Interdisciplinary Journal of Information, Know ledge, and Management Volume 3, 2008

Improving Security for SCADA Control Systems

Mariana Hentea
Excelsior College, Albany, NY, USA
[email protected]

Executive Summary
The continuous growth of cyber security threats and attacks including the increasing sophistica-
tion of malware is impacting the security of critical infrastructure, industrial control systems, and
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) control systems. The reliable operation of
modern infrastructures depends on computerized systems and SCADA systems. Since the emer-
gence of Internet and World Wide Web technologies, these systems were integrated with business
systems and became more exposed to cyber threats. There is a growing concern about the security
and safety of the SCADA control systems. The Presidential Decision Directive 63 document es-
tablished the framework to protect the critical infrastructure and the Presidential document of
2003, the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace stated that securing SCADA systems is a na-
tional priority. T he critical infrastructure includes telecommunication, transportation, energy,
banking, finance, water supply, emergency services, government services, agriculture, and other
fundamental systems and services that are critical to the security, economic prosperity, and social
well-being of the public. The critical infrastructure is characterized by interdependencies (physi-
cal, cyber, geographic, and logical) and complexity (collections of interacting components).
Therefore, information security management principles and processes need to be applied to
SCADA systems without exception. Critical infrastructure disruptions can directly and indirectly
affect other infrastructures, impact large geographic regions, and send ripples throughout the na-
tional and global economy. For example, under normal operating conditions, the electric power
infrastructure requires fuels (natural gas and petroleum), transportation, water, banking and fi-
nance, telecommunication, and SCADA systems for monitoring and control.
In this paper, we provide an analysis of key developments, architecture, potential vulnerabilities,
and security concerns including recommendations toward improving security for SCADA control
systems. We discuss the most important issues concerning the security of SCADA systems in-
cluding a perspective on enhancing security of these systems. We briefly describe the SCADA
architecture, and identify the attributes that increase the complexity of these systems including the
key developments that mark the evolution of the SCADA control systems along with the growth
of potential vulnerabilities and security concerns. Then, we provide recommendations toward an
enhanced security for SCADA control systems. More efforts should be planned on reducing the
vulnerabilities and improving the security operations of these systems. It is necessary to address
not only the individual vulnerabilities,
Material published as part of this publication, either on-line or but the breadth of risks that can interfere
in print, is copyrighted by the Informing Science Institute.
P ermission to make digital or paper copy of part or all of these with critical operations.
works for personal or classroom use is granted without fee We describe key requirements and fea-
provided that the copies are not made or distributed for profit
or commercial advantage AND that copies 1) bear this notice tures needed to improve the security of
in full and 2) give the full citation on the first page. It is per- the current SCADA control systems. For
missible to abstract these works so long as credit is given. To example, in assessing the risk for
copy in all other cases or to republish or to post on a server or SCADA systems, use of general meth-
to redistribute to lists requires specific permission and payment
of a fee. Contact [email protected] to request
ods for risk analysis including specific
redistribution permission. conditions and characteristics of a con-

Editor: Kathy Lynch

Improving Security for SCADA Control Systems

trol system need to be applied. Effective risk analysis for SCADA systems requires a unified
definition for mishap and identification of potential harm to safety. As computer systems are
more integrated, the distinction between security and safety is beginning to disappear. In bridging
the gap between these domains, we propose a unified risk framework which combines a new
definition of mishap with an expanded definition of hazard to include the security event.
However, methods for risk management that are based on automated tools and intelligent tech-
niques are more beneficial to SCADA systems because they require minimum or no human inter-
vention in controlling the processes. We also identify a unified security/safety risk framework for
control systems. Implementing security features ensures higher security, reliability, and availabil-
ity of control systems. Thus organizations need to reassess the SCADA control systems and risk
model to achieve in depth defense solutions for these systems. The increasing threats against
SCADA control systems indicate that there should be more directions in the development of these
systems. T herefore, achieving better quality and more secure SCADA control systems is a high
priority.
Information security management principles and processes need to be applied to SCADA systems
without exception. We conclude with a thought about the future of SCADA control systems. A
strategy to deal with cyber attacks against the nation’s critical infrastructure requires first under-
standing the full nature of the threat. A depth defense and proactive solutions to improve the se-
curity of SCADA control systems ensures the future of control systems and survivability of criti-
cal infrastructure.
Ke ywords: industrial control system, SCADA control system, cyber security, critical infrastruc-
ture, requirements, risk management, security framework.

