore the Boeing F/A-18 HORNET. Between 1985 and
1990 Spain received 72 EF-18A/B, Finland
received 64 F/A-18C/D between 1995 and
2000, with Switzerland taking 34 F/A18C/D between 1996 and 1999. So Europe
was worth 1,202 advanced combat aircraft
to Lockheed Martin and Boeing between
1979 and 2012. Any way that you want
to look at it, Europe was and is a very important market for the US combat aircraft
industry.
The US intends to continue its dominance
of the European combat aircraft scene and
the primary mechanism through which
this is to be achieved is through the Lockheed Martin F-35 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER
(JSF). There is little point in providing a
history of the JSF, suffice to say this programme remains the biggest procurement
effort currently being undertaken by the
Pentagon.
Lockheed Martin was awarded the JSF System Development & Demonstration (SDD)
contract in October 2001. This was to be
the aircraft that would replace the F-16,

Photo: US Air Force

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A Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) Boeing F/A-18F SUPER HORNET ejects
flares during a training mission. European markets such as Denmark,
Finland and Switzerland are very important for Boeing as it seeks export sales for the SUPER HORNET to sustain production of the aircraft.

76

European Security & Defence April 2016

between them, while export sales could

add another 3,000 aircraft to this total, potentially making this a 6,000 aircraft programme. Some seven years on we can see
that these programme numbers are wishful
thinking. The JSF programme has not been
easy, the aircraft is still not ready for prime
time service and it is now far more expensive than originally anticipated though to
be fair, no recent advanced combat aircraft
programme has been able to be delivered
on time and on cost!
Despite all of this, the JSF will inevitably become the primary replacement for existing
combat aircraft in Europe. Of the original
eight JSF partner nations, both Britain and
Italy remain totally committed to this programme, the same is true of Turkey and of
Australia. The Netherlands and Norway are
also committed, but the recent change of
government in Canada puts their participation in doubt, and Denmark will have to
have a competition to meet its needs. Another key point to note is that the numbers
of JSF that will eventually be acquired are still
not set in stone. JSF is not the only game in
town, though. The Boeing F/A-18E/F SUPER
HORNET has been offered to both Denmark
and Switzerland, with Finland representing an evolving opportunity. Logic would
seem to indicate Belgium ought to follow
the Netherlands into the JSF orbit. Poland
also looks to be a future JSF possibility, while
other opportunities such as Slovakia appear
destined for second-hand or leased aircraft,
possibly in a lighter class.
Combat aircraft opportunities exist in Europe outside of JSF, so there are possibilities for F/A-18E/F, GRIPEN, RFALE and TYPHOON. The crux of the problem though
is simple: at this time how much money is
really available for combat aircraft?
L

Defense and Security

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We expect to provide much more local

content in our projects and products.
Interview with Hseyin Avar, Head, Department
of Land Platforms, Turkish Undersecretariat for Defense
Industries (SSM)

Photo: SSM

the key land platform manufacturers in the

world in the near future.

78

ESD: Without any doubt, the ALTAY MBT

programme must be among your currently
most demanding challenges. What is the

ESD: In the scope of the ALTAY programme,

can you elaborate on the individual agreements between SSM and your Korean partners, Turkish and possibly foreign defence
industries?

Photo: OTOKAR

ESD: What exactly are your responsibilities

as SSMs Director of Land Platforms, who do
you report to, and how is your department
structured?
Avar: Before I answer the question, I would
like to briefly elaborate on the mission and
structure of our Undersecretariat which will
help to explain my department and my position.
SSM is one of two Undersecretariats of the
MoND and basically in charge of advanced
defence procurements, industrialisation,
R&D activities and life cycle management
systems a nd sub-systems. Unlike other governmental institutions the vertical hierarchy
at SSM is very limited which enables us to
take quick and effective decisions, decrease
the response times and conduct projects efficiently.
The department heads of SSM report to
relevant Deputy Undersecretaries. The Deputy Undersecretary, to whom I report, is in
charge of all platform projects.
My department comprises two project
groups Battle Tanks & Tracked Vehicles
and Wheeled Vehicles & Special Projects
with nearly 20 employees.
As the Land Platforms Department, our
major responsibility is to meet land systems
requirements of the Turkish Armed Forces
(TAF) and the Turkish Police with a significant share of local content and industrialisation in accordance with our strategic
targets. We aim to create a self-sufficient
Turkish land platform industry to the maximum possible extent and enable sustainable
growth. I strongly believe that we have already achieved a lot, however, it is still not
enough to reach our goals. We will invest
much more efforts and hopefully be one of

