IMPROVISING A HOMELAND DEFENSE

BACKGROUND MATERIALS: THE FAA

21. FAA Press Release, "Chronology of Events on September 11, 2001", dated August 2002

22. FAA Internal Briefing Document

23. Timelines for the four hijacked flights, from "FAA Hijack Summary of Events", dated September
17,2001

24. FAA Order 7610.4: Escort of Hijacked Aircraft

JAN. 19. 2004 1:58PM 9-11 COMMISSION NO. 1 6 6 1 P. 4

Fact Sheet: Chronology of Events on September 11, 2001 (August 2002)

FAA News
Federal Aviation Administration
Washington, DC 20591

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Date: August 12, 2002
Contact: William Shumann
Phone: 202-267-3883

0800. American Airlines Flight 11. a Boeing 767 with 92 people on board, takes off from Boston Logan airport for Los
Angeles.

0614. United Air Lines Flight 175, a Boeing 767 with 65 people on board, takes off from Boston Logan airport for LOB
Angeles.

0821. American Airlines Right 77, a Boeing 757 with 64 people on board, takes off from Washington Dulles airport for Los
Angeles.

0840. FAA notifies the North American Aerospace Defense Command's (NORAD) Northeast Air Defense Sector about the
suspected hijacking of American Flight 11.

0841. United Air Lines Flight 93, a Boeing 757 with 44 people on board, takes off from Newark airport for San Francisco.

0643. FAA notifies NORAD's Northeast Air Defense Sector about the suspected hijacking of United Flight 175.

OB46. (approx.). American Flight 11 crashes into the north tower of the World Trade Center.

0902. (approx.). United Flight 175 crashes Into the south tower of the World Trade Center.

0904. (approx.). The FAA's Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center stops all departures from airports In Its Jurisdiction
(New England and eastern New York State).

0906. The FAA bans takeoffs of all flights bound to or through the airspace of New York Center from airports In that Center
and the three adjacent Centers - Boston, Cleveland and Washington. This Is referred to as a First Tier groundstop and
covers the Northeast from North Carolina north and as far west as eastern Michigan.

0908. The FAA bans all takeoffs nationwide for flights going to or through New York Center airspace.

0924. The FAA notifies NORAD's Northeast Air Defense Sector about the suspected hijacking of American Flight 77. The
FAA and NORAD establish an open line to discuss American 77 and United 93.
,-—• " '
0923. The FAA bans takeoffs of all civilian aircraft regardless of destination - a national groundstop,

0940. (approx.). American Flight 77 crashes into the Pentagon.

0945. In the first unplanned shutdown of U. S. airspace, the FAA orders all aircraft to land at the nearest airport as soon as
practical. At this time, there were more than 4,500 aircraft in the air on Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) flight plans.
JAN.19.2004 1:58PM 9-11 COMMISSION NO. 1661 P, 5

1007. (approx.) United Flight 93 crashes In Stony Creek Township, PA.

1039. Reaffirming the earlier order, the FAA issues a Notice to Airmen (MOTAM) that halts takeoffs and landings at all
airports.

1215. (approx). The airspace over the 48 contiguous states is clear of all commercial and private flights.

Notes:
All times are Eastern Daylight For UTC/Zulu/GMT, add four hours.
Flight departures are actual takeoff times, not scheduled or gate departure times.

Que
Explanation of FAA internal briefing document

1) The following document was received in response to subpoena.

2) Based on our investigation, we believe this document was created in the weeks
immediately following 9/11 in an effort to reconstruct the events of the day. The
information in the briefing, particularly the notification timeline related to UAL 93,
suggests that the FAA knew immediately after September 11, 2001, and far in advance of
the Commission's May 2003 hearing, that they failed to notify the military of the
hijacking of UAL 93, as explained in Staff Statement 17.
 MAY. 2b. 2004 4:19PM 9-11 COMMISSION
N0. 2788 P
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inn
A ALII UAL175 AAL77 UAL93

First Sign 08:20* 08:462 08:563 09:284

Probable time
flight was known to 08:255 08:52* 08:567 09:328
be in distress

NORAD**
NEADS*** 08:38* 09:05* 09:24* 10:08*
Notification

Estimated
Crash time 08:46 09:03 09:38 10:04

All times are Eastern

Daylight Time

1. AAL11 secondary radar return (transponder) lost.

2. UAL175 assigned transponder code of 1470 changes; communications lost.

3. AAL77 secondary radar reiurn (transponder) and radar contact was simultaneously lost.

4. Two radio transmissions of unintelligible sounds: possible screaming, sounds of a struggle and
"gel out of here" is heard over the Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center radio. The mode C
for UAL93 has descended 700 feel from assigned altitude

5. A radio transmission is heard telling passengers "nobody move everything will be ok if you try to
make any moves you'll endanger yourself and the airplane just stay quiet."