Introduction
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, Distributed Control Systems
(DCS), and other smaller control system configurations including skid-mounted Programmable
Logic Controllers (PLC) are often found in the industrial sectors and critical infrastructures.
These are also known under a general term, Industrial Control System (ICS). A control system is
a device or set of devices to manage, command, direct, or regulate the behavior of other devices
or systems. ICSs are typically used in industries such as electrical, water, oil and gas, and
chemical including experimental and research facilities such as nuclear fusion laboratories. The
reliable operation of modern infrastructures depends on computerized systems and SCADA sys-
tems.
The Presidential Decision Directive 63 document established the framework to protect the critical
infrastructure and the Presidential document of 2003, the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace
stated that securing SCADA systems is a national priority.
The critical infrastructure includes telecommunication, transportation, energy, banking, finance,
water supply, emergency services, government services, agriculture, and other fundamental sys-
tems and services that are critical to the security, economic prosperity, and social well-being of
the public. The critical infrastructure is characterized by interdependencies (physical, cyber, geo-
graphic, and logical) and complexity (collections of interacting components). Cyber interdepend-
encies are a result of the pervasive computerization and automation of infrastructures (Rinaldi,
Peerenboom, & Kelly, 2001). The critical infrastructure disruptions can directly and indirectly
affect other infrastructures, impact large geographic regions, and send ripples throughout the na-
tional and global economy. For example, under normal operating conditions, the electric power
infrastructure requires fuels (natural gas and petroleum), transportation, water, banking and fi-
nance, telecommunication, and SCADA systems for monitoring and control.

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There is a growing concern about the security and safety of the SCADA control systems in terms
of vulnerabilities, lack of protection, and awareness (Byres & Franz, 2005; Byres, Hoffman &
Kube, 2006). T herefore, information security management principles and processes need to be
applied to SCADA systems without exception.
This paper provides a relevant analysis of most important issues and a perspective on enhancing
security of these systems. The rest of this paper is organized in sections as follows: next section
provides an overview of the SCADA architecture. Then, in the following section, we describe
key developments that mark the evolution of the SCADA control systems along with the increase
of potential vulnerabilities and security concerns. In the next section, we provide recommenda-
tions toward an enhanced security for SCADA control systems. We describe key requirements
and features needed to improve the security of the current SCADA control systems. We conclude
with a thought about the future of SCADA control systems.

SCADA Architecture
A SCADA system is a common process automation system which is used to gather data from
sensors and instruments located at remote sites and to transmit data at a central site for either con-
trol or monitoring purposes. The collected data is usually viewed on one or more SCADA host
computers located at the central or master site. Based on information received from remote
stations, automated or operator-driven supervisory commands can be pushed to remote station
control devices, which are often referred to as field devices.
Generally, a SCADA system includes the following components:
• Instruments that sense process variables
• Operating equipment connected to instruments
• Local processors that collect data and communicate with the site’s instruments and operating
equipment called Programmable Logic Controller (PLC), Remote T erminal Unit (RT U), In-
telligent Electronic Device (IED), or Process Automation Controller (PAC)
• Short range communications between local processors, instruments, and operating equip-
ment
• Host computers as central point of human monitoring and control of the processes, storing
databases, and display of statistical control charts, and reports. Host computers are also
known as Master T erminal Unit (MTU), the SCADA server, or a PC with Human Machine
Interface (HMI)
• Long range communications between local processors and host computers using wired
and/or wireless network connections.
SCADA systems differ from DCSs (Distributed Control Systems) which are generally found in
plant sites. While DCSs cover the plant site, SCADA systems cover much larger geographic ar-
eas. Also, due to the remoteness many of these often require the use of wireless communications.
Figure 1 shows an integrated SCADA architecture.
SCADA architecture supports T CP/IP, UDP or other IP-based communications protocols as well
as strictly industrial protocols such as Modbus T CP, Modbus over T CP or Modbus over UDP, all
working over private radio, cellular or satellite networks.

