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THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF

THE CONSTITUTION’S
“EXECUTIVE VESTING
CLAUSE”—EVIDENCE FROM
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY
DRAFTING PRACTICE
BY ROBERT G. NATELSON*

ABSTRACT
Advocates of presidential power from the days of George Washington at least to the time
of George W. Bush have claimed that the Constitution’s so-called “Executive Vesting
Clause,” the first sentence of Article II, not only designates the President as chief executive,
but also confers broad authority. Some commentators support that view, while others
maintain that the President’s powers are limited to those enumerated elsewhere in the
Constitution.
This study addresses the previously-overlooked question of which interpretation is more
consistent with contemporaneous drafting customs. It concludes that treating the “Executive
Vesting Clause” as a mere designation is consistent with those customs, while treating it as a
grant is not. Indeed, the grant interpretation would result in a document structure so
anomalous as to render it unlikely that the Founders intended that interpretation.
This study marshals evidence overlooked by prior commentators, such as the royal
commissions to American colonial governors, power-granting documents employed by the
Continental Congress, and the eighteenth-century law governing grants.

*
Professor of Law, The University of Montana.
Researching this article required extensive use of sources not customarily
consulted by American legal scholars. I am particularly grateful to Phil Cousineau and
Bob Peck of the Jameson Law Library at The University of Montana for their
assistance, to Professor Sarah Wiant, Director of the Law Library at Washington and
Lee University for access to her library’s research facilities, and to Ms. Virginia Dunn,
Archives Research Services Manager, the Library of Virginia. I would like to
acknowledge also the insights of Gary S. Lawson, the Abraham & Lillian Benton
Scholar and Professor of Law at Boston University.

1
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2 WHITTIER LAW REVIEW Vol. 31

CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
II. STRUCTURE OF ARTICLE I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
III. ALTERNATIVE STRUCTURES FOR ARTICLE II . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
IV. THE STRUCTURES OF EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY
DOCUMENTS CONFERRING ENUMERATED POWERS . . . . . . . . 7
A. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
B. Powers (Letters) of Attorney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
C. Corporate Charters (Other than for Colonies) . . . . . . . . . 9
D. Colonial Charters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
E. Statutes Empowering Agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
F. Commissions to Royal Governors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
G. Commissions in the Journals of the Continental
Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
H. Post-Independence American Constitutions . . . . . . . . . . 19
V. OTHER EVIDENCE CONFIRMING THAT ARTICLE II
FOLLOWS THE ARTICLE I STRUCTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
A. The Organization of Article III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
B. The Uncertain Scope of the “Executive Power” . . . . . . 28
C. The Ratification Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
D. The Grants in Sections Two and Three in
Historical Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
E. The Broad Scope of Presidential Express and
Implied Powers—Including Those over Foreign
Affairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1
VI. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

1. Bibliographical Note: This footnote collects alphabetically the secondary

sources cited more than once in this Article. The sources and short form citations used
are as follows:
The Attorney’s Compleat Pocket-Book (5th ed., His Majesty’s Law Printer 1764)
[hereinafter Pocket-Book].
Thomas Branch, Principia Legis & Aequitatis (Henry Lintot 1753) [hereinafter
Branch].
Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the
Laws, 104 Yale L.J. 541(1994) [hereinafter Calabresi & Prakash].
Nicholas Covert, The Scrivener’s Guide (4th ed., E. & R. Nutt & R. Gosling 1724)
[hereinafter Covert].
The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution (Merrill Jensen et
al. eds., 1916) [hereinafter Documentary History].
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2009 EXECUTIVE VESTING CLAUSE 3

I. INTRODUCTION
From the administration of George Washington2 at least through
the administration of George W. Bush,3 promoters of presidential
power have argued that the first sentence of Article II of the

Jonathan Elliot, The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of
the Federal Constitution (2d ed., J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1836) (1941 ed., 5 vols.
inserted in 2 vols.) [hereinafter Elliot’s Debates].
The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (Max Farrand ed., Yale U. Press
1937) [hereinafter Farrand].
Alexander Hamilton, John Jay & James Madison, The Federalist (George W. Carey
& James McClellan eds., Liberty Fund, Inc. 2001) [hereinafter The Federalist].
The Heritage Found., The Heritage Guide to the Constitution (Edwin Meese III et al.
eds., Regnery Publg., Inc. 2005) [hereinafter Heritage Guide].
The Colonial Records of North Carolina: Instructions for Our Trusty and
Welbeloved [sic] Gabriel Johnston Esq. (William L. Saunders ed., P.M. Hale 1886)
[hereinafter Instructions for Gov. Johnston].
Giles Jacob, The Accomplish’d Conveyancer (2d ed., Henry Lintot 1750)
[hereinafter Jacob].
Job Mill, The Present Practice of Conveyancing (Henry Lintot 1745) [hereinafter
Mill].
Robert G. Natelson, The Agency Law Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause,
55 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 243 (2004) [hereinafter Natelson, Necessary and Proper].
Royal Instructions to British Colonial Governors 1670-1776 vol. 2 (Leonard Woods
Labaree ed., Octagon Books, Inc. 1935) [hereinafter Royal Instructions].
Anthony Stokes, A View of the Constitution of the British Colonies (B. White 1783)
(available at
http://books.google.com/books?id=VmNzusdnHlcC&printsec=frontcover&
dq=anthony+stokes#PPP7,M1) [hereinafter Stokes].
Charles C. Thach, Jr., The Creation of the Presidency, 1775-1789: A Study in
Constitutional History (Liberty Fund, Inc. 2007) (originally published 1923)
[hereinafter Thach].
The Federal and State Constitutions: Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws
(Francis Newton Thorpe ed., Govt. Prtn. Office 1909) [hereinafter Thorpe].
Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations (Béla Kapossy et al. eds., Liberty Fund, Inc.
2008) (originally published 1758) [hereinafter Vattel].
* Ed. note: Many of the eighteenth century sources not listed above may be found
on Eighteenth Century Collections Online. For purposes of clarity, where the long “s”
appears in the original text (i.e., the version of the letter that looks much like “f”), it
was replaced with a modern “s.”
2. Infra n. 140.
3. See Michael P. Van Alstine, Executive Aggrandizement in Foreign Affairs
Lawmaking, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 309, 339-40 (2006) (where the Bush-era claims are
summarized from a skeptical point of view).
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4 WHITTIER LAW REVIEW Vol. 31

Constitution—the so-called Executive Vesting Clause4—is a plenary

grant of “executive Power” to the President. If so, then the President
arguably enjoys an “immense” reservoir of power comparable to that of
the eighteenth-century British king, qualified only by explicit
limitations located in the Constitution.5 If, on the other hand, the initial
sentence of Article II merely designates the holder of the “executive
Power,” then the President’s authority is limited to the powers
specifically enumerated in the Constitution6 and their implied
incidents.7
There is no dispute that the comparable sentence in Article I is a
designation clause only, and confers no power. This is because that
sentence provides that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress of the United States . . . .”8 However, the words
“herein granted” are absent from the initial sentence of Article II.
In recent years, the debate over the “Executive Vesting Clause”
has been waged with great passion and ability.9 Both sides have
marshaled evidence from the Constitution’s text, from Founding-Era
political theories, and from the records of the federal convention and
the ratification process.10

4. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a
President of the United States of America.”).
5. Calabresi & Prakash, supra n. 1, at 578-79.
6. E.g. U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (power of veto); id. at art. II, §§ 2-3 (other
enumerated powers).
7. These are substantial. Infra nn. 158-62 and accompanying text.
8. U.S. Const. art. I, § 1 (italics added).
9. For strong arguments that the first sentences of Articles II and III are “vesting
clauses,” see e.g. Steven G. Calabresi, The Vesting Clauses as Power Grants, 88 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 1377 (1994); Calabresi & Prakash, supra n. 1, at 571 (stating, “The Vesting
Clause of Article III is widely conceded to be a general grant of power to the federal
judiciary”); id. at 570-78 (arguing that the first sentence of Article II also is a grant);
Heritage Guide, supra n. 1, at 179 (“The Executive Vesting Clause . . . grants the
President those authorities that were traditionally wielded by executives.”); id. at 234
(“In sum, Article III’s introductory language has always been read as granting federal
courts the ‘judicial Power’ ”); Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The
Executive Power Over Foreign Affairs, 111 Yale L.J. 231, 257-58 (2001). This view is
questioned in Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the
Administration, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 47-48 (1994). Perhaps the most persuasive and
thorough argument against the vesting-clause hypothesis is Curtis A. Bradley & Martin
S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 545,
555 (2004).
10. See sources cited, supra n. 9.
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2009 EXECUTIVE VESTING CLAUSE 5

They have largely overlooked, however, the Anglo-American

drafting tradition that informed the writing and adoption of the
Constitution. To be sure, commentators on the “Executive Vesting
Clause” have examined state constitutions and a few other documents.
But the drafting tradition was far more extensive. It encompassed also
a wide range of instruments by which one person, group of persons, or
entity conveyed enumerated powers to another person, group, or entity.
These instruments included powers of attorney, corporate and colonial
charters, statutes empowering public officials, and “commissions” of
all sorts. Among the relevant “commissions” were those by which the
British Crown enumerated and defined the powers of colonial
governors—instruments that were the direct ancestors of Article II.
The leaders who wrote the Constitution and guided it to
ratification knew these documents well. Most were, or had been,
practicing attorneys and public officials.11 Those who, like George
Washington, were not lawyers, were nevertheless familiar with legal
documents from government service and economic enterprise.12 If the
drafting tradition included customs that dictated how enumerated-
power instruments were structured, we would expect the Framers to
follow those customs and the ratifiers to read the Constitution by their
light.
After three introductory parts, this study sets forth in Part IV a
report on my investigation into how power-granting instruments were
drafted at the time. There were, broadly speaking, two prevailing
patterns for instruments conferring enumerated powers. One was
unlike any of the Constitution’s articles, but the other served as the
template for Article I. In my view, it also served as the template for
Article II (and, moreover, for Article III). This structure is consistent
with reading the first sentence of Article II as a designation alone, but
inconsistent with reading it as a grant of authority. In order to read that

11. On the delegates to the federal convention, see e.g. Clinton Rossiter, 1787: The
Grand Convention 79-137 (MacMillan 1966).
12. For example, planters such as Washington and George Mason made wide use of
commodity factors (brokers) to sell their crops abroad; larger planters served as factors
themselves. Louis B. Wright, The Cultural Life of the American Colonies, 1607-1763
7, 11-12 (Harper Torchbooks 1957). Factors received their authority from powers of
attorney. A General Treatise of Naval Trade and Commerce vol. 2, 400 (E. & R. Nutt
1753) (“A Factor is a Merchant’s Agent, residing beyond the Seas, or in any remote
Parts, constituted by Letter or Power of Attorney, to sell Goods and Merchandize [sic],
and otherwise act for his Principal . . . .”).
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6 WHITTIER LAW REVIEW Vol. 31

sentence as a “vesting clause”—a grant of authority—one has to

suppose an organizational structure for Article II so anomalous as to be
virtually unprecedented in Anglo-American drafting practice.
Part V provides some additional evidence—much of it new—
tending to corroborate the conclusion that the first sentence of Article
II merely designated the chief executive and did not grant authority.
The new evidence includes eighteenth-century sources shedding light
on the scope of the President’s incidental powers, a formerly-unnoticed
limitation on the authority of the British king, and the influence of an
eighteenth-century rule of conveyancing law. Part VI briefly concludes
this study.

II. STRUCTURE OF ARTICLE I

All acknowledge that the first sentence of Article I was merely a
designation clause because it referred to grants later in the
instrument.13 Taking it as such, Article I was organized in this way:
* Designation of Congress as the legislative branch (Section 1).
* Organizational details (Sections 2-7).
* Enumerated powers of Congress (Section 8).
* Restrictions on enumerated congressional powers (Section 9).
* Restrictions on the states (Section 10).
This study uses the term “Article I structure” to refer to those
documents that conveyed enumerated powers and featured the first
three elements of Article I in the same order. In other words, a
document following the Article I structure first contained a provision
(which might or might not be in the form of a recital) naming or
appointing the designee, but granting no authority. Next, it contained
one or more diversions into other subjects. Finally, it enumerated the
powers conveyed from the grantor to the grantee. Additional
provisions might or might not follow.

III. ALTERNATIVE STRUCTURES FOR ARTICLE II

If Article II followed the Article I structure, then Article II was
organized this way:
* Designation of the President as chief executive (Section 1, first
sentence).

13. U.S. Const. art. I, §1 (“herein granted”).

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2009 EXECUTIVE VESTING CLAUSE 7

* Organizational details (remainder of Section 1).

