UNITED OVERSEAS BANK vs.

ROSEMOOR MINING
FACTS: Petitioner Overseas Bank filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 seeking the reversal and the setting aside of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals declaring as null and void the Real Estate Mortgage executed by Rosemoor
Mining in favor of Overseas Bank.
Rosemoor Mining obtained a loan from Overseas Bank in order to raise the
necessary funds for the importation of machineries needed for its operations. The
loan was secured by two Real Estate Mortgage Contracts over six parcels of land
situated at San Miguel, Bulacan, and registered under the name of Rosemoor
Mining, and another two parcels of land situated at Gapan, Nueva Ecija, registered
under Pascuals name. Rosemoor Mining executed four irrevocable Letters of Credit
but subsequently defaulted in the payment prompting Overseas Bank to cause the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged properties and the sale thereof by public
auction wherein the Overseas Bank was the highest bidder. Rosemoor Mining
instituted two separate complaints against the bank, one filed before the RTC of
Manila and the other one before the RTC of Bulacan. In its Petition for Certiorari ,
Overseas Bank, raised the ssues of forum shopping and propriety of the default
order as well as theissue of the venue before the RTC of Bulacan. Overseas Bank
argued that the venue of the action for nullification of the foreclosure sales of the
mortgaged properties which were located in Bulacan and Nueva Ecija, were
improperly lodged before the Bulacan RTC. CA dismissed the case for lack of merit,
declared that no forum-shopping existed and upheld the validity of the default order
against Overseas Bank and the propriety of venue.
Rosemoor Mining is not guilty of forum shopping since the court ratiocinated that
there was no identity of parties involved and the rights asserted in both actions
were different from each other. On the issue of improper venue, this Court ruled that
the action to nullify the foreclosure sales of the Nueva Ecija properties, along with
the Bulacan properties were properly instituted before the Bulacan RTC. Further, the
motion for reconsideration could not have tolled the running of the period to answer
for two reasons. One, it was filed late, nine days after the due date of the answer.
Two, it was a mere rehash of the motion to dismiss; hence, pro forma in nature.
Thus, the Malolos RTC did not err in declaring the Bank in default.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not CA committed serious error of law when it affirmed the
RTC Bulacan decision refusing to dismiss the petition outright on the ground of
forum shopping and of declaring petitioner in default and depriving it of due
process.
2. Whether or not CA exceeded jurisdiction when it granted a relief not included in
the complaint.
HELD: 1. No, Rosemoor Mining is not guilty of forum shopping by filing both the
Bulacan and the Manila cases. Our jurisprudential pronouncements are conclusive
upon this Court in the instant petition and could no longer be overturned without
REBECCA N. MORADA LLB 4

transgressing the elementary principle of the law of the case. In the case at bar,
Overseas Bank, therefore, is now barred from once again raising before this Court
the issues on forum shopping, the default order and after the intricacies involved
therein were already adjudicated and resolved fully and with finality.
Further, when Overseas Bank deliberately opted to file a Motion for Reconsideration
of the order of the Bulacan RTC denying its Motion to Dismiss, instead of filing an
Answer, it assumed the risk of losing its standing in court and it cannot simply
excuse itself from the adverse consequence of its chosen procedural course.
Overseas Bank cannot feign that it was denied its day in court when it was
precluded from presenting its evidence during the hearing by the default because
Overseas Bank, in several instances, was able to raise before the Court the issue of
the validity of the interlocutory orders issued by the courts a quo and, likewise, on
various occasions, moved for the dismissal of both the Bulacan and Manila cases,
instead of proving the merits of its cases before the lower courts. Overseas Bank,
therefore, cannot pound on due process and substantial justice, when it is evident in
the records that it had, countless times, used, if not abused, such procedural due
process for its end and thereby prolonged the disposition of the cases involved.
2. No, while it is true that Rosemoor Mining did not specifically ask for the
annulment of the Real Estate Mortgages, upon scrutiny of its Complaint however, it
is apparent that the allegations propounded by Rosemoor Mining go into the very
validity of the mortgage contracts. The allegation that Overseas Bank committed
fraudulent acts in the constitution of the Real Estate Mortgages was actually an
attack on the mortgage contracts, and not just on the foreclosures of these
mortgages. The nullity of the foreclosures, therefore, was merely a necessary
consequence of the invalidity of the mortgages. Thus, to void the foreclosure sales
and not the mortgage contracts would only result in absurdity when it is palpable
from the body of the Complaint that Rosemoor Minings challenge of the foreclosure
sales was rooted in the defective mortgage contracts. If at all, Rosemoor Minings
failure to particularly pray for the nullification of the Real Estate Mortgages was
merely an oversight on its part that is deemed cured when it asked from the court a
quo for such other reliefs and remedies as may be deemed just and equitable in the
premises. The general prayer of Rosemoor Mining, couched in the phrase, "such
other reliefs and remedies as may be deemed just and equitable in the premises,"
should be interpreted to include the prayer for the nullification of the mortgage
contracts since this is already evident from the allegations contained in the body of
its Complaint though it was not specifically pleaded in the prayer. The general
prayer is broad enough "to justify extension of a remedy different from or together
with the specific remedy sought." Even without the prayer for a specific remedy,
proper relief may be granted by the court if the facts alleged in the complaint and
the evidence introduced so warrant. The prayer in the complaint for other reliefs
equitable and just in the premises justifies the grant of a relief not otherwise
specifically prayed for.