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Improving Security for SCADA Control Systems

RTU RT U RTU
SCADA Host
Int ernet ,Wid e-Area Network

SCADA Node
SCADA Node
RTU RTU RT U
SCADA Host LAN
RT U RTU RTU

LAN

SCADA Hos t SCADA Node

Legend
RTU RT U
Field
Instrument s

SCADA Node

RT U

Figure 1. Integrated SCADA Architecture

In complex SCADA architectures, there is a variety of both wired and wireless media and proto-
cols involved in getting data back to the central monitoring site. T his enables implementation of
powerful IP-based SCADA networks over mixed cellular, satellite, and landline systems. SCADA
communications can employ a diverse range of both wired (lease line, dialup line, fiber, ADSL,
cable) and wireless media (licensed radio, spread spectrum, cellular, WLAN, or satellite). The
choice depends on a number of factors that characterize the existing communication infrastruc-
ture. Factors such as existing communications infrastructure, available communications at the
remote sites, data rates and polling frequency, remoteness of site, installation budget and ability
to accommodate future needs, all impact the final decision for SCADA architecture. In the fol-
lowing section, we discuss key issues in the development of SCADA systems. Therefore, a re-
view of SCADA systems evolution allows us to better understand many security concerns.

SCADA Evolution and Security Issues Escalation

A real world SCADA system can monitor and control hundreds to hundreds of thousands of I/O
points. SCADA systems evolve rapidly and are now penetrating the market with a number of I/O
channels from 100 K up to near 1 M I/O channels currently under development. DataMonitor, a
market research firm, predicted growth of revenue from sales of control systems software with a
rate from 3.5 to 4 percent per year through 2009 (Geer, 2006).
SCADA systems evolved from hardware and software in the 1970s to current systems that in-
clude standard PCs and operating systems, T CP/IP communications, and Internet access. Security
of control systems became a concern issue since the advent of Internet and the rise in terrorist

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threats. In addition, the LANs that these architectures use raise a new set of security concerns,
leading to the introduction of features such as encrypted data sets and dedicated access mecha-
nisms in information assurance applications. In the following, we provide a summary of the most
important developments of the SCADA control systems.
In the past, control systems were isolated from other Information Technology (IT ) systems. Con-
nection to the Internet is new (early 1990s) and debatable among specialists. Many specialists
agree that exposing control systems to the Internet is not a good idea. However, without any con-
nection to the Internet these systems are still vulnerable to external or internal attackers that can
exploit vulnerabilities in software such as operating systems, custom and vendor software, data
storage software, databases, and applications.
These systems evolved from static to dynamic systems. The increased connectivity to Internet and
mobile device technology has also a major impact on control systems architectures. Standardiza-
tion and use of open market technologies are current requirements in control systems. Modern
products are often based on component architectures using commercial off-the-shelf products
(COT S) elements as units. This architecture leads to control systems that “ are becoming very
complex software applications” with the following characteristics (Sanz & Arzen, 2003):
• T ime critical
• Embedded
• Fault T olerant
• Distributed
• Intelligent
• Large
• Open
• Heterogeneous.
SCADA systems are exposed to the same cyberspace threats as any business system because they
share the common vulnerabilities with the traditional Information Technology (IT ) systems. Also,
most SCADA systems are not protected with appropriate security safeguards. T he operating per-
sonnel is lacking the security training and awareness. Threats against SCADA systems are ranked
high in the list of government concerns, since terrorists have threatened to attack several SCADA
systems of critical infrastructure (Dacey, 2003) and successfully launched near-disastrous attacks.
In addition, recent attacks are becoming more sophisticated and the notion of what kind of vul-
nerabilities actually matter is constantly changing. For example, timing attacks are now common
threats, whereas only a few years ago they were considered exotic. The threats are often poorly
understood and ignored, and the vast majority of organizations lag in realizing secure infrastruc-
tures. In complexly interactive systems whose elements are tightly coupled, great accidents are
inevitable. Vulnerabilities and attacks could be at different levels – software controlling or con-
trolled device, application, storage, data access, LAN, enterprise, Internet, communications.
SCADA systems are now adopting Web technology (ActiveX, Java, etc.) and OPC (as a means
for communicating internally between the client and server modules). However, Web applications
are an interesting target for cyber attacks that are increasingly automated. Web is the dominant
development platform for software, but Web-based secure software is immature. In an average
month, Web vulnerabilities accounted for 61% of the total vulnerabilities counted during that
month of 2006 (Andrews, 2006). New spectrum of Web worms with a high level of sophistication
that exploit vulnerabilities in Web applications are growing fast since 2004, when the first worms
propagated themselves via blog links (Holz, Marechal, & Raynal, 2006).