ESD: What are the current priorities of your

work? Which major objectives are to be
met?
Avar: In the 21st century the global system
is going through major transformation with
increased uncertainty and volatility. Under
this uncertainty pressure and future combat
environment, the major objective of our department is, as I mentioned before, to create sustainable growth for the local military
vehicle industry. For this major objective our
priorities are to
Meet the entire TAF and Police Departments needs with the capabilities of our
national defence industry;
Optimize the performance, budget,
schedule and industrialisation aspects
of the vital projects;
Export our products to emerging markets;
Achieve Performance Based Logistics
(PBL) in our projects;
Apply the strategies to maintain a competitive local industry and to improve
the quality and quantity of the qualified
human resources.

status and the projected further time schedule of the programme?

Avar: I agree. Taking the complexity of
MBTs into consideration, the ALTAY Project
is the most significant project and we are
paying utmost attention to it.
Currently, we are conducting very comprehensive and thorough qualification and acceptance tests including endurance and reliability, mobility, protection, fire power, EMI/
EMC, command and control etc. with 3 different prototypes. I can proudly state that so
far the achievements of these tests, which
commenced on 20 April 2015, are above our
expectations and if it goes like that we will
have successfully qualified ALTAY as the first
national Turkish main battle tank by the end
of 2016. On the other hand, we have already
initiated the serial phase arrangements and
activities concurrently with the development
phase and the first batch of ALTAYs is scheduled to be produced and delivered in 2018.
Following deliveries of the first batch, we will
enrich the ALTAY vehicle family by developing the engineering vehicles such as recovery
vehicle and mine clearing systems using the
ALTAY chassis.

The ALTAY will be qualified as the first national Turkish main battle
tank by the end of 2016.

European Security & Defence April 2016

ESD: At the recent IDEF exhibition in Istanbul

FNSS presented two new vehicle designs. To
what extent are these developments supported and/or funded by public means?
Avar: Frankly speaking, the development
phases of these two new vehicles (KAPLAN
and PARS 4x4) were neither supported nor
funded by SSM or any other state agencies.
As I know, these vehicles were designed and
developed by FNSS engineers without any
external support or assistance and funded
in house by FNSS R&D expenditures.
On the other hand, this constitutes a perfect
example for the maturity level of the Turkish
military land vehicle industry. Besides the local defence projects, FNSS and other local
companies progressively develop indigenous vehicles in response to local and global
warfare trends and land vehicles projection
by undertaking the non-recurring costs and
marketing them to internal and external
markets. They sometimes submit bids in the
scope of local military projects with these vehicles, which is a big advantage for the government supporting a lower project budget
and schedule. These vehicles are sometimes
delivered to foreign armies even before the
Turkish Armed Forces introduce them.
ESD: How would you assess the development of the Turkish military land vehicle industry since the foundation of SSM/DIDA
(Defense Industry Development and Support Administration-Later named SSM)?
Which capabilities can be provided indigenously, and where do you still have to rely
on international cooperation?

Photos. FNSS

Avar: If your question is for the serial production phase of ALTAY Project, I could say
that it is a bit early to talk about the project
model, foreign agreements, main contractor and sub-contractors, etc. However, I
can tell you that the ratio of industrial participation/offset will be 70%minimum. On
the other hand, all these questions will be
clarified in 2016 after we conclude the serial
production arrangements.
For the development phase, OTOKAR is
the main contractor of the project and the
activities are being carried out in scope of
the agreement between SSM and OTOKAR.
OTOKAR has also signed a Technical Support and Assistance Agreement with the
Korean Hyundai-ROTEM company. Returning to your question, there is no agreement
between SSM and any foreign party. This
will also be the case in the serial production
phase, which means that SSM will only sign
a main contracting agreement with a local
company. The major subcontractors of the
development phase are ASELSAN for the
tank electronics, MKE for the main gun and
ROKETSAN for the armour.

At IDEF 2015 FNSS presented two new vehicle designs: KAPLAN (above)
and PARS 4x4.

