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Reason and Reasoning in Ibn azm of Cordova (d. 1064) Author(s): Josep Puig Montada Source: Studia Islamica, No. 92 (2001), pp. 165-185 Published by: Maisonneuve & Larose Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1596196 Accessed: 13/02/2010 16:25
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2001 Studia Islamica,

Reason and Reasoning in Ibn Hazm of Cordova (d. 1064)

we In viewing Ibn Hazm's huge and diverse literaryproduction, are not certainhow we ought to classify him, using the standard categories.He is a and a a Koranexpert,a traditionist, theologian, historian, aboveall, a polemicist. he Western But shouldwe askanycultivated reader, wouldanswerourquestion of by sayingthatIbn Hazmis a psychologistsince he is the author the Dove's into on Necklace- a treatise love andits symptoms whichhas beentranslated many modem languages and made widely known.(') We arrive at a very differentview when we pay attentionto the main concern of many of Ibn and Hazm'swritings, especiallyof his trilogythatconsistsof theFisalfi l-milal and m wa-l-ahwa'wa-n-nihal Al-Ihki li-usuil al-ahkam,(3) Al-Muhallabi-l(), bi-l-ikhtisar. All threeworksdeal withreligiousand (4) atharfi sharhal-mujalla juridicalsubjectsin the purestIslamicway and reveal to us Ibn Hazm's vital of concernfor the theoryandpractice Islamas the truerevealedreligion. are the Whereasthe Muhalladeals withjurisprudence, Fisal and the Ihkdm of the theoreticalworks that will help us to understand fundamentals his doctrine. Hazmwrotethelhkdmafterthe Fisal, bothworkscomplementing Ibn Islamas the only truereligionand each other.In theFisal, IbnHazmestablishes of shows the inconsistency otherreligionsas well as the sects thatdeviatefrom whichhe identifieswithhis own Zfhiriteschool.In fact,fora sound, orthodoxy, us completeknowledgeof Islamhe recommends to startby readinghis logical to li-hud&d handbook,Taqnrb al-mantiq,(5) follow with the partof the Fisal
London, 1953. (1) English translations A.R. Nykl, Paris, 1931 and A.J.Arberry, by (2) The Distinctionsregardingthe Religions and the MuslimSects, 5 vols. in 3 parts.Cairo, 1321/1903; de by reprinted1400/1980. Spanishtranslation M. Asin Palacios,Abenhdzam Cordobay su historia cr?tica de las ideas religiosas, 5 vols. Madrid,1927-32; reprinted1984. (3) The Accuracyfor the Foundationsof the Judgements,ed. AhmadM. Shakir,Cairo, 1345-48/1926-28 in 8 parts.Reprinted by I. san 'Abbas,8 partsin two volumes, Beirut, 1403/1983, with a shortintroduction. Zakariya 'A. Yfsuf reedited Shakir's text in 2 volumes and continuous page numbering(Cairo,n.d.). Quotationshere follow this edition. (4) The Ornament the Traditions,ed. AhmadM. Shakir, 11 vols. Cairo, 1351/1933; reprintn.d. of (5) An Approachto Logical Definitions,ed. Ihsan 'Abbas,Beirut, 1959, 2" edition in Ras 'il Ibn Hazm, vol. 4 (Beirut, 1983), pp. 93-356. Ibn Hazm summarizes in his Taqrtb the Eisagoge of Porphyrios,and Prior and Posterior Analytics - he unifies both books underthe Aristotle's Categories, On Interpretation, headingof. burhdn-, Rhetoricand Poetics.

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aboutGod,His unity,His messageand devotedto the haqd'iq,thetruedoctrine His messenger,andto end with theIhkdm. (6) 1. Scriptural text versus reasoning? Thereare two themesthatrunthroughIbn Hazm's writings:the necessity for demonstrative proofsand the convictionthatZahirismis the only school thattrulyrepresents Islam.The Zahiriteschool was foundedby Abu Sulaimian Da'wufd Khalaf(815/8-884), whom J. Schachtdescribedas "an extreme Ibn of Thus, at first representative the tendencyhostile to humanreasoning."(7) contradiction betweenIbnHazm'sdoubleadherence sightthereis an apparent to Zahirismand to logical reasoning.I wantto face this issue by focussingon whatZahirismmeansfor IbnHazmandon the dimensionsthatreasonreaches in his system. According to Ibn Hazm, wheneverGod commandssomething,He gives us the power to achieve it,(8)and thus God has endowed men with different capacitiesand powersso thatmen can achieve the aims which He has set for them. If God imposes on us such an intellectualduty as logical reasoning,he does it because He has bestowed on us the reason or intelligence ('aql) needed to comply with this duty.Ibn Hazmquotes the Koranicphrase:"God and says that men are endowed enjoins justice, kindness and charity",(9) with various capacities in order to fulfill this command. Among these capacities is reason which Ibn Hazm describeshere: Reason soul and obligesthediscerning to make justiceprevail to choose that which the sound mind indicates,and to have beliefs which are and themwiththetongue withthemovements and of knowledge to express the bodywhichareactions. soul accordingly The the strengthens capacity thatis reason thatreason thepowerto resistbeingmovedawayfrom so has thetruth, to reject towards that and whatignorance passions (') and lead. The Koraniccommandto use our intelligence obviously intendsto use it as a guide for ouractionsandreligiousbeliefs. In fact, IbnHazmaffirmsthat the whole purpose of the lhkam is to overcome the doctrinal divisions among Muslims and establishone faith.(1) Reasoningplays a decisive role in his strugglefor a unitarian doctrinewhich identifieswith truescience. Ibn Hazm gives us also details how reasonreaches scientific knowledge ('ilm):
referenceto the Fisal on p. 94: 3 and 1148: 6-7. (6) Ihkdm,p. 657: 21-25. Further (7) Encyclopediaof Islam,2 ed. vol. 2 (Leiden, 1965) s.v. Dawid Ibn Khalaf. (8) Ihkdm,p. 61: 23. Ibn Hazmuses the termtd 'a to designatean effective power, which in a propersense only God possesses. of (9) Ihkam,p. 5: 19-20, Koran, 16: 92, English translation N.J. Dawood, London 1956. (10) Ihkam,p. 6: 13-16, my translation.In similarterms, Fisal, vol. 5, p. 125: 23, defines reason as the capacity (qawa) thatthe soul possesses to differentiatethings accordingto theiressences. (11) hkdm, p. 10:18-11: 3.

