The Arab Spring

Big Idea: Towards a new Arab World Intervention Today Caught between Kosovo and Iraq: Understanding Germanys Abstention on Libya Yemen enters the Arab summer Revisiting the `Nene Blunder: Western Aviation technology Transfers to China Quo Vadis Cuba? A Watershed in South American International Relations

Untitled-2 1

ISSUE 08.11

01/07/2011 11:16:16

LSE IDEAS is a centre for the study of international affairs, diplomacy and grand strategy. Its mission is to use LSEs vast intellectual resources to help train skilled and open-minded leaders and to study international affairs through worldclass scholarship and engagement with practitioners and decision-makers. As its name implies, IDEAS aims at understanding how todays world came into being and how it may be changed, in line with LSEs old motto: rerum cognoscere causas - to understand the causes of things.

LSE IDEAS Level 2, Columbia House Houghton Street London WC2A 2AE Tel: +44 (0)20 7849 4918

Untitled-2 2

01/07/2011 11:16:16

EDITORs Note
As the last issue of IDEAS Today went to press, I recalled Harold Macmillans evocation of events as the essential contingencies of history. Then, Egypt was in the early days of an uprising that would overthrow Hosni Mubarak, but few could have anticipated that the inspiration of the protests first in Tunisia and later in Egypt would spread across the Arab world. As this Arab Spring of revolution becomes a long summer of transitions, we take the opportunity to review some of the historic developments in the region over the last few months. In doing so we throw the spotlight on the drivers of these popular uprisings, and the difficulties they present for the rest of the world in dealing with this strategically crucial region. Kicking us off, Gilles Kepel brings his considerable experience to bear in discussing the revolutions in macro-context, before in our feature article Luca Tardelli analyses the inherent difficulties in Western intervention that are now once again playing out in Libya, a point picked up by Felix Berenskoetter in his discussion of how Western division on Libya played out at the Security Council. Turning to Yemen, Tobias Thiel considers how the particular politics of coalition in that country may allow it to move beyond the surely-now-terminal Presidency of Ali Abdullah Saleh. International politics doesnt stop when crises occur, and the world faces a great many challenges at this time. Chinas rise seems perpetually on the agenda, and Marco Wyss provides a new take on the drivers of that power transition in his analysis of US arms sales to China. Meanwhile, as American hegemony in Latin America seems increasingly up for question, Carlos Solis-Tejada assesses the prospects for Cuba, that most dysfunctional of American relationships, in the wake of the sixth party congress.

CONTENTS
4 6 10 13 16 19 23
Towards a new Arab World
Gilles Kpel

Intervention Today
Luca Tardelli

Germanys abstention on Lybia

Felix Berenskoetter

Yemen turns up the heat

Tobias Thiel

China and the US military

Marco Wyss

Quo Vadis Cuba

Carlos Antonio Solis-Tejada

A Watershed in South American International Relations

Juliana Bertazzo

25

Conference on the Balkans

Antonio Moneo & Eirini Karamouzi

Nicholas Kitchen IDEAS Reports Editor June 2011

IDEAS Today welcomes your letters. Write to [email protected] Editor Nicholas Kitchen Creative Director Nawale Abdous

Untitled-2 3

01/07/2011 11:16:16

The IDEA

Towards a new Arab World

Interview with Prof. Gilles Kpel

Following the upheavals in the Middle East and the Maghreb, IDEAS Senior Fellow Gilles Kpel assesses the Arab Spring.
Will the western intervention in Libya change the outcome of the Arab spring?
In Libya, the military coalitions limited strategy is to neutralise the capabilities of Gaddafis army whilst allowing Libyan power structures to topple him, like in the case of Ben Ali and Mubarak. If this plan does not work, then we turn to the traditional scheme of western intervention, and with it the dangers of the atrocious legacies left behind in Iraq and Afghanistan. Unlike Egypt or Tunisia, Libya is not a strongly institutionalised society in which the head of the military can switch sides in line with social forces and be obeyed by his troops in order to wrest authority from the president. Only leaders of large tribes can ensure this process by disobeying the colonel. For this to happen, those leaders need to convince themselves that Gaddafi and his family are no longer worth their allegiance. Since it will also be difficult to negotiate Libyan oil so long as NATO is assisting the rebels, one might think this will aid his departure. Israeli hawks are also happy to portray Palestinians as unreliable and violent partners and thus share that interest. Renewed unrest in the occupied territories would fence off the perspective of a Palestinian State recognised by the UN General Assembly next September. Regimes favourable to the status quo and hostile to the aspirations of civil society therefore seek to revive the armed conflict and terrorist attacks. Even in Syria, a state that championed the Arab resistance against Israel, events in Deraa and their potential development show that the general aspiration for change goes beyond the sacred union imposed by the conflict with the Jewish state. Iran and its allies including Hamas are uneasy with democratic claims that might end up at their own door. It is however in their interest that those Arab resistance fronts rise once again. to articulate the Arab revolutions as the oil revenue system undermines their future.

Whats the wider perspective on the uprisings?

The fragile oil giant that is Saudi Arabia is worried by the possibility of spillover from the situation in Yemen, as it is in Bahrain. Yemen is a hybrid between urban civilisation and tribal networks, or if you like, between the Egyptian and Libyan models. Urban resistance in Sanaa and Aden is following a similar pattern to what happened in Tahrir Square (a square of the same name also exists in Sanaa) but the key to military stability remains in the hands of tribal leaders who still have not yet changed camp. However, oil-importing countries are reluctant to support transitions that would jeopardize daily supply. This core contradiction continues 4

What are the first Arab Spring?

lessons to draw of these weeks of

At this stage, the Arab revolutions have just started. The impact they may have on the environment, on the oil supply, on immigration and Arab states relationships with Israel are yet to come. However, one can already assert that we entered a new phase, closing the sequence opened by 9/11. The Islamist movement has seen its radical arm the Armed Islamic Group in Algeria or Al-Qaida, which practice armed resistance rendered irrelevant whilst its participatory arm, that takes part in society, is summoned to adapt to democratic reality. Thus in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood, underpinned by a large network of associations, represents the most structured

Untitled-2 4

01/07/2011 11:16:17

political force. At the same time it is interesting to note that recent events on their website are only referred to as revolution of the people. They seemed to have run after a movement they did not initiate. In fact, the Islamic movement has been divided since the 1990s and the confrontation between Islamists and the Algerian power. The 9/11 attacks gave radicals the upper hand as they occupied the international agenda for a whole decade, but the martyr model proved to be insufficient to mobilise the masses in their favour. Autocratic regimes were allowed breathing space by the legacy of 9/11 as they stood as walls against Al-Qaida. The obsolescence of the model hit this respite on the rebound.

Moukhabarat, or secret police. One wonders how such autocratic and police regimes could have been taken by surprise by those uprisings. The answer is they simply did not envisage the arrival of the Twitter generation, this rebellious youth rising against the reigning gerontocracies that lasted for another decade because of Osama Bin Laden. Having said that, one should be wary of fetishising social networks formed around the Web. Television channels played a part and still have some power, although the landscape of media in the region is changing. Al-Jazeera has been criticised for its biases towards Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Hamas, and is now being challenged by the emergence of satellite channels in Egypt, as little by little, freed Egyptian media are reconquering the niche that the Qatari channel had first monopolised.

What

are the factors that triggered the desire for

democratic change across the region?

One of them is tied to the Turkish situation, where the AKP (Justice and Development Party), sustained by a small pious bourgeoisie in the countryside, was successful in pushing the military aside. One should not conceive the AKP as a pure Islamic party attracted by Iran. Iranian nuclear ambitions remain a threat to neighbouring Turkey, and the AKP is torn between radicalism and secularism. What the Turkish situation reveals is that democratisation happens within a logic that contradicts the usual Muslim Brotherhood ideology. More generally, we are looking at a transformation of the political software of the Arab societies. Islamists did not manage to control the terminology of the current upheavals. This situation stands in sharp contrast with the Iranian revolutions that happened thirty years ago. At that time, Ayatollah Khomeyni managed to impose his rhetoric and his discourse on the democratic riot against the Shah and thus subvert it.

What consequences will the revolutions have regionally?

The dark face of those revolutions lies in the fact that they follow decades of repression that inhibited their capacity to generate elites of substitution. Unlike in Eastern Europe, there is no dissidence that can be released from jail. Exiled opponents usually have no political experience. In Egypt, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces took over Mubarak. This time, they did not name a new Mamluk (unlike what happened with Naguib and Nasser, then Sadate and Mubarak). No institution underpins those counter powers. The imperative for emerging political elites is to break out of the virtual world and root themselves in politics on the ground. The cyberspace can help in the short term but cannot be taken as a permanent substitute. Given these difficulties, the worst scenario would be that those revolutions turn out to be unable to reach adulthood. In terms of the international politics of the region, all roads lead back

On the contrary, Egyptian participatory Islamists did not manage to establish their own rhetoric to convey what was happening. Even Shiites from Bahrain use the terminology of human rights and democracy. If there is one downfall to our democracy, it is our inability to

We are looking at a transformation of the political software of the Arab societies

to Israel. The theory that the Jewish State is better off negotiating with autocratic regimes than democratic ones has been reigning for a long time. Yet, one can look at the results and question. Discussions and treaties with Arab dictatorships resulted in the erection of a wall and in the Israeli

have read autonomy and universalism in this movement. It is even uncertain that this movement remains Muslim or Arab.

ghettoisation in the region. It may just be that a democratising Arab world offers more hope. ***

Does this software change characterise all upheavals?

We need of course to take into account local decisions and conditions. Yes, the vocabulary is the same. But the syntax can change. This movement was born in Tunisia, in a culturally mixed society marked by the coalescence between urban class and poor youth. Eastern Libya rose because few transfers of the oil windfall happened in a region mistrustful of Gaddafi. However, all these countries share a common denominator in the omnipresence of the

Gilles Kpel is a Professor at Sciences Po and a Senior Fellow at LSE IDEAS. A version of this interview first appeared in Le Monde.

