The Process and Impact of Ideologization of Islam in Pakistan

Supervised By:
Dr. Shailaja Fennell
Jesus College
University of Cambridge, UK

Researched and Written By:

Maleeha Aslam
Wolfson College
University of Cambridge, UK

This paper was compiled as an MPhil dissertation at the University of Cambridge in the UK in 2003,
and primarily relies on secondary literature and two primary sources, namely, Ms.Asma Jehangir,
a lawyer by profession and the UN Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human rights on extra
judicial, summary or arbitrary executions since 1998, pioneer member of Human Rights Commission
of Pakistan(HRCP), Women Action Forum(WAF) Pakistan and Mr. Aitzaz Ahsan, an accomplished
politician and twice elected as senator from the platform of Pakistan People’s Party, led by Ms.
Benazir Bhutto.

This paper presents an argument different and distinct from what has been mostly written in the
west and the Muslim world. This paper is not about, presenting secularism, as mostly suggested by
the western intelligentsia or Islamic form of government, as upheld by the Muslim intelligentsia, as
a panacea to the politically struggling nation of Pakistan. Since it is not a theological document it
does not condemn or commend sacred text like many of the Muslim feminists, like Fatima Mernissi
from Morocco and Haleh Afshar from Iran have done in a desperate attempt to break free of
patriarchy. The primary task of this paper is to locate Islam within the “power construct” of
Pakistan. It reveals those State practices through which Islam was largely used as a tool or an
appliance to grab and maintain power and suppress the people of Pakistan. Pakistan came in to
being because it was thought that the Muslims of India had a different identity, yet the question of
its identity remains unresolved as its citizens question that was the birth of Pakistan related to
rejecting Hindu dominance rather than the oft quoted stance that it was an affirmation of Islam.
This is largely because what they have come across in their 57 year old history is just the political
face of Islam, full of greed and power struggle amongst its various “users” with multiple subtexts,
and not the religion as one would fancy emerging out from the heavens above

Right at the beginning it is pertinent to mention that though the paper itself is largely inclined
towards modernist perspectives that perceive and appreciates that ultimate power rests in the
State machinery, we are fully aware of post-modern discourses, especially the contributions of
Foucault drawing inspiration from Benthem’s Panoptican model, conveying that power is not a
central phenomenon or does not rest in one particular institution but remains largely elusive. In
other words, to place the State at the centre of every issue, without giving equal significance to the
other non-state or societal power structures may not be an entirely accommodating analytical
approach. However, for the purpose of profound analysis of atleast the visible power manoeuvres on
part of the State, it becomes unavoidable to focus more on the modernist perspective and map
down the various ways in which the State precisely gains and maintains high level of power and
authority to rule over its people, unchallenged and unquestioned. In Pakistan, the state repeatedly
used Islam as an instrument to maintain the privilege of the privileged; bolster a patently unjust
socio-economic order and to denounce and proscribe any attempts at social change and threat to
the rule by branding it un-Islamic. Equally important in this connection is the fact that it was and
remains difficult for the people of Pakistan to perceive or challenge any authority that comes
enveloped in Islam. Apparently the State’s approach is to use Islam in particular, and not any other
element, for giving rise to its power construct. Though it is practically difficult to come across
unbiased literature due to the constant struggling of academics over objectivist and subjectivist
approaches to analysis, the issue will be sufficiently addressed, and the power struggle reflected

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upon by mapping the process of ideologization of Islam in Pakistan in detail through available
literature. The question arises that what are the reasons behind a State considering religion, or in
Pakistan’s case, Islam as an assurance to its power construct. One possible explanation can be the
one presented by Bourdieu in 1993, “Power is diffused and often concealed in broadly accepted,
and often unquestioned ways of seeing and describing the world”. This is to safely deduce that the
State, willing to enjoy ultimate authority, usually selects that particular institutional arrangement
or mechanism for itself which comes in the realm of “unquestioned ways”. Religion, being more a
matter of belief and faith, especially for Pakistanis, remains unquestioned and unchallenged, no
matter what levels of political and social forms of exploitation it may take after coming in the
hands of the powerful classes. In Pakistan the State repeatedly wore the apparel of custodian of
Islam, ensuring greater control over routine lives of its citizens. Nighat Said Khan, 1993
commenting on Gen.Zia-ul-Haq’s Islamization program describes: “The state moved on to take over
the lives of women, to control their bodies, their space, to decide what they should wear, how
they should conduct themselves, the jobs they could take, the sports they could play, and took it
upon itself to define and regulate women’s morality .It is a State’s own interpretation of Islam, the
one that suits its power interests that is popularised. Khan goes on to emphasize that “the attempt
to impose single interpretation of Islam has pitted Islam against Islam, sect against sect” and it can
be added, men against women.

Post-structuralists like Bourdieu would rather assert with his notion of habitus and the field that
people themselves are predisposed to indulge into certain cultural practices, regardless of power
structures and state interventions. Similarly Durkheim, from amongst the classical sociologists used
the phrase “religious mentality”, now more of a cliché, to maintain that people would practice few
things only because they want to do so. However, this paper would focus more on State’s
intervention using Islam as a mean and mode to perpetuate a culture that served its power interests
best and legitimised its authority.

Prior to proceeding on an extensive analysis of the issue in point it is once again stressed that the
various positions undertaken during analysis are actually mosaic opinions that reflect on how the
process of ideologization of Islam “appears” to have occurred in Pakistan. These are only few
explanations amongst the many untold ones and may be equally true or false. Having stated this,
simultaneously these are significant enough to provide us small evidences that the forms of human
especially women oppression and suppression, though justified through Islam by the proponents are
not really God gifted. Instead, quite unfortunately these have been, presently are, and likely to
remain as consciously designed, orchestrated and engineered efforts on part of the power structures
in Pakistan to gain and maintain power and make it a source of security for themselves and
insecurity for all those who remained beyond its ambit. It is almost like being trenchant and
categorising people in what Durkheim called sacred and profane. But, the most interesting thing is
that if one inquires from its users about what “sacred” is to them, the responses are varied and
diagrammatically opposed. In other words, though the label “Islam” applies across power
constructs, being apparently quite uniform, it holds very different meanings for different power
groups, and ofcourse different uses. Hence as a factor in the power construct, Islam is invested with
a wide ranging, even contradictory subtext. Often the “user”, decides the subtext in accordance to
what serves its power interests best.