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All SCADA systems are based on common software that has one or more vulnerabilities.
SCADA systems used to run on DOS, VMS and UNIX based operating systems. Lately, several
vulnerabilities were discovered and corrected for the UNIX based operating systems. Although
UNIX used to be dominant for SCADA systems, now UNIX systems are often displaced by
Linux and Microsoft Windows platforms with new versions of Windows operating system up-
dated every few years. These changes increased the threats against SCADA systems and a need
for more awareness. The reaction to these new challenges is diverse. Plant people expect their
software to run for years without major modification, and certainly without change in operating
system. SCADA vendors release one major version and one to two additional minor versions per
year. T hus, these products evolve very rapidly so as to take advantage of new market opportuni-
ties, to meet new requirements of their customers, and to take advantage of new technologies.
It is well known that Linux and Microsoft Windows have their own set of vulnerabilities. One
factor is the huge number of lines of code for an operating system. Recent studies of software
reliability estimate that a Linux kernel may have approximately 15,000 bugs for the Linux kernel
that has more than 2.5 million lines of code. At the other end, Windows XP has at least double
the number of vulnerabilities since its kernel is more than twice as large as the Linux kernel. It
has been demonstrated that bugs in the operating systems do more damage than the bugs in appli-
cation programs (Tanenbaum, Herder, & Bos, 2006). These vulnerabilities are serious concerns
because of the 90 percent concentration of Microsoft Windows operating systems for computers.
The total number of vulnerabilities logged by organizations in 2006 was 8064, an increase of 35
percent from the previous year (Erickson, 2007).
Besides sec urity concerns, the computer systems including SCADA control systems raise the is-
sue of safety causing harm and catastrophic damage when they fail to support applications as in-
tended (Dunn, 2003). In January 2003, the Slammer worm infected the safety monitoring systems
at the Davis-Besse nuclear plant in US. In 2003, two hackers gained access to control technology
for the US’s Amundsen-Scott South Pole Station which ran life-support technology for scientists.
This attack disabled the safety monitoring system for nearly five hours (Poulsen, 2003). The in-
famous breach of SCADA for Maroochy water system in Australia (Gellman, 2002) plagued the
wastewater system for two months. This caused a leak of hundreds of thousands of gallons of pu-
trid sludge into parks, rivers, and private properties as a result of which marine life died, the creek
water turned black and the stench was unbearable for residents.
The reality is that a growing number of worms and viruses spread by exploiting software design,
operations, and human interfaces. The software-intensive system design skills for the construc-
tion of control systems are often misunderstood. In the control industry, two separate groups of
engineers are typically involved in the development of any nontrivial controller: control engineers
and programmers. These two groups tend to have very different perspectives and working prac-
tices, and both lack the global picture needed for the task (Rinaldi et al., 2001). In addition, cyber
attacks exploit vulnerabilities previously not modeled or unknown to a system. SCADA net-
works were initially designed with little attention to security. SCADA networks traditionally
used de dicated telephone lines to send control messages to field devices from the control station
and get the current status of the field equipment. However, the modern SCADA networks, inte-
grated with corporate networks and the Internet, have become far more vulnerable to unauthor-
ized cyber attacks putting the national infrastructures at risk and easy targets of attacks by terror-
ists. By sending a false control message from a computer connected to the Internet, an unauthor-
ized intruder can manipulate traffic signals, electric-power switching stations, chemical process-
control systems, or sewage-water valves, creating major concerns to public safety and health.
Although several documents can make the security evaluation task more efficient and effective,
there are no obvious magic-bullet solutions. The worst is that these documents can be used by
hackers to refine their own attack techniques.