Untitled-2 5

01/07/2011 11:16:17

THE MARCH OF INTERVENTION

ith 130.000 NATO troops still engaged in Afghanistan, 42.000 American troops present in Iraq and shrinking budgets following the global financial crisis, few would have expected renewed military interventionism in the international

arena. Yet, three military interventions took place in March 2011. Following the approval of UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1973, on 19 March US, British, and French air and naval units began Operation Odyssey Dawn against Libyan forces to establish a no-fly zone (NFZ) over the country and arrest Muammar Gaddafis forces advance towards the rebel city of Benghazi, with the operation subsequently taken on by NATO (Operation Unified Protector). A few days before, on 14 March, Saudi and UAE forces were deployed in Bahrain with the endorsement of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to help quell the ongoing protests in the country. On 31 March, military units of the French mission and UN Operation in Ivory Coast (UNOCI) intervened in the ongoing conflict between Laurent Gbabo and Alassane Outtaras forces in Abidjan favouring the demise of the former. Western intervention in Libya in particular has brought the question of Liberal interventionism back under the spotlight. Why this renewed interventionism? What does Libya tells us about intervention today? And where is all this going? To answer these questions three dimensions need to be addressed: an ideological and normative dimension; a political and strategic one; and a military one.

THE (ETERNAL) RETURN OF LIBERAL INTERVENTIONISM

The first dimension refers primarily to the ideological drivers of Western interventionism and the debate around Liberal interventionism. Simply put, Liberal interventionism refers to the doctrine advocating intervention in foreign societies, including the use of force, to promote Liberal values of freedom and human rights. Liberal interventionism burgeoned during the humanitarian interventions of the 1990s and reached its most ambitious experiment in Iraq 2003.

Interve Toda
UN security council vote for a no-fly zone over Libya. Photograph: Stan Honda/AFP/Getty Images
01/07/2011 11:16:17

Despite the human, political, economic costs of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Liberal interventionism remains an influential doctrine among both Western policy-makers and intellectuals. As Toby Dodge argued one year ago on these pages (Ideas Today, Issue 2, 2010), there is no silver bullet that will keep it out of international relations. It will keep bouncing back. Why is it so? First, Liberal interventionism is here to stay for a very simple reason: the Liberal creed upon which all Western politics is predicated, which legitimates Western political discourse, institutions, and the political leaders that run them. A significant part of this creed is shaped by the belief in both democracies action as a force for good in world politics as well as in the often taken-for-granted assumption of the right of democracies to intervene to rectify wrongdoings perpetuated by tyrannical regimes or fill the authority voids left by failed states. In this sense, Liberal Interventionism has not come back it was never dead in the first place. The Arab Spring and the images of young protesters challenging autocratic regimes have simply provided new fuel to the ideational engine of Western interventionism. Second, the experiences of the 1990s provided Western leaders with a set of lessons and a narrative over the possibility offered by the multilateral use of force, particularly air power and peacekeeping operations, in addressing humanitarian crises and domestic conflicts, as well as a stark reminder over of the costs of inaction (e.g. Srebrenica, Rwanda). It is an experience that is still exerting an enormous influence today: not surprisingly, intervention in Libya has often been justified as way to prevent a new Srebrenica in Benghazi. Third, it is an evolving doctrine that can be implemented though various forms 6

Untitled-2 6

of military and non-military action. In this sense, its adaptability to changing contexts helps explain its long-term appeal. Its latest evolution can be identified in the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Adopted by the UN in 2005, the doctrine allows for the international community to take all the measures when a state fails to protect its own citizens from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This trend found expression in UNSC Resolution 1973 calling members states to take all necessary measures... to protect civilians in Libya. UNSC 1973 reference to the protection of civilians and the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China) abstention over the resolution has been hailed as the manifestation of an emerging consensus over the R2P doctrine beyond Western circles. At closer look however such optimism is misplaced. The BRICs abstentions resulted from exceptional circumstances, including the presence of regional support for intervention provided by the Arab League and the lack of any primary strategic interests in Libya for the BRICs. In addition, the Libyan case may well create a precedent that other states could use. Humanitarian considerations were cited by Russia in the war in Georgia in 2008 and tomorrow Moscow could invoke the same to address the consequences of what might be turbulent political transitions in Central

time, the USs limited role resulted from a compromise between a more interventionist position present primarily in the State Department (Hilary Clinton, Amb. Susan Rice) yet not exclusively (Samantha Power) and a more cautious Pentagon (Robert Gates). But domestic politics and bureaucratic compromises tell only part of the story. European and American positions have been shaped by the different interests and vulnerabilities with regard to the Libyan question, in terms of the different costs that Libyan instability entailed to different actors. More importantly, allied decisions stemmed from need to adapt to a rapidly changing situation on the Southern shore of the Mediterranean, in a strategic setting defined by competing interests among interveners themselves. Such a competitive stance derives from the need to secure not only competing security and economic interests but also a favourable position in the new regional order that could assure access and influence over the emerging regimes. Intervention appealed to European governments in particular as a shortcut to get back on the right side of history

vention oday
repeat the experience.

Asia and the Caucasus. More importantly, military stalemate in Libya and casualties among civilians might well strangle R2P in its newfound Libyan cradle. Emerging powers increasing criticism of NATO air strikes in Libya already indicates that they wont probably
A Bosnian woman mourns over coffins of a newly identified victims during preparations for mass burial at the Potocari Memorial cemetery near Srebrenica on Saturday. AFP photo

Where is all this leading? On the one hand, Liberal interventionism relevance in Western political discourse and the political instability produced by the Arab Spring underscore the likelihood of future interventions. On the other hand, deficit cuts and the experience of Afghanistan and Iraq have left a profound scepticism about the use of ground troops and stressed the need for allied and regional consensus to secure sufficient legitimacy and support. As a result, what we are experiencing is a shift from the proactive and imperial forms of Liberal intervention symbolised by Iraq 2003 and a return to more classic, reactive forms of Liberal interventions following and addressing revolutions, domestic conflicts, and human rights violations.

when transitions appeared inevitable. Allied humanitarian aid, the de facto and official recognition of the National Transitional Council in Benghazi, the provision of military support all need to be addressed from the perspective of a renewed competition for credibility, prestige, influence and economic positions in a politically altered region, vis--vis new regimes and Arab public opinion after the initial ambiguities and the previous support for the autocratic regimes in the area. As in earlier cases of allied interventions in the Balkans, competing views and interests will make the survival of the coalition an objective in itself. This will likely lead alliance decisionmaking into compromise and ineffective military solutions at the operational level that in turn will leave NATO the familiar choice to either wait or escalate.

A COMPLEX STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

At the same time, coalition politics takes place within two broader Intervention is a highly political decision, shaped by both domestic and international contexts and contests. Both domestic and international factors interplay in shaping interventionary policies. For instance, domestic politics help explain both French activism as well as German and Italian reluctance to intervene. At the same dynamics. First, rising powers have played an indirect but important role so far, by abstaining in the UNSC. However, they have been increasingly vocal about NATO airstrikes in Libya, advocating a negotiated resolution of the conflict proposed by the African Union (AU). Relations between NATO countries and rising powers will likely 7

Untitled-2 7

01/07/2011 11:16:18

determine the shape of NATO exit strategy from Libya as well as provide indications on the emerging balance between Western countries and the BRICs. Second, regional actors state and inter-state are becoming more relevant in shaping interventionary responses. The Libyan case, in particular, highlights the role played by France and the UK and US willingness to give European allies a leading role with regard to operations in the European and Mediterranean region. Obamas remarks in his recent speech at Westminster Hall on the indispensability of the transatlantic alliance further stressed this point. It is a trend that encompasses also the Middle East and Africa. The Arab League played a key role in legitimising intervention in Libya. In the Gulf, the Arab Spring has pushed Saudi Arabia and the GCC into a more interventionist role, exemplified by the intervention in Bahrain and diplomatic initiative to solve the political crisis in Yemen. Similarly, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) request for a stronger UN mandate in Ivory Coast ignited the process leading to UN troops air strikes against Gbagbos compound. After Iraq, regional support has become a key criteriacriterion for US intervention, as stressed by former Secretary of Defense Gates in the run-up to allied intervention in Libya. Yet, as the Arab Leagues case shows, regional support can be half-heartened and turn sour quickly once the objectives of the intervener become clearer and the costs of intervention human, political, and economic are made evident.

