AMERICA
on theWorld Stage |
||)
Cold Global Hegemony,
War
and 1945-1991
Melvyn P. Leffler
We are and
accustomed heroic
age was memoirs
spearheaded constructed carefully
to viewing ofthe response and orchestrated
the U.S. by
cold war
as a determined aggression im This in their first schol
had was where
no master determined his
to communist the Soviet and their Union.
or conquer to spread He revolution the world. plan a to establish in eastern of influence Europe sphere communist minions would rule. But at the same Sta time, his wartime allies along with and Japanese power, which table. Consequently, tioned communist in order he assumed to control was the inevi
by presidents
advisers ofthe
lin wanted rebirth
arly works a wide of rebutted variety by who blamed officials historians ington origins as well of the as those
was (i). This view also incorporated on the cold war, but was then revisionist inWash for the
in some
to get of German
cau he frequently in France, followers
in Moscow
Soviet-American in the traditional aftermath
conflict ofthe
(2). Nonetheless, cold war the
interpretation
f^^^Kf^_9H03HHI^I^HlB
pI^^^^hbui __#_y j_i_i{ii____i________________r ^^____H ^____p_
_B_______N(Bhm^^HhI^BRP^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H
to avoid and elsewhere Italy, Greece, actions that might provocative frighten or his wartime allies. Within antagonize his own country and his own he sphere, was almost cruel, evil, just genocidal,
reemerged. most eminent in a
the John Gaddis, arguably historian of the cold war,
and other traditional scholars f^^^HIII^^h^k^^^I^^^^^m^h^^HHI^^^^^h'^ W^^^^^^^^^^^^R^^Ias Gaddis ^^B^^^^^^SI^m^HvP^^^^I^^^Q^?f'^v^l^^^^^^^s^Hl suggest (4). Yet U.S. and British officials were initially eager to work with him.
wrote
war was wise and
the mid-1990s that the cold versus of evil, of struggle good in the West democratic leaders and inhumanity of
They rarely dwelled upon his domestic
barbarism.
^_ffi*5w?HMp
reacting
to the crimes
Joseph Stalin, the brutal dictator in the Kremlin (3).
This war way interpretation places in a traditional framework. to understand American the cold It is one foreign
BS* '''^^S^B6^^b__3vB^F
^v -'*^^?i ji ^^^_^__________fi_fl_i_i ^^^%V^^3_______________B ^^^ "V ^^^BJ
'
^^bis ^^ Hj
n___l
Truman ...
President Typically, wrote his wife, Bess,
S Harry after his
first meeting
He he wants can't
with Stalin: "I like Stalin.
is straightforward. Knows what and will when he compromise Averell Harri to Moscow, possible overcome" to
':a'^'*'V;________________________________________ ? ?_K____^___________________________________H
man,
W get it." Typically, the U.S. ambassador that
policy between the end of World War II and the breakup of the Union of Soviet
Socialist But Republics some for quite (U.S.S.R.) time now, in 1991. historians,
remonstrated
"If it were
___
^^H
r*r<cJ^^^^^^^^^^^^H^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B^^^^^H ^i^_______________________________0______| of our
see him /Stalin/ more frequently, many
difficulties would be
(5)
Yet come. stand the the difficulties fears were grew. nowadays of postwar see They freedom not To over under examine American the and con So American them,
and economists have scientists, political in a much been the cold war studying so because context. They do larger global Soviet the new documents from the Union older lies and its former from empire the U.S. conducted as well and as
scholars context
global and Soviet test between Winston Churchill, Harry S Truman, and Josef Stalin shake hands at the Potsdam Conference, July 23, 1945. (Image courtesy ofthe Truman Presidential Museum & Library, Accession number: 63 1457-29.) to collaborate in stabilizing that Stalin ofthe why, tribution international scholars examine viet fabric litical
documents suggest
its al amore
diplomacy. American
that Stalin inconsistent
totalitarianism
and complex than previously
imagined
policy foreign and that U.S.
as part of an evolving economic of international and po in the twentieth conditions century. War the role leaders II, they say, U.S. or leader, of hegemon,
officials
initially did not regard Stalin,
After World assumed
crimes his and brutal notwithstanding as an with whom partner ity, unacceptable and remaking the postwar world. Most scholars looking at Soviet
documents
now
agree
of power
of Soviet power. To explain and container economy the operation ofthe world and the dis economy in the international look at transna system. They
OAH Magazine of History
March 2005 65
tional ideological conflict, the disruption of colonial empires, and the
rise of revolutionary America states, nationalism in Asia and Africa. They rise explain the
Compared
to the U.S.
in 1945,
the
Soviet
Union
was
weak.