* Enumerated powers of the President (Sections 2 and 3).
* Removal of the President (Section 4).
On the other hand, if the first sentence of Article II conferred
power, then it was organized as follows:
* Plenary grant of power and designation (Section 1, first
sentence).
* Organizational details (remainder of Section 1).
* Further grants and/or restrictions, explanations, or qualifications
(Sections 2 and 3).
* Removal of the President (Section 4).
As noted in Part II, this study labels the structure of the first
alternative the “Article I structure.” The second alternative will be
called the “vesting-clause structure.” The vesting-clause structure was
characterized by these three provisions in succession: (1) A general,
indefinite grant, (2) one or more diversions into other subjects, and (3)
what were, in form, specific enumerated powers, but actually might
have served to qualify the initial broad grant.

IV. THE STRUCTURES OF EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY DOCUMENTS

CONFERRING ENUMERATED POWERS

A. INTRODUCTION
Founding-Era life was replete with documents by which one or
more persons conferred enumerated powers on others. Indeed, the
general public of the time probably was more conversant with such
documents than the general public is today.14 Instruments conferring
enumerated powers included powers of attorney, corporate charters,
colonial charters, the royal commissions by which the British Crown
had bestowed authority on colonial governors, commissions to
diplomats, military officers, and other agents, the early state
constitutions, and the Articles of Confederation. This study examines
each of these.15

14. See generally Robert G. Natelson, Judicial Review of Special Interest Spending:
The General Welfare Clause and the Fiduciary Law of the Founders, 11 Tex. Rev. L.
& Pol. 239, 247-48 (2007).
15. Infra Parts IV, subs. B-H.
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8 WHITTIER LAW REVIEW Vol. 31

B. POWERS (LETTERS) OF ATTORNEY

During the constitutional debates of 1787-1788, the Federalists
sometimes made explicit the connection between the Constitution and
other documents conferring enumerated powers. At the North Carolina
ratification convention, for example, Federalist spokesman James
Iredell compared the Constitution to “a great power of attorney.”16
Iredell knew his audience: The power of attorney (or, as it was then
often called, the letter of attorney) was a widely known document,
employed in a range of business transactions.17
Members of the Founding Generation employed several different
power-of-attorney forms. One common form simply stated that A was
appointing B as his agent, and then proceeded to further enumeration.
An illustration of such is a letter of attorney to the bailiff (manager) of
a manor, which appeared in a conveyancing manual by Giles Jacob, a
popular and prolific treatise writer.18 The letter began with the words,
“Know all Men by these Presents, That I . . . Have made, constituted
and appointed A. B. . . . my Bailiff . . . to collect, gather, ask, require,
demand and receive of and from all and every my Tenants . . . .”19
After the designation, it proceeded to enumerate the bailiff’s powers.20
Another kind of form set forth recitals before the appointment and
grant of powers. At the end of the enumeration, there was frequently a
general conferral of authority in a manner reminiscent of, or
foreshadowing, the Necessary and Proper Clause.21 For example, a
letter of attorney form in the 1764 edition of The Attorney’s Compleat
Pocket-Book authorized an agent to receive a legacy on behalf of the
principal.22 The first two sentences were “whereas” recitals describing
the existence of the will leaving a legacy to the principal, the fact of

16. Elliot’s Debates, supra n. 1, vol. 4 at 148 (“[The Constitution] may be

considered as a great power of attorney, under which no power can be exercised but
what is expressly given.”). See also id. at 148-49, 166.
17. On Founding-Era powers of attorney, see Natelson, supra n. 14, at 251-52.
18. Jacob, supra n. 1, at 430-31.
19. Id. at 430.
20. Id. at 430-31. Other examples of this form are A Letter of Attorney to Execute a
Deed, Mill, supra n. 1, at 369, and William Newnam, Power of Attorney from
Executors, in The Complete Conveyancer vol. 2, pt. 1 at 211-12 (1786).
21. See Robert G. Natelson et al., The Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause
(Cambridge U. Press forthcoming 2010) (ms. on file with Author); Natelson, Necessary
and Proper, supra n. 1, at 274–76 (setting forth numerous illustrations).
22. Pocket-Book, supra n. 1, vol. 1 at 186-87.
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2009 EXECUTIVE VESTING CLAUSE 9

probate, and the name of the executor.23 The words “Now know ye”
then introduced a sentence stating that the principal “do[es] make,
ordain, constitute, depute and appoint” two persons as his “true and
lawful attornies [sic] jointly. . . .”24 Following was an enumeration of
the agents’ powers, including a general clause ratifying whatever the
attorneys might lawfully do.25 A transcript of this form is reproduced
at the end of this Article as Appendix A.
These forms followed neither an Article I structure
(designation—other matter—enumerated powers) nor the vesting-
clause structure (indefinite power grant—other matter—specific
enumerations and qualifications). Instead, they exemplified a direct-
grant structure: A pattern in which an instrument, with or without
preliminary recitals, granted powers to named persons or entities and
then proceeded directly to an enumeration.
Occasionally, a power of attorney would designate the agent in a
recital, and therefore arguably assume an Article I structure. A “Letter
of Attorney to receive Monies due from Several Persons” recited a debt
owed to a creditor, explained why the principal was assigning a debt
owing to the principal to the creditor, and then made the grant of
enumerated powers.26
I uncovered no powers of attorney that followed the vesting-
clause structure.27

C. CORPORATE CHARTERS (OTHER THAN FOR COLONIES)

Another power-delegating instrument was the royal charter
bestowing privileges and powers on a group of people, such as a
municipality, charity, or business corporation—often while granting
corporate status. The Gale database Eighteenth Century Collections
Online contains a substantial selection of these charters.28

23. Id.
24. Id. at 187.
25. For another form with recitals, see Mill, supra n. 1, at 373-74.
26. Covert, supra n. 1, vol. 1 at 134-35.
27. Other letters of attorney can be found in id. at 135-58; Jacob, supra n. 1, vol. 1
at 420-36; Pocket-Book, supra n. 1, vol. 1 at 184-91.
28. A title search with the word “charter” shows that the database includes
approximately thirty such documents, excluding duplicates, abstracts, excerpts, and
colonial charters; the exact number depends on how one counts. Most, but not all, are
eighteenth-century documents; the others are older instruments republished in the
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Approximately half began with recitals stating the name of the entity or
persons being empowered, then set forth other recitals, and then
proceeded to grant enumerated powers. In other words, those charters
followed the Article I structure. Entirely typical was the celebrated
royal charter that created Dartmouth College (1769), the same
instrument litigated in the Supreme Court’s Dartmouth College Case.29
The Dartmouth Charter first recited background facts, including the
college founder’s recommendation that named persons serve as
trustees, and that the founder “desire[d], that the trustees aforesaid may
be vested with all that power therein, which can consist with their
distance from the same.”30 In a further recital, the charter named the
trustees. After yet another recital, the charter introduced the
enumeration of powers with the phrase “KNOW YE, THEREFORE.”31
Thus, the Dartmouth Charter followed the Article I pattern of
“designation—other matter—enumerated powers.” Many other royal
charters did so as well.32
Some royal charters employed a direct grant structure,33
particularly older documents,34 or those empowering a large number of

eighteenth century.
29. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819).
30. Id. at 519-23; also available as The Charter of Dartmouth College 4 (1769).
31. Id. at 519-24.
32. E.g. The Charter of the Royal Canal Company (1789); A Translation of a
Charter, Granted to the Inhabitants of the City of Exeter (1785); The Charter of the
City of Albany (1771); The Charter, Laws, and Catalogue of Books, of the Library
Company of Philadelphia (1770); The Royal Charter of the Hospital and Free-School
of K. Charles the Second, Dublin (1768); The New Charter, Granted to the Mayor and
Commonalty of Colchester, In Essex (1764); A Copy of the Charter of the Corporation
of the Governor and Company of the Bank of England (1758); Charter of Incorporation
of the London-Hospital (1758); A True Copy of the Charter of Havering-atte-Bower, in
Essex (1757); A Copy of His Majesty’s Royal Charter for Incorporating the Governors
and Guardians of the Hospital for the Relief of Poor Lying-In-Women, In Dublin
(1757); An Authentic Copy of the Charter, and Bye-Laws, &c. of the City of
Rochester, in the County of Kent (1749); Charter of the British Linen Company (1746)
(containing an Article I structure within an Article I structure); The Charter of the
Royal Lustring Company (1720); Charter by King James VI. in Favour of the Town of
Perth (1600).
See also The Charter for Sutton’s Hospital, in The Case of Sutton’s Hospital [1612] 10
Co. Rep. 1, 1a-22b, 77 Eng. Rep. 937, 945-59—a case lawyers in the founding
generation studied because of the popularity of Coke’s reports.
33. E.g. The New Charter, Granted to the Mayor and Commonalty of Colchester, In
Essex (1764); His Majesty’s Royal Charter, Granted on the Eleventh Day of October
1750 . . . for Incorporating the Society of the Free British Fishery (1751); The Charter
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2009 EXECUTIVE VESTING CLAUSE 11

people who could not conveniently be named twice.35 There also were
charters that followed unique forms.36
Only two charters were found that arguably followed the vesting-
clause structure of “indefinite power grant—other matter—specific
enumerations and qualifications.” One of these was very old:
Translated from Latin and republished in 1763, but dating from the
time of Henry VIII (reigned: 1509-1547).37 This instrument
38
incorporated the town of Sutton-Coldfield. It first granted corporate
status, then named the town, then granted perpetual succession and
stated the qualifications of successors, then proceeded to grant more
powers.39 However, the charter bespoke more of disorganization than
specifically of a vesting-clause structure.
The other was a charter creating two courts for the town of
Gibraltar (i.e., at the straits by that name).40 The instrument first
named a “Court of Civil Pleas,” then listed its powers, and later named
a “Court of Appeals,” then listed its powers.41 The structure of the
document is ambiguous because it is not clear whether the designation
clauses for each of the two courts also conveyed power to those courts.
The designation clause for the first tribunal stated, that “[w]e . . . do . . .
grant, ordain, direct, and appoint, that a Court of Judicature be erected:
And we do hereby erect and constitute a Court at Gibraltar aforesaid,
to be called by the Name of The Court of Civil Pleas . . . .”42 The
second designation clause provided that “we . . . grant, ordain,
constitute and appoint, that a Court of Judicature be erected at
Gibraltar aforesaid, to be called by the Name of The Court of

of His Majesty King George II. for Erecting and Endowing St. Patrick’s Hospital
(1746).
34. E.g. The Charter of the Governours of the Grey-Coat-Hospital in Tothill-Fields,
of the Royal Foundation of Queen Anne (1712); The Charter of Queen Anne, to the
City of Bristol (1710); A Translation of the Charter of K. H. the 8th . . . (1514).
35. E.g. Charter and Statutes of the Royal Irish Academy (1786).
36. E.g. Charter of the Royal Hospital of King Charles II. &c. near Dublin (1760).
37. A Genuine Translation of the Royal Charter Granted by King Henry the Eighth,
to the Corporation of Sutton-Coldfield (1763).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. The Royal Charter for Establishing a Civil Government at Gibraltar (1742).
41. Id. at 2-27
42. Id. at 2-3.
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12 WHITTIER LAW REVIEW Vol. 31

Appeals.”43 These clauses probably only erected the courts rather than
empowered them, particularly since enumerated powers follow each of
them, but the presence of the words “grant” and “constitute,”44 enable
one to argue the contrary.
Nevertheless, as this examination of royal charters shows, the
Article I structure was extremely common and the vesting-clause
structure—if used at all—was very rare.

D. COLONIAL CHARTERS
From an American point of view, the most significant royal
charters were those that served as the colonies’ basic laws.45 The
charters of Carolina, Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and the 1606 and 1611-1612 charters of
Virginia all fit the Article I structure. They featured a designation in
the recitals, followed by signaling words (“Now Know Ye,” in the case
of Connecticut), followed by grants.46 However, the Georgia charter47
and the 1609 Virginia charter48 listed the power-holders in a grant
authorizing them to act in the corporate form, and then immediately
enumerated their other powers. They thus adopted the direct-grant
structure.
I found no colonial charters adopting the vesting-clause structure.

