24.

500/Phil253 topics in philosophy of mind/perceptual experience

session 3

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24.500/Phil253 S07

Figure by MIT OCW.

plan
martin, transparency the argument for the dependency thesis campbell, reference and consciousness

Cite as: Alex Byrne, course materials for 24.500 Topics in the Philosophy of Mind: Perceptual Experience, Spring 2007. MIT OpenCourseWare (http://ocw.mit.edu/), Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Downloaded on [DD Month YYYY].

24.500/Phil253 S07

the dependency thesis to imagine [sensorily] an F is to imagine experiencing an F

F replaced by pig, table, unicorn, etc.

Figure by MIT OCW.

Phil. How say you, Hylas, can you see a thing which is at the same time unseen? Hyl. No, that were a contradiction. Phil. Is it not as great a contradiction to talk of conceiving a thing which is unconceived? Hyl. It is. Phil. The, tree or house therefore which you think of is conceived by you? Hyl. How should it be otherwise? Phil. And what is conceived is surely in the mind? Hyl. Without question, that which is conceived is in the mind.
Cite as: Alex Byrne, course materials for 24.500 Topics in the Philosophy of Mind: Perceptual Experience, Spring 2007. MIT OpenCourseWare (http://ocw.mit.edu/), Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Downloaded on [DD Month YYYY].

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Figure by MIT OCW.

immediacy when one imagines an F, the imagined situation contains an F (414) an apparent triviality but now, given the dependency thesis, intentionalism looks problematic, because the intentionalist holds that one can experience an F in the absence of an F

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24.500/Phil253 S07
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1. experiencing an F does not entail that an F exists so (plausibly): 2. when one imagines experiencing an F, the imagined situation need not contain an F but, by the dependency thesis: 3. when one imagines experiencing an F, the imagined situation must contain an F contradiction

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24.500/Phil253 S07
Figure by MIT OCW.

Figure by MIT OCW.

what about revising the dependency thesis?

to imagine an F is to imagine perceiving an F now there is no contradiction, because perceiving an F does entail that an F exists

Cite as: Alex Byrne, course materials for 24.500 Topics in the Philosophy of Mind: Perceptual Experience, Spring 2007. MIT OpenCourseWare (http://ocw.mit.edu/), Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Downloaded on [DD Month YYYY].

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taking this route, Martin thinks, requires affirming: when one imagines experiencing an F, the imagined situation need not contain an F that is: the visualizing must be neutral about what objects the imagined situation is taken to contain (417) which, Martin thinks, is implausible (417-8)

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24.500/Phil253 S07
Figure by MIT OCW.

Figure by MIT OCW.

a problem
when one imagines an F, the imagined situation contains an F (414) an apparent triviality but now, given the dependency thesis, disjunctivism looks problematic, because the disjunctivist holds that one can experience an F in the absence of an F
Cite as: Alex Byrne, course materials for 24.500 Topics in the Philosophy of Mind: Perceptual Experience, Spring 2007. MIT OpenCourseWare (http://ocw.mit.edu/), Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Downloaded on [DD Month YYYY].

24.500/Phil253 S07

Figure by MIT OCW.

so how does the disjunctivist escape the argument?

according to the disjunctivist, a visual experience of an expanse of water which is [a] veridical perception involves the patch of water as a constituent of the experiencewhen one visualises such an expanse of water, one thereby imagines such an experience and hence the constituents of the experience(414) isnt Martin revising the dependency thesis? and why the hence? imagining a tiger need not involve imagining the tigers kidneys
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Figure by MIT OCW.

asked what image have you?, one can answer with a picture Wittgenstein imagining a box:

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Figure by MIT OCW.

imagining a beetle inside a box:

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cognitive gloss: theres a beetle inside

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Figure by MIT OCW.

imagining a pig:

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imagining experiencing a pig:

Figure by MIT OCW.

Figure by MIT OCW.

cognitive gloss: Im experiencing it hence: when one imagines experiencing an F, the imagined situation must contain an F (one half of the dependency thesis, and the one needed for the argument)
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1.

experiencing an F does not entail that an F exists so (plausibly): 2. when one imagines experiencing an F, the imagined situation need not contain an F but: 3. when one imagines experiencing an F, the imagined situation must contain an F (plausible independently of the dependency thesis) the dodgy step

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Figure by MIT OCW.

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Figure by MIT OCW.

Figure by MIT OCW. compare: that there is a cube does not entail that there is a 3D cube (there are 4D cubes, e.g.) hence[?] when one imagines a cube, the imagined situation need not contain a 3D cube see 413 on the reverse cartesian principle

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Figure by MIT OCW.

the argument for the dependency thesis

to imagine an F is to imagine experiencing an F imagining experiencing an F imagining an F
plausible, and the needed direction for the previous argument

imagining an F imagining experiencing an F

controversial
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 what explains the similarity between seeing a pig and imagining (visualizing) one? the community of properties view (neoHumeanism: see McGinn) similar contents, e.g. the intentional view imagining isexperiential precisely because what is imagined is experiential (406) that is, imagining a pig is imagining experiencing a pig

Figure by MIT OCW.

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Figure by MIT OCW.

against the CoP view (405-6)

the community of properties view cant be right in general, because feeling an itch is sufficient for the existence of an itch, and on the CoP view, if one imagines an itch then one is feeling a faint itch, yet imagining an itch is not sufficient for the existence of an itch further, the intentional view nicely explains the similarity
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Figure by MIT OCW.

the point extended

one can visualize a red light to the left and a green light to the right, and vice versa the red light is on the left (say) in the imagined situation, not (or not necessarily) on the left relative to ones actual egocentric frame this parallels the case of itchiness the red light is imaginedto the left of the point of view within the imagined situation by being imaginedas being experienced as to the left from that point of view (410) why experienced and not perceived?
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Figure by MIT OCW.

the idea seems to be that on the CoP view, visualizing the red light on the left would mean that it is imagined as being, simply, on the left, which it need not be turning your head need not change the imagined situation the point could also be made with front-back: if one imagines a tiger in front, the imagined situation has nothing to do with where one is in fact facing
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Figure by MIT OCW.

but, if Martins solution is acceptable: the red light is imaginedto the left of the point of view within the imagined situation by being imaginedas being experienced as to the left from that point of view (410) why isnt this: the red light is imaginedto the left of the point of view within the imagined situation by being imaginedas being to the left from that point of view?
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Figure by MIT OCW.

indeed, since the imagined situation contains an F, by the same token the imagined situation contains a red light on the left so the imagined situation can contain something on the left, without this involving ones actual orientation and once this is granted, what work is the experience of somethings being on the left doing?

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