TURNING UP THE HEAT IN LIBYA

In military terms, Libya may come to represent an emblematic case of post-Iraq military intervention, characterised by a return to the experience of the 1990s and the renewed comfort found by Western leaders in the promises of air power. The lessons of Kosovo whether the correct ones or not loom large in Operation Unified Protector. As in the case of Kosovo, however, operations in Libya have once again highlighted the illusion that air power can be successful alone. The intrinsic limits of air operations in assuring substantial gains on the ground have ignited a classic escalatory process. As air operations proved ineffective in securing an immediate result, the UK, France and Italy have deployed military trainers to Benghazi to provide organisational support to the rebels. Furthermore, in May 2011 NATO significantly escalated its air strikes against Tripoli and the ruling elites sites and assets. In a other remarkable step, Apache, Tiger, and Gazzelle attack helicopters have been deployed by Paris and London to the theatre of operations. As confirmed by British Prime minister David Cameron, these measures aim at turning up the heat in Libya and exerting increased pressure on Gaddafi and his domestic allies. Problems for alliance cohesion will arise if NATO strikes and the new measures adopted do not deliver. NATO leaders will find it difficult not to escalate and adopt further measures such as the provision of weapons, including heavy artillery to the rebels; a larger presence and role for military trainers to take on more operational and military training programmes; and an increased role for intelligence operatives and special operations forces. Significantly, the US might be forced to reassume a more prominent role in attack operations if the operation continues unsuccessfully. Resolution 1973 explicitly prohibits any foreign occupation force of any form on any part of the Libyan territory. Nonetheless, discussion over the possibility of using ground forces might still ensue. In particular, discussion of the use of ground troops will resurface in view of a solution to the conflict. Three outcomes are in fact possible: the failure of NATO operations, a NATO military success (ousting Gaddafi), or a negotiated settlement. In all three cases, ground troops might be required to, respectively: escalate the conflict and secure the alliance objectives; provide support to the reconstruction process in Libya; and monitor the eventual ceasefire. INTERVENTION IN REVOLUTIONARY TIMES The March 2011 interventions have been a reaction to the revolutionary wave and the political transition processes in the Middle East and North Africa. This process is not over yet. Western and Middle Eastern governments will continue to operate in an a rapidly evolving political and ideological framework. Post-revolutionary phases are traditionally highly unstable and unpredictable and often characterised by series of interventions and counterinterventions. The outcome of this phase is still hard to detect. The French Revolution and the Russian February Revolution in 1917 toppled absolutist, autocratic regimes, only to pave the way in the short-term for Napoleon and the Bolsheviks. The French revolution changed Europe, but only after two decades of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary wars. In this sense, the Arab Spring will be shaped by both domestic developments in the region and external interference. Evolutions in US doctrine also need to be taken into account. President Obamas speech on the Middle East (19 March 2011), pledging US support for the ongoing transition in the region, marks a significant Wilsonian shift away from the more pragmatic phase expressed in the Cairo speech. Obama has stressed how the ongoing process gives the US the chance to abandon its past acceptance of the world as it is in the region in the name of stability and instead pursue the world as it should be, placing self-determination as the new guiding 8

Untitled-2 8

01/07/2011 11:16:18

principle of American policy in the region. Two aspects, nonetheless, remain unclear: first, the extent to which the US and its European allies will be willing to support other ongoing democratic transitions not only via the economic measures approved recently by the G8 but also via the direct and indirect use of military force. More importantly, it is not entirely clear where history is heading in the Middle East, i.e. whether the Arab Spring will lead the region towards increased participatory democracy or various forms of either Islamist or indirect military rulers. The picture of political and ideological confrontation looks increasingly complex. It is a context shaped by the obsolescence of the al-Qaida model and yet also a potential greater role for moderate Islamism, as argued by Gilles Kepel in this issue. Growing democratic aspirations, Western support for the latter, and militaryled transitions further complicate the picture. Alignments in the region might also be altered. Interestingly, local Libyan Islamists are supporting Western intervention in Libya. At the same time, GCC discussions on Morocco and Jordans membership in the council indicates the possible emergence of a counterrevolutionary front in the region. Threats and windows for intervention will likely arise at the intersection of these ideological dynamics, competing political and strategic interests and escalatory military factors. In this sense, Africa and the Middle East are likely to provide most of the flash points in 2011. In Africa, the electoral processes taking place in the first months of 2011 have already spurred regional and international crises. The civil violence ignited by the elections in Nigeria and Ivory Coast provide a stark reminder of the possibility of both domestic conflict and foreign intervention in the continent. The road ahead is marked by other warning signs. The Democratic Republic of Congo is heading towards elections in November-December 2011 in a context of political instability, ongoing international military presence, and human rights violations. The unfinished process leading to Southern Sudans independence coupled with the domestic situation in Somalia completes a tense picture.

and humanitarian aid. In 2009, US aid increased to approximately $70 million, from $5 million in 2006. In January 2010, 25 countries and international organisations, including US and EU countries, the GCC, Turkey, Egypt and the UN, established the Friends of Yemen initiative in an attempt to avoid Yemen turning into a failed state and a safe heaven for terrorist groups. More importantly, the US and the UK are already present in Yemen with military trainers. In addition, direct air strikes against members and facilities of al-Qaida in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) have been conducted although officially not confirmed via drones and cruise missiles. Yemen represents a failing state of considerable interest to NATO not only because of its strategic position and the presence of AQAP in the country. Yemen matters to GCC governments because of the potential regional consequences of a rapidly deteriorating domestic context where anti-government protests add up to the political uncertainty ensuing President Ali Abdullah Salehs departure from Yemen; the ongoing clashes between government troops and forces loyal to the Hashid tribal confederation led by Sadeq al-Ahmar; the consequences of the Houthi rebellion in the North; and secessionist movement in Southern provinces. Saudi border and air operations against the Houthi rebels in November 2009 exemplify the potential spill-over effects of Yemens domestic conflict for neighbouring states. The failure of the GCC diplomatic initiative in April and the military clashes between government and anti-government forces in May have increasingly reduced the scope for a peaceful solution to the crisis in the country and opened the door for all-out domestic conflict. The list of other possible flashpoints is undoubtedly longer, encompassing other regions. If anything, the Libyan case has stressed the role of strategic surprise in international affairs. Few observers noted the changing political landscape in the Arab world. Even fewer anticipated political change and domestic conflict in Libya. No-one could have imagined a few months ago that the West would be engaged in a military intervention against Gaddafi. But revolutions do accelerate history, and make it rather unpredictable. Hence, the only possible prediction: prepare for more surprises.

*** In the Middle East, Assads repression of Syrian protests has been closely monitored by Western leaders. So far, this has resulted in new targeted sanctions against the regime and Obamas and European allies calls for Assad to either reform or quit. Western action with regard to Syria is unlikely at this stage, however, and it will remain contingent on both the extent of continued protests, the extent of Assads repression and its regional repercussions, and the ongoing NATO commitment in Libya. Iran represents the other obvious critical node due to both the Iranian nuclear programme and the possible resumption of youth protests in the country. At the moment, however, Yemen represents a more immediate concern. Yemen is the recipient of significant Western economic 9 Luca Tardelli is a PhD candidate in the International Relations Department at LSE and Research Student at LSE IDEAS.

Untitled-2 9

01/07/2011 11:16:19

T
B L of the O G

he German decision to abstain from voting on the UN Security Council Resolution 1973 authorizing a no-fly zone over Libya

puzzled many observers and was heavily criticized by some. The German government has been accused of irresponsible and inconsistent behaviour, abandoning Western consensus, and of having failed the test of leadership. Such criticism has been voiced abroad (mainly by Western countries supporting the resolution) and domestically (by, for instance, Klaus Naumann and Joschka Fischer). Accompanied by an air of moral superiority and/ or a sense of embarrassment, the critics explained the German decision with a misplaced pacifist reflex, poor strategic thinking, and an incompetent Foreign Minister. And, of course, with a shortsighted and an inward-looking government concerned mainly about public opinion (the parties of the governing coalition had been trailing in polls for state elections which took place a week after the UN vote). My aim is not to defend the German decision. But sometimes criticism says more about those voicing it than about their target, and so I think it is important to take a step back and consider the strategic thinking behind the abstention. And then, it seems to me, the decision to abstain does not appear unreasonable at all (and not just in hindsight).

Caught between Kosovo and Iraq: Understanding Germanys Abstention on Libya

By Felix Berenskoetter, SOAS
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/ideas/

Lets begin with the facts: Resolution 1973 authorizes the enforcement of a no-fly zone over Libya with the aim of protecting civilians with all necessary measures. It was clear to everyone involved that this would entail the use of military force. Furthermore, Germanys decision to abstain, as communicated by the government, did neither imply neutrality nor was it meant to obstruct the mission. It can be interpreted as a constructive abstention as it exists in the EUs decision-making procedure for CSDP missions and also in NATOs silent procedure. Furthermore, it is misleading to attribute this stance to an incompetent Foreign Minister, as Guido Westerwelle took the decision in consultation with the Chancellor and the Minister of Defence. As such, it was also Angela Merkels decision. This is important, as Merkel is generally considered an experienced leader who uses a lowprofile but consistent approach to pursue German interests, informed by careful, calculated and, yes, strategic thinking. Finally, the German government has been relatively clear in explaining its position. While sharing the goal of Resolution 1973, it argued that voting in support would bind Germany into a risky mission with unintended consequences. That prospect Merkel and her Ministers wanted to avoid. Now, one could view this stance as a repetition of Germanys refusal to participate in the 2003 war against Iraq. And, indeed, there are many parallels. For instance, there is the familiar attempt to portray Germany as an outlier who is acting irresponsibly and isolated from the international community. While it is not surprising to find this frame amongst those leading the mission