6. TJAL175 has failed to respond to several calls and is observed turning off course.

7. Aircraft is presumed crashed over Pennsylvania.

8. UAL93 is unresponsive to multiple calls from the controller. Additionally, there are three
transmissions indicating a possible struggle aboard an aircraft.

These times are derived from the review of the NEADS Jog.
**North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)
***Northcast Air Defense Sector (NEADS)
 y-\I 00

(*.

UAL 93

0931:00 Probable time flight was known to be in distress. (UAL 93 is unresponsive to

calls from the controller. Additionally, there are three mostly unintelligible
transmissions from an unknown origin indicating a possible struggle aboard
an aircraft).

0916:00 North East Air Defense Sector logs show FAA notifying the military.
(Note: We believe this time to be inaccurate since it precedes the indications
that UAL 93 was in distress).

0939:59 Cleveland Center notifies Great Lakes Regional Operations Center.

0944:31 Cleveland Center notifies Pittsburgh TRACON of unauthorized turn by

UAL 93 towards Pittsburgh, loss of transponder, and lack of radio
communications.

1004:00 (This time is approximate). UAL 93 crashes in the vicinity of Somerset,

Pennsylvania.
Explanation of the FAA Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events

We received a document from the FAA entitled "FAA Summary of Hijack Events" dated
9/17/01. We were told by the FAA that this document was used to brief the White
House. That document cites to the NEADS operations log for FAA notifications to the
military concerning the hijackings of American 11 and United 175. Specifically, it cites
to the log for the 8:40 notification time on AA 11 and 9:05 for the notification time on
United 175. That document conspicuously omits any hijack notification times for
American 77 and United 93. The document also conveniently omits the fact that FAA
Headquarters was aware no later than 9:34 that United 93 was reported to have a bomb
on board. The document also omits the fact that Washington Center gave NEADS the
first piece of information on AAL 77 that day when they advised NEADS that AAL 77
was lost and could not be located. Finally, that document cites to tape recordings of
controller interaction with UAL 93 that makes clear the plane could not have been
hijacked prior to 9:28.
American Airlines Flight 11 (AAL11)
Boston - Los Angeles
All times indicated are Eastern Daylight Savings Time

0756:27 Boston Airport Traffic Control Tower (BOS) issued taxi instructions to AAL11.

0800:00 AAL11 began takeoff roll, runway 4 Right, Boston Logan International Airport.
All communications with BOS and with Boston Departure Control were routine
and normal.

0809:17 AAL11 established radio contact with Boston Air Route Traffic Control
Center (ZBW). "Boston Center, good morning, American Eleven with you
passing through one-nine-zero (nineteen thousand feet) for two-three-zero
(twenty-three thousand feet)."

0809:22 ZBW acknowledged AAL11. From this time until 0813:31 all communications
appear routine and normal. The sector was responsible for six aircraft including
AAL11. The flight was instructed to climb to twenty-eight thousand feet,
subsequently to twenty-nine thousand feet, and issued a twenty degree turn for
traffic.

0813:47 ZBW instructed AAL11 " American Eleven, now, climb and maintain flight
level three-five-zero (thirty-five thousand feet)." There was no
acknowledgement to this transmission. ZBW made two subsequent
transmissions to AAL11, neither of which were acknowledged. Between 0813:47
and 0824:53, ZBW made several radio transmissions attempting to contact
AAL11. None of the attempts were acknowledged.

0814:45 ZBW during intra-facility coordination recognized that AAL11 appeared to be

turning right but had not acknowledged the climb clearance to thirty-five
thousand feet and did not acknowledge any further radio transmissions.

0817:59 A brief unknown sound (possibly a scream) from an unknown origin was heard
over the ZBW radio.

