BHAVAVIVEKA'S PRAJNAPRADfPA

A Translation of Chapter Two:

'EXAMINATION OF THE TRAVERSED, THE UNTRAVERSED, AND THAT WHICH IS BEING TRAVERSED'

by
WILLIAM L. AMES INTRODUCTION 1 The Madhyamaka 2 school is one of the two major philosophical schools of Mahfiyfina Buddhism, along with the Yogficfira school. The Madhyamaka is best known for its doctrine of emptiness (gtinyatd). The idea of emptiness is found in the "perfection of discernment" (praj~d-pdramitd) sfitras, which are among the earliest Mahfiyfina sfitras. While the sfitras expound emptiness in a discursive way, the Mfidhyamikas use systematic argument. Emptiness, for the Madhyamaka school, means that dharmas are empty of intrinsic nature (svabhdva). All Buddhists hold that conditioned dharmas arise in dependence on causes and conditions. For the Mfidhyamikas, this fact of dependent origination (pratitya-samutpdda) implies that dharmas can have no intrinsic, self-sufficient nature of their own. Since dharmas appear when the proper conditions occur and cease when those conditions are absent, the way in which dharmas exist is similar to the way in which mirages and dreams exist) Thus attachment and aversion are undermined, since ultimately, they have no substantial objects and lack any self-sufficient status of their own. 4 The Madhyamaka school was founded by Nfigfirjuna (active c. t50--200), the author of the M~la-madhyamaka-kdrikd (MMK). The M M K inspired a number of commentaries which not only expounded the meaning of the M M K but also often acted as vehicles for the commentators' own views. The Akutobhayd seems

Journal of Indian Philosophy' 23: 295--365, 1995. 9 1995 KluwerAcademic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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to be the earliest of the extant commentaries. It is of uncertain authorship, although it is sometimes ascribed to Nfigfirjuna himself.5 The earliest extant commentary on the MMK by a known author 6 is that of Buddhapfilita (c. 500). Buddhapfilita closely followed Nfigfirjuna's own method, which utilized mainly prasahga arguments. These are arguments which show that the opponent's position leads to consequences (prasahga) unacceptable to the opponent himself, without, however, committing the Mfidhyamika to affirming a contrary position. Bhfivaviveka (c. 500--570) was the next important Mfidhyamika philosopher. Besides his commentary on the MMK, the Prajhdpradipa, he wrote some notable independent works, such as the Madhyamaka-hr.daya-kdrikd and its autocommentary, the Tarkajvdld. Bhfivaviveka seems to have been the first to use the formal syllogism of Indian logic in expounding the Madhyamaka; and he strongly criticized Buddhapfilita for failing to do so. He felt that the author of a commentary should state independent inference (svatantra-anumdna) rather than simply giving prasahga arguments] Bhfivaviveka's position was later criticized by Candrakirti, who defended Buddhapfilita in his own commentary on the MMK, the

Prasannapadd.
Bhfivaviveka's Prajh@radipa is, in the first place, of great interest for its explanation and elaboration of the MMK. In the second place, it is important in the history of the Madhyamaka. Bhfivaviveka's criticisms of Buddhapfilita in the Prajh@radipa resulted in the division of the Madhyamaka into two subschools: the Svfitantrika-Madhyamaka of Bhfivaviveka and the PrfisafigikaMadhyamaka of Buddhapfilita and Candraldrti. (The names of these subschools, derived from svatantra-annumdna and prasahga, seem to have originated some centuries after Candraldrti and are known to us only from Tibetan sources, s) Moreover, the Prajhdpradipa is the first commentary on the MMK to make use of the formal apparatus of Buddhist logic and the first to discuss non-Buddhist philosophical schools extensively. Bhfivaviveka's accounts, in the Prajh@radipa and elsewhere, of the positions of other Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools give valuable information on the state of Indian philosophy in his day. Chapter two is one of the most important chapters of the MMK, for in it, Nfigfirjuna develops his critique of a fundamental and

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pervasive concept, "activity" (kriyd). Many of the arguments in chapter two, or variations of them, are utilized in later chapters of the MMK; and Nfigfirjuna refers explicitly to chapter two no less than four times. 9 Thus chapter two, like chapter one, plays a key role in the structure of the MMK. Chapter two is stated in terms of a critique of motion, rather than of activity in general. As Bhfivaviveka explains, this is done for two reasons. First, in the dedicatory verses of chapter one (MMK 1-A,B), Nfigfirjuna set forth eight negations characterizing dependent origination, among them "without coming, without going." One purpose of chapter two is to establish these two negations. Beyond that, if one takes motion as a paradigmatic example of activity and then negates motion, it will be easy to show that other activities can be negated in the same way. 1~ In reading chapter two, one might get the impression that Nfigfirjuna's aim was to construct a grammatical tour de force in which seemingly every form derived from the root gain ("to go," etc.) is used and negated. One might also wonder whether he was critiquing motion or language. I think that his purpose in chapter two can be understood in the following way: In the first place, he did not wish to deny motion from the point of view of convention (vyavahdra) or "superficial reality" (sam vrti). Rather, he wanted to show that the conventional existence of motion does not imply that some sort of intrinsic nature (svabhdva) exists as the basis of motion. 11 He proceeded to do this by analyzing the process of motion into its interdependent components of goer, path, going, beginning of going, stopping, etc. Then he could show that these components, while not identical, lacked the sort of self-sufficient independence which they would necessarily have if each possessed its own intrinsic nature. His analysis naturally made use of the rich variety of nouns and adjectives which the Sanskrit language can derive from a single verbal root. His intent, though, was not to analyze Sanskrit as such or language as such but rather to show that there is no intrinsic nature at work in what we conventionally call "motion." From a modern point of view, one might object that Nfigfirjuna's analysis applies only to Sanskrit because other languages may use different categories for talking about motion, leading to a different analysis of the process of motion. It is difficult to see, however,

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how any such categories could fail to be just as interdependent as a "goer" and his or her "going." Thus Nfigfirjuna's basic argument against intrinsic nature would still apply if another language were used, even though the details might have to be formulated differently. Aside from a few quotations in the Prasannapadd, the Pr@idpradipa has been lost in the original Sanskrit. It exists in Tibetan and Chinese translations. The Chinese translation is reportedly rather poor; 12 but the Tibetan translation, done by JfiS_nagarbha and Cog ro Klu'i rgyal mtshan in the early ninth century, seems to be excellent. The same translators also translated Avalokitavrata's massive subcommentary on the Prajfidpradipa, called the Prajfidpradipa-tfkd. (Avalokitavrata's work is not extant in Sanskrit, and apparently no Chinese translation was ever made.) The present English translation was made from the Tibetan. I consulted the Peking, Narthang, Derge, and Cone editions and made my own edition of the text. Most of the variants found in the different Tibetan editions are either obvious scribal errors or else represent different orthographic conventions. Rarely do the variants offer significant alternatives for the meaning of a sentence. I also made extensive use of the Peking and Derge editions of Avalokitavrata's subcommentary. Since the Prajfidpradipa is often terse, allusive, or technical, sentences frequently need to be amplified with phrases in square brackets; and explanatory notes sometimes need to be provided. For both purposes, Avalokitavrata's work is invaluable. Also, since the subcommentary quotes the entire Prajfidpradipa, it is sometimes helpful in establishing the text. An English-Tibetan-Sanskrit glossary has been provided for important terms. Although we do not have the Sanskrit text of the Prajfidpradtpa, the Tibetan practice of using standardized translation equivalents enables one to infer the Sanskrit original of many terms with a high degree of confidence. Sanskrit terms in the glossary are given in the translation in parentheses at their first occurrence, unless the English translation equivalent is so widely used that this seems unnecessary. Sanskrit and Tibetan words and phrases which are not in the glossary are also sometimes quoted in parentheses, especially when the translation is a bit conjectural.

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NOTES TO INTRODUCTION 1 The introduction to my translation of chapter one of the Praj~dpradipa (Ames (1993)) is repeated here (with minor revisions) for the convenience of the reader, except that material specific to chapter one has been replaced by a discussion of chapter two. Also, for more details on all the matters discussed in this introduction, see Ames (1986), ~ I: Introduction," and the sources cited therein. Addendum to Ames (1993): Avalokitavrata's quotation from a non-Buddhist text, mentioned in Ames (1993), p. 236, n. 20, has been identified by J. W. de Jong as Manusmrti IV.80; see Jong (1988), p. 430. 2 As a general rule, "Madhyamaka" is the name of the school and its philosophy; a follower of the school is called a "Mfidhyamika." See Ruegg (1981), p. 1 and n. 3. 3 See, e.g., MMK 7--34 and 17--33. 4 See, e.g., chapter 23 of the MMK, which is discussed in Ames (1988). s On the Akutobhayd, see Huntington (1986). 6 There is also a Chinese translation of a commentary ascribed to Asaflga which deals only with the dedicatory verses of MMK (MMK 1--A,B). See Ruegg (1981), p. 49, and Keenan (1989). 7 In this connection, it is interesting to note that in his commentary on MMK 2--19 (see following translation), Bhfivaviveka admits that Nfigfirjuna gives a praswiga argument. In his commentary on MMK 1--1 (see Ames (1993)) and elsewhere, Bhfivaviveka criticizes BuddhapSlita's praswiga arguments because, among other reasons, they could be converted into syllogisms asserting things which Buddhapfilita does not, in fact, wish to say. For example, Bhfivaviveka claims that BuddhapSlita's prasar~ga argument against things originating from themselves could be converted into a syllogism showing that things originate from another. In the case of MMK 2--19, however, Bhfivaviveka converts Nfigfirjuna's prasa~ga argument against a goer and his going's being the same into a syllogism which also simply negates sameness without asserting difference. Thus Bhfivaviveka seems inconsistent, if not biased, on this point. 8 See Ruegg (1981), p. 58. 9 See MMK 3--3, 7--14, 10--13, and 16--17. 10 See Bhfivaviveka's commentary preceding the opponent's initial objection at the beginning of chapter two. 11 Bhfivaviveka apparently accepts, on the conventional level, a "cinematic" theory of motion in which motion is, in a sense, illusory even conventionally. (See his commentary following MMK 2--22c and n. 176 to the translation of chapter two.) Nfigfirjuna would not necessarily have rejected such a theory on the conventional level. The point is that some conventional activity is taking place, whether one describes it as continuous motion or as rapid origination and cessation at successive points; but that conventional activity has no intrinsic nature. 12 See Kajiyama (1963), p. 39.

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Now [Nfigfirjuna] begins the second chapter because he wishes [either] [1] to show that dependent origination possesses the characteristics of [being] without coming and without going,3 or [2] to refute positions contrary (vipaks.a) to the teaching in the first chapter that all entities are unoriginated. [Buddhapdlita's commentary:] [Buddhapfilita]4 comments: [Nfigfirjuna] begins the second chapter for the sake of students (~is.ya) [in whom] conviction (graddhd) has arisen through hearing the reasoning [which proves] nonorigination [and who] wish to hear a negation of the going and coming which are commonly known in the world. 5 [Bhdvaviveka's critique:] That is not [logically] possible, because it is not [logically] possible that one whose mind is in error due to specious means of knowledge (pramdn.a-dbhdsa) would ask such [a question]. [Rather,] it is [logically] possible that that [sort of student] 6 would state inferences in order to show that going exists and in order to show that origination exists. Also, how is that [idea], "In ultimate reality, going does not exist," [logically] possible for one whose mind is confused by specious means of knowledge? [This is so] since the question [as framed by Buddhapfilita] is not suitable. 7 If one supposes that it is a question [put by] one who does not understand, [that is not the case] because this treatise would [then] be within the [cognitive] domain of ordinary people. 8 The world, for the most part, is attached to things to be done by virtue of the conventional practice (vyavahdra) of many activities. In order to remove that thorn of attachment, if one [first] removes one activity which has the defining characteristic of going, [then] it will be easy to remove the remaining activities also. 9 Therefore a contrary position will be set forth. 1~ Here one who is an opponent of the point under discussion appears: 11

Objection:
[Thesis:] Internal entities have indeed originated, [Reason:] because the conventional activities (vyavahdra) of one who possesses the objects of those [internal entities] 12 are performed. [Dissimilar example:] Here one who does not originate does not

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perform the conventional activities of one who possesses the objects of those [internal entities]. For example, a childless woman's son does not go. [Similar example:] It is not the case that Devadatta and Vis.numitra likewise do not go. [Conclusions:] Therefore internal entities do indeed originate. Answer: In order to refute the contrary position which has been set forth, the following is said: If [you] are establishing the origination and going and coming which are commonly known in the world [and] which bring about giving (ddna), moral conduct (dila), meditation (dhydna), and so on, [then you] establish what is [already] established [for us]. But if [you seek to] establish that origination and going and coming exist in ultimate reality, ]that is,] with reference to the yogin in meditative concentration (samdhita) ]whose] eye of discernment sees the true state ~3 of entities, [then] the meaning of ]your] reason -- "because the conventional activities of one who possesses the objects of those [internal entities] are performed" -- is not established. [This is so] because going has been negated by the negation of going, too, just according to the negation of origination. ~4 Even if [you] suppose that ]your] reason is commonly known to both sides in a general way (spyi'i rnam pas), is [in that case,] the meaning of your reason is contradictory. ]This is so] because there is no positive concomitance (anvaya) [between your reason and the property to be proved] and because that [reason[ is positively concomitant only with dissimilar cases

(vipaksa). 16
Furthermore, [the following arguments] are given: Here if going existed in ultimate reality, that [going] would exist either on the traversed (gata), on the untraversed (agata), or on that which is being traversed (gamyamdna). Moreover, as to that, To begin with, the traversed (gata) is not being traversed (gamyate)57 [MMK 2--1a] [This is so] because there [i.e., on the part of the path which has already been traversed,] the activity of going [or traversing] is past. Since that point is common knowledge to others, also, [we] will not prove [it]. That ]point] was stated because [Nfigfirjuna] wishes [to have] an example which is accepted by others. The property of that [already traversed path] is that it is a path; [the property] of the

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not [yet] traversed [portion of the path] is also similar to that. 18 Therefore, The untraversed (agata) is also not being traversed. [MMK 2--1b] The idea is that [this is so] [Reason:] because it is a path, [Example:] like the [already] traversed path. 19 Alternatively, [one can make the following argument:] "Untraversed" [means] that the activity of going [or traversing] has not [yet] begun. The property of that [portion of the path] is that it has not [yeq been traversed. An example [is stated] by virtue of [the property] to be proved and the proving property. [In this case, the example is] a path which one does not wish to traverse, [since it is] a property-poseessor (dharmin) which possesses properties (dharma) commonly known to both [proponent and opponenq. 2~ Here the inference is: [Thesis:] The untraversed is not being traversed, [Reason:[ because it has not [yet] been traversed, [Example:] like a path different from that, which one does not wish to traverse. Objection: Here the Aulfikyas 21 say: Do [you] show that going does not exist on that untraversed [path] because Devadatta's activity of going has not [yet] originated [there]? Or do [you] show that going does not exist because the activity of going [will] not [ever] exist [there]? The point is this: If [you] maintain the former supposition, [you] are establishing what is [already] established [for us]. But if ]you[ maintain the latter supposition, the meaning of [your] reason ["because the activity of going will not ever exist there,"] is contradictory. 22 Therefore it is not the case that the meaning of [our] previous reason 23 is unestablished. [The Anlfikyas continue:] ff [you] say that that [argument of ours] is not ]logically] possible because it is not established that going is different from substance, 24 [we reply:] [Thesis:] [Devadatta as] the object of a mind (mati) which thinks, "Devadatta possesses going," possesses [something belonging to[ a category (paddrtha) different from Davadatta's self ((ttman),25 [Reason:] because certainty (nges pa) arises, [Example:[ as with the object of a mind which thinks, "Devadatta has a staff.''26

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Answer: As to that, if here [you] show that [Devadatta as] the object of a mind [which thinks of] Devadatta [as] possessing some characteristic (vi~esa), possesses [something belonging to] a category different from Devadatta's self, [then you] establish what is [already] established conventionally [for us]. [This is so] because [we] accept this mind which thinks, "This possesses going," as referring to a collection of conditioned factors 27 called "Devadatta" which has the particular defining characteristic of originating in another place. 2s But if [you] say that Devadatta posesses a category called "going," there is no example. 29 But even if it is otherwise, [then] since the meaning [of your reason] is contradictory even conventionally, 3~ what need is there to speak of ultimate reality? Therefore there is no avoiding the fault 31 which [we] have stated. Objection: Some of [our] fellow Buddhists 32 say: Effort (prayatna or vydydma) arises from wishing (chanda) as [its] cause; [and effort] produces the element (dhdtu), air. Because of [the element, air], the collection of elements and matter depending on the elements which is called a "body" comes to originate uninterruptedly in another place; [and this] is called "going." Therefore going does not exist as a different thing (artha). Since that which originates ceases in the very place where it originates, going is illusory (bhrdnta) like tongues of flame and so on. 33 Therefore [we] do not accept going as a different thing. Also, in ultimate reality, going does not exist. Therefore [your] negation of going in ultimate reality [that is, of ultimately real going] establishes what is [already] established [for

US].
Answer: [1] Since [we] have negated origination, the proof which you have stated is not established. [2] That cognition ]which knows] that going is illusory (bhrdnta) like tongues of flame, etc., is also mistaken (bhrdnta). 34 [3] [We] will also negate [the idea that] the one who goes and [his] going are not different. Therefore [for these three reasons,] that ]argument of yours] also does not please the minds of learned persons. Objection: The Sfi.mkhyas say: When [the guna called] rajas becomes predominant on the not [yet] traversed [path] and [rajas'] function (pravrtti) of performing activities becomes manifest, [then] one goes. 35 Answer: For them, also, going is not established, since manifestation has been negated. Therefore [this] is a mere supposition.