10

Untitled-2 10

01/07/2011 11:16:22

and amongst domestic pundits concerned about German standing in the world, it does not hold much water. Most obviously, the BRIC countries hardly amount to a small share of the international community; the real issue is, of course, that Germany is not supposed to be in that camp. Yet even if we look at Germanys position among NATO members the picture is mixed. Tellingly, and in contrast to the Iraq episode, there has been no fallout with the US. Indeed, the two countries were closer in their position than it may seem; until the day before the UN vote the Obama administration was sceptical about military intervention and it has since withdrawn its planes from the operation. Within Europe, also, support for the intervention was by no means unanimous; many countries stood back and silently shared the German position. Like during the Iraq debate, the German government shared the goal of regime change, that is, it agrees that it is desirable to end Gaddafis reign in Libya. Yet while it supported all kinds of civilian measures towards that end, including sanctions, it did not consider military intervention as the appropriate instrument. The reason is not merely pacifism. Then as now, the German government remained unconvinced that there was an immediate threat to international (or: European) peace and security. Indeed, such a claim is not easy to make even for those leading the intervention in Libya. Although some commentators tried to revive the triangular logic of Tyrant-Terror-WMDs used so effectively (and misleadingly) by Bush and Blair in 2003, the argument that intervention is necessary to fight terrorism and disarm a dictator was even less plausible in this case. After all, for the past five years or so Western governments considered the Gaddafi regime a useful partner in fighting terrorism and sold it plenty of arms. But times change, and now the West is concerned about human security/rights in Libya. Thus the situation appeared to be a classic case of the R2P logic: Gaddafi is a bad sovereign who is killing his own people (Resolution 1973 speaks of possible crimes against humanity) and in order to protect Libyan civilians the establishment of a no-fly-zone, including the use of military force against the forces of the regime, is necessary. Given that Germany was willing to intervene in Kosovo in 1999 under a similar logic (even without UN resolution), why abstain now? Have Germans forgotten their vow to allow no more genocide? It will be difficult to have German officials admit as much in public, but there are doubts as to whether the moral case was as straightforward. Without downplaying the fact that civilians were (and still are) being killed in Libya, as they are elsewhere, the term genocide has not been invoked, and for good reason. The scenario of an impending massacre in Benghazi, central to the sense of urgency to pass the UN resolution, remains a scenario. One could say this is only thanks to the intervention, but how do we know? Certainly the rebels learned to play the R2P tune to their advantage. The murkiness of the moral case is particularly visible in the proclaimed care for refugees. Like in the Kosovo episode, there is the image of displaced people streaming

into the EU. But then as now, justifying military intervention with the need to protect refugees is full of hypocrisy. Rather than driven by a responsibility to protect, European policy primarily rests on the fear of Europe being overrun by brown people (in the case of North Africa). Thus, governments had readily cooperated with a Gaddafi regime rigorously preventing migration flows northwards. Now they were going to create the conditions for people to be happy to stay where they are by dropping bombs? Here, of course, the humanitarian argument overlaps with a broader geostrategic rationale for intervention, namely the wish to support the Arab spring. Just like the protest movements sweeping away authoritarian regimes in Central and Eastern Europe at the end of the Cold War, now we are witnessing a transformative dynamic in the Arab world which sees oppressed populations overthrowing dictators in their quest for freedom. In this scenario, Libya was presented as just another falling domino, following Tunisia and Egypt, and Western intervention a logical move to assure a place on the right side of history. Now, lets assume the German government saw the regional dynamic and understood its historical importance

Guido Westervelle. Angela Merkel. Reuters

(after all, Merkel would not be where she is without the protest movements in Central and Eastern Europe). Still we can see how four factors made it wary of intervening and formed the key motive for the abstention: The fear of Germany becoming entrapped in a mission-creep. First, officials in Berlin were aware of one important parallel between 1989 and 2011, namely that on both occasions Western governments were taken by surprise. Having grown comfortable with the status quo, the West did not understand the societies behind the regimes they dealt with and so most practitioners will have to admit that when Resolution 1973 was passed, Libya beyond Gaddafi was largely unfamiliar terrain. What was visible to those who looked close enough, however, was that Libya did not appear to be another Tunisia/Egypt. The resistance movement was neither as broad and encompassing as it had been in those countries nor was it primarily civilian. Instead, it reflected long standing tribal divisions and quickly showed the willingness to take up arms on 11

Untitled-2 11

01/07/2011 11:16:23

both sides. There was a risk of becoming entangled in a civil war one did not understand. Second, it was apparent from the start that the Obama administration was not willing to lead another military intervention in an Arab country, certainly not in the long term. And so, while the Arab League gave its blessing, the burden would be carried by Europeans. This idea seemed to appeal to France and the UK, eager to lead the good war also for domestic reasons (to divert attention from internal problems and low popularity) and to regain international status (including to make forget ties to authoritarian rulers in the region whose departure they now celebrate). Driven by a sense of urgency, those two countries showed little interest in consultation and cooperation that would divert them from the chosen path, all the while the US was working on getting NATO involved to offload the main responsibility onto Europeans. Without the US, however, Germany would have had to take on a bigger role in the intervention. Third, one does not need to read Clausewitz to know that military engagement unfolds its own, unpredictable dynamic. The German government understood that the goal amongst those pushing for intervention was not merely to protect civilians but regime change and, thus, that military force would be used to support the rebels. Resolution 1973 is sufficiently vague to allow the interpretation that civilians are only safe once Gaddafi is gone. Yet officials in Berlin could also see that regime change might be difficult to achieve through a no-fly-zone and that letting go of this goal would be equally difficult, making a more robust invasion a possibility (as was the case with Iraq, eventually). Apart from the dangers this entails, the subsequent responsibility of the intervening forces to assist in building peace could easily turn into another draining multi-year commitment. Fourth, the argument that supporting the UN resolution would still have allowed Germany to stand back is unrealistic. Supporting a resolution only to then refuse investing in its implementation would have rightly been criticized as irresponsible. What is more, the German government would have been legally bound to the cause: In 1993 the Constitutional Court ruled that solidarity within an alliance (Bndnissolidaritt) must be upheld even if this risks violating Basic Law principles later on. And the German experience in Afghanistan had vividly displayed the danger of getting caught in a mission out of solidarity whose agenda is set by others, only to be accused of not doing enough and branded a bad ally. For these reasons, which include concerns about personnel overstretch and costs (lets not forget, military operations are very expensive), the Merkel government decided to forego another adventure. This decision does not appear short-sighted and inwardlooking to me. I also am not convinced that it poses a problem for either the people in Libya or for German standing in the world. To be 12

sure, there is a risk now for Germany to be perceived as unwilling to support the Arab Spring. And there also is the somewhat peculiar but nevertheless persistent view that the German abstention damaged European unity/the EU. This the government must deal with. Already it is trying to compensate for the abstention by taking over important AWACS flights in Afghanistan and by working on launching a humanitarian mission for Libya through the EU. It is in the latter setting where Germany could regain its credibility and show leadership, not the least because going through the EU would benefit both sides: If there is an actor which remained largely invisible in the Arab Spring and should worry about its reputation it is the EU. Not only is there little evidence that the Barcelona process and 15 years of democracy promotion have contributed in any way to the current dynamics in North Africa. Tellingly, the first reaction coming from Brussels since the protests began has been the mobilization of the EUs border protection agency, FRONTEX. If Germany can turn this into a productive neighbourhood policy worthy of the name, the abstention will soon be forgotten. *** Felix Berenskoetter is a Lecturer in the Department of Politics and International Studies at SOAS (University of London) and a member of its Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy.

Untitled-2 12

01/07/2011 11:16:23

Yemen Enters the Arab Summer

By Tobias Thiel

Turning Up the Heat:

The current political crisis in Yemen poses the fiercest challenge to the regime of President Saleh to date. As he continues to hold on to power, Yemen is heading towards a humanitarian catastrophe. With Mr Saleh under medical treatment in Saudi Arabia, the international community should engage the opposition and quickly move towards a political transition.

perhaps 5-year-old girl climbs the main stage at Tagheer Square in the Yemeni capital Sanaa. Overlooking thousands of protestors, she timidly grabs the microphone and shouts from the top of her lungs: ash-shaab yureed tagheer an-nidham! (The people want

to overthrow the system!). The contagion effect of the political earthquakes in North Africa reached Yemen in mid-January 2011. The ouster of Ben Ali in Tunisia and Mubarak in Egypt provided a blueprint for defeating Arab dictatorships with peaceful mass protests. Calls for reform initially eclipsed those for the removal of President Ali Abdullah Saleh for fear that a power vacuum in Yemen low in literacy and abundant in weapons could trigger a civil war. Still, tens of thousands of protestors joined the anti-government sit-in at Sanaa University. They are an odd mix: socialists and Islamists side by side, doctors and engineers next to illiterate tribesmen, elderly sheikhs and adolescent university students, womens rights activists and members of the security forces. What unites them is the demand for Mr Saleh and his kin to leave power and the hope for a new Yemen. And because it is fun. The crowd is in high spirits as people listen to political speeches, dance, pray, chew qat (a popular light narcotic in Yemen), and bond with fellow protestors in revolutionary fervour. But Mr Saleh, a shrewd tactician who once likened ruling Yemen to dancing on the heads of snakes has survived dozens of challenges in Yemens notoriously ungovernable political landscape since his ascent to power in 1978. Seeing himself as the Father of the Nation, a virus common among veteran strongmen in the region, he has been clinging on to power at any cost. In an environment where formal political institutions lack salience, Mr Saleh secures political support through a highly inclusive patronage network of tribal, religious, military and political party
Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh

elites. Mastering the art of divide et impera, he resorts to military force only when politically expedient. When protests gained momentum, Saleh reached into the dictators toolbox. He mobilised thousands of his own supporters in the streets by offering daily stipends and free qat, paid off tribal leaders and gave wage increases to government employees and security forces. He also tried to co-opt reformists by proposing a new constitution and parliamentary system and claimed that the demonstrations were orchestrated from a control room in Tel Aviv for destabilizing the Arab world [ that is] managed by the White House. When these conventional strategies failed to halt the Youth Revolution, security forces and pro-Saleh thugs used lethal force against unarmed demonstrators. March 18 became a watershed moment as rooftop snipers from the security forces killed at least 52 unarmed protestors after Friday prayers. Whether authorised by Mr Saleh himself or his supporters acting on their own, the event seemingly

13

Untitled-2 13

01/07/2011 11:16:23

confirmed the moral bankruptcy of the government and galvanised anti-regime sentiment. The president declared a state of emergency. A week later, on the so-called Friday of Departure, more than a hundred thousand protestors gathered at Tagheer Square and perhaps one million in other cities. The political crisis inspired by the Arab Spring soon brought intraelite rivalries to the fore that had been simmering under the surface for some years. The Muslim scholar Sheikh Abdulmajid alZindani openly opposed Mr Saleh by issuing a legal opinion that confirmed the rights of demonstrators. Sadiq al-Ahmar, head of the powerful Hashid Tribal Confederation, which encompasses nine tribes including Mr Salehs own Sanhan tribe, and his brothers Hamid, Hussein and Himyar, publicly turned against the president. On March 21, Major General Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar, the presidents relative and one of the most powerful generals in the country, moved his 1st Armoured Division into Sanaa, vowing to protect the protestors. Mr Muhsin had many reasons to settle old scores with his commander-in-chief: Saleh had tried to politically neutralise him and sabotaged his war efforts against the Huthis rebels. Muhsins desertion precipitated dozens of military defections. Scores of senior officials and ambassadors resigned from their positions and the ruling General Peoples Congress (GPC) party. These long-term allies of Mr Saleh felt increasingly marginalized by the concentration of power around his immediate family.

