Introduction Presented in this chapter is the synthesis of researches on how relevant licensing systems are.

Included in this chapter are the foreign studies and local studies which have relation to Business Permit and Licensing System. This chapter also includes the related local and foreign systems and summative review on how the proponents project will have an edge over the existing systems presented. Foreign Study In Compulsory Licensing Trends in the Technology Sector: China as a Case Study on Licensing Patents by Greg Slater it talked about the Strong protection of IPR gives confidence and incentive to companies to invest billions of dollars in R&D in the technology sector. For instance, my company (Intel Corporation) invests anywhere

from 11% to 15% of its annual gross revenue in R&D. As a result of such investments and the stability and rewards created by IPR protection, the IT industry has been able to generate the innovation that has formed the foundation for our digital economy. Overbroad compulsory licensing of patents can seriously undermine the incentive to invest. The WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property

Rights (TRIPS) allows members states to issue compulsory licenses, but subject to certain key limitations or safeguards. Those limitations, however, are not a modicum of clarity, have not always been followed, and challenges as to their scope and meaning recently have increased. Indeed, it has been argued that Ownership of technology remains concentrated in the developed countries where large amounts of capital are invested in research and development (R&D). Industries in developing countries have great difficulty in competing in R&D because of persistent structural imbalances. Developed country enterprises are often reluctant to license new technology on terms and conditions that will permit developing country enterprises to effectively compete in world markets. Although TRIPS makes a number of references to encouraging transfers of technology, there is little evidence that programs to accomplish this are being implemented. Compulsory licensing, and the threat of compulsory licensing, are necessary to make transfer of technology a reality.

China provides an especially interesting case study on compulsory licensing trends in the technology sector because: (1) Its legal system has rapidly evolved since WTO accession in 2001; (2) The PRC government continues to exercise significant efforts to develop a local information technology (IT) industry as it is considered critical to Chinas future growth, and in doing so has had to confront the significant intellectual property rights (IPR) owned by foreign entities on IT products; and (3) Chinese government officials have developed a number of initiatives over the last five years or so that are testing traditional compulsory licensing limitations. It is difficult to talk about evolving trends in compulsory licensing in China, however, without first providing some high level background on the relevant TRIPS licensing provisions and how other developing countries have viewed them. That background, provided in section I below, also includes some brief remarks on Chinas patent law (as recently amended) and comparisons between TRIPS and that law as they pertain to compulsory licensing safeguards. There were four significant drafts on the TRIPS Agreement that discussed compulsory licensing: (i) the draft of July 23, 1990, (ii) the Brussels Draft of December 1990, (iii) the Dunkel Draft of 1991, and (iv) the Uruguay Round TRIPS Agreement, eventually signed in 1994. The "national emergency" or "other circumstances of extreme urgency" exception was first proposed by the EC in its submission of March 29, 1990, although the wording was slightly more restrictive. The commentary of Gervais indicates that contracting parties are "free, within reason, to determine what constitutes a national emergency. Indeed, the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health states that Each Member has the right to determine what constitutes national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency." This exemption and WTO decisions related to it have been relied on by various member states to increase access to drugs needed to address health epidemics such as the AIDS/HIV crisis. Of relevance and concern to high tech companies, some of the same stakeholders which argued that the AIDS pandemic is a national emergency

within many countries -- thus justifying compulsory licensing of certain drug patents without application of the traditional TRIPS safeguards have begun to make similar arguments with regard to environmental technologies that may help address global climate change. The TRIPS wording allowing a compulsory license to remedy "anti-competitive" conduct also changed during the negotiations. The variations were similar to the final wording allowing a compulsory license to remedy a practice determined after judicial or administrative process to be anti-competitive. Importantly, the original wording referred to one of the limited cases where compulsory licensing was allowed, rather than as an exception to the safeguards applicable to compulsory licensing as it did in the Brussels Draft and does now. In addition, I point out that unlike the earlier Brussels Draft, which required reasonable remuneration for licenses granted under Article 31, the current TRIPS Agreement indicates that the amount of compensation may depend on how best to correct the anti-competitive conduct at issue and thus in theory allows a member state to withhold all compensation in those circumstances. Also noteworthy are Articles 8 and 40 of TRIPS, which provide context for the type of anti-competitive conduct that might be subject to a compulsory license. The negotiation histories over these provisions indicate a concern by developing countries with the potential for both market restricting and anticompetitive effects of IPRs. Article 8 recognizes that Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the provisions of [TRIPS], may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of technology. Please note that abuse of IPR and unreasonable restraints on trade or transfer of technology are separate causes of concern. As reflected in Article 8, however, any measures taken

must be consistent with TRIPS -- specifically Articles 31 and 40. Article 40(1) of TRIPS recognizes that some licensing practices or conditions pertaining to intellectual property rights which restrain competition may have adverse effects on trade and may impede the transfer and dissemination of technology. In that

vein, WTO members are not prevented from specifying in the ir legislation licensing practices or conditions that may in particular cases constitute an abuse of intellectual property rights having an adverse effect on competition in the relevant market. In License to Drill: The Case for Modernizing Americas Crude Oil and Natural Gas Export Licensing Systems by Scott Lincicome he said that revolutionary extraction technologies have helped increase the supply of fossil fuels in the United States, driving down prices, spurring economic activity, and potentially reversing the longtime status of the United States as a net energy importer to a significant exporter. Impeding that transition are outdated federal regulationsin particular discretionary export licensing systems for natural gas and crude oilthat restrict exports, distort domestic energy prices, deter investment, and encourage graft. They also subvert some of the Obama administration stated policy objectives and could run afoul of U.S. international trade obligations. Despite the potential economic windfall, opposition to exporting natural gas and crude oil has materialized among certain domestic consuming industries and environmental groups, causing the administration to delay any approvals on pending export-license applications. But there are compelling reasons to approve those applications and to overhaul our disjointed, anachronistic, export license systems to properly reflect the new energy landscape. According to his research Fossil-fuel extraction technologies, such as hydraulic fracturing (fracking) and horizontal drilling have revolutionized the U.S. energy market. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, domestic production of crude oil and natural gas has skyrocketed in recent years and is projected to stay at relatively high levels for decades, even assuming existing state and federal restrictions on production and transport. As summarized by economist Mark Perry, U.S. oil production reached a 15-year high in 2012 with a yearly increase that was the largest in history, net oil imports fell to a 21-year low, and U.S. energy self-sufficiency rose to a 22-year high last year.