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Recently, the US National Infrastructure Assurance Council Initiative (NIAC) for the Common
Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) was published in 2005 as a first generation open scoring
system designed to address a framework for assessing and quantifying consistent scores that ac-
curately represent the impact of software vulnerabilities. Several other databases contain informa-
tion about vulnerabilities for IT systems, but there is not so much information provided for
SCADA systems. While the exact number of cyber attacks against control systems is not known
because many enterprises will not tell the public, a few recent cyber attacks and vulnerabilities
are disclosed for SCADA systems. In 2005, CERT posted for the first time a few vulnerabilities
for SCADA systems (CERT SCADA, 2007), although many more vulnerabilities are reported via
other reports and sources (Byres et al., 2006; Geer, 2006). Although CVSS is an emerging stan-
dard, it has some limitations. CVSS generates consistent scores for vulnerabilities in the context
of software flaws only (Scarfone & Romanosky, 2006) thus leaving other vulnerabilities un-
counted.
On the other hand, risk management for SCADA control systems is not a common practice and it
is not based on a unique standard to follow. Several methods for risk assessment are emerging
(Vidalis & Jones, 2003). Risk management challenges include limitations of these methods, un-
trained and unskilled developers in business management and organizational areas, various classi-
fications and non unique taxonomies of vulnerabilities. In the following section, we discuss re-
quirements and enhancing features that should be provided to improve the security and safety of
SCADA systems. Also, we suggest a unified security/safety risk framework.

Toward Improving Security

Internet and global e-business application requirements demand that companies increasingly im-
plement computing infrastructures specifically designed for at least 99.999 percent availability.
This is the equivalent of less than 5.3 minutes of downtime a year. This is also a requirement for
the SCADA networks. In response to these trends, government and SCADA owners need to ad-
dress increased security and support for high availability.
Lately, the government, NIST , academia, and several SCADA vendors have initiated a strategy to
support SCADA security. The CVSS NM- SIG for network monitoring is discussing the Informa-
tion Systems and SCADA risks (Leivesley, 2005). In addition, the Control Systems Security
Event Monitoring (SEM) Working Group at Process Control Systems Forum (PCSF) is working
on a method to regularly collect statistics from SCADA and DCS networks that are being moni-
tored for cyber security events. SEM’s mission is to accelerate the design, development, and
deployment of more secure control and legacy systems. Another goal is quantifying the threat for
use in risk calculations (PCSF, 2006). However, more information about SCADA vulnerabilities
should be provided on these documents.
More efforts should be planned to reduce the vulnerabilities and improve the security operations
of these systems. It is necessary to address not only the individual vulnerabilities, but the breadth
of risks that can interfere with critical operations.
Hans-Jurgen Weidemann (Conference Reports, 2006) stressed the complexity of control systems
and greater need of compliance for safety, quality of service, and security of systems and data.
SCADA sec urity design and information security management can be improved by applying a
wide range of control principles and methods as well productivity control, involving decision
making under uncertainty with increased levels of decision support. Therefore, the improvements
for SCADA security have to be broad - at the systems level - and detailed - at the component
level. We discuss the most important issues for improving the security in the next subsection.