43. Id. at 15.

44. See infra nn. 131-32 and accompanying text (discussing the contemporaneous
meanings of “constitute”).
45. See e.g. Elliot’s Debates, supra n. 1, vol. 3 at 75, 172, 212, 317, 466 (referring
to various colonial charters at the Virginia ratifying convention).
46. Carolina Charter (1665), Thorpe, supra n. 1, vol. 5 at 2761; Conn. Charter
(1662), id., vol. 1 at 529; Md. Charter (1632), id., vol. 3 at 1677; Mass. Charter (1691),
id., vol. 3 at 1870; Pa. Charter (1681), id., vol. 5 at 3035; R.I. Charter (1663), id., vol.
6 at 3211; Va. Charter (1606), id., vol. 7 at 3783; Va. Charter (1611-1612), id., vol. 7 at
3802.
An additional Virginia charter is not commonly available. This was a three-page
document issued in 1676 that converted (or announced the conversion) of Virginia into
a royal colony. A large part of the charter was devoted to the confirmation of
Virginians’ existing privileges. To the extent it followed a scheme of organization, it
reflected the direct-grant structure. Va. Charter (Oct. 10, 1676), United Kingdom
Public Record Office, Colonial Office, Entry Book of Letters, Commissions,
Instructions, Charters, Warrants, Patents, Grants & c., C.O. 5/1355 (reproduced in
Folio 95-96, Reel 28, Film 1609, The Library of Virginia, Richmond VA).
47. Ga. Charter (1732), Thorpe, supra n. 1, vol. 2 at 766.
48. Va. Charter (1609), id., vol. 7 at 3790, 3795.
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2009 EXECUTIVE VESTING CLAUSE 13

E. STATUTES EMPOWERING AGENTS

Statutes sometimes conveyed enumerated powers to designated
agents. Illustrative are the land enclosure acts, which Parliament
enacted to enable the owners of scattered land holdings to rearrange
title so as to consolidate those holdings. Each enclosure act appointed
commissioners and empowered them to survey the land, measure the
amount of land belonging to each owner, reset the boundary lines, lay
out access roads, and the like.
The exact patterns for the enclosure acts varied. Some, such as an
act for the area known as Little Kington, followed the Article I
structure.49 Others, such as the statute governing Fillingham Manor,50
adopted what appears to be a direct-grant structure.51 The direct-grant
structure was a common mode of organization employed in other sorts
of power-conferring statutes as well.52 I have found no statutes
employing the vesting-clause structure.

49. An Act for Allotting, Dividing, and Inclosing the Open and Common Fields,
and Common or Commonable Meadows . . . within the Manor of Little Kington . . . ,
Private Acts, 12 Geo. 3, c. 19 1772. The designation of commissioners (which at first
looks like a conferral of powers, but was not), id. at 2-3, was followed by
administrative details and conferral of powers, id. at 5.
See also An Act for Dividing and Inclosing the Common Fields . . . in the Manor and
Lordship of Carlton upon Trent . . . , Private Acts, 5 Geo. 3, c. 72 1765 (setting forth
the designation, id. at 3; next, other matters, and then commencing the powers later, id.
at 4.)
50. An Act for Dividing and Inclosing Several Common Fields and Grounds, within
the Manor of Fillingham, in the County of Lincoln, Private Acts, 32 Geo. 2, c. 8 1759.
51. The statute first designated certain persons as commissioners to supervise the
work. Id. at 2. Whether the designation itself conveyed authority is doubtful, but in
any case, it was followed, without intermediate digression, by grants of enumerated
powers. Id. at 2-3.
Also adopting the direct-grant structure is An Act for Inclosing the Common or
Waste called Lightwood Forest . . . , Private Acts, 7 Geo. 2, c. 14 1734. (The
designation of the office of commissioner, id. at 2; the commissioners’ powers begin,
id. at 3).
See also An Act for Dividing and Inclosing the Common Fields, within the Parish of
Lutcham . . ., Private Acts, 33 Geo. 2, c. 9 1760, and An Act for Dividing and Inclosing
Several Open Fields and Pastures, or Commons, in the Township of Nunburnholme . . .
, Private Acts 28 Geo. 2, c. 27.
52. See e.g. An Act for Making and Widening a Passage or Street . . . , 8 Geo. 3, c.
16 1768; Documentary History of Yale University 21-23 (Franklin Bowditch Dexter
ed., 1916) (reproducing the 1701 Connecticut statute that gave Yale its charter); J.
Contl. Cong. 1774-1789 vol. 21, 1187-90 (Dec. 31, 1781) (ordinance incorporating
national bank).
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14 WHITTIER LAW REVIEW Vol. 31

F. COMMISSIONS TO ROYAL GOVERNORS

Another class of power-conferring documents consisted of the
colonial-era “commissions” by which the Crown empowered and
directed colonial governors. A commission named the governor as a
person worthy of trust, appointed him, recorded his duties, and
enumerated his powers. Short instructions were often intermingled
with the enumerated powers.53 When a new governor arrived in a
colony, his commission was read aloud to the colony’s executive
council, a body staffed by local residents.54 The commission was
supplemented with a lengthy list of instructions, which remained secret
at the time but were subject to later disclosure.55
The leading Founders, who had served under colonial governors,
naturally were cognizant of those documents. As Associate Justice
Bradley observed in later years, “[t]he framers of the Constitution . . .
were familiar with the [colonial] governments . . . They had first drawn
their breath under these governments; they had helped to administer
them.”56 Indeed, the framers of the 1780 Massachusetts and 1784 New
Hampshire constitutions largely copied the executive military powers
clauses of those constitutions from the language of royal
commissions;57 and the instructions drafted by the Continental and
Confederation Congresses resembled in form the former royal
instructions.58 Among the enumerated powers in Section 3 of Article
II of the federal constitution is wording distinctly reminiscent of the
royal instructions, most notably the admonition to “take Care.”59

53. See infra Appendix B (setting forth the form of a commission to a royal
governor, and including, for example, the requirement of oath-taking and oath-
administering).
54. Instructions for Gov. Johnston, supra n. 1, at ¶ 2.
55. Royal Instructions, supra n. 1 (containing numerous clauses from royal
instructions to colonial governors). See infra nn. 61-62, 64-66.
56. Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. 457, 558-59 (1870) (Bradley, J., concurring).
57. Mass. Const. ch. II, § 1, art. VII (1780); N.H. Const. pt. II, sub. Exec. Power
(1783); Stokes, supra n. 1, at 158-60.
58. See infra n. 83 (citing examples of instructions from the Continental and
Confederation Congresses).
59. In the initial royal instructions to North Carolina governor, Gabriel Johnston,
the phrase “take care” was employed at least twenty times, in addition to several
variations of the phrase: “taking care,” “take particular care,” “take due care,” “take
especial care,” “take effectual care.” Instructions for Governor Johnston, supra n. 1, at
92-94, 96-97, 100, 102-06, 108-11, 113-17.
The phrase also appeared in other power-granting instruments. See e.g. A Deputation
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2009 EXECUTIVE VESTING CLAUSE 15

Under the circumstances, it is odd that modern commentators have

overlooked these commissions and instructions and their constitutional
significance.60
The organizational pattern for royal commissions changed little in
the century before Independence61—as shown by individual
commissions still extant.62 In 1788, Anthony Stokes, the former chief
justice of the Georgia colony, was able to distill into a single form the

or Warrant from a Lord of a Manor to his Game-Keeper, in Covert, supra n. 1, vol. 1

at 484 (“to look after and take care to preserve the Game there”); id. vol. 2 at 986
(nominating “overseers” of a will, and charging them “to take Care and see the same
performed according to my true Intent and Meaning”); Record of Nisi Prius, Pocket-
Book, supra n. 1, vol. 2 at 276 (“The prothonotaries to take care that every record . . .
be ingrossed . . . .”). Many of the instructions issued by the Continental and
Confederation Congresses included similar language. See e.g. J. Contl. Cong. 1774-
1789, vol. 14, 957 (Aug. 14, 1779) (“take especial care”); id. at 962 (“taking care”); id.,
vol. 18 at 1136 (Dec. 9, 1780) (“taking care”); id., vol. 20 at 616 (Jun. 8, 1781) (“[y]ou
shall take especial care”).
“Take care” language also appeared in the executive provisions of the
contemporaneous constitutions of New York and Pennsylvania. N.Y. Const. art. XIX
(1777) (stating that the governor is “to take care that the laws are faithfully executed to
the best of his ability”); Pa. Const., § 20 (1776) (providing that the state president and
council “are also to take care that the laws be faithfully executed”).
60. A search in the Westlaw “journals and legal periodicals” database with the
query “constitution /20 ‘royal commission’ /s governor governour” (i.e., “constitution”
within twenty words of “royal commission” appearing in the same sentence with
“governor” or “governour”) yielded only four results, three of which were articles in
foreign journals and another that was inapposite. Search of Westlaw (Nov. 14, 2009).
61. Royal Instructions, supra n. 1, at 809 (noting the lack of variation). Thus, the
commission designating Edmund Andros governor of the “Dominion of New
England,” issued in 1688 was organized under much the same Article I structure
characteristic of commissions issued during the eighteenth century and discussed in the
text. Commission of Sir Edmund Andros for the Dominion of New England. April 7,
1688, Thorpe, supra n. 1, vol. 3 at 1863.
62. Three are reproduced in Royal Instructions, supra n. 1: That for Patrick Tonyn
as Governor of East Florida (1773), id. at 825; for James Glen as Governor of South
Carolina (1739), id. at 816; and for Sir Jonathan Atkins as Governor of Barbados
(1673), id. at 809. See also Draft Commission for Arthur Dobbs as Governor of North
Carolina (Feb. 1753) (microfilmed at British Public Record Office, Colonial Office,
Class 5 Files: Part 4: Royal Instructions and Commissions to Colonial Officials, 1702-
1784, U. Publications Am. Watson Lib., the U. of Kansas, reel 8, v. 200); Draft
Commission for William Anne, Earl of Albermarle as Governor of Virginia (Oct., 6,
1737), id. at reel 6, v. 195; Draft Commission for Gabriel Johnston as Governor of
North Carolina (Apr. 5, 1733), id.; Commission of Sir Edmund Andros for the
Dominion of New England (Apr. 7, 1688), Thorpe, supra n. 1, vol. 3 at 1863.
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16 WHITTIER LAW REVIEW Vol. 31

pattern that all of them followed.63 Excerpts from that form appear at
the end of this article as Appendix B.
A commission began by reciting that the gubernatorial nominee,
designated by name, was “trusty and well beloved.” It next contained
an appointment clause in the form of a royal command that the named
person serve as governor. It is clear that neither the recital nor the
appointment clause was a conferral of power. The royal command was
that the nominee act “according to the several Powers and Authorities
granted or appointed you by this present Commission”64—which
powers and authorities were enumerated later. Following was a
requirement that the designee take and administer certain oaths and
subscribe a declaration. Then the commission granted the nominee a
series of discrete powers, using phrases such as “We do hereby give[]
and grant unto you,” and adding any qualifications to them.65 The
governor’s powers included several later granted by the Constitution to
the President, including authority to act as commander-in-chief, and the
right to grant pardons and reprieves, veto laws, and appoint judges.
The commissions also conferred powers the Constitution did not grant
to the President, such as authority to establish fairs, markets, and
courts. After the enumeration of powers, a royal commission provided
for a substitute to serve in the governor’s absence, set forth a
habendum clause indicating that the governor served at the will of the
Crown, and ended with a testimonium clause.66
Thus, the overall organization of royal commissions—
designation, other details, enumerated powers, and provision for
removal—was the Article I structure. I have found none that followed
any other structure.67 Given the close relationship between the
commissions and Article II, this is useful evidence of the plan of
Article II.