The production spike has driven down domestic gas and oil prices, creating a significant gap between U.S. and international market prices. As shown in the chart, natural gas prices in Japan, the worlds largest liquid natural gas (LNG) consumer, were more than five times higher than U.S. prices in 2012, and European prices were three to four times higher. The increase in domestic energy supplies and resulting decline in prices has been a boon to downstream industries, such as electricity generators and petrochemical producers that rely on fossil fuels for energy or feedstock. According to the Boston Consulting Group, low energy prices have contributed, and will continue to contribute, to an American manufacturing renaissance in terms of domestic employment and ex port competitiveness in these sectors. The resulting price differentials have U.S. energy producers positioned to become a global exporting powerhouse, and could reverse the United States historic position as a net energy importer. According to a November 2012 report by the International Energy Agency, the United States could become a net exporter of natural gas by 2020 and will be almost self -sufficient in energy, in net terms, by 2035. That same report estimates that the United States will become t he worlds largest oil producer by around 2020, causing North America to emerge as a net oil exporter by 2035. As with IPR licensing policies in standardization, this view appears to be changing to a more balanced approach respectful of IPR regardless of its source. It

may be too early to tell, however, given that the applicable legal provisions are almost brand new. Consider the following developments in the last five years: (1) In 2004, as part of Chinas effort to draft an Anti-Monopoly Law (AML), the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) undertook an investigation of MNC practices to identify those that should be considered anti-competitive as well as possible counter-measures to curb them. The report listed a broad array of practices deemed to be anti-

competitive, many of which would raise concerns under most antitrust regimes. But SAICs list also included a refusal to deal (including specific mention of a refusal to license relevant patents by the largest network manufacturer which happens to be a

U.S. MNC); (2) Not coincidentally, the next draft of the AML included a Refusal of Access to Network provision that stated: where an undertaking is unable to compete with undertakings with dominant market position without the access to a network or other infrastructures owned by those dominant undertakings in relevant market, the undertakings in dominant position shall not refuse to grant access to the network or other infrastructures to other undertakings at reasonable prices. An exemption was provided where the dominant undertaking could establish that it is impossible or unreasonable to grant access to the network or other infrastructures to other undertakings on account of technology, security or other justifiable reasons. Significant push back on this provision from U.S. industry, the American Bar Association, and U.S. antitrust agencies persuaded the AML drafters to remove it; (3) Beginning in 2004, the AML drafts exempted from the reach of the Anti-Monopoly Law those entities which exercise their IPR in a manner consistent with Chinas IPR laws, but the exemption carved out any use of their IPR deemed to be abusive under the AML. Later drafts (including Article 55 of the law as now enacted) clarified that any determination of abuse of IPR under the AML also had to be accompanied by a finding that there was a restriction or elimination of competition. On its face, this provision

alone (without the Refusal of Access to Network) could be acceptable to technology companies that owe their success to innovation and its corresponding IPR. However, such a conclusion assumes that the PRC patent law itself contains no overbroad patent abuse provision, which it currently doesnt. But it does contain compulsory licensing provisions which are not quite as restrictive as TRIPS, including the authority to issue a license that may not be limited to remedying anti-competitive conduct when that forms the basis for its issuance. And, to the extent the AML defines anti-competitive conduct too broadly; the risk of broad compulsory licenses being issued for the legitimate exercise of patent rights still exists. In that vein, depending on how certain provisions are applied, the AML could be used to force reduction in royalty requests deemed unreasonable or force an entity to deal with a competitor which offers minimal royalties. For example, AML Article 17 states that dominant undertakings shall also not abuse their dominant position byselling products at unfairly high prices [or]refusing to trade with another party

without legitimate reasons. SAICs rules implementing the AMLs abuse of dominance provisions are still forthcoming, and likely will shed light on whether Article 55 of the AML is sufficiently protective. Lastly, as Mark Cohen, former Senior IP Attach at the U.S. embassy in Beijing once pointed out, Article 55 dealing with abuse of IPR appears in AML Chapter 8 entitled Supplemental Provisions instead of Chapter 3 which relates to abuses of a dominant market position. He raises the question whether a company could abuse IPR without a finding that the patents in question enable the patentee to hold a dominant market share. Returning to the issue of compulsory licensing safeguards, one of the threshold questions is whether the refusal to license constitutes an independent ground or a pre-condition for granting a compulsory license. TRIPS makes it clear that it is the latter, and that every application for a compulsory license should be considered on its individual merits. If it was otherwise and compulsory licenses were automatically granted based on a simple refusal to deal, patent rights would mean very little. Xiaohai Liu, Bayer-Chair for Intellectual Property Rights at Tongji University in Shanghai agrees and notes that Chinas patent law reflected the first view, but its latest amendments bring it into conformity with the second view. The author is hoping that Mark Cohen is right. The Third Amendment to the Patent Law as enacted does not make it clear that each application will be considered on its individual merits. In brief, despite greater conformity with TRIPS, the Third

Amendment to the Patent Law still has weaknesses and ambiguities. These limitations are further aggravated by the ambiguities in the newly enacted AML, the developing IPR policies of Chinas standard setting bodies, and the lack of experience in the judiciary in applying TRIPS safeguards. Yet we have witnessed improvement in various initiatives related to compulsory licensing that could have caused significant concern as originally drafted. In Downsizing Administrative Licensing System and Private Sector Development in the PRC: A Preliminary Assessment by Bill K.P. Chou the ideological suspicion against private sector development has been gradually dissipating in the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). Ideological change has resulted in the Chinese Communist

Party (CCP)s revision of its constitution to allow private entrepreneurs to qualify for Party membership and amendment of the state constitution to enshrine the private economy as an important pillar of national economy. Creating jobs for first-time job seekers and laid-off workers through developing the private sector is placed high on the CCPs agenda. Private enterprises are now permitted to enter many sectors once monopolized by state enterprises and to create new market sectors. Both foreign-invested and domestic companies face less restrictions on acquiring state assets. Further private sector development requires a reform of the regulatory regime to make it more business friendly and encourage investors to invest. Reforms of the regulatory regime include two parts: to downsize licensing systems and to enhance governments regulatory capacity in policing markets and coping with various forms of market failure. This paper focuses on the first part of regulatory reforms. The significance of this part lies in its relevance to the improvement of the business environment on the one hand and implementation of PRCs commitments to the World Trade Organization (WTO) on the other. The paper was structured in the following way: It first introduces the background and impact of the administrative licensing system on private sector development. Then the paper outlines the contours of administrative license downsizing. Emphasis will be placed on a discussion about Administrative Licensing Law. In the end, the implementation of downsizing measures will be evaluated. This paper argues that administrative license downsizing has been selectively implemented. Many local governments have kept the licensing activities that should be either annulled or handed over to upper-level governments. Based on an institutional analysis, this paper argues that the institutional features of PRCs bureaucracy have shaped the incentive systems of local bureaucrats in a way unfavorable for successful implementation of license downsizing. For pursuing local economic growth, local bureaucrats have more incentives to keep burdensome licensing systems than to reduce the ranged business activities requiring licenses. The high costs of policy coordination and supervision enable local bureaucrats to hide their activities from the scrutiny of their political masters. The institutional weaknesses in the mechanisms for reining in local