well as the United States. Saudi Arabia, which maintains extensive transnational patronage networks in Yemen, is alleged to have ceased payments to Yemeni tribal elders since April. In the last round of the GCC-brokered deal on May 22, Mr Saleh allowed loyalist gunmen to besiege Arab and Western diplomats in the United Arab Emirates embassy. The diplomats had to be flown out by helicopter and the chief mediator Abdullatif al-Zayani withdrew the initiative due to a lack of suitable conditions. On May 23 heavy fighting erupted between Sadiq al-Ahmars tribal fighters and government forces in Sanaas Hassaba neighbourhood and later spread to other parts of the city. Government forces attacked the homes of tribal leaders, while tribal fighters seized government complexes, which they handed over to the demonstrators. Mediation efforts by a group of tribal sheikhs failed, but ultimately a fragile cease-fire came into place. Sheikh Al-Ahmar and Mr Saleh blamed each other for the outbreak of violence. The Yemeni economy has since plummeted and the bloodshed threatens to unleash a humanitarian catastrophe. As the poorest country in the Arab world, people in Sanaa face shortages of gasoline, water, cooking oil, electricity and other basic supplies. The opposition has accused Saleh of having deliberately cut off supplies in order to stave off the demonstrations. Fearing that the clashes could spiral into a broader war in Yemen one of the most heavily armed countries per capita in the world people have begun leaving Sanaa and moved to the safety of their villages.

The Downward Spiral

Mr Saleh, a veteran survivor of Yemeni politics, has been playing for time. The GCC countries with Western backing brokered a deal in which the president was to step down within 30 days in exchange for immunity, but Mr Saleh failed to sign it on three different occasions. Instead, Mr Saleh showed himself defiant and played up fears that his departure would lead to a bloody civil war. Opposition leaders accused Saleh of having a hand in the takeover by Islamist militants of the city of Zinjibar in a bid to raise fears in the United States that Yemen may turn into a safe haven for jihadists. However, while most Yemenis understand the fragility of their conflict-ridden country, they now refuse to see Mr Saleh as the last bulwark against Yemens descent into anarchy. On the contrary, many now believe that Saleh is dragging the country into civil war. Mr Saleh may reckon that he can win a military confrontation as he did in 1994. The Republican Guard is under the command of his son Ahmad Ali Saleh and his nephews Tarik, Yahya and Amar are in key military positions. He may still count on the support of some powerful tribes around the capital Sanaa. However, with the Hashid tribes, the Huthi rebels, parts of the military, as well as the South against him, the political and military balance has shifted in favour of the opposition. Yemens empty state coffers and rentier economy make Mr Saleh strongly dependent on foreign currency. His patronage system survives on hydrocarbon exports, as well as military aid and rents from Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries as 14

On June 3, Mr Saleh was injured in an attack on his compound in Sanaa. The official story is that a shell hit the mosque in the presidential palace, where Saleh and his entourage were praying. At least eleven people were killed and several others, including President Saleh, were seriously injured. The Al-Ahmar family denied responsibility for the attack. Tactical intelligence analysts from Stratfor claim that the pictures of the crime scene point to an assassination attempt with an improvised explosive device, rather than an artillery shell. If true, this would imply an inside job, either by Ali Muhsin or an insider in the Republican Guards, rather than Al-Ahmars Hashid fighters. The next day, Mr Saleh and his aides and family members were flown to Saudi Arabia, where he is recovering from surgery amid a fragile ceasefire and speculations over his rule in Yemen.

Moving Beyond Ali Abdullah Saleh

With the wounded Yemeni president in oil-rich Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom finds itself in the position of kingmaker. The Saudis may be reluctant to allow Mr Salehs return as president. However, with reformist pressures from the Arab Spring in the Kingdom itself, the Saudi policy establishment is torn in their approach to Yemen. The United States position is ambivalent, too. While Hillary Clinton has called for Mr Saleh to immediately step down, the U.S. Department of Defense seemingly prefers Mr Saleh to the prospect of a less complacent ally in the War on Terrorism and has intensified its drone attacks on suspected militants in Yemen. Although the situation is largely unpredictable, Mr Salehs resignation may come

Untitled-2 14

01/07/2011 11:16:23

soon. For now, Mr Salehs injuries do not allow him to travel, as he reportedly incurred second-degree burns and shows symptoms of brain haemorrhage. Nevertheless, his sons and nephews in powerful military positions remain in Yemen and Vice-President Abdulrabu Mansour Hadi has deferred any decision until Salehs return. Although the youth protestors have already slaughtered cows to mark their victory over the regime, they may become the first victims of their own revolution. Ironically, none of the most powerful supporters of the movement Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar, Hamid and Sadiq al-Ahmar and Sheikh Abdulmajid al-Zindani are known for their democratic ideals. They are longstanding allies of Mr Saleh and known for corruption and a hardline approach to religious minorities, the Huthi rebels and south Yemen. Youth protestors are aware that a new regime dominated by these old elites would be all too similar to the one they seek to oust. To ensure a smooth transition process, the various factions will have to agree on a framework for how to move forward. A temporary presidential council of civilian technocrats, rather than a political compromise between various opposition forces, would enjoy most legitimacy among Yemenis, who are actively debating what they call a modern civic state. The failing social contract needs to give way to a more democratic and inclusive power-sharing arrangement that provides enough space for Yemens extensive pluralism and diversity. It must not exclude youth and civil society representatives, the southern movement (al-Hirak), the Huthi rebels and reform-oriented actors from the ancien rgime. The good news is that Yemens history has shown that even the most curious political coalitions are possible, as political expediency trumps ideology. A federal system with decentralised governance and a large degree of self-rule for local authorities would not only help defuse internal conflicts, but also provide tribes, which control more or less 40 per cent of Yemen, with an incentive to cooperate with the state. There will have to be a trade-off between inclusiveness and efficiency. Concrete results need to reach Yemeni homes. Civil service reform is essential to create responsive and transparent government institutions that can address widespread poverty and unemployment. Ending the squandering of public money and endemic corruption must be priorities, too. The success of a future interim government will be measured on these tasks. With Yemen unable to stem these challenges by itself, the international community should push for President Saleh to transfer authority to the vice-president, and tighten the noose with smart sanctions in the case he does not. Humanitarian assistance can help alleviate the suffering of the Yemeni population and thereby boost the legitimacy of political transition process. Donor countries should provide technical support for the transition process through development cooperation and intensify dialogue and engagement with both the parliamentary opposition and protestors on the street. As the Arab Spring enters the summer, many divisions threaten the transition from the personalised patronage politics of Arab strongmen to an alternative idea of state, governance and stability. Undoubtedly, such a transition will not happen overnight, but the crisis provides an unprecedented opportunity for Yemenis and for

those states that are genuine about supporting Arab democracy.

*** Tobias Thiel is a PhD Candidate in the International History Department at LSE.

15

Untitled-2 15

01/07/2011 11:16:23

Image from aerospaceblog.wordpress.com

Revisiting the Nene Blunder: Western Aviation Technology Transfers to China

By Marco Wyss

eneral Electric (GE), a major player in jet engines and aeronautical technology, plans a joint venture with the state-

in the civil aviation sector, which inadvertently runs the risk of dualuse technology, which can find its way into Chinese military aircraft developments. When US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates visited China in January, his hosts disclosed and tested the prototype of their first fifth generation fighter aircraft in an apparently unintended sideshow. At first glance, the J-20 prototype seems to have many similarities with the American F-22 Raptor the worlds first and only fully operational fifth generation fighter aircraft yet. Meanwhile, according to Russian experts, half of the Chinese stealth fighter prototype is Russian designed and still powered by Russian engines. Admittedly, it could still take ten or more years until the J-20 is fully operational and, according to most observers, its flight performances will be less than those of the F-22. The US also has the F-35 up its sleeve, an ace it is willing to share with a number of allies as an advanced multirole stealth fighter. Nevertheless, the J-20s apparently lower, albeit unconfirmed

owned Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC). The American company is supposed to provide its advanced avionics technology the electronics for communications, navigation, cockpit displays and controls for the development of the new Chinese airliner: the C919, a potential future competitor for Airbus and Boeing in China. Exporting state-of-the-art technology is neither a new phenomenon for GE, nor for other western companies. Amid competition for lucrative sales to a continually expanding Chinese aviation market, these companies are willing to sell their technological prowess: Beijing asks for technology as an entry price, and plays foreign competitors against one another for handsome commercial prizes. Although Washington and Brussels are well aware of the dangers their companies incur in joint-ventures, particularly by upholding an arms embargo against China, they are nevertheless reluctant to intervene more forcefully against the transfer of their major capital technology. The Chinese Government attaches similar importance to the development of the C919 which is already kitted out with western technology alongside a number of components used in the national space programme. Beijing not only wants to strengthen its grip on its domestic aviation market, but to branch out internationally as well. Western companies are basically helping China to do this on two levels; increasing Chinese competitiveness 16

performances should not distract from the great leap forward of the Chinese military aircraft industry. Within a short time span it went from developing fourth to fifth generation aircraft; in ball park terms, that has put them close to Russian capabilities, whose PAK50-FA fifth generation aircraft made its maiden flight a year earlier. Although Beijing would not have been able of this achievement without its mentors from Moscow, there will also have been a lot of

