CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I CASE DIGEST

Tabanao, Ma. Shila B.

TITLE: Soliven Vs. Makasiar CITATION: 167 SCRA 393

FACTS: In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1) whether or not petitioners were denied due process when information for libel were filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President; and (2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause. Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot and academic. On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of Justice denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against petitioners. A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President, through the Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these developments, petitioners' contention that they have been denied the administrative remedies available under the law has lost factual support.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not petitioners were denied due process when information for libel were filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President. 2. Whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause

RULING: With respect to petitioner Beltran, the allegation of denial of due process of law in the preliminary investigation is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter- affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-

affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counteraffidavits if he is so minded. The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads: Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation. What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts. It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus, with regard to the issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained. The petitions fail to establish that public respondents, through their separate acts,

gravely abused their discretion as to amount to lack of jurisdiction. Hence, the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for cannot issue. WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions in G. R. Nos. 82585, 82827 and 83979. The Order to maintain the status quo contained in the Resolution of the Court en banc dated April 7, 1988 and reiterated in the Resolution dated April 26, 1988 is LIFTED.

TITLE: Estrada vs. Desierto CITATION: G.R. No. 146710-15. March 2, 2001

FACTS: In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by problems that slowly eroded his popularity. On October 4, 2000, Ilocos Sur Governor Chavit Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The expose immediately ignited reactions of rage. On November 13, 2000, House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. On November 20, 2000, the Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. On January 16, 2001, by a vote of 11-10, the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the second envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name Jose Velarde. The ruling was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger that hit the streets of the metropolis. Thereafter, the Armed Forces and the PNP withdrew their support to the Estrada government. Some Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries and bureau chiefs resigned from their posts. On January 20, 2001, at about 12 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. On the same day, petitioner issued a press statement that he was leaving Malacanang Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of the nation. It also appeared that on the same day, he signed a letter stating that he was transmitting a declaration that he was unable to exercise the powers and duties of his office and that by operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President. A copy of the letter was sent to Speaker Fuentebella and Senate President Pimentel on the same day. After his fall from the power, the petitioners legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President

2. Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as President

RULING: Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from a permanent disability. Resignation is a factual question. In order to have a valid resignation, there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect. In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before leaving Malacanang Palace. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions before, during and after Jan. 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. The Court had an authoritative window on the state of mind of the petitioner provided by the diary of Executive Sec. Angara serialized in the Phil. Daily Inquirer. During the first stage of negotiation between Estrada and the opposition, the topic was already about a peaceful and orderly transfer of power. The resignation of the petitioner was implied. During the second round of negotiation, the resignation of the petitioner was again treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and after the transition period. The Court held that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacanang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic, but with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of the nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to reassume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of the country; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. The Court also tackled the contention of the petitioner that he is merely temporarily unable to perform the powers and duties of the presidency, and hence is a

President on leave. The inability claim is contained in the Jan. 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent to Senate Pres. Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella. Despite said letter, the House of Representatives passed a resolution supporting the assumption into office by Arroyo as President. The Senate also passed a resolution confirming the nomination of Guingona as Vice-President. Both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioners claim of inability. The Court cannot pass upon petitioners claim of inability to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. The question is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political issue which cannot be decided by the Court without transgressing the principle of separation of powers.

TITLE: Almonte et. Al. vs. Vasquez

CITATION: G.R. No. 95367. May 2, 2001

FACTS: This is a case wherein respondent Ombudsman, requires petitioners Nerio Rogado and Elisa Rivera, as chief accountant and record custodian, respectively, of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce "all documents relating to Personal Services Funds for the year 1988" and all evidence such as vouchers from enforcing his orders. Petitioner Almonte was formerly Commissioner of the EIIB, while Perez is Chief of the EIIB's Budget and Fiscal Management Division. The subpoena duces tecum was issued by the Ombudsman in connection with his investigation of an anonymous letter alleging that funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB had been illegally disbursed. The letter, purporting to have been written by an employee of the EIIB and a concerned citizen, was addressed to the Secretary of Finance, with copies furnished several government offices, including the Office of the Ombudsman. May be erased: [The letter reads in pertinent parts: that the EIIB has a syndicate headed by the Chief of Budget Division who is manipulating funds and also the brain of the so called "ghost agents" or the "Emergency Intelligence Agents" (EIA); that when the agency had salary differential last Oct '88 all money for the whole plantilla were released and from that alone, Millions were saved and converted to ghost agents of EIA; Almost all EIIB agents collects payroll from the big time smuggler syndicate monthly and brokers every week for them not to be apprehended.] In his comment on the letter-complaint, petitioner Almonte denied all the allegations written on the anonymous letter. Petitioners move to quash the subpoena and the subpoena duces tecum but was denied. Disclosure of the documents in question is resisted with the claim of privilege of an agency of the government on the ground that "knowledge of EIIB's documents relative to its Personal Services Funds and its plantilla will necessarily lead to knowledge of its operations, movements, targets, strategies, and tactics and the whole of its being" and this could "destroy the EIIB." ISSUE:

Whether petitioners can be ordered to produce documents relating to personal services and salary vouchers of EIIB employees on the plea that such documents are classified without violating their equal protection of laws.