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There is no way to scientific knowledge but by these two directions:the one is what intuitive knowledge by the mind and immediateperceptionby the senses cause us [to know], the other is the premises that go back to intuitive knowledge and directperception. (12) Ibn Hazm sets up a theory of knowledge at the bottom of which intuitive knowledge and immediate sense perception lie. He does not explain in this passage what constitutes intuitive knowledge but it is no doubt related to what he stated in an early passage of the Ihkam when commenting on how we know that reasoning is rightly carried out. He raised there the question of how we know that knowledge resulting from argumentation is true and gave following answer: We realize that what the intelligence causes us to know is right in an immediate and instantaneousway. There is no delay between the first moment of our understanding our knowledge. As soon as we understand and it, we know that the whole is bigger than the part,and thatevery individual is differentfrom each other, and that the same thing cannot stand and sit at the same time.(13) Upon this layer of primary knowledge there is a second one of premises, and in a third place, a layer of complex reasoning that makes us certain of the Islamic dogmas: God's unity and uniqueness, Muhammad's mission and the Koran's authenticity. God has decided that we obtain this knowledge through argumentation (muhajja), by means of conclusive arguments (hujja qati'a). (4) In the Koran Ibn Hazm finds the command to employ logical reasoning when it encourages friendly discussion as a mean to conversion. (15) He even affirms that God does not want us to accept any conclusion unless based on a demonstrative proof (burhdn). (16) At the beginning of the Ihkdm Ibn Hazm defines burhan as "any sentence or sentences showing a true judgment passed on something", (7) but his words need further explanation. In its original form burhan should be identified with the Aristotelian apodeixis (demonstration) as it is taught in Ibn Hazm's Taqrib. (8) According to Aristotle, ap6deixis is "a syllogism which produces scientific knowledge"
(12) Ihkdm,p. 59: 16-17. (13) Ihkdm,p. 17: 1-3. That thereis no action without an agent is another"principleof reason",Fisal, vol. 1, p. 6: 6. (14) lhkdm,pp. 20-23. Reason (15) Ihkdm,p. 20: 2-4: "Callmen to the path of your Lordwith wisdom and kindly exhortation. with them in the most courteousmanner.Your Lordbest knows those who stray from His pathandthose who are rightly guided" (Koran 16: 126). (16) Ihkdm,p. 23: 1-2. (17) lhkdm, p. 37: 7. Sometimesdaltl, proof, is synonymousof burhdn,Ihkdmp. 37: 8-9. ed. (18) Taqrib,pp. 105-203; 2"d Rasb'il, pp. 218-350.

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(An. Post. 71 b 17) and the premisses of such syllogism must be "true, primary, immediate, better known than, prior to, and causative to the conclusion"(71 b 21-22). However, Ibn Hazm does not stick to the originalmeaningof ap6deixis. We can betterunderstand what burhdnis for him if we listen to Ibn Hazm when refuting qiyas, "analogy", which usually means syllogism in philosophical texts. For Ibn Hazm, qiyas is "to pass a judgment on something about which there is no text, based on its similarity (shibh) to something else [in a text]".(9) The Koran,for instance, forbidseating pork meat (6: 145), but how is it with its fat? All legal schools except Zahirism agree that, by analogy, pork fat is also forbidden,but Ibn Hazm shows that there is no analogy between the fat and the meat of any animal.(20) Fat to a sort (jins) differentfrom meat, but these people do not know belongs what genus, species anddifferencesare.(21)Ibn Hazm consequentlysustains that true knowledge must derive from the natureof beings, and not from accidentalaspects. Since similaritycan be merely an accidentalfeaturethat two objects share,reasoningby analogycan lead not only to differentresults conclusions. Thus, for according to each school but even to contradictory Ibn Hazm analogy is mostly a negative form of knowledge, and he is ready to accept it only if it there is no contradictionto the conclusion, because analogy producesajudgmentaboutsomething,for which thereis no text, on the basis of a judgment about something, for which there is scriptural text.(22) Ibn Hazm disclaims the use of analogy in religious matters,arguingthe He falsity of this way of proceeding in the final part of the Ihlhkm.(23) interpretsthe Koranso as to find its rejectiontheretoo. (24) On the rejection of analogy Ibn Hazm agrees with Zihirism and opposes the three main schools of theology: Shafi'ism and the majority of Milikism, and He Hanafism.(25) goes so far as to considerqiyas as a forbiddeninnovation, by arguingthat the Companionsof the Prophetwere of one view in regard to all kinds of subjects and yet had no need for analogy to decide which view was better than another. The use of analogy "was improperly introducedin the second centuryof Islam, spreadover and yet gained the After the Greeksophists,Ibn Hazmdoes in upperhand the thirdcentury."(6) not know of anybodywhosejudgementsare more false thanthe followers of analogy. They do not use reason;they claim thatif a thing A is forbiddenor permittedby Islamic law, anotherthing B, despite being of a differentkind
(19) Ihkdm,p. 40: 24 - 41: 1. (20) Ihktdm, 966. Zahirismclaims thatit is forbiddenonly because of universalconsensus (ijmd') p. (21) Ihkdm,p. 1032. (22) Ihklm, p. 1006: 22-23. (23) Chapter38, pp. 929-1109, and to a largeextent chapter39, pp. 1110-1170. (24) Ihkdm,pp. 952: 11 - 953: 1. (25) See Ihkdm,pp. 920: 4 - 921: 1, or 1044: 19 - 26, for variouskinds of qiyls these schools admit. (26) Ihkrm,p. 1026: 8-9.

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too (nawe), is forbiddenor permitted becauseof some similaritytheybelieve to see with A. If grainsof wheat (burr)are declaredunlawful,for instance,
by analogy acorns are too. (27)

Should they use reason, they would refrain from any analogical judgement.IbnHazmraises the question:Whatis the differencebetweenthe pig and the ram? No one, but God declared the pig illicit, and the ram, licit.(28) ThereforeGod cannoturge upon us to consideranalogy,andcompel reasonto know whatit cannotknow. IbnHazmends his plea againstanalogy with these words: "Analogyis an error,is a sin, is a heresy, and nobody is
allowed to make use of it for religious judgements."
(29)

To know more aboutburhanwe may know look at the Muhall, because Ibn Hazm always calls burhanthe argumentwith which he underpins each of his assertions there, and draw an instance from this book. The first chapter of the Muhalla begins with the duty of shahada, the public confession of Muslim faith: There is no other divinity than God, and is Muhammad His messenger.The proofs Ibn Hazm submitscome fromthe Muhammadan traditions (hadith)and among them is one going back to Abu Huraira,who heardMuhammad say:
I have received the commandto fight againstthe people until they testify that there is no other divinity than God and until they believe in me and in that which I have broughtto them.(30)

The argumentis not syllogistic, and the commandto fight contradicts the passage we saw above, where Muhammadpreached friendly disputation (Koran 16: 92) and nevertheless,Ibn Hazm considersit to be burhan.In fact, he is ready to accept a wide range of argumentsexcept for those employed by the rival schools of jurisprudence,and based on analogy, which he unveils as completely useless. Therefore he justifies his adherence to Z.hirism precisely because it is the only school thatuses reason, 'aql in the right manner, and procuresaccordingly true knowledge, 'ilm.(31) For Ibn Hazm only Z.hirism complies with the basic rules of thought;it does not admit a judgment about the same thing that is different for two different people or in two differenttimes, and he gives an astoundingexplanation:

(27) lhk2m,p. 1033. (28) .hkdm, p. 1039: 20-26; p. 27: 20-21. (29) Ihkdm,p. 1109: 11-12. book of (30) Muhalld, vol. 1, p. 3: 4-5, 1 1. The hadfthis found in the Sahih of Muslim Ibn al-Hajjaj, is Faith,no. 32, and of Bukhari,book of Faith,no. 17. The tradition relatedto Koran,9: 5, "Whenthe sacred months are over slay the idolaterswhereveryou find them." (31) .hkam, p. 1042: 23-24: They say that the Zihirites abolish reasoning, and AbOMuhammad(Ibn Hazm) answers:"They lie, on the contrary,we really adhereto reasoning".

