1. Fudot v Cattleya FACTS; 1.

De La Serna requested that Justice Tinga, the ponente in the Fudot case, be inhibited because it was alleged that he received P10m from Chan in exchange for a favorable decision. De La Serna suggests that Tinga abandoned the doctrine in Lim v Jorge to accommodate Chan. 2. He also said that Tinga prioritized the case and that Chan already knew of the outcome of the case before the decision was promulgated. 3. Chan related that he approached De La Serna for the purpose of amicably settling the case, and offered him to be their retainer in Bohol. He denied having said to De La Serna that he had already spent so much money for the Supreme Court. Issue: W/N Serna Is guilty of indirect contempt? Held: Yes. Contempt is defined as a disobedience to the court by setting up opposition to its authority, justice and dignity. It is not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the courts orders but it also brings authority of the court and administration of law into disrepute or in some manner impedes the due administration of justice. Indirect contempt is one committed out of or not in the presence of the court but tends to be little, degrade obstruct or embarrass the court and justice. Improper conduct tending to directly or indirectly impede obstruct or degrade the administration of justice is also indirect contempt.

A lawyer is first and foremost an officer of the court and it is his duty to maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers. While he is expected to bring forth irregular and questionable practices of those sitting in court it is important that this criticism shall be bona fide and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. His statements bear badges of falsehood because the version of the witnesses disputes his statements. He maliciously made these declarations irresponsibly. The libelous attack on the integrity and credibility of Justice Tinga degrade the dignity of the court and erode public confidence in it. Fined 30k 2. YU VS PALANA On November 16, 2006, complainants Henry and Catherine Yu filed a complaint1 for disbarment against respondent Atty. Antoniutti K. Palaa for alleged acts of defraudation, before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).2 Complainants attached therewith their Consolidated Complaint-Affidavit3 which they earlier filed before the City Prosecutors Office of Makati, charging the respondent and his co-accused (in the criminal case), with syndicated estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22). The facts, as found by the CBD, are as follows: Sometime in 2004, complainants met a certain Mr. Mark Anthony U. Uy (Mr. Uy) who introduced himself as the Division Manager of Wealth Marketing and General Services Corporation (Wealth Marketing), a corporation

engaged in spot currency trading.4 Mr. Uy persuaded the complainants, together with other investors, to invest a minimum amount of P100,000.00 or its dollar equivalent with said company. They were made to believe that the said company had the so-called "stop-loss mechanism" that enabled it to stop trading once the maximum allowable loss fixed at 3%-9% of the total contributions, would be reached. If, on the other hand, the company would suffer loss, Wealth Marketing would return to the investors the principal amount including the monthly guaranteed interests. Further, Wealth Marketing promised to issue, as it had in fact issued, postdated checks covering the principal investments.5 It turned out, however, that Wealth Marketings promises were false and fraudulent, and that the checks earlier issued were dishonored for the reason "account closed." The investors, including the complainants, thus went to Wealth Marketings office. There, they discovered that Wealth Marketing had already ceased its operation and a new corporation was formed named Ur-Link Corporation (Ur-Link) which supposedly assumed the rights and obligations of the former. Complainants proceeded to Ur-Link office where they met the respondent. As Wealth Marketings Chairman of the Board of Directors, respondent assured the complainants that Ur-Link would assume the obligations of the former company.6 To put a semblance of validity to such representation, respondent signed an Agreement7 to that effect which, again, turned out to be another ploy to further deceive the investors.8 This prompted the complainants to send demand letters to Wealth Marketings officers and directors which remained unheeded. They likewise lodged a criminal complaint for

syndicated estafa against the respondent and his coaccused.9 Despite the standing warrant for his arrest, respondent went into hiding and has been successful in defying the law, to this date. In an Order10 dated November 17, 2006, Director for Bar Discipline Rogelio B. Vinluan required respondent to submit his Answer to the complaint but the latter failed to comply. Hence, the motion to declare him in default filed by the complainants.11 The case was thereafter referred to Commissioner Jose I. De la Rama, Jr. (the Commissioner) for investigation. In his continued defiance of the lawful orders of the Commission, respondent failed to attend the mandatory conference and to file his position paper. Respondent was thereafter declared in default and the case was heard ex parte. In his report,12 the Commissioner concluded that Wealth Marketings executives (which included respondent herein) conspired with one another in defrauding the complainants by engaging in an unlawful network of recruiting innocent investors to invest in foreign currency trading business where, in fact, no such business existed, as Wealth Marketing was not duly licensed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to engage in such undertaking. This was bolstered by the fact that Wealth Marketings financial status could not support the investors demands involving millions of pesos. It also appears, said the Commissioner, that Ur-Link was created only to perpetuate fraud and to avoid obligations. The Commissioner likewise found that respondent had been previously suspended by this Court for committing similar

acts of defraudation.13 Considering the gravity of the acts committed, as well as his previous administrative case and defiance of lawful orders, the Commissioner recommended that respondent be disbarred from the practice of law, the pertinent portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, after a careful evaluation of the documents presented, including the jurisprudence laid down by the complainants involving the same respondent, and said decision of the Supreme Court forms part of the law of the land, the undersigned commissioner is recommending that respondent Atty. Antoniutti K. Palaa be disbarred and his name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys upon the approval of the Board of Governors and the Honorable Supreme Court.14 In its Resolution dated August 17, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Commissioners report and recommendation.15 This Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors. Lawyers are instruments in the administration of justice. As vanguards of our legal system, they are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. In so doing, the peoples faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. Lawyers may be disciplined whether in their professional or in their private capacity for any conduct that is wanting in morality, honesty, probity and good demeanor.16

In the present case, two corporations were created where the respondent played a vital role, being Wealth Marketings Chairman of the Board and Ur-Links representative. We quote with approval the Commissioners findings, thus: As correctly pointed out by the City Prosecutors Office of Makati, it appears that the executive officers of Wealth Marketing Corporation conspired with each (sic) other to defraud the investors by engaging in unlawful network of recruiting innocent investors to invest in foreign currency trading business. The truth of the matter is that there was no actual foreign currency trading since said corporation is not duly licensed or authorized by the Securities and Exchange Commission to perform such task. In the General Information Sheet (Annex "I") of Wealth Marketing and General Services Corporation, the authorized capital stock is only P9,680,000.00 and the paid up capital, at the time of [in]corporation is (sic) only P605,000.00. Said corporation, as the records will show, has been dealing with investors with millions of pesos on hand, with the hope that their money would earn interests as promised. However, their company resources and financial status will show that they are not in the position to meet these demands if a situation such as this would arise. xxxx Furthermore, in order to evade the investors who were then asking for the return of their investments, said respondent even formed and made him part of a new

company, Ur-Link Corporation, which according to the complainants, when they met the respondent, would assume the obligations of the defunct Wealth Marketing Corporation. It is also evident that respondent is frolicking with the Securities and Exchange Commission for the purpose of employing fraud.17 To be sure, respondents conduct falls short of the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal profession. The fact that the criminal case against the respondent involving the same set of facts is still pending in court is of no moment. Respondent, being a member of the bar, should note that administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of criminal cases. A criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial question even if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in the administrative proceedings.18 Besides, it is not sound judicial policy to await the final resolution of a criminal case before a complaint against a lawyer may be acted upon; otherwise, this Court will be rendered helpless to apply the rules on admission to, and continuing membership in, the legal profession during the whole period that the criminal case is pending final disposition, when the objectives of the two proceedings are vastly disparate.19 Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare and for preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice law.20 The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court.21

As to the recommended penalty of disbarment, we find the same to be in order. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides: A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. x x x. Time and again, we have stated that disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, and, as such, the power to disbar must always be exercised with great caution for only the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar.22 The Court notes that this is not the first time that respondent is facing an administrative case, for he had been previously suspended from the practice of law in Samala v. Palaa23 and Sps. Amador and Rosita Tejada v. Palaa.24 In Samala, respondent also played an important role in a corporation known as First Imperial Resources Incorporated (FIRI), being its legal officer. As in this case, respondent committed the same offense by making himself part of the money trading business when,

in fact, said business was not among the purposes for which FIRI was created. Respondent was thus meted the penalty of suspension for three (3) years with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely.25 Likewise, in Tejada, he was suspended for six (6) months for his continued refusal to settle his loan obligations.261avvphi1 The fact that respondent went into hiding in order to avoid service upon him of the warrant of arrest issued by the court (where his criminal case is pending) exacerbates his offense.27 Finally, we note that respondents case is further highlighted by his lack of regard for the charges brought against him. As in Tejada, instead of meeting the charges head on, respondent did not bother to file an answer and verified position paper, nor did he participate in the proceedings to offer a valid explanation for his conduct.28 The Court has emphatically stated that when the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him.29 Verily, respondents failure to comply with the orders of the IBP without justifiable reason manifests his disrespect of judicial authorities.30 As a lawyer, he ought to know that the compulsory bar organization was merely deputized by this Court to undertake the investigation of complaints against lawyers. In short, his disobedience to the IBP is in reality a gross and blatant disrespect of the Court.31 By his repeated cavalier conduct, the respondent exhibited an

unpardonable lack of respect for the authority of the Court.32 Considering the serious nature of the instant offense and in light of his prior misconduct herein-before mentioned for which he was penalized with a three-year suspension with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely; and another sixmonth suspension thereafter, the contumacious behavior of respondent in the instant case which grossly degrades the legal profession indeed warrants the imposition of a much graver penalty --- disbarment.33 Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample them underfoot and to ignore the very bonds of society, argues recreancy to his position and office, and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic.34 WHEREFORE, respondent Antoniutti K. Palaa is hereby DISBARRED, and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in his record as a member of the Bar; and let notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country. SO ORDERED.