Avar: Over the last 30 years since its foundation, the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries has made significant achievements
in building the blocks for a modern national
defence industry in Turkey, with notable results in the land vehicle industry.
At the beginning, the local industry had
some production capability, however, the
design and development skills were very
limited, even almost none. Therefore, during
the 1980s and 1990s, the requirements of
the TAF were met either through the direct
procurement from abroad or local production under licence.
Following this era, thanks to the experiences
gained from these procurements, our local
companies were encouraged to design, develop, qualify and manufacture their own
products. So that during the 2000s, we
have managed to conduct local development projects such as ALTAY, LEOPARD 1
Modernisation, Amphibious Assault Bridge,
and fortunately most of these projects were
completed successfully. The remaining projects are still on track and we expect the
same achievements from these as well.
On the other hand, the achievements that

I have already referred to do not mean that

we are done. Nowadays, not only my
department but the entire SSM is working
on the life cycle management. Hopefully,
in the future, we will not only procure and
deliver the systems to the user but we will
also manage the life cycles of our systems
so that we will be able to provide better
systems in terms of cost effectiveness and
logistics.
As a result of considerable dedication and
efforts, key defence industry institutions
have been established to meet the requirements of the TAF locally, each filling an important void in its field. Currently the Turkish
land vehicle industry is capable to develop all
kind of land platforms indigenously.
However, our local industries still have some
dependencies, not at the system level, but
with regard to some sub-systems, including
armament, sensors, armour material, suspension and propulsion systems. We expect
to deal with these issues in the near future
and provide much more local content in our
projects and products.
L
The interview was conducted
by Korhan zkilinc.

April 2016 European Security & Defence

79

Firms & Faces

(Photo: U.S. DoD)

The North Atlantic Council approved the

nomination of General Curtis M. Scaparotti, United States Army, to the post of
Supreme Allied Commander Europe. General Scaparotti (right) is currently serving as

applications across Air, Land and Marine

markets. An ESUK-KBR joint-venture was
recently awarded a contract to deliver the
fixed-wing Military Flying Training System
for the British armed forces. In addition,
Elbit Systems joint company with Thales
UK is the provider of the WATCHKEEPER
programme, the new UAS of the UK armed
forces.

Martin Fausset new CEO of

Elbit Systems UK Limited
(df) Elbit Systems UK Limited (ESUK) announced the appointment of Martin Fausset as CEO with effect of March 1, 2016.
Fausset will report directly to Bezhalel Machlis, Elbit Systems President and CEO. Prior
to his joining ESUK, Fausset held a number
(Photo: Elbit Systems)

Airbus Sells its Defence

Electronics Branch

(Photo: Airbus)

(ck) Airbus Group SE will sell its defence

electronics branch to Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co L.P. (KKR), a global investor, for
Euro 1.1Bn. The defence electronics branch
has 4,000 employees and generates a turnover of about Euro 1Bn. Airbus will retain

of senior positions in the Aerospace, Defence and Automotive sectors, including at

AgustaWestland, Rolls-Royce and Ricardo
PLC. He brings extensive international business and board experience from across a
number of sectors and markets. ESUK has
a number of wholly-owned subsidiaries
in the UK that provide advanced technology solutions for military and commercial
80

Airbus Group Proposes New

Board Members for Approval
(wb) Airbus Group SE has published the
agenda and other related information online for its AGM being held on 28 April
2016 in Amsterdam. Among the proposed
resolutions, shareholder approval will be
sought for the appointment of three new
independent non-Executive Members to
the Board of Directors. Catherine Guillouard, aged 51, Deputy CEO of Rexel SA
and a Member of the Board of Directors of
Engie SA, would replace Anne Lauvergeon,
56, whose mandate expires at the close of

ESD Has Started a New

LinkedIn Group
(df) LinkedIn has become a more and more
important source for information. The
magazine European Security & Defence
has therefore started a LinkedIn group to
share information between industry and
experts, to start discussions on security
topics and to get in touch with users in the
military. Members of this group will also
get the latest messages on the magazines
activities, upcoming events of special interest for the military community and also a
global exhibition schedule. The information
exchange between group members is of
highest interest, of course. Latest discussions included news on the risk of laser attacks on pilots, an analysis on Syria-Turkey
intervention and news on the UKs longsawaited Multi-Role Vehicle Protected
(MRV-P). Like all social media this LinkedIn
group is not a one way information sharing
portal, but a place to discuss, to ask questions, share information, get in touch with
the editorial team of ESD and ESD Spotlight
or meet partners in defence industries and
military throughout Europe. This community is still growing and the editorial team
of ESD hopes to meet you there!