63. Stokes, supra n. 1, at 150-64.

64. Royal Instructions, supra n. 1, at 817 (quoting from the commission of James
Glen to be governor of South Carolina, June 15, 1739); see also Stokes, supra n. 1, at
151 (setting forth similar language in a typical commission form).
65. E.g. Royal Instructions, supra n. 1, at 818-24; Stokes, supra n. 1, at 153-63.
66. Royal Instructions, supra n. 1, at 824-25; Stokes, supra n. 1, at 156, 163.
67. However, the Continental Congress’s commission to General Washington, a
somewhat analogous document, did not enumerate powers. It simply appointed him as
commander-in-chief and stated that he was “vested with full power and authority to act
as you shall think for the good and welfare of the service.” Several instructions
followed. J. Contl. Cong., 1774-1789 vol. 2, 96 (June 17, 1775).
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G. COMMISSIONS IN THE JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS

Beginning in 1774, the Continental Congress68 met regularly until
the federal government was organized under the Constitution in early
1789. The congressional journals reproduce numerous power-granting
documents. These include the commissions or “credentials” by which
state legislatures and conventions authorized named individuals to
serve as delegates in Congress; military commissions; and
commissions granted to congressional agents, such as diplomats,
judges, and representatives to the Indian tribes.
In the early years of the Continental Congress, some commissions
authorizing delegates to act on behalf of their states enumerated their
powers, although the enumerations generally were quite short—
consisting only of two or three powers. These commissions generally
followed the direct-grant structure, with or without a preamble.69 In
accordance with Crown practice, the states sometimes inserted brief
instructions in these commissions.70 In later years, after the customary
duties of congressional delegates were fully understood, state
commissions merely conferred the office and its powers in a single
grant. In other words, they were no longer enumerated-powers
instruments.71 Some of these commissions described the delegates

68. It is more precise to refer to Congress after adoption of the Articles of

Confederation on March 1, 1781 as the “Confederation Congress,” but the term
“Continental Congress” is frequently used for the entire period before the convening of
the Federal Congress. Id., vol. 19 at 208 (Mar. 1, 1781).
69. E.g. J. Contl. Cong. vol. 4, 353-54 (May 14, 1776) (reproducing Rhode Island
commission to delegates in Congress and enumerating powers to join with other
delegates, consult and advise on particular measures, enter into measures, and adjourn);
id., vol. 5 at 489-90 (June 22, 1776) (reproducing New Jersey commission to
delegates); id., vol. 6 at 962 (Nov. 19, 1776) (reproducing Maryland commission to
delegates); id., vol. 6 at 1000 (Dec. 2, 1776) (reproducing Delaware commission to
delegates); id., vol. 10 at 100 (Jan. 30, 1778) (reproducing Delaware commission to
delegates).
70. J. Contl. Cong. 1774-1789 vol. 20, 628-29 (June 12, 1781) (reproducing
Massachusetts commission requiring delegates to honor later instructions).
71. E.g. J. Contl. Cong. 1774-1789 vol. 11, 811 (Aug. 19, 1778) (reproducing
Virginia commission to delegates); id., vol. 13 at 260-61 (Mar. 1, 1779) (reproducing
New York commission to John Jay); id., vol. 16 at 399-400 (May 1, 1780)
(reproducing New York commission to James Duane); id., vol. 24 at 107, 341, 510
(reproducing North Carolina and Massachusetts commissions of various dates in
1783); id., vol. 34 at 1-9 (Jan. 21, 1788) (reproducing all states’ commissions for the
year).
Sometimes it is unclear whether the document should be read as containing a single
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18 WHITTIER LAW REVIEW Vol. 31

appointed as “trusty and well beloved”72—language imitating the royal

commissions that preceded them.73
Commissions to military officers usually did not enumerate
powers.74 However, letters of marque and reprisal75 were enumerated-
power documents, listing in detail what privateering ships could and
could not do. The Continental Congress issued letters of marque and
reprisal using the direct-grant structure.76
Some commissions to diplomats did not enumerate powers, but
merely appointed the designee to an office with pre-arranged or
otherwise-understood powers,77 or with separate accompanying
instructions.78 On the other hand, many diplomatic commissions did
contain enumerations. These also adopted the direct-grant structure,
usually with a preamble.79 (A sample is reproduced below as

or multiple grants. See e.g. id., vol. 7 at 25-26 (Jan. 9, 1777) (reproducing
Massachusetts commission to delegates).
72. E.g. J. Contl. Cong. 1774-1789 vol. 16, 399 (May 1, 1780) (reproducing that
language in a New York Commission); id., vol. 34 at 2-3 (Jan. 21, 1788) (reproducing
that language in a Massachusetts commission). Cf. id., vol. 23 at 581 (Sept. 16, 1782)
(reproducing a commission with the direct-grant structure to George Washington
describing him as “trusty”).
73. See Appendix B (setting forth the form of a commission to a royal governor).
74. E.g. J. Contl. Cong. 1774-1789 vol. 2, 96 (June 17, 1775) (reproducing
commission of George Washington); id., vol. 12 at 1212 (Dec. 11, 1778) (reproducing
revised form of officer’s commission); id., vol. 16 at 380 (Apr. 20, 1780) (reproducing
naval officer’s commission). But see id., vol. 23 at 581 (Sept. 16, 1782) (reproducing
an enumerated-power commission with the direct-grant structure to George
Washington to enter into prisoner-exchanges).
75. Cf. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (authorizing Congress to issue letters of marque
and reprisal).
76. E.g, J. Contl. Cong. 1774-1789 vol. 4, 247-48 (Apr. 2, 1776) (reproducing
“form of a commission” to privateers with a direct-grant structure); id., vol. 7 at 339-40
(May 8, 1777) (reproducing amended form); id., vol. 16 at 404-05 (May 2, 1780)
(reproducing another form).
77. E.g. J. Contl. Cong. 1774-1789 vol. 17, 536-37 (June 20, 1780) (designating
John Adams and Francis Dana to undertake responsibilities previously given to Henry
Laurens); id., vol. 20 at 652-54 (June 15, 1781) (reproducing commission to ministers
plenipotentiary).
78. J. Contl. Cong. 1774-1789 vol. 18, 1134-36 (Dec. 9, 1780) (designating William
Palfrey as consul to France, with accompanying instructions).
79. E.g. J. Contl. Cong. 1774-1789 vol. 5, 833 (Sept. 28, 1776) (reproducing form
of “letters of credence” for diplomats); id., vol. 8 at 518-19 (July 1, 1777) (reproducing
commission of William Lee); id., vol. 8 at 519-22 (July 1, 1777) (reproducing the
commissions of Ralph Izard, Benjamin Franklin, and Arthur Lee); id., vol. 11 at 547
(May 28, 1778) (reproducing new diplomatic commission form); id., vol. 23 at 621-22
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Appendix C.) Also following the direct-grant structure was Congress’

commission to the Court of Appeals that Congress constituted to hear
maritime cases.80 However, the congressional commission to
secretaries to foreign ministers arguably fit the Article I structure.81 I
have not been able to find any congressional documents from this era
that followed the vesting-clause structure.82
Congress frequently followed the Crown practice of
accompanying commissions with sets of instructions.83

H. POST-INDEPENDENCE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS

After Independence, but before the 1787 federal convention,
Americans prepared a number of important constitutional documents.
The Continental Congress drafted the Articles of Confederation. That

(Sep. 28, 1782) (reproducing a direct-grant commission to Franklin to negotiate with

Sweden); id., vol. 24 at 376-77 (June 2, 1783) (reproducing a direct-grant commission
to Oliver Pollock as a commercial agent; the preamble, if it be such, consists of only a
few words); but see id., vol. 4 at 219 (Mar. 20, 1776) (reproducing a direct-grant
commission to diplomats to Canada without a preamble).
80. J. Contl. Cong. 1774-1789 vol. 16, 121 (Feb. 2, 1780) (reproducing form of
commission to judges of the Court of Appeals).
81. J. Contl. Cong. 1774-1789 vol. 15, 1159-60 (Oct. 9, 1779) (reproducing form of
commission leading with appointment clause, followed by brief instructions, followed
by authorization to undertake various duties upon the minister’s death).
82. The closest are the credentials from New Hampshire for its delegates in
Congress during congressional consideration of the territorial dispute over the land that
would become Vermont. Since Congress was charged with resolving the dispute, New
Hampshire decided to tack onto its delegates’ commissions language authorizing them
to represent the state in the proceedings. J. Contl. Cong. 1774-1789 vol. 20, 498-99
(May 14, 1781) (reproducing credentials); id., vol. 21 at 1100-01 (Nov. 5, 1781)
(reproducing credentials). However, the credentials contain only one enumerated
power rather than several (as would be required to comply with the vesting-clause
structure), seemingly inserted as an afterthought.
83. E.g. J. Contl. Cong. 1774-1789 vol. 3, 339-41 (Nov. 8, 1775) (reproducing
committee instructions); id., vol. 4 at 215-19 (Mar. 20, 1776) (reproducing instructions
of commission to go to Canada); id., vol. 7 at 38-39 (Jan. 15, 1777) (reproducing
instructions to Indian agent); id., vol. 8 at 519-21 (July 1, 1777) (reproducing
instructions to diplomats); id., vol. 18 at 1135-36 (Dec. 9, 1780) (reproducing
instructions to William Palfrey as consul to France); id., vol. 20 at 616-17 (June 8,
1781) (reproducing diplomatic instructions to John Adams); id., vol. 32 at 66-69 (Feb.
20, 1787) (reproducing instructions of Indian affairs superintendents).
The foregoing examples are only a few from several formal instructions issued by
Congress to its agents during the Continental and Confederation periods.
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20 WHITTIER LAW REVIEW Vol. 31

instrument first identified the states as parties;84 next set forth certain
preliminary information,85 including the designation of Congress as the
representative of the states;86 and then bestowed enumerated powers.87
In other words, the Articles of Confederation adopted the Article I
structure.
In addition, eleven states adopted constitutions. (Connecticut and
Rhode Island merely modified their royal charters.) The executive
provisions of the following constitutions followed the Article I
structure: Massachusetts (1780), Virginia (1776), South Carolina (its
second, adopted in 1778), New Hampshire (1784), and New Jersey
(1776). For example, in the Massachusetts Constitution, Chapter II—
the executive provision—began with a pure designation clause: “There
shall be a supreme executive magistrate, who shall be styled—The
Governor of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; and whose title
shall—be His Excellency.”88 Chapter II next prescribed the rules for
the governor’s election, and then enumerated his powers.89 The
executive provisions of the New Hampshire Constitution followed the
same pattern.90 The Virginia Constitution identified the governor as
the “chief magistrate”;91 provided for his election, term and salary; and
then listed his powers.92 The 1778 South Carolina Constitution also
contained a pure designation clause—“the executive authority be
vested in the governor and commander-in-chief, in manner herein
mentioned”93—and in later parts of the document, listed his powers.
The designation clause of the New Jersey Constitution also employed
the word “vested,” but in such a general way that no designee was
vested with any particular sphere of authority: “[T]he government of
this Province shall be vested in a Governor, Legislative Council, and
General Assembly.”94 After information on various other matters
(such as elections), the New Jersey instrument enumerated the

84. Arts. Confed., preamble.

85. Id. at arts. I-IV.
86. Id. at art. V.
87. Id. at arts. VIII-IX.
88. Mass. Const. ch. II, § 1, art. I (1780).
89. Id. at arts. II-XIII.
90. N.H. Const. pt. II, sub. Exec. Power (1784).
91. Va. Const. (1776) (articles not designated).
92. Id.
93. S.C. Const. art. XI (1778) (emphasis added).
94. N.J. Const. art. I (1776).
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governor’s authority: “[S]hall have the supreme executive power, be

Chancellor of the Colony, and act as captain-general and commander in
chief . . . .”95
As the “supreme executive power” phrase in the New Jersey
Constitution shows, some of these documents did grant governors very
broad executive authority—but not in the designation clause. Indeed,
several had no designation clauses, and therefore did not follow the
Article I structure, the vesting-clause structure, or the direct-grant
structure. The North Carolina Constitution (1776) enumerated some
powers of the governor, and then added afterwards that he could
“exercise all the other executive powers of government, limited and
restrained as by this Constitution is mentioned, and according to the
laws of the State.”96 The first South Carolina Constitution (1776)
utilized the same pattern as North Carolina’s.97 The Maryland
instrument (1776) lacked an executive designation clause, but granted
broad executive authority with the wording: “[T]he Governor . . . may
alone exercise all other the executive powers of government . . . .”98
The Constitution of Georgia (1777)99 also lacked a clause that
merely designated the governor, although an early part of the
constitution provided for his election.100 A general grant of authority
was inserted later in the instrument: “The governor shall, with the
advice of the executive council, exercise the executive powers of
government.”101 An enumeration of specific powers followed
immediately.102 Thus, the Georgia Constitution conformed to the
direct-grant structure,103 the only contemporaneous state constitution to

95. Id. at art. VIII.

96. N.C. Const. art. XIX (1776).
97. S.C. Const. art. XXX (1776).
98. Md. Const. art. XXXIII (1776).
99. Ga. Const. (1777).
100. Id. at art. II.
101. Id. at art. XIX. The full article reads:
The governor shall, with the advice of the executive council,
exercise the executive powers of government, according to
the laws of this State and the constitution thereof, save only
in the case of pardons and remission of fines, which he shall
in no instance grant; but he may reprieve a criminal, or suspend
a fine, until the meeting of the assembly, who may determine
therein as they shall judge fit.
102. Id. at arts. XIX-XXII.
103. Supra text following n. 25 (describing this structure).
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22 WHITTIER LAW REVIEW Vol. 31

do so. Perhaps it was influenced by the direct-grant structure of the

Georgia colonial charter.104
The New York (1777) and Pennsylvania (1776) Constitutions
included the term “vest” in their designation clauses,105 and these
designation clauses were physically separated from enumerations of
power. If, therefore, the designation clauses conferred power, then the
New York and Pennsylvania Constitutions would follow the vesting-
clause structure. Unfortunately, there is no convincing evidence that
their designation clauses granted anything at all. Some scholars
maintain that the Latin predecessors of the word “vest” suggest that the
word connoted immediate assumption of power.106 However, at least
three other American Constitutions had designation clauses that
employed “vest” in ways that excluded any inference that those clauses
granted power: The New Jersey Constitution,107 the 1778 South
Carolina Constitution,108 and the designation clause in Article I of the
U.S. Constitution.109
In sum, grants of authority in state constitutions sometimes
followed the Article I structure, in one case followed the direct-grant
structure, and sometimes adopted other forms of organization. None
clearly followed the vesting-clause structure.