Yet
it
spread ofthe cold war from Europe toAsia, Africa, the Middle East and
Latin pendent ofthe on decolonization, by focusing of peoples and the yearnings the roles the everywhere of newly inde to modernize
loomed very large not only in the imagination of U.S. officials, but also in theminds of political leaders throughout the world. It did not loom
large Soviet capitalize because of fears of Soviet military Yet aggression. they feared ofthe postwar Contemporary that Stalin would
policymakers knew that Stalin did not want war. They did not expect
troops on to march the manifold across Europe. opportunities world: the vacu
their countries and enjoy higher standards of living. Yet the capacity
U.S. to assume on more than depended tions, and its wealth and container of hegemon, balancer, U.S. and strength; the success ofthe its culture "soft power" of mass (6).
ums of power stemming from the defeat of Germany and Japan; the
breakup economic of colonial reform; World vitality, popular empires; yearnings and widespread disillusionment for postwar social and with the function
also depended on the appeal of its ideology, the vitality of its institu
the attractiveness nowadays call of consumption?what scholars
many as the
ing of democratic capitalist economies
During enormous world War II, the American but many could system
(8).
At the end ofWorld War II, the U.S. and the Soviet Union emerged
two ing models U.S. was possessed ect power the in the world nations and as exemplars of compet strongest was a But it The of political economy. bipolarity. peculiar on the earth. It nation alone the most incontestably powerful a navy It alone that could proj the atomic bomb. possessed across the The oceans U.S. of was and also an air force the gold richest reserves was that nation and could reach across It of that of in the world. three-fourths times
capitalist
had demonstrated economy the wondered whether contemporaries to function in be made peace effectively
time.
nomic
Its performance during their lifetimes had bred worldwide
depression, social malaise, political instability, and personal
eco
dis
continents.
possessed its invested
two-thirds capital.
the world's national
illusionment. Throughout Europe and Asia, people blamed capitalism for the repetitive cycles of boom and bust and for military conflagra tions that brought ruin and despair. Describing conditions at the end of
the war, had come the historian to believe Igor Lukes has written: ... had that capitalism here was Auschwitz "Many become in Czechoslovakia obsolete. Influen
Its gross
product
three
the Soviet Union and five times that ofthe United Kingdom. Itswealth had grown enormously during the war while the Soviet Union had been devastated by the occupation by Nazi Germany. Around 27 mil lion inhabitants ofthe U.S.S.R. died during World War II compared
to about 400,000 ravished the agricultural Americans. The Germans its mining and transportation of Soviet Russia and devastated economy infrastructure (7).
tial intellectuals saw the world emerging from the ashes ofthe war in
black and white terms: and there was Stalingrad.
The former was a byproduct of a crisis in capitalist Europe ofthe 1930s; the latter stood for the superiority of socialism" (9). Transnational ideological conflict shaped the cold war. Peoples
everywhere yearned for a more secure and better life; they pondered
alternative ways of organizing their political and
economic ties sought the resistance affairs. communist par Everywhere, as leaders to present themselves of so of fascism, proponents against reform, and advocates of national
cioeconomic
self-interest. Their political clout grew quickly
as their Greece, membership from 17,000 in for example, soared, in 1935 to 70,000 in 1945; in May from 28,000 1945
in Czechoslovakia,
to 750,000 in September 1945; in Italy, from 5,000 in 1943 to 1,700,000 at the end of 1945
(10). these passed "There collapse For Stalin and his comrades in Moscow, unsur advis grassroots developments provided for Truman and his opportunities; is complete on going economic, in Central social
ers in Washington,
they inspired fear and gloom.
and political the extent Europe,
of which is unparalleled sistant Secretary of War
1945
in history," wrote As John McCloy in April
was not nonethe
Soviet Union, of course, (11). The for these conditions. Danger responsible talize on them. "The greatest
less inhered in the capacity ofthe Kremlin to capi
danger to the security
ofthe United States," the CIA concluded in one of
"is the possibility of economic col reports, acces Europe and the consequent lapse inWestern sion to power of Communist elements" (12). its first
Transnational ideological conflict impelled U.S. officials to take action. They knew they had
to restore The cathedral tion; people at Legharn, Italy,was one ofthe casualties yearned for a better future. (Image donated II.The war wrought Corbis-Bettman, BE048024.) by of World War untold devasta tion hope effectively that private markets could func to serve the needs of humankind.
People had suffered terribly, Assistant
Secretary
66 OAH Magazine of History
March 2005
__?_
of
State
Dean
G.
Acheson
told
congressional and
committee social welfare.
in
1945. They
sume
the
land reform, nationalization, They demanded that governments should take action believed business and of state control and state
the means tas and George provide
responsibility to purchase
food
to provide dollars and fuel and,
so
that
other
nations to reduce
had quo State
eventually,
to alleviate
their misery. shall be pushed
They felt it "so deeply," said Acheson,
further further" (13). like Acheson ofthe
"that they will demand that the
interference
curtail restrictions. exchange a new C. Marshall outlined the funds necessary
whole
of 1947, Secretary the U.S. would approach, saying to promote the reconstruction of Europe.