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the and Thefoundation ourschoolis thatreading Koran of literally the we to soundtraditions(32)thetruth; arecertain be righton this.In every is we of assertion we encounter, takethe literal that and reading theKoran of Whoever thesoundtraditions. us, (33) opposes is wrong. In addition the Koran to theauthenticated traditions Hazmaccepts Ibn and to its consensus(ijmd'),as a sourceof Islamiclaw althoughhe restricts use very AbuiSulaimin Da'wud Ibn Khalaf,who did not accept narrowly,following of consensusotherthanof theCompanions theProphet. Thisis forIbnHazm (34) has the only rightijrma', it, moreover, to be supported a textualbasis: and by There noconsensus on thetext,andthetextis thewords is but We assert: or which reported, keptandavailable, onhisactions, well are of Muhammad, or which are also reported, his sanctioning (iqrar),since Muhammad whathe knewanddid not deny,andthisis a situation sanctioned reported
and well kept too.(35)

Apart from the text, Ibn Hazm does not admit any other source of theological knowledge. He rjects not only analogy but also authoritative
teaching (taqlid)(36) - frequently practiced by the Malikites - or the individual effort in interpretation (ijtihad)(37) - defended by the Kalan

theologians. All these are rejected because they lead to opposite views concerningone and the same subject. by Up to now, we have seen what Ibn Hazm understands burhan,mainly throughits opposition to qiyas. Frequentlyit is a suitable quotationof the Koranictext, but it includes also logical arguments.We have seen to what Zfhirism means for him. For him there must not be any contradiction between the Koranicsentencesand the formaluse of reasoning,eitherin the of understanding them or in the applicationof them. It means thatIbn Hazm praisesreason but also empties it of any capacityto decree on its own what is morally permittedor forbidden: that actions orillicit,or thatreason licit declares He whopretends reason all effects- because divineactions causesnecessary existingin thisworld, are reason he doesthesame or by religious natural, revealed Godin human of as theone whodeniesreason capacity causation. (3") any
chain (32) A hadith is the saying ascribedto the Prophetand it is sound, if the links of the transmission are flawless. (33) Ihkdmi, 656: 22-24. p. (34) Ihkam,p. 509: 4. (35) Ihkdm,p. 501: 4-7. (36) All authoritative teachingis forbidden,in all branchesof the law, Ihkdm,p. 861: 14. (37) Ibn Hazm does not see any need for ijtihddsince the sentences of the religious law are clearly known, Ihkdm,p. 1156: 6-11. (38) Ihkdm,p. 27: 5-8.

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Both extremes are erroneous.Ibn Hazm grantsreason a restrictedpower both to know and to act. The capacity of reason does not reach as far as to know why the pig is illicit and the goat is licit, why the middayritualprayer is of four rak'a(39) the prayerat sunset is of three, why Muslims have and to wash the head and not the neck for the cultic ablution,etc. (40)In the face of these limitations we should raise the question whether reason has the power not only to apply the text but also to prove its authenticity. 2. Reason as the foundation of knowledge Throughoutthe precedingpages, Ibn Hazm has been leading us towards a system that I would summarizeas follows: We recognize the truthof the Koranand the authenticated traditionsas a text. The text contains a creed and a set of rules for action. Those humanactions that are contemplateby these rules, are morallyqualified, bad or good, and those actions which are not contemplated by the them are to be considered as licit. The only justification for these rules lies in the afterlife:rewardand punishmentwill first take place then. Nevertheless,these tenets need to be sustainedby rationalarguments,by first proving thatthe Koranis God's revealed word, and thatMuhammad is His messenger, otherwise we risk falling actually into a contradiction. George Houranipointed out that Ibn Hazm upheldreason for this purpose, namely to justify revelationitself, since Ibn Hazm was, well aware that to make revelation the first source of all religious knowledge is self-defeating,because it leaves nothingbut a circular of argumenton which to base the authenticity revelationitself.(4) Nevertheless HouraniinterpretedIbn Hazm as restrictingthe priorityof reason to what he called <<the primarytermsof value, such as good, evil and arethe ethical equivalentsof those universalprinciples (42) obligatory.>> They of knowledge we learnedabove (p. 4). Ibn Hazm no doubtwould acceptthe priority of these universal concepts but he would not limit the power of reasonto them alone, otherwisehe would not have writtenthe Fisal to prove that Islam is the truereligion and to refute Judaismand Christianity. There, of towardsits end,(43) Ibn Hazm rejects the "equivalence" the argumentsin favor of one religion or the other by attackingthose who maintainedthat
(39) Bending of the torso followed by two prostrationsin Muslim prayerritual (40) Ihkdm,p. 27: 14-25. (41) "Reason and Revelation in Ibn Hazm's Ethical Thought", in P. Morewedge (ed.) Islamic Philosophical Theology (Albany:SUNY, 1979), pp. 143-44. (42) "Reason and Revelation",pp. 144-145. (43) Fisal, vol. 5, pp. 119-136, "Treatiseagainstwho assertedthe equivalenceof the proofs".

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there is no way to know which religion is the true one. He concludes the discussion stating: who is Thatthe worldis temporally created,that it has one Creator that is that of is we eternal, prophecy true, theprophecy Muhammadgenuine, knowthatall thisis trueonly by meansof demonstrative proofs(burhan) of basedon thesensesandon the necessity reason. (") In the context of Ibn Hazm's criticism of analogy, A. Turki faced the question how Ibn Hazm explainedthe truthof our knowledge.(45) Turki,as R. Araldez before, answeredthe question by saying that for Ibn Hazm (46) the truthis self-evident and that reason grasps its obviousness intuitively. Ibn Hazm would embracesuch a theoryof certainty,which Al-Ghazaliwill latersustain,but we saw above thathe appliedthis criterionof evidence only to primarynotions, to generalprinciples.Thereforeargumentation basedon is needed to found revelation.Although the startingpremises are proofs evident, the long way to the conclusionhas to be paved with proofs. To know is to prove. In the Ihkdm,Ibn Hazm talks about signs God has put in this world to be used as pieces of evidence to build up demonstrations, and invoques again the Koranfor God's command to "employ the proofs Because of the command we do not (dalil) of reason and the senses."(47) incur in a circularargument: may abstractthe command,and the proofs we are still valid. Consequently Ibn Hazm sketches a rational demonstrationof God's of existence, based on the nature humanlanguage.No humanbeing can exist without language;languageis ?<united words> and union or compositionis the action of an agent. Every action takes place within time, in which it begins. Thus the union or composition of words must have a beginning. Since man cannotexist withoutlanguage,he himself must have a beginning, and thereforehe is temporallycreated.Ibn Hazm switches now to another premise: Whoever is temporallycreated (mu.idath)has a creatordifferent from him. Man has received the knowledge of this fact from his Creator because man has no science or knowledge withoutGod teachinghim.(48) And if we turnto the Muhalld,we find a betterdeveloped argument. Ibn Hazm attempts to prove that God is the creator of the universe using a burhanwhich I would summarizeas follow: We cannot imagine the world
(44) Fisal, vol. 5, p. 136: 4-6. Correctsense perceptionand "necessityof reason" are the two pillarsof his theoryof knowledge. "Necessityof reason"is found in generalprinciples,for instance, thatthe whole is bigger thantthe part (See above, p. 4). (45) "Argumentd'autorit6,preuve rationelle et absence de preuves dans la m6thodologiejuridique musulmane",in Theologiensetjuristes de I'Espagnemusulmane,aspects polemiques (Paris, 1982), p. 20. (46) < La raisonet l'identificationde la verit6selon Ibn Hazmde Cordouea, in Melanges L Massignon, vol. 1 (Paris, 1956), pp. 111-121. (47) Ihkdm,p. 60: 13-17. (48) Ihkdm,p. 28: 11 - 29: 9, the context is the discussion about the origin of the humanlanguage.

