Magdalene Diamantis v. Milton Bradley Company, 772 F.2d 3, 1st Cir. (1985)
Magdalene Diamantis v. Milton Bradley Company, 772 F.2d 3, 1st Cir. (1985)
2d 3
38 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 35,510, 54 USLW
2218, 3 Fed.R.Serv.3d 633
On appeal, Diamantis raises seven issues that she argues warrant reversal of the
district court's order. Primarily, the appellant addresses her brief to whether this
would be a permissible interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1292, since
generally discovery orders are not reviewable until after final judgment has
been entered. See, e.g., United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 532-33, 91 S.Ct.
1580, 1581-82, 29 L.Ed.2d 85 (1971); Sheehan v. Doyle, 513 F.2d 895, 898
(1st Cir.1975); 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291. Additionally, she argues that, if this appeal
is heard, reversal is warranted because the district court abused its discretion in
refusing to quash the discovery order.
We find, however, that there is a preliminary issue that must first be addressed:
whether Diamantis has standing to bring this appeal on behalf of the third party
witnesses. As a first step in determining whether jurisdiction exists over this
appeal, we must inquire into the nexus between Diamantis' status in this
litigation and the claim she is presenting. Such is necessary to ensure that she is
a proper and appropriate party to invoke federal judicial power in this context.
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968). For
purposes of this inquiry, we accept as valid the appellant's allegations. See
United States v. American Telephone and Telegraph, 642 F.2d 1285, 1291
(D.C.Cir.1980).
Clearly the basis for these objections are concerns of Fullerton and TurnAbout,
Inc.--not of Diamantis. It is the third party witnesses whose rights would
allegedly be violated, whose privacy would be invaded, and who would have to
bear the expense of producing the requested documents. It is well settled under
the standing doctrine that a party ordinarily may not assert the legal rights of
others. See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255, 73 S.Ct. 1031, 1034, 97
L.Ed. 1586 (1953); Ripon Society v. Nat'l Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567, 573
(D.C.Cir.1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933, 96 S.Ct. 1148, 47 L.Ed.2d 341
(1976). Here, this is precisely what Diamantis is attempting to do by bringing
this appeal on behalf of Fullerton and TurnAbout, Inc.2 She has not shown that
her own rights are threatened by the compliance of the nonparties with the
district court's order. See Diggs v. Schultz, 470 F.2d 461, 464 (D.C.Cir.1972).
An individual must assert his own legal rights and interests and cannot rest his
claim to relief on the legal rights and interests of third parties. Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 499, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2205, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975); Construction
Industry Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897, 903 (9th Cir.1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 934, 96 S.Ct. 1148, 47 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976). Accordingly, we
hold that Diamantis does not have standing to pursue this appeal. There is no
need to reach the other issues.
Appeal dismissed.
A possible justification for Diamantis herself having brought the appeal may be
found in the language of Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a). The rule does require the district
judge to "consider objections [to a magistrate's ruling on a nondispositive
matter] made by the parties...." (Emphasis added). To read the rule narrowly,
however, as permitting a party to object to rulings involving only third party
witnesses ignores the rest of the language of the rule and, more importantly,
well-settled standing doctrine. Rule 72(a) "parties" are the parties before the
magistrate, not the parties to the litigation from which the nondispositive matter
originated