3. SERVANDO MANGAHAS VS CA, SPOUSES SIMEON and LEONORA CAYME, This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking to nullify the decision of the Court of Appeals[1] dated May 25, 1990[2] and the Court of Appeals Resolution of October 12, 1990,[3] denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. From the records on hand, the antecedent facts that matter can be culled as follows: Since April 1955,[4] the spouses, Severo S. Rodil and Caridad S. Rodil, occupied and possessed the subject property,[5] which is an agricultural land with an area of 15.0871 hectares.[6] On February 1, 1971, they sold the said piece of land to the spouses, Pablo Simeon and Leonora Cayme, for Seven Thousand (P7,000.00) Pesos, as evidenced by the affidavit[7] executed by the former in favor of the latter in the presence of the herein petitioner, Servando Mangahas.[8] During the trial below, the lower court gave credence to the evidence on record that it was the herein petitioner himself who approached the buyer and offered to sell subject parcel of land and he was also the one who received said consideration of P7,000.00. On the same day, the private respondents filed with the Bureau of Lands a Free Patent application for the same land in dispute, which application was approved on August 27, 1975 by the Bureau of Lands under Free Patent No. 576411.[9] Pursuant thereto, the Register of Deeds in Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro issued the corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. P-6924.[10]

Records show that before the sale, the spouses Rodil had already applied for subject tract of land with the Bureau of Lands which application was not acted upon even until the aforesaid sale. It was also shown that petitioner, Servando Mangahas, had been in possession thereof by virtue of the agreement between him and the spouses Rodil, allowing him (petitioner) to occupy and cultivate the said parcel of land.[11] For allowing him to occupy and cultivate the same, petitioner Servando Mangahas paid the amount of P7,000.00 to the Rodils, as mentioned in the Kasulatan ng Pagtanggap ng Salapi[12] Twelve (12) hectares of the property were then developed into a fishpond, two (2) hectares planted to rice and one (1) hectare used as tumana with a house erected thereon. Petitioner was permitted by the private respondents to continue possessing and working on the same land, even after the sale, upon the request of the private respondents themselves because they were then busy in their palay business. Private respondents did not get any share in the fruits or harvest of the land except on one occasion, when the petitioner gave them one-half (1/2) tiklis (big basket) of tilapia. However, the private respondents had long before demanded from the petitioner the return of the premises in question but the latter refused to vacate the place. Private respondents tolerated petitioners possession until February 5, 1985, when they commenced the present action for recovery of ownership and the possession of real property, docketed as Civil Case No. R-528 before Branch 45 of the Regional Trial Court in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro.

Petitioner theorized that he entered into the possession of the land under controversy, sometime in 1969, by virtue of a prior sale he inked with the spouses Rodil on December 7, 1969, and since then, he has been in continuous occupation and possession in concepto de dueo up to the present, enjoying the fruits thereof to the exclusion of all others, his right thereto being evidenced by the Kasulatan ng Pagtangap ng Salapi dated December 7, 1969. Petitioner denied having offered the same land for sale to the private respondents or ever receiving the amount of P7,000.00, the consideration of the alleged sale of February 1, 1971.[13] He further averred that respondent Leonora Cayme misled the Bureau of Lands into granting her a Free Patent for subject parcel of land on the basis of a Deed of Relinquishment of Rights, supposedly executed by Severo Rodil, and to which document the signature of petitioner as a witness was procured through fraud, deceit and misrepresentation.[14] In due time, the parties went to trial which culminated in the rendition by the court a quo of its decision of November 14, 1986, in favor of the plaintiffs (now the private respondents), disposing as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered: (a) Declaring the plaintiffs to be the absolute and registered owners of the land in question covered by and described in OCT No. P-6924 (Free Patent NO. 576411) of the Office of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Occidental Mindoro;

(b) Ordering defendant and all persons claiming under him to remove their respective houses constructed thereon, and to deliver the possession of the land in question together with all the improvements thereon unto the plaintiffs; (c) Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P5, 000. 00 as and for attorneys fees; and (d) Ordering the defendant to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.[15] With the denial[16] of his Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial, petitioner seasonably appealed to the Court of Appeals which came out with a judgment of affirmance on May 25, 1990.[17] The issues posited by petitioner boil down to: I. WHETHER THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE LAND IN QUESTION IS NO LONGER PART OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN FOR THE REASON THAT DEFENDANT IS ALREADY, BY OPERATION OF LAW, THE OWNER THEREOF BY VIRTUE OF A GOVERNMENT GRANT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW AND EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE. II. WHETHER THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING PLAINTIFF LEONORA CAYME GUILTY OF FRAUD AND MISREPRESENTATION IN SECURING FREE PATENT NO. 576411 FROM THE BUREAU OF LANDS. The first issue is mainly predicated on the theory that the petitioner acquired ownership of the disputed land by

acquisitive prescription. Petitioner theorized that with the length of possession of his predecessors-in-interest, the spouses Rodil, tacked to his own possession, the total period of possession in his favor would suffice to vest in him the ownership of the property under the law on prescription.[18] So also, citing the early case of Cario vs. Insular Government[19] up to and including the more recent cases of The Director of Lands vs. Bengzon, et al.[20] and The Director of Lands vs. Manila Electric Company, et al.[21], petitioner stressed that by prescription, he became the owner of subject property ipso jure, which land became a private property by operation of law, and had been withdrawn and segregated from the alienable and disposable part of the public domain. Consequently, the Bureau of Lands had no authority to issue the Free Patent in question, which was then null and void;[22] petitioner argued. The factual milieu obtaining with respect to the petition under scrutiny has rendered petitioners reliance on the applicability of the aforestated principles misplaced. In disposing of the issue, the Court of Appeals opined: xxx Even if we were to disregard the need for a proper application, Article 1138 of the Civil Code provides, In the computation of time necessary for prescription the following rules shall be observed: (1) The present possessor may complete the period necessary for prescription by tacking his possession to that of his grantor or predecessor in interest x x x.

The defendant-appellants grantor or predecessor in interest (Severo Rodil) took possession of the property, subject matter of the litigation, on April 1955 (Exhibit F for the plaintiff-appellees and exhibit 5 for the defendant). Since the complaint in the case at bar was filed on February 25, 1985,[23] the requirement of at least thirty years continuous possession has not been complied with even if We were to tack Rodils period of possession. xxx[24] As found by the lower court below, petitioner had admitted,[25] contrary to his disclaimer, that the possession of the spouses Rodil, from whom he traces the origin of his supposed title, commenced only in April 1955. Petitioner can not now feign ignorance of such judicial admission which he has resolutely repudiated in his present petition.[26] Acquisition of ownership under the law on prescription cannot be pleaded in support of petitioners submission that subject land has ipso jure become his private property. As regards the issue of fraud tainting the acquisition of the questioned Free Patent, the Court discerns no basis for disturbing the finding by the lower court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Findings of fact by the trial court are not to be disturbed on appeal, except for cogent reasons, as when the findings of fact are not duly supported by evidence.[27] On the other hand, findings by the Court of Appeals on factual questions are conclusive and ought not to be disregarded. But the rule admits of some exceptions as when such findings of fact are contrary to what the trial court found.[28] Mere allegation of error without more will not prevail over the

findings by the trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, as in the case under consideration. Petitioner has not adduced before the lower court a preponderance of evidence of fraud. It is well settled that a party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it.[29] Thus, whoever alleges fraud or mistake affecting a transaction must substantiate his allegation, since it is presumed that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns and private transactions have been fair and regular.[30] The requirement that fraud must be established by clear and convincing evidence has been reiterated in Cuizon vs. Court of Appeals,[31] viz.: We are not, however, inclined to toe the line of the trial courts finding that private respondents are liable for fraud. Fraud is the deliberate or intentional evasion of the normal fulfillment of an obligation. The mere failure of private respondents to execute a deed of sale because they demanded first an accounting of the lots used as collaterals by petitioner and the amount of loans secured could not be considered as fraud. Fraud is never presumed. It must be alleged and proven. Fraus est odiosa et non praesumeda x x x (Emphasis ours) In the petition under scrutiny, the fraud theorized upon by petitioner is belied by what the Court of Appeals found, to wit: "This court has found that the defendant-appellant is a person whose credibility is much in doubt. On the other hand, We have found the plaintiff-appellee Leonora Simeon Cayme to be straightforward and credible. She has convincingly shown to this court, through her

testimony and the supporting documentary evidence, that she is in fact the rightful owner of the property in dispute x x x[32] (Underscoring supplied for emphasis.) WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision appealed from AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

4. Pedro L. Linsangan vs Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino Facts: Pedro Linsangan (Linsangan) of the Linsangan Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office filed a complaint of disbarment against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino (Tolentino) for solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional services alleging that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his clients to transfer legal representation to said respondent with the promise of financial assistance and expeditious collection on their claims. To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages. Complainant presented the sworn affidavit of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano convinced him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and use respondents services instead, in exchange for a loan of P50,000.00. Issue: Whether or not, Tolentinos actions constitute disbarment.

