The Justification of Punishment
The Justification of Punishment
20, 2012
(1) Punishment involves the infliction of pain, harm, loss, or deprivation. Intuitively, these things are bad, undesirable, or both, and seem to demand justification. (2) In some contexts, claiming to administer criminal punishment seems futile or wrong.
[An unusual example : the case of the dog Provetie p. 261]
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The ancient principle of lex talionis (an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, a life for a life)
It can be traced back to the ancient Babylonian code of Hammurabi (about 1772 B.C.)
It seems to be implicit in several fundamental texts in the Judeo-Christian, for instance Genesis 9:6
Once society establishes sufficient reason to punish, the punishment must be administered. Even if a society were about to disband, the justification of punishment would require it to execute the last murderer remaining in the prison. (p. 102)
Builds on lex talionis as a way of determining what kind and degree of punishment is appropriate. (This is the retributivists answer to Question Two.)
Kant sometimes calls it the principle of equality. (But the details are more complex than this suggests.)
Kant rejects any defense of punishment that appeals to possible beneficial consequences for society (including any appeals to utility). He rejects deterrence He rejects the idea of rehabilitation or behavioral therapy All such projects wrongly manipulate the criminal merely as a means to the purposes of others. (p. 100)
R. B.Brandt The retributivist claims to punish moral guilt; but then shouldnt attempted crimes be punished as severely as successful crimes? (p. 267)
Cant there be (admittedly exceptional) circumstances in which we must be ready to punish independent of moral blameworthiness?
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Consequentialist Views
Start with a notion of good consequences, then define what is right in terms of what promotes good consequences.
Deontological Views
Maintain that what it is right to do (what moral duty demands) must be defined prior to and independent of what might promote good consequences.
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These views start with a notion of good consequences, and then define what is right in terms of what promotes those good consequences.
e.g. Utilitarianism : -Rule-utilitarianism (Brandt, p. 263) (Observe those general rules that maximize net expectable utility.)
These views maintain that what it is right to do (what moral duty requires) must be defined prior to and independent of what (might) promote good consequences.
[deon Gk. for obligation or duty]
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E.g. Kants moral theory Morality is addressed to human beings in the form of unconditioned and exceptionless commands.
We can articulate those commands by reference to the fundamental principle of morality called The Categorical Imperative. [3 formulations - .]
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Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.
(2) Respect for Persons Formula Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of any other, always as an end and never as a means only
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Penalties should be such that the (probable) disutility of making them more severe just balances the probable gain in utility for society.
(p. 264) Here he draws on Benthams views in Principles of
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1. Does it matter that there is disagreement about the deterrent value of punishment? 2. Can the utilitarian recognize the importance of defenses that completely excuse someone from criminal liability?
e.g. compulsion; ignorance of fact; some versions of the insanity defense]
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This theory claims to incorporate features of deterrence, retributivist, and rehabilitation views. Punishment must be a form of moral education, teaching both the wrongdoer and the public at large the moral reasons for choosing not to perform an offense. (p.276)
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It supposes that the only thing that human beings can deserve in life is some good.
So that punishment (as the infliction of pain and loss) is justified when and only when it benefits the offender.
Wrong occasions punishment not because pain deserves pain, but because evil deserves correction. (p. 279).
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