Commander, United Nations Command,

Combined Forces Command, United States
Forces Korea. His recent positions include
Director of the Joint Staff and ISAF Commander. Upon completion of national
confirmation processes, he will take up his
appointment as successor to General Philip
M. Breedlove, United States Air Force, at a
change of command ceremony at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
in Mons, Belgium, expected in spring 2016.

the defence electronics branch. KKR has

the financial ressources, detailed knowledge of the global industry sector and an
international network all of which is necessary to generate growth and facilitate the
companys development.

a minority interest. Johannes Huth, a KKR

representative, said: We are glad that we
have been chosen as the best partner for

European Security & Defence April 2016

(Photo: Airbus)

General Curtis M. Scaparotti

New SACEUR

the AGM. Claudia Nemat, 47, a Member of

the Board of Management of Deutsche Telekom AG and a Member of the Supervisory
Board of Lanxess AG, would replace Manfred Bischoff, 73, whose mandate expires
at the close of the AGM. Carlos Tavares,
57, Chairman of the Management Board of
PSA Peugeot Citron and a Member of the
Board of Directors of Faurecia (a subsidiary of Peugeot SA), would replace Michel
Pbereau, 74, whose mandate expires at
the close of the AGM.

Patria Becomes a FinnishNorwegian Company

(df) The Ownership Steering Department
in Finlands Prime Ministers Office has
released information about Patrias new
minority owner and ownership structure.
The State of Finland is to sell 49.9% of the
defence company Patria Oyj to Kongsberg
Defence & Aerospace AS. The total value of
the transaction is Euro 270M. The transaction is expected to be concluded during
the second quarter of 2016. After that the
State of Finland will own 50.1% of Patria
Oyj. Kongsberg is more than 200 years old,
and the State of Norway is its main stake-

NITEC16 in Estonia

market analysis, border security will be the

main focus of the 7th Intelligence Workshop. In times of the refugee crisis and terrorism it is essential to detect, locate and
identify individuals and their networks. To
identify threats before they occur, COMINT
technology supporting (existing) border
security solutions will be highlighted. Use
cases and challenges will be discussed during a special session on border protection.
An additional session Combining sensitive data will provide new solutions and
ideas of processing and analysing IP and
(Photo: PLATH)

(Photo: Kongsberg)

holder with more than 50% ownership.

Kongsberg has four Business Areas: Maritime, Defence Systems, Protech Systems

and Oil & Gas. The Group employs some

7,700 persons and operates in more than
25 countries. Kongsbergs turnover in 2015
was Euro 1.8Bn.

PLATHs Intelligence
Workshop in May
(df) The 7th Intelligence Workshop by
PLATH will be held on May 10, 2016, prior
to the EW Europe 2016 conference. To fulfill the continuously growing expectations
of the international audience PLATH evaluated the recent intelligence requirements
as well as the newest trends and technologies. Resulting from the comprehensive

metadata. The 7th Intelligence Workshop

will close with the session Bringing down
COMMS, highlighting new and smart
jamming capabilities. The Intelligence
Workshop is a full-day event, which is free
to attend.

The NATO Communications and Information (NCI) Agency and the Association for
Communications, Electronics and Information Systems Professionals (AFCEA Europe), the two number ones in communications and information technologies,
are partnering for the fifth time to support the Alliance on this crucial way into
the future by providing a highly professional and attractive stage for discussing
and showcasing the latest technological
developments at the annual NCI Agency
Industry Conference and AFCEA TechNet
International (NITEC). NITEC16 will be
held at the Swisstel Tallinn, Estonia from
7 to 9 June 2016, organised in cooperation with the Estonian Ministry of Defence
and will bring together over 500 senior
government, military and industry leaders
as well as defence and security experts.
Taking place in the run-up to NATOs
Warsaw Summit, the event will provide
an excellent venue to address how NATO entities and industry can collaborate
more effectively in a new era of shared
risk to build resilience through developing and delivering secure C4ISR and cyber
capabilities. The conference programme
on Building Resilience through Secure