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without time. Time is defined as "extension"(madda) and as such it is a measureor numberingwhich increasesbecauseof "its passing away and its That which increasesmust have a beginningand an end, duration."
If time necessarilyhas a beginning,andif the worldcannotbe untiedfrom time, and time has a beginning, that which does not precede what has a beginning,has a beginningtoo. (49)

The world therefore has a beginning, and if so, then it is temporally created(muhdath)and what is temporallycreatedneeds a creator.We may dispute the flow of the argument but there is no doubt that Ibn Hazm employs a logical reasoningsustainedby generalpremises.As for the Fisal, Ibn Hazm having criticized the materialists,produces five argumentsin favor of the temporalcreationof the world.(5')They are well known and
may willed be spared an analysis here.(51)

But the key questionis how this kind of reasoningextendsto the especific of tenets of Islam:How does Ibn Hazmprove the authenticity the Koranand His the genuineness of Muhammad'sprophethood? answerin the Ihkfimis quite short:
If we are asked: How do you know that the Koran is true? We must answer: On the basis of right premises to which reason and the senses attest.(52)

We are not allowed to go back to revelationto look for the truthof the premises, IbnHazmremindsus; we would thus fall into a circularargument. Now we have to look for the argumentproving the genuineness of the Koran,but maybe the Ihkfimis not the place to look for it, but the Fisal. Ibn Hazm refers us to the Fisal in a passage of the Ihkam. Readingthe Fisal (53) results in considering miracles as the decisive argument in proving the
divine nature of the Koran. (54)

Muhammad quenchedthe thirstof his armyin Tabukand Hudaibiyawith waterflowingoutof a cuphe heldbetweenhis fingers. Muhammad his army fed at the battleof the 'Trench"and at Jabir'shome. Muhammad threwa handful of sandagainstthe enemy tribeof Hawazinandblindedthemall. But the most and impressiveand convincingmiracleis the Koran'suniqueness, all Muslims his Muhammad to challenged contemporaries agreeuponthisdogma.Although
(49) Muhaldl,vol. 1, p. 3, 1 2. (50) Fisal, vol. 1, pp. 9-19. Press,1976),firstargument, 403, of University p. (51) See -I.A.Wolfson,ThePhilosophy the Kalam(Harvard third,p. 421-423, fifth,pp.421. "Reason Revelation", 144. and p. (52) Ihkdm, 60: 7-8. Cf. G. Hourani, p. (53) Ihkam, 657: 19-26. p. fromthe Muhammadan traditions, (54) Fisal, vol. 1, pp. 104-07.Cf. vol. 5, p. 7. The examplesaregathered Tradition A hadith;see A.J. Wensinck, Handbook EarlyMuhammadan of (Leiden,1927),pp. 166-167.

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similarto the Koran,they did not do so becausetheywere composesomething and the capacityneeded to do it. aware of their lack of divine inspiration time like since Muhammad's no one has been able to writeanything Moreover, the miracle. the Koranandconsequently Book is an enduring (55) The Muhallaalso deals with the issue of Muhammad's prophecy.Thathe is God's messengeris proved(burhan)by the fact thathe brought the Koran which has arrivedto us on a flawless sequence of transmission,called upon his adversariesto producea similarwork and they all failed.(56) Ibn Hazm does not question the authenticity of the afore mentioned miracles since the chain of transmittersis "sound," and regarding the uniquenessof Koran,he does not ponderany explanationotherthanthatof its miraculousnature.To prove additionaltenets of Islam Ibn Hazmresorts to the scriptural text, i.e. the Koranor the traditions. is To sum up: the only way to avoid circularityin the argumentation that reason not only organizes the contents of our knowledge by means of of generalrules andprinciples,butalso intervenesin the elaboration the very content.Ibn Hazm was well awareof the necessity to prove the genuineness Those aiming to provethe of revelationand he advancedseveral arguments. creationof the worldfall within the bordersof reasonandbasically temporal of adjustto the rules of reasoning,but those aiming to prove the authenticity the Koran and of Islamic revelation lack, however, demonstrativepower belonging insteadto a kind of rhetorical,persuasivediscourse. 3. The foundation of moral values But Ibn Hazm did not see the shortcomingsof his argumentsconcerning the miraculousnatureof revelation;maybe the streamof the polemics was so strong and rapid that he was dragged on in the midst of the many argumentsthat fill all his works, and he did not stop to think over possible weaknesses. But let us granthim the firmnessof his premises and advance to the second stage of his system, namely, the moralqualificationof human actions. If we raise the classic question, "what makes an action good or evil," Ibn Hazm answersthat there is no objective good or evil. Good and evil are what God declaresgood or evil, respectively.(57) Who is a believer or an unbeliever is again a matter solely of divine decision. Ibn Hazm admonishesus that unbelief (kufr)is evil because God has made it evil and thatunbeliefconsists only of what God has madeit; by contrast, faith consists only of what God has made it.(58)He gives us the
(55) See also Fisal, vol. 3, pp. 15-22. (56) Muhalld, vol. 1, p. 8, 1 10. (57) Hdhundqabih illd md qabbahahaAllh aw hasan illd md hassanaha Alldh. Fisal, vol. 3, p. 111: 18. According to reasonall options are possible (flhadd al-mumkin) and licit, Fisal, vol. 1, p. 98: 1-3. (58) Fisal, vol. 3, p. 111: 9-10.