In June
The intent of the Marshall Plan was to provide dollars to likeminded
and McCloy, the officials who became cold war, understood the causes for the world the economy fundamental a cold in the interwar years. and vul Soviet so to grow continue their Europe they could insure undercut the ap employ political stability, into an economic and avoid being sucked peal of communist parties, orbit dominated U.S. officials wanted by the Soviet Union. European resources to and their for the benefit of cooperate governments pool governments economies, in Western workers, their i_. ig__ ?Si___ i _l_________;H"_IBBS i ^^iBBBS6, _ _>__hbsBbKv^BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBsssssMMBi for __H and well-being establishment of a large, market where integrated goods the to do the this, the U.S. would to make ef of collective
Policymakers as the "Wise Men" known ofthe intent Long on
malfunctioning were They nerabilities.
capitalist
correcting before they
weaknesses war with
envisioned
the
Union,
the
they labored diligently during 1943 and 1944 to design
International Monetary reduce Fund
i n I -#?W_L__
_, **__^_M_-fesn^ft^ J____H_1 -_^^1E_____________^K ___________
(IMF) and theWorld Bank. They
to Congress They wanted to buy U.S. the Ameri foreign
-".J* ' nfc
and capital could move freely. In
order incur the responsibility
urged tariffs. can
fi!sbb ^*i"_i ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^h~*Er^> "^EbH^bbbI
people
more
goods. They knew that foreign nations without sufficient dollars
to purchase fuel would easily. They raw materials not be able and to recover govern
^b^^^9^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^h^^^^^^^h^B^B9^^I_^^^^_-a^__k^E^^^I
fectively, Soviet become seer, would its, of
system operate capitalist at least in those parts Union. the the The hegemon, global loans, tariffs, U.S. would or economy: provide and
the globe not dominated by the
over it cred insure
realized
that
ments short of gold and short of dollars would seek to hoard their
resources, regulate establish the free and quotas, flow of capital.
make reduce
currency stability (16).
The Plan tion tries Most ny's not success ofthe on the Marshall resuscita and indus depended ofthe coal mines of western
And they knew that these actions in the years between World War I and World War II had brought
about created zism, the Great the fascism, Depression conditions for and and Na
Europeans revival. Nonetheless, interfere the with three
Germany (17). Germa feared U.S.
totalitarian
officials hoped that Stalin would
efforts zones currency Federal to merge of Germany, reform, SB7 i_______ Republic Plan aid, _H^M_ fered lies western
ism to flourish
(14).
"Now, as in the year 1920," Presi in early March dent Truman declared 1947, "we have in history. is uncertain reached National turning economies ~~ ' ^^^^^^_l >^__________________________________IV __nVT^y ^________________J_____^,r..?_B~~~BB~i a
institute create the
and
point future
have been disrupted by thewar. The
Eco everywhere. are in a state of flux." the president trade, recon
of Germany. Marshall in fact, initially was of Russia Europe. and into he and But its al Stalin
to Soviet in eastern
policies Governments
nomic
abroad,
wanted explained, save dollars, and struction. itwas This was
to regulate promote Freedom warned, the U.S.
a large crowd Palmiro Togliatti, the leader ofthe Italian Communist Party, addresses in Rome to hear him speak. The communists to a offered one alternative gathered better future. In countries like Italy, they enjoyed a huge following. (Image courtesy of Hulton-Deutsch 1-11)008913.) Collection/CORBIS, where the march, freedom power was But regi dispersed. If not stopped everywhere. at home. "In this atmosphere factor will be the type ropean governments on the tion based security be Europe would man power would eastern Europe, would be to be free flow drawn of
would not tolerate the rebuilding
of Germany integration Nor would into an its prospective a western bloc. eastern Eu
understandable; flourished was on
allow
also perilous. Truman mentation, abroad, itwould
evolving
economic
federa
information, Stalin's
force
to curtail
of doubt
and hesitation,"
Truman
declared,
"the decisive
endangered. eroded and be impaired.
his
of leadership that theUnited States gives theworld." If itdid not act decisively,
Soviet and trade. capital, eastern in of influence sphere to control the future of Ger capacity on In late 1947, Stalin cracked down communist coup in Czechoslovakia, as much would that as it alarmed to power to revive occu plans to shape
the world capitalist system would flounder, yet greater opportunities providing to grow and for Soviet to accrue. for Comrnunism If the U.S. did not strength exert leadership, state freedom would be compromised abroad and a garrison markets transnational and free were interrelated. had they To
encouraged economic The French The provoke French
the
and instigated a new round of purges (18).
Germany's the Russians. act autonomously. Germany pation The might of France. revival feared scared the French that Germany also were afraid attack and regain initiatives
might develop athome (15).
U.S. conflict, ideological the world function system effectively. capitalist too new, too the IMF and the World Bank were funded to accomplish the intended Open the peoples inextricably officials By 1947, to make realized and had too
French a Soviet officials
win
culminate against had the
in another American
remonstrated
poorly
inexperienced, results. The U.S.
and demanded military aid and security guarantees
French and other wary Europeans
(19).
capacity
to as
OAH Magazine of History
March 2005 67
their
future.
They
exacted
strategic anxieties troops
commitments
from
the U.S.