Untitled-2 16

01/07/2011 11:16:24

American and European technology in the new prototype. The J-20 is only the most recent and most infamous exploit of the Chinese aviation industry. Since the 1990s, Beijing has pushed through reforms and injected enormous amounts of cash to transform its defence industry. Self -sufficiency in defence issues has been one goal, modernising the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) the other. Among the defence sectors and military organisations, the military aviation industry and the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) have been the main players in this game. According to the 2008 Chinese national defence White Paper, the aim was to accelerate the PLAAFs transition from territorial air defense to both offensive and defensive operations, and increase its capabilities for carrying out reconnaissance and early warning, air strikes, air and missile defense, and strategic projection, in an effort to build itself into a modernized strategic air force. At least from a material perspective, Beijing is gathering pace on this front. The Chinese aerospace manufacturing base, which is organised into AVIC, can virtually single-handedly supply the PLAAF with the aircraft it requires. The only countries with a more complete aircraft industry than China are Russia and the US. All that said, China still has a number of steps it must take to close the gap with Russia, and indeed, sizeable leaps when it comes to America. The gaps are mostly in the field of engines and avionics both areas in which GE has much to offer. Beijing is not afraid to use reverse engineering or the integration of advanced commercial technologies into existing platforms to gain a couple of paces. It also has few qualms about exploiting dual-use technologies. The defence industry is linked to the commercial sector, which in turn enters into partnerships and joint-ventures with western companies. This allows for the indirect transfer of technologies, know-how and money into the defence industry. AVIC aggressively pursues this strategy in the commercial sector through partnerships not only with GE but even with future competitors in the civil aviation market, such as Boeing and the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS). As the achievements of Chinas military aviation industry demonstrate, these strategies have proved to be successful. If nothing else, they make a mockery of the western arms embargo imposed on the Middle Kingdom. The jointventure between GE and AVIC is illustrative of this success story. The jauntiness with which western governments allow their aeronautical companies to export technology to China is akin to what the historian Jeffrey A. Engel termed the Nene blunder. At the onset of the Cold War, in 1946 and 1947, the British Rolls-Royce company sold Nene jet engines to the Soviet Union. Britain was the leading nation in jet technology at the time, and the Soviets did not even possess a prototype. But through reverse engineering, they

were able to start production of their own engines. Only a few years later, the Americans were confronted with the Russian Mig15 in the Korean War; not only did the Mig outperform US aircraft, but it was also powered by a descendant of the Rolls-Royce Nene engine. Until the US was able to align equivalent or superior aircraft, the Migs took a heavy toll on its air force equipment and personnel. London felt the full wrath of Washington as a result. Even before the appearance of Soviet jet fighters in Korean skies, America had voiced concerns over Britains laissez faire defence exports even when the stash was going to allied or neutral countries. Unsurprisingly the criticism turned to outright anger in light of the experience. Whitehall had no choice but to admit its blunder. Part of the explanation was that Britain was broke after the Second World War. Lax export policies were designed to earn money and secure a leading position on the international aircraft market. London also considered its large and highly advanced aircraft industry as a means to restore and maintain Britains world role. Obviously arms sales were off limits to Russia and their allies as the Cold War chilled, but it was not really until the Nene blunder sunk in, that Whitehall fully grasped the security implications of technology transfers. But even then Britain remained willing to

It was not really until the Nene blunder sunk in, that Whitehall fully grasped the security implications of technology transfers

supply engines, aircraft and the licences to build them to Allies, neutrals and non-aligned countries. The Treasurys position could not really allow for much else. The risk that advanced technology could indirectly fall into Soviet hands was understood, and although London did not direct supply its direct foes, it still played into the hands of its future

competitors on the military aviation market. Partially thanks to British technology transfers, the French whose aircraft industry had almost been annihilated by the Second World War soon posed a threat to the British aircraft industry and finally overtook it. In contrast to London, security interests mostly outweighed business interests in Washington during the Cold War. If a country wanted American technological know-how it had to either be allied or informally aligned. A wealthy US could act from strength as the dominant force in western armouries. Fast forward sixty years, and America is looking more like post-War Britain. The US has massive financial difficulties and a negative trade balance. Washington, similar to its European Allies, has thus become willing to accept that its leading aeronautical companies must export their technological prowess to benefit from the Chinese market. Moreover, just like early Cold War Britain, it holds the erroneous belief that western technology is still so advanced that an industrialising country could never catch up. But it is not just a case of technological arrogance in the West. What its leaders and companies tend to forget or willingly disregard is that short-lived financial gains come with political,

17

Untitled-2 17

01/07/2011 11:16:24

security and economic risks. Despite Washingtons and Beijings continuous assurances that they both desire a cooperative and peaceful relationship, diverging geopolitical interests could lead to antagonism. The PLAAF has made quite clear that its capabilities, doctrine and training are calibrated on an anti-access/area-denial strategy. Defending Chinese sovereignty and territory is the order of the day. As yet, Chinese anti-access capabilities remain a work in progress, and striking power remains inherently limited. Nevertheless, the doctrinal and material modernisation of the PLAAF has raised concerns in the US, particularly around the vexed issue of Taiwan. American capabilities still outweigh Chinese clout in East Asia, but if Washington and Brussels continue to supply the Chinese aviation industry with technological know-how, the material gap could disappear. With additional developments in doctrine and training, the PLAAF could thus become a formidable challenge to US force projection in Asia-Pacific writ large. Moreover, China could greatly enhance its position on the military aircraft market; that would pose a direct threat to US arms exports, a fate that the Russians already know far too well. After years of technology transfers to China, they have played a fundamental role in building up Beijings aircraft industry which is now bearing down on Moscows arms trade interests. Chinese fighters are now competing with Russian types for orders from developing and third world countries; this certainly has raised hackles from Russia Inc, and in particular from the MiG and Sukhoi aircraft companies. Although Moscow is closing the door after the horse has bolted in terms of holding back new engines, its probably a case of too little too late. Beijings reverse engineering and western technology transfers will make mince meat of Russian intransigence. In a few years time, Washington could also be confronted with the same sobering situation as Moscow. US aircraft would have to compete with relatively cheap but highly advanced Chinese types. Hardly an uplifting thought for the US government or commercial big wigs. The only silver lining at this stage is that Beijing still regards military exports as a secondary priority after the equipment of the PLA. But the writing is on the wall; China is increasingly aware of its financial power and the strategic edge this will bring in terms of arms transfers. This not only applies to Chinese military hardware, but future fighter exports to developing states for enhanced political leverage. America and Russia will be the inevitable losers in that game. As the J-20 brilliantly demonstrates, western and Russian aviation technology transfers to China are extensive. Although an ever more competitive Chinese aircraft industry risks undermining western security, political, and commercial interests, the US and its European Allies will probably continue to sell their inventions for hard cash. The Chinese are thus well en route to reach parity in aircraft developments, first with the Russians, and then with the Americans. This process seems to be irreversible, whether the political fallout will be quite so acute remains to be seen. *** Marco Wyss is a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Security Studies in Zurich and a former visiting Research student at LSE IDEAS.

18 . Lin Zuoming, left, president of AVIC with GE CEO Jeffrey Immelt, announcing plans last year for an avionics joint venture. Bloomberg News
Untitled-2 18 01/07/2011 11:16:24

Quo vadis Cuba?

By Carlos Antonio Solis-Tejada
Photograph: Enrique de la Osa/Reuters

The Parade and the Congress

pril 16, 2011 was business as usual for Cuba as the countrys people joined in to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the defeat of the CIA-backed Cuban opposition militias that tried to invade the country at Playa Girn in 1961. That invasion had consolidated popular

support for the Cuban Revolution and its Socialist character, and the on-line broadcast by official Cuban television commentators was keen to remind viewers of its historic importance. The celebrations included a fully-fledged military parade by the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) in best Soviet style including a display of their locally-renovated antique Soviet military hardware, followed by a carnival-like civic parade, a public display that was both seeking to demonstrate to their American and Cuban-migr enemies the purported unity of the Cuban Government and its people, and their disposition to defend the Socialist Character of their revolution. This populist display would be repeated during the May 1st celebrations where the Communist Party reminded the Cuban people of the feats of the Revolution. Together, the events were seen by supporters of the Cuban government as a chance to remind the world that in spite of the economic woes the island has suffered since the Special Period in Peacetime began in 1991 after the fall of the Soviet Union, the Cuban regime still has a substantial popular backing. These kind of symbolic gestures by the regime are no novelty, but this year they served to frame the Sixth Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC), a long-delayed and much-awaited Congress which promised to set the tone of the so called perfectioning and the rectification and updating of the socialist economic model. Those hoping to see during these events the staging of the grand finale of the Castro saga probably should ask for their money back. Like in cinema, heroes never seem to die, and until nature dictates otherwise Raul, Fidel and their loyal FAR crew seem certain to continue to take centre-stage.