The paper has three sections, namely: (i)The Islamic Republic of Pakistan: Ideology; Religious
groups; Law and Legislation (ii)State of Pakistan and the Process of Ideologization: and lastly,
Impact of obscurantist versions of Islam on Pakistani Society .

The Islamic Republic of Pakistan: Ideology; Religious groups; Law and Legislation

Wide-ranging ideologies exist in the Muslim world that is not monolithic. Ahmed (1985) suggests that
ideology lends a sense of direction to the society and provides a cognitive structure, furnishes a
prescriptive formula, and performs an evaluative task. Keeping this in mind, Pakistan’s Islamic
ideology should mean that Islam must form the cognitive, prescriptive and evaluative framework for
the citizens of Pakistan.

Though ‘Islamic ideology’ is still upheld and promoted, the debate on its centrality continues
amongst the intelligentsia. The ideologization of Islam in present day Pakistan is disputed by
academics like Ayesha-Jalal, Hamza-Alavi, Aitzaz-Ahsan etc, who maintain that the use of Islam for

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Pakistan movement was a short-term political strategy of the Muslim statesmen of that time and is
now redundant. Therefore, they maintain that Pakistan movement must be characterised as
‘Muslim’ and not ‘Islamic’, led by diverse Muslim ethnic groups from different regions and social
strata. This is however rejected by the opposing intelligentsia, who believe that Pakistan’s survival
was due to this ‘Islamic mandate’, otherwise its people are divided in ethnic and sectarian groups
[ B a x t e r e t a l - 1 9 8 7 ] .

It can be perceived effortlessly that the silencing of voices of dissent in Pakistan, with or without
force, made ‘ideologization of Islam’ in Pakistan appear like an authoritarian process unleashed by
both pseudo-democratic governments and authoritarian regimes of Pakistan to maintain the ‘state’
and ‘societal’ power structures and relations in the country. There remained some grey areas in
which the state itself appeared confused about its Islamic ideology. However, largely as explained
before Islam was used as a tool of oppression and suppression on the ‘poorer sections of the
society’. Sometimes the state succumbed to the pressure of societal power-holders e.g. the Ulema,
the landed aristocracy and the capital-owning classes, to encapsulate the country in ‘Islam’. This
further developed a strong nexus between the state and non-state elements to maintain their power
and ensure their share in the kitty. This political mess shaped Pakistan’s negative societal attitudes
e.g. supporting gross human rights violations like honour-killings. Sensible or insensible,
ideologization of Islam in Pakistan cannot be believed to be without a purpose, or a hidden agenda
to run power politics. Therefore in the present context it must be realised that it is not Islam but
the “application of Islam” in the contemporary world political scene that requires our attention.

A state’s well-defined ideological posture has its impact on the whole society, which again is not a
homogenous entity but constitutes of men & women; rural and urban population; different religious,
sectarian, linguistic and ethnic groups. To accommodate diversity it is advisable for the state not to
declare any religion for itself and remain secular, quite unlike what the State of Pakistan has chosen
to do, by declaring itself as the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. However, Anita Weiss and
Juergensmeyer-1995, believed that it is an oversimplification to imagine separation of religion from
State, in traditional and especially post-colonial societies, because they have religious histories that
were part of national heritages; religious institutions that were an effective communication system;
and religious leaders who generally proved to be more efficient than government officials.

When the State is expected to decide its approach towards religion, it mainly has two choices: that
which sidelines religion i.e. secularism, and the one that centralises it, for example, Islamisation.

Secularism is largely considered to be a Christian phenomenon having roots in Christian history, but
something that can be adopted by other societies. It compartmentalises religion and limits its
intervention as an institution in an individual’s personal beliefs [David Martin-1978]. Whereas Islam
as a religious doctrine, and code of social and political organisation rejects, separation of religious
institution and State [Juergensmeyer-1995].

Commonly it is believed that mostly Asian countries were introduced this far-off ideology of
secularism by their western-educated elites, and henceforth is not indigenous, which may make it
unpopular in the masses. However Rajan [1998] points that secularism was not a far-off or foreign
ideology to the traditional society of India which had had rulers like the sixteenth century Mughal
emperor Jalalud din Muhammad Akbar who believed in an ‘India for All’. Despite this, most
interestingly the twentieth century India witnessed reaction to Nehru’s secularism as ‘a western-
import, grafted in a traditional society for minority appeasement’.

To some people, especially in the Islamic world, secularism is regarded as ‘Camouflaged-

Christianity’ in competition with other religions. It is indeed pitiable that ‘toleration’, supposedly
an essential component of secularism, is nowhere to be seen in secularised societies [Rajan-1998].
Khan (1993), satirically presents her views on usage of religion for political gains in the South-Asian
context by revealing that at the time of partition of India in 1947, Muslim League was less Muslim
than what it claimed to be and Congress was more Hindu than what it claimed to be. In other words
use of religion, prior to partition and even today, remains solely for political ends and power
struggle, as would also be supported by Pratt 1970.

Having briefly touched upon secularism, now one can explore the second i.e. the religious option
available to States. If one takes Islamization to explain the option, it is significant to realise that

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Islam has a wide spectrum of beliefs from the most fanatical and intolerant ones to the most benign
and easy going. The definition of Islamization will vary with each and this is exactly what makes it
more complex.

Islamization, can be simply defined as a process in which Islam becomes an encompassing and a
supreme force. Islamization entails a process of legislative, executive and legal actions through
which individuals spend their lives in accordance to the teachings of Islam and take it as a “code of
life”. Teachings that should commonly be derived from the four sources of Islamic information,
namely: Al-Kitaab; Sunnah; Fiqh; Ijtehad. To a westerner’s astonishment it is meaningful to believe
in an Islamic political and economic system, Islamic law/ Shari’a, an Islamic Ummah [Baxter, Malik,
Kennedy, Oberst, 1987].