bureaucrats allow local bureaucrats high discretion in distorting many national policies going against their interests, administrative license downsizing included. In Western countries, regulatory reforms are responses to the challenges posed by perceived failure of public ownership and Keynesianism in sustaining economic growth, the pressure of globalization for policy convergence, and the demand on governments for cutting business costs and saving public resources at the time when raising tax rates to satisfy public demands has become difficult (Janow, 1998: p.216). Downsizing administrative licensing systems is one of the regulatory reform measures. It involves cutting the number of licenses required in business activities, simplifying the procedures in obtaining licenses, and curtailing governments licensing authority. Through downsizing, the PRC government hopes to improve administrative efficiency, economize the use of state resources, combat corruption, and above all, bolster its performance legitimacy. The downsizing merits scholarly attention for several reasons. The first is the implications of administrative license downsizing on promoting private sector activity which has the potential of significantly contributing to PRCs economic growth and social stability. An increase in business is conducive to job creation Carlile and Tilton (1998) identified two models of regulatory reform. One is an Anglo-American tradition and increasingly European trend of correcting market failure. Behind the model are mistrust of government and worship of market: Government should refrain from intervening in markets to reduce inefficiency. Governments primary function is to ensure smooth operation of the market and to deal with such market failure as protection of public health and safety. A desirable regulatory reform is one seeking to reduce the regulatory costs on firms (such as the costs of adapting business processes to meet regulatory requirements, licensing fees, delays in obtaining regulatory approval, and time cost and bribery used for dealing with officials) to the level not higher than necessary for tackling market failure. The advocacy of antitrust, transparency, and competition is largely based on this model. The second model is a developmental state model represented by Japan, Korea, and Taipei, China. The advocates of this model have a high trust in government and believe that bureaucrats should actively foster technological development and designate particular industries and

businesses for support. This model is characterized by governments e xtensive use of licenses to influence economic development. No companies, including domestic and foreign, are allowed to enter particular industries, alter their mode of production, or import particular products without appropriate licenses for the sake of protecting these industries from excessive competition, accumulating a technological foundation for quick modernization, and facilitating late developers to catch up with early industrializing countries. The PRCs regulatory reform exhibits both the sim ilarities with the above two models and characteristics shared with many developing economies. The PRCs regulatory reform is a mix of corporatization, privatization, deregulation, and reregulation. It is a response to the need for filling a regulatory vacuum left by the rolling back of the state in micro-managing the economy (Pearson, 2004: pp.567-583). The rolling back is characterized by a de-nationalization of public ownership (such as telecommunications), rise of new economic activities (such as insurance and stock exchange), emergence of market failures (such as coalmine accidents, shoddy product quality, and environmental pollution), and the perceived necessity of protecting domestic enterprises against foreign competition resulting from trade liberalization (such as banking). One aspect of the regulatory regime is a licensing system. Like their counterparts in many developing countries, bureaucrats in PRC often use various administrative and business licenses to extract rent. Removing officials licen sing authority and the opportunities for extracting rent by downsizing regulations on the private sector has become a major strategy in the latest round of regulatory reform. Regulatory reforms are widely used to resolve economic problems because of their potential in encouraging private investment and bolstering GDP without incurring government expenditure and debt. Recent studies in OECD economies show that both the private investment level and the productivity of that investment are higher in countries with lighter regulatory burden. Estimates for a group of developing countries suggest that reducing the cost of registration procedures to the level in the United States (0.6% of per capita income) could increase private sector investment by more than 20%. A growing number of countries reducing administrative licenses and simplifying licensing procedures have achieved positive results. For example, the World Bank reported that after the municipal government of La Paz, Bolivia reduced the

procedures required in business registration, the number of registered businesses increased by 20%. Similar measures in Viet Nam increased new businesses from 6,000 in 1999 to more than 21,000 in 2002. In Uganda, the new businesses increased even by four times. In comparison to other developing countries, PRCs licensing system for regulation of business on paper is not particularly burdensome. However, the reality suggests a worse picture. The licensing system is arbitrary, cost inflating and inconsistent. Setting up a local retail business, for instance, needs 112 licenses from different departments. To get approval for importing certain types of foreign equipment may require six months or even longer (Meng, 2004). Bureaucrats arbitration in revoking licenses has made an unpredictable business environment. On a single day, the government of an unnamed city illegally revoked the business licenses of 100-odd joint ventures. Beijing city once revoked the permission granted to the fast food chain giant McDonalds for establishing a restaurant in a prime location. In 2003, the public security bureau of Leqing city of Zhejiang province withdrew 150 business licenses of man-powered tricycles auctioned in 1999, and penalized the license holders who refused to return the licenses. Without giving compensation or grace period, an unnamed city withdrew the operation licenses of the schools below the benchmark that the government imposed arbitrarily. The resultant unpredictable business environment, together with the inconsistency of regulations and policies of different levels of government, had put off many private investment projects involving more than one level of governments as the risk involved in these projects is either difficult to calculate or prohibitively high. Licensing barriers also precluded private sector from entering the market sectors dominated, but badly served, by state-owned enterprises. Many investors relied on personal relationships and bribery to transcend the red tape and get things done. The consequences were a lower level of infrastructure investment, lower degree of institutionalization of administration, rampant corruption, and business cost inflation (Asian Development Bank, 2003). Downsizing administrative licenses may be construed as the second stage of structural reform since the early 1980s. The first stage of reform, characterized by DE bureaucratization, de-nationalization, and greater use of market principles, comprises the strategies of bureaucracy downsizing, departments merging, reform of state-owned

enterprises, transformation of government departments into quasi-governmental , and civil service reform. The control on business opportunities was relaxed. Monopolies over foreign trade were broken up. Industrial ministries were either transformed into economic entities, industrial associations, or absorbed into other ministries. Market forces were phased in to replace bureaucracy in directing economic production and resources distribution. Bureaucracy was trimmed. Those remaining in bureaucracy were better educated, younger, and less obsessed by the Leninist ideas of economic management. State-owned enterprises were incorporated and exposed to greater competition. While the state retreated from enterprise ownership and economic planning, it set up and strengthened ministries and departments with economic and social regulatory functions, such as environment, food safety, work safety, financial services, telecommunication, and intellectual property rights. Meanwhile, it restricted administrative discretion and bureaucratic interference in private businesses through a legal framework. Administrative Litigation Law (1990), Compensation Law (1994), and Administrative Punishment Laws (1999) are examples in this legal framework. Before the end of the 1990s, the PRC government launched several rounds of downsizing. In the 1998 administrative reform, most industrial ministries were either transformed into quasi-governmental industrial associations or downgraded and merged with other ministries. Many forms of administrative licenses disappeared together with these industrial ministries. In September 2001, the State Council set up an interdepartmental State Council Leadership Small Group on the Reform of the System of Administrative Licensing (Guowuyuan xingzheng shenpi zhidu gaige gongzuo lingdao xiaozu) to improve the coordination of downsizing. After several rounds of downsizing, the State Council gave up the authority over 1,795 licensing items. Some of these abandoned licensing items were annulled altogether whereas others were handed over to industrial associations and other intermediary agencies (Meng, 2004). The downsizing campaign soon penetrated into many local governments. The process of issuing licenses has been made more transparent. Jinan city displayed official documents concerning licenses in public libraries or on government websites. Guangzhou city published hongtou wenjian in Guangzhou Administrative Report and accepted subscriptions from the public. Wuhan city posted its new hongtou wenjian in the Public Bulletin of Wuhan