The
dence
movements
arose
in French
Indochina
and
the Netherlands
East
North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949 as a result of their fears about
as their about were part Soviet Russia. U.S. strate and U.S. of a double containment
Indies. Nationalist
in Indonesia wanted was Decolonization
leaders like Ho Chi Minh
over to gain control an embedded feature ofthe
in Vietnam and Sukarno
countries' postwar the future international (23).
as well Germany commitments gic
their
strategy, containing the uncertain trajectory of the Federal Republic of Germany as well as the anticipated hostility of the Soviet Union.
meant (20). needed power balancing, strategic into commit
system, propelled by the defeat of Japan and the weakening
tional European powers. Decolonization fueled cold war
of tradi
as it pro
responsibilities Hegemonic alliances and military ments, Just as western Germany Soviet so did
vided opportunities for the expansion of communist influence. Third World nationalists wanted to develop, industrialize, and modernize
their countries. They often found Marxist-Leninist it blamed wardness tation. Soviet At as attractive ideology their countries' back on the capitalist exploi same the time, economy
to be
integrated
a western
sphere lest it be sucked into a
orbit, worried Japan. U.S. oc that their
officials
cupation of Japan might fail and that the Japanese might
seek to enhance their own in
command
seemed to provide amodel
rapid successors, less modernization. therefore, for
for
Stalin's saw end expand
terests by looking to the Soviets
the communist economic Chinese partners. as In future
or
opportunities
turned 1948, U.S. policymakers from their attention reforming
ing their influence in the Third World; leaders inWashington perceived dangers (24). As hegemon of the free
world economy, U.S. officials
Japanese social
institutions
and political
eco Japan's they
nomic
to promoting reconstruction. growth,
felt a responsibility to contain
nationalism and to revolutionary core and periphery. The integrate Truman administration prod
past
economic
knew, depended
China, hands.
on
and
links to
Korea,
Manchuria,
areas increasingly slipping into
alternative and Japan sources of outlets need raw her
ded the Dutch and the French to
make concessions to revolution but often could ary nationalists, not outcomes of colo shape the nial struggles. When the French, for example, refused to acknowl
communist
ed
materials
for
manufactured goods. Studying the functioning of the global
America's economy, capitalist that concluded cold warriors the industrial Asia, core of north
edge Ho Chi Minn's republic of Vietnam and established a
Bao under puppet government to in 1949, Dai the U.S. chose the French. Otherwise, support Truman and his advisers feared
east
integrated much needed
to be Japan, needed its underdevel with
oped periphery
rope
in southeast
Eu to "'r W' I*; 'W' ;^Nli_Jli_000xX3OCX^ '" ' * -|| ;ft;=ffi.' :'';! ? ? ^ -B i*r' S?-* ^W^CfQy *>l^V?: j .~;! ;_flL l^^^f^ -^-|| i* 5?RflC!Kw_i8Si___' ^ J^'f* access
Asia,
like Western to have
theywould alienate their allies in
a and permit key a communist into gravitate France area to orbit
petroleum in the Middle East (21). Itwas the obligation ofthe hegemon ofthe world capitalist
to make of the compo could system sure
where
Chinese
itwould be amenable to
or Soviet influence. Fall
economy nent units
ing dominos
would the split between the Soviet Bloc in Eastern 1950 map of Europe demonstrates of NATO in the West, Europe and the members (from Doris M. Condit, History ofthe DC: Office ofthe Secretary of Defense, Volume II: The Test of War, 1950-1953 [Washington, Historical Office ofthe Secretary of Defense, 1988].) This sever
in Southeast Asia
the future economic
benefit from the operation of
the whole. But, as hegemon, the U.S.
links between this region and Ja
pan, making rehabilitation in the
also had to be sensitive to the
and of other revival of responsive countries. the to the In Asia,
worries
industrial core of northeast Asia all themore difficult (25). In the late 1950s and 1960s
sparked had by the Korean War
needs the them
as
that U.S.
of power troops would that the U.S.
former remain would
Axis
in Europe, feared many peoples nations. Truman promised as Japan regained even in the Pacific,
Japan's
extraordinary Yet, opposing
economic
recovery,
and fueled by subsequent exports to North America, defied American
assumptions. a position by then, American officials locked the U.S. into like nationalist movements led by communists,
its autonomy,
and
in Japan, even insure peace
if itmeant a new round of security guarantees, as it did with the Philip pines and with Australia and New Zealand (22). Yet, much as American officials hoped to integrate Japan with
Southeast revolutionary uncertain. that prospect Asia, nationalist During World movements War in II, popular the region indepen
Ho Chi Minh. U.S. officials feared that if they allowed a communist triumph in Indochina, America's credibility with other allies and cli
ents would be shattered. Hegemons needed to retain their credibility.
made
Otherwise, key allies, likeWestern Germany and Japan,might America's will and reorient themselves in the cold war (26).