Central to Islamism is Allah’s sovereignty and a Caliph. It is argued that accepting Allah’ s
sovereignty is essential for creating equality amongst the mortals i.e. the people [Esposito-2002].
During Prophet Muhammad’s life Islamisation focused on attracting infidels but later on the concept
broadened to influence Muslims to spend their lives in accordance to the religion. In the 2nd and 3rd
century, this led to the development of Shari’a [Jorgen.S.Nielson-1987]. Later on Islamisation
became a reactionary phenomenon due to developments in Muslim history. In 1258 the Mongol
attacks on Muslim learning institutions pushed them in poverty which was exacerbated by the
twentieth century, colonisation. All these developments in the Muslim history need to be considered
during analysis of ‘Islamisation’ [Asghar-1985].

It is important to note that after the Prophet’s death, there was a spill over between the
progressive and the reactionary. The former emphasised on Ijtehad i.e. constructive thought, and
the latter on Taqleed [imitation]. To the masses, Islam largely remained the code of life. Tensions
between the quietist, and more activist application always remained. In pre-modern times both
Christianity and Islam had similar levels of relations between religion and politics. However, later,
west discarded its past while the Muslims still retain it for their identities prompting Islamic
revivalist movements [Kiddie-1994].

In Pakistan’s case Islamization has remained as a process of mass mobilization in support of Ulema-
led Islamic traditions [based on Quran and Shari'a] discouraging both Fiqh and Ijtehad and
simultaneously introducing priesthood or what can be called Ulemaism in Pakistan despite the fact
that there is no concept of priesthood in the original religion which originally believes that anyone
doing research for Allah’s pleasure and for the welfare of mankind is a human being in service of
Islam. There has always been a constant struggle between Islamists and secularists in Pakistan with
the former complaining that the liberals will ‘mould Islam’ to satisfy the west [Khurshid- Ahmed-
2000] and the secularist backfiring that “clerics do not allow any other voice to have space for
expression” [Ms.Asma-Jahangir].

Recalling that Pakistan is an “Islamic” republic, one needs to understand the implications of a well-
defined ideological posture by the State. By declaring a religion for itself, the State
compartmentalises society, determining its mode, and level of interaction with each group of
people. State interaction with the society gets limited to religious parameters or more precisely to
the interpretations of the clerics [Smith-1971].

Following is an illustration of the possible interaction between an Islamic-state and its society as
suggested by the clerics that may or may not be truly Islamic.

The spiritual elevation is just one aspect of Islam. Prophet’s mission was to use his moral force
for the reconstruction of the society….. construct life on the basis of Marufaat [virtues] and
cleanse it of Munkarat [vices].
[Maulana-Mau’dudi-1960]

If the State chose the Prophet’s mission of ‘reconstruction’ for itself, it can be highly exploitative.

Islam uses political power to reform society

[Maulana-Mau’dudi]

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The effects of interpretations on interaction between state and society, is reflected in the
following:

‘Say my Lord! Let my entry be by the gate of truth and honour and like wise my exit be by the
gate of truth and honour and grant me from thy presence a ruling authority to aid me

[Al-Qur’an xvii;80]

[As interpreted by Maulana-Mau’dudi]:

Grant me Power on earth or make any ruling authority, any state, my supporter so that I may,
with the force of the coercive powers of the state, establish virtue, eradicate evil, put an end to
the surging tide of corruption , vulgarity, sin, set at right the disruption which has engulfed life
and administer justice according to your revealed law

Assume if Hinduism is made India’s state religion, it will require formalising the ‘caste system’,
henceforth declaring its largest minority, the Muslims, as ‘untouchables’. Similarly in Pakistan it
would be what Maulana-Mau’dudi asserted: ‘law of the land will be the law of the majority. Minority
can safeguard their religion but cannot promote it’ [Asghar-Ali-2001]

But this raises the question that can religion be ignored? Only to brush it slightly it is very difficult
to do so as discussed by Rajan, 1988, that it is not always a sensible choice to make since if religion
is made a private matter, it can immunise an important issue from public inspection and debate
e.g. Communal Violence. This requires another stone to be turned.

Pakistan’s religious political groups

The Indo-Pakistan history has diverse and varied versions of Islam. Various intellectual, spiritual,
political and academic approaches to Islam are coupled with more institutionalised forms. The
existence of varied sects within Islam, make ‘state religion’, a complex issue. Diverse versions of
Islam have been a part of Pakistan’s history professed by dignified personalities. This confuses the
layman in determining which version is the most reliable.

The Sufis possibly played the most significant role in the Islamisation process of the Indo-Pak
subcontinent through mobilisation of spiritual power and its application for the regeneration of the
Muslim Society in the 11th and 13th century. Unlike the ‘mystic’, who dedicates himself solely to
spiritualism, the Sufis maintained a social life of their own, encouraging meditation, cordial
relations amongst all i.e. irrespective of faith and religion. They encouraged sinners to confess and
seek forgiveness. The institution of ijtehad was upheld by them [Saeed-1994]. Sufis of Chishtiyya
and Suharwardiyya Silsila, brought with them the ‘popular Islam’ for the rural masses, also
addressing women. Radical traditionalists like Mau’du'di and Ulema were different from the Pirs and
Sufis. Settled in urban areas they attempted to become powerful through sarkar [State]. They
excluded women and rejected Sufi’s ‘popular Islam’ and introducing ‘pure Islam’. Maulana-
Mau’dudi believed in certain women rights under Islam but simultaneously stressed on rigid gender
roles and segregation- a functional division in terms of their inherent traits and tendencies
[Papanek-1973]. The Ulema labelled piri-mureedi i.e. master & disciple relationship as superstitious
and vulgar, emphasising on Qur’an and Sunnah as pure versions to be followed by all Muslims.
Maulana-Mau’dudi in his four-point formula, presented as a resolution in Feb 1948 at the Law
College Lahore, emphasised on sovereignty of Allah and implementation of Shari’a in state &
political, economic and social affairs [Ahmed-1985]. He labelled secularist as slaves of the West and
reiterated that Pakistan’s sole purpose was becoming the homeland of Islam otherwise the struggle
of Pakistan movement can easily be termed as futile.