Peoples Government every two weeks. The Bulletin was distributed to the public free of charge. Chongqing city published most of its hongtou wenjian in the Administrative Affairs Bulletin since January 2002. The cities of Wuxi and Shenzhen reviewed and overhauled hongtou wenjian. By June 2002, Shenzhen had reviewed 2,500 internal documents, annulled 878 of them, and modified 1,700 (Lai, 2003: pp.171-172). The amount of license fees which used to be secretive were made open. License applicants deposited the fees directly in the bank accounts under the scrutiny of treasury bureaus so that in principle no departments could embezzle the fees. The licensing procedures were streamlined by setting up one-stop service centers. Complaint centers and telephone hotlines were set up to keep rent seeking behavior in check. Many licensing items annulled have been re-established later on. The number of licensing items in Shenzhen city rose to 652 in 2001 after having been slashed from 1091 to 463 in 2000 (Shizhengfu, 2001). Guangdong province slashed the number of licensing items to 1,205 in June 2000. Soon after that, it rose to 1,519 items (Guanshe, 2006). To avoid the re-establishment of annulled licensing items, the National Peoples Congress (hereafter NPC, the national legislature) enacted the Administrative Licensing Law (hereafter the Law) to institutionalize the procedures of creating licenses through restricting administrative power and increasing the transparency of licensing procedures. The drafting of the Law began in mid-1990s. It took almost five years to finish consulting various stakeholders before State Council could start drafting the Law in 2000. NPC Standing Committee reviewed the draft law in 2002 and passed it on 27 August 2003. The effective date of the Law was postponed to 1 July 2004 to allow local governments more time for aligning their license regulations with the Law (Xingzhen, 2004). Several provisions of the Law are noteworthy: Article 12 states that only six broad market sectors require licenses for market access, though what constitutes the six broad market sectors is vaguely defined. 5 In parallel with PRC government partial centralization of economic authority from sub-provincial to provincial-level governments since the late 1990s, 6 Article 25 removes the licensing authority created by sub provincial governments. All the licensing authority of sub-provincial governments must be either based on national laws or delegated from provincial-level governments. Provincial-level governments, in turn, are restricted by Article 15: The licensing items

created by provincial-level governments may be valid for one year at most. Upon expiry, an enactment from the provincial peoples congress (legislature at provincial level) is required to keep the licensing items valid. Furthermore, this Article addresses the issues of regional protectionism: It prohibits local governments from using licenses to limit market entry and import of product, services and labor. Article 13 signifies the retreat of governments from licensing, stating that government departments should not create licensing items when business activities can be effectively regulated by: 1) citizens, legal entities, and other organs; 2) market competition; 3) industrial associatio ns; 4) post verification. Several provisions are to take on rent-seeking behavior. Article 27 prohibits license-issuing departments from compelling license applicants to purchase particular products produced by the departments or their subsidiary enterprises. Article 58 allows departments to charge license fees only if: 1) the fees are stipulated in laws or administrative decrees, and; 2) the public has prior knowledge of the fees. This provision reflects the Laws convergence with paragraph 308(a) of the R eport of the Working Party, stating: China's licensing procedures and conditions were published prior to becoming effective. In contrast to the user charge principle widely used in industrialized countries, Article 58 requires licensing departments to cover

administrative costs of issuing licenses by their budgets. This requirement is even stricter than the commitment in the Report of the Working Party paragraph 308(d) discussed above, which permits charging license fees to cover operating costs. Transparency issues are addressed in the following provisions: Article 5 states that unless state or business secrets or privacy are involved, internal hongtou wenjian cannot be used as sources of licensing authority. Article 19 states that before introducing new licensing items, provincial-level governments should consult the public through public hearings - a means of consultation increasingly popular in PRC. Article 42 mandates departments to inform applicants of the result of their license applications in 60 days. Article 50 embraces the rule of silence as consent, stipulating that if departments fail to respond to license holders applications for renewing their licenses in thirty days, the licenses will be automatically renewed. These articles converge with the requirement in the paragraph 308(f) of the Report of Working Party about speedy decisions on license applications.

According to them there are some successful cases of implementing Administrative Licensing Law have been reported. Central government and Guangdong province declared the previous regulations on chemical industries void and revoked subordinate departments licensing authority on chemical industries (Yu and Tan, 2005). Wuhan city declared 48 government documents that created licenses ineffective. Ningxia province annulled 170 items of administrative licensing. Liaoning province annulled almost half of its licensing items (Xingzhen, 2004). Gulou district of Nanjing city reduced its licensing items from 278 to 53 (Mao and Ming, 2005). Chongqing city planned to reduce the processing time of license applications for construction projects involving land acquisition from 350 days to between 110 and 150 days. If the downsizing was successfully implemented, the city government predicted that license fees worth hundreds of thousands yuan could be saved (Lan, 2006). Guangdong province annulled the Regulations on Pesticide Management, implying that no licenses were necessary for trading pesticides. The province also permitted foreign investors to trade pesticides by the end of 2004 and fertilizers by the end 2006 respectively. Domestic private entrepreneurs were granted equal footing with foreign investors, and may enter all the markets open to foreign investors (Yu, 2005). Caution is necessary for interpreting the success. The data about annulling licensing items and the government activities in implementing the Law were supplied by local governments and seldom checked by their supervisory governments. Besides that, attribution problems should also be considered. An objective of downsizing administrative licenses is to improve business environment through increasing government efficiency and resolving regional protectionism. Most business managers interviewed in a survey felt that government efficiency had been improved and regional protectionism had been alleviated after the Law came into effect. However, there is no knowing whether the improvement is due to license downsizing or other measures. Furthermore, managers perception change was reported before the Law was effective, as suggested by an earlier longitudinal survey. The most chosen option unchanged reflects that the change in government efficiency is not really significant. Examples of unsuccessful implementation of the Law are numerous. Private entrepreneurs in Guangzhou city were denied licenses to run businesses of agricultural