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April 2016 European Security & Defence

81

C4ISR: NATO-Industry Collaboration in a

New Era will focus on the new way of
engaging with industry adapted to the
diversity and simultaneity of threats and
rapid technological developments, while
providing concrete opportunities to connect, exchange views, discuss lessons
learned and collaborate with industry
partners. Over all three days NITEC16
will also present an Industry Exhibition
to allow a closer look at cutting- edge
hard and software applications as well as
in-depth discussions in reserved meeting
areas and during conference breaks. B2B
speed dating sessions will help to find
new partners and to increase business
opportunities. Beyond that, enjoyable
social events will be provided to allow intensive networking and relaxation after
busy working days. Registration is open
and the latest programme is available on
www.nitec.nato.int.

Lockheed Martin and ORBCOMM

Join Forces for IoT Footprint
(df) Lockheed Martin and ORBCOMM have
signed a Memorandum of Understanding
to enhance their footprint in the area of
Internet of Things (IoT) technologies. As the
world becomes increasingly connected and
automated, Lockheed Martin plans to leverage ORBCOMMs Machine-to-Machine
(M2M) portfolio and expertise to explore

opportunities for customers and across

the corporation. Space-enabled solutions
in particular provide satellite connectivity
and services for IoT applications that require wide-area coverage and integration
with multiple tiers of information technology. The vision of the Internet of Things
promises to change how society benefits
from machines embedded with greater
intelligence, improving the decisions organizations make and ultimately the quality of service delivered to their end users,
said Dave Markham, Vice President Strategy and Advanced Programs at Lockheed
Martin Space Systems. To that end, we
look forward to exploring future opportunities with a satellite M2M market leader
like ORBCOMM. The two companies will
jointly explore future satellite and hybrid
satellite/cellular M2M opportunities primarily in the government sector in the United
States, as well as select international markets. Collaboration may span a range of
activities, including joint business development, portfolio evolution and allied partnerships.

Deliveries of Bell Helicopter

(df) Bell Helicopter, a Textron Inc. company,
delivered 175 aircraft in 2015, a combination of its current production products as
follows: 52 x Bell 429, 12 x Bell 412 (EP/EPI),
99 x Bell 407 (GX/GXP), 12 x Bell 206L4.

Preview

The regional deliveries include 28 commercial helicopters to countries in the Pacific

Rim, 69 civil aircraft in North America, 31
deliveries in Latin America, and 47 helicopters across Europe, the Middle East and
Africa. The company also launched the Bell
407GXP and announced the largest helicopter order in Bell Helicopter history for
200 x 407GXPs to Air Methods Corporation. The first of those aircraft were delivered in January 2016. Improvements to the
Bell 412 helped secure a major win in Japan
and will serve as the foundation for Japans
Ministry of Defense UH-X development
programme. UH-X is a co-development
programme between Bell Helicopter and
Fuji Heavy Industries for approximately 150
helicopters, to be delivered over the next
two decades. 2015 was a challenging
year for the helicopter industry with ongoing impacts of the decline in oil and gas,
continued geopolitical unrest and global
economic uncertainty, said Mitch Snyder, Bell Helicopters
president and CEO.
Despite tough market conditions, Bell
Helicopter expanded
its market presence
and secured a number of key wins.

E S D 3 /2 0 1 6 Ju n e 2

Battlefield Intelligence & Observation Eurosatory Focus

Tactical Mobility Eurosatory Focus
Field Artillery/Joint Fires Eurosatory Focus
Country Focus: ISRAEL
Eurofighter TYPHOON Capability Review
Airborne Surveillance: What Next?
Airborne Precision Weapons
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LIFT and Light Combat Aircraft Review
Helicopter Propulsion Systems
Class F110 Frigates for the Spanish Navy
Naval Aviation
Proliferation of WMD and Defending Against CBRN Threats
SUPPLEMENT: SSM Defence Procurement in Turkey
Mittler Report Verlag GmbH
Baunscheidtstr. 11 53113 Bonn, Germany
Phone: +49 228 35008 70 [email protected]
www.mittler-report.de www.euro-sd.com

82

European Security & Defence April 2016

016

(Photo: Bell Helicopters)