Though coming up with a recipe for the Islamic government for Pakistan, Maududi disapproved of
Jinnah in pre-partition days and vice versa. This can be assessed by the fact that Jinnah was called
Kafir-I-Azam [The Great Infidel] instead of Quaid-I-Azam [the Great Leader] by Maulana-Mau’dudi-
the stalwart of Ulema [Rafiq-Zakaria-1998]. Factionalism amongst the Ulema was deep-rooted
[Binder-1961]. However their ‘propaganda machinery’, as Ms.Asma-Jahangir puts it, was so
professional that they always managed to project themselves as people’s voice.

5
Unfortunately, it was not long before when Sufism also institutionalised class structures through
‘Gaddi-Nashini’ or succession on the basis of lineage and not spiritualism. The government
allocated land and money to the gaddi-nashin to build mausoleums that strengthened their
economic and political clout.

Other than the Ulema and the Sufis, there have always remained Modernists amongst Muslim
intelligentsia who drew their inspiration from western ideas of capitalist economy and materialism.
As A.L. Basham states that rationalism as the basis of ethical thinking and the idea of human
progress and evolution, the possibility of scientifically engineering social change, the concept of
natural rights connected with individualism, were all alien to the traditional society and that
inspired the progressive minds of India [Panday-1990]. Sir Syed Ahmed presented Islam’s
compatibility with science and urged believers to give attention to the ‘Word’ and ‘Work’ of God.
In this realm his ‘Muhammadan-Anglo-Oriental-Movement’ played an important role [Irfani-1985].

Most importantly, all these groups had issues in conceptualising Pakistan as an “Islamic” State,
which exacerbated the already existing identity crisis. People could draw inspiration either from
Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, or Iqbal, the philosopher who conceived the idea of a separate
Muslim homeland comprising of all these states in South Asia, largely to challenge Arab imperialism.
Or else they could follow Maulana Maududi, who though before partition was an Indian nationalist
had a powerful clout to influence those very people whose independent land movement he never
politically supported but opposed. Jinnah’s Pakistan was a homeland for Muslims and to him Muslim
civilization made sense only if it was about “justice, fair-play, and complete impartiality”, as he
stated in July 1947. While addressing the First Constituent Assembly of Pakistan in 1947, he said,
“You may belong to any religion, caste or creed…that has nothing to do with the business of the
State.”

Jinnah stressed that religion was merely an element in people’s lives. This is evident by: “Religion
is there and religion is dear to us. All the worldly goods are nothing to us when we talk of religion,
but there are other things which are very vital, our social life, our economic life, and without
political power how can you defend your faith and your economic life”[April 11th -1946]

Jinnah’s view on religious leaders was painfully realistic. He called them rulers who could bring in
despotic oppression misusing their religious authority over a people who would not question
clergies, simply to respect religion [Asghar-Khan-1985]. Ulema considered Ummah superior to
nation-state, which worried Jinnah.

Iqbal’s Islam was the one that ensured freedom, equality, solidarity, Sharia and Tawhid. His
Islamic state was a state that would uphold Ijtehad. He once stated: “To have a succession of
identical thought and feeling is to have no thoughts and feelings at all”. Maududi’s Islamic state,
on the other hand was that which followed the principle of constructing life on the basis of
Marufat and cleansing it of Munkarat (1960)*. His Sharia was about Quran and Sunnah and that was
it.

Such was the potpourri of ideas or version of Islam in future Pakistan when the country was born as
a weak state in August 1947, with most of the rights denied to it by the British Raj after much
political manoeuvring with the selected political leadership of the adversary with Gandhi Ji, going
on a hunger strike to ensure that the new born baby i.e. Pakistan atleast gets the first feed in time.

One power struggle ended with the partition as the crown was lifted from the Indian soil, and it
paved the way for another dirty power struggle inside the new state. The trump card was “Islam”.
The first recorded political move to incorporate Islam in the state apparatus was through the
Objective Resolution 1949, that acting like a blue-print outlined the aims and objectives for all the
future constitutions of Pakistan. In retrospect, it can be concluded that this document was the
outcome of intense pressurising by the Ulema, for example: Maulana-Shabbir-Ahmed-Usmani who
started mobilising people of Bengal to hold the government accountable for backing-off from its
commitment to ‘make Pakistan a fortress of Islam’. With India drafting its constitution in 1948, the
pressure intensified. Usmani accused Muslim League for sidelining the Ulema. He craftily used
Jinnah’s name to mobilise people for an Islamic State. Usmani’s concept of an Islamic state
remained undisclosed as he waited for the Constituent Assembly to appoint him to work as a
committee member and define for them the structure and function of an Islamic state[Binder-1961].

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A sub committee of twenty-five men, confused about the status of the Resolution, sought help from
an Islamic scholar’s board, formulated on request, to advise on matters arising out of Objective
Resolution. These scholars decided on issues from a Sunni perspective, idealising caliphate; making
a ‘Man’ responsible as head of state and noting that a leader’s behaviour must be Islamic. It was
like institutionalising ‘veto power’, a negative vote on anything considered Un-Islamic.

The resolution had two significant clauses:

First, sovereignty lies with Allah, and people of Pakistan will spend their lives in accordance to the
limits prescribed by Him

Second, Muslims will spend their lives in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam
as set out in the Holy Quran and the Sunnah;

In Feb-1949, the Muslim League Parliamentary Party met in utmost secrecy to finally consider
Objective Resolution about which Smith, 1970 wrote that this document “was carefully imprecise”.
Smith’s comment warns well about the chaos that was later on generated through this document.
But, then as Asma Jehangir makes one realise that it is not always the document that is good or
bad. It is the use of that document that matters. She goes on to say: “Had they(alluding to the
powerful) not used Objective Resolution, they would have found another document for the
purpose”.

No matter how confused the committee was, or how imprecise the document, the basic issue had
already been generated . One of the most significant sources of Islamic information which keeps the
religion of Islam “modern” i.e. Ijtehad was almost sweeped aside. Interpretation of Quran and
Sunnah were already linked to the religious clergy since they enjoyed that symbolic power to
interpret the word of Allah and prophet for the ignorant citizens of Pakistan, unversed in Arabic. It
almost looked like an attempt to shift the power base towards those who had protested the very
origin of the country of Pakistan, i.e. the Ulema. They now wanted to regain their lost glory of the
days of Mughal empire.

