Archie Briggs v. John T. Kerrigan, Bonnie Fay v. Ray Gauthier, 431 F.2d 967, 1st Cir. (1970)
Uploaded by
Scribd Government DocsArchie Briggs v. John T. Kerrigan, Bonnie Fay v. Ray Gauthier, 431 F.2d 967, 1st Cir. (1970)
Uploaded by
Scribd Government Docs431 F.
2d 967
14 A.L.R.Fed. 629
Archie BRIGGS et al., Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
John T. KERRIGAN et al., Defendants, Appellees.
Bonnie FAY et al., Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
Ray GAUTHIER et al., Defendants, Appellees.
Nos. 7518, 7542.
United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
Aug. 14, 1970.
Gershon Michael Ratner, Boston, Mass., and John Cratsley, Cambridge,
Mass., with whom Nicola Smith, Mark Willis, and Stephen Rosenfield
were on the brief, for appellants.
Raymond D. Battocchi, Atty., Dept. of Justice, with Whom William D.
Ruckelshaus, Asst. Atty. Gen., Herbert F. Travers, Jr., U.S. Atty., and
Alan S. Rosenthal, Atty., Dept. of Justice, were on the brief, for Clifford
Hardin, Secretary of Agriculture, and others, federal appellees.
Alan G. MacDonald, Deputy Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom Robert H.
Quinn, Atty. Gen., was on the brief, for William G. Saltonstall, Chairman
of the Board of Education of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and
others, state appellees.
Edith W. Fine, Assistant Corporation Counsel for the City of Boston, for
John T. Kerrigan, Chairman of the Boston School Committee, and others,
city appellees.
Paul F. Hennessey, Asst. City Solicitor for the City of Somerville, for Ray
Gauthier, Chairman of the Somerville School Committee, and others, city
appellees.
Before ALDRICH, Chief Judge, McENTEE and COFFIN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
These suits seek to enjoin the operation of the school lunch programs in the
Boston and Somerville school systems on the grounds that these programs
violate the National School Lunch Act, 42 U.S.C. 1751 et seq., and the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The alleged violation consists
of providing school lunches to some relatively affluent students while failing to
provide such lunches to other, needier students. The district court granted
summary judgment against plaintiffs in both cases. We affirm on the basis of
the district court's careful opinion in Briggs v. Kerrigan, 307 F.Supp. 295
(D.Mass.1969), adding only the following comments.
First, we think both cases were ripe for summary judgment. The undisputed
evidence indicated that both Boston and Somerville provided lunches in all
their high schools and junior high schools, but in only a few of their elementary
schools. School officials, by deposition, explained this discrepancy on the
grounds that elementary schools, being generally older and smaller than high
schools, lacked the necessary facilities for preparing meals. Since the National
School Lunch Act makes only limited provision for capital expense, compare
42 U.S.C. 1759a with 7 C.F.R. 210.6(b), providing additional facilities would
require substantial expenditures of scarce local funds. Plaintiffs criticize aspects
of this testimony as mere assertion and call for additional substantiation.
However, the purpose of summary judgment is not to explore all the factual
ramifications of the case, but to determine whether such exploration is
necessary. When a motion for summary judgment has been properly made and
supported, an adverse party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). This plaintiffs have failed to do.
Second, we reject plaintiffs' assertion that an absolute need priority must be
read into the statute in order to give effect to the Congressional intent. The
statutory provision on which plaintiffs primarily rely requires state officials to
disburse funds to individual schools 'taking into account need and attendance'.
42 U.S.C. 1757. In our view, this language is addressed to cases in which the
limited federal funds available under 42 U.S.C. 1753 are insufficient to satisfy
all the requests for aid from schools willing and able to participate. If, however,
a school is unwilling to participate or unable because of a lack of facilities, we
think 1757 permits state officials to direct funds elsewhere. Certainly, 1757
does not require officials to hold up the lunch program in schools throughout
the state because a few relatively poor schools are unable to participate.
Third, the district court's disposition of plaintiff's equal protection claim has, in
our opinion, been confirmed by the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court
in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970).
In Dandridge, the Court reiterated the proper standard for assessing social
welfare programs:
5
'If the classification has some 'reasonable basis,' it does not offend the
Constitution simply because the classification 'is not made with mathematical
nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.' Lindsley v. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78, 31 S.Ct. 337, 55 L.Ed. 369.' 397 U.S. at
485, 90 S.Ct. at 1161.
Judged by this standard, the administration of the school lunch program in
Boston and Somerville seems clearly valid. Schools are classified on the basis
of whether or not they can be served by existing kitchen facilities. This
classification is reasonable in the light of the substantial additional expenditure
required to provide new facilities, especially since school officials in both cities
have decided to include kitchens and lunchrooms in new elementary schools as
they are constructed. Undoubtedly, classification on the basis of schools results
in some inequality among children, but this inequality cannot be cured without
additional taxation or diversion of school resources from other programs which
may be equally important to the poor. These considerations illustrate the
wisdom of the reminder in Dandridge that the Fourteenth Amendment does not
require government either to attack a problem in its entirety or not at all. 397
U.S. at 486-487, 90 S.Ct. 1153.
Affirmed.
You might also like
- No ratings yetGertrude P. Fuller, Richard L. Grubman, Thomas F. Cacciola and Josephine Cacciola, His Wife, and Others to Be Named, in No. 15043 and Jerry Volpe, Intervening-Plaintiffs-Appellants, in No. 15044 v. Austin A. Volk, Frederick M. Raubinger, Commissioner of Education of the State of New Jersey, Kenneth Ancrum, Deborah Spruill, Intervening, 351 F.2d 323, 3rd Cir. (1965)10 pages
- No ratings yetJoseph Biehunik v. Frank N. Felicetta, Commissioner of Buffalo Police Department, Thomas R. Blair, Deputy Commissioner of Buffalo Police Department, Howard R. Wheeler, Inspector, Buffalo Police Department, Charles Devoe and Karl Muehlbauer, Both Captains of the Buffalo Police Department, 441 F.2d 228, 2d Cir. (1971)7 pages
- No ratings yetMatilda Harrelson, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. Earl Butz, Secretary of United States Department of Agriculture and William L. Lukhard, Commissioner of the Virginia Department of Welfare, Matilda Harrelson, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. William L. Lukhard, Commissioner of the Virginia Department of Welfare, and Earl Butz, Secretary of United States Department of Agriculture, Matilda Harrelson, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. Earl Butz, Secretary of the Department of Agriculture, and William L. Lukhard, Commissioner of the Virginia Department of Welfare, 547 F.2d 915, 4th Cir. (1977)3 pages
- No ratings yetRiley Reid, a Minor Under the Age of 21 Years, by His Mother, Ellen Hoffman, and Benjamin Kennedy, a Minor Under the Age of 21 Years, by His Mother, Virginia Kennedy, on Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated v. The Board of Education of the City of New York, and Harvey B. Scribner, Individually and as Chancellor of the Board of Education, 453 F.2d 238, 2d Cir. (1971)9 pages