Firms & Faces

Intelligence for the Intelligent

1/2016

International Security and Defence Journal

European Security
& Defence

Politics
Armed Forces
Economy
Technology

renz1

ndeed, at first sight, the

new text looks
bours and beyond: the
very similar to the Military
Kremlin considers
Doctrine of
military power became
the former Soviet area
2010. Still, the latest version
the chief instituits vital sphere of
of the Doctional foundation of Russian
interest and has a high
trine is much clearer in
statehood.5
level of commitformulation of the
This peculiarity goes some
ment to its defence. Another
two main ideas:
way towards
interesting
explaining the renewed
1) The West is presented
attention paid to
as a source of danger and threats to Russia.
These include
the movement of military
infrastructure
of NATO member states
towards Russias
borders, which was already
mentioned in
the 2010 doctrine, as well
as the deployment of strategic missile
defence systems
in Europe. Large-scale military
exercises in
Russias neighbourhood
are also described
as threats. An important
nuance in the
2014 doctrine is the fact
that, unlike in the
2010 version, cooperation
with NATO is
no longer regarded as a
means of reinforcing collective security.3
The 2014 doctrine
merely mentions NATO
as a potential partner for equal dialogue.
This seems to
indicate that Moscow has
abandoned any
hope or ambition for future
cooperation
with NATO.
2) Russia clearly outlines
its vital interests,
defining red lines for
opponents in a
Military base in the
fairly explicit manner.
Franz Joseph Land
The term neigharchipelago:
The Arctic is included
bourhood (more precisely
in Russias vital sphere
states borof interest.
dering the Russian Federation)
is widely
nuance of the 2014 doctrine
used in the 2014 doctrine.
is the incluSome main
the restoration of Russias
sion of the Arctic in Russias
military danger and threats,
great power
s
vital spheres
according
status and military might
nethe rland
of interest for the first
: the
to the doctrine, focus
under the Putin
time. This could
regime.
country stem from: a) regime be interpreted as
change
a signifier by Russia to
in the neighbourhood,
and b)
other states with a stake
military exercises, as well
in the Arctic reas military
gion that the exercise of
Conventional Military
bilisation in the neighbourho 4 moperceived undue
od. Obviinfluence
Capabilities
will not be accepted.
ously, the 2014 military
doctrine is sending a clear message to
Russias neighUntil recently, conventiona
The Restoration of Russias
l capabilities
and deterrence were considered
au th o r s
Great Power Status and
Russias
weakest points, although
the situation
Military Might?
Dr Polina Sinovets is an
has started to change.
associate proA significant and
fessor at the Odessa National
steady rise in the defence
A peculiarity of Russian
I.I. Mechtom middendorp
budget over
strategic culture
nikov in
University, Ukraine; Dr
the past decade in addition
is the clear interconnect
Bettina
sted themselves
to the imedness of the
Renz is an associate professor
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plementation of systematic
greatness of the state
e
at the
reforms since
was when threats
t in ukrain
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University of Nottingham,
conflic
2008
the
:
has
the year 2014
led
power.
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to
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This idea was borne out
s of europe
by the
on the border
conventional military
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africa. now, in
capabilities. Reno uncertain terms
empire, when
east and north
cent improvements in
s in the Middle
Russian military
.
the development
(Photo: defensie.nl)

nds
of the netherla

and

2015, we are seeing

Readers of
European Security &
Defence stay abreast
rs
with what really matte
at decisive levels!

Our citizens ask for a better Union

Future Soldier Systems

Federica Mogherini on the future of Europes Foreign and

Security Policy in the light of new threats

Some 40 countries are conducting comprehensive force

modernisation programmes

P o l i t i c s A r m e d F o r c e s P r o c u r e m e n t Te c h n o l o g y

the effects of those

events

reorganwere also radically

rational
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November 2015 European

Security & Defence

13

area.
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European Security & Defence is a specialist magazine, which

keeps track of events and developments in the defence and security
arena. Our professional writers and contributors investigate, report,
analyse, comment and if necessary criticise. The magazines objective
is to describe, explain and interpret European and transatlantic security policy
which extends far beyond conventional defence with military forces in all
complex and sophisticated correlations.

arM aMe

nT & TeC hno

loG y
equipment co
mmonality is a
key success fac
tor.
(Photo: NATO)

Armoured Vehicles

SACEUR
von der Leyen,
Defence
Defence Ursula
Minister of
n Minister of
the Netherlands r meeting
From left: Germa
Breedlove and
ministe
at the NATO
General Philip
-Plassschaert
Jeanine Hennis

Since we last spoke

with oCCar (organ
isation Conjoi
Coopration en
nte de
matire darm
ement) in Septem
organisation has
ber 2013 the
significantly extend
ed the portfolio
procurement
of defence
programmes under
oCCars aegis.
oCCar direct
in this interview
or Tim rowntree
reviews curren
achievements
t
activit
ies and recent
and explains his
organisations
with the nSPa,
working relatio
eda and indust
nship
ry.