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The proponents of going, fearing the faults which [we] have stated, might think: Objection: If [we] assert that going exists on that ]portion of the path] which is [in the process of] being traversed (gamyamdna), the stated faults will not exist. Answer: The dcdrya [Nfigfirjuna], having ascertained that point, explains that that which is being traversed does not exist apart from the traversed and the untraversed: Apart from the traversed and the untraversed, that which is being traversed is not known (gamyate). IMMK 2--1cd[ The meaning is that it cannot be grasped. 36 How is it that that does not exist? Here that which is being traversed must be either the traversed or the untraversed or something which is both partly traversed and partly untraversed; but [if any of these cases] there would be conflict with inference, as shown in both cases [separately].37 Objection: It is not the case that that which is being traversed does not exist, because Going (gati) ]exists] where there is movement of the limbs (cestd). And because that movement ]exists] on that which is being traversed, Not on the traversed [and] not on the untraversed, therefore going exists on that which is being traversed. [MMK 2--2] As to that, going exists in that place where a movement of the limbs appears which has as [its] defining characteristic lifting up and setting down the foot. Because that movement of the limbs also appears on that which is being traversed, but that movement neither appears on the traversed nor appears on the untraversed, therefore going exists on that which is being traversed. Therefore, in that way, going is established because that which is being traversed exists; [and] hence what we maintain is established. Therefore, by the method which [we] have thus stated, what [Nfigfirjuna] said, "That which is being traversed is not known" [MMK 2--1d], is not [logically] possible; and there will be no conflict with the inferences which [you] have shown in both cases [separately]. [Buddhapdlita's commentary:] [Buddhapfilita]38 says: yatah. ]means] "of the goer" (gantuh.).39

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[Bhdvaviveka's critique:]4~ That is not [logically] possible, [1]

because there would be no correlative of the word "therefore," [2] because the basis (gzhi) of an activity is invariable (avyabhicdrin), 41 and [3] because the negation of a goer's going [on[ the traversed and the untraversed has been shown already. Answer [to the objection expressed in MMK 2--2]: Here [Nfigfirjuna] says, How will going (gamana) be possible on that which is being traversed? 42 [MMK 2--3ab] The idea is that ]this is the case] when: ]Thesis:] Whether [you] accept that ]that which is being traversed] has an intrinsic nature which is separate or not separate [from the traversed and the untraversed], 43 it is not possible that going exists there, [Reason:] because ]that which is being traversed] is a path, [Example:] like the path which has been traversed [already]. Alternatively, [one can explain MMK 2--3ab as follows:] How will going be possible on that which is being traversed? [MMK 2--3ab] The idea is that [this is so] because there would be the same question raised in objection. If one supposes that going exists on that which is being traversed, there would be this same question raised in objection: Where does movement of the limbs exist, on the traversed, on the untraversed, or on [some path] having properties dissimilar to those two? The faults in those [three alternatives], moreover, have been explained [already]. 44 Alternatively, [one can explain MMK 2--3ab in a third way:] How will going be possible on that which is being traversed? [MMK 2--3ab t ]This is so] because there is no inference showing that ultimately real going exists. [How will going (gamana) be possible on that which is being traversed,[ When that which is being traversed is not possible without going? [MMK 2--3 cd] The idea is that [going is not possible on that which is being

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traversed] also because it would be like the tethered horse. 45 How would this be like the tethered horse? Because by saying, "What is that which is being traversed? It is [the place] where movement of the limbs [exists]. Where does movement of the limbs ]exist]? On that which is being traversed," neither of the two is specified. Objection: Having accepted [the path] which is being traversed, which has been common knowledge conventionally from beginningless [time], [we] maintain that ultimately real going exists there. Answer: Even so, that single activity of going which exists here has the power of being applied to what is called "that which is being traversed." What is that other going, [of which one could say,] "Going exists on that which is being traversed? ''46 As to that, what the opponent said [in his initial syllogism] -"Internal entities do indeed originate, because one who possesses the objects of those [internal entities] performs conventional activities" -- is not established, because the meaning of the reason is not established. ~Iis] example 47 is also not established, because Devadatta is not established in ultimate reality. Objection: The activity of going is not complete in that [term,] "that which is being traversed." Because we express that ]activity of going[ in the word "going," therefore, since that [activity of going] exists, it is not the case that the meaning of [our] reason is unestablished. 48

Answer:
For one for whom going (gamana) exists on that which is being traversed, it follows that That which is being traversed [exists] without going (gati), for that which is being traversed is known. 49 [MMK 2--4] For [one] disputant, going exists on that which is being traversed. For the position of that ]disputant], it follows that although [the activity of] going exists in [the word] "going," that which is being traversed ]exists] without going. Why? Because "that which is being traversed" is known and understood without the activity of going's being complete in that ]term] and without [its] applying [to that term]. [The opponent] does not maintain that; he maintains that that [term] "that which is being traversed" does possess going. Therefore since [in that case,] the activity of going has [already] performed its function (artha) in regard to that [term, "that which

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is being traversed"], another going is not possible. Thus there is no avoiding the fault which [we] have stated. Desiring to rid himself of the pain of the stated fault, [the opponent may] say: Objection: [We] maintain that that which is being traversed does possess [ultimately real] going; and [ultimately real] going itself is [the activity of] going. 5~ Answer: Even so, If going exists on that which is being traversed, it follows that there are two goings, That by which that [is called I "that which is being traversed" and that which is the going on that. [MMK 2--5] If [you] suppose that going exists on a ]path] which is being traversed [and] which possesses an ultimately real going, it follows that there will be two goings: that [ultimately real] going by which [that path] which is being traversed would be called "that which is being traversed" and that ]conventional] going by which there would be conventional going on that [path] which is being traversed. 51 In that case, If it follows [that there are] two goings, it also follows [that there are] two goers . . . [MMK 2--6ab] Why? The rest of the sentence is: Because without a goer, going is not possible. [MMK 2--6cd] That also is not maintained. Therefore one who wishes to remove definitively the stain of the faults which [we] have described [should[ accept just one conventional going. 52 A ]conventional[ goer and a [conventional path] which is being traversed are ]then] established through dependence on that [conventional going]; but since an ultimately real going is also s3 not possible, the meaning of the reason [in the opponent's initial syllogism] -- "because one who possesses the objects of those [internal entities] performs conventional activities" -- is not established. For that reason and [also] because [his] example does not exist, [the opponent's thesis,] "Internal entities do indeed originate," is not established; and dependent origination which possesses the characteristics of being without coming and without going is established.

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Objection: The grammarians 54 say: There is only one going; and

that very [going], by its own intrinsic nature, [is what] we call "going." That basis (gzhi) where that [going] exists is that which is being traversed, and that one who is the goer is the agent [of the activity of going[. Therefore it does not follow that there are two goers and [two] goings.55 Answer: That is not [logically] possible, [1] because the origination of going in ultimate reality has been negated, [2] because going does not exist since that which is being traversed does not exist, [3] because a collection of conditioned factors which has originated in a different place is conventionally designated as a goer, and [4] because that which is being traversed has also been investigated [already] .56

Objection:
[Thesis:] One should understand that going does indeed exist, [Reason:] because the basis of that [going] exists. [Dissimilar example:] Here that which has no basis does not exist, like the falling, going, etc., of a childless woman's son. [Similar example:] The basis of going, a goer [such as] Devagarman, does exist. [Conclusion:] Thus because [its] basis exists, going exists. Therefore, because the reason [in our initial syllogism] is established, internal entities do indeed exist; and going and coming and so on are also established.

Answer:
ff the goer does not exist, going is not possible. ff going does not exist, how indeed will a goer exist? 57 [MMK 2--7] [The opponent might] think that if he does not state a reason, going is not established; [and then] it would not be the case that the stated faults do not exist. [Recognizing that] if the goer does not exist, going does not exist, [he might] therefore state a reason -"because [its] basis exists" -- which depends on the goer, the basis of going. ff so, is it not the case that If the goer does not exist, going is not possible? [MMK 2--7ab]

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[But] it has been ascertained [already] that that going is also not possible. Therefore, If going does not exist, how indeed will a goer exist? [MMK 2--7cd] The idea is that [this is so] since the cause of being a goer [i.e., going] does not exist. The word "how" (kutah.) [shows] that it is not credible (yid mi ches pa); the meaning of the sentence is that the goer does not exist. [The explanation] in full is as before. 58 Since the goer is not established, the meaning of [your] reason, "because [its] basis exists," either is not established or else is contradictory. 59 Objection: Well, listen to this other inference, which will establish going: [Thesis:] It is certain that going does indeed exist, [Reason:] because by means of that [going], there is the conventional designation (vyavahdra) of one who possesses that [going].6~ IDissimilar example:] Here, as for what does not exist, one does not point out one who possesses that by means of that [nonexistent thing]; for example, one does not point out a horned hare. [Similar example:] "Devadatta goes:" By means of going, this conventional designation of one who possesses that [going] does exist. [Conclusion:] Therefore going exists. [And because going exists, our] intended meaning is established. 61 Answer: Do [you] maintain here that this conventional designation, "Devadatta goes," is [a designation] of one who is a goer in ultimate reality or of one who is not a goer? As to that, To begin with, a goer does not go. [MMK 2--8a] The phrase, "to begin with" (tdvat), refers to the order [of negations in MMK 2--8]. "A goer does not go" sets forth the thesis. [Why is the verb "go" in MMK 2--8a in the middle voice? 62 There are some grammarians 63] who follow mere words and are not skilled in the discrimination of dharmas. Their intellects are impaired by bad views; and they have turned their backs on moral conduct (dffa), meditation (dhydna), and discernment (prajfid).

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They themselves have entered a wrong path; and they also cause others to enter that [wrong path], by saying [such things as the following:]64 If a word is faulty in accent or letter, [then[ since it is wrongly used, it does not express its meaning. That adamantine word destroys the sacrificer, as [the word] indradatru ]destroyed V.rtra] because of a defect in accent. 65

"When those asuras said, 'Helayo he&yah.,' they were defeated.''66 "If one who maintains a sacred fire (gthita-agni) has uttered an incorrect word (apadabda), he should perform an expiatory sacrifice (isti) in honor of Sarasvati, ''67 etc.6s "ff even one word is rightly
used, one goes to the world of those who perform [ritual] well.''69 Likewise, [they say,] "The fixed inherent natures (svar6pa) of verbal roots (dhdtu) which are conjugated in the active voice only (parasmaipadin), in the middle voice only (dtrnanepadin), or in both voices (ubhayapadin) are only [to be] repeated [and not to be changed]. Therefore [a verbal root conjugated in the active voice only] cannot be designated as a conventional sign (sam.keta) having the middle voice.''7~ [NgLgfiljuna]has used the middle voice [in MMK 2--8a] in order to cause [those grammarians] to abandon attachment to that [i.e., to mere words]. To them, the following should be said: [Thesis:] Verbal roots which are conjugated in the active voice only, do not have the intrinsic nature of being conjugated in the active voice only, [Reason:] because they [1] are not conjugated in both voices and [2] are verbal roots, [Example:] like ]verbal roots[ which are conjugated in the middle voice only. One should state [a similar syllogism] also in regard to verbal roots which are conjugated only in the middle voice. Likewise, ]Thesis:] Verbal roots which are conjugated in both voices also do not have the intrinsic nature of being conjugated in both voices, [Reason:] because they are verbal roots, [Example:] like [verbal roots] other than those [i.e., like verbal roots which are conjugated in only o n e v o i c e ] . 71 To the etymologists,72 one should say [the following]: In superficial reality, there is no harm ]in using gam in the middle voice in

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MMK 2--8@ [1] because one repeats the words used by a distinguished person 73 and [2[ because gam [can be] established as being conjugated only in the middle voice by the methods of "ruledivision ''74 and so on. In this [thesis], "A goer does not go," the [proving] property of that [goer] is [his] possession of activity, because a goer does possess activity. An example [is given] by virtue of [the property] to be proved and the proving property. [In this case, the example I is one different from that [goer]. Here the syllogism is: [Thesis:[ In ultimate reality, a goer does not go, [Reason:] because he [already] possesses activity, [Example:] like one who stays (sthdtr). Thus, to begin with, a goer does not go. Objection: Since [we hold that] a nongoer goes, that proof [of yours] does no harm to us [i.e., to our position[.

Answer:
A nongoer does not go. [MMK 2--8b] It is common knowledge that conventionally, [a goer] possesses going. When it is not possible that even a goer goes, then a nongoer, who is empty of going, indeed does not go. The idea is that [this is so] because [a nongoer] is devoid of going, ff one is a nongoer, how could one go? But if one goes, one cannot be called a nongoer. Alternatively, [the statement,] A nongoer does not go, [MMK 2--8b] adduces a similar example. One should understand that here a nongoer is to be established as not possessing going, because A nongoer does not go, [MMK 2--8b] is the topic [under discussion] here. Since a property of a nongoer is [his1 being devoid of going, the proving property is evident. Therefore the syllogism is: [Thesis:[ In ultimate reality, a nongoer also does not go, [Reason:] because he is devoid of going, [Example:] like [a nongoer] different from that. 7s The followers of Kanfida [i.e., the Vaigesikas] and [our] fellow Buddhists should also be answered in that way. 76

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The $5~. khyas might charge [Nfigfirjuna] with the fault of establishing what is [already] established [for them[, [namely, that a nongoer does not go]. They should be asked [the following] question raised in objection: What is that nongoer [of whom you say that a nongoer does not go]? If it is one in whom going is unmanifest (avyakta), [we] will declare the same conflict with inference which was explained [previously].77 If [the Sfimkhya replies that the nongoer who does not go] is the state prior to a goer, ]that] conflicts with [his[ own inference. [This is so] because in the state prior to a goer, those who have the form of standers and so on are also nongoers. 7s If [the Sfi.mkhya replies that the nongoer who does not go] is the absence of a goer, 79 [that] conflicts with [his own] former position, since [he] does not accept that the absence of a goer [is indicated] by the word "nongoer.''s~ Objection: The Jains 81 say: [We] accept the going of [one who is both] a goer and a nongoer, according to the mode (parydya). 82 [Therefore we] avoid the faults which [you] have stated. Answer: The dcdrya [Nfigfirjuna] explains that another intrinsic nature [that is, an intrinsic nature] of a mixed ('chol ha) goer and nongoer, does not possess an activity of going and does not exist: What third [category], different from a goer and a nongoer, will go? [MMK 2--8cd] The idea is that that [third category] of such a kind simply (eva) does not exist. [This is so] because it is difficult to point out that which would be both a goer and a nongoer. Here there will be the fault of [self]-contradiction (vipratisedha), due to the teachings (tham lag) of the modal point of view.83 Therefore [you[ must undoubtedly embrace a twofold doctrine, [namely,] that in relation to one ]mode?], one is a goer and in relation to another [mode?], one is a nongoer. Even then, there will be conflict with the inferences which have been shown in the cases of a goer and a nongoer ]separately]. Therefore the point which [you] maintain is not established. Objection: [The reason,] "possession of activity," does not pervade the set of all similar examples (sapaks.a). 84 Therefore the meaning of [your] reason is not established. Answer: That is not good, because [we] specify that the very one

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who possesses activity does not [emphasis represents eva] go. 85 [This is so] because, for example, although [the set of all similar examples] is not pervaded by the specification, "The very [thing] which immediately follows effort is not ]emphasis represents eva] permanent," [nevertheless that[ property of the subject (paks.adharma) is considered to be a reason, s6 It is also not the case that the meaning of [our] reason, "possession of activity," is not established for [the purpose of] negating going. This ]argument] has also answered [a similar objection, by showing[ that being devoid of going is a reason. 87 Objection: One who stays becomes a nongoer, but he also becomes a goer. Therefore, since one who stays is accepted [as the example in your syllogism], the example [in fact] does not exist. [This is so] because it lacks one part of the property to be proved. 88 Answer: Since the portion to be proved is common knowledge to both [parties in the debate], it is a suitable example; 89 hence there is no fault [in the syllogism]. Therefore, if that is the case, here any conventional designation "goes" is not possible. Therefore the meaning of [your[ reason, "because there is the conventional designation of one who possesses that [going[," is not established. 9~ [Your] example also does not exist, because it lacks the property to be proved. The meaning of the reason is also contradictory. 91 Objection: One observes that the expression, "A goer goes," [is commonly used[. Since there is no other [means of knowledge] superior to observation, it is not the case that [our[ reason and so on are unestablished. 92 Answer: True; but that is observed by a cognition which belongs to convention. That very [observation] must be examined as to [its] ultimate reality. Is that which is observed as it appears to be, or is it different? As to that, to begin with, if [you] say that it is so [i.e., as it appears], [thatI cannot be understood. 93 Why? To begin with, how will it be possible that a goer goes? [MMK 2--9ab l The meaning of the sentence is that it is indeed not possible. For example, it is like [the rhetorical question,] "How [could] one who is intent upon fleeing from a battle be a hero?"

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How is it not possible? To show that, [Nfigfirjuna says,] When a goer is not possible without going. [MMK 2--9cd] How going is not possible has been shown at the very beginning [of this chapter by the verses] starting with To begin with, the traversed is not being traversed; [MMK

2-1al
and [it has been shown by] the negation of the origination of going. 94 Alternatively, To begin with, a goer does not go, [MMK 2--8a] sets forth the thesis; and [MMK 2--9] starting with To begin with, how will it be possible that a goer goes? [MMK 2--9ab] shows that. [MMK 2--9] should be explained according to [the previous] explanation. Objection: Therefore, in that way, going does not exist in ultimate reality. Nevertheless [we say:] The goer is unreal (abhf~ta); but by imputation (samdropya), the goer goes.

Answer:
For one whose position (paksa) is that a goer goes, it follows That [there is] a goer without going -- because he maintains that a goer goes. [MMK 2--10] For that disputant according to whose position it is maintained that a goer goes, it follows that [there is] a goer without going. Why? Because he maintains that a goer goes. The idea is that [this is so] because if going does not exist, the goer does not possess that going. Alternatively, [it is so] because that single going which exists is complete in that [term,] "goes. ''95 But if [the opponent], wishing to avoid that fault, maintains that the goer possesses an ultimately real going, even so [Nfigfirjuna says,] If a goer goes, it follows that [there are] two goings: That by which he is manifest (ajyate) as a "goer" and that which he, having become a goer, goes. [MMK 2--11]

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If a goer possesses going, it follows that [there are] two goings. How? The going by which he is manifest as a "goer" and the going which he, having become a goer, goes. In that case, there will also be this fault: If it follows [that there are] two goings, it also follows [that there are] two goers. Because without a goer, going is not possible. [MMK 2--6] The idea is that [this is so] because an activity is dependent on a basis (gzhi). [The proponents of going[ 96 do not maintain that there is a goer without going [or] two goings and two goers. What do they maintain? They maintain that a goer has going and that [there is] just one going and also just one goer. [We say that] that also is established in superficial reality; but in ultimate reality, it is not established. Hence, because [their[ example 97 does not exist, the proof stated by [our] opponents is not established. Objection: The opponents say: [Thesis:] Going does indeed exist, [Reason:] because the beginning (ffrarnbha) of that exists. [Dissimilar example:] Here that which does not exist has no beginning, as, for example, a garland of sky-flowers has no beginning. [Similar example:] One who has been staying (sdod par gyur pa) does possess the beginning of going, which has the defining characteristic of movement (rab tu gYo ba). [Conclusion:] Therefore going does indeed exist. Answer: Here, like one who paints a multicolored fowl another color and presents [it as a different bird], [you] have presented in different words just what [we] have answered previously. For the ffcdrya [Nfigfirjuna] raises an objection in the form of a question to you, [asking,] "Here does that very beginning of going exist on the traversed, the untraversed, or that which is being traversed?" [Then] as before, it is not possible in any way. Wishing to show [that], [Nfigfirjuna] says, One does not begin to go on the [path already[ traversed. [MMK 2--12a] [This is so] because there the activity of going is [already[ past.