Objective Resolution though was passed by the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan in March, 1949, but
was only made a substantive part of the Constitution of Pakistan by P.O (Presidential Order) .No.14
of 1985, Art.2 and Sch.item 2 (with effect from March 2, 1985). The year of its pre-ambler
formulation and its much later incorporation in the main text of the 1973 constitution reveals that
the leadership of the eighties, wanted to procure out the maximum from the introduced but
recessive, shift of power base that Objective Resolution had caused.

State of Pakistan and the Process of Ideologization

Building on Objective Resolution, a few Ulema began to oppose the very attempt of constitution-
making in Pakistan in the light of Qur’an and Sunnah. To some it was equivalent to Kufr [infidelity]
and only an Aa’lim was qualified to interpret and give verdict by applying laws of the Qur’an and
Sunnah. However Dr. Omar Farooq [2002] argues that an Islamic government, unlike what these
Ulema were asserting, is supposed to have a constitution and must be participatory for and
accountable to the people, quite unlike the unelected dictatorial regimes who had most ironically
become the banner-holders of Islam [Shafaat-1983].

Unsure about what was an “Islamic State”, the process of Islamisation started on a slippery road in
Pakistan. 1956 Constitution was to appease the theocratic elements in defining the role of Islam.
Therefore the ‘Repugnancy clause’ was incorporated [Azfar-1987]. Later on leaders used religion to
suit themselves. Ayub-Khan justified his presidential system and Basic Democracies through the
institution of Caliphate.

Ayub, realising that Qur’an was unchangeable, changed the law instead. He upheld spiritualism &
Ijtehad emphasising the role of legal experts in it. Muslim Family Laws 1961 were promulgated and
polygamy was linked to the court to make it a difficult option for men. Women were given ‘right to
divorce’ [Smith-1971].

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Maulana-Ihtesham-ul-Haq, the only Aa’lim, in the board constituted for the purpose, reacted in
these words:“If we cannot put Europe to shame for permitting free indulgence in adultery, we have
no cause to blush at the permission granted by Shari’a for lawfully marrying a second wife”.

Bhutto raised slogans of ‘Islamic Socialism’ publicly reciting the Kalima [Anwar-H-Syed] and saying
that “Islam… is our religion, the basis of Pakistan…if any party is not to make Islam the main pillar
of its ideology then that party would not be a Pakistani party. It would be an alien party”. Bhutto
declared Ahmedi, non-Muslims. Pakistan’s most competent Foreign Minister Sir. Zafarullah Khan, an
Ahmedi, was stated upon by a unanimous Ulema decision: “Zafarullah has committed Apostasy and
is punishable by death”[Smith- 1971]. Bhutto used Islam to save his skin, otherwise he himself, at
one stage promoted the idea that Islam had little relevance since both the exploiters and the
exploited were Muslims [Ayoob-1979]. Islam, after the defeat of the military in 1971, was used as a
cushion for recovering from humiliation by his government. Licking its wounds, the State spent
energy in establishing the power structures not only internally but also internationally so that it
could be taken as a key member of the Islamic Ummah [Ritcher-1979].

Zia-ul-Haq, drew his inspiration from Maulana-Mau’dudi and largely Islamised to win political
legitimacy and establish a link between the military and the society which was essential to
popularise himself after Z.A. Bhutto [Tahir-Kheli]. After passing Bhutto’s hanging orders, Zia the
‘religious merchant’ [Saeed-1994] used Pakistan’s defeat of 1971, to his advantage echoing that
‘fall of Dhakka’ happened due to absence of Islamic brotherhood and Pakistan’s salvation only lied
in Shariatization of its polity. In this form, Pakistani political machinery characterised itself in a
way that it encompassed both military rule and the use of Islam to legitimise a socially
conservative, economically unjust and a politically unpopular order. However more unfortunate was
the fact that in post-Zia time-period i.e. of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif’s democratically
elected governments, things remained the same. One does not come across sufficient evidence in
which these two tried to undo the damages of the unelected governments.

In his avarice for power Zia played with the sanctity of Islam. He gave excessive powers to Council
of Islamic ideology [CII] that had the nerve to call party-elections, Un-Islamic. All political parties
were banned and non-party elections were decided. Zia settled for 207 seats for the Majlis-I-Shoora
[National Assembly] to represent the districts. Twenty seats, each for minorities and women, were
reserved. On December 1st, 1984, referendum was held on the ridiculous question of, if people
supported Islamic ideology of Pakistan. The turn over was 60% and 97% gave a positive answer. In
Jan 1985, he announced the elections and declared Jamaat I- Islami as the only registered and
eligible party for elections.

Zia institutionalised gender inequalities through his so-called Islamisation. In his cabinet a separate
women’s division was established. It remained dependent on financial transactions by the
government for research purposes.

About the ‘Law of Evidence’ many women protestors came out on the streets but were Lathi
[Baton] charged and arrested. About 100 Ulema declared this act of women as sacrilegious and
called it a war against the word of God.

Women lawyers were declared incompetent for interpreting the Qur’an. It was debated that a small
group of western educated women, unversed in Arabic were not qualified to interpret the Qur’an.
During Zia’s time period statements like that given by Dr.Israr Ahmed were common: “The fact that
two women are equal to one man is the bitter pill that these modern and educated women must be
prepared to swallow in an Islamic society.”

Women Action Forum [WAF] took the challenge to start weekly classes of reading Arabic and
Qur’anic Studies in Islamabad with the belief that women were left to fight their own battle
[Korson-and-Maskeill-1985].

The plight of women was worrisome under Zia’s regime. Nasra-Shah shares that there were 2.4%
salaried women in urban population, according to 1981 census, and 2.1% in the national population.
The women worked in a largely gender-segregated environment. 90.6% of these professional women
were teachers, or doctors, the so-called noble professions. Lady doctors were limited to

8
gynaecology and obstetrics and journalists to women reporting only. Zia never attempted to
understand issues of progressive and educated urban women.