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instance of wine drinking.Before God revealed to us its prohibition,it was licit and it has become unlawful only because God has qualified it as
such. (59)

Virtue consists, therefore,of the exact compliance with God's revealed commands, and vice of disobedience to them. Virtuous behavior as God expects it from us is nothingbut observanceof what He has commandedor to what He has urged upon us.(60)The Koran expresses God's will and God's power, and the believer must obbey it to be virtuous. According (61) to Ibn Hazm there are no objective foundationsfor virtue or vice, which are both decreed by God, and humanreason cannotknow by itself what is evil For or good, as the Mu'tazilitesmaintained. them God can do only <whatis (62) insofargood has an objective existence. rationallygood? Whetherobedience to God gives man true happiness in his mortal life his does not really concern Ibn Hazm throughout works, for man is going to be rewardedwith true happinessor punished with continuous suffering in the afterlife. Ibn Hazm goes into detail with the matterof the afterlife,and especially, with the sufferingof the unbelievers.We may, however, find a quotationcondensing his views: then mustbe firsttestedandquestioned; he will live in Everydeceased when or sadness untilthedayof resurrection, he will receivehis reward, joy
and be sent to paradiseor to the fire.(63)

Resurrectedhumanbeings, paradise,and the fire have physical reality, and are not allegorical. Ibn Hazm follows eschatological traditions and places paradisein the sixth heaven(6) Thus, the pain unbelieversare going to suffer is a real, physical pain caused by an everlastingfire.(65) Certainlythis set of quite simple argumentsexpounds Ibn Hazm's true beliefs and his essential doctrine.Nevertheless,we want to look for other optionsand ask whetherthereis a role in it thatphilosophyis allowedto play. And so we readhow, in the Fisal, Ibn Hazmdefinesphilosophyas ethics: of is The sense of philosophy ... improvement the soul by meansof in and the goodconduct thislife,whichwill lead practicing virtues following us to well-being in the afterlife;[philosophyalso consists of] good
(59) Fi.sal, vol. 3, pp. 111: 20 - 112: 3. Cf. similarpassages in the Ihkdm,p. 46: 25 - 47: 4; p. 53: 10-25. (60) Ihkdm,p. 7: 1-3. (61) Ihkam, p. 497: 13-15: "You should know that the believers do not have other path than the obedience, t 'a, of the Koranand of the rules firmlyestablishedby the Messenger." (62) Fisal, vol. 3, p. 100: 5-6. Ibn Hazm opposes also to the Mu'tazilite distinction between God's potency, which is always good, and the humanpotency, which is good or bad and is added to the divine in our actions, see Fisal, vol. 3, p. 111: 12-14. (63) Fisal, vol. 4, p. 67: 12-13. (64) Fisal. vol. 4, p. 82: 6-14. vol. (65) Ihkam,p. 10: 6-9. MuhallM, 1, p. 10, n. 15.

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of and administrationthehouseandof thesubjects thesearetheveryaimsof the revealedreligiouslaw. Thereis no disagreement them between on and (6) philosophers theologians. the Howeveracording him the philosophers to to assignphilosophy capacity distinguishbetweenvices and virtuesby employingdemonstrative proofsthat (67) separatetruthfrom error. In the following sentences,Ibn Hazm redefines philosophy as "nothingmore than improvementof the world" in two dimensions.In its internal dimension,philosophyis the soul's abidingby laws (shara'i,) thatkeep men away (zajira) from wrongdoing and, in its exteral dimension, philosophyis the defense of the city against its enemies and, add accordingto IbnHazm,the philosophers to it healingthe bodiesby means
of medicine. (68)

IbnHazm describesthese prohibitory laws and gives instancessuch as the against murder, engaging in unlawful sexual relations, and prohibition damagingsomeone else's property.If these prohibitionswere violated, "the world and the sciences would be destroyed." Ibn Hazmhoweverdoes not (69) accept this answer as final and concluding a legitimate inductiveresearch. Traditionalphilosophy can admit it, because it sees the universe and the human society ruled by rational laws, that if violated, damage and even distroy them. The Divinity has created the world according to rational principles that men can know by themselves and to which they have to conform their actions. Ibn Hazm, however, moves the center of attraction toward the lawgiver:There are laws, the question is who has given them, and as we can expect, his answerwill be thatonly God can promulgate them. Besides this answer,Ibn Hazm contemplates that of his adversaries. Our helplessadversaries he says - may objectthatthesekindsof laws have been laid down (maw.di'a) some wise men in orderto motivatecommonpeople by towarda virtuous (70) life. Thesewise men threaten uneducated peopleas though but Ibn they were children areonly usinglies to achievea good purpose. Hazm deploys several arguments trying to show the inconsistencyof considering religiouslaws as ruleslaid down by wise men for the welfareof the common are that people.(71) His attacks launchedon the presumption humanconvention andthattherefore theseruleswouldbe lies.(72) IbnHazmmay all equals falsity,
the is with isldh (66) Fisal, vol. 1, p. 94: 15-19. Isldh an-nafs, "rendering soul virtuous" complemented the but al-'alam, "improving world."Ibn Hazm does not name the philosophers, he may well be thinkingof Muhammad Zakariya Ibn ar-Razi 935), whose ideashe knew. (d. (67) Fisal, vol. 1, p. 94: 21-22. (68) Fisal, vol. 1, p. 94: 23 - 95: 2. (69) Fisal, vol. 1, p. 95: 8-9.
(70) Fisal, vol. 1, p. 95: 12-14.

(71) Fisal, vol. 1, p. 96:4 - 98: 15. Muslimscholar,Ibn Hazmis (72) I see his defenceof lying as permitted Islamiclaw. As a well informed by of ready to accept lying undercircumstances necessitybut he cannotacceptlies as a generalprinciple,so that of telling the truthwouldbe a vice andlying, a virtue.His acceptance lying undersome circumstances, regulated by divine law, of necessitymarks,however, anotherweak point of his system because it relies on a circular Fisal, p. 96: 2 - 97:1. argument.

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weakandresorts are guess thathis arguments rather againto revelation, denying or humanreason the capacityto declarea prohibition a commandand says is again,"There nothinggoodbutwhatGodmakesgood (hassana),andnothing evil butwhatGod makesevil (qabbaha)." (73) From his point of view, if rules are laid down by men, thereis no reason to follow one rule and not the other.Rules that are not dictatedby God do not have the authoritythat requiresto obbey to them.(74) Ibn Hazm has a very definite aim in mind:therecan be only one truelaw, the shar'a, among the various laws and he does not make any distinction between laws of generalcharacters respectfor man's life - or particular numberof prayers. Why can there not be more thanone law? His answerreads:One thing and its contrarycannotbe forbiddenandpermittedat the same time for the same The individual.(75) only valid law, of course, is a law coming from God, and thatthis law is the Islamicshar'a appearsclearto Ibn Hazm afterthe proofs he has producedin favor of Islam.(76) In spite of Ibn Hazm's polemics against a philosophical foundationof morality, he does not rebukephilosophy absolutely. Philosophy is ethics and its moral recommendationsare often in agreement with religious commands.The most apparent proof for this compatibilityis his own book, Risala fi mudctwdt an-nufas wa-tahdhib al-akhldq wa-z-zuhd fi rwhich he wrote in his late years in the seclusion of his farmat radha'il,(77) Huelva.(78) Montija, 4. Philosophic ethics