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One does not begin to go on the [path] not [yet] traversed.

[MMK2--12b]

[This is so] because going does not exist on the [path[ not [yet] traversed, which is empty of going. One does not begin [to go] on the [path] which is [in the process of] being traversed. [MMK 2--12c1 [This is so] because the [path[ which is [in the process of] being traversed never exists apart from the [path already[ traversed and the [path] not [yet] traversed. Where does one begin to go? [MMK 2--12d] Now then, tell [us] that [argument] by which [your[ stated reason will be established, so that the meaning which [you] maintain will be established! Therefore here the meaning of the sentence [i.e., MMK 2--12d] is that it has been shown that the beginning [of going[ does not exist on the traversed, the untraversed, or that which is being traversed. Thus here there will be [the following] syllogisms: [Thesis:] The beginning of going does not exist on the [path already[ traversed, [Reason:] because it is a path, [Example:] like the untraversed path. Alternatively, ]Thesis:] The beginning of going does not exist on the untraversed [i.e., the path not yet traversed], [Reason:] because it is untraversed, [Example:] like an untraversed [path] other than [the path] one wishes to traverse. Likewise, [Thesis:] Even on that which is being traversed, the beginning of going is not possible, [Reason:] because it is a path, [Example:] like [paths] different from that [i.e., the traversed and the untraversed]. Therefore, in that way, since the beginning [of going] does not exist, the meaning of [your] reason, 98 [that is,] the beginning [of going], is not established; and [your reason] is too specific (asddhdran, a). 99 [The explanation] in full is as before? ~176

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Objection:
[Thesis:] Well, one can understand in a different way that going exists, [Reason:] because a cause exists for applying a particular expression to an entity which has [a temporal stage] different from [going's] own temporal stage (avasthd). 1~ [Dissimilar example:] Here, as for that which does not exist, there is no cause for applying a particular expression to an entity which has [a temporal stage] different from its own temporal stage. For example, there is no cause for applying the particular expressions, "One blind from birth saw; one blind from birth sees; he will see," to one blind from birth, who is devoid of visual cognition. [Application:[ There is a cause for applying a particular expression to an entity which has [a temporal stage] different from going's own temporal stage. That [place] where that [going] has [already] occurred is the traversed [path]. That [place] where that ]going] is [now] occurring is [the path] which is being traversed. That [place] where that [going[ has not [yet] occurred is the untraversed [path]. [Conclusion:] Therefore, just by virtue of the reason which has been stated, going does indeed exist; and the point under discussion 1~ is established. Answer: If the origination of going existed, it would also be the case that "That [place] where that [going] has [already] occurred is the traversed [path]. That [place] where that [going] is [now] occurring is [the path] which is being traversed. That [place] where that [going] has not [yet] occurred is the untraversed [path]." But it has been shown that that going also does not exist. Even if going did exist, Prior to the beginning of going, neither [the path[ which is being traversed nor the [path already] traversed, Where that going could begin, exists. How could there be going on the untraversed? [MMK 2--13] Prior to the beginning of going, [the path[ which is being traversed, where going could begin, does not exist and is empty of going. The [path already] traversed also does not exist. The idea is that that [path already traversed] is not possible for one who does

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not possess going. 1~ Likewise, the meaning of [the rhetorical question,] "How could there be going on the untraversed?" is that going does not exist [there]. [This is so] because [such a[ thesis would conflict with inference, since there are the inferences previously indicated, 1~ which show that if [a path] is empty of going, going is not possible [there]. Therefore, in that way, when in ultimate reality, the conceptual construction of going is not possible in any way, then If the beginning of going just does not appear in any way, What traversed [path or] what ]path] which is being traversed [or] what untraversed [path] is conceptually constructed?

NMK 2--141
The word "just" (eva) has the meaning of specification. Here one should understand that "just" [goes with] "does not appear." Otherwise, one would understand that [the beginning] of just going [does not exist], but not [that the beginnings[ of other [activities do not exisq. 1~ [The conceptual construction of the traversed, etc.] is like the conceptual construction by one suffering from eye disease of unreal hairs, flies, mosquitoes, and so on. Since going does not exist, that same fault 1~ pursues you, like the javelin ]which killed] Ghatotkaca. 1~

Objection:
[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, going does indeed exist, [Reason:] because [its] opposite exists. [Similar Example:] Here it is seen that whatever has an opposite exists, as for example, the opposite of light, darkness, exists [and so light exists]. [Application:] Going also has an opposite, [namely,] stopping. 1~ [Conclusion:] Therefore going does indeed exist. Answer: You [will be asked] a question raised in objection ]concerning] that, also. To whom do you think stopping belongs? Does it belong to a goer or a nongoer? As to that, if [you] think that it belongs to a goer, [N~tg~trjuna says,] To begin with, a goer does not stop. [MMK 2--15a] The phrase "to begin with" (tavat) relates to the order [of negations in MMK 2--15]. "A goer does not stop" sets forth the thesis. Since a property of a goer is that he possesses an activity [of

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going], the property of the subject ]which proves the thesis] is evident. An example [is given] by virtue of that [proving property and property to be proved]. [In this case, the example is] a goer whose going is unimpaired. Here the inference is: ]Thesis:[ In ultimate reality, it is not possible that a goer stops, [Reason:] because he possesses an activity of going, [Example:] like Devadatta [when his activity of[ going is unimpaired. But if you think that [stopping] belongs to a nongoer, [Nfigfirjuna says,] A nongoer does not stop. [MMK 2--15b] The idea is that [this is so] because that is not possible, since even conventionally, one who is devoid of going cannot cease to go. But if, because ]you] are possessed by the demon of obstinacy, 1~ [you] think that some other stops, [Nfigfirjuna asks,] What third [category[, different from a goer and a nongoer, will stop? [MMK 2--15cd] Now tell [us[ that, friend! The meaning of the sentence is that it is not possible that any [such] stops. Alternatively, [one can show as follows that a goer does not stop:] To begin with, how indeed will it be possible that a goer stops, When a goer is not possible without going (gamana)? [MMK 2--16] The idea is that [this is so] because it is not possible, since two activities [of a single agent] at the same time are contradictory. Thus that sentence [i.e., MMK 2--16] has shown that the conventional expression, "A goer stops," is not possible, because it has shown that one who stops is devoid of going. Objection: There is no fault [in saying that one who stops goes] since it is established that even one who is devoid of going is a goer, because he possesses the state of [having] the capacity [to go] in the three times, like a potter. 11~ Answer: Because [you[ accept a metaphorical designation (upacdra) [that is, that one who is not going is a goer], what [you yourself] accept [that is, that one who is really a goer stops] is lost.

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Therefore, as before, it follows that [your] reason and example will be faulty, m Alternatively, there is also another way of refutation. Is that stopping supposed here to be a cessation [of going] on the traversed, the untraversed, or that which is being traversed? As to that, [Nfigfirjuna says,] One does not stop on that which is being traversed, nor on the traversed or the untraversedJ lz [MMK 2-- 17ab] One does not stop on that which is being traversed because, by the inference previously shown, stopping is not possible for one who possesses going. If [you] say that that ]stopping] is established on the [path already] traversed, [we answer that] the establishment of that [stopping] on the traversed is also not ]logically] possible. [This is so] because stopping, the cessation of going, does not exist on the traversed, where there is no going. If [you] think, "Well then, stopping will be established on the untraversed," that is also not possible, because the cessation [of going] is not possible where going does not exist. Therefore one also does not stop on the untraversed. Thus the meaning of ]your] reason 113 is not established. There is also no positive concomitance [in your example] since [we] do not accept that light and darkness are opposites in ultimate reality. Alternatively, the meaning [of your reason] is also contradictory. 114 Objection: Stopping does indeed exist, [1] because [its] opposite [i.e., going] exists, [2] because [its] beginning (drambha) exists, and [3] because an entity [i.e., going] 115 originates due to the cessation of that ]staying]. Answer: To those [who make such an objection], one should say, Going (gamana), beginning (sam.pravrtti), and cessation are the same as going (gati). [MMK 2--17cd]

(nivr.tti)

[1] Just as the opposite of going is not possible for a goer, a nongoer, or one different from those, so also the opposite of stopping is not possible for one who stops, one who does not stop, or one different from those. [2] Just as the beginning (drambha) of going is not possible on the traversed, the untraversed, or that which is being traversed, so also the beginning (sam.pravrtti) of

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stopping is not possible on [a path] where one has stopped [already], on ]a path] where one has not ]yet] stopped, or on [a path] where one is [in the process of] stopping. [3] Just as the cessation of going is also not possible on the traversed, the untraversed, or that which is being traversed, so also the cessation of stopping is not possible on [a path] where one has stopped [already], where one has not [yet] stopped, or where one is [in the process of] stopping. In that way, one should expand inferences. For fear of prolixity and because the meaning has been explained [already], [these points] have not been explained in detail. Nevertheless, I will explain just a part: [Thesis:] One who stops does not go, [Reason:] because he is devoid of going, [Example:] like another who stops, whose stopping is [still] unimpaired. [Thesis:] The beginning of stopping does not exist on [a path] where one has [already] stopped, [Reason:] because one has [already[ stopped [there], [Example:] like [a path] where one has stopped for a long time. [Thesis:] Stopping does not cease on [a path] where one has [already[ stopped, [Reason:[ because going does not exist [there[, [Example:] like another [path where[ stopping is [still[ unimpaired. Likewise, in the remaining [cases[ also, one should apply inferences appropriately. Therefore in that way, because stopping is not established, [you] are certainly not freed from the fault which [we] have stated. 116 Objection: You say that neither a goer nor going exists. Since [you thus] exclude [expressions I commonly known in the world, [such as] "Caitra goes; Maitra goes," [your position] will be in conflict with common knowledge. For example, it is common knowledge in the world that [what is called] "hare-possessing" 117 is just the moon; but to exclude [that, saying that it is] not the moon [is in conflict with common knowledge]. Answer: Here what is the meaning of [your] reason? Is it "because of excluding what is commonly known in the world" or "because of excluding what is commonly known in treatises?" The point is this: If [the meaning is] "because of excluding what is commonly known in the world," the meaning of [your] reason is not established. [This

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is so] because [we] have not abandoned the conventional designations of goer and going which are commonly known in the world, since [we] have just employed a qualified thesis [by saying,] "in ultimate reality." If [on the other hand, you mean that] that [position of ours] will be in conflict with common knowledge because it excludes what is commonly known in [our] own treatises, ]you] ought to say ]instead] that it will be in conflict with what [we ourselves] accept. [But] that ]fault] also finds no place with us. [This is so] because we do not accept that a goer and going exist in ultimate reality and also because [we] have shown previously that those two ]i.e., a goer and going] are not possible. Moreover, [the following answer to the opponent's objection] is explained. If a goer and going were established in ultimate reality, they would necessarily be either the same or different; but that is also not possible. How [is it not possible]? [Nfigfirjuna] will examine that very [point]: It is not [logically] possible that a goer is just the same as [his] going (gamana), Nor is it [logically] possible that the goer is just different from [his] going (gati). [MMK 2--18] That ]verse] sets forth two theses. How are [sameness and difference] not [logically] possible? If a goer were just the same as [his] going (gamana), The identity (eMbhdva) of agent and action/object (karman) 118 would follow. [MMK 2--19] Thus because here [in MMK 2--19] there is a prasahgaargument, 119 the original meaning (prakrta-artha) can be negated; and [the verse] has the meaning of a statement in which a reversed meaning is manifest. 12~ For example, [it is like the following argument:] If sound were permanent, it would follow that a jar would also be permanent; but it is not maintained that a jar, which is made [and] is impermanent, is permanent. Therefore, ]Thesis:] sound is impermanent, [Reason:] because it is made, ]Example:] like a jar.

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Therefore here, by virtue of the meaning of [that] statement [in which a reversed meaning is manifest], the syllogism is: [Thesis:] In ultimate reality, goer and going are not just the same, [Reason:] because they are agent and action/object, [Example:] like the cutter and the cut (bcad pa). Although [we] have explained that goer and going are not just the same, [we] have not [thereby] shown that they are just different. 12l Objection: Others 122 say: If one examines the meaning of [your[ thesis, [one finds that your] example does not exist, because the cutter and the cut lack difference, which has the defining characteristic that each [of two things[ is empty of the potentiality for the other. 123 Answer: That is not good, because [we] merely negate sameness; and that [example], too, is indeed common knowledge because the manifestations of cutter and cut are distinct. Even if one accepts that the meaning of the thesis has the defining characteristic that each [of the two, goer and going[ is empty of the potentiality for the other, it is not the case that an example does not exist. [This is so] because in superficial reality, it is generally established that what is to be known (rtogs par bya ba) and the one who knows (rtogs par byed pa) are each empty of the potentiality for the other; and just those are maintained to be the exampleJ 24

Objection:
[Thesis:[ In ultimate reality, the cutter and the cut are not just different, [Reason:] because they are measurable, 125 [Example:] like the cut's own self. Therefore [your reason] suffers from [the fault] that it is counterbalanced. 126 Answer: That is also not [logically] possible, because [our reason] will not [in fact] suffer from [the fault] of being counterbalanced. [This is so] since it is not established that the cut's own self is not just different. 127 Even if [our reason] did suffer from [the fault[ of being counterbalanced, [we] do not believe ('chel ba) in the two extremes (anta) of sameness and difference. Since [we] wish to show that [those two extremes[ are not established in ultimate reality, what [we] maintain is established. 128 If [you are trying[ to prove that [the cutter and the

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cut] are the same conventionally, [that thesis] will be in conflict with common knowledge. [The opponent], having agreed to 129 the meaning of [our] thesis, might argue ]as follows:] Objection: By explaining that the goer and the going are not just the same, ]you] have shown that goer and going are just different. Therefore there will be conflict with what [you yourself] accept. Answer: That ]objection] has also been answered by that same ]argument, i.e., by the answer to the previous objection]. 13~ In order to refute those who, wishing to avoid the faults which have been explained, resort to the position that [goer and going] are different, [I] will [now] show the proof of the second thesis which was set forth [in MMK 2--18]: [Conventionally, the goer is] 131 a collection of conditioned factors, 132 which arises if [its] specific (pratiniyata) causes and conditions exist. 133 ]That collection is composed of] various intrinsic natures, TM and it is the basis of activities. It has arisen from the traces and seeds and causes of conceptual proliferation proceeding from beginningless time. 135 ]Conventionally, going is] the uninterrupted origination [of that collection] in another place by virtue of false conceptual construction (abh(tta-parikalpa). 136 In regard to ]that conventional goer and going], If a goer who is just different from going (gati) is conceptually constructed, [MMK 2--20ab] one who conceptually constructs [such a goer] can in no way be stopped ]from doing so]; but he will suffer by obtaining an undesired [consequence]. 137 How [will there be an undesired consequence]? Here if one accepts that goer and going are just different, There would be going (gamana) without a goer and a goer without going. ]MMK 2--20cd] The idea is that [this is so] because they are different like a pot and a cloth, which are not related by the relation (bhdva) of support (rten) and supported (brten pa). 138 ]But] even the proponent of difference does not maintain that there is going without a goer or a goer without going.

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By means of that undesired consequence, 139 the property of the subject [which proves the thesis] is the [mutual] dependence of goer and going; and the property to be proved is that [goer and going] are not different. By virtue of that [property to the proved and proving property], the example is shown to be a subject (dharmin) which is common knowledge [to both proponent and opponent, and] which possesses the [property] to be proved and the proving property. 14~ [Therefore] here the syllogism is: [Thesis:] One should understand that in ultimate reality, going is not just different from the goer, [Reason:] because [the goer] is dependent on the use of a particular expression (brjod pa khyad par can jug pa), [Example:] like going's own self. Likewise, [Thesis:] One should specify that in ultimate reality, a goer is also not just different from [his] going, [Reason:] because [going] is dependent on the use of a particular expression, [Example:] like the goer's own self. TM It has not been shown that [the above reason] is absent from all dissimilar cases, because [its[ absence from that [set of all dissimilar cases] is established [simply] because that [set of dissimilar cases] does not exist. 142 Objection: [Mutual] dependence is not established for [things] for which the relation of support and supported is not established. Therefore [your reason] does not pervade one part of the subject. 143 Answer: Even for those [things], finally there is undoubtedly the use of the particular expression, "This is one [thing]; this is another." Therefore, since they are [mutually] dependent, there is no fault [in our reason]. 144 Objection: [Things] are different [from each other] because of a discrimination (vyavaccheda) that one is not the other or because they possess [the quality (gun.a) of] difference. 145 Answer: Even for those [things], the use of the particular expression, "This is one [thing[; this is another," undoubtedly exists in dependence on that [discrimination or that quality]. Therefore since they are dependent, it is not the case that the meaning of [our] reason is unestablished.