In 1983 a government directive was issued and women newsreaders were ordered to wear a dupatta
[A long scarf] over their head. Similarly, the air-hostesses were asked to wear modest clothing and
cover their heads. Chador was imposed on teachers and female students [Korson- and-Maskeill-
1985].

The question arises, what were the government’s sources of information? They were evidently not
involved in Ijtehad. In this context, it might be useful to note that in the 10th century, Islamic
jurisprudence went into stagnation. The leading scholars believed that all essential questions in the
law were answered. Thus the independent reasoning of Ijtehad, was cleverly replaced by Taqlid
[imitation]. Jurists became Muqallids- the followers of the predecessors. Maulana-Mau’dudi school,
for this reason, remains unchallenged till today. After this, it becomes very difficult for any Muslim
to stand with pride and state that Islam is the most modern religion. Even if Pakistan is taken as a
case study, the Had’ud Ordinance draws its inspiration from the eighteenth century outdated text
of Fatwa-i-Alamgiri to sound like a death knell for the most modern of Pakistani women of the
twenty first century.

It was in 1956, that Pakistan was constitutionally identified as an Islamic Republic, later on
formalised in 1963 implying it to be a cradle of Islamic democracy. However the rulers of this
Islamic Republic, elected or self-imposed, never exhibited their knowledge of Islam or democracy as
recognised by Islam [Justice-Dr-Tanzil-ur-Rehman]. In 1973-Constitution, Article-2 symbolically
declared Islam as the state religion without professing Islamic law i.e. Shari’a to be the law of the
land. Quite interestingly the courts observed: There is no scope for the argument that the Islamic
laws are to be enforced, in their entirety by virtue of Article 2, itself.

Alcohol intake was banned for Muslims, and state was made liable to eliminate Riba[Usury and
interest]1. Article 41 [2], 62[d], 62[e] and 62 [h] outlined that the President must have a good
character and is not commonly known as one who violates Islamic injunctions.

In addition to this the Council of Islamic Ideology [CII] and the Federal-Shariat-Courts[FSC] are of
immense importance to understand the process of Islamisation. For Ayub CII was merely an advisory
body with no powers. During Zia’s regime both CII and FSC became deciding factors. FSC provided
Ulema an opportunity to act as judges. It was authorised to convene cases from High Court and re-
evaluate vis-à-vis Islam. CII was involved to recommend the Parliament on all issues of legislation.
CII was involved to pick on repugnant laws vis-à-vis Islam, if any. To make matters worse, in 1979,
Zia introduced the Hadu’d laws, literally meaning “limitations” and commonly referred to as the
“black laws”. As soon as the laws were enforced the testimony of a woman witness was halved to
that of a man and it became increasingly difficult to impart justice to a rape victim, who was to be
brought to court as a criminal, an adulterous, if fails to provide four witnesses to prove her
innocence. To exacerbate the fall-outs of this law, the Pakistani police proved to be disappointingly
criminal in practice, by refusing to register cases under Zina bil-Jabr i.e. rape and recording it
instead as a case of Zina i.e. adultery. Asma Jehangir’s description in this regard is indeed very
helpful, that she presented while being interviewed:

Q: The requirement of four witnesses bearing testimony to the crime of Rape makes the whole issue
highly complex, and the rape ‘victim’ ends up becoming the ‘offender’ herself. How does that
happen?

A: No, it is not the four witnesses that is the issue in this context. It is actually the police, where
the First Information Report (FIR)is registered and the police will think that one has consented to the
act, that is the reason why she was raped. This is the mindset of the police. They think that a
woman ‘asks for it’. So they register it as not under Zina-bil-Jabr (Rape) but Zina(Adultery). They
file an indictment and the woman is arrested. Police is very prejudiced and biased. I am not saying
here-say, I have conducted hundreds of cases where policemen would say ‘How do you think this
woman would get raped. She went from Gujranwala2 to Lahore in a bus, she is really looking for it.’

1
Interest or Riba means, effortless profit.
2
A small town in Punjab (Pakistan)

9
 This is their concept of ‘asking for it’. If you look at the judgement of the superior courts, the way
they have talked about woman’s morality is as if any woman who speaks twenty words should be
raped. The indictments are filed under adultery. This is done so automatically. I have read cases
where judges clearly say this is not rape, this is Zina (adultery)

To counter, criticism on Zia’s policies, Kennedy [1990] presented his arguments that Zia’s
Islamisation was very fast and amateurish, inviting no skilful opposition. Between 1980-85,
operations of FSC were modified 28 times. There were various interpretations of Had’ud laws. The
judges in FSC were all western-educated, i.e. 87% had no actual exposure to Islamic law. FSC
worked in collaboration with the High Courts. Oft criticised, Shari’a Ordinance 1988, never became
a law, since the National Assembly never approved it, after its promulgation. Qa’nun–I-Shahadat
[Law of evidence]– a procedural reform, halving a woman’s testimony to a man, much opposed by
WAF was also benign, since two witnesses are a routine in all financial transactions in Pakistan, to
which the law was related. Similarly punishment under criminal laws regarding Had’ud [ordinances
on Zina, Qazf, Prohibition of Alcohol and drugs, and Property], were never implemented.

Zia were opposed largely by his secular political opponents who argued that these laws were anti-
human-rights, anti-women, anti-minority. A reactionary argument was that Zia wanted to take
Pakistan 1400 years back. Again Ms.Asma-Jahangir, takes serious exception to Kennedy’s analysis to
maintain and reflect upon the draconian impact of Zia’s Islamisation by stating:“Zia legacy is that
he destroyed all our institutions…these laws had an impact on the whole democratic process in the
country …Zia changed the criminal law, which had an adverse impact on women. Before the change
a woman could not be punished for adultery…[a commentary on Adultery in Pakistan-Penal-Code-
1960 states]...in a society where women are already dis-empowered the scales of justice will be
loaded against them, if we make this into a crime. So…they were right…. This law is a charade...it
is exploitative”

Ms.Asma-Jahangir is convinced that Had’ud Laws must be repealed and not amended because these
are a bad piece of legislation both procedurally and substantively. She candidly criticises the rich
and famous of Pakistan who commit adultery and drink alcohol but have never even been indicted.
Had’ud law is to oppress the masses: “As a lawyer I will say that the test is in the eating of the
pudding. Time and again, this law has showed that it operates against the poor, vulnerable and [is
used] to keep the oppressive, traditional practices alive”.