Held: The court adopted the findings of the IBP on unethical conduct of the respondent whereby it found the respondent to have encroached on the professional practice of complainant, violating Rule 2.03 of the CPR which provide; Rule 2.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO OR PERMIT TO BE DONE ANY ACT DESIGNEDPRIMARILY TO SOLICIT LEGAL BUSINESS. Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers. Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment. Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides: Rule 1.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR ANY CORRUPT MOTIVE OR INTEREST, ENCOURAGE ANY SUIT OR PROCEEDING OR DELAY ANY MANS CAUSE. This rule proscribes ambulance chasing (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain employment) as a measure to protect the community from barratry and champerty. Based on such, Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino is found to have violated Rules 1.03, 2.03, of the CPR and is suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

learned that Respondent did not file his entry of appearance in the cases he filed. Further, Respondent failed to inform him that he was entitled to prepare a counter-affidavit to answer the complaint for other light threats. Worse, Complainant had no knowledge that there had already been arraignment dates for the criminal cases against him, and that warrants had already been issued for his non-attendance. RULING: Respondent DISBARRED, his name STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys; ordered to immediately RETURN to Complainant all his papers and documents and his money. Respondent has indubitably fallen below the exacting standards demanded of members of the bar. He did not merely neglect his clients cause, he abandoned his client and left him without any recourse but to hire another lawyer. To hide from Complainant, avoid his calls, ignore his letters, and leave him helpless is unforgivable; and to commit all these acts and omissions after receiving the full amount of legal fees and after assuring the client of his commitment and responsibility violates the CPR.A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Canon 1,Rule 1.01 of the CPR). Deceitful conduct involves moral turpitude and includes anything done contrary to justice, modesty or good morals. It is an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellowmen or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. Representing to Complainant that he would take care of the cases filed against him, assuring Complainant that his property involved in a civil case would be safeguarded, and then collecting the full amount of legal fees of PhP900,000.00,

5. Overgaard vs Valdez FACTS: Complainant, a Dutch national paid Respondent P900,000 to represent him in several cases filed by, and against him. Despite continued efforts to contact (via unanswered phone calls and e-mails) Respondent to inquire on the status of the cases, Later, Complainant

only to desert the complainant after receipt of the fees, were manifestly deceitful and dishonest. A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. The CPR further provides that a lawyer is required to keep the client informed of the status of his case and to respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for information. The respondent did the opposite. Despite Complainants efforts to consult him and notwithstanding numerous attempts to contact him, simply to ask for an update of the status of the cases, Respondent was able to avoid Complainant and never bothered to reply.A lawyer shall account for all money and property collected or received for and from the client (Rule 16.01, Canon 16). Complainant paid p900,000.00 to Respondent for legal services to be rendered. However, since Respondent did not carry out any of the services he was engaged to perform, he must immediately return the money he received from the client upon demand. However, he refused to return the money he received from Complainant despite written demands, and was not even able to give a single report regarding the status of the cases. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the client's cause. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose such as for filing fees but not used for failure to file the case, must immediately be returned to the client on demand..

6. PNCC vs Mandagan In termination cases, the burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the dismissal of the employee is for just or authorized cause. Failure to do so would mean that the dismissal is not justified. A dismissed employee is not required to prove his innocence of the charges leveled against him by his employer. Likewise, the determination of the existence and sufficiency of a just cause is to be exercised with fairness and in good faith and after observing due process. Thus, we agree with the CA that PNCC failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that Mandagan was indeed guilty of moonlighting as defined under the PNCC Code of employee Discipline, i.e., rendering for another employer without the knowledge or approval of management. In the manner in which the rule is phrased, since the words knowledge and approval are separated by the disjunctive OR, it is evident that even knowledge alone by the management of PNCC of the alleged moonlighting is tantamount to an implied approval and is sufficient to exonerate respondent from liability. Therefore, it cannot be said that her appearance in the ejectment case of PNCC Corporate Comptroller was without the knowledge of management considering that the former PNCC top officers were the ones who asked her to do so. Moreover, when she filed her application for leave of absence during one of her hearings, she specifically stated in the leave form that her absence was due to the filing of the ejectment case and this application was approved by petitioner.

Loss of trust and confidence as a ground of dismissal has never been intended to afford an occasion for abuse of its subjective nature. It should not be used as a subterfuge for causes which are illegal, improper, and unjustified. It must be genuine, not a mere afterthought intended to justify an earlier action taken in bad faith. Let it not be forgotten that what is at stake here is the means of livelihood, the name, the reputation of the employee. However, it should be remembered that petitioner is a government-owned and controlled corporation. The handling by the lawyers in its employ of cases of its employees, whether for a fee or not and despite the knowledge and approval of management while not absolutely prohibited is nonetheless, discouraged as it could only breed corruption and cause distraction from the very duties that the lawyers were precisely hired for. The fact that a number of lawyers in petitioners employ has handled private cases, obviously with tolerance of petitioner, does not validate the practice or make it an acceptable rule of conduct. A wrong done by many does not make a right. In light of the foregoing, we find respondent, though not entirely faultless, was indeed illegally dismissed from employment by petitioner.

practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December 1998. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship and eventually approved in may 2004. On July 14, 2006 pursuant to RA 9225, pettioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship, on that day also he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippines. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and intends to resume his law practice. Issue: may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice law in the Philippines? Ruling: no. since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigner. The court also stated the rules and condition to be meted out in attorneys and admission to the bar, citing section 2 of rule 138 of the rules of court. The petition was granted subject to the compliance of the conditions set forth in the rules of court. 8. In re: Cunanan et al Facts: Congress passed Republic Act Number 972, commonly known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953. In accordance with the said law, the Supreme Court then passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of 72 per cent by raising it to 75 percent. After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking its provisions, while other motions for the revision

7. Re: Benjamin M. Dacanay Facts: B.m.no.1678, December 17, 2007Petition for leave to resume practice of law, Benjamin m. Dacanay, petitioner was admitted to the bar in march 1960. He

of their examination papers were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are also others who have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972. Issue: Whether or Not RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid. Held: RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation. In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the admission, suspension, disbarment or reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial. On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and legislative departments of the government. It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities may say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license. Republic Act Number 972 is held to be unconstitutional.

9. Wilfredo Catu vs Atty. Vicente Rellosa Facts: Respondent was the Punong Barangay of Barangay 723, Manila. Respondent, as punong barangay, presided over the conciliation proceedings between petitioner and Antonio Pastor as regards a contested property. The parties to the conciliation proceedings failed to arrive at an amicable settlement. Respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court. Regina Catu and Antonio Catu, the mother and brother of the complainant, filed a complaint for ejectment against Pastor before the Metropolitan Trial Court. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendant in that case. Issue: Whether or not respondent acted in contravention of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility? Held: Yes, respondent acted in contravention of the rules established by Canon 7, particularly rule 7.03, of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent violated the provision stated in Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules which prohibits public officer or employee from engaging directly in any private business, vocation or profession unless such public officer or employee is granted permission to engage in such activities by the head of the Department in which they belong. As punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his profession. However, respondent should have obtained the prior written permission of the Secretary of Interior and Local Government before he entered his appearance as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. A lawyer who disobeys

the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal profession. Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the bar. Every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. Respondent was suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months.

This Court required respondent to comment on the Complaint.[2] He failed to comply; thus, he was presumed to have waived his right to be heard.[3] In its Resolution, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.[4] Report of the Investigating Commissioner In her September 23, 2004 Report,[5] Investigating IBP Commissioner Teresita J. Herbosa found respondent guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility. Despite due notice, he neither submitted a position paper nor appeared at any of the hearings[6] called by the Commission. Thus, the case was decided on the basis of complainants evidence. According to the findings of Commissioner Herbosa, complainants engaged the services of respondent (sometime in May 1998)[7] to appeal to the CA the adverse Decision of the Department of Agrarian Relations Adjudication Board (DARAB).[8] Instead, he erroneously filed a Notice of Appeal[9] with the DARAB. Under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, appeals from the decisions of the DARAB should be filed with the CA through a verified petition for review.[10] Because of respondents error, the prescribed period for filing the petition lapsed, to the prejudice of his clients. Commissioner Herbosa gave no credence, however, to the allegation of complainants that respondent had

10. GARCIA VS. BALA The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on lawyers who meet the high standards of legal proficiency and morality. Any conduct that shows a violation of the norms and values of the legal profession exposes the lawyer to administrative liability.

The Case and the Facts On April 8, 1999, Spouses Eduardo and Teresita Garcia filed before this Court a Letter-Complaint[1] against Atty. Rolando S. Bala. According to complainants, he failed to render a legal service contracted -- the preparation of a petition for review that he was to file with the Court of Appeals (CA) in connection with DARAB Case No. 5532. Moreover, he supposedly refused to return the P9,200 legal fees they had paid him for the purpose. Finally, he allegedly hurled invectives at them when they asked him for a copy of the petition that he claimed to have filed.