0820:48 Secondary radar return (transponder) indicating aircraft speed, altitude, and
flight information was lost on ZBW radar displays. The aircraft was then
observed as a primary radar target only.

0824:38 A radio transmission partially unintelligible stated, "we have some planes just
stay quiet and you'll be ok we are returning to the airport" from an unknown
origin was heard over the ZBW radio.
0824:57 A second radio transmission partially unintelligible stated "nobody move
everything will be ok if you try to make any moves you'll endanger yourself and
the airplane just stay quiet" - from an unknown origin was heard over the ZBW
radio.

0825:00 ZBW began notification based on radio transmissions that a suspected hijack was
in progress. The New England Regional Operations Center (ROC), the Air
Traffic Control System Command Center (ATCSCC), and the ZBW facility
manager were notified. Additionally, controllers began inter-facility coordination
with New York Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZNY) of the possible hijacking.
Coordination describes the last known altitude as twenty-nine thousand feet.

0826:00 AAL11 began southbound turn over Albany, New York. The last known
altitude was twenty-nine thousand feet.

0833:59 A third radio transmission partially unintelligible stated "nobody move please we
are going back to the airport don't try to make any stupid moves" - from an
unknown origin was heard over the ZBW radio. AAL11 primary radar track was ^
still southbound, and the last known altitude was twenty-nine thousand feet.

0834:00 ZBW contacted Cape Terminal Radar Approach Control (located on OTIS Air
Force Base) and requested they notify the Military of the events regarding
AAL11.

0835:00 \*» New England Regional Operations Center advised Washington Operations Center
(WOC) of the suspected hijack of AAL11.

0836:00 WOC notified Civil Aviation Security Intelligence (ACI), and conferenced New
England Regional Operations Center and the Air Traffic Control Systems
Command Center (ATCSCC).

0838:00 ZBW notified New York Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZNY) of possible
hijacking of AAL11.

0840:00 North East Air Defense Sector (NEADS) logs indicate they were notified by the
Federal Aviation Administration of the events concerning AAL11.

0841:00 Military Command (VACAPES) issued scramble order on AAL11.

0844:00 ZNY facility manager notified New York Terminal Radar Approach Control
(N90) of possible hijacking of AAL11. N90 began internal coordination of the
aircraft's last known altitude (twenty-nine thousand feet) and southbound course.

0846:31 Primary radar tracking of AAL11 was lost.

0846:35 Impact at World Trade Center.

0850:00 Washington Operations Center activated a Tactical Net at the request of Civil
Aviation Security Intelligence (ACI).

0850:00 Newark Airport Traffic Control Tower (EWR) advised N90 of possible aircraft
crash into the World Trade Center.

AAT-20
September 17, 2001
6:30 AM
United Airlines Flight 175 (UAL175)
Boston - Los Angeles
All times indicated are Eastern Daylight Savings Time

0804:55 Boston Airport Traffic Control Tower (BOS) issued taxi instruction to UAL175.

0814:00 UAL175 began takeoff roll, runway 9, Boston Logan International Airport. All
communications with BOS and with Boston Departure Control were routine and
normal.

0823:01 UAL175 established radio contact with Boston Air Route Traffic Control
Center (ZBW). "Boston, morning, United one-seven-five out of one-nine
(nineteen thousand feet) for two-three-zero (twenty-three thousand feet)."

0823:06 ZBW acknowledged UAL175. At this point the controller was busy due to the
events surrounding AAL11. The sector was responsible for six aircraft including
UAL175. All communications between ZBW and UAL175 appear routine and
normal. The flight was subsequently instructed to climb to flight level 310
(thirty-one thousand feet) and after radar handoff, was issued a frequency change
to contact the New York Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZNY).

0840:32 UAL175 established radio contact with ZNY. "United one-seventy-five at flight
level three-one-zero."

0840:37 ZNY acknowledged UAL 175. "United one-seventy-five, New York Center,
roger."

0841:32 UAL175 transmitted to ZNY, "We figured we'd wait to go to your center, we
heard a suspicious transmission on our departure out of Boston. Someone keyed
the mike (initiated radio communications) and said everyone stay in your seats."

0841:51 ZNY replied, "okay, I'll pass that along." (The controller ensured UAL175's
comments were forwarded to the Operations Manager.)