In other words and as is evidenced by Hadu’d laws, replacement of civil law with Islamic law gave
the state a right to police the private lives and morality of the people through criminalization of
purely private acts between two consenting adults such as Zina adultery and fornication
[Hossein1994].

State posture is clearly Islamic even today. One proof can be the reports published by the State
Bank of Pakistan, each year religiously dedicating a chapter to Islamisation of financial system in
Pakistan. In the past the government has boasted its Islamic measures of introducing financing
modes as Mudarabah3. Simlarly last year a policy decision was finalised to include setting up of
subsidiaries by commercial banks to make Shari’a-compliant-transactions.

Today, orthodox versions of Islam are re-surging in Pakistan. This is due to the State’s excessive
usage and failed ideologization of Islam to gain political legitimacy and raise electioneering
safeguards. During Bhutto’s era an editorial ‘For God Sake Leave Islam Alone’ reflects this misuse of
religion. State even coupled economic emancipation with fundamentalist ideologies [Richter-1979].
Every leader justified the government’s action under Islam and simultaneously ensured their own
survival by making public referrals to Islam. The State exploited the people in the name of Islam
and some of the educated people always felt uncomfortable with it.

Gen Musharraf who came to power in 1999 after a bloodless coup, is apparently not an Islamist. His
support for the US probably sends out a clear message that he would rather make himself secure
and powerful through the Whitehouse than a Friday sermon in a local mosque. His involvement in

3
A form of partnership in which one party provides the funds while the other provides expertise and management.
The latter is referred to as Mudarib. Any profits accrued are shared between the two parties on a pre-agreed
basis, while loss is borne by the provider of the capital.

10
the war against terror and Waziristan operation to crackdown Al-Qaeda militant and dislodge their
operatives; his efforts to reform the madrassa curriculum and the imposition of a ban against
militant organizations have earned him two failed assassination attempts. No matter how modern he
appears, he is still somewhat eccentric in comparison to the Bhuttos , who in an attempt to save
their power, also used Islam to regain the lost popularity. One needs to wait and see Musharraf’s
struggle to remain in power. In 2002 Elections the Mutahidda Majlis-I-Amal, a conglomerate of
religious parties came to power, most importantly, democratically and the Shari’a Bill was passed
in the provincial assembly of NWFP. Before this, the religious parties had never been able to make
it to the parliament. Their success and popularity was attributed to US War against Afghanistan that
resulted in increased inclination of Pakistanis towards religious parties. Soon after coming into
power Maulana Gul Naseeb Khan, SG- MMA ,NWFP, stated: “ We have great respect for womenfolk.
We are not against their employment, education and other social activities… If our resources
permit we would also establish separate higher education institutions, universities for women”.
One cannot fail to question that how will the resource requirement be met for these separate
universities in a poor country like Pakistan. MMA is against the repeal of Had’ud Ordinance, and
generally possesses a strong anti-NGO stance.

Other than these legislative and legal interventions, the State also maintained the status-quo
through printing and publishing of literature that promoted outdated approaches towards life and
society, in the name of promoting Islamic traditions and culture. It ensured that novels like Asghari
and Akbari---a tale of two married sisters, written by Moulvi Nazir Ahmed are readily available even
today. A component of the moral of the story is that a free-soul and independent woman would end
up repenting and a typical house-wife busy in cooking, cleaning and pleasing her husband will
remain content. This novel, which was initially written during the pre-partition days, in a strictly
gendered framework, has its excerpts incorporated in primary school text even today without a
suitable prologue that would emphasize on the changes that have taken place in the Pakistani
society and above all Pakistani women.

Another such example can be Maulana-Ashraf-Ali-Thanvi’s [1864-1943] book Bahisti Zevar

‘Ornaments of Paradise’ , still given as a dowry-gift to daughters in Pakistan. It singled out women
as the cause of all social ills and disease saying that they must be ‘managed’ and taught the science
of religion. Though used by the author, to deal with superstitious women of those days, today it has
been broadened to the convenience of men. The book gives detail in meticulous and most
embarrassingly explicit fashion about how a good Muslim woman should address and serve her
husband, behave towards her in-laws, etc. Delineating a set of rigorous rules for the most amazingly
mundane activities, including how to write letters to the husband, bathe, dress, walk, speak, pray
and look, reflecting fully the conservative Muslim psyche [Jalal-1991] of the pre-partition days and
the State’s interest to maintain the same stagnancy in thoughts, even today.

Following excerpts from the book might be of interest to the reader:

•(Section: Clothing & Purdah)
“It is compulsory to make purdah with a Non-Muslim … woman. This also applies to maids
and domestic servants who are not Muslims. The purdah that has to be made with them is the same
as that which has to be made with Na-mahram men”
•(Section: Nikah)
If the daughter is present and the father says: "I give this daughter of mine in marriage to
you", and the person replies: "I accept her", the nikâh will be valid.

Thanvi once stated; “To me that Muslim woman is the best, who is obedient and practices self-
restraint”.

To be short, the State promoted the publication of literature that judged “Woman’s morality”.
Now, it may be argued that this might be the result of State’s unprofessional attitude and
inefficiency rather than some hidden interest. However, largely by reviewing the Islamic policies of
the governments and especially that of Gen.Zia, the thought that it might have been done
intentionally to suppress Pakistani women, does not remain very difficult to accept.

Impact of Obscurantist Versions of Islam in Pakistani Society

11
By now it is clear that the State tampered with Islam. Very soon this official tampering of religion
created an open playfield for all and sundry in the social sphere. The layman’s attitude towards
religion can be phrased like: “If State of Pakistan is the custodian of Islam keeping surveillance over
women, then every Pakistani man must be a guardian, policing routine activities of the women of
his household”. Women’s morality was an “identity-issue” before the partition of India, but it
became a “gender-issue” cause of it being made a “singled-out issue” inside Pakistan. Throughout
these years, Pakistani political and social institutions remained geared towards ensuring women’s
seclusion, simultaneously making them more prominent, making them feel odd and embarrassed
about themselves. The asset of a woman was supposed to be nothing more than hayya (shame) and
just like a piece of property, she was to be possessed. She was made the site of family honour i.e.
ghairat. As Lamb 1991, shares that most killings are a result of feuds over women, land and guns
amongst Magsis of Balouchistan.