deceived them by resorting to a wrong remedy. While opining that he might not have been in bad faith in filing a notice of appeal instead of a petition for review, the commissioner in her Report nonetheless held that his failure to use the proper legal remedy constituted lack of professional competency that warranted an appropriate sanction.[11] The Report also concluded that respondent should be sanctioned for his unjustified refusal and failure to return the money paid by his clients.[12] Their payment totaled P9,200, broken down as follows: P5,000 to write the appeal; P700 to mail it; and an additional P3,500 for writing the pleading on short notice. He, however, failed to return the money despite his promise -- and his obligation under the circumstances -- to do so.[13] Finally, Commissioner Herbosa held that respondent should be sanctioned further for uttering unsavory words against complainants during one instance when they had called on him to ask for a copy of the supposed appeal. Hence, she recommended that, aside from a fine of P5,000 and the return to complainants of the amount of P9,200, suspension from the practice of law for a period of six months should be imposed upon him. Recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors On March 12, 2005, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed Resolution No. XVI-2005-74,[14] which adopted with modification the Report and Recommendation of the investigating commissioner. It recommended that respondent should be reprimanded and suspended from the practice of law for six months; and that he should

return, within thirty days from his receipt of the Decision, the amount of P9,200, with legal interest from the filing of the present Complaint with this Court.[15] The Court's Ruling We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP. Administrative Liability of Respondent The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possessed and continue to possess the legal qualifications for it.[16] Indeed, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency and morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing.[17] They must perform their fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.[18] Negligence for Wrong Remedy The Code of Professional Responsibility[19] mandates lawyers to serve their clients with competence and diligence.[20] Rule 18.02 states that a lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation. Specifically, Rule 18.03 provides that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his

negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Once lawyers agree to take up the cause of a client, they owe fidelity to the cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them.[21] A client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense authorized by law, and is expected to rely on the lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense.[22] Evidently, respondent failed to champion the cause of his clients with wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion. Despite adequate time, he did not familiarize himself with the correct procedural remedy as regards their case. Worse, he repeatedly assured them that the supposed petition had already been filed.[23] Since he effectively waived his right to be heard, the Court can only assume that there was no valid reason for his failure to file a petition for review, and that he was therefore negligent. Conduct Unbecoming Having become aware of the wrong remedy he had erroneously taken, respondent purposely evaded complainants, refused to update them on the appeal, and misled them as to his whereabouts.[24] Moreover, on June 17, 1998, he uttered invectives at them when they visited him for an update on the case.[25]

Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that a lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for information. Accordingly, complainants had the right to be updated on the developments and status of the case for which they had engaged the services of respondent.[26] But he apparently denied them that right. Furthermore, for using unsavory words against complainants, he should also be sanctioned. Lawyers may be disciplined -- whether in their professional or in their private capacity -- for any conduct that is wanting in morality, honesty, probity and good demeanor.[27] Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates a lawyer to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession at all times. In addition, the Court notes the nonparticipation of respondent even in the present proceedings. He ignored the directive for him to file his comment,[28] just as he had disregarded the IBP hearing commissioners orders[29] for the conduct of hearings, submission of documentary evidence and position paper. Never did he acknowledge or offer any excuse for his noncompliance. Clearly, his conduct manifests his disrespect of judicial authorities. Despite the fact that his profession and honor are at stake, he did not even bother to speak a word in his defense. Apparently, he has no wish to preserve the dignity and honor expected of lawyers and the legal profession. His demeanor is clearly demeaning.

The Need to Reimburse the Money Paid Under the present factual circumstances, respondent should return the money paid by complainants. First, his legal services were virtually nullified by his recourse to the wrong remedy. Complainants would not have lost their right to appeal had he acted competently. Second, the legal fees were not commensurate to the services rendered. Complainants engaged his legal services to appeal the DARAB Decision, but all he did was to file a Notice of Appeal.[30] Additionally, he had already promised them a refund of the money paid, yet he failed to do so. The Court may ascertain how much attorneys fees are reasonable under the circumstances.[31] In the present case, the request of complainants for a full refund of the attorneys fees they had paid effectively challenged the contract; it was as though the parties had no express stipulation as to those fees. [32] Quantum meruit therefore applies. Quantum meruit -- meaning as much as he deserves -is used as basis for determining a lawyers professional fees in the absence of a contract.[33] Lawyers must be able to show that they are entitled to reasonable compensation for their efforts in pursuing their clients case, taking into account certain factors in fixing the amount of legal fees.[34] Based on the circumstances of the present case, the legal services actually rendered by

respondent were too insignificant for remuneration because of the uselessness of the remedy he took. This Court has imposed the penalty of suspension for six months for a lawyers negligence in failing to perfect an appeal.[35] Considering the similarity of the circumstances with those prevailing in this case, we find the imposition of the same penalty reasonable. WHEREFORE, Atty. Rolando S. Bala is found guilty of negligence and conduct unbecoming a lawyer; he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six months, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. Furthermore, he is ORDERED to pay Spouses Eduardo and Teresita Garcia the amount of P9,200 -- with legal interest from April 8, 1999 -- within 30 days from his receipt of this Decision. He is further WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offenses will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent as attorney. Further, let other copies be served on the IBP and on the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.

11. SERANA VS SANDIGANBAYAN 542 SCRA 224 Facts: Petitioner Hannah Serana was a student regent appointed by Pres. Estrada. In view of the renovation of the Vinzons Hall Annex in UP Diliman, petitioner with her siblings and relatives registered with the SEC the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI), of which the president gave 15000000 as financial assistance, however, said project never materialized. Hence, after due investigation, the Ombudsman indict petitioner and her brother for estafa. Petitioner moved to quash the information claiming that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the case or over her person, in her capacity as student regent. She invoke RA 3019 as amended by RA 8249 which enumerates the crimes or offenses which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction only; that the petitioner is not a public officer with Salary grade 27 and she paid her tuition fees; that the offense charged was not committed in relation to her office; and that the funds in question personally came from the president and not from the government. Issue: Whether or not the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction in not quashing the information and dismissing the case notwithstanding that it has no jurisdiction over the offense charged in the information. Held: The petition cannot be granted. Sec. 4 of RA 3019 does not determined the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but rather PD 1606. Under this provision, it reads **other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes

committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection A of this section in relation to their office.** Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies and this other felony includes estafa. The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should receive a sensible construction so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion. Interpretaio talis in ambiguis simper fienda est, ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum. Where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted. Every section, provision, or clause of the statute must be expounded by reference to each other in order to arrive at the effect contemplated by the legislature. The intention of the legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the law and every part of the act is to be taken into view. Also, statute must be ascertained from the whole under the principle of Optima Statuli Interpretatix est ipsum statutum. 13. SUAN VS. GONZALEZ The instant administrative complaint filed by Rufa C. Suan charges respondent Atty. Ricardo D. Gonzalez with violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, perjury and forum shopping, and prays for his suspension or disbarment. Complainant is a Director and Vice President of Rural Green Bank of Caraga, Inc., a rural banking corporation with principal place of business at Montilla Blvd., Butuan City, while respondent is one of its stockholders. The antecedent facts are as follows:

On February 11, 2004, respondent filed a case for Mandamus, Computation of Interests, Enforcement of Inspection, Dividend and Appraisal Rights, Damages and Attorneys Fees against the Rural Green Bank of Caraga, Inc. and the members of its Board of Directors before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Butuan City, Branch 33, praying, inter alia, that a temporary restraining order be issued enjoining the conduct of the annual stockholders meeting and the holding of the election of the Board of Directors. On February 14, 2004, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) conditioned upon respondents posting of a bond. Thereafter, respondent submitted JCL Bond No. 01626 issued by Stronghold Insurance Company, Incorporated (SICI) together with a Certification issued by then Court Administrator, now Associate Justice, Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. that, according to the Clerk of Court of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Butuan City, SICI has no pending obligation and/or liability to the government insofar as confiscated bonds in civil and criminal cases are concerned. Based on the foregoing, Suan filed this complaint alleging that respondent engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct when he submitted the certification to the RTC despite knowing that the same is applicable only for transactions before the MTCC; and that the bond was defective because it was released by SICI despite respondents failure to put up the required P100,000.00 collateral.

Suan also claimed that in the complaint filed by respondent, together with Eduardo, Purisima, Ruben, and Manuel, all surnamed Tan, before the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) against Ismael E. Andaya and the members of the Board of Directors of the Rural Green Bank of Caraga, Inc. for alleged gross violation of the principles of good corporate governance, they represented themselves as the banks minority stockholders with a total holdings amounting to more or less P5 million while the controlling stockholders own approximately 80% of the authorized capital stock. Suan averred that respondent committed perjury because the above allegations were allegedly inconsistent with respondents averments in the complaint pending before the RTC where he claimed that the majority stockholders own 70% ( and not 80%) of the outstanding capital stock of the Rural Green Bank of Caraga, Inc. while the minority stockholders stake amounted to P6 million (and not P5 million). Complainant finally claimed that respondent is guilty of forum shopping because the causes of action of the cases he filed before the RTC and the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas are the same. Respondent denied the allegations against him. He alleged that it was the bonding company which inadvertently attached the certification pertaining to the MTCC; that when he discovered the inadvertence, he immediately filed with the RTC an ex-parte motion to replace the certification with the one pertaining to the RTC; that he had satisfactorily complied with the requirements of SICI as shown in the letter of Ms. Evelyn R.

Ramirez, SICIs Officer-in-Charge, dated March 19, 2004; that there is no inconsistency in the allegations contained in the complaints pending before the RTC and the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas thus he could not be held liable for perjury; that there is no forum shopping because the causes of action and the reliefs prayed for in the cases pending before the trial court and the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas are different; and that it is complainant who is guilty of forum shopping since this is the second disbarment suit that she filed against him. In her Reply, complainant insisted that she is not guilty of forum shopping; that she only filed one disbarment suit against respondent while the other two suits were filed by Joseph Omar Andaya and Dr. Arturo Cruz based on different acts committed by the respondent. On December 1, 2004, the instant administrative complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. After the mandatory conference, the parties were directed to submit their respective position papers. In a Report and Recommendation dated September 20, 2005, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the administrative complaint be dismissed because complainant failed to prove by strong and substantial evidence the imputations of dishonesty against the respondent. In its Resolution dated December 17, 2005, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved the dismissal of the complaint.