REBECCA N. MORADA LLB 4

HEIRS OF PEDRO LOPEZ v. HONESTO DE CASTRO

FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari asserting that the decision
ordering the issuance of a decree of registration, while promulgated subsequent to
the issuance of the certificate of title in the names of the second applicants, should
be "executed" and that the certificate of title issued to the latter should be nullified.
There are two applications for registration of the same parcel of land that were filed
twelve years apart in different branches of the same RTC, but a certificate of title
was issued in one case while the other is still pending appeal. The first action was
instituted in RTC-Cavite in 1956 by Pedro Lopez, et al while the second action was
filed before RTC-Cavite in Tagaytay City sometime in 1967 by Honest de Castro, et
al. The Municipality of Silang, Cavite opposed the first case since it alleges that a
portion of the land sought to be registered had been leased to private persons and
was the formers patrimonial property, to which the applicants answered that the
whole of the land passed to them by inheritance. The court denied the
municipality's petition for a dismissal of the application for registration stating that
even if the land was the property of the Municipality of Silang, by virtue of its
incorporation into the city of Tagaytay, it became property of the latter. Thus, the
municipality of Silang has no personality to appear in the proceedings. After due
investigation regarding the application, the court approved the application in 1971
and ordered the issuance of a corresponding decree of registration to Lopez, et al. In
the second case, although the application for registration was filed only in 1967, or
11 years after the filing of the first action, RTC-Cavite in Tagaytay City decided to
adjudicate the land in favor of de Castro, et al. in 1968. De Castro, et al. claim that
pursuant to Republic Act 3749, the Tagaytay City court held jurisdiction now over
the case and was the proper venue for any action involving registration of lands
covered by its jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC-Cavite was divested of its jurisdiction.
HELD: No, the petition for review was denied since a proceeding in rem, such as
land registration proceedings, requires constructive seizure of the land as against all
persons, including the state, who have rights to or interests in the
property. Constructive seizure of the land for registration is effected through
publication of the application for registration and service of notice to affected
parties. Consequently, when private respondents filed their own application for
registration of the same parcel of land, the Tagaytay City branch could no longer
entertain the application for registration as the res involved had been constructively
seized by the Cavite City branch of the same court. Venue is procedural, not
jurisdictional, and hence may be waived. It is meant to provide convenience to the
parties, rather than restrict their access to the courts as it relates to the place of
trial. It has been submitted that a court having territorial jurisdiction over the
property should take cognizance of its registration. Upon the creation of the
Tagaytay City branch, Pedro Lopez, et al.s application for registration should have
been transferred to that court inasmuch as the property involved is located in that
city. It appears, however, that the Cavite City branch remained the venue of
REBECCA N. MORADA LLB 4

petitioners' application for registration, according to RA 3749. Notably, the law is not
clear on whether or not the phrase "in the same place" refers to the judicial
district/province or the place where a branch of the court is stationed. Hence,
considering the general rule that once a court acquires jurisdiction over a case it
remains with that court until its full termination, the phrase "in the same place"
should be interpreted as referring to the province of Cavite. The Cavite City branch
of the RTC- Cavite thus correctly retained jurisdiction over the application for
registration because there was no jurisdictional question involved in the
proceedings in Land Registration Case No. 299. What was in question was whether
the Cavite City branch of the RTC-Cavite was the proper venue for said case upon
the creation of the Tagaytay City branch.

REBECCA N. MORADA LLB 4