Abu 'Ali [Ibn] Miskawaih(d. 1030) had composed a book with a similar title - Tahdhibal-akhldqwa-ta.hir al-a'riq(79) - whose influence on Ibn Hazm is obvious. Miskawaihknew the ethical doctrinesof Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics, and organized his book in chapters dealing with various moral subjects such as the essence of happinessor the differentvirtuesand
(73) Fisal, vol. 1, p. 96: 3-4. (74) Fisal, vol. 1, p. 97: 1-8. (75) Fisal, vol. 1, p. 97: 23-25. (76) It may be addedthatIbn Hazmalso deridesthose who pretendthatmancan discoverthe truereligion by knowing which religion has the rightprohibitionsand commandsbecause no prohibitionor commandis justified by reason (Fisal, vol. 1, p. 98: 1-2). (77) Epistle on the remediesof the soul and on the correctionof the characterand on turningawayfrom the vices. First edition Cairo, 1908. Spanishtranslation M. Asin Palacios, Los caracteres y la conducta. by Madrid, 1916. Ed. by Nada Tomiche as Al-akhldqwa-s-siyar, followed by her own Frenchtranslation: Epttremorale, Beirut, 1961. by Quotationsfollow the English translation M. AbuLaylah,In Pursuit of Virtue,London 1990, and are accordingto chapterand aphorism,common to most editions. de (78) Asin Palacios, Abenhdzam Cdrdoba,vol. 1, pp. 232-233. by of (79) Ed. C.K. Zuraik,Beirut, 1966. English translation himself, The Refinement Character,Beirut, Ibn 1969. Anotheredition by Ghurayba al-Khatib,Cairo, n.d

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vices. By contrast,Ibn Hazm's Tahdhibal-akhlaq contains a series of 331 reflections or aphorisms,gatheredin chapterswhich do not correspondto specific matters,such as virtues, conduct, etc. In one of them we find his definition of happinessas follows: I havetried findonegoalwhicheveryone wouldagreeis excellent to and I of beingstriven after. havefound only:to be freefromanxiety one worthy (tardal-hamm). is anxiety a goal uponwhichall nations agree,fromthetime Dispelling whentheAlmighty will created worlduntilthedaywhenthisworld pass the (80) away. To be free of anxiety, to get rid of worries, is what all men have been longing for since God createdthis world. Thereseems to be, however, ages of turmoil and uncertaintywhen this longing is more alive. This was no doubt the age of the fitna, the dismemberingof the Cordovan caliphate, which Ibn Hazm had experienced. Ten centuriesbefore Ibn Hazm, anotherCordovan,who lived in Rome had expressedsimilarviews. L.A. Seneca (d. 65 AD) attainedthe rankof an imperial senator and was the preceptorof Nero, who later orderedhim to commit suicide, as Suetoniusreported.His life was not free of sorrowat all and he devoted an entire treatiseto the subjectof the soul's happiness,De animae beatitudine,where he states: But whatyou desireis something and greatandsupreme veryclose to
This abidingstabilityof mind the Greekscall being a god: to be undisturbed. of the soul" on which there is an excellent treatiseby euthymia"well-being Democritus;I call it tranquility. (81)

Another Stoic philosopher, Epictetus (d. 125-130 AD), compared to Seneca, had a very different personal situation since he was a slave; his master was one of the officers of Nero's guard. But for Epictetus, too, (82) is tranquillity,freedomfrom perturbation, somethingworth striving for and he urges us to make a desperateeffort to attaintranquility mind, freedom of
and magnanimity. (83)
(80) Akhldq,1.5. (81) De aninae beatitudine, 9.2.3 (non concuti), in L. Annaei Senecae dialogorum libri XII. Ed. L.D. Reynolds, Oxford, 1977. I quote the translationby J.W. Bassore, Seneca Moral Essays, 3 vols. Loeb Classical Library1933; reprinted1970. Poets, Rhetoricians,and (82) The great of Rome reckonedamong their numerousslaves Grammarians, Philosophers;slavery was not synonym with hardship. (83) Epiktetetoudiatriba II.1.21: ataraxta, aphobta, eleutherfa. See also I1.16.11-15.Epictetus, The Discourse as reportedby Arrian;the Manualand Fragments, ed. & English transl.by W.A. Oldfather. Loeb Classical Library,1925; reprinted1967.

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There onlyonewayto happiness theruleis notto looktoward is ...: things thatarebeyond power ourwill,to think nothing ourown,togive the of that is to (84) up all thingsto theDivinity, Fortune. Ibn Hazm's definition of happiness echoes the Stoic concept of it as freedomfrom perturbation, he may even have known the Stoics since he and mentions that all nations "from the time when the Almighty created the world until the day when this world will pass away" sharedthis view. Ibn Hazm and the Stoics basicallyagreeuponthe way to attaintranquillity is Ibn too: happiness(euirhoia) the productof virtue.(85) Hazm observesthe strenuous effortsmen maketo attainfreedomfromperturbation each although Somepeoplechaseafterrichesto dispelthe fearof follow a different way. may poverty, others chase after pleasuresto dispel the anxiety of missing them, otherschase afterknowledgeto dispelthe anxietyof being ignorant None of ... these actionswill free manfromanxiety.Only actionsperformed "withan eye on eternity" to contribute dispel anxietyand, as a conclusion: that You should therefore understand there onlyoneobjective strive is to and for, it is to dispelanxiety; only one pathleadsto this,andthatis the
service of the most high God.(86)

Ibn Hazm's idea of virtueis differentfrom that of the Stoics because of its Islamic content and in two basic aspects: God decrees which 'amal is a good deed and God bestows on us the power to do it. According to the reasonandknows what is good or evil. Stoics, man possesses [right]natural When Epictetusinquiresaboutthe essence of the good, he is convincedthat where the natureof the Divine lies, there lies the natureof good; he finds it in "intelligence,knowledge,andrightreason." And for Seneca, as for the (87) other Stoics, virtue, good, and wisdom are intertwinedas well,(88)although the question about good and evil cannot be fully answered without taking will into account.(89) Regardinghis definitionof virtue,it remainsfor us to look into the main aspect of virtue, i.e., man's behavior.Ibn Hazm estates: Virtueis the meanbetweenthe extreme excess andthe extreme of of are and defect.Thesetwo extremes to be blamed; virtueis to be praised,
(84) Discourse, IV.4.39. I quotethe translation George Long, TheDiscourses of Epictetus(New York, by n.d.), p. 339. (85) Epictetus,Discourses, 1.4,6. Long's translation, p. 14: What is the productof virtue?Tranquillity. Cf. Seneca, De vita beata, XVI.1.1. Ergo in virtuteposita est verafelicitas. (86) Akhldq 1.8. Asin Palacios' text writes al-'amal li-l-dkhiraso that he translates"la obra buena fitil parala vida futura". (87) Epictetus,Discourse, H.8.3: noas, episteme, logos orthds. (88) Ad Luciliumepistulae morales,XXXI.6. Ed. & English translation R.M. Gummere,3 vols. Loeb by Classical Library,1917; R 1967. in Epictetus,Discourse, 1.19.1;11.16.1;IV.2.; IV.9. (89) V.g.