factor inputs because the agriculture bureau ran the same business (Yang, 2005). A survey of 1,500 citizens in seven cities suggested that the Law failed to live up with the public expectation on its ability to improve administrative efficiency. The survey, conducted by Social Survey Institute of China at the end of 2004, revealed that 73% of the respondents did not feel the Law had improved administrative efficiency; 76% of the respondents thought that local government had watered down the effect of the Law; and 49% believed that individual bureaucrats had circumvent the Law (Jin, 2004). In creating a pro-competition business environment, policy has achieved only limited success. A survey of business managers in 2005 revealed that 34%, 58.1%, and 7.9% of the respondents thought the problems associated with barriers to market entry have been alleviated, unchanged, and worsened, respectively. Discriminatory administrative licensing procedures remained the most cited factor impeding business expansion, with 42.9% of the respondents thinking so, followed by discriminatory quality inspection standards (38.2%), exorbitant fees and unpredictable taxation policies (27.8%), restrictions on import and sale (23.5%), and discriminatory price restrictions (17.3%) (Centre of Human Resources Research and Training, Development and Research, the State Council, 2005). It has to be noted that about 17% of the respondents in the survey are affiliated to state-owned enterprises. State-owned enterprises are better protected by governments at various levels and find it easier to bypass administrative barriers. If respondents from state-owned enterprises had been excluded and only private entrepreneurs had been counted, the percentage of respondents expressing negative opinions about licensing issues would have been even higher. It may take several years before the real impact of the license downsizing measures become obvious. At this stage, it can be concluded that the success is mixed. Many measures of the central government cannot be realized. Lu characterized policy executors distortion of national policies in communist countries as communist neo traditionalism, a concept first used by Walder (1986) in analyzing the bureaucratic behavior in Chinese communist regime. Lu argued that very often bureaucrats in communist regimes refused to adapt themselves to the modern (such as rational, empirical, and impersonal) bureaucratic structures imposed by political elites. Instead they reshaped the processes behind the structures to reinforce and elaborate traditional

(or patrimonial) modes of operation (Lu, 1999). The case of downsizing administrative licensing helps to illustrate the argument. Many parts of the Administrative Licensing Law have been reshaped to adapt to old licensing practices. According to the State Council Directive No. 412, provincial governments are permitted to keep 144 licensing items (Zhonghua, 2005). However, Sichuan province keeps 383 items in the end (Gao, 2005). Fujian province keeps 445 items (Fujian, 2006). Selective implementation may appear in the form of substantial delays. Private businesspeople are allowed in the trade of agricultural factor inputs such as seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides according to the Article 12 of the Law. By the end of 2005, Guangdong provincial bureau of industry and commerce neither put an end to the state monopoly of the trade nor permitted private sector to enter the trade (Yu and Tan, 2005; Yu, 2005). Certain localities violated Article 58 of the Law prohibiting license fees. A license for selling chemical products in Guangzhou city was worth more than 20,000 yuan in early 2006, one and a half years after the Law came into effect (Yu and Tan, 2005). Foreigninvested enterprises in Lianyungan city of Jiangsu province with a registered capitalization of US$3 million or above have to obtain at least 11 licenses and pay a license fee of 15,000 yuan before starting any businesses. The city also violated Article 26 and failed to designate one department to handle license applications involving more than one department. Among its 50 departments with licensing authority, only the urban management department followed this Article. Also the city government did not annul all licensing items according to laws: 109 out of its 428 licensing items remained in force illegally (Yan, 2005: p.44; Chen, 2005: p.75). The efforts at alleviating legislative inconsistency and creating a uniform trade regime have been compromised. Some departments of Guangzhou city have broken Article 5 of the Law and referred to internal documents or even department heads personal opinions in considering licensing issues. The citys industry and commerce bureau justified some of its lic ensing authority by quoting the internal hongtou wenjian State Council Directive No. 68 issued in 1988 (Yu and Tan, 2005; Yang, 2004). PRCs WTO commitments of increasing regulatory transparency, setting up a uniform trade regime, and reforming licensing systems may be considered deep economic integration a countrys convergence of its economic policies with international rules. Haggard argued that while the agenda of trade

liberalization in deep integration has the potential for augmenting overall welfare benefits, it remains unclear whether deep integration can augment welfare benefits to particular countries, regions of a country, and/or and industries. Infant industries in developing countries may lose out if developing countries harmonize their regulatory policies around the norms of developed countries (Haggard, 1995: pp.2-4). The notion is particularly true to the countries like PRC which have no effective mechanism to redistribute the gains of free trade from beneficiaries to losers. In view of the damage to the losers, the WTO permits developing and the least developed member countries to maintain certain protectionist measures for safeguarding their infant industries. Following this line of reasoning, PRC should not have committed to uniform administration of trade regime given that its regional development varies greatly, and the benefits to different localities could have been maximized by liberalizing trade at various degrees. Since the policy design of downsizing measures has not considered the reality, the downsizing measures cannot serve the needs of many localities and are opposed by local governments. On top of improving the business environment, license downsizing has the potential for changing bureaucrats behavior towards private busines ses through institutionalizing the operational mode of the administration on the basis of PRCs WTO commitments. The downsizing centers on removing the licensing authority of local bureaucrats and changing the practice of creating market barriers and rent seeking by the use of an overly complicated licensing system. The PRC government has slashed most licensing items and issued laws and regulations to prevent annulled licensing items from being re-established. Sub-provincial governments have to refer to national laws and regulations before making decisions on licensing issues, and gain the approval from provincial-level governments in order to establish new licenses. Provincial peoples congresses have taken some of the licensing authority from provincial -level governments and weakened the latters ability in licensing issues. The selective implementation of the downsizing illustrates that the masterminds behind the policy have failed to adequately consider the structural features of local institutions through which the downsizing policy is carried out. Since the policy entails numerous implementers whose interests are diverse and activities are poorly coordinated, a

command-and-control approach in implementing the policy neither solicits voluntary compliance from implementers nor generates adequate information for policymakers to monitor policy implementation and exercise sanctions. Besides that, the incentive systems in local governance go against the policy in the implementation process: The performance appraisal systems of local leaders and job rotation system encourage local leaders to narrowly focus on the short-term economic growth of small localities but ignore the welfare of wider regions and the long-term policy of improving investment environment. Licensing authority conducive to achieving the immediate result of economic growth by fending off competition against local enterprises and their products is therefore much sought after. Since local governments are required - at least to a large extent to be financially self-sufficient, the potential of the licensing authority to form local governments major source of revenue provides strong incentive for the local government without a broad tax base to thwart license downsizing. Other institutional features such as weak institutional positions of private businesses, ineffective legislation review mechanism, and deficient legal system make it possible for local leaders to bypass the formal rules. In Graduated Driver Licensing: Effectiveness of Systems & Individual Components by Teresa Senserrick and Michelle Whelan, they discussed that newlylicensed drivers are one of the groups most vulnerable to crash involvement, particularly in their first year of driving. This pattern is common worldwide. Licensing jurisdictions have become increasingly aware that traditional methods to address this issue, such as standard driver education and training programs, have not worked. An alternative, is to introduce a range of requirements and restrictions on drivers in sequential stages as they learn to drive, that is, mandate a graduated licensing system (GLS). The crash risk of novice drivers is inflated by the effects of both youth and inexperience. The aim of GLS is to reduce this risk by limiting driving to safer, lower-risk conditions and progressively lifting restrictions as experience is gained. Basic forms of GLS were introduced as early as the 1960s and 1970s. However, the more sophisticated systems that currently exist were largely implemented during the 1990s.