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By the very inference which has been shown, difference is not established [at all]. Therefore, since there are no dissimilar cases, it is also not the case that [our reason] is inconclusive) 46 There is also no conflict with common knowledge. [This is so] because the examination of reality is not the province of those with untrained minds, chariot-makers and so on, and because [this] has been shown previously) 47

Objection:
[Thesis:] The goer is just different from [his] going, ]Reason:] because the conventional designation ["a goer's going"] exists, [Example:] just as [the conventional designation I "Devadatta's horse" [exists, and Devadatta is different from his horse]) 4s Answer: That, too, is not good, [1] because [difference] is not established for one part of the subject since [the expression] "the goer's own self" is established in the case of a goer 149 and [2] because [your reason] is inconclusive even for yourself because of [the example of] a goer's own self) 5~ [Your argument is not good] because [your] example also does not exist, since it is not established that Devadatta and ]his] horse are different [in ultimate reality]. That [refutation] has also answered [arguments with] reasons such as "because the cognitions are different," etc. TM Objection: [The following syllogism[ might occur to the mind of one who is sharp-witted: [Thesis:] The term, "the goer, Devadatta" has a referent (visaya) which is connected with a category (paddrtha) [i.e., going] which is different from [the goer, Devadatta's] own self [and therefore goer and going are different], 152 [Reason:] because there is positive and negative concomitance, 153 [Example:] like the term "blue blanket. ''154 [Dissimilar Example:] That term which is not of the sort which has been described does not have positive and negative concomitance, as with the term "existence. ''1s5 Answer: As to that, if ]you] infer that [goer and going] are different, [then] since there is no relation of support and supported, the relation of goer and going is excluded. Therefore ]you] will be in conflict with [your own] inference. 156 [Moreover, your[ reason is inconclusive. [This is so] because

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there is positive and negative concomitance of the term "Devadatta, Devadatta" also with other [persons] of the same name, t57 who are not connected with a category different from their own selves. Even if [your reason] is stated specially, the meaning of the reason is not established. 158 [Your example is faulty] because it is also not established in ultimate reality that the term "blue blanket" has the referent (vis.aya) which ]you] have stated. 159 By ]pointing out] the faults of the [opponent's] reason and example, that ]preceding refutation] has also answered the position ]concerning] the cognition that the goer is just different from [his] going. ~6~ Objection: Since [you] have shown an inference in order to negate sameness, [you] have [thereby] refuted the inferences which [you] have shown negating difference. Therefore ]your] negation of difference is also not established. Answer: [We] have negated sameness and difference by virtue of showing inferences negating both. [By those negations, we] wish to show that the cognition which has those [two, sameness and difference] as [its] object is unoriginated. 161 Hence there is no fault [in our giving inferences to negate both]. Therefore, in that way, [we] have shown that it is not the case that the goer is just different from [his] going. [But] the opponent has wrongly supposed that the meaning of [our] thesis is that [goer and going] are just nondifferent [i.e., the same]; 162 [and] he has implied ~63 that [this] conflicts with what [we ourselves] accept. There is ]however] no ]such] conflict. Objection: Another [Vaiie.sika] might show, by a minute examination, that [our] example does not exist, because it is not established that the goer's own self is not just different from itself. 164 Answer: That is also not good. Since [we] have established that the goer's own self is empty of the intrinsic nature of difference, there is no fault in giving [the goer's own self] as an example. Therefore, in that way, the arguments adduced by the followers of Kanfida [i.e., the Vaiie.sikas] out of a desire to conceal the faults of their own doctrine do not harm us. Objection: Having abandoned the original topic, [namely,] that going does not exist, [you] assert that goer and going are not the same or different. That [constitutes] abandoning the original topic and futile rejoinder. 165

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Answer:
For which two, by means of identity (ndndbhdva) . . . M M K 2--21ab

(ekibhdva) or difference

If goer and going were established as the same or different, one would know that those two exist. But when, as has been explained, as the same or different, there is no establishment, how can there be establishment of those tWO? 166 [MMK 2--21cd] Therefore, in that way, because [we] wish to negate the very existence (bhdva) of that [going], [our raising the question of whether goer and going are the same or different] is not abandoning the original topic. Because the conceptual construction that they are the same, etc., is itself negated, [our argument] is also not a futile rejoinder. ObJection: 167 Although they cannot be specified as the same or different, goer and going are established. Therefore the faults which [you] have explained [for each of those two cases] do not exist [for our own position]. Answer: To that [objection], also, [our] answer is the same: For which two [there is existence] by means of identity or differe n c e . . . [MMK 2--2lab] one can understand that those two exist conventionally; but you maintain that in ultimate reality, [goer and going cannot be described as the same or different]. Therefore if as the same or different, there is no establishment, how can there be establishment of those two? [MMK 2--21cd] ]That is, their establishment] does not exist. The idea is that ]this is so] because there is no inference showing the existence [of two things] which do not exist as the same or different. 168 [We] have previously shown [the following] inferences: 169 [Thesis:] In ultimate reality, a goer does not go, [Reason:] because he [already] possesses activity, [Example:] like one who stays. Likewise,

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[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, it is not possible that a goer stops, [Reason:[ because he possesses an activity of going, [Example:[ like Devadatta [when his activity of] going is unimpaired. Others, who fancy that they are learned, allege that [those syllogisms] are faulty: Objection: What is the general meaning Iof the reason in these two syllogisms[? Is it that one who possesses an activity does not perform another activity? Or is it that he does not perform that activity which he possesses? As to that, if [you] maintain the former supposition, there is no example, because [the examples you have cited[ do perform activities different from that [activity which is under consideration]. 17~But if [you[ maintain the latter supposition, even so the meaning [of your reason[ is contradictory. [This is so] because a speaker speaks words and a cutter cuts wood and [because[ one performs that [activity] because of possessing that [activity]. ~71 Answer: As to that, here it is not the case that there is no example. [We do, in fact,l maintain that [our] example is the agent of an activity different from that [going], who is not established as an agent of going, [such as] one who stays, etc. Therefore there is no avoiding the faults which [we] have stated. 172 Nor is the meaning [of our reason] contradictory, for That [goer] does not go that going (gati) by which he is manifest as a goer. [MMK 2--22ab] The meaning is that that goer does not go that going by which he is manifest as a "goer." [This is so] because in ultimate reality [the goer and that going by which he is manifest as a goer] are not just different, like [the goer and his] own self. Therefore [you] will be in conflict with [your] own inference. 17~ Those who say that [goer and going] are not just different [conventionally] will also be in conflict with common knowledge, because it is common knowledge in the world that Someone goes somewhere. [MMK 2--22d] [That is, someone goes somewhere[ different from his own setf. 174 Alternatively, [one can argue as follows:[ That [goer] does not go that going (gati) by which he is manifest as a goer. [MMK 2--22ab]

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Why?
Because [the goer] does not exist prior to [his] going (gall). [MMK 2--22c] "Prior to ]his] going" [means] "before [his] going." The meaning is "before the origination of [his] going." ]Prior to his going,] there is not any goer persisting by his own self who [either] would be the cause of going or would depend on the conventional designation, "He moves and goes. ''iv5 For conventionally, the goer is a collection of conditioned factors which originates continuously (dus tha dad pa reed par) in another place. [This origination] occurs by virtue of the element (dhdlu), air, which is produced by effort; [and that effort, in turn,] arises from wishing as [its] cause. 176 Going is that which is the arising of that [goer] with a defining characteristic unlike that of the previous moment. 177 ]We] also do not maintain that because of the conventional designation of the cause as the agent, that [goer] is the agent [of going] in reality (yang dag par). For Someone goes somewhere. [MMK 2--22d] [That is, he does] not [go] to his own self, because it is not possible to act on one's own self. 178 Thus to begin with, [the half-verse] That [goer] does not go that going (gati) by which he is manifest as a goer, [MMK 2--22ab] [is stated] for [our] fellow Buddhists. 179 Objection: For the Sfi.mkhya position, also, [going and goer have the same nature; but the goer performs the activity of going]. Going is the predominance of [the guna called] rajas in [the elements] earth and so on [when they have] the particular state (rnam par gnas pa) of a ]living] body. The goer is [the body as] the group of states (gnas) which perform the activity [of going], which possess that [rajas] and have the nature of that [rajas].18~ Answer: That also [is not possible], Because [the goer] does not exist prior to ]his] going. [MMK 2--22c]

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Prior to going, one who has the nature of that ]going, i.e., rajas] does not exist, because otherwise it would follow that one goes even when one stays. When going has [already] appeared, then it is also not possible that [the goer] is the cause of that [going]. [This is so because] Someone goes somewhere. [MMK 2--22d] The idea is that that very [going] does not make that [going]. ~a Those expressions, [such as] "A sprout grows" [or] "He makes himself learned," [which refer] to the production of a particular origination in something, are also imputed by conceptual construction. [This is so] because it is not possible to act on the unoriginated. 182 Just as it is not possible that [a goer] who has the nature of going goes, so also in the case of [expressions such as] "A speaker speaks words" or "A cutter cuts wood," it is not possible to perform an activity on one's own self. Objection: I83 Here also, effort arises from wishing as [its] cause. [Effort] produces the places of articulation (sthdna) and the activity of the organs of articulation (karana). The collection of conditioned factors of speech, called "letters (vya~jana), words, and sentences (pada), ''184 arises from [the places of articulation and the activity of the organs of articulation] as [its] cause. [The collection of conditioned factors of speech] is not different in intrinsic nature from the speaker. It [originates with] a defining characteristic unlike that of the previous moment. 185 Because of a particular [collection of conditioned factors of speech], [a person] is [conventionally] called a speaker. Since the cause of that [collection of conditioned factors of speech] is the speaker, [one says that] the speaker speaks words.186 Answer: That is also not possible, Because [the speaker] does not exist prior to ]his] speaking. Someone speaks something. 187 By that Iargument], [we] have also answered [the assertion] that a cutter cuts wood. Therefore, in that way, the examples also, like the exemplified (dngos), are not established. 188 Hence it is [logically] possible that the fault that they have a contradictory meaning will
o c c u r . 189

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WILLIAM L. AMES [Buddhapfilita] 190 says: As to

[Buddhapdlita's commentary:] Here that [pdda],

Because [a goer] does not exist prior to [his] going: [MMK 2--22c] Prior to the origination of going, it is not possible that a goer who is devoid of going is ]in fact] a goer. Therefore, since the conventional designation, "A goer goes," is not possible, it is not ]logically] possible that a goer goes. [Bhdvaviveka's critique:] That [explanation] is not [logically] possible, because the point has [already] been shown by means of that [argument] that a goer does not go [in MMK 2--9]. Objection: The Vaigesikas say: It is true that That [goer] does not go that going as a goer. [MMK 2--22ab]

(gati) by which he

is manifest

Nevertheless, since [for us] that [goer] is just different from that [going], 191 we will not be harmed by a refutation (bddha) of the sort which [you] have stated. We prove that: ]Thesis:] The cognition of substance and the cognition of action are just different, [Reason:] because they have separate objects (visaya), ]Example:] like the difference of [one's] cognition of a cow and [one's] cognition of a gayal. [Dissimilar Example:] That [cognition] which is not just different does not have a separate object, just as a cognition of a cow is not just different from itself. Answer: Just as That [goer] does not go that going as a goer, [MMK 2--22ab]

(gati) by which he

is manifest

because that is not [logically] possible, likewise That [goer] does not go a going (gati) different from that by which he is manifest as a goer. [MMK 2--23ab] The idea is that [this is so] [1] because [a going] different from that [goer] has been negated [in MMK 2--20], [2] because there is no inference which shows that, [3] because it is accepted that it is not possible for anything which is together (sdrdharn) with something

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to be different [from it], 192 and [4] because an example is also not established. Alternatively, [the half-verse,] That [goer] does not go a going (gati) different from that by which he is manifest as a goer, [MMK 2--23ab] sets forth the thesis. Why [is that thesis so]? Because two goings 2--23cd]

(gati) are not possible for one goer. [MMK

That ]half-verse] shows that the ]proving] property of the goer is that he does not possess two goings. Here the inference is: ]Thesis:] In ultimate reality, a goer does not go a going different from himself, ]Reason:] because he does not possess two goings, [Example:] like one who stays. [Buddhapdlita's commentary:] Here [Buddhapfilita] 193 says: Because two goings 2--23cd]

(gati) are not possible for one goer: [MMK

Because two goings -- [namely, the going] by which he is manifest as a goer and [the going] which he goes [after] having become a goer -- are not possible for one goer, therefore the goer also does not go a going which is different from that [by which he is manifest as a goer]. [Bhdvaviveka's critique:] That is not [logically] possible, [1] because, since [you] have accepted that just one cause of going does exist [for one goer], it is established that a goer goes because of possessing that ]single cause of going], [2] because it has not been negated that [the goer] is different [from his going], and [3] because [this argument] is not different from that [given in MMK 2--9:] To begin with, how will it be possible that a goer goes? [MMK 2--9ab]

Objection: The followers of Kanfida [i.e., the Vaigesikas] say: [There isI just one going. That [going] is indeed different from the goer; and because of [his] possessing that [going], one can conventionally designate the goer as a "goer." Since [the goer] is the cause

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of going, one says, "He goes," when he performs that [going]. For example, since a lamp is the cause of light, one says, "[The lamp] illuminates." Therefore that [argument of yours,] Because two goings 2--23cd]

(gati) are not possible for one goer, [MMK

is not [logically] possible. 194 Answer: That is not good, [1] because [you] have established the reason which [we] have stated, 19s [2] because going has been negated in ultimate reality, and [3] because origination from [a prior state ofl nonexistence has been negated. 196 Alternatively, [that objection is not good[ because it will suffer from conflict with inference, since [Thesis:] It is understood that a goer is not a cause which possesses going, [Reason:] because he is the cause of the use of a particular cognition and word, [Example:] like action (karman)? 97 [Moreover, neither a goer nor a nongoer possesses going. A goer does not possess going] because it would be pointless for a goer to possess that. [A nongoer does not possess going] because a nongoer also, since he is not a goer, does not possess that [going], just as one who stays [does not]) 9s Here [you] should ask for or state syllogisms. Since all proponents are valiant in propounding their own systems (gzhung), there is no end to words. 199 Therefore if one investigates in that way by means of reasoning, A real (sadbhtita) goer does not go the threefold going (gamana). An unreal (asadbh(tta) [goer] also does not go the threefold going. [MMK 2--24] ]A goer] who is both real and unreal (sadasadbhtita) does not go the threefold going. [MMK 2--25ab] "A real goer" is a goer who possesses going 2~176 ba dang ('gro ldan pa); the meaning is that he has going ('gro ba yod pa). [In these verses,] "going" (gamana) [means] "that which is to be traversed" (gantavya). "Threefold" [refers to] the traversed (gata), the untraversed (agata), and that which is being traversed (garnyamdna). "An unreal [goer]" is a goer who is devoid of going. "[A

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goer] who is both real and unreal" is a goer who both possesses going and is devoid of going. As to that, to begin with, [Thesis:] A real goer does not go the threefold going, ]Reason:] because he [already] possesses the activity [of going], [Example:] like [another real goer] different from that [first real goer]. 2~ [Thesis:] An unreal [goer] also does not go the threefold going, ]Reason:] because he is devoid of going, [Example:] like one who stays. [A goer] who is both real and unreal also does not go the threefold going, because there would be conflict with the inferences shown in both cases [separately]. Likewise, one should also adduce appropriate reasons and examples for [syllogisms with] "going" as the subject. 2~ Therefore when one thus examines in every way by means of reasoning and scripture, the threefold going, etc., are not possible in any way. Therefore [the activity of I going (gati), the goer, and that which is to be traversed (gantavya) do not exist. [MMK 2--25cd] [That half-verse] is the conclusion [of the chapter I by virtue of the result of the effort which has been shown. By means of this case [i.e., goer and going], the dcdrya [Nfigfirjuna] has also shown the negation of the remaining activities and agents. As to that, here the meaning of the chapter [is as follows:] By showing that going lacks intrinsic nature, it has been shown that dependent origination possesses the characteristics of [being1 without coming and without going. Therefore those [scriptural[ statements [such as the following] are established: 2~ [From the Arya-aksayamati-nirde~a-s~tra,] a04 Where there is no going (gad) and no coming (dgati), that is the state (gati) of the Noble Ones. [From the Dharmodgata chapter of the Ast.asdhasrikdprajhdpdramitd-sfitra,] 20s Son of good family, the Tathfigata has no coming or going. [From the Arya-brahma-vigesa-cintd-pariprcchd-sfttra,] 2o6 Here there is not any coming or going.

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All dharrnas are like space. Likewise, [from the Bhagavati-prajhdpdramitd-suvikrdntavikrdmistitra,] 207 W h e r e t h e r e is n o t e v e n so m u c h as an a t o m to b e t r a v e r s e d o r to b e a r r i v e d at, that is the b o d h i s a t t v a ' s p e r f e c t i o n o f d i s c e r n m e n t . T h e r e c o m i n g a n d going are n o t discerned. Suvikr5_ntavikrSa-nin, the c o m i n g a n d going o f m a t t e r are n o t d i s c e r n e d (prajhdyate). T h e c o m i n g and going o f feeling, p e r c e p t i o n / c o n c e p t i o n , m e n t a l formations, a n d cognition are n o t d i s c e r n e d . T h a t which is the n o n d i s c e r n m e n t o f the c o m i n g and going o f matter, feeling, p e r c e p t i o n / c o n c e p t i o n , m e n t a l f o r m a t i o n s , a n d cognition is the p e r f e c t i o n o f d i s c e r n m e n t . 2~ T h e s e c o n d c h a p t e r , " E x a m i n a t i o n o f the T r a v e r s e d , the U n t r a versed, a n d that w h i c h is being T r a v e r s e d , " o f the Prajfi@radipa, a c o m m e n t a r y o n [Nfigfirjuna's] MadhyamakarnFda c o m p o s e d b y dcdrya B h a v y a k a r a / B h a v y a k f i r a (legs ldan byed) 2~ [is concluded].

N O T E S TO T R A N S L A T I O N I would like to express my thanks to David Seyfort Ruegg, in whose class at the University of Washington I read part of chapter two, for a number of helpful comments and insights. I would also like to thank David Eckel for sending me a copy of his notes for a translation of chapter two. Any errors in this translation are, of course, my own. 2 "The traversed, the untraversed, and that which is being traversed" translates gata-agata-gamyamdna. I generally translate forms derived from the Sanskrit verbal root gam with forms of the English verb "to go." Unlike "to go," however, garn may take a direct object. In this chapter, passive forms of gain, such as gata, agata, gamyamdna, and gantavya refer to the path which is (or is not) being traversed or gone over or gone on at some point in time. Here I have used the English verb "to traverse" to translate gain. The third singular present passive gamyate may mean either "is being traversed" or "is known," depending on the context. See also note 17. In verses 22 and 23, gati is used as a direct object of gacchati. Here gatim. gacchati means "one goes the going" in the sense of "one performs the activity of going." In verses 24 and 25, on the other hand, gamanam gacchati means "one goes the going" in the sense of "one traverses (the path) to be traversed" (gamana glossed as gantavya). See note 200. 3 See MMK 1--A,B. Avalokitavrata comments that Mahfiyfina sfitras, such as the Prajfi@dramitd, teach that all dharmas are without coming and going. Nevertheless, others will not understand just by means of that scripture. Therefore here [NfigfirjunaI wishes to show that by means of reasoning. See Ava P252a--4,5,6; D216a--7 to 216b--2.