doubt
68 OAH Magazine of History
March 2005
JjL
Hegemony and credibility required superior military capabilities. Leaders inWashington and Moscow alike believed that perceptions of their relative power position supported risk-taking on behalf of allies
and clients in Asia and Africa. In the most important U.S. strategy he doc
disseminating the cold war
their
values
and believe
increasingly institutions
their promoting that America's
culture. success
Yet as a
scholars hegemon,
of
its capacity to evoke support for its leadership, also depended on the
habits its mass and of constitutional values, and (30). the liberal and humane appeal governance, of the resonance of and its free market
ument ofthe cold war, NSC 68, Paul Nitze wrote thatmilitary power
an "policy to have "indispensable of calculated backdrop" and gradual force to containment, coercion." which called a in To pursue containment
was
consumption
economy
the Third World and erode support for the adversary, the U.S. needed
superior military of atomic weapons. of their weapons their arsenal of (27). But after U.S. Prior to 1949, the U.S. had a mo the Soviets tested and developed to officials believed they needed
Endnotes
Vol I: 1945, Year of Decisions, Memoirs, Vol. II: Years of reprint 1955); Truman, Memoirs, Trial and Hope, 1946-1952, reprint (New York: Signet, 1965,1956); Dwight D. Mandate for Change: The White House Years, 1953-1956 (Garden Eisenhower, Present at the Creation: My City, NJ: Doubleday, 1963); Dean G. Acheson, Years at the State Department F. Kennan, (New York: Norton, 1969); George 2 vol. paperback ed. (New York: Bantam, Memoirs, 1967-1972). 2. See, for example, Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (New York: Harper & Row, 1972); for a discussion ofthe "The Cold War Over see my essay, different historiographical approaches, the Cold War," in Gordon Martel, ed., American Foreign Policy 1993 Reconsidered, (London: 1890 i. For example, see Harry S Truman, (New York: Signet, 1965,
nopoly nuclear
own,
augment deter Soviet
aggression
aim was not only to Their weapons. strategic in the center of Europe, but also to support the
ability ofthe U.S. to intervene in Third World countries without fear of
Soviet countermoves. weapons, therefore, produced paradoxical results. Their enor Nuclear
mous power kept the cold war from turning into a hot war between the
and the Soviet Union. on both sides rec Leaders
U.S.
ognized that such a war would be suicidal. But at
the same time nuclear of encouraged
Routledge,
weapons and Moscow
I994) 3. John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know. Rethinking Cold War (New York History Oxford University Press, 1997) 4. For some
ficials in bothWashington
to engage in on the "periph Africa,
risk-taking ery," that is, in Asia,
the Middle East, and the
because each
Caribbean
ofthe best new on Stalin, see scholarship Simon Montefiore, Sebag Stalin: The Court of the Tsar,
side thought (and hoped)
that the dare would adversary to escalate the into a nucle
York:
not
(New reprint 2004, Knopf, 2003); M. Norman Naimark, The Russians in Germany.
Red
competition
ar exchange
Reagan to
(28). When
revived
Ronald
the determination
regain
of the
the Soviet History of Zone 1945 of Occupation, MA: 1949 (Cambridge, Press of Harvard Belknap Press, The 1995); Cold
U.S.
University military those
superiority in the 1980s,
sought to use
Vojtech Mastny, War and Soviet The Stalin Oxford NATO was as part of a double containment French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman U899652ACME.) International 1996); Mark, Years
he
not military capabilities, for a preemptive attack the Soviet Union, against to sup but as a backdrop U.S. interventions port behalf of anti-com from words,
Insecurity: (New York: Press, University Eduard Maximilian
formed
many. Here, donated by Corbis-Bettman,
the Soviet Union and Ger strategy: containing signs the NATO charter on April 4,1949. (Image
on
"Revolution by Stalin's National Degrees: Front Strategy for Europe, War Cold 1941-1947,"
munist
Angola. as a key
insurgents In other
Nicaragua Reagan
and viewed
El Salvador superior
to
Afghanistan
and
Woodrow
strategic credibility,
to containing
communism,
preserving
capabilities and support
D.C: History Project Working Paper No. 31 (Washington, Center for Scholars, 2001); Geoffrey Roberts, International Wilson "Stalin and the Grand Alliance: Public Discourse, Private Dialogues, and the
ing hegemony
For U.S. the transnational
(29).
officials,
to win the cold war the U.S. required waging to contain and Soviet power. ideological struggle To achieve to be an effective these goals, the U.S. had This hegemon. meant to nurture that the U.S. had the world and lubricate economy, and coopt es and preserve western allied Germany cohesion, and contain Japan, establish military nationalism, allianc and
of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1941-1947," Slovo 13 (2001): 1-15. Ferrell, ed., Dear Bess: The Letters from Harry to Bess Truman, 1910 to Truman, 1959 (New York: Norton, June 8, 1945, 1983), 522; Harriman of State, Foreign Relations ofthe United States: The Conference of Department Berlin: The Potsdam Conference, D.C: Government 1945 (2 vols., Washington, 1: 61. Printing Office, i960), 6. For soft power, see Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power. The Means to Success in World 5. Robert H. Politics (New York: Public Affairs, Nye, The Paradox 2004); of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone (New York: Oxford Press, 2002). University 7. Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall ofthe Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict From 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987), 347-72; R. J.Overy, Russia's War (London: Penguin Books, 1997); Allan M. Winkler,
Direction
build
revolutionary
bind the industrial core of Europe and Asia with the underdeveloped periphery in the Third World. To be effective, Cold Warriors believed
that superior military capabilities were an incalculable asset. They fo
cused much
less attention and allocated infinitely fewer resources to
OAH Magazine of History
March 2005 69
America During World War II, 2nd ed. (Wheeling, IL: Davidson, 2000). 8.Melvyn P. Leffler, A PreponderanceofPower. National Security, theTruman Administration, and theCold War (Stanford, CA Stanford University Press, 1992), 1-141. Harlan in of Communist Regimes Eastern Europe, 1944-1949 Press, 1997), 29; William (Boulder, CO: Westview I. Hitchcock, The Struggle for Europe: The Turbulent History of a Divided Continent, Books, 2004), 1945 to the Present (New York: Anchor 1-125. 10. Adam Westoby, Communism Since World War II (New York: St. Martiris Gibiansldi, eds., Press, 1981), 14-5. 11.Memo for the President, Secretary's 12. Central Agency, World Relates of the File, Harry by John McCloy, April 26,1945, S Truman Presidential Library. box 178, President's Igor Lukes, A. and L. I "The Czech Road The to Communism," Establishment in Norman M. Naimark
Home
Front U.S.A.:
I. Hitchcock, France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for in Europe, 1944-1954 of North Carolina Leadership (Chapel Hill: University Press, 1998). 20. Timothy P. Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins ofthe North 19. William Atlantic 21. Michael in Asia Press, 1981). Treaty Organization (Westport, CT: Greenwood Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins ofthe Cold War B. Schonberger, Press, 1985); Howard (New York: Oxford University
9.