Germany. The
In-Service Support
COBRA radar
for the
placed a first study
is ongoing and
the system
for a midlife upgrade
has performed
We have also
well
.
made significa
conditions. Deliveri under operational
nt advances
in programme
es of FSAF-PA
management
defence systems
AMs
and corporate capabilities,
are nearly finished air
to enable us
we are preparin
to further
strengthen our
g a mid-life upgrade and
already strong
FREMM frigates
reputati
for successful
have been delivere . Six
programme delivery on
the French and
d to
has included a
. This
Italian Navies
major review and
and Italy
has executed
reinforc
ment
its option for
eof our risk manage
another two
ships. In the
ment and performance measure
ESSOR (Europe
ESD: What have
an Secure
ment systems
SOftware defined
been OCCAR
optimisation of
and an
s major
achievements
our
OCCAR is preparin Radio) Programme,
over the last two
skills to meet currentorganisation and key
years?
Rowntree: During
and future needs.
the development g the final stage of
the last two years
So, in summar
phase and in the
have expanded
y, we are expandi
we
(MUltinational
MUSIS
our
ng our programme portfolio
Space
12 active program portfolio from 8 to
,
tem) we are about based Imaging Sysmes including
control on our maintaining a strong
to finish the definitio
the
gration of three
existing program
phase. Deliveri
new programmes inten
which
mes,
es
of
are
the combat proven
2015: Maritim
during
already providin
TIGER helicopt
e Mine Counte
g important
military capabili
ers, to the latest
r Measures
(MMCM), the
ties
capability standards,
Logistic Support
tions, and improvin in our customer naare ongoing and
Ship (LSS)
and the PPA
g our organisa
we have
Multipurpose
the future.
tion for
Patrol Ship.
We are also
managing the
acquisition
of the MMF
(Multinational
Multi role
tanker transpo
rt aircraft Fleet).
The MMF
was facilitated
by the Europea
n Defence
Agency (EDA)
and its acquisit
ion and
initial support
will be manage
d by OCCAR. Long term
support will be
manage
through the NATO
Support and Procured
ment Agency
(NSPA).
In addition, we
are preparing
management
for the
of a definition
study for a
MALE UAS (Medium
Altitude Long
durance Unmann
Ened
existing program Aircraft System). Our
mes are also advanci
On A400M,
ng:
20 aircraft have
been delivered (includin
g one of the
export aircraft to Malaysi
a) and
a long-term commo we are developing
n in-service support
solution. In the
BOxER program
have now delivere
me we
d more than
300 vehicles and we
Six FREMM
are preparing
frigates have
the procure
ment of a second
been deliver
and Italy has
batch of vehicles ed to the French
executed its
for
option for
and Italian
the French

&
European Security
November 2015

Defence

25

Tim Rowntree,
a British citizen
has been the
,
OCCAR Directo
since 1 March
r
2013.

(Photo: DCNS)

February 2016 www.euro-sd.com ISSN 1617-7983

Polina Sinovets and Bettina

Published on 26 december
2014,2 russia's new doctrine
did not attract a great deal
especially in the West. contrary
of public attention,
to expectations and widesprea
d rumours in the run-up
the Kremlin neither issued
to its publication,
a doctrine of nuclear pre-emptio
n, nor explicitly named
its perceived foes.

in the interest

COUNTRY FOCUS: AUSTRIA

Security P o licy

russias 2014 Military doc

trine
and beyond: threat Perc
eptions,
capabilities and ambition
s

(Photo: OCCAR)

ES&D

a 7.90

(Photos: mil.ru)

European
Security
&Defence

FoC AQUITA
INE in New

another two
Navies
ships. Shown
York.
here is

November 2015
European Security
&

Defence

43

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