104. Supra n. 47 and accompanying text.

105. N.Y. Const. art. XVII(1777) (“And this convention doth . . . ordain, determine,
and declare that the supreme executive power and authority of this State shall be vested
in a governor”); Pa. Const. § 3 (1776) (“The supreme executive power shall be vested
in a president and council.”).
The 1784 New Hampshire constitution did the same in its legislative provisions.
N.H. Const. pt. II (1784) (stating that “[t]he supreme legislative power . . . shall be
vested in the senate and house of representatives,” providing for assembly of the
legislature, and then enumerating powers). The New Hampshire instrument generally
followed that of Massachusetts, which, however, did not use the word “vest” in its
legislative designation clause. Mass. Const. ch. I, § 1, art. I (1780).
106. E.g. Calabresi & Prakash, supra n. 1, at 572-73. The argument sometimes is
buttressed by the fact that educated members of the founding generation were familiar
with Latin. Gary Lawson, What Lurks Beneath: NSA Surveillance and Executive
Power, 88 B.U. L. Rev. 375, 387 (2008).
107. The New Jersey Constitution could not have vested specific powers in specific
officers, because of its wording: “[T]he government . . . shall be vested in a Governor,
Legislative Council, and General Assembly.” There was no statement as to which
branches were to exercise what kind of authority. N.J. Const. art I (1776).
108. S.C. Const. art. XI (1778).
109. U.S. Const. art. I, § 1, cl. 1.
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2009 EXECUTIVE VESTING CLAUSE 23

V. OTHER EVIDENCE CONFIRMING THAT ARTICLE II FOLLOWS THE

ARTICLE I STRUCTURE
This part briefly summarizes evidence confirming the
implications for Article II of contemporaneous drafting practice.
Although some of this confirmatory evidence appears in the relevant
literature, much of it does not.

A. THE ORGANIZATION OF ARTICLE III

The organization of Article III sometimes is cited as a reason for
concluding that the first sentence of Article II was a vesting clause.
The argument runs like this: (1) Other than its first sentence, Article III
contained no grant of judicial power, so (2) the first sentence of Article
III must have been a vesting clause,110 and (3) therefore the first
sentence of Article II, which was similarly worded (both omit the
Article I phrase “herein granted”) was probably a vesting clause as
well.
If Article III was organized according to the vesting-clause
structure, this certainly increases the chances that Article II also was so
organized. There is a fundamental difficulty with the vesting clause
argument, however—the assumption that Article III contained no
grants other than in its first sentence is in error.
Article III originated from two resolutions adopted by the
Constitutional Convention and forwarded to the Committee of Detail,
which was charged with preparing the Constitution’s first draft.111
One member of the Committee of Detail was Nathaniel Gorham, a
businessman and a former president of Congress.112 But the other four

110. See e.g. Calabresi & Prakash, supra n. 1, at 574 (“Put more simply, there are no
other powers ‘herein granted’ in Article III once we get beyond the Vesting Clause.”);
Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction Stripping,
and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response to Justice Scalia, 107 Colum. L.
Rev. 1002, 1012 (2007) (“the only power directly granted to the federal courts by the
Constitution is the ‘judicial Power’ granted by the Article III Vesting Clause.”);
Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power Over Foreign
Affairs, 111 Yale L.J. 231, 257 (2001) (“Moreover, the Judicial Power Clause—Article
III's counterpart to the Executive Power Clause—must vest power with the federal
judiciary, because it is the only clause that could possibly vest any power with the
federal judiciary.”).
111. John R. Vile, The Constitutional Convention of 1787: A Comprehensive
Encyclopedia of America’s Founding vol. 1: A-M, 106, 384-85 (ABC-CLIO 2005).
112. Id. at 323.
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24 WHITTIER LAW REVIEW Vol. 31

members were lawyers who ranked among the most learned and
prominent in their respective states: Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut,
James Wilson of Pennsylvania, Edmund Randolph of Virginia, and
John Rutledge of South Carolina.113 (Ellsworth, Wilson, and Rutledge
were eventually to serve on the Supreme Court; Randolph was to
become the first attorney general of the United States.)114
One of the two convention judicial resolutions submitted to the
committee called for a “Supreme Tribunal” with certain designated
powers.115 The other resolution specified that “the national Legislature
be empowered to appoint inferior Tribunals.”116 The committee was
bound by these resolutions, but it had not received any resolution
listing powers for the inferior courts.
Nor could it expect to, in light of the rules by which people
knowledgeable about law then understood power grants. Those grants
were to be conveyances from the people as sovereign to federal
officials and agencies,117 and the rules governing those grants were
broadly similar to those governing private conveyances.118 Pursuant to
contemporaneous law, a grant was “always accompanied with delivery
of possession, and [took] effect immediately . . . .”119 In other words,
grants, like most other conveyances, could not be “pre-set” to spring
into effect at a future date.120
Thus, under the resolutions of the convention, Congress would
determine whether and when inferior tribunals were created. Congress
might never create inferior tribunals, or it might do so long after the

113. Id. at 106.

114. Id., vol. 2 at 242, 649, 690, 841.
115. Farrand, supra n. 1, vol. 2 at 132-33.
116. Id. at 133.
117. U.S. Const. preamble; cf. William Blackstone, Commentaries vol. 1, *262
(noting that in Britain, the Crown, as sovereign, granted).
118. E.g. Letter from Edmund Pendleton to Richard Henry Lee, June 14, 1788
(reprinted in Documentary History, supra n. 1, vol. 10 at 1625-26) (comparing the
people's grant of power to various real estate conveyances and to the agency.
Pendleton chaired the Virginia ratifying convention). See also supra n. 16 and
accompanying text (reporting James Iredell comparing the Constitution to a private
power of attorney).
119. William Blackstone, Commentaries vol. 2, *441 (emphasis added). See also
Matthew Bacon, A New Abridgment of the Law vol. 2, 656 (1786) (no grant permitted
of a “bare Possibility”).
120. Cf. id. at *165 (“. . . no estate of freehold can be created to commence in futuro;
but it ought to take effect presently either in possession or remainder . . . .”).
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2009 EXECUTIVE VESTING CLAUSE 25

ratification of the Constitution. Because contingent, “springing” grants

were foreign to the law, the Constitution was not a proper medium for
conveying powers to tribunals whose existence, if any, would not begin
until sometime after ratification. The best the Framers could do would
be to equip Congress with the ability to convey the necessary powers.
Therefore, the Committee of Detail—and, ultimately, the convention—
adopted a scheme for the judicial power121 that relied not merely on
Article III, but on provisions located at various places in the document.
Article III began by designating the agencies (the Supreme Court
and any inferior courts Congress might create) that were to execute the
judicial power and by adding certain attributes of the judicial
offices.122 Next, Article III listed nine categories of cases and
controversies within the judicial power.123 This must be understood as
merely a list; no powers were granted at this point. Next came the
provision granting enumerated powers to the Supreme Court, which
employed the preceding list of cases and controversies as a reference:
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme
Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases
before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate
Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and
under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.124
This clause thus granted to the Supreme Court original
jurisdiction over three of the nine items on the “Cases and
Controversies” list; it also granted the Court appellate jurisdiction over
the other six items.125 It further provided that Congress could divest
the Supreme Court of any of the six areas of appellate jurisdiction.
Some commentators have resisted the conclusion that Congress
enjoyed such wide divesting power.126 But this conclusion was almost

121. Edmund Randolph suggested the strategy when drafting his outline of a
constitution for the Committee of Detail. Farrand, supra n. 1, vol. 2 at 146-47. See the
final Committee product. Id. at 172-73.
122. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.
123. Id. at § 2, cl. 1.
124. Id. at cl. 2.
125. In light of such clear wording, it is difficult to understand how some
commentators could have concluded that Article III contained no vesting provision
outside of its first sentence.
126. See e.g. the summary of views in Heritage Guide, supra n. 1, at 260.
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26 WHITTIER LAW REVIEW Vol. 31

certainly the Founding-Era understanding. The applicable maxim was,

“The designation of the justices is by the King, but ordinary
jurisdiction [is defined] by law.”127 American state constitutions
usually recognized, either implicitly or explicitly, the legislative
prerogative to define courts’ jurisdiction.128 The notes of the
Committee of Detail show that it expected Congress to have wide
authority over jurisdiction.129 And several leading Founders (including
Committee of Detail member Gorham) stated expressly that Congress
was to have such power.130

127. Branch, supra n. 1, at 19 (Designatio Justiciariorum est a Rege, Jurisdictio

Vero Ordinaria à Lege) (translated by the author).
128. State Constitutions contained almost no restrictions on the legislature’s
authority to create courts or define their jurisdiction. See e.g. N.J. Const. art. XXII
(1776) (containing no restrictions); N.Y. Const. art. XLI (1777) (same); Mass. Const.
ch. III (1780) (containing few restrictions, and affirmatively authorizing the legislature
to alter some jurisdictional lines); Pa. Const. § 26 (1776) (containing few restrictions
and providing that, “the legislature shall have power to establish all such other courts
as they may judge for the good of the inhabitants of the state.”).
129. Randolph’s initial outline stated, “The jurisdiction of the supreme tribunal shall
extend 1[.] to all cases, arising under laws passed by the general <Legislature> 2. to
impeachments of officers, and 3. to such other cases, as the national legislature may
assign, as involving the national peace and harmony . . . .” Farrand, supra n. 1, vol. 2
at 146-47. Randolph’s outline added, “But this supreme jurisdiction shall be appellate
only, except in <Cases of Impeachmt. & (in)> those instances, in which the legislature
shall make it original.” Id. at 147. The final Committee draft provided that, “[t]he
Legislature may (distribute) <assign any part of> th(is)e Jurisdiction <above mentd.,—
except the Trial of the Executive—>, in the Manner and under the Limitations which it
shall think proper (among) <to> such (other) <inferior> Courts as it shall constitute
from Time to Time.” Id. at 173.
130. Rufus King and Nathaniel Gorham wrote that “in a few enumerated instances
the supreme Court have original & final Jurisdiction—in all other cases which fall
within the federal Judicial, the supreme court may or may not have appellate
Jurisdiction as congress shall direct.” Supplement to Max Farrand’s The Records of
the Federal Convention of 1787 283 (James H. Hutson ed., Yale U. Press Supp. 1987)
[hereinafter Farrand-Supp.] (italics added); see also Farrand, supra n. 1, vol. 2 at 431
(showing that “exceptions” modified “appellate,” with “law and fact” inserted for other
purposes). Around the same time, Roger Sherman of Connecticut, who had played a
key role at the federal convention, observed that the judicial powers “cannot be
extended beyond the enumerated cases, but may be limited by Congress . . . .”
Farrand-Supp., supra, at 288 (italics added). During the Virginia Ratification
Convention, John Marshall (later Chief Justice) stated in the course of defending the
Constitution:
What is the meaning of the term exception? Does it not mean an alteration
and diminution? Congress is empowered to make exceptions to the appellate
jurisdiction, as to law and fact, of the Supreme Court. These exceptions
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2009 EXECUTIVE VESTING CLAUSE 27

Note that Article III granted no power to the inferior courts.