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4 Literally, "others;" identified by Avalokitavrata. See Ava P253a--3ff., D217a-4ff. 5 Rephrasing of Buddhapfilita's text, for which see Saito (1984), p. 31.1--4. Avalokitavrata quotes Buddhapfilita directly; see Ava P253a--4,5; D217a--5,6. 6 According to Avalokitavrata, there are three types of student: one whose mind is in error; one who doubts; and one who has not understood. Here "one whose mind is in error due to specious means of knowledge" refers to the first type. See Ava P253a--7ff.; D217a--7ff. 7 "Suitable" translates tshul dang mthun pa. According to Avalokitavrata, "one whose mind is c o n f u s e d . . . " refers to the second type of student. (See previous note.) Since he is in doubt as to whether motion exists or not, he would have no conviction that motion does not exist in ultimate reality and thus would not ask for a negation merely of conventional going and coming. See Ava P254a--lff., D218a--lff. 8 According to Avalokitavrata, this sentence refers to the third type of student. (See note 6.) The Madhyamaka~dstra is not within the [cognitive] domain of ordinary people (phal pa'i spyod yul, probably prdkrta-gocara) because it is taught with reference to mahdbodhisattvas. See Ava P254a--7 to 254b--5, D218a--5 to 218b--2. ~) The first two sentences of this paragraph explain why Nfigfirjuna now takes up the subject of coming and going, instead of proceeding through the eight negations of MMK 1--A in order. See Ava P254b--5ff., D218b--2ff. "Things to be done" translates bya ba'i dngos po, perhaps kdrya-vastu. 10 "Contrary position" here translates phyogs snga ma, pt~rva-paks.a, literally, "previous position." According to Avalokitavrata, going will be negated by means of refuting a contrary position. See Ava P255b--5,6; D219a--6,7. ~ That is, one who holds that the origination of entities exists. "Point under discussion" translates skabs kyi don, probably prakrta-artha, mi mthun pa'i phyogs, vipaks.a is here glossed as dgra bo phyogs, probably ~atru-paksa. See Ava P255b--7 to 256a--1, D219a--7 to 219b--1. ~2 The internal entities are the six inner dyatanas, that is, the six sense organs. Avalokitavrata explains that their objects are the six sense objects. "Possessing the objects of those" (that is, being connected with or characterized by them) refers to the bodily organs. The collection of those organs, that is, a living body, performs the activities of going and so on. Such a collection is conventionally designated as a person, so that one says, "Devadatta goes" or "Vi.s.numitra goes." See Ava P256a--3 to 256b--3, D219b--3 to 218a--2. 3 yang dag pa fi lta ba bzhin rtyid, perhaps ydthdtathya. ~4 In negating origination in general, the origination of going and so on has also been negated. See Ava P257b--5,6; D221a--2. ~5 That is, it is established for the proponents of origination that origination and going and coming exist in ultimate reality; and it is established for the Mfidhyamikas that origination and going and coming exist in superficial reality. See Ava P257b--6,7,8; D221a--3,4. 16 It is contradictory to adduce a reason valid only in superficial reality to prove a positive thesis about ultimate reality. Since the property to be proved is origination in ultimate reality, there is no positive concomitance between it and a

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reason concerning conventional activities. Such a reason pertains only to some dissimilar eases, that is, things which exist only conventionally. See Ava P258a--1 to 6, D221a--4 to 221b--1. 17 The Tibetan translation in BPP of gatam, na gamyate (PSP 92.7) is song la 'gro reed de. The postposition la is inserted presumably because the Tibetan verb 'gro ha, like the English verb "to go," cannot take a direct object. The Sanskrit verb garn, however, may take a direct object; and I have used the Engfish verb "traverse" here and in similar instances in order to follow the syntax of the Sanskrit more closely. See also note 2. ~8 In other words, everyone admits that going is not presently taking place on that portion of a path which has already been traversed. According to Bhfivaviveka, Nfigfirjuna mentions this well-known fact only because he wants to use it as an example in an implied syllogism. The already traversed path's property of being a path will be used as the proving property in that syllogism. See Ava P258b--3 to 259a--3, D221b--5 to 222a--3. 79 Avalokitavrata paraphrases this argument as follows: The [alreadyI traversed path is not [now] being traversed, because it is a path. Likewise, the not [yet] traversed path is not [now] being traversed, because it is a path. See Ava P259a--5,6; D222a--5,6. 20 That is, both sides acknowledge that going does not take place on an untraversed path which will, in fact, never be traversed. Thus such a path possesses both the proving property, being not yet traversed, and the property to be proved, not being a locus of going. See Ava P259b--1 to 260a--1, D222b--1 to 7. 2~ Vaigesikas who hold that there are substances (dravya), according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava P260a--7,8; D223a--4. 22 According to Avalokitavrata, this interpretation of the Mfidhyamika's reason would contradict common knowledge, since it is seen in the world that the untraversed is traversed when the activity of traversing arises there later. See Ava P260b--2,3; D223a--6,7. 23 That is, the reason in the opponent's first syllogism near the beginning of the chapter. See Ava P260b--3,4; D223a--7 to 223b--1. 24 The Aulfikya here anticipates a possible objection which the Mfidhyamika might make. The Mfidhyamika might say that he does not seek to negate conventional going as recognized in the world. Rather, he seeks to refute the Aulfikya/Vaigesika position that going exists in ultimate reality under the heading of karman, one of the six or seven Vaigesika categories (paddrtha). The category of karrnan is distinct from the category of substance. See Ava P260b--6 to 261a--1, D223b--1 to 5. On the Vaigesika category of karman, see, e.g., Potter (1977), pp. 131--2 and Sinha (1956), pp. 318--21. 2s That is, the object of such a thought, Devadatta, possesses a paddrtha, going, which is different from Devadatta's dtman, which belongs to the paddrtha of substance. See Ava P261a--4 to 8, D223b--7 to 224a--3. See also, e.g., Potter (1977), pp. 67--73, 95--100 and Sinha (1956), pp. 311--6, 414ff. 26 The idea seems to be that just as it is clear that the staff is one thing and Devadatta who possesses the staff is another, so it is clear that going is one thing

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and Devadatta who possesses going is another. See Ava P261a--8 to 261b--5, D224a--3 to 7. 27 sarnskdrdh in the sense of samskrtd dharmdh. On the meanings of sam.skdra, see, e.g., May (1959) p. 74 n. 108 and p. 252 n. 902. (Note that, contrary to n. 108, three senses of samskdra are distinguished.) 28 In the Buddhist view, "going" results when an identifiable collection of momentary dharmas ceases in one place and arises at an adjacent place continuously from moment to moment. 29 If the Aulfikyas mean to establish a category of "going," such a category is absent in the example of their syllogism, which refers to Devadatta's possessing a staff. See Ava P262a--7 to 262b--1, D224b--7 to 225a--2. 3o The Aulfikyas may insist that the general fact that conventionally, things possess characteristics which are different from themselves, proves that going exists as a category. This is contradictory even conventionally because going is absent from the perception that Devadatta has a staff. See Ava P262b--2 to 5, D225a--2 to 5. 31 According to Avalokitavrata, this refers to the fault which the Mfidhyamika has pointed out in the reason in the opponent's first syllogism in this chapter. See Ava P262b--6,7; D225a--6. 32 The Sautrfintikas, according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava P262b--7,8; D225a-7. 33 That is, there is only the origination, immediately followed by cessation, of momentary dharmas. Nothing exists tong enough to move. Thus motion is a perceptual illusion. See Ava P263b--l,2,3; D225b--7 to 226a--2. 34 The cognition that what is called "going" can be reduced to origination and cessation is mistaken because origination does not exist in ultimate reality. See Ava P264a--2,3,4; D226a--6 to 226b--1. .35 Among the three Sfimkhya gun.as, rajas is the principle of activity and motion. See Sdm.khyakdrikd 12 and 13. See also, e.g., Frauwallner (1973), Vol. 1, p. 276; Sharma (1960), pp. 154--5; Sinha (1952), pp. 13--5; and Larson and Bhattacharya (1987), pp. 65--73, 154, 184. 36 Buddhapfilita and Candrakirti agree with Bhfivaviveka in taking gamyate in MMK 2--1cd to mean "is known," rather than "is being traversed." See Saito (1984), 31.18,19 and PSP 93.8. Here Avalokitavrata glosses "cannot be grasped" (gzung du meal) as "cannot be apprehended" (dmigs su med). See Ava P265a--1, D227a--3. The idea is that apart from the path which has already been traversed and the path which has yet to be traversed, one cannot perceive a path which is just now in the process of being traversed. Here Avalokitavrata explains, "What is called 'that which is being traversed' is the path which is presently being covered by a stride (gorn pas renan pa, probably padendkrdntam.), which is neither the traversed path nor the untraversed path. But that does not exist apart from the traversed and the untraversed paths, [that is,] between the two." See Ava P265a--l,2; D227a--3,4. 37 That is, if the gamyarndna is completely gata or completely agata, those cases have already been treated. If it is something which is partly gata and partly

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agata, each part separately falls under the cases which have already been treated.
3s Literally, "others." Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P265b--8, D227b-7. 39 Tibetan in Saito (1984), 10.11. The issue is this: Buddhapfitita apparently understood yatah in MMK 2--2b as the masculine or neuter genitive singular of the present active participle of root i, "to go." The present active participle of i has strong stem yant (compare third plural present active yanti) and weak stem yat; hence one has yatah., "of one going." Bhfivaviveka, on the other hand, understands yatah, as the indeclinable meaning "because," correlative with tatah., "therefore," in MMK 2--2d. See also Saito (1984), translation, pp. 234--5 n. 7. 4o Literally, "some say." Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P266a--8, D228a--7. 41 According to Avalokitavrata, "activity" refers to the activity of going/traversing; "basis" refers to the path which is being traversed; and "invariable" means "definite, always just that." See Ava P266b--5,6,7; D228b--4,5. The idea seems to be that the qualification "of the goer" is unnecessary. 42 Throughout most of chapter two, gati and gamana appear to be used synonymously to mean "going" in the sense of "the activity of going." In MMK 2--24,25, however, garnana is used to mean gantavya, "[the path] to be traversed." See notes 2 and 200. I have translated the phrase garnyamanasya gamanam. (PSP 94.6) as "going 9 .. on that which is being traversed." The same phrase occurs in verses four and five and is similarly translated there. I have understood the phrase to mean "a traversing of which is being traversed" (objective genitive). If one takes it to mean "that which is being traversed possesses going" (possessive genitive), then MMK 2--4 becomes difficult to understand. The Tibetan translation is bgom la 'gro bar yod par, which can be understood either as possessive ("that which is being traversed possesses going") or locative ("going exists on that which is being traversed"). I have opted for the latter translation. One might argue that the translation "there is a traversing of that which is being traversed" is preferable, since it is the most literal translation of the Sanskrit. It is, however, difficult to maintain consistently, since we have the Sanskrit only for the verses and not for Bhfivaviveka's commentary. 43 This translation follows Avalokitavrata's explanation. See Ava P267a--5ff., D229a--3ff. "Separate" translates drnigs kyis bsal ba, perhaps vidhdrita here. In the first case ("separate"), that which is being traversed is something different from both the traversed and the untraversed. In the second case ("not separate"), it is included in them. 44 In MMK 2--1, it was argued that going cannot exist on the already traversed path or the not yet traversed path and that no third category of path exists9 The same applies to movement of the limbs. See Ava P267b--5 to 268a--4, D292b--2 to 230a--1. 45 The story of the tethered horse is as follows: Someone asks, "Who owns this tethered horse?" He is told, "The one who owns this other horse." He asks, "Then who owns this other horse?" He is told, "The one who owns the tethered horse." See Ava P268b--5,6; D230a--7 to 230b--1.

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46 If there were no activity of traversing or going, the path which is being traversed would not be called "that which is being traversed." Thus one activity of going is necessary for that which is being traversed to be so designated. Once the path which is being traversed is established as such, there is no second, independently established activity of going which exists on that path. Conventionally, of course, the goer, the going, and the path which is being traversed are designated in dependence on the activity of going. Since these are all interdependent, since none of them can exist without the others, none of them exists by intrinsic nature. It is this last point which Nfigfirjuna is concerned to prove. This argument will be expanded in the following verses. 47 The reference is evidently to the similar example in the opponent's initial syllogism in this chapter, namely, that Devadatta and Vi.snumitra do go. 48 Here the opponent's position is that the single activity of going which exists in a particular case applies to the word "going" (gamana), not to "that which is being traversed" (gamyarndna). See Ava P269b--7 to 270a--2, D231a--7 to 231b--2 and Bhfivaviveka's answer. 49 As with gamyate in MMK 2--1d, Bhfivaviveka takes gamyate in 2--4d to mean "is known" rather than "is being traversed." For the interpretations of the other commentaries, see Saito (1984), translation, p. 236 n. 11. 5o See Ava P271a--2,3; D232b--l,2. s~ According to Avalokitavrata, the opponent holds that the intrinsic nature of ultimately real going is the activity of going; and the intrinsic nature of that which is being traversed is established because it possesses that activity. Subsequently, that going which exists on that which is being traversed is conventional going. See Ava P271a--2,3; D 2 3 2 b - - l , 2 and also Ava P271a--6,7; D232b--4,5. 52 A conventional going which is "established as long as one does not investigate" (ma brtags na 'grub pa), according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava P271b--6,7; D233a--4. 53 According to Avalokitavrata, the word "also" (yang, api) is used to indicate that an ultimately real goer is not possible, either. See Ava P271b--8 to 272a-1, D233a--5,6. 54 sgra pa dag, s'dbdika, glossed by Avalokitavrata as "those who have the ~abda-siddhdnta, that is, the vaiydkaranas." See Ava P272a--8, D233b--5,6. On the grammarians as a philosophical school, see Coward and Raja (1990). 55 Avalokitavrata gives a parallel example: When a man cuts wood, there is only one activity of cutting. That activity, by its intrinsic nature, is called "cutting." The basis, wood, which is to be cut by that activity of cutting is that which is cut; and the man who performs that activity is the cutter. See Ava P272a--8 to 272b--2, D233b--6,7. 56 Ultimately real origination was negated in chapter one, and the path which is being traversed was negated in MMK 2--1cd. See Ava P272b--5 to 273a--1, D234a--3 to 6. 57 This translation follows the Tibetan. The Sanskrit of PSP 97.6,7 translates as, "If going is not possible without a goer, then if going does not exist, how indeed will a goer exist?" See May (1959), p. 60 n. 37. 55 According to Avalokitavrata, this means that just as going does not exist on the traversed, the untraversed, or that which is being traversed, so also the goer

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does not exist on those three paths. See Ava P274a--6 to 274b--3, D235a--6 to 235b--3. 59 It is not established in ultimate reality, and it is contradictory to try to prove a thesis about ultimate reality using a reason which is valid only conventionally. See Ava P274b--3,4; D235b--3,4. 6o According to Avalokitavrata, by means of that going, [the expressions] "Devadatta goes" and so on exist as conventional designations of a goer who possesses that going. See Ava P274b--6,7; D235b--6. 61 This refers back to the opponent's initial syllogism in this chapter. See Ava P275a--l,2; D236a--1,2. 62 The verb garn, "to go," is normally conjugated in the active voice (parasmaipada) in classical Sanskrit, although forms in the middle voice (dtmanepada) are found in the epics. In the Sanskrit texts of the verses of MMK as preserved in the Prasannapadd, garn is indeed in the active voice in MMK 2--8a (gacchati, PSP 97.14). The Tibetan translation does not distinguish between active and middle voice. Nevertheless, from Bhfivaviveka's following commentary, it seems that he must have read gacchate (middle voice) here. 63 Identified by Avalokitavrata as vaiydkarandh.; see Ava P275a--7,8; D236a-6. 64 The first three, at least, of the following quotations are taken from the opening section of Patafijali's Vydkarana-rnahdbhds.ya,where he explains the advantages of the study of grammar. (I am indebted to David Seyfort Ruegg for this information.) See, e.g., Abhyankar and Shukla (1969), pp. 10ft. 65 See Abhyankar and Shukla (1969), p. 10. The story alluded to is found in the Satapatha Brdhrnana 1.6.3. The god Tvastr had a son named Vigvarfipa, who was killed by Indra. When Tvastr created the serpent Vrtra to destroy Indra in revenge, he intended to say, "Grow, destroyer of Indra!" (indra~atrtlr vardhasva). Instead, Tvastr incorrectly accented the compound on the first syllable (indra~atru), thus making it a bahuvrihi compound ("having Indra as destroyer") rather than a tatpurus.a compound ("destroyer of Indra"). (As a tatpurus.a compound, it would be accented on the last syllable.) Thus Tvastr actually said, "Grow, having Indra as your destroyer!"; and Indra destroyed Vrtra, contrary to Tvastr's intent. See also Ava P275b--7 to 276a--4, D236b--5 to 237a--1. 66 See Abhyankar and Shukla (1969), p. 10 and ~atapatha Brdhmana 3.2.1.23,24. See also Ava P276a--6,7,8; D237a--3,4,5. In one of the battles between the gods and the asuras, the gods began to flee. The asuras meant to shout, "Oh enemies! Oh enemies!" (he 'rayo he 'rayah). Instead, they made an error in one letter and uttered the meaningless sound helayo helayah. As a result, their merit was exhausted; and the gods returned and vanquished them. Avalokitavrata remarks that this is an example of the use of a word with an incorrect letter, whereas the previous quotation gave an example of the use of a word with an incorrect accent. See Ava P276a--4,5; D237a--l,2. 67 See Abhyankar and Shukla (1969), p. 18 and Ava P276b--1 to 4, D237a-5,6,7. 68 According to Avalokitavrata, the word "etc." indicates examples from other texts which also show the misfortunes which result from the use of incorrect
. . .