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and except when it is a questionof intelligence, then therecan be no

excess. (90)

This definition echoes Aristotle'sdefinition in the NicomacheanEthics, wherevices areconsidered theextremes.Now, the Stoicshada different as idea of what vices are, since for them vices are diseases of the soul caused by movementsof the soul that, when they passions. Passions are blameworthy Virtuerequires containment the of becomestrongandlasting,causedisease.(91) and virtuouspracticesare necessaryto cure the disease.Moderation, passions advisedby the Stoics.(92) and frugalityare continuously The Stoic view that virtue means containment of passion appears incidentally in the second chapterof Ibn Hazm's Akhlaq,where he quotes the Koran:
Allih says: Anyone who fears the majesty of God, and controls himself against passion, he shall have Paradisefor his refuge (78: 40). These words

in all to means factto turn oneselfagainst passion encapsulate virtue: control fromone's natural toward andlust,thingswhichare away tendency anger
both underthe dictatesof passion.(93)

The distinctionbetween anger and appetiteis an old one, and Plato had alreadyspoken of the two forces within the mortalkind of soul in man;(94) we should rememberthat Arabic works of ethics are a rich amalgam of influences, Pre-islamic,Iranian,Greek,etc., eitherdirect or indirect. The main partof Ibn Hazm's treatiseon ethics deals with the correction of characteror naturaldispositionsthat might otherwisebecome vices. The guideline for such correctionis the Platonicdivision of fourcardinalvirtues, which are the foundationof all the others:justice ('adl), insight (fahm),
courage (najda) and generosity (jid); (95) the last one, generosity, replaces

the Platonic virtue of temperanceor moderation. The cultivation and (96) growthof virtuesimplies the rootingout of theiropposite vices, an aspectto which Ibn Hazm attaches great importance.(97) Hazm was especially Ibn concernedby two vices of the soul: anger(ghadhb)and pride('ujb). He was a hard polemicist, no wonder that he had a strong naturaldisposition for contesting and his very recognizanceof this inclinationis to his credit.(98)
(90) Akhldq,IX.295. (91) Seneca, Ad Luciliumepistulae morales, LXXV.11-12. (92) Seneca, De animae beatitudine,9. (parsimoniafor frugality).De vita beata, X.3 (temperantiafor moderation). (93) Akhldqwa-s-siyar. 11.25.Man ... nahd an-nafs 'an il-hawd is the Koranicexpression. (94) Timaeus,69 C - 71 D. (95) Akhldq,VII.195. (96) Sophrosyenl.For Plato's division, see RepublicIV.6-10, 428 B - 434 C. (97) Foran analysisof virtuesandvices accordingto Ibn Hazm,see my article"IbnHazmy el estoicismo representado S6neca",en Revistadel InsitutoEgipcio de EstudiosIsldmicos,37 (1995), pp. 91-95. por (98) Akhldq,IV.97.

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The most noxious vice for him is 'ujb. Let us rememberthat the Stoics were often accused of arrogance (oiesis) and Epictetus(99)and Seneca blamed those philosophers who behaved in an arrogant way. Seneca's treatiseDe beneficiiscontainmany observationsadmonishingagainstpride; we must be humble when receiving benefits as well as when giving them because pride would spoil the effect of our action: and Oh,Pride,thebaneof greatfortune its highestfolly! Howgladwe are to receivenothing fromthee!How thoudostturneverysortof benefit thee! Howill all thyactsbecome intoinjury! ('0) Ibn Hazm outdoesSeneca in blamingpride.He compares 'ujbwith a tree trunkout of which differentkinds of pridegrow as branches; he observes (101) how arrogantly and people behave,(102) expresses his amazementat the fact that pride can exist for no good reason and thatpride aboundsamong those "who have not a iota of knowledge, fortune,reputation courage."("03) or Ibn Hazm attaches great importanceto correctingpride; and we may wish to know why pride is for him a vice to be rebukedso strongly. Throughlong enquiryinto humannature,IbnHazmbelieves he has come to the conclusion that not only riches and material goods are given to us, by God but intelligence and moralqualitiesas well: You haveno meritfromyourown virtues; theyareonly gifts fromthe themto another, wouldhavemadehim which,if He hadgranted Almighty, that,left to yourowndevices,you would just likeyou,andyou will realize collapseanddie.(04) Consequently Ibn Hazm's ethics as presented in Al-akhlaq wa-s-siyir does not show an alternativeversion of his moral teaching as presentedin his main works. Philosophical ethics is neither a sufficient nor complete science. Firstof all, Ibn Hazmdoes not agree thatscience andknowledgeare equal to virtue, althoughhe concedes that "knowledgehas a part in every virtue and ignorancehas a part in every vice." By personal experience he on corroborates, the one hand, that some common people surpasseducated people regardingtheir morals <butthis is very rare.> On the other hand, people who know the messages of the prophets and the sayings of the is philosopherssurpassthe most wicked and <<this very common>.(105)
(99) Manual, ch. XII, XXII, XXIV, XLVI, XLIX. (100) Seneca, De beneficiis, 11.13. (101) Akhldq,IX.262. (102) Ibn Hazm has detailed observations,for instance,of the man who always refrainsfrom laughing and moves slowly in a display of self-conceit, although"sucha fault is not very serious"(Akhldq,IX.263). (103) Akhldq,IX.265. (104) Akhl2q,IX. 247: they arejust minahAllah, gifts of God. (105) Akhldq,IX.54-55.

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5. Reason, freedom and will Concerningthe humanknowledge of the revelation,Ibn Hazm insisted that whenever God commands something, He gives man the power to achieve it. Concerningmorallife he explains it by saying thatGod not only helps man to act in a virtuousway but gives him the necessarypower. In a passage of the Akhlaq,divine interventionappearsin the form of a natural dispositionthat God stamps(taba'a) in our souls: is Thebestgrace GodcangiveHisservant to endowhimwithjustice that and anda love of justice,withtruth a love of truth aboveallelse....There is no strength power and (16) exceptin GodtheAlmighty. risks falling into predeterminism, he is Ibn Hazm's interpretation but deeply familiarwith the issue, which he discusses at length in the Fisal. ('07) To summarizehis view, which he presentsas the orthodoxone, we may say that he posits in the individual two kinds of effective capacity to act (istita'a). The first istitcf'ais freedomof actionin as much as man is healthy and endowed with all the members of his body and there are no external this hindrances; capacityprecedesthe action. For the second, God createsin man a power simultaneous with action;this innovatedpowerhelps or deserts him: to in Therealcapacity actconsists theintegrity thelimbstogether of with the absenceof hindrances both aspectspreceding action- and in the fromGod- thisaspect another existssimultaneously the with coming power action-. Whentheyarejoined,the actiontakesplace.Godis the one who
makes anythinghappen. ('8)

By means of this explanationIbn Hazm is convinced he preservesman's responsibilityfor his salvationor perdition.He does not hesitateto quotethe Mu'tazilites as sharinghis view in as much as they consider istita'a God's to action, but he does not accepttheirview thatall istiti 'a is always anterior the action.('0) Together with the Mu'tazilites Ibn Hazm stresses that, without the power (qawa) God gives man, he cannotdo either the good or the evil. Moreover this doctrine harmonizes with Ibn Hazm's frequent assertionthat, wheneverGod commandsman to do anything,He gives him the capacity to performit. It is true that in other passages Ibn Hazm may sound predestinarian, these pages of the Fisal should leave no doubt but abouthis true convictions.
(106) Akhldq,IV.113. (107) Fisal, vol. 3, pp. 22-43. (108) Fisal, vol. 3, p. 30: 7-9. Similartext on p. 32: 13 - 33: 1. (109) Fisal, vol. 3, p. 30: 18-20; the critiquefollows on pp. 33: 2 - 34: 13.

