Chap 10
Chap 10
Chapter 10 explores various sources of monopoly power and the effect of imperfect competition on the
marketplace. Although the measured degree of industrial concentration has declined in the United States in
recent years, the ability of firms to differentiate their products produces monopoly power that has an important
impact on market participants. Perfect competition provides consumers with the lowest prices and the highest
levels of output, but concentration may lead to increases in research and innovation. Thus, evaluating the
impact of imperfect competition is not an easy task.
As you work through this chapter, you will find that analysis of imperfect competition requires a solid
understanding of both the perfectly competitive model and the monopoly model. Depending upon the nature of
the firms in the industry, behavior may more closely follow one model than the other. For example, the market
for personal computers is more like a perfectly competitive environment, while the market for automobiles is
more like a monopoly environment. In any case, most “real world” markets can be placed somewhere along a
continuum between the perfectly competitive and monopoly extremes.
Over the past century, policymakers in the United States have protected and served the interests of
competition in most instances. A major question that must be considered as you work through this chapter is as
follows: Do the benefits to competitive markets outweigh the costs of protecting and preserving them? Later
chapters in the text will help you to develop a complete answer to this question.
After you have read Chapter 10 in your text and completed the exercises in this Study Guide chapter, you should
be able to:
1. List the determinants of market power, and understand how cost structure, barriers to entry, and the
potential for collusion influence the translation of that market power into a particular market structure of
imperfect competition.
2. Understand the spectrum of imperfect competition, stretching from perfect competition at one extreme
to monopoly at the other, and identify examples of industries that appear at various spots along the length
of this spectrum.
3. Understand the potential risks and gains involved when a few firms collude to determine industry price
and/or output. Use the model of cartel behavior to illustrate the effects of tacit collusion on markets.
4. Describe the importance of game theory for modeling firm behavior in noncollusive imperfectly
competitive markets.
5. Conceptualize how profit-maximizing behavior in large firms might be compromised by the divorce of
ownership from control. Translate profit-maximizing behavior from the theoretical models to the “real
world” using rules of thumb like cost-plus markup, or using price discrimination.
6. Evaluate to your own satisfaction the Schumpeterian hypothesis that significant market power leads to
extensive and socially desirable programs of research and development that would otherwise not be
forthcoming.
7. Understand how imperfect competition leads to prices which exceed marginal cost, and use
deadweight loss to evaluate the associated welfare cost.
8. Compare and contrast alternative intervention strategies that governments might pursue in order either
to promote the emergence of competitive markets or to manage big business where it must exist due to the
importance of economies of scale in production.
Match the following terms from column A with their definitions in column B.
A B
__ Market power 1. The analysis of situations involving two or more decision makers who have
conflicting objectives.
__ Concentration- 2. Pricing strategy in which firms take the expected average cost of a product and
ratio mark it up by a percentage.
__ Herfindahl- 3. The loss in real income to both buyers and sellers that arises due to the existence
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6. Rivalry exists in oligopolistic industries due to mutual interdependence. Modeling this rivalry is very
difficult; industries tend to develop their own standards of behavior depending on the particular nature of the
production and distribution process and on the demand for the product itself. Game theory is a method of
analysis that is used in situations involving two or more decision makers who have conflicting objectives.
Game theory can help us to understand and even to predict, in some cases, the behavior of rivals in an industry.
7. Price discrimination is a technique used by firms with monopoly power to extract additional consumer
surplus. Price discrimination schemes occur when firms charge different consumers different prices for the
same product. Firms want to charge higher prices to consumers whose demand is more inelastic.
V. HELPFUL HINTS
l. As you learned in Chapter 9, entry barriers are important to the emergence of imperfect competition.
However, notice that these barriers evolve over time. For example, IBM had a near monopoly in the market for
computers throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Their economic profits encouraged entry by competitors; “Big
Blue” was able to hold them at bay for years due to the fact that it was heavily invested in research and
development. This led to large numbers of patents on new products. However, with the emergence of the
personal computer around 1980, rivals burst into the market with a passion. Economic profits were soon eroded
by fierce competition among firms in the industry, and IBM now sees itself fighting for market share.
2. Oligopoly behavior is very difficult to model, posing great challenges for economists. In oligopolistic
industries, firms must explicitly recognize and react to their competitors. This mutual interdependence is one of
the factors that makes modeling difficult. If you think about big industries in the U.S. economy, you can
imagine why. Domestic airlines have a system of pricing that is mystifying to even the most knowledgeable
travelers, auto producers use a complex and ever-changing system of rebates and financing incentives, and
producers of breakfast cereals have an endless variety of products on the grocery store shelves. All of these
industries are dominated by domestic oligopolies, requiring that firms be aware of the responses of competitors
to changes in prices and output. Because of this mutual interdependence, economists have a wide class of
models from which they can pick and choose when describing oligopoly behavior. There is no single model
that can accurately generalize the actions and reactions of rivals.