The primary aim of the current project was to review the effectiveness of overseas GLS models and the effectiveness of individual GLS components in reducing the crash risk of young drivers. A further objective was to provide a detailed description of current Australian GLS models and their specific requirements and restrictions for both the learner and intermediate license phases. According to them most overseas GLS models follow the standard three-stage structure common in Australia. Evaluations of the effectiveness of overseas GLS models in reducing crash risk have generally shown substantial benefits, although the range of reductions in certain crash and injury types shows much variation. In addition to methodological issues, one of the main reasons for this variation is a lack of consistency in the many GLS requirement and restriction options incorporated in each system. In addition, jurisdictions can differ on a number of levels before a GLS is implemented, which can also affect the nature or extent of change following a new GLS. Their review clearly shows that imposing graduated driving requirements and restrictions on young drivers contributes to reductions in their crash and injury risk. However, other factors, such as contrasting methodologies, delayed and declining licensing rates and lack of distance travelled data make it difficult to quantify the extent of the contribution. Moreover, individual GLS components of a certain phase of the system do not function in isolation from other components within that phase or components in other phases. Deciding on the nature and extent of restrictions and requirements for particular GLS models requires careful consideration of a wide range of options and, potentially, further assessment of their effectiveness based on the existing licensing system and the community affected by it. Imposing any restrictions involves a trade-off between mobility wants and needs and crash reductions. Restrictions need to be perceived as onerous or demanding enough to provide initiative to partake actively in behavior that will lead to their removal. Perhaps surprisingly in some instances, even some of the more stricter GLS models have received acceptable levels of community support, if not at the time of their introduction, a year or so later.

Most Australian jurisdictions have had some form of GLS in place for a long time. Certainly, requirements and restrictions of extended learner and intermediate licence stages form a system that has contributed to safer driving among 16-21 year-old and even older drivers who progress through the system. However, in general terms, Australian licensing systems do not conform to the full (US) concept of GLS and, therefore, do not necessarily achieve the full benefits that GLS offer. Therefore, the question remains, whether it is time to revise current models to include components such as night-time driving restrictions and peer passenger restrictions, and/or to include additional or optional steps within licensing phases. It is important to note that overseas GLS restrictions shown to have significant effects in reducing novice driver crashes are not the same as those that have previously raised concern in Australia. For example, most passenger restrictions in overseas GLS models do not ban all passengers. Rather they allow carriage of family members, children and adults, but not carriage of peer passengers. Night-time driving restrictions include automatic exemptions for work, education and other non-recreational purposes. Jurisdictions with such restrictions in place are achieving significant benefits and, while having penalty sanctions in place to encourage compliance, the systems primarily rely on self-compliance, compliance enforced by parents/guardians and socialization processes. As such the ability to enforce compliance by Police is not an essential element. While both night-time driving and passenger restrictions are effective countermeasures in their own right, the review highlights that night-time driving restrictions address only one time segment. Moreover, daytime recreational driving with peers in the US is associated with a higher crash rate for novices than when driving during night-time hours. Therefore, it has been argued that, if only one such initiative were to be introduced, peer passenger restrictions would provide a more effective countermeasure than night-time driving restrictions alone. However, some US research has shown that the crash reduction effects of night-time driving restrictions carry over to daytime hours, resulting in substantial reductions in fatalities to a similarly high or higher level than that predicted for passenger restrictions. The comparative value of these

findings for Australian jurisdictions is complicated by age differences, including differences in legal drinking ages, and by differences in BAC laws. Moreover, overseas research suggests that having both of theseinitiatives in place, concurrently, is most effective in reducing young driver fatalities, and is considered more viable than other measures with similar effectiveness. The combination of their reported effectiveness and viability in implementation warrants further assessment of their potential effectiveness in the Australian context. It is appropriate to assert that driving should be viewed separately from other rights afforded to young Australians due to their disproportionately high risk of being involved in an injury crash during the early stages of driving. Vehicle crashes are the leading cause of death for young people and most are preventable. From this perspective, novice drivers and the community in general need to be educated with respect to any initiatives that are introduced so that restrictions are viewed as enhancers of road safety rather than as punitive measures. The present review provides support that this is possible. While education clearly is an essential precursor to compliance, as has been the experience in New Zealand and elsewhere, appropriate penalties for violations of GLS requirements and restrictions are also likely to be essential to encourage high compliance rates. Any changes to current GLS models should be carefully linked to appropriate education and enforcement programs to maximize their effectiveness. Research suggests that parents could be particularly important facilitators of this process. Therefore, increased parental involvement should be an essential

consideration. Their conclusion, this review details many new and varied GLS initiatives when compared to those included in current Australian models. While some have been wellevaluated and clearly show positive effects, others provide only face validity and sometimes anecdotal evidence of their effectiveness. This review has attempted to highlight these differences and identify those options worthy of further consideration. While Australian GLS models have undoubtedly contributed to crash reductions, young drivers are still over-represented in Australian crash statistics, especially at night and

with peers. Therefore, it is time to review current models and to develop, implement and evaluate additional GLS initiatives in order to maximize their road safety benefits and better address the over-involvement of young Australians in crash statistics. Local Study Taken from BPLS REFORM PROGRAM GUIDE Promoting Local Business Permit and Licensing System Reform in the Philippines by USAID it focuses on streamlining of the BPLS programs how were they able to build that it was by devising a program which began in 2009 when the DILG and DTI convened two working groups under the Philippine Development Forum (PDF): the working group on decentralization and local government(DLG) and the working group on growth and investment climate (GIC). Initially, the program was to streamline BPLS in as many LGUs as possible. But to do this the program had to set service standards for BPLS that LGUs can follow, develop and implement capacity building programs for LGUs as they streamline their business registration systems, organize government departments at the regional level to work with LGUs in implementing the BPLS reforms, and harmonize development partners reform initiatives on BPLS streamlining. This project laid the groundwork for scaling up reforms in 2010. When the new administration took over in 2010, no less than President Benigno Aquino III called on LGUs to look for more ways to streamline our processes to make business start-ups easier. Responding to this call, the DTI and the DILG scaled up the program and launched the Nationwide Streamlining of Business Permits and Licensing Systems (BPLS) Program on August 6, 2010, with the signing of the JMC 2010. Hence, BPLS streamlining is associated with compliance with the service standards set in the JMC for processing business registration applications. The governments BPLS program has five components, Component 0: Mobilizing Champions for the BPLS Reform Process which is a composition of Local chief executives, as reform implementers, it is important that LCEs act as local champions and provide financial and manpower support for the program. LGU leagues, BPLS reforms involve cities and municipalities that issue the Mayors permits. Support from the League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP) and the League of Municipalities of the Philippines (LMP) is needed to encourage their respective members to participate in the