The Draft Guide for Economic and Social Policy: Getting rich is not glorious
Much was made in the international news media about the economic reforms proposed and implemented by Raul Castro, likening them to the Chinese or Vietnamese models. But as the President made clear in his opening speech to the Congress, far from following Deng Xiaopings maxim that To get rich is glorious, he would not allow Cubans to accumulate capital. This was decided despite the 19

Untitled-2 19

01/07/2011 11:16:24

fact that some of the feedback to the proposed Draft Guide for Economic and Social Policy seemed to recommend a more relaxed view towards wealth. According to Mr. Castro, such views come in open contradiction with the essence of socialism, for example, (the) forty-five propositions that argued in favour of allowing for the concentration of property. This declaration is in line with previous statements about his economic policy. Last December, before the National Assembly of Peoples Power, he stated that he ...was not elected President in order to restore capitalism in Cuba, nor to give away the Revolution. further adding that he ...was elected to defend, maintain and continue to perfect socialism, not to destroy it. Such policy guidelines underpin the arguments of critics of the proposals, such as the Cuban dissident economist Oscar EspinosaChepe, who characterized them as scarce, limited and delayed in his report on the Draft Guide published last February on-line. But as substantive as these criticisms are, these reforms arguably do reflect a change in the character of the socialist economic system in Cuba, by first putting an end to egalitarianism as a guiding social policy principle, and seeking to introduce incentives into the labour market by linking salaries to productivity. Many in Cuba had been found to be content with subsisting with what the government provided for free through the rations book, which is now to be eliminated. Another key change has been the evolving attitude towards entrepreneurship, from reluctant toleration in the early days of the Special Period to open acceptance and calls from Mr. Castro to quit demonizing the officially denominated self-help workers. Under the new reforms these capitalist pioneers have been given a new role as primary providers of services and goods, making legal micro-entrepreneurship a palliative to unemployment. The move is also an attempt to eradicate the teeming black market known as Cubas Second Economy - as the government is set to undertake massive cuts, including half a million redundancies, in order to seek to balance the governments budget at a time when the previously generous aid from the Venezuelan government is drying out as Hugo Chavez government tries to address its own economic woes. A further innovation is the new role given to taxation, which will be progressive and seek to curtail any form of capital accumulation by entrepreneurs. This calls into question, in line with arguments proposed by Hernando De Soto in his seminal books The Other Path and The Mystery of Capital, the kind of incentives Cubans will have to start businesses and whether these taxes might have the adverse effect of increasing informality as the state becomes the problem more than an aid.

The reforms set in place by Mr. Castro after the Congress will also continue giving a prominent role to external sources of income from the Cuban migr community through their remittances, as well as promoting more Foreign Direct Investment and Technological Transfer throughout joint ventures with international corporations a policy that might seem ironic taking into consideration past discourses from the leaders of the Revolution which characterised migrs as worms and demonised transnational capital.

Perestroika maybe, but not Doi Moi

So as far as the economic reforms go, they seem to come more in line with the spirit of Perestroika, which sought to preserve the basics of the socialist centralised economy, than with that of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics or Vietnamese Doi Moi. There is however a Cuban twist: the leaders and pioneers of the revolution themselves (together with their academic and intellectual supporters) are the ones undertaking the role of critics and reformers denouncing the failure of the economic system they set in place, instead of waiting for their successors to do so, and thus seeking to secure their legacy. Indeed, for the octogenarian brothers and their ageing comrades, the survivors of the Sierra Maestra, their legacy is no small issue. They are well aware that their revolution has reverberated in waves throughout the Latin American region and could be endangered by external or internal factors. During its fifty-two years in power, the Cuban Revolution and its leaders have served as inspiration, financiers and supporters of guerrilla movements in Latin America and Africa as well as ideological supporters of more democratic leftist movements in the Global South.

From Carnivore to Veggie Leftism

The Castro have also been witnesses to and active participants in the evolution of leftist politics in Latin America as it has moved from the Halcyon days of youthful guerrilla warfare and radical populism, to a rigid orthodox Stalinist regime, to its present transition to a purportedly more progressive regime repentant of its politically incorrect past and self critical (albeit non repentant) of past errors. This current phase is arguably more amenable to western supporters in liberal academic and media circles, which are often willing to turn a blind eye to the human rights record of the Cuban government. In the same vein it could be argued that the Latin American leftist movements since the 1960s have in a similar way progressed from guerrilla and terrorist tactics, together with the hyper-ideologised workers and the student and intellectual movements of the Cold War period, to the more nuanced and politically pragmatic versions embodied by the new Latin American Left.

20

Untitled-2 20

01/07/2011 11:16:24

Image from asbarez.com

These have been classified and caricatured by right wing authors such as the exiled Cuban journalist Carlos Alberto Montaner as the Veggie Left, as opposed to the Carnivore Left embodied by the Cuban and Venezuelan governments. These regional developments beg the question of whether or not the Cuban regime is slowly becoming less of the Carnivore type as the transition to a post-Castro era dawns, and if it is, what shape Cubas relationships with its neighbours, its global enemies and partners will take in the future.

Who comes next?

During the Sixth Congress Raul Castro was elected First Secretary, a role that after succeeding his brother Fidel as President in 2008 and maintaining his position as Commander of the FAR has effectively consolidated his grip to power. His rise is also witness to the increasing role of the seemingly more pragmatic and efficiently entrepreneurial armed forces who have led several successful export-led enterprises. Indeed, the economic and political clout of the armed forces is confirmed and reflected in the recent appointments to the PCCs Central Committee. With the ever-increasing possibility that Mr. Castros successor might come from a FAR background, any future US or EU administration that seeks to mend or improve its relations with Cuba will have to seek to establish positive contacts with the armed forces. At the same time, some see in Mariela Castro-Espn, the daughter of the Cuban president, a likely successor that could give Cuba a soft progressive image, due to her role in improving the status of the Cuban LGTB community and her academic credentials, especially since the dismissal of former Foreign Affairs minister Felipe Perez-Roque in 2009.

Courting with Cuba. The BRICS and the US

Under the Raul Castros pragmatic command new avenues of economic support have been welcomed as the drying out of Venezuelas subsidised oil-supply forces Cuba to seek to strengthen its relations with emerging world powers. In 2008 China became Cubas second biggest trading partner after Venezuela and was quick in welcoming the reforms made in last Aprils Congress, which the Chinese Foreign Ministrys assessment anticipated would have a profound and far reaching impact. Certainly the Asian giant sees the island as a platform to increase its economic and political influence in the region. China has engaged in joint ventures with both Cuban and Venezuelan oil companies to exploit the countrys 5bn barrels of offshore reserves. Russia, Brazil, Singapore and Malaysia have also been courting Cubas offshore oil reserves and like China have had no qualms in reconciling their diplomatic and economic ties with Cubas human rights record. With its rivals in its mare nostrum, US policy towards Cuba may be forced to change as it risks losing control of the Gulf of Mexicos oil reserves which the US government deems essential to Americas energy security. This brings us to the issue of the fifty-year US blockade of Cuba, which has served as a scapegoat for the Cuban government to justify to its people the economic woes of the country. In the US, both Democrat and Republican politicians seek to placate hard-line Cuban-Americans in Florida, that most electorally important of states, where the ageing conservative Cuban-American establishment still exerts significant political and economic influence. But there are some signals that this situation is changing as new generations

21

Untitled-2 21

01/07/2011 11:16:24

of Cuban exiles and Cuban-Americans become less politicised and their attitudes towards the Cuban government more nuanced and pragmatic. This evolving situation gives the Obama administration more leeway to undertake a more practical policy towards the island, taking into consideration the increasing role of the BRICS in the Gulf of Mexico. Nonetheless, the US is yet to signal any dramatic change in its policy towards Cuba beyond allowing Cuban-Americans to travel to the island. The much understated trade relationship between the two countries, which in 2007 was worth $13.8 billion, makes the US Cubas 5th largest trade partner, and its primary source of hard currency remittances. Taking into consideration their proximity, which made the US Cubas preeminent pre-revolutionary trading partner, US-Cuba trade has the potential to crowd out any Chinese or Russian pretention in the region, that is, if the Obama administration could manage to persuade the Republican Congress of the benefits of lifting the embargo.

Until death they do part

Perhaps as in Spain or China, Cuba will have to wait until the death of their iconic leaders to see more radical changes taking place, but when they do such changes will reconfigure the political panorama in the Western Hemisphere, just as the Cuban revolution has done for the last fifty years. Until that time comes the social effects of the new policies are uncertain: they may allow Cuba to preserve its unique developmental path for generations to come, or might be merely the preface of a deeper crisis that leads to more profound and fundamental changes on the island. ***

Carlos Antonio Solis-Tejada is an MSc Candidate in Urbanisation and Development, an LSE joint programme between the Departments of Geography and Environment and International Development.

Glasnost Cuban style

The election of the new central committee of the PCC also reflects what Cuba seems to have learned from Perestroika and Glasnost. The Castro brothers have been cautious enough to keep the top seats for the old guard and offer less senior positions to a new generation of apparatchiks that the elderly leadership hopes will learn their ways and commit to preserving the socialist character of the revolution. In the meantime the FAR and Cubas political and intellectual elite, many of whom are members of the Central Committee, will try to keep reinventing themselves, capitalising on their positive public image. In doing so they have a delicate balance to maintain between their purported fidelity to the Revolution and its leaders as a source of legitimacy, whilst at the same time making public their criticism of past political errors, which they tend to justify in historical context. Further efforts towards openness have been apparent in the calls for the public to participate in the consultations over the Draft Guide, which follow in the tradition of public local assemblies that have been promoted by the government ever since the Revolution began. It could be argued that these efforts of appropriating criticism and keeping a step ahead of dissidents and exiled politicians is part of a new strategy in what the Cuban government calls the war of ideas, seeking to neutralise criticism and softening Cubas image among the worlds intellectual elite. Regime dissidents both within Cuba and abroad have made it clear that this new attitude has not changed things in practice, but although no radical change will take place in the near future, slowly but steadily and in stealth real changes are taking place.

22

Untitled-2 22

01/07/2011 11:16:24

A Watershed in South American International Relations

by Juliana Bertazzo
egional organizations all around the world are increasingly R involved in international intervention, which can range from the issuing of a statement to an all-out war. International mediation, on the other hand, is a form of alternate dispute resolution that although by definition is still considered intervention, precludes the use of force. A few months after its inception, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) was called to mediate a conflict between state and opposition leaders in Bolivia. This was noteworthy for three main reasons: firstly, because Bolivia is no exception to the rule that all countries in Latin America will value sovereignty before anything else in their international relations, in light of the record of US intervention in the region; Secondly, because Bolivia does not have regular diplomatic relations with Chile, the country temporarily presiding over UNASUR back then. Finally, the framework of this intervention seemed to take into consideration the agonistic aspect of Bolivian democracy, a factor which is unprecedented and central to its success. Conversely, the gas war was due to the government expressing a preference for Chile over Peru as a port for the exportation of Bolivian natural gas in 2003. During the XIX century and early XX century Bolivia lost parts of its territory to each of its five neighbors, including a coastal portion taken over by Chile, which made it a landlocked state. Diplomatic ties between the Bolivia and Chile are still severed for the most part. Two recent crises are often singled out for the level of violence and popular mobilization: the water war and the gas war. Both were generated by popular opposition to government policy and by popular sentiment against a foreign power. The 1999 water war erupted due to the internationalization of water supply services of Cochabamba, one of the largest cities in Bolivia. This policy increased anti-US sentiment because the main company in the deal was a US corporation. the underdeveloped Bolivia, where institutions perform poorly and corruption is widespread. The local political arena has seen plenty of revolutions and social movements have been regarded as more representative and legitimate than political parties.