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3. Figure 10-6 in your textbook compares the long-run perfectly competitive market equilibrium with the
long-run monopoly solution using the simplifying assumption that marginal costs are fixed and constant. The
result in no way depends upon this assumption. If marginal costs are upward-sloping, there is still a deadweight
loss to monopoly. The assumption simply makes the illustration more clear.
These questions are organized by topic from the chapter outline. Choose the best answer from the options
available.
d. Average cost curves that reach their minima at roughly 30 percent of market demand.
e. All the above.
e.
8. OPEC represents a market structure most accurately represented by:
a. the pure monopoly model.
b. a collusive oligopoly model with incomplete market coverage.
c. the monopolistic competition model.
d. the duopoly model.
e. perfect competition.
9. Which alternative to question 8 would have been correct if the market in question had been the market for
soybeans?
a. the pure monopoly model.
b. a collusive oligopoly model with incomplete market coverage.
c. the monopolistic competition model.
d. the duopoly model.
e. perfect competition.
10. If we consider an industry composed of many sellers of differentiated products, and if entry into this
industry is free, then we should expect the long-run equilibrium position of the typical firm in this industry to
have which of the following properties?
a. Average cost (AC) would be at its minimum possible level, and the price charged (P) would be equal
to that AC.
b. AC would be at its minimum level, and P would be above that AC.
c. AC would be above its minimum level, and P would be above that AC.
d. AC would be above its minimum level, and P would be equal to that AC.
e. AC would be above its minimum level, but P would equal that minimum.
11. Suppose Figure 10-1 (below) represents the demand and cost conditions for an industry operating as an
international cartel. The profit-maximizing price and output for this industry are:
a. $5 and 10 units.
b. $2 and 10 units.
c. $4 and 20 units.
d. $4 and 15 units.
Figure 10-1
Figure 10-2
22. Which answer to question 21 would have been the correct description of the competitive equilibrium?
a. 4 units at a price of $2.
b. 4 units at a price of $6.
c. 8 units at a price of $2.
d. 10 units at a price of $2.
e. 5 units at a price of $5.
23. Which answer to question 21 would have been correct if the monopolist were trying to maximize revenue?
a. 4 units at a price of $2.
b. 4 units at a price of $6.
c. 8 units at a price of $2.
d. 10 units at a price of $2.
e. 5 units at a price of $5.
24. The monopolist of question 21 creates distortions whose welfare cost, measured in terms of consumer
surplus, equals:
a. $2.
b. $4.
c. $6.
d. $8.
e. $10.
25. Unlike antitrust laws, regulation:
a. allows monopolies and near-monopolies to exist under the watchful eye of a government agency.
b. breaks monopolized industries into many small firms which then operate competitively.
c. places heavy taxes on firms to provide them with incentives to do the right thing.
d. encourages government ownership, or nationalization, of industries that have been monopolized.
e. provides firms with the capital that they need to pursue research and development of new products.
The following problems are designed to help you apply the concepts that you learned in this chapter.
TABLE 10-1
1995 2000
Market Market
Firm Share Share
A 10% 30%
B 8 6
C 12 12
D 20 30
E 21 10
F 2 1
G 5 3
H 6 1
a. Calculate the four-firm concentration ratios for 1995 and 2000. What happened in this industry over
this time period?
b. Calculate the eight-firm concentration ratios for 1995 and 2000. Do these calculations give you a
different notion of developments in this industry over this time period?
c. Calculate the Herfindahl-Hirschman Indexes for 1995 and 2000. What does this index tell you about
changes in concentration in this industry over this time period?
3. As stated above, oligopoly behavior is characterized by mutual interdependence; that is, rivals in an
oligopolistic market must be constantly aware of one another’s behavior. In Figure 10-3, DD represents the
effective demand curve facing some oligopolist who abides by a collusive agreement with a few competitors. It
could, for example, be the result of a consistent 30 percent share of total sales for any price along a market
demand curve. Notice that every reduction of $1 in the price produces, for the firm when all other firms
conform, an increase in sales of 10 units. Marginal revenue is given by MR. Average cost and marginal cost
are assumed, for simplicity only, to be constant at $4 per unit regardless of output level.