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words. The next quotation, on the other hand, shows the benefits which arise from the correct use of words. See Ava P276b--4,5,6; D237a--7 to 237b--2. 69 "Those who perform [ritual] well" translates legs par byed pa rnams, probably sukrtah. On the meaning of this word, see Gonda (1966), pp. 116ft., 130ft. I have not been able to find this passage in Patafijali's Vydkara{m-mahdbhdsya. Compare, however, satyadevdh sydrnety adhyeyam vydkaranarn, "We should study grammar in order to become true gods" (Abhyankar and Shukla (1969), p. 19). David Eckel has informed me that a similar quotation, ekah dabdah sufl~dta.h. suprayuktah, svarge loke kdmadhug bhavati, is found in Kaiyat.a's Pradipa on the first dhnika of the Mahdbhdsya. 70 My translation of this passage follows my understanding of Avalokitavrata's subcommentary. See Ava P276b--8 to 277a--7, D237b--4 to 238a--1. Avalokitavrata remarks, "Even the sfitras of Pfinini are sftras of repetition (rjes su smra ba), not invented (byas pa) sftras" (Ava P277a--3, D237b--6). The opponent's idea seems to be that verbal roots take the active, middle, or both voices by intrinsic nature and that Nfigfirjuna is wrong to use the middle voice arbitrarily in MMK 2--8a. 71 Avalokitavrata points out that similar syllogisms can be stated about other grammatical categories, such as the six kdrakas, the seven case affixes (vibhakti), the three genders (lifiga), and the three numbers (vacana). See Ava P278b--5 to 279b--3, D239a--3 to 239b--6. 72 nges par smra ba dag, glossed by Avatokitavrata nas brda sprod papa nges par smra ba dag; see Ava P279b--6, D239a--l,2. This translation is somewhat conjectural, since the regular Tibetan equivalent of nirukti is nges pay tshig. 73 Avalokitavrata explains that the .r.si Vyfisa (the legendary author of the Mahdbhdrata) and other authorities have used nonstandard forms; and he quotes two verses to illustrate his point. He points out that the grammarians (vaiydkaran,a) themselves accept that such usages must somehow be explained as correct, at least in those cases. Nfigfirjuna is also an authority, and his usage must also be seen as being correct. See Ava P279b--7 to 280a--4, D240a--2 to 5. 74 sbyor ba rnam par dbye ba, probably yoga-vibhdga. Yoga-vibhdga, literally, "rule-division," is a method of interpreting grammatical rules, particularly Pfinini's sfitras. One divides a single rule into two in order to explain the formation of certain words which would otherwise be ungrammatical. See Abhyankar (1961), yoga-vibhdga, s.v. According to Avalokitavrata, if gain is taken to mean "to know," then the middle voice is permissible. How this relates to yoga-vibhdga is not clear to me. See Ava P280a--4 to 280b--2, D240a--6 to 240b--3. David Eckel points out that Pfinini 1.3.29 is a sFttra which might be made, by means of yoga-vibhdga, to permit dtmanepada forms for gain. As it stands, the sFttra prescribes the dtmanepada for gain and certain other roots, but only when they have the prefix sam- and are used intransitively. 7~ This rather confusing alternative interpretation of MMK 2--8b is considerably clarified by Avalokitavrata. According to him, the nongoer referred to in the thesis is [an animate being?] such as Devadatta, whom the Sfi.mkhyas and so

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on consider to be a nongoer. The nongoer referred to in the example is [an inanimate object?] such as a mountain, which is also a nongoer and does not go because it is devoid of going. See Ava P282a--5 to 282b--3, D242a--3 to 7. 76 Avalokitavrata explains that both of these schools hold that entities come into existence after having previously been nonexistent. As long as the activity of going has not originated, one is a nongoer and does not go; but later, when the activity of going has originated, one is a goer and therefore does go. The Mfidhyamika should argue that one who is a nongoer previously also does not go later, because of being devoid of going, like another [nongoer]. See Ava P282b--3,4,5; D 2 4 2 a - - 7 to 242b--2. 77 The Sfimkhyas might maintain that one in whom going is unmanifest is a nongoer and does not go, but that later when going becomes manifest, he does become a goer and does go. The manifestation theory of the Sfim.khyas has, however, been refuted previously (in the commentary shortly before M M K 1--2). The unmanifest cannot become manifest, because it is unmanifest, like a sky-flower. See Ava P283a--2 to 6, D 2 4 2 b - - 5 to 243a--1. 78 The Sfimkhyas might maintain that one who is a nongoer in the state prior to his becoming a goer does not go, but that later he does become a goer and does go. Then one has the absurd consequence that a stander (or sitter or lier) also later becomes a goer and goes. See Ava P283a--6 to 283b--5, D 2 4 3 a - - 2 to 7. 79 Or "a nonexistent goer," 'gro ba po med pa. 80 Avalokitavrata explains that the Sfimkhyas hold that even before the activity of going originates, the goer always possesses the nature of rajas and that therefore the goer always exists. See Ava P284a--l,2,3; D243b--3,4,5. According to the Sfi.mkhyas, rajas is one of the three gunas which constitute prakrti, "primordial matter" or "original nature." Part of the nature of rajas is its being mobile (cala); see Sdm.khyakdrikd 13 and the references in note 35. 81 Literally, "others." Identified by Avalokitavrata as the Arhatas, i.e., the Jains. See Ava P284a--4, D243b--5. 82 According to Avalokitavrata, the Jains maintain that the nature of the soul (fiva) is mobile, while the nature of the body is immobile (presumably because a dead body does not move). Thus according to the mode of the soul, a goer goes; but according to the mode of a body, a nongoer goes. See Ava P284a--4 to 8, D 2 4 3 b - - 5 to 244a--1. On the Jainas' view of substances (dravya), qualities (guna), and modes (parydya), see, e.g., Sinha (1952), pp. 197, 213--6. Note that qualities are sometimes considered to be a kind of mode. 83 Here "modal point of view" translates rnarn grangs kyi tshul, probably parydya-naya in this context, although tshul may also translate other Sanskrit words. As a technical term in Jaina philosophy, naya means "point of view, partial knowledge." The nayas are divided into dravya-nayas, points of view which emphasize the substantial aspect of a thing to the exclusion of its modes and qualities, and parydya-nayas, which do the reverse. These two classes of nayas are further subdivided. See, e.g., Sinha (1952), pp. 199--205. In any case, the idea seems to be that it is self-contradictory to say that something is both a goer and a nongoer from one and the same point of view. If

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it is a goer in one way and a nongoer in another way, then each of the two aspects become subject to arguments made earlier in the cases of a goer and a nongoer, separately (as Bhfivaviveka goes on to say). s4 This refers to Bhfivaviveka's syllogism immediately before MMK 2--8b, showing that in ultimate reality, a goer does not go. According to Avalokitavrata, the opponent's point is that it is not the case that all who do not go possess activity. For example, one who stands and a childless woman's son both do not go; but the latter does not possess activity. See Ava P285b--2 to 6, D 2 4 4 b - - 7 to 245a--3. ss That is, we do not say that everyone who does not go possesses activity. Rather, we say that everyone who possesses activity does not go. See Ava P285b--8 to 286a--5, D 2 4 5 a - - 5 to 245b--1. 86 Anything which "immediately follows effort" (prayatna-anantar[yaka), that is, which is produced by effort, such as sound or a pot, is necessarily impermanent. This is so despite the fact that some impermanent things, such as lightning and wildflowers, are not produced by effort. See Ava P286a--6 to 286b--4, D 2 4 5 b - - 2 to 7. 87 This refers to the reason in Bhfivaviveka's syllogism following MMK 2--8b, showing that in ultimate reality, a nongoer does not go, because he is devoid of going. According to Avalokitavrata, an opponent might object that while [the property of] being devoid of going does indeed exist in a mountain, which does not go, it cannot be said to exist in a childless woman's son, who also does not go. The answer is the same as in the previous case. See Ava P286b--7 to 287a-8, D 2 4 6 a - - 2 to 246b--1. 88 One who stays does not do so at all times. After staying, he may become a goer and go. See Ava P287b--1 to 5, D 2 4 6 b - - 2 to 5. 89 It is well known that as long as one who stays does stay, he does not go. Therefore the example is suitable. See Ava P287b--6 to 288a--1, D 2 4 6 b - - 6 to 247a--1. 90 This refers to the reason in the opponent's syllogism preceding 1VEMK 2--8a. Since in ultimate reality, a goer does not go and a nongoer does not go, the designation "goes" is not possible in ultimate reality. The example, "Devadatta goes," also does not exist in ultimate reality. 91 Presumably, this means, as before, that if the reason merely refers to what exists conventionally, it cannot prove a thesis about ultimate reality. That is, the conventional existence of a conventional designation proves nothing about ultimate reality. I do not understand Avalokitavrata's subcommentary here. See Ava P288a--6,7; D247a--4,5. 92 The opponent's point is that there is no means of knowledge (pramdna) more authoritative that direct perception (pratyakqa). See Ava P288a--8 to 289a--1, D247a--6. 93 Avalokitavrata glosses this as "is not possible." See Ava P288b--3,4; D247b--l,2. 94 Implicit in the negation of origination in chapter one. See Ava P289a--l,2,3; D 2 4 7 b - - 6 to 248a--1. 95 That is, the single activity of going is expressed by the verb "goes;" and then

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there is no other activity of going which can make the goer a goer independently of the going which he performs. Compare MMK 2--3,4; and see Ava P289b--5 to 8, D247a--3,4,5. (Note omission in Ava P.) 96 See Ava P290b--6ff., D249b--2ff. 97 According to Avalokitavrata, this refers to the example in the opponent's syllogism just before MMK 2--7. See Ava P291a--5 to 291b--2, D250a--1 to 5. 98 This refers to the reason in the opponent's syllogism just before MMK 2--12a. See Ava P292b--8 to 293a--3, D251b--2,3,4. 99 According to Avalokitavrata, it is too specific because the beginning of going is not "in common with" (sddhdraqa) the traversed, etc. See Ava P293a--2,3; D251b--3,4. 100 According to Avalokitavrata, if an opponent raises an objection similar to that in MMK 2--2, the answer should be similar to MMK 2--3; and so on. See Ava P293a--3,4,5; D251b--4,5. 10l That is, the activity of going serves as a cause for applying the expressions, "He went; he goes; he will go," to past, present, and future goers. See Ava P293b--1 to 5, D252a--1 to 5. In other words, a single activity of going at a particular time becomes a cause of the expression "He will go" throughout all time prior to that activity, and it becomes a cause of the expression "He went" throughout all time subsequent to that activity. 102 According to Avalokitavrata, this refers back to the opponent's initial syllogism at the beginning of the chapter. See Ava P294a--8 to 294b--1, D252b--6,7. 103 That is, there is no path which one who has not moved has already traversed. 104 Avalokitavrata refers to MMK 2--lab, "etc." See Ava P295a--4, D253b--2. 105 In the Sanskrit of MMK 2--14cd, eva, "just," immediately follows gamanasya, "of going." Bhfivaviveka, however, says that it must be understood with adr.@arndne, "does not appear," in order to avoid the implication that it is only the beginning of going which does not exist in ultimate reality, and not the beginnings of other activities. See Ava P295b--3,4,5; D253b--7 to 254a--2. 106 The fault that the reason in your syllogism is not established. See Ava P296a--5,6; D254b--1. 107 In the Mahdbhdrata, Ghatotkaca was the son of Bhima, the second of the five Pfin.dava brothers, by the rdksasi Hidimbfi. Ghatotkaca was killed by Karna with the "unfailing javelin" (amoghd gaktih) of Indra, which Karna had been saving for his final battle with Arjuna. Avalokitavrata tells a version of the story slightly different from that in the Mahdbhdrata. He has the javelin pursuing Ghatotkaca as he flees through the three worlds. See Ava P295b--8 to 296a--6, D254a--4 to 254b--1. 108 In the context of MMK 2--15,16,17, the verb sdodpa, sthd (elsewhere translated as "staying") has the connotation of "ceasing to go, stopping," rather than "remaining stationary." See especially Bhfivaviveka's commentary following MMK 2--15b and his commentary on MMK 2--17ab.

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109 "Obstinacy" translates legs par ma zin pa, which, I have assumed, stands for durgraha here. 110 According to Avalokitavrata, the opponent means that there is no fault in saying that one who stops goes, as opposed to saying that a goer stops. He explains that although a potter normally stays seated at his potter's wheel, he sometimes gets up and moves about. See Ava P297b--8 to 298a--3, D256a--1 to 3. 111 See Ava P298a--4,5,6; D256a--4,5. ~12 Sanskrit and Tibetan have the ablative, so that MMK 2--17ab literally reads, "One does not stop from that which is being traversed," etc. 113 This refers to the reason, "because its opposite exists," in the opponent's syllogism preceding MMK 2--15a. See Ava P298b--7, D256B--5,6. i14 If the proponents of going assert that stopping, the opposite of going, exists conventionally, it is contradictory to use this reason to prove that going exists in ultimate reality. See Ava P299a--l,2; D256b--7 to 257a--1. 11s See Ava P299a--4,5; D257a--3. 116 That is, the fault that the reason in the opponent's syllogism preceding MMK 2--15a is unestablished. See Ava P300b--8 to 301a--1, D258b--1,2. 117 "Hare-possessing" translates ri bong can, iagin. In India, the "man in the moon" is a "hare in the moon." 118 karman may mean either "action" or "direct object of an action." (In the sense of action, karman is synonymous with kriyd, "activity.") Here both senses seem appropriate, gamana, "going," is, of course, the name of an action. One can, however, say gantd gamanam gacchati, "the goer goes the going." (See, e.g., MMK 2--24,25.) In that case, gamana is also the direct object of the verb gain, "to go." 119 glags yodpa'i tshig. See Ames (1993), p. 244, n. 102. 120 That is, the explicit hypothesis that goer and going are the same is to be negated. The sense is that goer and going are not the same. See Ava P302b--8 to 303a--3, D260a--5,6,7. 121 This is so because the negation is a simple negation, not an implicative negation. See Ava P303b--5,6,7; D261a--l,2. See also Ames (1993), p. 242, n. 85. 122 Sfimkhyas who are proponents of potentiality, according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava P303b--8, D261a--3. 123 According to Avalokitavrata, the opponent holds that not being the same means being different, and that two things' being different means that one is empty of the potentiality for the other. For the Sfimkhyas, since all tl~dngs (except purusa) are made of the three gun.as, all things ultimately have the same nature; and nothing is empty of the potentiality for anything else. In particular, this is true of the cutter and the cut. See Ava P303b--8 to 304a--6, D261a--3 to 7 and the references in note 35. 124 According to Avalokitavrata, the Sfirpkhyas hold that spirit (pwztsa) knows and that primary matter (pradhdna), composed of the three gu.nas, is known. They also hold that spirit and primary matter are different in nature. As knower and known, however, they are also agent and object and thus can serve as an

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example in the preceding syllogism. See Ava P304b--2 to 8, D 2 6 1 b - - 4 to 262a--1, and Larson and Bhattacharya (1987), pp. 73--83. This passage suggests that Bhfivaviveka understands karrnan in M M K 2--19 as "direct object of an action." On the other hand, Bhfivaviveka may wish to be ambiguous in order to include both senses of the term. 125 "Measurable" translates dpag tu yod pa, glossed as tshad yod pa. Here Avalokitavrata glosses "the cut" as shing, "wood." See Ava P305a--2,3; D 2 6 2 a - 2,3. 126 ~gal ba 'khrul pa reed pa, probably viruddha-avyabhicdrin. A reason is counterbalanced when it leads to one conclusion and another valid reason leads to a contradictory conclusion. According to Dignfiga, this is a variety of inconclusive reason; but Dharmakirti did not recognize it as a separate type of fallacy. See Stcherbatsky (1930), vol. 2, pp. 220--9 and Tachikawa (1971), pp. 124--5, 135 n. 40, 142. See also Ava P305a--1 to 7, D262a--1 to 5. 127 Avalokitavrata's gloss adds the qualification "in ultimate reality." See Ava P305a--8, D262a--6,7. 128 That is, we wish to show that agent and action/object are not the same and that they are not different. See A v a P305b--3,4,5; D262b--1,2,3. 129 See Ames (1994), p. 125, n. 47. 130 Avalokitavrata refers again to the fact that the Mfidhyamika uses simple negation, not implicative negation. See Ava P306a--2,3,4; D 2 6 2 b - - 7 to 263a--1. 131 See Ava P306a--7,8; D263a--3,4. 132 See note 27. 133 According to Avalokitavrata, this means that the collection of conditioned factors conventionally called "Devadatta" has specific causes and conditions, different from the causes and conditions which give rise to the collection called Yajfiadatta. See Ava P306b--1,2; D263a--5,6. 134 That is, the different natures of the five aggregates. See Ava P306b--2,3; D263a--6. 135 According to Avalokitavrata, the "cause" referred to is the dlaya-vijhdna. See Ava P306b--3,4,5; D 2 6 3 a - - 7 to 263b--1. 136 According to Avalokitavrata, the conventional goer, the basis of going, belongs to the paratantra-svabhdva. The conventional activity of going belongs to the parikalpita-svabhdva. See Ava P306b--5 to 8, D 2 6 3 b - - l , 2 , 3 . 137 According to Avalokitavrata, one who insists that a pillar is an elephant cannot be stopped from doing so because he is subject only to his own arbitrary conceptions; but since a pillar is not an elephant, he will suffer the undesired consequences of his false belief. Likewise, one who is rash enough to insist that goer and going are different cannot be stopped; but he will incur an undesired logical consequence (prasahga). See Ava P307a--1 to 4, D263b--4,5,6. 138 If the activity of going and the goer who is the basis of that activity were each established by themselves, they would be unrelated like a pot and a cloth; and like a pot and a cloth, each could be perceived in the absence of the other. A pot and a cloth are not related as support and supported in the way that the basis of an activity and the corresponding activity are. See Ava P307a--5 to 307b--2, D 2 6 3 b - - 7 to 264a--4. 139 glags yod pa, prasatiga. See Ames (1993), p. 244, n. 102.