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Key Requirements
Based on the analysis of the past and current developments, we identified key requirements and
features that can improve the security of control systems as follows:

Critical path protection

It is mandatory to protect the critical components from cyber attacks. An approach to security
evaluation for the identification of critical components is discussed in Rae, Fidge, and Wildman
(2006). In control systems, a component failure greatly increases the likelihood of multiple simul-
taneous failures. Also, the high-speed of SCADA networks facilitates the quick propagation of
malicious code.

Stronger safety policies and procedures

Solutions for preventing the attacks are becoming more important to enterprises and software
vendors. T he best first steps recommended for preventing attacks against control systems are in-
creased awareness of potential vulnerabilities and solutions, as well as implementing stronger
safety policies and procedures. It is essential that every enterprise is taking security seriously
when developing software, or managing the control systems.

Knowledge management
Organization need to build a strategy that supports knowledge management and training compe-
tencies. Security knowledge is likely to include policy, standards, design and attack patterns,
threat models, code samples, reference architecture, and secure development framework (Steven,
2006).

System development skills

Specific issues need to be addressed by SCADA systems developers. First, the evaluation of the
software is crucial. Software plays an increasingly important role in all types of controllers in
SCADA systems. Developers of control systems require programming skills in addition to engi-
neering skills to be able to understand the broad picture and detailed control problems. A com-
mon perspective and security solution to the control systems is essential in the design of these
systems. New approaches and skills for software development of distributed control systems ar-
chitectures are required to ensure that software is stable and reliable to avoid hazard conditions
(Heck, Wills, & Vatchtsevanos, 2003). Control methods are essential in distributed software de-
velopment and E-commerce applications (Hellerstein, Diao, Parekh, & T ilbury, 2005).

Enhanced security for device

Since real-time applications alone may never be capable of addressing all security requirements,
incorporating security features into a device can further enhance system security. Individual de-
vices erect their own security perimeters and defend their own critical resources, such as a net-
work link or storage media (Cummings, 2002). Although protecting code in embedded systems is
sometimes a business decision, a company must weigh the cost of implementation of protection
versus the potential loss of service revenue when the vulnerabilities are discovered (Fisher, 2000).

Sensor networks solutions

Security and privacy challenges will require new technological solutions for sensor networks.
Sensor networks implementations include monitoring factory instrumentation, pollution levels,
etc. Sensor networks consist of hundreds or thousands of sensor nodes. Each node represents a
potential point of attack. However securing each node is impractical. Sensor detectors offer one

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defense against attacks and have the capability to differentiate between the transmissions of au-
thorized and unauthorized sensor networks and other devices (Chan & Perrig, 2003).

Operating system based on microkernel architecture

A more radical method of developing operating systems software based on microkernel architec-
ture to limit the number of lines of code and implicitly the number of bugs is recommended in
T anenbaum et al. (2006). The microkernel technique was used in the past to develop dedicated
operating systems for process computer control (Hentea, Balla, Balla, & Rosu, 1978; Soceneantu,
Hentea, Balla, Balla, & Rosu, 1978). This technique might be making a comeback to its poten-
tially higher reliability.

Increasing quality of software with security features

Companies such as Klockwork consider that software security is an important and growing aspect
of software quality for control systems (Klockwork, 2007). New products are developed to nor-
malize the events in SCADA application logs that are not understood or used in security monitor-
ing. T he products from DigitalBond Inc. (DigitalBond, 2007) can detect the security events and
provide the pattern a Security Event Monitoring (SEM) can use for SCADA systems.

Security requirements early in the software development cycle

Saydjari (2002) recommends developing a top-down architecture and engineered approach to the
problem because current technology is insufficient to defend against cyber warfare. Developing
requirements for control systems with security features and use of simulation models based on a
framework could improve the definition of requirements and reveal problems early in the soft-
ware development cycle (Menzies & Richardson, 2006).