Complainant is now before us on appeal praying for the reversal and setting aside of the assailed Resolution arguing that it failed to state clearly the facts and the reasons on which it is based and that the evidence she presented were ignored and not considered. Complainant maintains that contrary to the findings of the IBP, respondents act of submitting a wrong certification to the RTC, relative to SICIs capacity to issue bonds, was deliberate and with intent to mislead, thereby constituting a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. She claims that respondent who is interested in the issuance of a temporary restraining order is expected to examine all the documents as well as the attachments, hence there is no reason why he would inadvertently attach the certification intended for the MTCC. We are not persuaded. Complainants insistence that respondent deliberately attached the MTCC certification instead of the RTC certification lacks merit. We are inclined to believe the findings of the IBP that the MTCC certification was inadvertently attached and that it was not deliberate. Indeed, respondent as well as every litigant is expected to examine all the documents he files in court. However, not every mistake or oversight he commits should be deemed dishonest, deceitful or deliberate so as to mislead the court. Respondent has nothing to gain by submitting the wrong certification. On the contrary, he runs the risk that his complaint be dismissed or denied outright.

There is no reason for respondent, or even the bonding company, to attach the wrong certification as the latter was equally qualified to issue bonds in civil or criminal cases pending before the RTC. Further, what militates against complainants insistence that the filing of the wrong certification was deliberate and with intent to deceive was the fact that after respondent knew of the inadvertence he immediately filed a manifestation with motion that the same be replaced with the certification applicable to the RTC. It is well-settled that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant and the case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. Considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, this Court has consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty.[1] In the instant case, complainant Suan failed to show that respondent willfully and deliberately resorted to falsehood and unlawful and dishonest conduct. She failed to show not only the dubious character of the act done but the motivation as well.[2] Complainant next claims that the injunction bond was wrongfully released to respondent by SICI as the latter failed to put up the required collateral, as shown in the February 28, 2004 letter of Evelyn R. Ramirez which the IBP allegedly ignored. She also insists that protesting the propriety of the bond before the trial court is not a pre-requisite to the filing of the instant administrative complaint. Besides, she argues that it would have been

futile to file a protest before the trial court considering that she knew of the defects in the issuance of the injunction bond long after the bond has expired. The argument is without merit. The IBP correctly disregarded the February 28, 2004 letter of Ramirez considering that on March 19, 2004, Ramirez wrote another letter to the trial court informing the latter of respondents compliance with the required collateral. Anent the allegation of perjury, the same is likewise bereft of merit. In the case of Villanueva v. Secretary of Justice,[3] the Court held that a mere assertion of a false, objective fact, a falsehood, is not enough to warrant a finding of perjury, thus: There are two essential elements of proof for perjury: (1) the statement made by the defendants must be proven false; and (2) it must be proven that the defendant did not believe those statements to be true. xxxx A conviction for perjury cannot be sustained merely upon the contradictory sworn statements of the accused. The prosecution must prove which of the two statements is false and must show the statement to be false by other evidence than the contradicting statement.[4] (Emphasis supplied) Thus, it is necessary that there must be contradictory statements for perjury to exist. In the instant case, we find that respondent made no

contradicting statements. Indeed, he alleged in the complaint before the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas that the minority stockholders own more or less P5 million while the controlling stockholders own approximately 80% of the authorized capital stock. These figures are mere estimates and in no way contradict respondents allegations in the complaint pending before the RTC that the minoritys stake is P6 million while the majoritys stockholdings is 70% of the outstanding capital stock. Besides, for perjury to prosper it is necessary that complainant prove the falsity of the statements and that respondent did not believe any of the statements to be true. We find that complainant failed to meet the required standard of proof to sustain the charge of perjury. The IBP correctly noted that no malice was shown when respondent made the foregoing allegations and that respondents failure to allege the exact shareholdings was due to the banks refusal to allow respondent to inspect the books. We agree with the findings of the IBP that there is no forum shopping. The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment.[5] There is forum shopping when, between an action pending before this Court and another one, there exist: a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions, b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action, will, regardless of which

party is successful amount to res judicata in the action under consideration; and said requisites also constitutive of lis pendens.[6] The filing of the intra-corporate case before the RTC does not amount to forum-shopping. It is a formal demand of respondents legal rights in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by the law with respect to the controversy involved.[7] The relief sought in the case is primarily to compel the bank to disclose its stockholdings, to allow them the inspection of corporate books and records, and the payment of damages. It was also prayed that a TRO be issued to enjoin the holding of the annual stockholders meeting and the election of the members of the Board, which, only courts of justice can issue. On the other hand, the complaint filed with the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas was an invocation of the BSPs supervisory powers over banking operations which does not amount to a judicial proceeding. It brought to the attention of the BSP the alleged questionable actions of the banks Board of Directors in violation of the principles of good corporate governance. It prayed for the conduct of an investigation over the alleged unsafe and unsound business practices of the bank and to make necessary corrective measures to prevent the collapse of the bank. As such, the two proceedings are of different nature praying for different relief. Likewise, a ruling by the BSP concerning the soundness of the bank operations will not adversely or directly affect the resolution of the intracorporate controversies pending before the trial court.

Furthermore, to merit disciplinary action, forum shopping must be willful and deliberate.[8] Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court requires that, should there be any pending action or claim before any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency, a complete statement of its status should be given. The Certification of Non-Forum-shopping attached by respondent substantially complied with this requirement by providing therein that he has also filed a Complaint before the BSP. Likewise, such disclosure negates the allegation that he willfully and deliberately committed forum-shopping. It bears stressing that disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest, undertaken for public welfare and for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of the persons unfit to practice them.[9] However, the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution and only in a clear case of misconduct which seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of the bar.[10] ACCORDINGLY, we AFFIRM the Resolution dated December 17, 1005, of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines recommending the dismissal of the instant complaint for disbarment/suspension against respondent ATTY. RICARDO D. GONZALEZ for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

14. SABERON VS LARONG Facts: Complainant Saberon charged Atty. Larong respondent of grave misconduct for allegedly using abusive and offensive language in pleadings filed before the BSP. In An anwer filed by respondent Atty. Larong with affirmative defenses to the petition stating inter alia, that this is another in the series of blackmail suits filed by plaintiff(complainant) and his wife to coerce the bank and Mr. Bonpin for financial gain. Finding the aformentioned statements to be "totally malicious, viscous and bereft of any factual or legal basis" complainant filed the present complaint. By res., the court referred the case to IBP for investigation.IBP Investigating commissioner held that the word "blackmail" connotes something sinister and criminal. Unless the person accused thereof is criminally charged with extortion, he added, it would be imprudent, if not offensive, to characterize that persons act as blackmail. In view thereof, he recommended that respondent be found culpable of gross misconduct and suspended from the practice of law for 30days.IBP Board of Governor disapproved the recommendation and instead dismissed the case for lack of merit Issue: Complainant appealed challenges thev res. as illegal and void ab initio for violating the mandatory requirements of sec12(a) of rule 139-b of the revised rules of court that the same be reduced to writing, clearly and distinctly stating the facts and the reasons on which it is based.

Held: This court finds respondent guilty of simple misconduct for using intemperate language in his pleadings. The code of professional responsibility mandates: canon 8- a lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against oppossing counsel. canon 8.01-a lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper. canon11-a lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the court and to judicial officer and should insist on similar conduct. rule11.03-a lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive, or menacing language or behavior before the courts. 15. FOODSPHERE INC VS MAURICIO JR FACTS: Foodsphere, Inc. corporation engaged in meat processing manufacturer and distributor of CDO canned goods and grocery products. Atty. Melanio Batas Mauricio writer/columnist of tabloids including Balitang Patas, Bagong Tiktik, Toro and Hataw!, and a host of television program Kakampi Mo Ang Batas aired over UNTV and a radio program Double B Batas ng Bayan aired over DZBB. June 2004 Alberto Cordero complained about the quality of the CDO Liver Spread, found to be sour and soon discovered a colony of worms inside the can. Bureau of Food and Drug Administration Laboratory examination confirmed the presence of parasites in the Liver spread. Cordero demanded P150,000 as damages, but Foodsphere

refused to heed the demand, instead offered to return actual medical and incidental expenses supported by receipts. The offer was turned down and threatened to bring the matter to the attention of the media. Mauricio proposed to Foodsphere to settle the matter for P50,000, P15,000 of which would go to the Corderos and P35,000 to his Batas Foundation, and directed them to place paid advertisements in his tabloids and radio and television programs. Otherwise, he threatened them to proceed with the publication of articles maligning, discrediting and imputing vices and defects to Foodsphere and its products. Foodsphere filed a complaint for disbarment and criminal complaints against Mauricio for libel and threatening to publish libel under the Revised Penal Code. Mauricio continuously attacked Foodsphere in his columns and radio and television programs. Atty. Mauricio was suspended from the practice of law for three years and warned that are petition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Violations: Rule 1.01 of Code of Professional Responsibility refrain from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.(He engaged in deceitful conduct by taking advantage of the complaint against CDO to advance his interest to obtain funds for his Batas Foundation and seek sponsorships and advertisements for the tabloids and his television program).Rule 13.02 of CPR a lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.(Despite the pendency of civil case against him, he continued with his attacks against complainant and its products)Canon 1 of CPR to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.(Also violated the lawyers oath to

obey the laws as well as legal orders of the duly constituted authorities)Canon 8 of CPR a lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.(Rule 8.01 a lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper). 16. VC PONCE CO. INC. VS REYES

On October 22, 1971, respondents filed a complaint-inintervention in Civil Case No. 455-R. Respondents executed contracts to sell with petitioner over individual lots comprising the area covered by TCT No. 97084 prior to the institution of the case. Their complaint-inintervention was allowed.