Instead, Article I conveyed to Congress broad authority to “constitute”
such courts.131 During the Founding Era, to “constitute” a court meant
either: (1) To establish it, or (2) to depute and empower it.132 To
depute and empower a court—and therefore “constitute” it—Congress
need not establish it first. As the Continental Congress had done, it
could “constitute” an existing tribunal (such as a state court) to hear
particular matters.133
Article III did grant Congress authority to “Regulat[e]” the
Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction.134 The need for this clause
followed from congressional power to “constitute” inferior courts,
since part of regulating appellate jurisdiction was determining the
lower courts from which appeals were to be heard.
In private law terms, this judicial vesting scheme was analogous
to a conveyance (a) in which Peter135 listed his nine parcels of land as
Parcels 1 through 9, (b) conveyed Parcels 1, 2, and 3 to Sam in fee
simple absolute, (c) conveyed one-half of each of Parcels 4 through 9
to Sam in fee simple subject to divestment, and (d) gave a power of
appointment to Carole entitling Carole, at her discretion, to distribute to
Ira, Irene, Iris or to anyone else the remaining halves, or all, of Parcels
4 through 9.136

certainly go as far as the legislature may think proper for the interest and
liberty of the people.
Elliot’s Debates, supra n. 1, vol. 3 at 560.
131. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 (“To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme
Court”); id. at art. III, § 1 (“such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish”).
132. See e.g. Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language (Times Books
1755) (unpaginated) (defining “constitute” and “depute”).
133. J. Contl. Cong. 1774-1789 vol. 19, 354-56 (Apr. 5, 1781) (“constituting” state
courts to hear cases of piracies and felonies on the high seas).
134. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
135. In this illustration, “Peter” is the analogue to the people, “Sam” to the Supreme
Court, “Carole” to Congress, and Ira, Irene, and Iris to the inferior courts.
136. Professor Gary Lawson has suggested to me that construing the Judicial Vesting
Clause as a class gift subject to open (i.e., subject to partial divestment) eliminates the
in futuro grant problem. By this reading, the Clause granted the entire judicial power
to the Supreme Court, subject to Congress enlarging the class with lower tribunals that
would take part of the power away. By this interpretation, the Judicial Vesting Clause
would remain a grant, which would increase the odds that the first sentence of Article
II also was a grant.
Professor Lawson’s suggestion is ingenious. However, if the Judicial Vesting
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28 WHITTIER LAW REVIEW Vol. 31

Once this scheme is understood, it becomes clear that Article III

approximately followed the Article I structure. Article III’s initial
sentence designated the entities that would wield judicial authority.
The rest of Section 1 provided organizational detail. Section 2 granted
power to the Supreme Court. It granted no authority to inferior
courts—but not because the grant was in the so-called “Judicial
Vesting Clause,” but because such an in futuro grant would have been
inconsistent with the law and practice of the time. Instead, Article I
granted Congress the power to “constitute” (erect and/or depute)
inferior tribunals, and Article III granted it the ancillary power to mesh
Supreme Court appeals practice with the lower courts it had
constituted. Finally, Article III qualified the judicial powers with rules
requiring juries in criminal trials and restricting the law of treason.137
That both Article I and Article III followed the same pattern
certainly suggests that Article II did as well.

B. THE UNCERTAIN SCOPE OF THE “EXECUTIVE POWER”

The vesting-clause interpretation of the initial sentence of Article
II holds that it was a grant of “those authorities that were traditionally
wielded by executives.”138 However, there was no Founding-Era
tradition authoritatively defining the scope of executive power. Each
of the thirteen states allocated a somewhat different set of prerogatives
to the executive, and all of those sets differed from that exercised by
the royal governors and the British king.139 For example, the British
king could make treaties, but in America people argued over whether

Clause was a class gift subject to open, it would be so different in character from the
first sentence of Article II that it would serve as weak, if any, evidence of the nature of
the latter. More importantly, treating the Judicial Vesting Clause this way does not
eliminate the in futuro problem. Article III, Section 2, Clause 2 makes it clear that the
Supreme Court never received—not for an instant—the entire judicial power.
Specifically, it did not receive original jurisdiction over most federal cases (the
“remaining halves . . . of Parcels 4 through 9” in the text’s analogy). Hence, the lower
courts had to receive their original jurisdiction from a source other than the Supreme
Court—either from the Judicial Vesting Clause directly (unlikely because that would
be a grant in futuro) or from Congress (as I argue in the text).
137. U.S. Const. art. III, §§ 2-3.
138. Heritage Guide, supra n. 1, at 179 (“The Executive Vesting Clause . . . grants
the President those authorities that were traditionally wielded by executives.”).
139. Thach, supra n. 1, at 13-44 (summarizing the different components of executive
power in the states).
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2009 EXECUTIVE VESTING CLAUSE 29

that was an executive or legislative power.140 The British king had no

authority to make specific recommendations to the legislature, but
some state governors did.141 Royal governors could suspend members
of the upper house of the legislature142—but no one claims that
prerogative is within the scope of the President’s “executive Power,”
even though the Constitution did not withhold it explicitly. Moreover,
advocates of the vesting-clause hypothesis have not agreed among
themselves whether the measure for the “executive Power” was the
British Crown or some other executive magistrate, such as the governor
of New York.143

C. THE RATIFICATION RECORD

During the ratification debates, Anti-Federalists were casting
about for arguments proving that the presidency would be too
powerful, but no one seems to have suggested that Article II’s initial
sentence was a source of authority beyond the powers specifically
enumerated. On the pro-Constitution side, Alexander Hamilton,
writing as “Publius,” offered a detailed analysis of most of the
enumerated presidential powers, and then introduced a brief discussion
of the remainder with the phrase, “The only remaining powers of the
executive[] are . . . .”144 Neither he, nor any other Federalist, seems to
have suggested before ratification that the first sentence of Article II
was a grant, as well as a designation. The vesting-clause hypothesis
seems not to have been dreamt of until someone suggested it during the
First Federal Congress, after the Constitution had been ratified.145

140. E.g. Farrand, supra n. 1, vol. 2 at 537 (quoting George Mason as stating that
treaties were “more of a legislative nature” than appointing ambassadors); see also id.,
vol. 1 at 65-66 (quoting James Wilson as opining that the King’s powers over war and
peace were more of a legislative than an executive nature).
141. E.g. N.Y. Const. art. XIX (1777).
142. See Stokes, supra n. 1, at 153.
143. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra n. 1, at 577-79 (measuring executive power,
before specific constitutional qualifications, by the authority of the British king);
Thach, supra n. 1, at 159-60 (claiming that the relevant model was the New York
governorship).
144. The Federalist, supra n. 1, No. 77 at 399-400.
145. Thornton Anderson, Creating the Constitution: The Convention of 1787 and the
First Congress 186-87 (Pa. St. U. Press 1993); Thach, supra n. 1, at 135-37. Hamilton
picked up the argument in 1793 in his first “Pacificus” essay, thereby contradicting (not
for the only time) his representations in the Federalist Papers. Alexander Hamilton,
Pacificus, No. 1, in The Founders’ Constitution (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner
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30 WHITTIER LAW REVIEW Vol. 31

D. THE GRANTS IN SECTIONS TWO AND THREE IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT

There are several reasons for believing that the terms of Sections
2 and 3 of Article II are only grants (some of which are qualified),
rather than limitations on British-style regal authority as the vesting-
clause advocates would have it.146 First, they are phrased as grants:
The Vacancy Clause, for example, states flatly that “[t]he President
shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies;”147 the Commissioning
Clause states “he . . . shall Commission all the Officers of the United
States.”148 Second, at least one of the items in the enumeration could
not have been a qualification on British-style executive authority, for it
was a power the king did not enjoy. This was the President’s right to
“recommend to [congressional] Consideration such Measures as he
shall judge necessary and expedient.”149 Although the king could use
his “speech from the throne” to draw Parliament’s attention to general
subject areas, he was not permitted to recommend specific measures to
the legislature in the way that the President could.150 So this provision
is certainly a grant rather than a qualification, and its status as a grant
suggests that the other items on the list are grants as well.151 If they
are, then interpreting the first sentence of the Article as a “vesting
clause” would violate the rule of construction against interpretation that
results in surplus152—one of the many rules of construction taken very
seriously during the Founding Era.153

eds., 1986) (available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/

a2_2_2-3s14.html) (arguing that the first sentence of Article II is a plenary grant of
power).
146. E.g. Calabresi & Prakash, supra n. 1, at 578 (“Thus, Article II, Section 2, when
read in conjunction with Article I, Section 8, makes clear that the President will not
have many of the arguably ‘executive’ powers of King George III.”).
147. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
148. Id. at § 3.
149. Id.
150. Jean Louis (J.L.) De Lolme, The Constitution of England 164-65, 184, 283 (4th
ed. 1784) (re-issued, David Lieberman ed., 2007).
151. Branch, supra n. 1, at 71. “Noscitur ex Socio qui non cognoscitur ex se”
(“What is not known by itself alone is known by its associate”) (translated by the
Author).
152. The Constitution does contain surplus clauses, such as the Necessary and Proper
Clause, and the Founders represented them as such. Infra n. 149 and accompanying
text. But none is on the order of that resulting when one imposes a vesting-clause
structure on Article II—that is, two full sections.
153. It is not generally recognized, I believe, how committed to these maxims
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2009 EXECUTIVE VESTING CLAUSE 31

Advocates of the vesting-clause hypothesis sometimes counter

that treating the first sentence of Article II as a mere designation also
violates the rule against surplus. Of course, the amount of surplus
would be much less than that created by the vesting-clause hypothesis.
In any event, however, a description or designation is not surplus. The
designation clause in Article I informed the reader of the agency that
would exercise the legislative power. The designation clause in royal
commissions identified the new governor by name. Similarly, the first
sentences of Articles II and III each informed the reader that, just as
Congress would be the sole legislature, the President would be the sole
executive, and the Supreme Court and any lower courts ordained by
Congress would comprise the judiciary.
To be sure, the first sentence of Article II, unlike the first sentence
of Article I, omitted the words “herein granted.” But we should not
read too much into this. Under the Constitution’s governmental
scheme, the scope of domestic executive power was defined by the
scope of the legislative power. The President was to “take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed”—meaning the laws passed by
Congress.154 Because the legislative powers already were limited to
those “herein granted,” there was no need to add similar words to the
executive power.155 As for the foreign affairs portion of executive

Founding-Era lawyers were. Contemporaneous law placed them on the same stratum
of authority as statutes. Thomas Wood, An Institute of the Laws of England vol. 1, 6
(10th ed., 1772) (“Maxims . . . are of the same Strength as Acts of Parliament when
once the Judges have determined what is a Maxim”). Accord State v. —, 2 N.C. 28, 1
Hayw. 28 (1794). These maxims were seen as ways to infer the “intent of the makers”
of a document. Robert G. Natelson, The Founders’ Hermeneutic: The Real Original
Understanding of Original Intent, 68 Ohio St. L.J. 1239, 1273-81 (2007) (discussing
the contemporaneous use of rules of construction).
The Founders certainly expected future generations to employ those rules in
constitutional interpretation. E.g. The Federalist, supra n. 1, No. 32 at 156 (Hamilton)
(discussing negatives pregnant); id., No. 78, at 404-05 (Hamilton) (discussing
competing maxims); Anti-Federalists made much of how the Constitution might be
abused by judges misapplying Anglo-American interpretive techniques to it. See e.g.
Timoleon, N.Y. J. (Nov. 1, 1787), reprinted in Documentary History, supra n. 1, vol.
13 at 535 (creating a fictional judicial opinion, complete with legal maxims, to allow
the federal government to suppress freedom of conscience and of the press).
154. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 Harv. L. Rev.
1867, 1895 (2005).
155. Id. at 1894-96 (explaining that the scope of executive power is limited by the
scope of legislative power).
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32 WHITTIER LAW REVIEW Vol. 31

authority, we shall see that the President’s enumerated powers and their
incidents gave him ample capacity in that arena.156

E. THE BROAD SCOPE OF PRESIDENTIAL EXPRESS AND IMPLIED

POWERS—INCLUDING THOSE OVER FOREIGN AFFAIRS
A final reason for concluding that Article II partakes of the
Article I structure is that this construction results in an executive with
sufficient “energy” (effectiveness) to be acceptable to the Founding
Generation. This is a crucial point, because a lynchpin of the vesting-
clause hypothesis is the belief that limiting the President to Article II’s
enumerated powers would result in an executive too weak, particularly
in foreign affairs, for what the Founders were trying to accomplish.
That argument probably overstates the amount of executive
authority acceptable to the Founding Generation, for even construed
narrowly, the enumerated powers gave the President a sphere of action
greater than that of any state governor. This was why the Anti-
Federalists could credibly attack the office as too potent.157
The argument also understates the scope of authority the
President received from the enumerations in Article II, Sections 2 and
3. Those sections, together with other parts of the Constitution,
conveyed at least sixteen enumerated powers, some of them, such as
the veto,158 which was very significant indeed. Moreover, in absence
of express provisions to the contrary, documents bestowing express
powers also granted implied, incidental powers. This was what the
Necessary and Proper Clause was designed to communicate for
congressional authority. But the presence or absence of a necessary
and proper clause made absolutely no substantive difference, as
prominent Founders repeatedly stressed.159 The President’s authority