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140 See Ava P 3 0 7 b - - 8 to 308a--8, D 2 6 4 b - - 1 to 265a--1. 141 According to Avalokitavrata, going is dependent on the use of the particular expression, "He goes." The goer is dependent of the use of the particular expression, "He goes on the path which is being traversed." See A v a P 3 0 8 b - - 2 to 8, D 2 6 5 a - - 2 to 6. The point of this argument may be that goer and going correspond to different elements extracted from the same sentence mad that they therefore cannot exist independently of each other. 142 That is, it is not necessary to show that all things which are different from each other are not dependent on the use of particular expressions, because (in ultimate reality) there are no such things. See Ava P308b--8 to 309a--6, D 2 6 5 a - - 7 to 265b--3. 143 According to Avalokitavrata, what the opponent means is the following: When a potter is not making pots, he and the pot are not mutually dependent/ related. Thus the Mfidhyamika's reason does not really apply to all things. That is, it is not the case that there are no dissimilar examples. See Ava P 3 0 9 a - - 7 to 209b--1, D265b--4,5. 144 The idea seems to be that even difference is a relation; but if two things are related, they are not (totally) different; that is, they are not independent. As Nfigfirjuna will argue in M M K 14--5, one thing is different from another only in dependence on that other. A thing cannot be said to be different without some other thing from which it is different. 145 According to Avalokitavrata, this is an allusion to the views of the Vaigesikas. On the first point, he gives as an example the fact that a cloth is said to be different from a pot because of a discrimination that it is not a pot. See Ava P 3 0 9 b - - 4 to 310a--3, D266a--1 to 6. 146 According to Avalokitavrata, this is a response to an objection that the reason in the preceding syllogisms is inconclusive because some things which are dependent/related are different and some are not. As before, Bhfivaviveka replies that the same argument shows that no two things are (completely) different. See Ava P310a--3 to 8, D266a--6 to 266b--2. 147 Avalokitavrata refers to Bhfivaviveka's commentary on M M K 1--A,B, where he explains that origination exists in superficial reality but not in uttimate reality. See Ava P310b--3,4; D266b--5,6. 148 See A v a P310b--5 to 8, D 2 6 6 b - - 6 to 267a--1. 149 That is, it is true that one says, "Devadatta's horse;" and Devadatta is conventionally different from his horse. But one also says, "the goer's own self;" and a goer is not conventionally different from his own self. See Ava P311 a-1,2,3; D267a--2,3,4. is0 That is, the opponent himself recognizes that one speaks of a goer's own self; but he does not maintain that a goer is different from himself. See Ava P31 la--5,6,7; D267a--5,6,7. 151 A n opponent might argue that goer and going are different because the cognition (or "idea," blo, buddhi) of a goer and the cognition of his going are different cognitions. It seems that one refutes this argument by again invoking the case of a goer and his own self. See Ava P311b--1 to 8, D 2 6 7 a - - 2 to 7. 152 See Ava P 3 1 2 a - - 2 to 6, D 2 6 8 a - - 2 to 5.

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153 Jug pa dang ldog pa. One would expect anvaya-vyatireka, but 'jug pa does not normally translate anvaya. Given what is apparently a Vaigesika context, the Sanskrit may have been anuvrtti-vydv.rtti. In any case, the point is that the term "goer" is applied to Devadatta when and only when he is connected with going. See Ava P312a--6 to 312b--1, D268a--5,6,7. 154 The term "blue blanket" is used if and only if the blanket is connected with blue, a category different from the blanket's own self. See Ava P312b--1 to 6, D 2 6 8 a - - 7 to 268b--4. 155 Since all entities possess existence, there is no negative concomitance. According to Avalokitavrata, this is a reference to the views of the Vaigesikas. Existence (yod pa nyid, sattd or astitva) is a "great universal" (mahdsdmdnya), as opposed to a "limited universal" (avdntara-sdmdnya), because it belongs to all entities. Limited universals are different from the entities to which they apply, but great universals are not. See Ava P312b--6 to 313a--3, D 2 6 8 b - - 4 to 26%--1. In fact, the Vaigesikas held that existence is different from entities. See, e.g., Potter (1977), pp. 133--5, 140--2; Sinha (1956), pp. 326--7; and Frauwallner (1973), vol. 2, pp. 175--6. 156 The opponent wishes to show that going and goer are different. But if they are different (that is, independent and unrelated) like a crow and an owl, they cannot be related as support and supported. In that case, they also cannot be related as goer and going. See Ava P313a--5 to 8, D269a--2,3,4. 157 The reading ming mthun pa for mi mthun pa is found only once in the subcommentary on this sentence in Ava D. It is not found in Ava D's quotation of the sentence, or in Ava P or PP PNDC. Nevertheless, it is much easier to understand Avalokitavrata's explanation if this reading is adopted. The idea seems to be that the many individuals named "Devadatta" are not connected with a common "Devadattaness" different from themselves, but that nevertheless the name "Devadatta" applies only to certain individuals and not to others. See Ava P 3 1 3 b - - 2 to 7, D 2 6 9 a - - 5 to 269b--2. 158 If the reason applies only to the subject of the syllogism, it becomes one part of the meaning of the thesis, as in the fallacious syllogism, "Sound is permanent because it is sound." See A v a P 3 1 3 b - - 7 to 314a--4, D 2 6 9 b - - 2 to 5. 159 Because all entities are unestablished in ultimate reality. See Ava P 3 1 4 a - 4,5,6; D269b--6,7. 160 The opponent might make the same argument in terms of the cognition of Devadatta as a goer, rather than the verbal expression, "the goer, Devadatta." In that case, the refutation is the same. See Ava P314a--7 to 314b--4, D270a--1 to 4. 161 Avalokitavrata here glosses 'hanoriginated" as "not one thing and not something manifold because of being dependently originated." See Ava P315a--4, D270b--3,4. 162 See Ava P315a--6,7,8; D270b--5,6,7. 163 nye bar brtags pa, perhaps upalaksita. 164 This refers to Bhfivaviveka's second syllogism following M M K 2--20cd. The

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Vaigesika's argument is that all entities possess the gu.na "difference" (gzhan nyid). Since the goer's own self possesses this gun.a, it is not established that it is not different from itself. See Ava P315a--8 to 315b--4, D270b--7 to 271a--3. The Sanskrit original of gzhan nyid here is probably pr.thaktva rather than paratva. All substances possess prthaktva, "separateness" or "distinctness." It serves to distinguish them from other substances. On the other hand, paratva in the Vai~esika system means "remoteness," as opposed to aparatva, "proximity." See, e.g., Potter (1977), pp. 112ff., Sinha (1956), pp. 4 1 0 - - 1 , 4 1 3 . 165 Avalokitavrata explains that "abandoning the original topic" is one of the "grounds of defeat" (nigraha-sthdna) recognized by the Naiyfiyikas. It probably corresponds to the second of the twenty-two grounds of defeat, pratij~dnmra. From a different point of view, raising the question of whether goer and going are the same or different is a kind of futile rejoinder (jdti). See Ava P316a--4 to 316b--3, D271b--2 to 7. On the grounds of defeat, see, e.g., Potter (1977), pp. 272--4 and Sinha (1956), pp. 537--50. 166 Bhfivaviveka splits MMK 2--21 into two half-verses with missing syntax supplied in each case by the commentary. This makes it difficult to translate the verse into readable English. Putting the verse back together, we have, How can there be establishment of those two For which there is no establishment by means of identity or difference? [MMK 2--21] 167 Avalokitavrata ascribes this objection to the Sautrfintikas. They hold that goer and going, like cause and result, are indescribable as the same or different. See Ava P317a--4,5,6; D272a--7 to 272b--1. 168 On this interpretation of MMK 2--21, see Ava P317a--8 to 317b--6, D272b--3 to 7. 169 The first syllogism was stated just before MMK 2--8b, the second just before 2--15b. 170 In the first syllogism, the example cited, one who stays, does perform an activity different from going, namely, staying. Likewise, in the second syllogism, "Devadatta when his activity of going is unimpaired" performs an activity different from stopping. Thus, according to the opponent, neither is a proper example for its respective syllogism. See Ava P318a--5,6; D273a--4,5,6. 171 According to Avalokitavrata, the reason, "because he does not perform that activity which he possesses," contradicts direct perception because it is directly perceived that a speaker speaks words and a cutter cuts wood. It contradicts the world because it is common knowledge in the world that one does perform an activity which one possesses. See Ava P318a--7 to 318b--3, D273b--1 to 4. 172 The faults that it is not established that a goer goes and not established that a goer stops. See Ava P318b--8, D274a--1. 173 The point seems to be that if the opponent maintains that the goer does perform an activity of going from which he is not different, then he must hold that agent and object are not different in general. But the opponent himself has already argued that one perceives that a speaker speaks words and a cutter cuts wood; and one does not perceive that the speaker and his words or the cutter

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and the wood are the same. See Ava P319a--6 to 319b--3, D274a--6 to 274b--3. F o r gati to be strictly analogous to words which are spoken or wood which is cut, it would have to be understood in its sense of "path," rather than "activity of going." 174 According to Avalokitavrata, this means, for example, a man or a woman goes to a town or a city which is different from his or her own self. See Ava P319b--5,6,7; D274b--4,5,6. Thus it would be contrary to common knowledge for a goer to perform a going from which he is not different. Again, this seems to slide over the distinction between an activity and the direct object of an activity. 175 'gro bar byed cing 'gro'o, perhaps gacchan gacchati. 176 Avalokitavrata points out that this is the view of the Sautrfintikas, which Bhfivaviveka accepts on the conventional level but not ultimately. The goer is conventionally designated as the agent of going because he is the cause of going. See Ava P320a--8 to 320b--5, D 2 7 5 a - - 6 to 275b--4. See also the parallel passage in the commentary following M M K 2 - - l b . 177 According to Avalokitavrata, this means that at the former instant the goer is unmoving (gYo ba reed pa) and then is moving at the next instant. See Ava P320b--5,6,7; D275b--4,5. iv8 By the above definitions, goer and going are not really different. Therefore the goer does not perform the activity of going, because nothing can act on or make its own self. See Ava P321a--1 to 4, D 2 7 5 b - - 7 to 276a--3. 179 Specifically, the Sautrfintikas. See Ava P321a--5,6; D276a--4. 180 See Ava P321a--7 to 321b--3, D276a--5 to 276b--2. See also note 35, and compare Larson and Bhattacharya (1987), p. 262. 181 When Devadatta goes to town, Devadatta and his destination are different. Likewise, a goer cannot be the cause of a going with which he is essentially identical. See Ava P 3 2 1 b - - 7 to 322a--6, D 2 7 6 b - - 5 to 277a--4. 182 Someone might cite these worldly expressions as evidence that things can act on themselvles. They are, however, mere imputations. For instance, one may say, "The rice gruel should be cooked;" but if it is already rice gruel, it does not need to be cooked; and if it needs to be cooked, it is not rice gruel. See Ava P322a--6 to 322b--5, D 2 7 7 a - - 4 to 277b--3. 183 Avalokitavrata attributes this objection to the Sautrfintikas (Ava P323a--4ff., D278a--2ff.). Their account of speech is similar to their account of motion. See notes 32 and 176. 184 See A K 2--74ab. The term for "word" in A K is ndman (Tibetan rning). Here Bhfivaviveka uses ngag, usually corresponding to vdc. 185 A t the previous moment, it was not a speaker. A t the next moment, it is a speaker. See Ava P323b--4,5; D278b--2. 186 This translation is based on Avalokitavrata's explanation. See Ava P323a--4 to 324a--1, D 2 7 8 a - - 2 to 278b--6. Note that Avalokitavrata says that the arising of the collection of conditioned factors of speech is the speaking of words (Ava P323a--6,7,8; D277a--4,5. 187 Here Bhfivaviveka makes an argument parallel to M M K 2--22cd, replacing "going," etc., with "speaking," etc. It is common knowledge in the world that the

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speaker does not exist (as such) prior to his spealdng and that speaking is different from the speaker himself. Therefore the speaker does not speak that speech by which he is manifest as a speaker. See Ava P324a--1 to 5, D278b--6 to 279a--2. 188 This refers to the examples, speaking and cutting, given in the opponent's objection preceding the first occurrence of MMK 2--22ab. "The exemplified" is the opponent's position that a goer goes. 189 Literally, "it is [logically] possible that it is not the case that there will be no occasion for the fault that they have a contradictory meaning." The examples and the exemplified have a contradictory meaning because it is not possible to act on one's own self. See Ava P324b--2 to 5, D279a--6 to 279b--2. 190 Literally, "others;" identified by Avalokitavrata. See Ava P324b--6ff., D279b--3ff. Bhfivaviveka here gives a loose paraphrase of Buddhapfilita's commentary, the text of which is found in Saito (1984), p. 47.12--14 and is quoted by Avalokitavrata (Ava P324b--7,8; D279b--4). 191 For the Vaigesikas, the goer belongs to the category of substance; but going belongs to the category of action (karman). See Ava P325a--6,7; D280a--2,3. On the Vaigesika categories, see, e.g., Potter (1977), pp. 49ff. and Sinha (1956), pp. 311ff. 192 See MMK 14--4. Avalokitavrata refers to chapter fourteen, samsargapariks.d; see Ava P326b--4 to 7, D281a--6 to 282b--1. 193 Literally, "others;" identified by Avalokitavrata. See Ava P327b--3ff., D282a--3ff. Tibetan text in Saito (1984), p. 48.5--7. 194 Again, Avalokitavrata explains that according to the Vaigesikas, going belongs to the category of action; and the goer belongs to the category of substance. Thus they are different; and there is only one going, which is related to the goer through his possessing it. See Ava P328a--4 to 7, D282b--3 to 6. ~95 According to Avalokitavrata, the Mfidhyamika has argued that a goer who possesses an activity of going does not perform that same activity of going which he possesses, because he (already) possesses it. The Vaigesika has accepted the reason, "because the goer [already] possesses activity." See Ava P328a--8 to 328b--3, D282b--6 to 283a--1. 196 The Vaigesikas hold that a cause produces an effect which did not exist prior to its origination (asatkdryavdda). See, e.g., Potter (1977), pp. 57--60 and Sinha (1956), pp. 399--402. ~97 According to Avalokitavrata, action causes the use, or occurrence, of the cognition and the word, "action." Thus it is not a cause which possesses action. (Presumably, this is so because a thing cannot possess itself.) Likewise, a goer is the cause of the use of the cognition and word, "goer." See Ava P328b--5 to 329a--3, D283a--3 to 283b--1. J9s One who is already a goer by intrinsic nature does not need to possess going. One who is a nongoer by intrinsic nature cannot possess going. See Ava P329a--3 to 8, D283b--1 to 5. ~99 The opponent should state syllogisms to prove his own position. He should also demand to know by what syllogisms the Mfidhyamika establishes his position, and then he should refute them. If each side seeks to establish its

354

W I L L I A M L. A M E S

position by mere words, without syllogisms, the argument wiU never be decided. See Ava P329a--8 to 330a--2, D283b--5 to 284a--7. 2o0 When it is a question of defining a real, etc., goer, the Sanskrit corresponding to 'gro ba is probably gati, in the sense of "the activity of going." (Compare MMK 2--25cd.) In MMK 2--24, 25ab, gamana is used in the sense of gantavya gata-agata-gamyamdna. Elsewhere in this chapter, gati and gamana appear to be used interchangeably. In any case, the Tibetan translation does not distinguish between them. 20i See Ava P330a--8 to 330b--2, D284b--5,6. 2o2 According to Avalokitavrata, this means that one divides gamana into the three cases of traversed, untraversed, and that which is being traversed. Then one argues, "On the [already] traversed, neither a real nor an unreal nor a both real and unreal goer goes, because the activity of going is past," etc. See Ava P331a--2 to 6, D285a--6 to 285b--2. 2o3 According to Avalokitavrata, scriptural quotations are given in order to answer the objection, "[The negation of going] has been established by a mere limited treatise of desiccated logic." Avalokitavrata replies that it will also be established by reliable scriptural sources. See Ava P331b--4,5; D285b--7 to 286a--1 and also P333a--1 to 4, D287a--3 to 6. See also Ames (1994), p. 134, n. 176. 204 Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P331b--5, D286a--1. The Sanskrit is quoted in PSP (with a variant) as part of a longer quotation; see PSP 108.3. Avalokitavrata quotes even more of the passage; see Ava P331b--6 to 332a--4, D286a--2 to 7. 20s The story of Sadfiprarudita is summarized by Avalokitavrata. See Ava P332a--4 to 332b--4, D286a--7 to 286b--6. The closest Sanskrit equivalent of this quotation can be found in Vaidya (1960), p. 253.25,26. 2o6 Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P332b--5, D286b--7. 207 Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P332b--8 to 333a--1, D287a--3. The Sanskrit text of the last three sentences is in Hikata (1958), p. 34. 208 The Sanskrit has "Where the coming and going o f . . . are not discerned, that is the perfection of discernment." Ibid. 209 See Ames (1994), p. 135, n. 188.
=

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355

SANSKRIT TEXT TO MMK. CHAPTER TWO, ACCORDING TO PSP AS EMENDED BY J. W. DE JONG (1978) AND FURTHER EMENDED BY AKIRA SAITO (1985) gataro, na gamyate tfivad agatarg, naiva gamyate / gatfigatavinirmuktar#, gamyamfinarg, na gamyate// ces.tfi yatra gatis tatra gamyamfine ca sfi yata.h / na gate nfigate cestfi gamyamfine gatis t a t a h / / gamyamfinasya gamanam katham nfimopapatsyate / gamyamfinarn, vigamanam yadfi naivopapadyate// gamyamfinasya gamanam yasya tasya prasajyate / rte gater gamyamfinaro, gamyamfinarg, hi gamyate// gamyamS_nasya gamane prasaktarn, gamanadvayam / yena tad gamyamfinar ca yac cfitra gamanam p u n a h / / 9 dvau gantfirau prasajyete prasakte gamanadvaye / gantfiram hi tiraskrtya gamanav#, nopapadyate// gantfirarn, cet tiraskrtya gamanarg, nopapadyate / gamane 'sati gantfitha kuta eva bhavisyati// gantfi na gacchati tfivad agantfi naiva gacchati / anyo gantur agantui ca kas t.rtiyo 'tha gacchati// gantfi tfivad gacchatiti katham evopapatsyate / gamanena vinfi gantfi yadfi naivopapadyate// pakso gantfi gacchatiti yasya tasya prasajyate / gamanena vinfi gantfi gantur gamanam icchatah// gamane dve prasajyete gantfi yady uta gacchati / ganteti cfijyate yena gantfi san yac ca gacchati// gate nfirabhyate gantum gantum nfirabhyate 'gate / nfirabhyate gamyamfine gantum firabhyate k u h a / /