0844:05 US Air Flight 83 transmitted to ZNY "I just picked up an ELT (emergency locator
transmitter) on 121.5 (emergency VHP frequency). It was brief, but it went off."

0844:09 ZNY acknowledged US Air Flight 83.

0846:48 UAL175's assigned transponder code of 1470 changed, first indicating 3020,
then changing again to 3321. ZNY air traffic computers do not correlate
either of these codes with UAL175. Consequently, the secondary radar
return (transponder) indicating aircraft speed, altitude, and flight
information began to coast and was no longer associated with the primary
radar return. Note: The controller communicating with UAL175 was also
monitoring the flight track ofAALll. Based on coordination received from
ZBWindicating a possible highjack, most of the controller's attention was
focused on AAL11.

0851:43 ZNY transmitted to UAL175, "UAL175, recycle transponder, squawk code

one four seven zero." No response was received from UAL175. The
controller made several attempts, repeatedly trying to contact UAL175 for
the next four minutes. During this time, the aircraft was also observed
making a left turn and descending.

0853:24 ZNY controller coordinated internally, asking other controllers if they saw
UAL175, or if they knew who the unidentified radar target is on transponder
code 3321. None of the other controllers replied in the affirmative. Note:
The unknown aircraft in this and all following times was later confirmed to be
UAL175.

0855:00 ZNY controller was busy trying to turn other aircraft away from the aircraft
believed to be UAL 175. The flight track of this aircraft had changed and was
now headed southeast bound.

0855:00 This time is approximate based on personnel statements from ZNY. A controller-
in-charge (CIC) advised the Operations Manager (OM) that she believed UAL175
was also hijacked. The OM advised the CIC that an aircraft had hit the World
Trade Center. The CIC began coordinating with the controllers working position
and one of the controllers stated that UAL175 appeared to heading "right towards
the city." The CIC returned to the OM position and heard a request for military
aircraft to scramble. UAL 175 was observed in a rapid descent

0855:00 This time is approximate based on personnel statements from ZNY. A controller
working a different position within ZNY reported that two aircraft, a Delta
Airlines flight was given instructions to avoid an unknown aircraft. At about the
same time a US Airways flight reported taking evasive action from an unknown
aircraft. The controller reported that the unknown aircraft was now headed
towards New York City. This controller, along with other controllers speculated
that the unknown aircraft was an emergency and was heading for an airport to
land.
0900:00 This time is approximate based on personnel statements from New York
Terminal Radar Approach Control (N90). N90 controller stated "at
approximately 9:00,1 observed an unknown aircraft south of the Newark,
New Jersey Airport, northeast bound and descending out of twelve thousand
nine hundred feet in a rapid rate of descent, the radar target terminated at
the World Trade Center."

0903:14 Second Impact at World Trade Center.

0905:00 North East Air Defense Sector (NEADS) logs indicate they were notified by the
Federal Aviation Administration of the events concerning UAL175.

0905:00 N90 received notification from the Newark Airport Traffic Control Tower of a
second aircraft striking the World Trade Center.

AAT-20
September 17, 2001
6:30 AM
United Airlines Flight 93 (UAL93)
Newark - San Francisco
All times indicated are Eastern Daylight Savings Time

0809:18 Newark Airport Traffic Control .Tower (EWR) issued taxi instructions to UAL93.

0842:00 UAL93 began takeoff roll, runway 4 left, Newark New Jersey International
Airport. All communications with EWR, with New York Departure Control,
and with New York Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZNY) were routine
and normal.

0924:30 UAL93 established radio contact with Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center
(ZOB), "Good morning Cleveland, United ninety-three, three-five-oh (thirty-five
thousand feet), intermittent light chop." The controller was busy, the sector was
responsible for sixteen aircraft. Of these, several aircraft were being issued new
routes based on the events occurring on the east coast. The controller did not
reply to this initial transmission.

0925:14 UAL93 again reported on ZOB frequency, "United ninety-three checking three-
five-oh (thirty-five thousand feet)." The controller replied, "United ninety-three,
Cleveland, roger." Note: This was the third radar sector within ZOB to
communicate with UAL93. The communications with the previous sectors were
routine and normal.

0928:19 A radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle

from an unknown origin was heard over the ZOB radio.