In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner V.C. Ponce Company, Inc. assails the October 27, 2005 decision[1] and February 3, 2006 resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 97084 and the issuance of individual titles in favor of respondents by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 109.

On July 17, 1989, Corazon Rodriguez (as administratrix of the estate of de Leon) and petitioner entered into a compromise agreement. Petitioner paid Rodriguez P3,500,000 in exchange for the release of the lis pendens annotation on the individual titles of the properties involved in Civil Case No. 455-R, and the dismissal of the case without costs. The court approved the compromise agreement, thereby terminating the case between petitioner and Rodriguez.

This case traces its history to a complaint filed by Eusebia de Leon vda. de Rodriquez against petitioner in the then Court of First Instance of Pasay City on January 3, 1963 docketed as Civil Case No. 455-R. It sought the annulment of the sale of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 97084 she had previously sold to petitioner. The subject property was already subdivided into smaller lots for which individual TCTs were issued in petitioners name.

Respondents, however, refused to compromise and the complaint-in-intervention was tried on the merits. In a decision[3] dated December 6, 1989, the Pasay City RTC ruled in favor of respondents. The dispositive portion of the decision read: WHEREFORE, the Omnibus Motion to Dismiss is hereby denied and accordingly, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the intervenors herein and against defendant V.C. Ponce & Co., Inc. The Court hereby orders and declares:

1. The individual Contracts to Sell entered into between the intervenors and the defendant are hereby declared valid, subsisting and binding on both parties, particularly the defendant V.C. Ponce & Co., Inc. and the latter is hereby enjoined to abide by the terms and conditions thereof subject to the modifications as [hereinafter] provided and under the same price originally stated therein; 2. The individual intervenors are hereby ordered to pay defendant V.C. Ponce & Co., Inc. the balance of the purchase price within a period of twelve (12) months from finality of this decision to be paid in twelve (12) equal monthly amortizations; 3. The defendant V.C Ponce & Co., Inc. is hereby given one (1) year from finality of this decision within which to complete the construction of the enumerated items in paragraph 5 of the Contracts to Sell; 4. Defendant V.C. Ponce & Co., Inc. is ordered to deliver clean titles to the individual intervenors upon full payment of the purchase price; 5. SO ORDERED. xxx

The Pasay City RTCs December 6, 1989 decision was appealed by petitioner and it eventually reached the Supreme Court. In a resolution dated October 21, 1991, respondents claims were affirmed when we ruled in their favor.[4] Entry of judgment was made on December 9, 1991.

It was at this point that respondents commenced the tedious process of trying to execute the Pasay City RTCs December 6, 1989 decision.

On October 2, 1992, the Pasay City RTC issued a writ of execution. Respondents consigned to the court their payments to petitioner under their respective contracts to sell, pursuant to the December 6, 1989 decision. But in view of petitioners obstinate refusal to comply with the October 2, 1992 writ of execution, the RTC again directed petitioner to deliver clean titles to respondents after payment and consignation.[5] Petitioner was likewise ordered to strictly obey the terms and conditions of the December 6, 1989 decision with a stern warning that repeated non-compliance would be dealt with severely. The RTC also ordered its clerk of court to receive respondents cash payments.

On August 5, 1993, the clerk of court was ordered to receive from respondents counsel their cash payments to petitioner and deposit them in the Philippine National Bank. Petitioner was (again) ordered to comply with the December 6, 1989 decision within ten days from receipt of the order.

Petitioner (once more) sought a deferment of the enforcement of the March 8, 1993 and August 5, 1993 orders but the same was denied. In an order dated August 3, 1994, the Pasay City RTC cited petitioner in contempt for its refusal to abide by the March 8, 1993 order. The Registrar of Deeds of Paraaque was likewise directed to cancel petitioners TCTs over the properties which were already paid in full and to issue new titles in favor of respondents.

clerk of court and ex-officio sheriff to execute deeds of conveyance in favor of respondents. The Registrar of Deeds of Paraaque, however, refused to register respondents deeds of conveyance because petitioner adamantly refused to surrender its owners duplicate TCTs. So, on January 11, 2002, the Pasay City RTC ordered the Registrar of Deeds of Paraaque to cancel petitioners duplicate TCTs. Petitioner sought a reconsideration but the same was denied in an order dated September 13, 2002.

Because of petitioners continued inaction, an alias writ of execution dated August 7, 1995 was issued by the Pasay City RTC to enforce the December 6, 1989 decision.

Respondents filed a manifestation and motion seeking a court order annulling the titles of petitioner over the properties involved in the case. In response, the Pasay City RTC issued the assailed order dated January 23, 2003 nullifying and canceling this time TCT No. 97084 (the mother title) and mandating the issuance of individual titles to respondents. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.

Respondents then filed an ex-parte motion for entry of judgment, praying that the Registrar of Deeds of Paraaque be directed to divest petitioner of its titles and to issue new ones to them. The court ordered its

Petitioner questioned the January 23, 2003 order (and that denying the motion for reconsideration) in the CA via a petition for certiorari. In denying relief to petitioner, the CA held that the cancellation of TCT No. 97084 (the mother title) was necessary to the execution of the trial courts decision, considering the refusal of the

Registrar of Deeds to register the deeds of sale and issue clean individual titles to respondents.

executed.[8] In the event of variance, the dispositive portion of the final and executory decision prevails.

Hence, this petition.

The dispositive portion of the December 6, 1989 decision read in part:

Petitioner claims that the January 23, 2003 order for the nullification and cancellation of TCT No. 97084 completely changed the tenor of the December 6, 1989 decision.

WHEREFORE, the Omnibus Motion to Dismiss is hereby denied and accordingly, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the intervenors herein and against defendant V.C. Ponce & Co.[,] Inc. The Court hereby orders and declares:

We deny the petition. 1. In general, the essential parts of a decision or order consist of the following: (1) a statement of the case; (2) a statement of the facts; (3) the issues or assignment of errors; (4) the court ruling; and (5) the dispositive portion.[6] In a civil case such as this, the dispositive portion should state whether the complaint or petition is granted or denied, the specific relief granted and the costs.[7] xxx

2. The individual intervenors are hereby ordered to pay defendant V.C. Ponce & Co.[,] Ince. the balance of the purchase price within a period of twelve (12) equal monthly amortizations; 3. xxx

4. Defendant V.C. Ponce & Co.[,] Inc. is ordered to deliver clean titles to the individual intervenors upon full payment of the purchase price; xxx

The order of execution must substantially conform to the dispositive portion of the decision sought to be

while the order dated January 23, 2003 stated in part:

[C]onsidering the affirmance of the decision of this Court dated December 6, 1989 by both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, for full satisfaction of the decision, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 97084, Register of Deeds, Rizal, the original of which is presently on file with the Register of Deeds of Paraaque City, is hereby NULLIFIED and CANCELLED and considered of no value and effect conformably with Section 107 of PD 1529 xxx

The variance claimed by petitioner allegedly lies in the directive to the Register of Deeds of Paraaque City to nullify and cancel TCT No. 97084. Petitioner insists that there was no such order in the dispositive portion of the December 6, 1989 decision. Petitioner is wrong.

In view of the foregoing, the Register of Deeds of Paraaque City is hereby directed to issue individual titles to the Intervenors to complete the satisfaction of judgment/decision of this Court already partially executed.

It is a cardinal rule that the dispositive portion of an order or judgment prevails over the discussion or the body of the said decision or order. In this case, the dispositive portion of the January 23, 2003 order merely reiterated the directive for the issuance of individual titles to respondents by the Registrar of Deeds.

The Intervenors are directed to coordinate with the Register of Deeds of Paraaque City to further hasten the issuance of their individual titles.

SO ORDERED.

Nevertheless, even if we analyze and compare the body of the January 23, 2003 order and that of the December 6, 1989 decision, no substantial variance exists between them. On its face, the January 23, 2003 order is in harmony with the dispositive portion of the December 6, 1989 decision. The Registrar of Deeds of Paraaque City is being directed to issue individual titles to respondents to complete the satisfaction of judgment/decision of th[e] [c]ourt partially executed. Reference to the partially executed decision simply stresses that the execution must conform to the December 6, 1989 decision.

Petitioner admits that TCT No. 97084 is the mother title of the individual titles of respondents.[9] However, it claims for the first time that TCT No. 97084 was the subject of another case and that it was already cancelled by virtue of another court order or judgment.[10] Furthermore, TCT No. 97084 allegedly subsists only with respect to areas which are not involved in this case. Petitioners claims are not only immaterial and undeserving of favorable consideration; they were also never established with evidence of such alleged court order or judgment. Thus, there is no way by which these allegations can be verified. Given petitioners propensity to manipulate legal procedures to defeat the just claims against it, such lapse is fatal to its cause.

in case of a refusal by the owner to surrender the duplicate copy of his TCT.

A considerable length of time has passed. It is time to end this litigation and write finis to this case. Enough is enough.

We remind petitioners counsel, Atty. Candice Marie T. Bandong, that she is an officer of the court who must see to it that the orderly administration of justice must never be unduly impeded, not even by her client. Her oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to her duty to her client; its primacy is indisputable.[14] In this light, we are sternly warning her (or any other counsel who might take over this case) of disciplinary action for any further delay in the execution of the decision of the Pasay City RTC.

