I.

INTERPRETATION –

Both sides must disclose full outlines and source citations for in case or evidence read for

offensive positions on the NDCA wiki at least one hour before the round.

II. VIOLATION –

My opponents outline and citations are not on the wiki! All my case citations for both sides are

online. I have printed versions of the wiki index if you don’t believe me.

III. STANDARDS –

A. Argument quality

1) Element of surprise. Disclosure forces debaters to commit to quality

2) Second-line argumentation- If both sides had equal information to prepare first-line

answers, debaters would have to devise more creative and thoughtful second-line

arguments.

3) Cross-pollination. Van Hippel argues,

In the case of academic publications, we see evidence that free revealing does increase

reuse—a matter of great importance to academics. A citation is an indicator that

information contained in an article has been reused: the article has been read by the citing

author and found useful enough to draw to readers’ attention. Recent empirical studies

are finding that articles to which readers have open access—articles available for free

download from an author’s website, for example—are cited significantly more often than

are equivalent articles that are available only from libraries or frompublishers’ fee-based

websites. Antelman (2004) finds an increase in citations ranging from 45 percent in

philosophy to 91 percent in mathematics. She notes that “scholars in diverse disciplines

it, as reflected in [citations].”

This would have a powerful signaling effect Argument quality is key to education.

Theory should be a forward-looking consideration because competing interpretations are

just competing plans for debate. Theory is about competing rules for making debate

better.

B. Evidence ethics - Disclosure is the only way to prevent evidence distortion before it occurs.

He might argue that evidence distortion doesn't happen often enough to justify disclosure, but

without a public and transparent system, we have no way to know that! Without disclosure, the

incentive structure is weak, and the prevention system is nonexistent. Misrepresentation of

evidence harms the educational process because it rewards students for butchering academic

articles and avoiding research.

C. Preparation asymmetry - If he/she really cared about making this debate fair, he/she should

have disclosed his outline and cites.

IV. VOTER - If he does not prove that nondisclosure is good, vote him down.

A. Direct abuse

B. Deterrence, Doug Siegal argues,

There are at least 4 reasons that can be isolated for voting on punishment positions irrespective

of what occurs in the rest of the round. First, most central to the entire notion of punishment is

the deterrent view. Just as we punish criminals to deter crime, we should punish debaters who

injure the debate process. A ballot that says "I think you may have won that second DA--but I

voted against you based on the illegitimacy of the conditional counterplans you ran" sends a
strong message to the teams involved and other participants in the activity that there are high

costs of abusive strategies.

There does seem to be merit to the negative reinforcement approach to debate. The arguments

and styles that are successful are copied; those that aren't are shunned. While the decision in one

round can't by itself fundamentally change debate, a general trend can be initiated and/or

reinforced by a decision. The experience of this author has been that, at least in college debate,

the threat of punishment now hangs over teams using strategies and styles that are generally

regarded as illegitimate.

Deterrence seems especially applicable to the debate setting because the participants have control

over their practices. We all practice judge analysis, trying to adapt to the inevitable likes and

dislikes of even the most tabula rasa critic. The feedback a punishment decision provides is

direct: everyone is given notice that the winning team will and can win rounds in the face of

abusive debating and that the judge involved will vote against such practices. It only takes a few

instances of punishment for the entire debate community to start incorporating the risk of

punishment in their pre-round planning.

C. Role of the Judge – It’s not what you do, it’s what you justify.

D. Competitive incentives are key – Punishing the abusive debater with a loss is key to restoring

competitive equity

E. Positive feedback loop – If I win that disclosure is good, only the ballot will yield results.

Sanchez argues,

at the n.d.t., many teams chose to post their first constructive speeches on

an accessible website -- that's the internet disclosure which stefan has

worked hard to achieve. yet some debaters chose not to do so, although they
may've likely read the blocks of their opponents prior to the round. (i even

recall stefan and others stopping just short of calling such free-riders

'cheaters'.) this begs the question, how does this community intend to

enforce this norm? i'd suggest that the short-term answer is not top-down

punishment from tourney directors, but debaters themselves taking ballots

away from free-riders, fair and square.

everyone knows there are dominant players who benefit immensely from the

status quo: teams which can afford to hire extra staff, students who can

afford to go to pricey institutes, companies which can afford to sue you if

you share their evidence. despite the lipservice paid to the educational

mission of debate, until this competitive incentive changes, nothing will

magically 'level the playing field'. so how do participants alter

competitive incentive? again, by winning ballots. blatantly non-topical

cases, for example, are liabilities. if/when the 'open source / creative

commons' position wins more ballots, it will more likely compel debaters to

put their briefs online. quite simply, the 'solvency mechanism' - at least

for the immediate future - is winning the position itself.