0928:54 A second radio transmission, mostly unintelligible, again with sounds of possible
screaming or a struggle and a statement, "get out of here, get out of here" from an
unknown origin was heard over the ZOB radio. At about this same time, the ZOB
controller observed that UAL93 had descended, altitude indicated thirty-four
thousand, three hundred feet.

0929:29 ZOB controller asked UAL93, "United ninety-three, verify three-five-zero

(thirty-five thousand feet)." There was no reply. The ZOB controller made
several attempts to contact UAL93 without receiving any acknowledgement.

0929:50 ZOB controller began moving other aircraft away from UAL93 due to the
lack of acknowledgement of any radio transmissions. Several other aircraft
on the frequency confirmed unusual sounds of an unknown origin. The
altitude of UAL93 again indicated thirty-five thousand feet.

0931:57 A third radio transmission, mostly unintelligible, may sound like an individual out
of breath, more unintelligible words and what sounds like "bomb on board" from
an unknown origin was heard over the ZOB radio.
0932:31 A fourth radio transmission stated "did you hear that transmission that reported a
bomb on board?" from an unknown origin was heard over the ZOB radio.

0934:50 ZOB controller observed that UAL93 was climbing without an air traffic control
authorization. The aircraft had started a turn to the southeast, also without air
traffic control authorization.

0938:47 UAL93 altitude indicated forty-thousand seven hundred feet.

0939:12 A fifth radio transmission, mostly unintelligible, stated words that may sound like
"captain, .. .bomb on board, .. .our demands, .. .remain quiet"

0939:59 ZOB notified Great Lakes Regional Operations Center of the screams and
statements from unknown origin, believed to be UAL93.

0941:00 Secondary radar return (transponder) indicating aircraft speed, altitude, and
flight information becomes intermittent and eventually failed on ZOB radar
displays.

0944:31 ZOB controller notified Pittsburgh Terminal Radar Approach Control (PIT) North
Arrival controller of the unanticipated turn, the loss of secondary radar return and
lack of radio communications with UAL93. The ZOB controller also stated that
the projected flight path would result in UAL93 passing in close proximity if not
directly overhead the Greater Pittsburgh International Airport.

0945:00 PIT controller notified the Operations Supervisor of the events surrounding
UAL93. The PIT controller also manually initiated radar tracking of the primary
radar target.

0951:00 After determination by the PIT facility manager to evacuate, the controllers have
completed coordination with adjacent facilities and the PIT facility has been
evacuated.

0956:56 A small contingency of controllers (volunteers) returned to the facility and

coordination with adjacent facilities pertaining to return to operational status is
completed. The track of UAL93 was no longer visible on the PIT radar displays.

1000:00 This time is approximate and is based on personnel statements from ZOB. A
ZOB controller's statement indicated that the pilot of a VFR aircraft reported
sighting a United Airlines aircraft at approximately eight thousand feet in the
vicinity of the Latrobe, Pennsylvania airport. The pilot also reported that the
United Airlines aircraft's landing gear was down, the wings were rocking, and
that the aircraft appeared to be in distress.
1004:00 This time is approximate and is based on personnel statements from ZOB. A
ZOB controller statement indicated that UAL93's primary radar target terminated
in the vicinity of Somerset, Pennsylvania.

1007:00 In response to a request from a ZOB controller, N20VF, a Falcon Jet

reported observing puffs of smoke in the vicinity of UAL93's last known
position.

1041:00 After receiving a telephone call from the Somerset, Pennsylvania police
department stating that several "911" telephone calls had been received reporting
an aircraft accident, a ZOB operations manager made official notification to Great
Lakes Regional Operations Center. Note: Although this is the officially
documented notification time, FAA officials were aware of the accident as these
events were reported as they occurred on a critical event teleconference
established at the Federal Aviation Administration headquarters building.

AAT-20
September 17, 2001
6:30 AM
 WITH DRAWAL NOTICE

RG: 148
Box: 00001 Folder: 0002 Document: 46
Series: Front Office Files

Copies: 1 Pages: 8

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: Public Hearing, 6/17/2004 [2 of 2]

Document Date:
Document Type: Manual
From:
To:

Subject: Order 7610.4, Special Military Operations, Ch. 7 E

scort of Hijacked Aircraft

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is
restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in
general and specific record group restriction statements which are available
for examination.

NND: 241
Withdrawn: 03-06-2008 by: ]<y

RETRIEVAL #: 241 00001 0002 46