Each year Pakistani women are targeted under honour killings/ and forms of honour violence in the
name of Islam. Asma Jehangir elaborates that : “Although it doesn't appear in the Koran, the view
survives in Pakistan and some other Muslim countries that a man has the right to kill a female
relative if she violates certain rules and norms. The violation could be a woman's refusal to an
arranged marriage, flirtation with men, or even having the misfortune of being raped. All these
situations brings discredit upon the family, and hence ‘justify' an honor killing by a senior male
relative. These murders are officially classed as criminal offences in Pakistan, but in practice the
authorities allow them to go unpunished”. Similarly, Dr. Tariq Rehman candidly expresses his
opinion on these killings by stating: “These ‘Honour Killings’ are in reality ‘Killings of Dishonour’
and they don’t follow Laws of Islam but Laws of Patriarchy”

Even if one acknowledges the role played by societal elements like the local feudals, mullahs, pirs
in maintaining this unjust system of human suppression, one can place the larger share of the blame
on the State by drawing strength from Bourdieu-1990, who called “State” the geometrical locus of
all perspectives, and a central bank which guarantees all certificates for all (sorts of activities).
Moreover, State does act like a holder of the monopoly of legitimate symbolic violence, as Weber
believed in, and can be endorsed after reviewing the State’s policies and practices in Pakistan,
especially those of the Zia-regime.

Therefore all the violence that was generated in the name of Islam, be it by the societal power
structures; honour killings/violence; routine domestic violence; forced marriages; H a q q
Bakhshwain(marriage to the Quran); cases of blasphemy or targeting of women artists/ classical
and folk dancers was by and large, passively or actively, allowed by the State. They either
legislated with a bias, or they simply decided to ignore the most burning issues related to human
rights abuse and related crime, simply because they didn’t want to upset the power balance that
worked in their favour.

Final Comment

Islam was misused as a tool for exploitation of masses and maintenance of power structures leading
to gross human rights violation, especially those of women, minorities and children in the country.
The state both passively and actively sanctioned this behaviour. Sometimes it allowed mobs on the
street, behind a crazy bearded fellow in the name of religion. Whilst at other times, it skilfully
politicised the legislature and law, for example, ‘Objective-Resolution’ and ‘Had’ud Ordinance’,
existing even after sixteen years of Zia’s death, proving the validity of modernist perspective of
‘State’ being the ‘ultimate authority’ to determine ‘sanctioned behaviour’. It is not the people but
the whole institution of the State that determine and maintains the development of a certain
culture and social behaviour amongst its citizens. A State that can exploit grey areas in history,
decide school curriculum through its elected, non-elected governments, and become a protagonist
in the formation of a collective social psyche for the future generations of a particular country.
Unfortunately, the Muslim Pakistanis have still to discover the unfathomable levels of insight and
vision that Islam may hold for them to serve their own nation and the global community with
justice, fairplay and impartiality.

12
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Panday. G, Occasional Papers on History and Society, Second Series # xxxiii, Reflections on Indian
Renaissance, Centre for Contemporary Studies Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, Teen Murti
House-New Delhi 1990

State Bank of Pakistan, Annual Report 2002-03

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Annex
Reference Chart of Islamisation under Ayub, Bhutto and Zia

# Ruler Years Characteristics/Measures of Islamisation

1 Ayub Khan 1958-69  Modernist brand of Islam
 Rejected stagnation and superstition
 Allocated advisory role to Council of Islamic Ideology
 Established an Islamic Research institute
 Brought in Muslim Family Laws [1961]
 Omitted ‘Islamic’ in the name title of Pakistan in 1962-
Constitution, but due to public pressure did not finalise
it
 Focused on Fiqh and Ijtehad , rejected Taqlid.
2 Z.A.Bhutto 1971-77  Islamic Socialism
 Hosted the Islamic Summit Conference in 1974
 Inclined towards Middle-East
 Encouraged study of Arabic,
 Used phrases like Mussawat-I-Muhammadi[Brotherhood
of Muhammad]
 Initiated a newspaper Mussawat[Brotherhood], giving
Islamic justification of PPP’s policies
 Declared Ahmadis as non-Muslims
 Prohibited alcohol, gambling , and night clubs
 Announced Friday as a weekly holiday
3 Zia-ul-Haq [1977-88]  Nizam-I-Mustafa[Nizam-I-Islam]
 Reconstituted Council of Islamic Ideology giving more
powers
 Imposed Islamic taxes, Zakath-Poor’s-due, Ushr-
agricultural Tax on productive land
 Declared economy free of Riba-interest
 Created Shari’a Bench courts to specify if any law was
repugnant to Islam
 Introduced Islamic laws, outlawing of political parties on
the basis that they were Un-Islamic
 Created Majlis-I-Shoora- Federal Advisory Council
 Imposed strict observance of R a m a d h a n , public
consumption of food and drink, smoking during the
month was punishable by a sentence of up to 06 months,
dance and music productions were banned during
Ramazan
 Brought in laws like Had’ud Ordinance with Qur’anic
punishments of Rajam-stoning to death on adultery, 4etc
 Formed an office of Wafaqi Mohtasib [Ombudsman]
 Established Profit and Loss [PLS]a banking system based
on traditional Islamic banking and believes that both the
depositor and the bank must share the profit and loss
 Replaced English with Urdu in schools
 Introduced compulsory national attire for all performing
in public domain
 Made compulsory, on female announcers to wear a
dupatta over their head, Similarly the air-hostesses were
asked to do it too. Imposed ‘The Pur’dah mentality’, as
Esposito calls it
 Hosted a Conference on Islamisation of knowledge[1982]
 Opened Shari’a College and Islamic University in
Islamabad inviting students from Muslim Ummah

For further information regarding this paper please contact Maleeha Aslam E-mail:
[email protected]

4
Rajam in accordance to a ruling of Shari’a Court has surprisingly been called as something repugnant to
Islam.

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