and the Remaking of Japan, 1945-1952 (Kent, OH: ofWar: Americans Aftermath Kent State University Press, 1989); John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in theWake of World War II (New York: WW. Norton, 1999), 271-3, 525-46. 22. Leffler, Preponderance of Power, 346-7,393-4,428-32,464-5; Roger Dingman, "The Diplomacy The Philippines of Dependency. and Peacemaking with Japan," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 27 (September 1986): W. Brands, Henry to SEATO: ANZUS States 307-21; "From United
Intelligence "Review of the As It to the
Situation United 26,
September 203, ibid.
Security States," 1947, box
Strategic Policy toward Australia and New Zealand, 1952-1954" International History Review 9 (May 1987): 250-70. 23. For the emerging nationalist in Indochina and struggles Indonesia, seeWilliam J. Duiker, Sacred War. Nationalism and Revolution in a Divided Vietnam 1995); Kahin, and Revolution in (New York McGraw-Hill, McTuman George Nationalism
G. 13. Testimony by Dean March Acheson, 8, 1945, U.S. Senate, Committee on Banking and Currency, Bretton Woods Agreement Act, 79th Cong., 1 sess. D.C: Printing 1: 35. (Washington, Government
Office, 1945), of 14. U.S. Department The United Commerce, States in the World Economy D.C: Printing Harley (Washington, Government 1943); Postwar
Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1952). "The 24. Odd Arne Westad, New International Three History of the Cold War (Possible)
Office, A. Notter,
Paradigms," Diplomatic History 24 (Fall 2000): 551-65; David C. Engerman, Nils Gilman, Mark H. Haefele, eds., and Michael E. Latham, Staging Growth:
Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945 D.C: (Washington, Government
Modernization, Devebpment,and the Global Cold War (Amherst of Massachusetts University Press, 2003). Lawrence, 25. Mark Atwood "Transnational and Building the Cold War Coalition the Making of in Indochina,
Office, 1950), Printing 128; Georg Schild, Bretton Woods and Dumbarton Oaks: American and Political Economic Postwar
Soviet
in the Summer Planning St. of 1944 (New York: Martiris, 1995). 15.Harry S Truman, Public Papers ofthe Presidents ofthe United States, 194J (Washington, D.C: U.S.G.P.O., Etoctrine speech which 1963), 167-72; see also his Truman to the Congress on the followed a few days later, 176-80, and his special message Marshall 16. Michael ofWestern David W. Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction Press, 1987); Europe, 194J-1952 (New York: Cambridge University and Postwar Ellwood, Rebuilding Europe: Western Europe, America Reconstruction (New York: Longmans, 1992); Thomas W. Zeiler, Free Trade, Free World; The Advent of GATT (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, Plan, 515-29. J.Hogan, The Marshall
Premier Nikita Khrushchev Sukarno (right) iswarmly greeted by Indonesian President Achmed in i960 at New York's Waldorf-Astoria. U.S. officials (second from left) at an Indonesian reception nations would feared nationalist look to Moscow leaders of emerging and Beijing. (Image donated by Corbis-Bettman, BE060377.) History 26
Diplomatic 1947-1949," Jon Rotter, The Path to Vietnam: (Summer 2002): 453-80; Andrew to Southeast Asia Commitment Origins ofthe American (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Press, 1987). University see the pathbreaking 26. For the importance of credibility, article by Robert J. McMahon, Power," Diplomatic History 15 (Fall 1991): "Credibility and World 455-71. 27. NSC 68, 14, 1950, Documents "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security," April H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, eds., Containment: on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950 (New York: Columbia
in Thomas
1999). The Origins Plan CA: Stanford 17. John Gimbel, of the Marshall (Stanford, the Line: The Press, 1976); Carolyn Woods University Drawing Eisenberg, to Divide Germany, American Decision 1944-1949 (New York: Cambridge Press, 1996). University "Moscow and the Marshall 18. Geoffrey Plan: Politics, Roberts, Ideology and ofthe Cold War, 1947," Europe-Asia Studies 46 Inside Pleshakov, 1371-86; V. M. Zubok and Konstantin War. From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, MA: Harvard the Onset 1996), 46-53. 1994): (December the Kremlin's Cold University Press,
Press, 1978), 401-2; NSC 114/2, "Programs for National University Security," October of State, Foreign Relations ofthe United States, 12,1951, Department D.C: 1951: National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy (Washington, Government 1979), 1:187-89. Printing Office, 28. For Soviet policy, see A. A. Fursenko "One Hell of and Timothy J. Naftali, a Gamble": Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, (New York: Norton, 1958-1964 Fursenko Khrushchev's and Timothy Cold War Naftali, 1997); Aleksandr (New York: Norton, 2005). 29. Peter Schweizer, Reagan's War. The Epic Story of his Forty Year Struggle and Final Triumph Over Communism (New York: Doubleday, 2002). and the 30. G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint,
70 OAH Magazine of History
March 2005
JL
NJ: Princeton University (Princeton, Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars and O. Robert Press, 2001), Keohane, Cooperation Hegemony: After 163-214; in the World Political Economy Discord University (Princeton, NJ: Princeton The Ideas that Mandelbaum, Press, 135-81; Michael 1984), especially in the Twenty-First and Free Markets the World: Peace, Democracy Conquered (New York: Public Affairs Press, 2002); Geir Lundestad, 1945-1997 Integration: The United States and European Integration, Oxford University Press, 1998); Gaddis, We Now Know. Century "Empire" by (New York:
the Department of State, of Defense, Department Central Agency, Intelligence sites containing have libraries the tories, and other information.