Figure 10-3
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a. On the basis of the assumption of perfect collusion, the firm will maximize profits along DD by
agreeing to a price of $___, therefore selling ___ units and earning profits of $___.
b. Now suppose that the firm could, by lowering its price relative to that of its colluding partners (i.e., by
cheating on its collusive agreement), pick up an extra 20 units of sales for every $1 reduction in price. It
could, in other words, increase its market share at the expense of other firms by lowering its price alone.
The resulting demand and marginal revenue curves are represented in Figure 10-3 by D’D’ and MR’,
respectively. The firm could, in this case, move to a new profit-maximizing position by (reducing /
maintaining / increasing) its price to $___ and selling ___ units. The result would be $___ in profits.
c. It is, of course, highly unlikely that the other firms would not catch on. Suppose, in response to the
cheating of the first firm, that all the other firms changed their prices to the cheater’s new price. DD would
again be relevant, and the cheating firm’s profits would fall to $___ as sales declined to ___ units.
d. It is clear, therefore, that successful cheating is better for a single firm than is successful collusion, but
cheating entails the risk of reducing profitability if all firms catch on and follow the behavior of cheaters to
protect themselves. Were the process to continue, in fact, the firms would, collectively, end up producing
the (competitive / monopoly) output and selling it at the (competitive / monopoly) price. In terms of
Figure 10-3, price would converge to $___, output would converge to ___ units, and pure economic profit
would converge to $___.
Figure 10-4
b. Now complete Table 10-2 to convince yourself that a sequence of trial markup percentages could lead
a careful manager to the profit-maximizing intersection of MR and MC without computing either schedule.
5. The Schumpeterian hypothesis about the large firms which dominate imperfectly competitive markets
postulates that “big business may have had more to do with creating our (high) standard of life than (with)
keeping it down.” This hypothesis is based, at least in part, upon the notion that (research-and-development
expenditure / purchasing power / real competition) seems to be concentrated most heavily in the largest
firms on the American scene. Since Edwin Mansfield has argued that the social return to invention is (3 / 0.5 /
5) times the private gain, it can certainly be argued that research and development is (overfunded / properly
funded / underfunded). However, the extent of underfunding depends critically upon the nature of innovation
and the ability of firms to appropriate the gains to expensive research and development projects. Particularly
when the (average / total / marginal) costs of reproducing an idea or product approach zero, high fixed costs of
innovation may pay slim rewards to the deserving firm or individual.
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TABLE 10-2
Percentage
Markup Output
over Cost Price (units) Profit
60 $___ ___ $___
80 ___ ___ ___
100 ___ ___ ___
120 ___ ___ ___
110 ___ ___ ___
105 ___ ___ ___
Figure 10-5
Answer the following questions, making sure that you can explain the work you did to arrive at the answers.
1. Studies show that the measured degree of concentration in U.S. industry has been decreasing in recent
years. What do you think Schumpeter would say about this trend?
2. In a monopolistically competitive market, the long-run position occurs where firms are earning no
economic profits. However, firms are not at the minimum of their long-run average cost curves. How can this
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be? Why do some people charge that monopolistic competition leads to waste and inefficiency? What, if
anything, do consumers gain when they purchase products from monopolistically competitive industries?
3. The DeBeers diamond syndicate is an example of a highly successful international cartel. Using the theory
developed in the text, illustrate the profit-maximizing decision of competitors in this industry. Why might
competitors decide to cheat? What impact might the emergence of Russia as an international competitor, but
nonmember of the cartel, have on the stability of agreements?
4. What is the difference between collusive and noncollusive oligopoly in the United States? Why is
collusive oligopoly illegal?
5. List and explain the alternative government policies that might be used to encourage competition in U.S.
industry. If Schumpeter is correct, should these policies be adopted? Why or why not?
6. Explain how one finds the supply curve for a monopolist.
The cartel will produce Q* units of output and sell it at $P* per unit. Competitors might decide to cheat if
they think that they can lower price and increase sales without attracting the attention of other cartel members.
As Russia enters this market as a competitor, the DeBeers cartel will suffer, unless it can pull Russia into the
cartel. Successful cartels must maintain control over the supply of the product.
4. In a collusive oligopoly, members make agreements concerning market strategy and share information. In
a noncollusive oligopoly, members consider the behavior of rivals, but they do not actually discuss strategy.
Collusive oligopoly is illegal because it severely limits competition among rivals.
5. To encourage competition, the government might make all monopolies illegal. The government might
break up large firms into several small firms. The government might refuse to allow mergers when the merging
firms operate in the same markets. According to Schumpeter, these actions all limit the size and scope of firms,
and hence limit their incentives to be innovative.
6. One cannot derive the supply curve for a monopolist.