156. Infra Part V, sub. E.

157. E.g. Elliot’s Debates, supra n. 1, vol. 3 at 56 (quoting Patrick Henry at the
Virginia ratifying convention as decrying the Constitution because it would create “a
great and mighty President, with very extensive powers—the powers of a king.”).
158. U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
159. E.g. The Federalist, supra n. 1, No. 33 at 158 (Hamilton) (“[The Necessary and
Proper Clause and Supremacy Clauses] are only declaratory of a truth, which would
have resulted by necessary and unavoidable implication from the very act of
constituting a federal government, and vesting it with certain specified powers.”); id.,
No. 44 at 234-35 (Madison) (“Had the constitution been silent on this head, there can
be no doubt that all the particular powers requisite as means of executing the general
powers, would have resulted to the government, by unavoidable implication.”);
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2009 EXECUTIVE VESTING CLAUSE 33

was as broad as if the Constitution had declared that, “the President

may issue all orders which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into Execution his enumerated powers.”
The presidency was particularly so in the realm of foreign affairs.
The Constitution designated the President commander-in-chief of the
armed forces.160 He was empowered, “by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the
Senators present concur”161–treaties that were to be the “supreme Law
of the Land.”162 He could “nominate, and by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate . . . appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers
and Consuls . . . and all other Officers of the United States, whose
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall
be established by Law.”163 He was to “receive Ambassadors and other
public Ministers” and “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,
and . . . Commission all the Officers of the United States.”164
Even narrowly construed, the foregoing gave the President
command of the military and the power to appoint, subject to senatorial
approval, all senior federal employees with foreign affairs
responsibilities. These included diplomats (“Ambassadors, other
public ministers”) and the “Consuls” who supervised American trade
abroad.165 Congress could “vest the Appointment” of lesser foreign
affairs officers “in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the
Heads of Departments.”166 But the President was to commission all of
them.167
One must now add to the mix the implied foreign affairs powers
that flowed from the President’s express authority. The duties of the
foreign affairs employees appointed by the President would be

Elliot’s Debates, supra n. 1, vol. 4 at 141 (Archibald [or William; the text does not
indicate] MacLaine, speaking at the North Carolina ratifying convention: “This clause
gives no new power, but declares that those already given are to be executed by proper
laws.”).
160. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
161. Id. at cl. 2.
162. Id. at art. VI, cl. 2.
163. Id. at art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
164. Id. at § 3.
165. Vattel, supra n. 1, at 279, 682 (discussing the various grades of diplomatic and
foreign trade officers).
166. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
167. Id. at § 3.
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34 WHITTIER LAW REVIEW Vol. 31

established by law. But the President would supervise their execution,

for he had the responsibility to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed.”168 These duties would include not only international
negotiation, but all the accoutrements of a foreign ministry. They
would include research; short-, medium-, and long-range planning; and
general departmental administration. How foreign affairs officials
prioritized and executed their duties was for the President to say. For
as the First Congress recognized,169 the President had authority—
incidental to both the appointment power and the “take Care” power—
unilaterally to remove any and all foreign policy employees for any
reason and at any time.170
More power flowed from the President’s responsibility to
“receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers.”171 As the leading
eighteenth-century international law treatise makes clear, the power to

168. Id.
169. See Parsons v. U. S., 167 U.S. 324, 328-30 (1897) (summarizing this debate);
Thach, supra n. 1, at 144-45 (discussing the First Congress’s grant to the President of
broad discretion in running the foreign affairs department).
170. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss all the reasons why I believe the
determination of the First Congress was correct. However, the following points are
germane:
First: As nearly all those who addressed the issue in Congress agreed, the removal
power was incidental to the appointment power. The real dispute was only over who
had the appointment power—the President alone or the President and Senate.
Second: Article II states that the President “shall nominate, and by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . all other Officers of the United
States.” U.S. Const. art II. § 2, cl. 2. This section makes it clear that it is the President
who appoints, with senatorial consideration a mere condition precedent.
Third: Article II subsequently provides that “the Congress may by Law vest the
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as [Congress] think[s] proper, in the President
alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.” Id. This implies,
although it does not state, that the appointment power normally is joint.
Fourth: The Founders expected the Constitution to be interpreted by maxims of
construction. As already noted, supra n. 152, they enjoyed very strong authority.
Fifth: Two maxims break the conflict in favor of the first clause. One is the rule
that more specific terms override more general terms: Generalibus Specialia derogant,
and Generalia sunt praeponenda Singularibus. Branch, supra n. 1, at 34. The other
maxim is that in grants, earlier terms override later, inconsistent ones. William
Blackstone, Commentaries vol. 2, *381 (“THAT, in a deed, if there be two clauses so
totally repugnant to each other, that they cannot stand together, the first shall be
received and the latter rejected”).
171. U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.
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2009 EXECUTIVE VESTING CLAUSE 35

“receive” foreign diplomats included the power not to receive them.172

This enabled the President to refuse to recognize any foreign
government.
The Constitution did not include a clause stating, “The President
shall have general Controul over the foreign Policy of the United
States.” But his enumerated powers and their incidents clearly gave
him such control, subject to some senatorial check. In foreign affairs at
least, a plenary grant in the first sentence of Article II would have been
superfluous.

VI. CONCLUSION
If one interprets the first sentence of Article II as a mere
designation clause, then Article II follows the same structure as Article
I: Designation, followed by organizational details, followed by power
grants. If one interprets the first sentence of Article II as a conveyance
of executive power, then the structure is quite different: A plenary
grant followed by organizational details, followed by specific grants
and qualifications.
This study has examined relevant eighteenth-century drafting
practice—a source of evidence almost entirely overlooked by prior
constitutional commentators. The study has included the royal
commissions to colonial governors,173 a source of evidence also
overlooked, even though those royal commissions were direct
ancestors of Article II. Also considered has been the structure of
Article III, as properly understood in the light of eighteenth-century
legal rules.
Article I followed a very common drafting template, but the
alternative proposed for Article II by the vesting-clause advocates was,
virtually non-existent. This renders much more probable that Article II
actually followed the pattern of Article I, so that the first sentence was
merely a designation clause rather than a conferral of power. This
conclusion is confirmed by a mass of other evidence.
One may, therefore, analyze Article II as consisting of four parts.
With one exception, the boundaries between the parts fall along section
lines, as they do invariably in Article I. The first is the initial sentence,

172. This is, I think, a fair reading of Vattel, supra n. 1, at 685-86 (discussing when a
sovereign can or should refuse to receive).
173. Supra Part V, sub. F (describing the organization of royal commissions).
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36 WHITTIER LAW REVIEW Vol. 31

which designates the President as the single chief executive officer, but
conveys no power.174 The second part comprises the remainder of
Section 1. It contains the details of the President’s selection, including
his term of office, mode of election, and qualifications.175 The third
part, making up all of Sections 2 and 3, consists of the grants of
enumerated powers—intermingled or overlapping, as contemporaneous
commissions sometimes were, with brief instructions.176 The last
portion of Article II, Section 4, is a provision for removal by
impeachment.177
The grants in Article II, Sections 2 and 3, and their incidents,
together with a few other specific grants located elsewhere in the
Constitution,178 thus defined the outer limits of the President’s
authority.

174. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (first sentence).

175. Id. at § 1.
176. Id. at cls. 2-3. The “take Care” provision is arguably an instruction as well as a
power. On the Founding-Era practice of adding brief instructions to power-granting
documents, see supra nn. 53 & 70 and accompanying text.
177. U.S. Const. art. II, § 4.
178. E.g. id. at art. I, § 7, cls. 2-3 (providing for a veto power).
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2009 EXECUTIVE VESTING CLAUSE 37

APPENDIX A
POWER OF ATTORNEY—DIRECT GRANT STRUCTURE179
Know all men by these presents, That whereas A. K. late of
________ by her last will and testament, bearing date ___________ did
give and bequeath unto me M. G. of ________________ 500 1.180 to
be paid unto me upon my sealing and delivering a general release to the
executors of the said A. K. and made and constituted F. B. of
_________ her executor, and shortly after died: And whereas the said
F. B. hath proved the said will, and the said M. G. hath sealed such
general release to the said F. B. as by the said will is directed, and left
the same in the hands of her attornies herein afternamed, to be
delivered to the said F. B. on payment of the said 500 l. Now know ye,
That [] the said M. G. have made, ordained, constituted, deputed and
appointed, and by these presents do make, ordain, constitute, depute
and appoint F. E. of __________ and F. S. of ______________ my true
and lawful attornies jointly, and either of them singly, for me, and in
my name, and to my use, to ask, demand and receive of and from the
said F. B. the said legacy of 500 l. so given and bequeathed to me the
said M. G. by the said A. K. in her said will as aforesaid; and upon
receipt thereof by my said attornies, or either of them, to deliver the
said general release so sealed as aforesaid, or to give such other
discharge as shall be sufficient; I hereby ratifying, allowing and
confirming all and whatsoever my said attornies, jointly or separately,
shall lawfully do in the premises. In witness, &c.

179. Pocket-Book, supra n. 1, vol. 1 at 186-87.

180. That is, £500.
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38 WHITTIER LAW REVIEW Vol. 31

APPENDIX B
EXCERPTS FROM FORM OF COMMISSION TO COLONIAL
GOVERNOR—ARTICLE I STRUCTURE181
(Author’s Explanatory tabs in bold type added.)
G. R.
GEORGE the Third, by the Grace of God, of Great Britain,
France, and Ireland King, Defender of the Faith, and so forth: To our
trusty and well beloved A. B. Esq;
GREETING:
Preamble: Notice of revocation of authority of previous
governor
WHEREAS we did, by our Letters Patent under our Great Seal of
Great Britain, bearing date at Westminster the first day of January, in
the eighteenth year of our reign, constitute and appoint C. D. Esq;
Captain-General and Governor in Chief in and over our Province of
F____, and the territories depending thereon in America, for and during
our will and pleasure; as by the said recited Letters Patent (relation
being thereunto had) may more fully and at large appear: Now know
you, that we have revoked and determined, and by these presents do
revoke and determine the said recited Letters Patent, and every clause,
article, and thing therein contained.
Preamble continued: Designation of new governor
And further know you that we, reposing especial trust and
confidence in the prudence, courage and loyalty of you the said A. B.
of our especial grace, certain knowledge, and mere motion, have
thought fit to constitute and appoint you the said A. B. to be our
Captain-General and Governor in Chief in and over our Province of
F_____, and the territories depending thereon in America:
Royal command to governor to act
And we do hereby require and command you to do and execute
all things in due manner that shall belong unto your said command, and
the trust we have reposed in you, according to the several powers and
directions granted or appointed you by this present commission, and
instructions herewith given you, or by such further powers,
instructions, and authorities, as shall at any time hereafter be granted or

181. Stokes, supra n. 1, at 150-64.

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2009 EXECUTIVE VESTING CLAUSE 39

appointed you under our Signet and Sign Manual, or by our order in
our Privy Council, and according to such reasonable laws and statutes
as now are in force, or hereafter shall be made and agreed upon by you,
with the advice and consent of our Council, and the Assembly of our
said Province under your government, in such manner and form as is
herein after expressed.
Royal command to take oaths
And our will and pleasure is, that you the said A. B. after the
publication of these our Letters Patent, do, in the first place, take the
oaths appointed to be taken by an Act passed in the first year of the
reign of King George the First, intituled, “An Act for the further
security of his Majesty’s person and government, and the succession of
the Crown in the heirs of the late Princess Sophia, being Protestants,
and for extinguishing the hopes of the pretended Prince of Wales, and
his open and secret abettors.” . . . As also, that you make and subscribe
the declaration mentioned in an Act of Parliament made in the twenty-
fifth year of the reign of King Charles the Second, intituled, “An Act
for preventing dangers which may happen from Popish recusants.”
And likewise, that you take the oath usually taken by the Governors in
the Plantations, for the due execution of the office and trust of our
Captain-General and Governor in Chief in and over our said Province
of F____, and the territories depending thereon, for the due and
impartial administration of justice . . . all which being duly performed,
you shall yourself administer unto each of the Members of our said
Council; as also to our Lieutenant-Governor . . . .
Enumerated powers begin, with applicable qualifications
And we do hereby give and grant unto you full power and
authority to suspend any of the Members of our said Council from
sitting, voting, or assisting therein, if you shall find just cause for so
doing; and if there shall be any Lieutenant-Governor, him likewise to
suspend from the execution of his command, and to appoint another in
his stead until our pleasure be known: and if it shall at any time
happen, that, by the death, departure out of our said Province, or
suspension of any of our said Councillors, or otherwise, there shall be a
vacancy in our said Council (any three whereof we do hereby appoint
to be a quorum), our will and pleasure is, that you signify the same
unto us by the first opportunity, that we may, under our Signet and
Sign Manual, constitute and appoint others in their stead. But that our
affairs may not suffer at that distance, for want of a due number of
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40 WHITTIER LAW REVIEW Vol. 31