The Pasay City RTC was well within its powers when it issued the January 23, 2003 order. It is the ministerial duty of the court to order the execution of its final judgment. It has the inherent power to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial offices, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a case before it, in every manner appertaining thereto.[11]

Section 10, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court[12] and Section 107 of PD 1529[13] provide the procedure to be followed

That TCT No. 97084 has been subdivided into smaller lots and that derivative titles have been issued therefor are of no moment. The fact remains that, for more than 15 years, petitioner has been consistently refusing to surrender its owners duplicate originals of the deriv ative TCTs, contrary to lawful orders and in evident bad faith. We are therefore ordering the cancellation and nullification of TCT No. 97084 and its derivative titles. Let new certificates of title be issued (a) in the name of the

individual respondents for the lots covered by their respective fully-paid contracts to sell and (b) in the name of petitioner for those portions not covered by the claims of respondents.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The October 27, 2005 decision and February 3, 2006 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77783 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The Registrar of Deeds of Paraaque City is ordered to cancel TCT No. 97084 and the derivative titles of the lots covered by respondents respective contracts to sell (with petitioner) and issue clean individual titles to them. Treble costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

17. BONDOC VS AQUINO-SIMBULAN FACTS: Former representative of Pampanga Juan Pablo P. Bondoc (Bondoc) charged Judge Divina Luz P. Aquino-Simbulan (Simbulan) with partiality, gross ignorance of the law, and gross misconduct in the handling of the criminal cases for violation of R.A. 3019 and falsification of public documents against Spouses Salvador and Flordeliz Totaan (accused).Bondoc alleged

that Judge Simbulan, after having issued an order suspending the accused pendent lite, asked the lawyers of the parties to approach the bench and suggested that the cases be settled because she did not want the accused to be administratively suspended. That at the continuation of the pre-trial, Judge Simbulan asked the accused to choose a date and promised to accommodate the accused in order to effect a speedy trial in view of their suspension. Bondoc also alleged that on the same day, Judge Simbulan directed Atty. Lanee Cui-David (Lanee) to be prepared for the hearing of the cases since accused had been suspended upon motion of Private Prosecutor Stephen David (Stephen), Atty. Lanees husband and co-counsel for Bondoc in the criminal cases. It was also averred that Judge Simbulan never carried out the suspension order against the accused and that despite Atty. Lanees explanation that Atty. Militante (Ombudsman Investigator) refused to testify on the ground that the substance of her testimony is covered by official documents, Judge Simbulan issued an order requiring Atty. Militante to explain why she should not be cited in contempt for failure to follow lawful orders of the court. In the supplemental complaint, Bondoc charged Judge Simbulan with conduct unbecoming of a judge for her denial of private prosecutors motion foe her inhibition. Judge Simbulan, in her Comment, stated that she did not fast track the resolution of the case but it was her habit to act fast on all cases before her. She also denied the charge of partiality for her failure to act on the suspension claiming that it was private prosecutors duty to file a motion to cite responsible heads of government agencies for indirect contempt for their failure to implement the lawful orders of the court. Judge Simbulan also explained that

her persistence in requiring Atty. Militantes appearance was due to them is understanding between Atty. Militante and the private prosecutors, therefore, she wants to find out the truth. In Bondocs Opposition to the Comment, it was stated that Judge Simbulan refused to answer the serious charges of partiality, abuse of authority and conduct unbecoming of a judge. In Judges Simbulans rejoinder, she requested that Bondoc be made to show cause why he should not be cited in contempt of court, and Attys. Stephen and Lanee to show cause why they should not be administratively sanctioned as members of the bar and officers of the court. The complaint against Judge Simbulan was dismissed, hence, OCA recommended that Attys .Stephen and Lanee be cited for indirect contempt since the complaint against Judge Simbulan could not have been filed without the active prodding and instigation of the lawyers and that private prosecutors were the primary sources of the allegations contained therein which Bondoc did not personally witness. HELD: Lawyers have the duty not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Attys. Stephen and Lanee David crossed the line of accepted and protected conduct as members of the bar and as officers of the court in the filing of the administrative complaint against the respondent. As the OCA noted, while the complaint was filed in the name of former Representative Juan Pablo P. Bondoc, he never really appeared in court and could not have woven the tale of unfair treatment in the complaint which spoke of intricate courtroom proceedings. The complainant thus relied primarily on the information relayed to him by his lawyers for the particulars of the complaint. More to the point, the two

lawyers can reasonably be considered to have authored the allegations in their clients complaint. Nothing is inherently wrong with the complainants dependence on Attys. Stephen and Lanee David for the substance of the complaint. Nonetheless, as officers of the court, counsels are expected to be as truthful and as objective as possible in providing information to their client regarding developments in the courtroom. Needless to say, they owe candor, fairness and good faith to the court. In these regards, Attys. Stephen and Lanee David proved to be wanting. From the pre-trial records quoted below, we find sufficient justification for the conclusion that the information Attys. Stephen and Lanee David supplied their client was patently misleading and slanted to cover up their gross shortcomings as lawyers, as the respondent aptly put it. On four occasions, private prosecutors never appeared before the court prepared. No proof was presented to corroborate the charge that the respondent sought to have the criminal cases settled; neither was there a showing that the respondent fast tracked the cases to favor the accused. The defense of Attys. Stephen and Lanee David that what they did is just a consequence of their commitment to their client can hardly exculpate them. A clients cause does not permit an attorney to cross the line between liberty and license. Lawyers must always keep in perspective that since they are administrators of justice, oath-bound servants of society, their first duty is not to their clients, as many suppose, but to the administration of justice. As a lawyer, he is an officer of the court with the duty to uphold its dignity and authority and not promote distrust in the administration of justice.

18. PACANA VS PASCUAL-REYES Facts: Pacana, herein complainant, was the Operations Director for Multitel Communications Corporation. Distraught of the corporations obligation to its creditors, complainant sought the advice of respondent. From then on, the former disclosed all his involvement and interests in Multitel. Respondent, in turn gave legal advice to complainant. Both of them, however, did not forge a formal Retainer Agreement. Later on, complainant knew that respondent was representing the creditors of Multitel. Assuring the complainant that it was part of respondents strategy of settling all the legal problems of the former, both parties continued to work together. Respondent also asked money from complainant allegedly for safekeeping to be used only for his case whenever necessary. Complainant agreed and gave her substantial amount of money. Soon after, complainant dismayed with respondents arrogance and evasiveness filed a disbarment case against respondent before the IBP. Issues: Whether or not a lawyer-client relationship binds the herein complainant and respondent 2. Whether or not respondent should be disciplined for representing conflicting interest Held: A lawyer-client relationship was present. The absence of a written contract will not preclude the finding that there was a professional relationship between the parties. Documentary formalism is not an essential element in the employment of an attorney; the contract may be express or implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of

an attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his profession.2. Yes, respondent should be disbarred. There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. Indubitably, respondent took advantage of complainants hapless situation, initially, by giving him legal advice and, later on, by soliciting money and properties from him. Simultaneously, she was also doing the same thing to impress upon her clients, the party claimants against Multitel that she was doing everything to reclaim the money they invested with Multitel.

19. PALM VS ILEDAN JR The case before the Court is a disbarment proceeding filed by Rebecca J. Palm (complainant) against Atty. Felipe Iledan, Jr. (respondent) for revealing information obtained in the course of an attorney-client relationship and for representing an interest which conflicted with that of his former client, Comtech Worldwide Solutions Philippines, Inc. (Comtech). Violation of the Confidentiality of Lawyer-Client Relationship Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: Canon 21. A lawyer shall preserve the confidence and secrets of his client even after the attorney-client relationship is terminated. (Emphasis supplied) We agree with the IBP that in the course of complainants consultations, respondent obtained the information about the need to amend the corporate bylaws to allow board members outside the Philippines to

participate in board meetings through teleconferencing. Respondent himself admitted this in his Answer. However, what transpired on 10 January 2004 was not a board meeting but a stockholders meeting. Respondent attended the meeting as proxy for Harrison. The physical presence of a stockholder is not necessary in a stockholders meeting because a member may vote by proxy unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation or by-laws. Hence, there was no need for Steven and Deanna Palm to participate through teleconferencing as they could just have sent their proxies to the meeting. In addition, although the information about the necessity to amend the corporate by-laws may have been given to respondent, it could not be considered a confidential information. The amendment, repeal or adoption of new by-laws may be effected by the board of directors or trustees, by a majority vote thereof, and the owners of at least a majority of the outstanding capital stock, or at least a majority of members of a nonstock corporation. It means the stockholders are aware of the proposed amendments to the by-laws. While the power may be delegated to the board of directors or trustees, there is nothing in the records to show that a delegation was made in the present case. Further, whenever any amendment or adoption of new by-laws is made, copies of the amendments or the new by-laws are filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and attached to the original articles of incorporation and by-laws. The documents are public records and could not be considered confidential. It is settled that the mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality. The client

must intend the communication to be confidential. Since the proposed amendments must be approved by at least a majority of the stockholders, and copies of the amended by-laws must be filed with the SEC, the information could not have been intended to be confidential. Thus, the disclosure made by respondent during the stockholders meeting could not be considered a violation of his clients secrets and confidence within the contemplation of Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Representing Interest in Conflict With the Interest of a Former Client The IBP found respondent guilty of representing an interest in conflict with that of a former client, in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. We do not agree with the IBP. In Quiambao v. Bamba, the Court enumerated various tests to determine conflict of interests. One test of inconsistency of interests is whether the lawyer will be asked to use against his former client any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous employment. The Court has ruled that what a lawyer owes his former client is to maintain inviolate the clients confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously represented him.

We find no conflict of interest when respondent represented Soledad in a case filed by Comtech. The case where respondent represents Soledad is an Estafa case filed by Comtech against its former officer. There was nothing in the records that would show that respondent used against Comtech any confidential information acquired while he was still Comtechs retained counsel. Further, respondent made the representation after the termination of his retainer agreement with Comtech. A lawyers immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyers employment with the client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the clients interests only on matters that he previously handled for the former client and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated.