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ANDREASONING IBNHAZM CORDOVA 1064) REASON IN OF (D.

Nevertheless we should not be mislead and think that his defence of humanresponsibiltyimplies a defence of philosophy,which on the contrary is pushed to the side. Ibn Hazm denies philosophy the necessary power to reform the soul, since only God and not man has the power and the real possibility of implementingman's moral duties. For this purpose we may approachIbn Hazm's views as statedalso in his essay Risalat at-tawqif 'ali shdri' an-najat bi-khtisdrat-tarq("0) and see how he answers his friend's inquiryaboutthe usefulness(manfa'a)of the ancientsciences and thatof the revelationof the prophets. The ancient sciences, which include philosophy, logic, arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, astrology and medicine are very useful, but their effectiveness is limited to this world and they bring little reward. ('1) By contrast,revelation is beneficial for the refinementof character,to avoid wrongdoingin this world, and for the salvation of the soul; revelationhas, therefore,an everlastingbenefit.Philosophy,in spite of its diminishedvalue, shareswith revelationthe taskof the refinementof character;but IbnHazm deprives philosophy of the capacity to achieve the task on its own first because it cannotdefine its aim properly,thatis, it cannotknow the essence
of a virtuous nature, (112) and second, because It is absolutely impossible for philosophy to correct characterwithout prophecy since the created being has not the power to cause necessary effects. (113)

Only God is the real cause of the effects we believe to be ours. This is not a valid argument, Muslimphilosopherscould object, since they maintain the that God does not act immediately and directly in all events but through causes immanentto the world. And even if we accept that only God can be an effective cause, it does not mean thatHe is not going to assist man in the actions recommendedby the philosophers.Ibn Hazm has shifted again the issue to the level of revelation, imposing a system based solely on the scripturaltext. the Throughout writingsof Ibn Hazm and throughthe lines of this article, reason ('aql) and reasoning (hujja, burhan, dalil) are omnipresent, but reason is never autonomousand does not develop freely, it always serves
(110) Treatisefor setting up the way of salvation in a brief manner.Ed. Ibsan 'Abbas,Rasd'il IbnHazm, n.d.), pp. 41-55; 2d ed., Rasd'il, vol. 3 (Beirut, 1982), pp. 131-138. (Cairo-Baghdad, (111) Cf. similar argumentsin the Kitdb mardtibal-'ulam, ed. A.G. Chcjne, in Ibn Hazm (Chicago, ibid. pp. 191-193. 1982), pp. 216-219, with English translation, blames the philosophersfor not being able to have one common doctrine: (112) Ibn IHazm The followers of reason [the intelligences]disagree upon the correctionof these characters,because the man whose irascible faculty prevailsdoes not hold the same view as the man whose concupiscible faculty prevails, and both do not hold the same view as the man whose rationalfaculty prevails (Tawfiq,ala shdri, an-najdt, 1"ed. p. 47: 6-9; 2" ed. p. 134: 10-12). (113) At-tawfiq 'ald shdri 'an-najdt, 1st. ed, p. 47: 5-6; 2 ed., p. 134: 9-10, td'at ghair al-khUliqId talzamu,td'a expresses here the will of God, not the obedience.

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revelation. By logical necessity, "necessity of reason", man has an immediateknowledge of universalprinciplesand he has to use them for a correctreading of the sacred text. Besides reason gives man the necessary and the most valuable of them is the instrumentsfor his argumentation, of the Aristotelian logic, burhan in its original apodeictic syllogism however, are carriedon in a dialecticalway and meaning.Many arguments, are not as flawless as he thinks to be. In most of the cases, reasoningis an invocation of the adequate Koranic text, so that proving its authenticity becomes the main task assignedto reason. Therefore,the keystone of his system is his justificationof revelationby means of reason. Ibn Hazm is convinced that he succeedes in reasoning aboutthe genuinenessof the Koranicrevelation,but it would be generousto qualify his reasoningnot more than an attempt.

Endnote
In the course of the foregoing words (?. 4) on Ibn Hazm's philosophic ethics, I comparedhis views with those of Seneca and Epictetus,two main of representatives Romanstoicism. The presenceof Stoic thoughtin Islamic philosophy and thoughtin general is a long acceptedphenomenon,but the mannerin which the influence occurredremainsa matterof discussion. D. Gutas has given us the latest status of the question in his article "PrePlotinian Philosophy in Arabic," (114) where he points out the necessity of

providing concrete evidence for the transmission of Stoic doctrines, somethingI have not done in this paper. Nevertheless,thereare some indicationsas to how Ibn Hazm could have been influenced by Stoic moral thought; one of these is the work of
Miskawaih who knew Galen's Arabic summaries. ('5) Christianity could

as too: As important Neoplatonismis for have been a channelof information for Christiandogmaticthought,Stoicism is important its moralthought.(116) Ibn Hazm had a deep and solid knowledge of Christianity,as well as make clear.(117) Judaism,as the chaptersof the Fisal againstChristianity if This is easy to understand we take into considerationthat Ibn Hazm was likely the grandson of a convert. Although he claimed to be a descendent of Yazid the Persian,("')who had been a servantof Yazid, the brotherof the caliph Mu'awiya (661-680), his origin is not clear, and the
A (114) (OtherthanPlatonismand Aristotelianism) Review of the sources,in Aufstiegand Niedergangder de romischenWelt,partII, vol. 36.7 (Walter Gruyter, 1994),pp. 4939-73. ebreodella in: of Zonta,Un interprete (115) See an account Galen'sknowledgein the Arabictradition Mauro Zamorani, 1995),pp. 4-20. filosofia di Galeno(Torino: der Antike, 1970),pp. 278-290 andpassim. (Mtlnchen, (116) Cf. C. Schneider, Geistesgeschichte christlichen The in (117) The subjecthasbeen recentlystudied M. AbuLayla his doctoraldissertation: Muslimviewof by to with Christianity SpecialReference the Work lbn Hazm,ExeterUniversity1994. of
(118) See the beginliri of his At-taqrfb li-hadd al-mantiq, ed. I. 'Abbas, Ras 'il, vol. 4 (Beirut, 1983), p. 93.

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AndalusianhistorianAbu MarwanIbn Hayyan (d. 1009) affirms that Ibn Khalaf was a Mozarabof Montija, near Niebla in the Hazm's grandfather gharb al-Andalus.(119)Ibn Hazm could easily have absorbedStoic influence of throughthe Latin tradition the Mozarabchurch,a circumstancethatdoes not exclude his receptionof Stoic moralideas transmitted writtenArabic by literature.
JOSEP PUIGMONTADA

(119) Quoted,for instanceby Yaqit (d. 1229) in Mu'jamal-udabd'. Ed. I. 'Abbas, vol. 4 (Beirut, 1993), n? 720, p. 1656.

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