program. These leagues can also provide capacity building support to members as the LMP did through its Electronic Governance for Municipal Development (eGov4MD) project. Private sector, national and local businesses, academia, and civil society organizations are important contributors to reform processes. As major beneficiaries of reforms, private business groups will be encouraged to monitor the progress of the program and participate as service providers to assist LGUs in the reform process. Concerned NGAs and their regional offices, the BPLS process involves securing permits from NGAs, so it is important that these agencies streamline their own processes, provide manpower support to LGUs business one-stop shops (BOSS), and provide coaching assistance to LGUs during the reform process. Development partners, support are needed from development partners to scale up the BPLS reforms and conduct studies for the next wave of process streamlining. Component 1: Simplification and Standardization of the BPLS Process using the ARTA as a framework, BPLS streamlining starts with process re-engineering that will enable LGUs to meet four service standards in processing registration applications: (1) use one application form; (2) limit the number of signatories; (3) reduce the number of steps; and (4) speed up processing time (see Performance Standards for a more detailed discussion of standards). Component 2: Computerization of the BPLS Process Efficient reengineering requires some form of computerization. Government is encouraging LGUs to use information technology in streamlining BPLS. Existing BPLS software includes programs widely promoted by government (e.g., e-BPLS by the National Computer Center (NCC2). With the new BPLS standards in place, government intends to redevelop e-BPLS and will review BPLS software now in the market. The objective is to assist LGUs in choosing appropriate IT solutions for streamlined BPLS processes. The NCC2 is taking the lead in this component. Component 3: Institutionalization of BPLS Reforms to ensure the sustainability of BPLS reforms, legal instruments such as local regulations should be issued to support the streamlined processes. Otherwise, every change in administration will lead to a return to old practices. The government will therefore assist in (1) setting up a monitoring and evaluation system at the LGU and at the regional and the national offices of DTI and DILG; (2) organizing local business chambers and civil society organizations for process improvements and monitoring; (3)

enjoining LGUs to work for International Organization for Standardization (ISO) certification of their BPLS; and (4) developing incentive systems to promote best practices. Component 4: Improvements in Customer Relations, the BPLS program also addresses complaints of poor service in the permitting process. Hence, after the LGUs have completed process re-engineering, they are encouraged to keep improving how they deal with the public. This entails complying with consumer protection laws, such as the Anti-Fixing Act; setting up a complaints desk; and implementing the Citizens Charter. Other areas of reform that can lead to a more customer-friendly BPLS include establishing Business One-Stop Shops (BOSS); conducting information, education, and communication campaigns; and training LGU staff in customer relations. When considering the performance standards, the most significant policy pronouncement in this decade on BPLS reform may well be JMC 2010 because it established the service standards against which LGU performance in BPLS reforms can be measured. JMC 2010 stipulates four performance standards for business registration: (1) use of a unified registration form, (2) limit on the number of steps that an applicant must take in applying for a permit, (3) limit on the processing time, and (4) limit on the number of signatories. Under Unified Business Registration Form an LGU must issue the Unified Business Registration Form. That form contains all information and approvals needed for registration and facilitates exchange of information among LGUs and NGAs. In the past, every department in the LGU required applicants to fill out separate forms. The unified form was developed by a technical working group organized by the LCP. It is based on the form used by the Philippine Business Registry (PBR), a project of the DTI that aims to centralize data from NGAs involved in business registration (e.g., DTI, BIR, Securities and Exchange Commission, and the social security agencies). JMC 2010 enjoins cities and municipalities to ensure that applicants follow five steps in securing a mayors permit, whether for new applicat ions or for business renewals: (1) Get an application form from the city or municipality; (2) File or submit the filled in form with required documents attached; (3) Undergo one-time assessment of

taxes, fees, and charges; (4) Make one-time payment of taxes, fees, and charges; and Secure the mayors permit. To be able to comply with these standard steps, JMC 2010 also recommends that LGUs adopt the following measures: Conduct inspections, in accordance with zoning and environment ordinances and building and fire safety, and health and sanitation regulations, which have been undertaken during the construction stage, within the year since issuance of the business permit. Organize joint inspection teams (JIT) composed of the BPLO, the city/municipal engineer, the city/municipal health officer or representative, the city/municipal planning officer or designated zoning officer, the city/municipal environment and natural resources officer or representative, the city/municipal treasurer, and the city/municipal fire marshal. Forge a memorandum of agreement between the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) and the city/municipality, as necessary, to implement streamlined procedures for assessing and paying fire safety inspection fees that will enable the LGUs to implement the steps above. In addition, DILG Memorandum Circular No. 2011-15 encourages LGUs to issue a conditional permit to a business in cases where the only lacking clearances are those of the SSS, Phil Health and PAG-IBIG, conditional upon the submission of the clearances after one month and the revocation or non-renewal of a business permit for failure to do so." Consistent with ARTA, cities and municipalities are enjoined to comply with prescribed times for processing and releasing business registrations: (1) Process and release new business permits in 10 days. LGUs are encouraged to strive for 5 days or less, which is the average processing time in LGUs with streamlined BPLS. This processing is classified as a complex transaction following ARTA. (2) Process and release business renewals in 5 days. LGUs are encouraged to strive for one day or less, which has been achieved in many LGUs that have streamlined their BPLS. This processing is classified as a simple transaction. Cities and municipalities shall follow the prescribed number of signatories required in processing new business applications and business renewals based on the provisions of the ARTA, which limits the number of signatures in any document to five. However, LGUs are encouraged to require only two signatories, the Mayor and the

Treasurer or the BPLO. To avoid delay in the release of permits, the Mayor may deputize alternate signatories (e.g., the Municipal or City Administrator or the BPLO). DTI and DILG have produced a manual that details the steps that LGUs may follow in streamlining BPLS. These steps include the following: (1) Pre-streamlining Activities. These activities solicit the support of stakeholders and the commitment of LCEs for the reforms. They consist of conducting orientation workshops on the reforms, securing the commitment of LCEs to making the reforms, and organizing technical working groups to make the reforms. (2) Diagnosis. This step is usually taken in selfassessment" workshops in which the LGU (1) creates a current BPLS flowchart for new registrations and renewals, (2) assesses the process vis-a-vis the standards set by government, and (3) identifies gaps and strategies for bridging the gaps. (3) Process Design. This step involves preparing the BPLS action or reform plan, which assigns responsible persons and defines budget requirements for the reforms. (4)