BACKGROUND
The subsequent major crisis, however, was an internal dispute For most of its history Bolivian people have been the poorest in South America, even though their territory holds one of largest amounts of oil and gas in the region. What is commonly referred in politics as the resource curse or paradox of plenty seems to hold true for between the Morales government and the opposition. In spite of that, the conflict involved the US and Chile. This time, while US representatives were literally thrown out of the country accused of collaborating to stage a coup dtat, Chileans were welcome to lead a multilateral intervention.

Untitled-2 23

01/07/2011 11:16:24

Image from Guilherme Paula

A FRAGILE STATE
Before Morales finished his first term in office, only half of the presidents in the new Bolivian democracy had completed their constitutional terms. The continuous domestic instability caused some observers to regard Bolivia as a fragile state. The condition of weak, failing or failed state generally refers to levels of inability to deliver public goods, but one of the reasons for a state to be considered fragile is the fact that they allow parallel systems of power to exist. Like many of its neighbors, Bolivia suffered constant US intervention during the Cold War either through anti-communism or anti-drug policies. Given the weakness of its institutions and chronic political instability, US intervention was perhaps more open there than anywhere else. The military governments, allegedly involved in the drug business, gave the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) office in La Paz, which opened in 1972, a great deal of leeway. Likewise, the 1983 bilateral treaty signed by the first civilian administration also allowed the US to shape Bolivian anti-drug policy.

A DISTINCTIVE INTERVENTION
UNASUR emerges from a consistent effort in the region to broaden the scope of its institutions beyond economic integration, and was preceded by more limited agreements such as the Community of Andean Nations and the Common Market of the South (Mercosur). In contrast with its slow-moving institution building, UNASUR displayed a particularly fast-paced decision-making process. In a high-level emergency meeting, the then few-months old UNASUR convened leaders of all countries in the region only three days after the Pando killings. Other than a mere declaration, this regional body issued a full-fledged plan of action. UNASUR decided to intervene in the Bolivian conflict through the establishment of three support groups staffed by renowned experts: one fact-finding commission to investigate the killings; a political commission to organize the dialogue between government and opposition; and a third commission, designed to offer assistance to local institutions. One week after the Pando killings, a conciliation meeting for Morales and opposition leaders was organized by UNASUR and several other facilitators and mediators were invited to attend. Two months later, the fact-finding commission had released

THE POLITICAL CRISIS Moraless pledge to reverse several years of economic and political exclusion of the indigenous peoples from highlands was met with fierce opposition by lowland leaders, who traditionally controlled the distribution of resources in the country. This dispute polarized Bolivian society, since the elites that traditionally ruled the country were unwilling to share the wealth of their resource-rich regions that hold low numbers of indigenous peoples. Their demands for local autonomy threatened the territorial integrity of the country, and by 2008 they were drafting their own separate constitution. In June 2008 President Morales ended the USAID agreement for reducing coca leaf plantations in the Chaparre region and in September he declared the US ambassador persona non grata. Opposition groups had been disrupting gas exports and occupying public buildings in the lowland states, in a series of violent moves that escalated up to a peak on 11 September 2008, when a bloody clash took place between groups supporting and opposing President Morales in the lowland province of Pando. Over a dozen were wounded or killed, and hundreds of survivors sought refuge in the neighboring Brazil, where most remain to date. The member states of UNASUR were called upon by the government of Bolivia to consider the crisis and what was later known as the Pando killings.

its report on the Pando events. The active collaboration of the Bolivian government and opposition all through the work of the three commissions legitimized the intervention and marked an unprecedented departure from the long-standing commitment to sovereignty and non-intervention in the region. The level of violence in the interaction between government and opposition decreased sharply after the mediation performed by UNASUR and political dialogue was restored even though tensions are still present. The conflict transformation approach of mediation, which does not aim to end conflict but to turn it into non-violent dispute instead, proved adequate to address the agonistic character of democracy in Bolivia. Moraless ability to reverse an escalating wave of violence and remain in power was in no small measure due to the international intervention performed by UNASUR. This intervention was therefore a turning point both not only for Bolivia but for the region as a whole, which had formerly been strongly committed to a policy of non-intervention and respect for sovereignty. ***

Dr Juliana Bertazzo is an Associate of the LSE IDEAS LatinAmerica International Affairs Programme and her research is supported by the Berghof Foundation for Conflict Studies.

Untitled-2 24

01/07/2011 11:16:25

The Balkans and the Cold War

By Antonio Moneo and Eirini Karamouzi
On May 27-29, 2011 LSE IDEAS Balkan International Affairs Programme, in cooperation with Konstantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy, held a three day international conference entitled Balkans in the Cold War in Athens, Greece. The conference brought together prominent scholars from almost all the countries of the Balkan region, as well as the USA, Britain and Russia. Divided in seven thematic panels that covered the whole period between 1945 and 1991, the conference examined the role of Balkans in the creation of the Cold War World Order; culture, perceptions and identity; security and military alliances; the role of ideology; the uneasy relations with superpowers and between neighbours; and the impact of Dtente on the region. The discussions during the conference pointed to a striking lacuna in the historiography. Although, there has been voluminous writing on the role of the Cold War in the Balkans especially in the beginning of the period, the role of the Balkans in the Cold War has been extensively overlooked. Professor Thanassis Sfikas argued that the reason lies in the simple fact that, the history of the Cold War was more important for the history of the Balkans, than was the history of the Balkans to the history of the Cold War. Although one must not fall into a trap of exaggerating the role of the region in the Cold War neither should the impact of regional developments be underrated and left under-researched. The initial divisions and resulting tragic conflicts within the region following the end of the Second World War were primarily the product of the great ideological divide of the Twentieth century and the emerging American-Soviet rivalry. The superpower dispute between 1945 and 1952 turned the Balkans into a laboratory for competition between Soviet-supported communism and the Free World, and elevated regional dynamics to the forefront of inter-bloc tensions. Uniquely for the global Cold War system, however, this led not to a simple bipolar but to a fourfold division of the region: the Western bloc, the Soviet bloc, the nonaligned Yugoslavia and, as of 1961, the Chinese-allied Albania. After events in Hungary in 1956, Cold War tensions moved away from the region and the impact of regional dynamics diminished. The advent of the Cold War and the military build-up froze the previous Balkans fragmentation, seemingly rendering the area a zone of relative peace. This was reflected in academic literature that lost interest in examining the period between the mid-1950s and the end of the Cold War. Only with the outbreak of the civil wars in Yugoslavia did the Balkans take centre stage again. Preparations of the Conference and its proceedings were a testament to the importance of cooperation between regional institutions and research centres focusing on the Balkans. The Balkan Programme wish to thank Professors Konstantina Botsiou, Evanthis Hatzivassiliou and their team for helping make this project such a success, and for their wonderful hospitality during the Conference, and to express our gratitude to the institutions who made this event possible; The LSE Annual Fund, ELLAKTOR and Aegean Oil. Alongside the emerging consensus on the need to examine the period between the outbreak and end of the Cold War by adopting a multi-disciplinary and cross-thematic analysis, and a multi-archival approach, the conference participants posed a number of interesting questions. How far could the Cold War explain the post-Cold War realities and developments in the region? Did the freezing of the inter-Balkan divisions exacerbate nationalistic sentiments, therefore partly explaining the intensity of the warfare in Yugoslavia? What was the impact of the modernization of societies achieved during the Cold War? These questions, and the fruitful discussions the conference provoked, form the platform for the Balkan Programmes next project that will concentrate on the post-Cold War period in the Balkans. In the meantime, the conference proceedings will be compiled in an edited volume and interviews with a number of Conference participants are available on IDEAS website. In tune with recent Cold War historiography and encouragingly for regional historiography, a number of papers in the conference dealt with the overlooked decades of the 1970s and 1980s. As the nascent historiography of the collapse of Yugoslavia is increasingly suggesting, this apparently stable and uninteresting period of the fading of the Cold War in the region allowed for the rise of nationalism that would lead to the convulsions of the 1990s. The need to look at the internal processes of the Balkans during this period was a theme that surfaced repeatedly during the conference, echoed by a call for further opening of the archives of Balkan countries as the only way to readdress open issues. In contrast to the impressive opening of archives in the former Soviet Bloc countries and in Serbia, access to Greek and in particular Turkish archives remains very restricted.

25

Untitled-2 25

01/07/2011 11:16:25

NEW

SPECIAL REPORT

After nearly a decade in power, Turkeys Justice and Development Party (AKP) has grown increasingly confident in its foreign policy, prompting observers to wondered aloud whether the country might be leaving the West, forcing that group to confront the question who lost Turkey? This is to cast Turkeys role, and its emerging global strategy, in unhelpful binary terms. Turkeys emerging role reflects the changes in the world politics whereby power is becoming decentred and more diffuse, with established blocs replaced by more fluid arrangements that loosely bind states on the basis shifting interests. Understanding Turkeys evolving global role can shed light on the emergence and orientation of other rising powers, and for the West, the challenge will be to shed the bloc mentality that remains pervasive, and reconceptualise an international order in which independent states become assets rather than inconveniences.

Online at lse.ac.uk/IDEAS

26

Untitled-2 26

01/07/2011 11:16:26