Compliance to standards for software development

Control software development can be improved by following documents such as NIST published
guidelines SCADA Security (SCADA Security, 2006), NIST Configuration (NIST Configuration,
2005), NIST Guidelines (NIST Guidelines, 2006), general assessment methods and tools for
SCADA vulnerabilities (IDAHO Assessment, 2005), and Holzman’s rules (Holzmann, 2006).

Integration of different technologies

New language s and platforms such as Java, C#, and CORBA are promising increased ease of use,
portability, and safety and contribute to making heterogeneous distributed control system plat-
forms possible. Low-level, real-time technology needs to be combined with high-level aspects,
such as programming, networking, security, simulation, and control.

Vulnerability analysis based on proactive, discovery, and adaptation

solutions
A changing vulnerability and threat landscape and continuing requirements for compliance are
the main drivers for vulnerability management programs to expand. In addition, a strategy to deal
with cyber attacks against the nation’s critical infrastructure requires first understanding the full
nature of the threat.
Vulnerability analysis must focus on identifying (and reducing) the vulnerability of engineered
systems to both natural (e.g., weather-related) and man-made (e.g., sabotage, terrorism) disrup-
tions. This implies new tasks related to conceptual and methodological development of risk and
vulnerability research in vulnerability modeling, cause mitigation analysis and process compo-
nent definition including risk and vulnerability assessments for SCADA networks. Also, the focus

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should be in the development of tools that can provide discovery and training on vulnerability and
adaptation. Currently, several vulnerabilities are modeled based on heuristics. In protecting
against an attack and maintaining continuous operation, research must focus in vulnerability
management.
Vulnerability management consists of a combination of technologies and processes to improve
security posture. T argeted threats drive the need for more effective and proactive infrastructure
protection solutions. A control system should monitor for cyber attack activities and automati-
cally generate patches to protect an application source code and identify new vulnerabilities
(Keromythis, 2004). This assumes that an analysis engine can identify the potential vector attack
from the information collected in real time and discover new vulnerabilities.
Vulnerabilities in software (bugs and flaws) can be grouped together by central characteristics
and give rise to particular attack patterns (Hoglund & McGraw, 2004). This is based on the prem-
ise that related programming errors give rise to similar exploit techniques. A particular exploit
usually amounts to the extension of a standard attack pattern to a new target. An attack pattern is
a blue print for exploiting software vulnerability. Solutions such as identifying attack patterns to
provide general descriptions of vulnerabilities are discussed in (Gegick & Williams, 2005;
Jiwnami & Zelkowitz, 2002).

Innovative risk management approaches

Information security management is a continual cyclical process comprised of key phases such as
assessment (risk management approach), policy, implementation, training, and auditing. Risk
management characterizes an overall process to identify, measure, control, and minimize losses
associated with uncertain events or risks. The first phase, called risk assessment, includes analyz-
ing assets, identifying vulnerabilities and potential risks due to threats, risk reducing measures,
and decisions related to the acceptance, avoidance, or transfer of risk. Risk assessment character-
izes both the process and the result of analyzing and assessing risk. The second phase includes the
process of assigning priority to, budgeting, implementing, and maintaining appropriate risk-
reducing measures. General models for managing risk through its various phases are available for
IT systems (Craft, Wyss, Vandewart, & Funkhouser, 1998; Glavin, 2003). However, methods for
risk management that are based on automated tools (Ozier, 1999), and intelligent techniques are
more beneficial to SCADA systems because they require minimum or no human intervention in
controlling the processes (Hentea, 2006).
The key issue in managing the risk is reducing the vulnerabilities and causes of the vulnerabili-
ties. A vulnerability is a problem that can be exploited by an attacker. To measure risk in a sys-
tem, it is necessary to identify the vulnerabilities, threats, and asset values. In assessing the risk
for SCADA systems, use of general methods for risk analysis including specific conditions and
characteristics of a control system need to be applied.
Another important issue is applying vulnerability management life cycle that offers guidance on
design and operational processes and technologies needed to find and remediate security weak-
nesses before they are exploited. It is imperative to analyze risk as a function of asset value, threat
and vulnerability. New concepts to analyze the threats and vulnerabilities have to be applied regu-
larly and uniformly. Methods for SCADA security risk analysis based on combining concepts of
vulnerability tree analysis, fault tree analysis, attack tree analysis, and the cause-consequence are
discussed in (Hentea, 2008; Patel, Graham, & Ralston, 2006).