Institutionalization. This step ensures that the legal requisites for the reforms (e.g., executive orders and ordinances) are prepared and legislated at the local level. (5) Implementation. Implementation starts with preparation of the work plan and financial plan, and dry-runs of the streamlined process. (6) Sustaining Reforms. Ensuring the sustainability of reforms involves setting up a monitoring system that includes client satisfaction surveys and engages stakeholders, such as local business chambers and civil society groups, to monitor LGU compliance with reforms. The more progressive LGUs have sought ISO certification for their BPLS. While all cities and municipalities are enjoined to streamline their BPLS, not all LGUs can be assisted with streamlining due to limited resources. Hence, it was agreed that the program will assist only a critical mass of LGUs. An LGU will be included on the basis of the number of business establishments in the LGU, the LGUs investment potential, especially in relation to the governments four priority sectors of 2009 (i.e., agribusiness, tourism, business process outsourcing and information technology (BPOIT), and mining), The LGU's being on the list of 120 sparkplugs identified by NCC1, LGU's inclusion in the governments commitments to the Millennium Challenge Corporation and the LGUs being a recipient of projects in the development community.

Foreign Systems In Australia, they have a system called National Occupational Licensing System which is a part of a program of regulatory reform to increase Australias productivity. Currently, occupations are licensed by each state or territory with the license only covering work performed in that state. Under a national license, companies and individuals will be licensed to work anywhere in Australia, removing duplicated and inconsistent regulation between states and territories for specific occupations. The national licensing was also design to improve business efficiency and the competitiveness of the national economy, reduce red tape, improve labour mobility, enhance productivity and enhance consumer confidence and protection without imposing unnecessary costs or lessening competition. In United States, they built a system called Nationwide Mortgage Licensing System & Registry (NMLS) which is a web-based system that allows state licensed mortgage lenders, mortgage brokers, and loan officers to apply for, amend, update or renew a license online for all participating state agencies using a single set of uniform applications. NMLS brings greater uniformity and transparency to the mortgage industry while maintaining and strengthening the ability of state regulators to monitor the industry and protect their citizens. NMLS began operation on January 2, 2008. NMLS is also the system of record for the registration of depositories, subsidiaries of depositories, and MLOs under the Consumer Financial Protection Bureaus Regulation G (S.A.F.E. Mortgage Licensing Act Federal Registration of Residential Mortgage Loan Originators), published December 19, 2011. In Netherlands, they built a system called Permit-To-Work which is a proven best-practice method to maintain safety on dangerous hazardous worksites. Whenever maintenance or other work is being done, a Permit-To-Work form has to be issued before work can commence. These forms are only authorized when the necessary safety precautions have been taken. In the old days these were issued on hard-copy forms. However, protocols and safety measures have expanded, business processes have become more complex and the industry has grown. Maintaining safety with hardcopy forms became a difficult and confusing process. Whenever overview and control

are lost, the risk of accidents increases. Permit Vision restores overview and control, enabling safe operation. In Nebraska they have a system called Licensure Unit which provides Web site access to licensure information for credentialed persons, health care facilities and services and child care programs. The information on the Web site allows for verification of the status of a Nebraska issued credential (license, certification, or registration); and the licensure information is: (1) A true and correct copy of the State of Nebraska licensure database; (2) Updated nightly to reflect any changes; (3) Accessible as "read only"; and (4) Protected by a secure firewall. The GL Suite licensing system allows government agencies to automate requirements tracking, notifications and alerts, correspondence, renewals, case workflow, and all review process steps. Track & Store every notification, letter, meeting, complaint, license history, etc. View, retrieve, resend, or audit at any time. Configure page layouts, fields, forms, menus, business rules, security, searches, and more to keep your licensing system in tune with your needs. Local Systems Amellar Solutions built a system called EPS (Engineering Permits System) which makes computation of building permit fees easier and more accurate, reduces processing time for issuance of permits, increases staff time for reviewing building plans, and monitoring building construction and compliance with NBC requirements and improves records management. The major features of the system are (1) Automates the assessment, billing, and collection of engineering fees; (2) Automates the processing and issuance of building, occupancy and other related permits; (3) Automates record updates based on field inspection; (3) Provides table-based schedule of fees in accordance with the National Building Code and local ordinances; (4) Links dynamically with Amellar RPTA for cross validation and to facilitate declaration and assessment of buildings; and (5) Integrates with the Amellar MRS for automated collection and payment validation.

Another system is called iTAX or Integrated Taxation Management System which is an automated computer system with interconnected modules modeled after the local ordinances of the local government units in the Philippines. The software has been developed and maintained by a group of local experts, known as the iTAX Team, using technically advanced application software such as PowerBuilder 12.5 Classic licensed under Sybase Corporation and Firebird RDBMS 2.5.1 database. The equipment used like IBM System x3650 do an excellent performance in the development process of the system as well. These machines together with the application software are able to accept large amount of data, process them with accuracy, and produce immediate and precise information. iTAX is compatible with workstations and server equipments with Microsoft and Linux operating system. The users of iTAX are provided with system security through user account that controls the access of the system functions and especially data. eBPLS or electronic Business Permit and Licensing System is a software product and web application that enables Local Government Units (LGUs) to process business applications electronically. This system standardizes the business process flow and will provide faster turnover time in the processing. The often tedious manual processes that require much applicant follow-ups are replaced by a system that enables applications, queries on approval status, as well as remaining tax dues. It also supports Community Tax Certificate (CTC) processing which every LGU requires. Processing of other types of permits (Fishery, Motorized, Occupational, and Peddlers) is also included in the system but as of May 2008 not completed, enabled nor tested. The collections on business permits and licenses, being the primary source of income of LGUs, lay the foundation from which the plans and programs of a city or municipality are funded. Conclusion The current scheme BPLS in Quezon City Hall follows is the concept of BOSS or Business One Stop Shop, the BOSS has been implemented in most part of the

Philippines. The system is actually effective to an extent but does not maximize the time among applicants and employees. Basing on the geographical space that the Quezon City occupies in the NCR, of course it is expected that it can release at least 20 business permits per day. The proponents are looking forward to adding more with the current statistics that Quezon City BPLS has. All of the systems presented in the local and foreign section of this chapter suggest effectiveness and improvement with the field it is in, however, it is not as effective as what the proponents view it to be. The systems presented do not have the capability of having a scheduled appointment, this is extremely important if we really want to handle time maximization. For an instance Quezon City Hall can process the maximum 20 applications per day with the scheduling paving its way on the process, the proponents are looking into processing 20 applications on a per hour basis.