Councillors, if ever it should happen that there be less than seven of

them residing in our said Province, we do hereby give and grant unto
you the said A. B. full power and authority to chuse as many persons
out of the principal Freeholders, inhabitants thereof, as will make up
the full number of our said Council to be seven, and no more; which
persons, so chosen and appointed by you, shall be, to all intents and
purposes, Councillors in our said Province, until either they shall be
confirmed by us, or that, by the nomination of others by us, under our
Sign Manual and Signet, our said Council shall have seven or more
persons in it.
And we do hereby give and grant unto you full power and
authority, with the advice and consent of our said Council, from time to
time as need shall require, to summon and call General Assemblies of
the said Freeholders and Planters within your government, according to
the usage of our Province of F______. And our will and pleasure is,
that the persons thereupon duly elected by the major part of the
Freeholders of the respective Counties and places, and so returned,
shall, before their sitting, take the oaths mentioned in the said Acts . . . .
And we do hereby declare, that the persons so elected and
qualified shall be called and deemed The General Assembly of that our
Province, and the territories depending thereon.
And you the said A. B. by and with the consent of our said
Council and Assembly, or the major part of them respectively, shall
have full power and authority to make, constitute, and ordain laws,
statutes, and ordinances, for the public peace, welfare, and good
government of our said Province, and of the people and inhabitants
thereof, and such others as shall resort thereto, and for the benefit of us,
our heirs and successors: which said laws, statutes, and ordinances, are
not to be repugnant, but as near as may be agreeable to the laws and
statutes of this our kingdom of Great Britain.
Provided that all such laws, statutes and ordinances, of what
nature or duration soever, be, within three months or sooner after the
making thereof, transmitted unto us under our Seal of F______, for our
approbation or disallowance of the same; as also duplicates thereof by
the next conveyance.
And in case any or all of the said laws, statutes, and ordinances,
being not before confirmed by us, shall at any time be disallowed, and
not approved, and so signified by us, our heirs or successors, under our
or their Sign Manual and Signet, or by order of our or their Privy
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2009 EXECUTIVE VESTING CLAUSE 41

Council, unto you the said A. B. or to the Commander in Chief of our

said Province for the time being; then such and so many of the said
laws, statutes and ordinances, as shall be so disallowed, and not
approved, shall from thenceforth cease, determine, and become utterly
void and of none effect; any thing to the contrary thereof
notwithstanding.
And, to the end that nothing may be passed or done by our said
Council or Assembly, to the prejudice of us, our heirs or successors, we
will and ordain, that you the said A.B. shall have and enjoy a negative
voice in the making and passing of all laws, statutes and ordinances, as
aforesaid: and you shall and may likewise, from time to time, as you
shall judge it necessary, adjourn, prorogue, and dissolve all General
Assemblies as aforesaid.
And our further will and pleasure is, that you shall and may use
and keep the Public Seal of our said Province of F_____, for sealing all
things whatsoever that pass the Great Seal of our said Province under
your government. . . .
And we do further by these presents give and grant unto you the
said A. B. full power and authority, with the advice and consent of our
said Council, to erect, constitute, and establish such and so many
Courts of Judicature and public Justice, within our said Province under
your government, as you and they shall think fit and necessary for the
hearing and determining of all causes, as well criminal as civil,
according to law and equity, and for awarding execution thereupon;
with all reasonable and necessary powers, authorities, fees, and
privileges belonging thereunto: as also, to appoint and commissionate
fit persons in the several parts of your government, to administer the
oaths mentioned in the aforesaid Act . . .
And we do hereby authorise and impower you to constitute and
appoint Judges, and in cases requisite, Commissioners of Oyer and
Terminer, Justices of the Peace, and other necessary Officers and
ministers in our said Province, for the better administration of justice,
and putting the laws in execution; and to administer, or cause to be
administered unto them, such oath or oaths as are usually given for the
due execution and performance of offices and places, and for the
clearing of truth in judicial causes.
And we do hereby give and grant unto you full power and
authority, where you shall see cause, or shall judge any offender or
offenders in criminal matters, or for any fines or forfeitures due unto
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42 WHITTIER LAW REVIEW Vol. 31

us, fit objects of our mercy, to pardon all such offenders, and to remit
all such offences, fines, and forfeitures, treason and wilful murder only
excepted; in which cases, you shall likewise have power, upon
extraordinary occasions, to grant reprieves to the offenders, until, and
to the intent that, our royal pleasure may be known therein.
And we do, by these presents, authorise and impower you to
collate any person or persons to any churches, chapels, or other
ecclesiastical benefices within our said province and territories
aforesaid, as often as any of them shall happen to be void.
And we do hereby give and grant unto you the said A. B. by
yourself or by your captains and commanders, by you to be authorised,
full power and authority to levy, arm, muster, command, and employ
all persons whatsoever, residing within our said Province of F_____,
and other the territories under your government; and, as occasion shall
serve, to march them from one place to another, or to embark them, for
the resisting and withstanding of all enemies, pirates, and rebels, both
at sea and land; and to transport such forces to any of our plantations in
America, if necessity shall require, for the defence of the same against
the invasions or attempts of any of our enemies; and such enemies,
pirates, and rebels, if there shall be occasion to pursue and prosecute in
or out of the limits of our said Province and Plantations, or any of
them; and if it shall so please God them to vanquish, apprehend, and
take, and being taken, either according to law to put to death, or keep
and preserve alive, at your discretion; and to execute martial law in
time of invasion, war, or other times, when by law it may be executed;
and to do and execute all and every other thing and things, which, to
our Captain General and Governor in Chief, doth or ought of right to
belong.
And we do hereby give and grant unto you full power and
authority, by and with the advice and consent of our said Council, to
erect, raise, and build, in our said Province of F_____, and the
territories depending thereon, such and so many forts and platforms,
castles, cities, boroughs, towns, and fortifications, as you, by the advice
aforesaid, shall judge necessary; and the same, or any of them, to
fortify and furnish with ordnance, ammunition, and all sorts of arms fit
and necessary for the security and defence of our said Province; and,
by the advice aforesaid, the same again, or any of them, to demolish or
dismantle, as may be most convenient.
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2009 EXECUTIVE VESTING CLAUSE 43

And forasmuch as divers mutinies and disorders may happen by

persons shipped and employed at sea, during the time of war; and to the
end that such as shall be shipped and employed at sea during time of
war, may be better governed and ordered, we do hereby give and grant
unto you the said A. B. full power and authority to constitute and
appoint Captains, Lieutenants, Masters of Ships, and other
Commanders and Officers, and to grant to such Captains, Lieutenants,
Masters of Ships, and other Commanders and Officers Commissions,
to execute the law martial during the time of war, according to the
directions of an Act passed in the twenty-second year of the reign of
our late Royal Grandfather, intituled, “An Act for amending,
explaining, and reducing into one Act of Parliament the laws relating to
the government of his Majesty’s ships, vessels, and forces by sea”; and
to use such proceedings, authorities, punishments, corrections, and
executions upon any offender or offenders, who shall be mutinous,
seditious, disorderly, or any way unruly either at sea, or during the time
of their abode and residence in any of the ports, harbours, or bays of
our said province and territories, as the case shall be found to require,
according to the martial law, and the said directions, during the time of
war as aforesaid.
Provided that nothing herein contained shall be construed to the
enabling you, or any by your authority, to hold plea, or have any
jurisdiction of any offences, cause, matter, or thing committed or done
upon the high sea, or within any of the havens, rivers, or creeks of our
said Province and territories under your government, by any Captain,
Commander, Lieutenant, Master, Officer, Seaman, Soldier, or other
person whatsoever, who shall be in our actual service and pay, in or on
board any of our ships of war, or other vessels acting by immediate
commission or warrant from our Commissioners, for executing the
office of our High Admiral of Great Britain; or from our High Admiral
of Great Britain for the time being, under the Seal of our Admiralty;
but that such Captain, Commander, Lieutenant, Master, Officer,
Seaman, Soldier, or other person so offending, shall be left to be
proceeded against, and tried, as their offences shall require, either by
commission under our Great Seal of Great Britain, as the Statute of the
twenty-eighth of Henry the Eighth directs, or by Commission from our
said Commissioners for executing the office of our High Admiral of
Great Britain, or from our High Admiral of Great Britain for the time
being, according to the aforementioned Act, intituled, “An Act for
amending, explaining, and reducing into one Act of Parliament the
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44 WHITTIER LAW REVIEW Vol. 31

laws relating to the government of his Majesty’s ships, vessels, and

forces by sea, and not otherwise.”
****
And our further will and pleasure is, that all public monies raised,
or which shall be raised by any Act to be hereafter made within our
said Province, and other the territories depending thereon, be issued out
by warrant from you, by and with the advice and consent of our
Council, and disposed of by you for the support of the government, and
not otherwise.
And we do hereby likewise give and grant unto you full power
and authority, by and with the advice and consent of our said Council,
to settle and agree with the inhabitants of our province and territories
aforesaid, for such lands, tenements, and hereditaments, as now are, or
hereafter shall be in our power to dispose of, and them to grant to any
person or persons upon such terms, and under such moderate quit-rents,
services, and acknowledgments, to be thereupon reserved unto us, as
you, by and with the advice aforesaid, shall think fit: which said grants
are to pass, and be sealed by our Seal of our said Province of F_____;
and being entered upon record by such officer or officers, as are or
shall be appointed thereunto, shall be good and effectual in law against
us, our heirs, and successors.
And we do hereby give you the said A. B. full power and
authority to order and appoint fairs, marts, and markets, as also such
and so many ports, harbours, bays, havens, and other places for the
convenience and security of shipping, and for the better loading and
unloading of goods and merchandises in such and so many places, as
by you, with the advice and consent of our said Council, shall be
thought fit and necessary.
Command to others to obey governor
And we do hereby require and command all Officers and
Ministers, civil and military, and all other inhabitants of our said
Province and Territories depending thereon, to be obedient, aiding, and
assisting unto you, the said A. B. in the execution of this our
Commission, and of the powers and authorities herein contained; and
in case of your death or absence out of our said province and territories
depending thereon, to be obedient, aiding, and assisting unto such
person as shall be appointed by us to be our Lieutenant Governor, or
Commander in Chief of our said Province for the time being; to whom
we do therefore by these presents give and grant all and singular the
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2009 EXECUTIVE VESTING CLAUSE 45

powers and authorities herein granted, to be by him executed and

enjoyed during our pleasure, or until your arrival within our said
province and territories.
Succession on absence or death
And if, upon your death or absence out of our said province and
territories depending thereon, there be no person upon the place
commissionated or appointed by us to be our Lieutenant Governor, or
Commander in Chief of our said Province, our will and pleasure is, that
the eldest Councillor, whose name is first placed in our said
instructions to you, and who shall, at the time of your death or absence,
be residing within our said Province of F_____, shall take upon him the
administration of the government, and execute our said commission
and instructions, and the several powers and authorities therein
contained, in the same manner, and to all intents and purposes, as other
our Governor and Commander in Chief of our said Province, should or
ought to do in case of your absence until your return, or in all cases,
until our further pleasure by known therein.
Term and removal from office
And we do hereby declare, ordain, and appoint that you the said
A. B. shall and may hold, execute, and enjoy the office and place of our
Captain General and Governor in Chief in and over our Province of
F______, and the territories depending thereon, together with all and
singular the powers and authorities hereby granted unto you, for and
during our will and pleasure.
Testimonium Clause
In witness whereof, we have caused these our Letters to be made
Patent.
Witness ourself at Westminster, the first day of January, in the
twenty-third year of our reign.
By Writ of Privy Seal,
YORKE and YORKE.
The
Great Seal
of
GREAT BRITAIN.
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46 WHITTIER LAW REVIEW Vol. 31

APPENDIX C
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS DIPLOMATIC COMMISSION—DIRECT
GRANT STRUCTURE
COMMISSION TO WILLIAM LEE182
The delegates of the United States of New Hampshire,
Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations,
Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia—To
all who shall see these presents, send greeting.
Whereas a friendly and commercial connexion between the
subjects of his imperial majesty, the emperor of Germany, and the
people of these states, will be beneficial to both nations:—Know ye,
therefore, that we, reposing special trust and confidence in the zeal,
fidelity, abilities and assiduity of William Lee, esquire, of the state of
Virginia, have appointed and deputed, and by these presents do appoint
and depute the said William Lee our commissioner, giving and
granting to our said commissioner full power and authority to
communicate and treat with his imperial majesty, the emperor of
Germany, or with such person or persons as shall be by him for such
purpose authorized, of and upon a true and sincere friendship, and a
firm, inviolable, and universal peace, for the defence, protection and
safety of the navigation and mutual commerce of the subjects of his
imperial majesty and the people of the United States; and to do not
only all such things as may conduce to those desirable ends, but also, to
transact and execute all such other matters as shall hereafter be given
him in charge.
Done in Congress, at Philadelphia, the first day of July, in the
year of our Lord, one thousand seven hundred and seventy-seven. In
testimony whereof the President, by order of the said Congress, hath
hereunto subscribed his name and affixed his seal.
(Signed)JOHN HANCOCK, President.
Attest,
CHARLES THOMSON, Secretary.

182. J. Contl. Cong. 1774-1789 vol. 8, 518-19 (July 1, 1777).