For
see
<http://www.state.gov/history/>; for The speeches, them
for the
<http://www.defenselink.mil/>; <http://www.cia.gov/>. selected documents, You can access
presidential oral his <http:// see Rob
through context,
www.archives.gov/presidential_libraries/index.html>. For short books the cold war locating
in a global S. Painter,
ert J.McMahon,
Oxford regarding
The Cold War: A Very Short Introduction (New York:
David Routledge, Coexistence, The Cold War: An 2002); Geoffrey Revolution and Cold War, East, West, since 1945, now Roberts,
Bibliographical Note
Most governments after publish the fact, primary now source documents
the history of their foreign policy. These documents
decades but we have For the evolution and 1960s. 1940s, 1950s, cold war, see U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of
are published
Press, University 2003); International History (New York: in World Politics: The Soviet Union 1945-1991; (New York: Routledge, South: Major Developments
many
documents for the many U.S. in the ofthe role ofthe
North,
Geir Lundestad, 1999); in International Relations
4th ed. (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1999).
Many using from and tries scholars are primary the former other to documents Soviet Union coun cold war.
the United States (Washington: Government Printing Office);
for see Britain Foreign and the cold war, and Commonwealth
communist study listed the
Office, Documents
Policy Overseas. Since
on British
the end
In addition to the books and
articles David in note way, Stalin Hollo 3, see and
of the cold war, the Cold War
International History Project
^^^^^Bm
BBBBBBBBaKIik
?J?i^^^^^^^^^^^KKKf^^
has been publishing (and dis tributing free of charge) pri
source Soviet documents Union communist and from other the
C ^bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbT
J^b__________ the
._bbbbbbbbH
(New
Bomb: the Soviet Union
Haven, Energy, CT: 1939-1956 Yale Uni
and Atomic
mary
<i^^_______B_______F
i*____l____r
c-
'
versity Press, 1994); William
Taubman, Man Norton, rison, and His
Khrushchev: Era
The
formerly
nations,
the People's Repub including are indis lic of China. They for understanding pensable
2003); the Soviets Up Driving Soviet-East German the Wall: 1953-1961 Princeton 2003). Some (Princ Univer ofthe
(New York: Hope M. Har
the global context of the cold
See the Cold War Interna
Relations, eton, NJ:
war.
tional History Project, Bulletin
D.C: Woodrow Center, Central In China's reception Chairman given leader Ho Chi Minn Mao Ze Dong (left) chats with Vietnamese in Beijing in 1955. (Image donated ,BEo46963.) by Corbis-Bettman (right) at a
sity Press,
(Washington, International Wilson 1992-2004). The
most fascinating books deal with Chinese foreign policy
and Mao the Tse-tung relations and S.N. between Stalin. See,
telligence Agency
several See,
(CIA) has
volumes of
published documents.
for Ho
for example,
Goncharov, Partners: Sta Press,
Woodrow
for example, ed., Assess J. Kuhns, lin, Mao, and the Korean War (Stanford,
JohnWilson
Xue, CA: Uncertain Stanford
Lewis, and Litai
University
ing the Soviet Threat: The Early Cold War Years (Springfield, VA: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1997); Scott
ed., Selected Estimates Staff, Center Ben on the Soviet for the Union, of 1950-1959 ton, D.C: History Study Intelligence, At Cold War's B. Fischer, End: Europe, 1989-1991 (Washing Central U.S. In VA:
1993); Jian Chen, Mao's China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: Univer
sity of North For key ter World Current Economic Carolina books on Press, the 2001). to reconstruct effort N. Gardner, and the world economy Diplomacy International Herman 1945-1980 (New York: see af in
A. Koch,
Intelligence telligence There als on
Agency, on the Soviet
1993); Union
War
II, see Richard The
and Eastern
(Reston, source
Central Intelligence Agency, 1999).
are several the cold war. Project, key Web The most sites for important primary locating are the Cold War materi International
Perspective: Origins Order (New York: Columbia Prosperity Zeiler, and
Sterling-Dollar the Prospects of Our
Van
der Wee,
Upheaval: and 2003).