Petitioner avers that he is the president of Push-Thru Marketing, Inc., which leases commercial stalls CS-PL 05, 19 and 30 in Tutuban Center, owned by Tutuban Properties, Inc., (TPI). On June 30, 1999, Angelina Hipolito, merchandising officer of Push-Thru Marketing, received a notice of disconnection of utilities from private respondent Grace Guarin, the Credit and Collection Manager of TPI, for failure of Push-Thru Marketing to settle its outstanding obligations for Common Usage and Service Area (CUSA) charges, utilities, electricity and rentals. Petitioner settled the charges for CUSA, utilities and electricity, which payment was accepted by private respondent Guarin, but petitioner failed to pay the back rentals. Thus, on July 1, 1999, private respondents Guarin, Nestor Sangalang, engineering manager of TPI, and Victor Callueng, TPI head of security, together with several armed guards, disconnected the electricity in the stalls occupied by Push-Thru Marketing. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a criminal complaint for Grave Coercion against TPI and its officers, David Go, Robert Castanares, Buddy Mariano, Art Brondial, and herein private respondents before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila.4 The complaint dated July 13, 1999 alleged that TPI and its officers cut off the electricity in petitioners stalls "in a violent and intimidating manner"5 and by unnecessarily

20. ROBERTO BARBASA, vs. HON. ARTEMIO G. TUQUERO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Justice, GRACE GUARIN, NESTOR SANGALANG, VICTOR CALLUENG, Petitioner assails the Decision1 dated July 29, 2003 and the Resolution2 dated May 21, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62610, which dismissed his petition for certiorari and denied his motion for reconsideration, respectively. The appellate court had found no reason to reverse the Resolution3 of the Secretary of Justice ordering the City Prosecutor of Manila to move for the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 336630 against private respondents.

employing "several armed guards to intimidate and frighten"6 petitioner and his employees and agents. The respondents in the criminal complaint filed separate counter-affidavits7 which presented a common defense: that the July 1, 1999 cutting off of electrical supply was done peacefully; that it was an act performed in the lawful performance of their assigned duties, and in accordance with the covenants set forth in the written agreements previously executed between petitioner and TPI; that petitioner was not present when the alleged acts were committed; and that petitioner had outstanding accumulated unpaid rentals, CUSA billings, electrical and water bills, unpaid interest and penalty charges (from June 1998 to May 1999) in the amount of P267,513.39 for all his rented stalls, as reflected in three Interest-Penalty Reports8 duly sent to him. Petitioner was likewise given demand letter-notices in writing at least three times wherein it was stated that if he did not settle his arrears in full, electricity would be cut.9 Of the total amount due from him, petitioner paid only P127,272.18 after receipt of the third notice. Accordingly, private respondents proceeded with the power cut-off, but only after sending a "Notice of Disconnection of Utilities"10 to petitioners stalls informing him of the impending act. Private respondents also pointed out that aside from the above arrears, petitioner has outstanding

accountabilities with respect to "Priority Premium Fees" in the amount of P5,907,013.10.11 B. COMMON USAGE AND SERVICE AREA (CUSA) CHARGES Minimum rate of P190.00/sq. m./mo. to cover expenses stipulated in Section 6 hereof, subject to periodic review and adjustment to reflect actual expenses. C. INDIVIDUAL UTILITIES ELECTRIC CONSUMPTION : metered + reasonable service (meter to be provided by the LESSOR, for the account of the LESSEE) OTHER SERVICES : metered and/or reasonable service charge 7. PAYMENTS In cases where payments made by the LESSEE for any given month is not sufficient to cover all outstanding obligations for said period, the order of priority in the application of the payments made is as follows: a. Penalties

b. Interests c. Insurance d. CUSA Charges e3333333. Rent f. Priority Premium PENALTY CLAUSE It is also expressly agreed that in case the LESSEE fails to pay at any time the installments on the priority premium, lease rentals or CUSA and utility charges corresponding to a total of three (3) months, even if not consecutively incurred, the LESSOR is hereby granted the option to cut off power and other utility services to the LESSEE until full payment of said charges, expenses, penalty and interest is made, without prejudice to any other remedies provided under this Contract, including the termination of this Contract. x x x x (Emphasis supplied.) Petitioner filed his Reply Affidavit,13 claiming that Go, Castanares, Mariano, Brondial, Guarin and Sangalang, while not personally present at the scene at the time, were to be held liable as the authors of the criminal design since they were the

ones who ordered the cutting off of petitioners electricity. Petitioner admitted that none of the armed personnel drew his gun, much more aimed or fired it, but insisted that he was unduly prevented from using electricity to the detriment of his business and his person. He claimed that the officers of TPI were unable to show the amount and extent of his unpaid bills; that as to the electric bills, the same were paid; and that there was an ongoing negotiation with respect to the matter of rentals and for reformation of the lease agreements.14 The Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila, through Prosecutor Venus D. Marzan, dismissed the complaint against David Go, Roberto Castanares, Buddy Mariano and Art Brondial but found probable cause against private respondents Grace Guarin, Nestor Sangalang and Victor Callueng. On January 13, 2000, an Information15 for grave coercion was filed in court, but proceedings therein were deferred when the private respondents filed an appeal to the Secretary of Justice. On August 23, 2000, the Secretary of Justice reversed the City Prosecutors Resolution, as follows: WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The City Prosecutor is directed to move, with leave of court, for the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 336630 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila and to report the

action taken within ten (10) days from receipt hereof. SO ORDERED. His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner assailed the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice before the Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari, which was, however, dismissed by the appellate court for lack of merit. The appellate court likewise denied his motion for reconsideration. Hence this petition. Petitioner raises the sole issue of whether private respondents act of disconnecting the supply of electricity to petitioners stalls and the manner by which it was carried out constitute grave coercion. After carefully considering petitioners appeal, we are in agreement to deny it for utter lack of merit. The crime of grave coercion has three elements: (a) that a person is prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his or her will, be it right or wrong; (b) that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, either by material force or such a display of it as would produce intimidation and, consequently, control over the will of the offended party; and (c) that the person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no right to

do so; in other words, that the restraint is not made under authority of law or in the exercise of any lawful right.17 Petitioners appeal gives us no sufficient reason to deviate from what has already been found by the Secretary of Justice and the Court of Appeals. The records show that there was no violence, force or the display of it as would produce intimidation upon petitioners employees when the cutting off of petitioners electricity was effected. On the contrary, it was done peacefully and after written notice to petitioner was sent. We do not subscribe to petitioners claim that the presence of armed guards were calculated to intimidate him or his employees. Rather, we are more inclined to believe that the guards were there to prevent any untoward or violent event from occurring in the exercise of TPIs rights under the lease agreements. If the respondents desired a violent result, they would have gone there unannounced or cut petitioners electricity through less desirable and conspicuous means. It is likewise clear from the penalty clause in the Contracts of Lease entered into by the parties that TPI is given the option to cut off power and other utility services in petitioners stalls in case petitioner fails to pay at any time the installments on the priority premium, lease rentals or CUSA and utility

charges corresponding to a total of three months until full payment of said charges, expenses, penalty and interest is made.18 The stipulation under said clause is clear; there is no ambiguity in what is stated. There could be no grave coercion in the private respondents act of exercising in behalf of TPI a right afforded to TPI under the solemn and unequivocal covenants of a contract to which petitioner had agreed and which he did execute and sign. As held by this Court in a previous case which we find instructive: Contracts constitute the law between the parties. They must be read together and interpreted in a manner that reconciles and gives life to all of them. The intent of the parties, as shown by the clear language used, prevails over post facto explanations that find no support from the words employed by the parties or from their contemporary and subsequent acts showing their understanding of such contracts.19 We could not see how the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila, through Prosecutor Venus D. Marzan, could have made a finding of probable cause to file a criminal case for grave coercion against private respondents, in light of the evidence then and now prevailing, which will show that there was a mutual agreement, in a contract of lease,

that provided for the cutting off of electricity as an acceptable penalty for failure to abide faithfully with what has been covenanted. Although the propriety of its exercise may be the subject of controversy, mere resort to it may not so readily expose the lessor TPI to a charge of grave coercion. Considering that petitioner owed TPI the total amount of more than P5 million, which was undisputed, we find that the resort to the penalty clause under the lease agreements was justified. As held in Pryce Corporation v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation: A penal clause is "an accessory obligation which the parties attach to a principal obligation for the purpose of insuring the performance thereof by imposing on the debtor a special prestation (generally consisting in the payment of a sum of money) in case the obligation is not fulfilled or is irregularly or inadequately fulfilled." Quite common in lease contracts, this clause functions to strengthen the coercive force of the obligation and to provide, in effect, for what could be the liquidated damages resulting from a breach. There is nothing immoral or illegal in such indemnity/penalty clause, absent any showing that it was forced upon or fraudulently foisted on the obligor.20 (Emphasis supplied.)

In this connection, counsels must be reminded that equally important, as their duty to clients, is their duty as officers of the court to see to it that the orderly administration of justice is not unduly impeded or delayed. Counsel needs to advise a client, ordinarily a layman unaccustomed to the intricacies and vagaries of the law, concerning the objective merit of his case. If counsel finds that his clients cause lacks merit, then it is his bounden duty to advise accordingly. Indeed a lawyers oath to uphold the cause of justice may supersede his duty to his clients cause; for such fealty to ethical concerns is indispensable to the success of the rule of law.21 WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 29, 2003 and the Resolution dated May 21, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 62610 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.