10

11 12

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WILLIAM L. AMES

prfig asti gamanfirambhfid gamyamfinam na vfi gatam / yatrfirabhyeta gamanam agate gamanam k u t a h / / gatam kim gamyamfina .m kim agatam kim vikalpyate / adrgyamfina firambhe gamanasyaiva sarvathfi// gantfi na tisthati tfivad agantfi naiva tisthati / anyo gantur agantug ca kas t.rtiyo 'tha tisthati// gantfi tfivat tisthatiti katham evopapatsyate / gamanena vinfi gantfi yadfi naivopapadayate// na tis.thati gamyamfinfin na gatfin nfigatfid api / gamanam sargpravrttig ca nivrttig ca gate.h samfi// yad eva gamanam gantfi sa eveti na yujyate / anya eva punar gantfi gater iti na y u j y a t e / / yad eva gamanam gantfi sa eva hi bhaved yadi / ekibhfiva.h prasajyeta kartuh karmana eva c a / / anya eva punar gantfi gater yadi vikalpyate / gamana .m syfit rte gantur gantfi syfid gamanfid r t e / / eka-bhfivena vfi siddhir ngnfibhfivena vfi yayoh / na vidyate tayo.h siddhih katham nu khalu vidyate// gatyfi yayfijyate gantfi gatim trim sa na gacchati / yasmfin na gatipfirvo 'sti kagcit kimcid dhi gacchati// gatyfi yayfijyate gantfi tato 'nyfim sa na gacchati / gati dye nopapadyete yasmfid eke tu gantari// sadbhfito gamanam gantfi triprakfiraxn, na gacchati / nfisadbhfito 'pi gamanarft triprakfiram sa gacchati// gamanam sadasadbhfitah triprakfirato, na gacchati / tasmfid gatig ca gantfi ca gantavyam ca na v i d y a t e / /

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

BHAVAVIVEKA'S

PRAJN~IPRAD[PA: C H A P T E R T W O
GLOSSARY

357

English
about to originate absence of self action activity aeon agent affliction afflictive aggregate appropriation appropriator assertion attachment attention basis (a) being Blessed One causal condition, condition cause cause of maturation cognition

Tibetan
skye bar 'dod pa bdag med pa nyid las bya ba bskal pa byed pa po nyon mongs pa kun nas nyon mongs pa nyon mongs pa can phung po nye bar len pa nye bar blang ba nye bar len pa po dam bcas pa mngon par zhen pa yid la byed pa gzhi seres can bcom ldan 'das rkyen rgyu rgyu rnam per stain pa'i rgyu blo rnam par shes pa shes pa bdag nyid thob pa grags pa rnam par rtog pa rtog pa spros pa lhan cig nyid, lhan cig gi dngos po 'dus byas 'du byed gnod pa gti mug mtshung par ldan pa'i rgyu

Sanskrit
utpitsu nairfitmya karman kriyfi kalpa kartr klega samklega klista skandha upfidfina upfidfitr pratijfifi abhinivega manasikfira figraya, etc. sattva bhagavan pratyaya hetu kfirana vipfika-hetu buddhi vijfifina jfifina fitma-lfibha prasiddhi, prasiddha vikalpa kalpanfi prapafica sahabh~va samskrta samskfira bfidha moha sa .mprayukta-hetu

coming into existence common knowledge conceptual construction conceptual proliferation concomitance conditioned conditioned factor conflict confusion conjoined cause

358 consciousness convention, conventional designation, conventional activity conventional truth conventionally conviction counterbalanced counterexample, dissimilar case, set of all such; counterposition craving criticism defective vision defining characteristic dependent designation dependent origination desire direct object disadvantage discernment doctrine

W I L L I A M L. AMES shes pa yod pa nyid tha snyad caitanya vyavahfira

tha snyad kyi bden pa tha snyad du dad pa 'gal ba 'khrul pa reed pa mi mthun pa'i phyogs

vyavahfira-satya vyavahfiratal). graddhfi viruddha-avyabhicfirin vipaksa

sred pa sun dbyung ba rab rib mtshan nyid brten nas gdags pa rten cing brel par 'byung ba 'dod chags 'dod pa las nyes dmigs shes rab tshul mdzad pa'i mtha' grub pa'i mtha' spyod yul bdag po'i rkyen

trsnfi dfisana
. . ,

timira laksana upfidfiya prajfiapti pratitya-samutpfida

9 .

domain dominant causal condition element (to) emanate emancipation entity established establishing what is [already] established fact of having this as a causal condition feeling

riga kfima karman fidinava prajna naya krtSnta siddhSma gocara adhipati/fidhipateyapratyaya
. ~ _

'byung ba khams sprul pa byang grol dngos po grub pa grub pa la sgrub pa rkyen 'di dang ldan pa nyid tshor ba

bhfita dhfitu nir-mfi apavarga bhfiva vastu siddha siddha-sfidhana idarnpratyayatfi vedanfi

B H A V A V I V E K A ' S PRAJNfiIPRADIPA: C H A P T E R T W O fellow Buddhist rang gi sde pa (more literally, "coreligionist") founders of non-Buddhist mu stegs byed sects futile rejoinder ltag chod hatred higher realms identifying mark immediately preceding causal condition implicative negation imputation in superficial reality m ultimate reality inconclusive inference inherent nature instrument internal intrinsic nature invariable locus logical mark [logically] possible manifestation material matter matter dependent on the on the elements meditation meditational attainment meditative concentration (in) meditative concentration meditative cultivation meditative sphere mental factor zhe sdang mtho ris mtshan ma de ma thag pa'i rkyen ma yin par dgag pa sgro 'dogs pa kun rdzob tu don dam par ma nges pa rjes su dpag pa rang gi ngo bo byed pa nang gi ngo bo nyid rang bzhin 'ldlrul pa reed pa gzhi (as in figraya-asiddhi) rtags rigs pa gsal ba gzugs can gzugs (as first aggregate) 'byung ba las gyur pa'i gzugs bsam gtan snyoms par 'jug pa ting nge 'dzin mnyam par bzhag pa bsgom pa skye mched seres las byung ba svayfithya

359

t~rthakara jfiti dvesa svarga nimitta (sam)anantara-pratyaya paryudfisa-pratisedha samfiropa sa.mvrtyfi paramfirthatal? anaikfintika anumfina svarfipa karana fidhyfitimika svabhfiva svabhfiva avyabhicfirin hgraya linga yukta vyakti rfpin rfpa bhautika-rfipa dhyfina samfipatti samfidhi samfihita bhhvanfi fiyatana caitta

360 mental formation mere assertion merit mind moral conduct necessary connection negation neutral nihilistic negation noble nonconceptual wisdom noncondition nonobstructing cause object object, object to be grasped [by a subject] object of cognition object of correct knowledge object of knowledge one who desires one who hates original meaning, point under discussion overextension perception-conception perfection person position positive concomitance potentiality previous position primary matter primordial matter, original nature property of the subject [which proves the thesis] property to be proved proving property

W I L L I A M L. A M E S 'du byed (as fourth aggregate) dam bcas pa tsam bsod nams sems yid tshul khrims med na mi 'byung ba dgag pa lung d u m a bstan pa skur pa 'debs pa 'phags pa rnam par mi rtog pa'i ye shes rkyen ma yin pa byed pa'i rgyu yul gzung ba dmigs pa gzhal bya shes bya chags pa sdang ba skabs kyi don ha cang thal ba 'du shes pha rol tu phyin pa gang zag phyogs rjes su 'gro ba nus pa phyogs snga ma gtso bo rang bzhin phyogs kyi chos samskfira pratijfifi-m~tra punya citta manas sSla avinfibhfiva pratisedha avyfikrta apavfida firya nirvikalpaka-jfifina apratyaya kfirana-hetu visaya grfihya firambana, filambana prameya jfieya rakta dvista prak.rta-artha
, .

atiprasafiga sam.jfifi pfiramitfi pudgala paksa anvaya gakti pfirvapaksa pradhS_na prakrti paksa-dharma

bsgrub par bya ba'i chos sgrub pa'i chos

sfidhya-dharma sfidhana-dharma

B H A V A V I V E K A ' S PRAJNAPRADfPA: C H A P T E R T W O question raised in objection reality reason reasoning refutation result brgal zhing brtag pa paryanuyoga

361

de kho na gtan tshigs rigs pa sun dbyung ba 'bras bu 'bras bu lung gsung tab rgyur byas pa'i gzugs dgag pa mi mthun pa dbang po tha dad pa mthun pa'i phyogs skal pa mnyam pa'i rgyu chos mthun pa'i dpe med par dgag pa lhan cig 'byung ba'i rgyu so sot nges pa nges par gzung ba ltar snang ba skyes bu byis pa 'gro ba slob ma chos can rtog ge phyi ma rdzas kun rdzob kun rdzob kyi bden pa kun rdzob pa 'jig rten las 'das pa sbyor ba'i tshig gzhung lugs dam bcas pa mtshan nyid kyi gzhi zhi ba bag chags bstan bcos

tattva hetu yukti, nyfiya dfisana phala kfirya figama pravacana upfidfiya-rfipa vipratisedha indriya prthak, bhinna, vyatirikta, etc. sapaksa sabhfiga-hetu sfidharmya-drs.tfinta prasajya-pratisedha sahabhfi-hetu pratiniyata avadhfirana, nirdhfirana -fibhfisa purusa bfila gati gisya dharmin uttara-tarka dravya samvrti sa.mvrti-satya sfimvrta lokottara prayoga-vfikya mata, samaya pratijfifi laks.ya giva vfisanfi gfistra

scripture secondary matter self-contradiction sense organ separate set of all similar examples similar cause similar example simple negation simultaneously arisen cause specific specification specious spirit spiritually immature state of existence student subject [of a thesis] subsequent reasoning substance superficial reality superficial truth superficially real supramundane syllogism system thesis thing characterized tranquil trace treatise

362 true state

W I L L I A M L. A M E S yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin nyid don dam pa don dam pa'i bden pa don dam p a p a 'dus ma byas thal ba ktm tu 'gro ba'i rgyu yang dag pa ma yin pa mi dge ba tshad ma chos gzugs (as an ~yatana) dge ba ye shes yfithfitathya (?)

ultimate reality ultimate truth ultimately real unconditioned undesired consequence universal cause unreal unwholesome valid means of knowledge virtue visible form

paramfirtha paramfirtha-satya pfiramfirthika asamskrta prasafiga sarvatraga-hetu abhfita akugala pramfina dharma rfipa

wholesome wisdom

kugala jnana
. ~ _

BHAVAVIVEKA'S

PRAJIVf[PRADiPA: C H A P T E R T W O
ABBREVIATIONS

363

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AK

The AbhidharmakoAa and Abhidharmakogabhdsya of Vasubandhu -- see Abhidharmakoga and Bhdsya of Acdrya Vasubandhu with Sphutdrtha Commentary of Acdrya Ya~omitra, ed. Swami Dwarikadas Shastri, Bauddha Bharati Series, vols. 5, 6, 7, and 9, Varanasi: Banddha Bharati, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973 and The Abhidharmakogabhds.yam of Vasubandhu, ed. Prahlad Pradhan, Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, voL 8, Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1975 (2nd rev. ed.). Akutobhayd In Dbu ma Tsa: D vol. 1; P vol. 95. Ava Avalokitavrata's Praj~dpradipatika. Chapters one and two in Dbu ma Wa: D vol. 4; P vol. 96. Chapters three through sixteen (part) in Dbu ma Zha: D vol. 5; P vol. 97; Chapters sixteen (part) through twenty-seven in Dbu ma Za: D vol. 6; P vol. 97. Buddhapfilita's Buddhapdlita-M~lamadhyamakav.rtti. In Dbu ma Bp Tsa: D voL 1; P vol. 95 and in Saito (1984). Co ne edition of bstan "gyur, Dbu ma Tsha. Published on microC fiche by the Institute for the Advanced Study of World Religions, Stony Brook, New York, 1974. ("C" without further specification refers to PP C.) Sde Dge Tibetan Tripitaka Bstan H.gyur, Dbu Ma, eds. K. HayaD shima, J. Takasaki, Z. Yamaguchi, and Y. Ejima, 17 volumes and index, Tokyo: Sekai Seiten Kanko Kyokai, 1977. ("D" without further specification refers to PP D.) LVP AK L'Abhidharmako~a de Vasubandhu, tr. Louis de La Vall6e Poussin, 6 volumes, Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1923--31 (reprinted 1971--2 as vol. 16 of Mdlanges Chinois et Bouddhiques). MMK N~gfxjuna's M(damadhyamakakdrikd. Sanskrit in CPP. Tibetan in Dbu ma Tsa: D vol. 1; P vol. 95 and also in Akutobhayd, Ava, Bp, PP, and PSP. N Snar thang edition of the bstan 'gyur, Dbu ma Tsha. Photocopy of the blockprint in the Royal Library, Copenhagen. ("N" without further specification refers to PP N.) The Tibetan Tripitaka, Peking Edition, ed. D. T. Suzuki, 168 P volumes, Tokyo-Kyoto: Tibetan Tripi.taka Research Institute, 1957--61. ("P" without further specification refers to PP P.) PP Bhfivaviveka's Prajfidpradipa. In Dbu ma Tsha: D vol. 2; P vol. 95. PSP Candrakirti's Prasannapadd. Sanskrit in M(damadhyamakakdrikds

de Ndgdrjuna avec la Prasannapadd, Commentaire de Candrakirti,

ed. Louis de La Vall6e Poussin, Bibliotheca Buddhica, vol. 4, St. P6tersbourg: Acad6mie Imp6riale des Sciences, 1913. Tibetan in Dbu ma 'a: D vol. 7; P vol. 98.

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Abhyankar, Kashinath Vasudev (1961). A Dictionary of Sanskrit Grammar. Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1977 (2nd rev. ed.). Abhyankar, Kashinath Vasudev and Shukla, Jayadev Mohanlal (1969). Patahjali's Vyffkarana-Mahdbhds.ya, Fasciculus I. Poona: Sanskrit Vidyfi Parisamsthg. Ames, William L. (1986). Bhdvaviveka's Prajfidpradfpa: Six Chapters. Unpublished dissertation. University of Washington. (Available from University Microfilms International, Ann Arbor, Michigan.) Ames, William L. (1988). "The Soteriological Purpose of N~tgfirjuna's Philosophy: A Study of Chapter Twenty-three of the Mftla-madhyamaka-kdrikds," Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 1I 2: 7--20. Ames, William L. (1993). "Bh~vaviveka's Prajfidpradipa: A Translation of Chapter One, 'Examination of Causal Conditions' (Pratyaya), Part One," Journal of Indian Philosophy 21: 209--259. Ames, William L. (1994). "Bhfivaviveka's Prajh@radipa: A Translation of Chapter One, 'Examination of Causal Conditions' (Pratyaya), Part Two," Journal of lndian Philosophy 22: 93--135. Coward, Harold G. and Raja, K. Kunjunni (1990). Editors. The Philosophy of the Grammarians. Vol. 5 of The Encyclopedia of lndian Philosophies. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Frauwallner, Erich (1973). A History of Indian Philosophy, tr. V. M. Bedekar. 2 vols. Delhi: Motilal Bamarsidass (German edition published Salzburg: Otto Miiller Verlag, 1953--6). Gonda, Jan (1966). Loka: World and Heaven in the Veda. Amsterdam: N.V. Noord-Hollandsche Uitgevers Maatschappij. Hikata, Ryusho (1958). Editor. Suvikrdntavikr6mi-pariprcchff Prajhdpfframitffs(ttra. Fukuoka, Japan: Kyushu University. Huntington, C. W. (1986). The Akutobhayff and Early Indian Madhyamaka. Unpublished dissertation. University of Michigan. (Available from University Microfilms International, Ann Arbor, Michigan.) Jong, J. W. de (1978). "Textcritieal Notes on the Prasannapadd," Indo-Iranian Journal 20: 25--59, 217--52. Jong, J. W. de (1988). "Buddhism and the Equality of the Four Castes," in A Green Leaf." Papers in Honour of Professor Jes P. Asmussen, ed. W. Sundermann, J. Duchesne-Guillemin, F. Vahman. Acta Iranica 28 (= Deuxi~me S&ie, Hommages et Opera Minora, Vol. XII): 423--431. Kajiyama, Yuichi (1963). "Bhfivaviveka's Prajhdpradipah. (1. Kapitel)," Wiener Zeitschrifi fiir die Kunde Slid- und Ostasiens 7: 37--62. Kajiyama, Yuiehi (1964). "Bhfivaviveka's Pra]h@radipah. (1. Kapitel) (Fortsetzung)," Wiener Zeitschrift fiir die Kunde Slid- und Ostasiens 8: 100--30. Keenan, John P. (1989). "Asafiga's Understanding of Mfidhyamika: Notes on the Shung-chung-lun," Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 12(1): 93--107.

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Larson, Gerald James and Bhattacharya, Ram Shankar (1987). Editors. Sdm. khya: A Dualist Tradition in Indian Philosophy. Vol. 4 of The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Potter, Karl H. (1977). Editor. Indian Metaphysics and Epistemology. Vol. 2 of The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Ruegg, David Seyfort (1981). The Literature of the Madhyamaka School in India. Vol. VII, Fasc. 1 of A History of Indian Literature, Jan Gonda (ed.). Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz. Saito, Akira (1984). A Study of the Buddhapdlita-mftlamadhyamakavrtti. Unpublished dissertation. Australian National University. (Saito's edition and translation are paginated separately. References are to the edition unless otherwise indicated.) Saito, Akira (1985). "Textcritical Remarks on the M~lamadhyamakakdrikd as Cited in the Prasannapadd," Indogaku Bukky6gaku Kenky~ 33: (24)--(28). Sharma, Chandradhar (1960). A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1973 (reprint). Sinha, Jadunath (1952). A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I. Calcutta: Central Book Agency. Sinha, Jadunath (1956). A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II. Calcutta: Sinha Publishing. Stcherbatsky, Th. (1930). Buddhist Logic. 2 vols. New York: Dover Publications, 1962 (reprint of Bibliotheca Buddhica 26, Parts I and II. Leningrad: Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R.). Tachikawa, Musashi (1971). "A Sixth-Century Manual of Indian Logic," Journal of Indian Philosophy 1: 111--145. Vaidya, P. L. (1960). Editor. Astasdhasrikd Praj~dpdramitd. Buddhist Sanskrit Texts 4. Darbhanga: Mithila Institute.

John F. Kennedy University Orinda, California, U.S.A.