Press, University 1980); The World Economy, the American
(Berkeley: University
Thomas W. University Cambridge For transnational
of California Press, 1986); Alfred E. Eckes and
Century cold war, Press,
History
ction=library.
collection^
<http://wwics.si.edu/index.cfm?topic_id=i409&fusea the National Archive, Security the Parallel History Project for Pact,
Globalization
gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/>; NATO and the Warsaw Documents The
<http://www. information and
on the
ideological
conflict
and
the
Joyce
Declassified
<http://www.isn.ethz.ch/php/>; Reference Service, <http://www.galegroup. of American on many issues, U.S. on Scientists like also has the nuclear agencies past foreign
and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States
& Row, 1945-1954 1972); Walt W. Ros (New York: Harper Foreign Policy, A Non-Communist Growth: tow, The Stages of Economic Manifesto, 3rd. ed. (New York: Cambridge Press, Furet, The Francois University 1990);
com/psm>. with valuable
Federation
aWeb arms also
site race. have
documents
See <http://www.fas.org/>. Web sites containing
Many documents
government current and
policy.
Passing of an Illusion: The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999); Odd Arne Westad, Cold OAH Magazine of History March 2005 71
JjL
and Revolution: Soviet-American Rivalry as and the Origins ofthe Chi
War
nese Civil War, 1944-1946 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993);
E. Latham, Carolina Modernization Ideology: American Social Science
Michael
and "Nation-Building" in the Kennedy Era (Chapel Hill: University
the Other David 2000); Shore: American Intellectuals Press, C. Engerman, Modernization and the Romance of Russian
of
North
from Devel
opment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003); John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (New York: Oxford
Press, are 1997). some wonderful the cold war. studies See, on decolonization, for example, Robert revolutionary J. McMahon,
Gary W. Reichard Chair and Project Editor, State University, Long Beach Joyce E. Chaplin Harvard University Ted M. Dickson Providence Day School, Charlotte NC Michelle Forman
University There
California
nationalism,
and
Colonialism and Cold War: The United States and the Strugglefor Indone sian Independence, 1945-49 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981);
Frances Gouda Brocades Thijs Zaalberg, Indies /Indonesia: US Foreign Amsterdam 1920-1949 (Amsterdam: East and American Policy and Visions Indonesian Press, ofthe Na 2002);
Netherlands tionalism,
University
Matthew James Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fightfor In dependence and the Origins ofthe Post-Cold War Era (New York: Oxford
Press, 2002); Piero Gleijeses, War J. Duiker, Conflicting is often U.S. Missions: Havana,
University
Washington,
context; see,
and Africa, 1959-1976 (Chapel Hill: University
2002). example, The Vietnam examined Containment for William
of North
in this Policy
Middlebury (VT) Union High School
Michael Grossberg Indiana University Robert Huehner
Carolina
Press,
and the Conflict in Indochina (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994); George C. Herring, America's LongestWar: The United States and
Vietnam, Peace: 1950-1975, For power and The Making Balance: 4th ed. (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2002). see Mark A Constructed the cold war, Trachtenberg, ofthe European Settlement, 1945-196} the Cold War (Princeton,
David
University ofWisconsin, Washington County Lee W. Formwalt Organization of American Historians Michael Johanek The College Board Kevin Organization B. Byrne American Historians of
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); William
Elusive Power and Perceptions the Truman During
Curti Wohlforth,
(Ithaca,
The
NY:
Cornell University Press, 1993); Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of
Power: National Security, Administration, and the Cold War
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992). Raymond L. Garthoff has written two lengthy and illuminating books that link power and
ideology. tions From See Garthoff, Nixon Detente to Reagan and Confrontation: D.C: (Washington, American-Soviet Brookings Rela Institution,
1985) and The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of
the Cold War (Washington, of the For discussions movements, Movement 1999); D.C: end of Institution, 1994). Brookings on ideas that focus the cold war and Uma
transnational The
see Matthew to End Robert D.
Transnational
Press, University West: Gorbachev, Columbia
Forces: Unarmed Evangelista, the Cold War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell and the Idea ofthe Russia English,
Venkateswaran
Educational
Testing Service
Cold War and the End ofthe (New York: Lawrence S. Wittner, Toward Nucle 2000); Disarmament Movement, 1971 ofthe World Nuclear to the Present CA: Stanford Press, University 2003). (Stanford, see the citations in of hegemony and soft power, For discussions notes and 29. 5 Intellectuals, Press, University ar Abolition: A History
(jkMegeBoaxd Advanced Placement
Program
Melvyn P. Leffler is the Edward Stettinius Professor ofAmerican History at The University of Virginia. Currently, he is a Jennings Randolph Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace and holds theHenry Kissinger Chair at
His the Library of Congress. book, A Truman the Administration, ecurity, versity Press, 1993), won the Bancroft, of Power: National Preponderance Uni and the Cold War (Stanford now Ferrell, and Hoover prizes. He is
writing a book about why the Cold War lasted as long as it did and why it endedwhen it did.
b3_9
72 OAH Magazine of History March 2005