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Ensure authentication, confidentiality, integrity, availability, and non-

repudiation
Security of SCADA control systems must ensure far more than the confidentiality of information
in transit. It must also ensure that only authorized parties have access to such information, a task
that will require abuse-resistant methods for identifying such parties. In the information security
context, the SCADA control systems require features that support key security concepts such as
authentication, authorization, confidentiality, integrity, availability, and non repudiation. Also,
control protocols should be improved to include security features.

Calculate risk as impact to security and safety

Effective risk analysis for SCADA systems requires a unified definition for mishap and identifi-
cation of potential harm to safety. As computer systems are more integrated, the distinction be-
tween security and safety is beginning to disappear. In bridging the gap between these domains,
we propose a unified risk framework which combines a new definition of mishap with an ex-
panded definition of hazard to include the security event. We modify the unified definition for
mishap described in Stoneburner (2006) by including the hazard due to security event in a model
depicted in Figure 2. The figure shows the unified security/safety risk framework. Also, the figure
shows that the risk should be calculated as impact of hazard multiplied by likelihood of mishap
event.

Figure 2. Unifie d se curity frame work

Nanotechnology: Promise in the future

Nanotechnology can help in building security applications (Arazi, 2006), however research and
results in these directions are far away.

Conclusion
Implementing security features as those described above ensures higher security, reliability, and
availability of control systems. T hus organizations need to reassess the SCADA control systems
and risk model to achieve in depth defense solutions for these systems. The increasing threats

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against SCADA control systems indicate that there should be more directions in the development
of these systems. The above analysis sugge sts that achieving better quality and more secure
SCADA control systems is a high priority.
However, a strategy to deal with cyber attacks against the nation’s critical infrastructure requires
first understanding the full nature of the threat. A depth defense and proactive solutions to im-
prove the security of SCADA control systems ensures the future of control systems and surviv-
ability of critical infrastructure. However, “ what the future brings depends on two factors: avail-
able technology and societal concern” (Bell, Dooling & Fouke, 1999). Perrow (2006) said that
“the public is unaware of our basic (US) vulnerabilities in the chemical industry, electric power
industry including nuclear plants.”

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Biography
Mariana Hentea is a Faculty and Director of Academic Programs at
Excelsior College, Albany, New York, USA. She is a member of ISI,
IEEE, ACM, ISCA, IRMA, CSI, (ISC)²® , and SWE. She received a
MS and Ph.D. in Computer Science from the Illinois Institute of T ech-
nology at Chicago, and a B.S. in Electrical Engineering and MS in
Computer Engineering from Polytechnic Institute of T imisoara, Roma-
nia. She has published papers in a broad spectrum of computer soft-
ware and engineering applications for telecommunications, steel, and
chemical industries. Mariana engineered networks and security systems
for telecommunications industry and government. Also, she has been
involved in the research and development of novel products based on
various telecommunications technologies such as AT M switch, Voice
over IP, wireless, broadband access (xDSL, cable), network management, and residential gate-
way. Her research focuses in computer and network security, network design and architecture,
wireless technologies, multimedia systems, home networking, broadband access, and use of Arti-
ficial Intelligence techniques for information security management, intrusion and prevention sys-
tems, risk management, network management, quality of service, and computer process control in
manufacturing.

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