RULING:

YES. At common law a governmental privilege against disclosure is recognized with respect to state secrets bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters and in addition, privilege to withhold the identity of persons who furnish information of violation of laws. In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the production of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. Indeed, EIIB's function is the gathering and evaluation of intelligence reports and information regarding "illegal activities affecting the national economy, such as, but not limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar salting." Consequently, while in cases which involve state secrets it may be sufficient to determine from the circumstances of the case that there is reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters without compelling production, no similar excuse can be made for a privilege resting on other considerations. The Ombudsman is investigating a complaint that several items in the EIIB were filled by fictitious persons and that the allotments for these items in 1988 were used for illegal purposes. The plantilla and other personnel records are relevant to his investigation as the designated protectors of the people of the Constitution. Nor is there violation of petitioners' right to the equal protection of the laws. Petitioners complain that "in all forum and tribunals the aggrieved parties can only hale respondents via their verified complaints or sworn statements with their identities fully disclosed," while in proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman anonymous letters suffice to start an investigation. In the first place, there can be no objection to this procedure because it is provided in the Constitution itself. In the second place, it is apparent that in permitting the filing of complaints "in any form and in a manner," the framers of the Constitution took into account the wellknown reticence of the people which keep them from complaining against official wrongdoings. As this Court had occasion to point out, the Office of the Ombudsman is different from the other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the government because those subject to its jurisdiction are public officials who, through official pressure and influence, can quash, delay or dismiss investigations

held against them. On the other hand complainants are more often than not poor and simple folk who cannot afford to hire lawyers. Finally, it is contended that the issuance of the subpoena duces tecum would violate petitioners' right against self-incrimination. It is enough to state that the documents required to be produced in this case are public records and those to whom the subpoena duces tecum is directed are government officials in whose possession or custody the documents are. Moreover, if, as petitioners claim the disbursement by the EII of funds for personal service has already been cleared by the COA, there is no reason why they should object to the examination of the documents by respondent Ombudsman.

TITLE: DOROMAL VS. SANDIGANBAYAN CITATION: G. R. NO. 85468, SEPTEMBER 07, 1989

FACTS: Quintin S. Doromal, a former Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019), Sec. 3(h), in connection with his shareholdings and position as president and director of the Doromal International Trading Corporation (DITC) which submitted bids to supply P61 million worth of electronic, electrical, automotive, mechanical and airconditioning equipment to the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (or DECS) and the National Manpower and Youth Council (or NMYC). An information was then filed by the Tanodbayan against Doromal for the said violation and a preliminary investigation was conducted. The petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition questioning the jurisdiction of the Tanodbayan to file the information without the approval of the Ombudsman. The Supreme Court held that the incumbent Tanodbayan (called Special Prosecutor under the 1987 Constitution and who is supposed to retain powers and duties NOT GIVEN to the Ombudsman) is clearly without authority to conduct preliminary investigations and to direct the filing of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan, except upon orders of the Ombudsman. Subsequently annulling the information filed by the Tanodbayan. A new information, duly approved by the Ombudsman, was filed in the Sandiganbayan, alleging that the Doromal, a public officer, being then a Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good Government, did then and there willfully and unlawfully, participate in a business through the Doromal International Trading Corporation, a family corporation of which he is the President, and which company participated in the biddings conducted by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports and the National Manpower & Youth Council, which act or participation is prohibited by law and the constitution. The petitioner filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that it was invalid since there had been no preliminary investigation for the new information that was filed against him. The motion was denied by Sandiganbayan claiming that another preliminary investigation is unnecessary because both old and new information involve the same subject matter.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the act of Doromal would constitute a violation of the Constitution. 2. Whether or not preliminary investigation is necessary even if both information involve the same subject matter. 3. Whether or not the information shall be effected as invalid due to the absence of preliminary investigation. RULING: Yes, as to the first and second issues. No, as to the third issue. Petition was granted by the Supreme Court. RATIO: (1) The presence of a signed document bearing the signature of Doromal as part of the application to bid shows that he can rightfully be charged with having participated in a business which act is absolutely prohibited by Section 13 of Article VII of the Constitution" because "the DITC remained a family corporation in which Doromal has at least an indirect interest." Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "the President, VicePresident, the members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants shall not during there tenure, directly or indirectly... participate in any business. (2) The right of the accused to a preliminary investigation is "a substantial one." Its denial over his opposition is a "prejudicial error, in that it subjects the accused to the loss of life, liberty, or property without due process of law" provided by the Constitution. Since the first information was annulled, the preliminary investigation conducted at that time shall also be considered as void. Due to that fact, a new preliminary investigation must be conducted. (3) The absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the case. Nor do they impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective; but, if there were no preliminary investigations and the defendants, before entering their plea, invite the attention of the court to their absence, the court, instead of dismissing the information should conduct such investigation, order the fiscal to conduct it or remand the case to the inferior court so that the preliminary investigation may be conducted.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted. The Sandiganbayan shall immediately remand Criminal Case No. 12893 to the Office of the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation and shall hold in abeyance the proceedings before it pending the result of such investigation.

TITLE: Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary CITATION: 194 SCRA 317

FACTS: On 25 July 1987, Cory issued EO 284 which allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions subject to limitations set therein. The CLU excepted this EO averring that such law is unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by CLU on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Art 7 other than those provided in the Constitution; CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.

RULING: Sec 13, Art 7 provides: Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment in the government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to posts held without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples during the debate and deliberation on the

general rule laid down for all appointive officials should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override the constitutions manifest intent and the peoples understanding thereof. In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than 2 positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.

TITLE: Joseph Estrada vs. Arroyo CITATION: G.R. NO. 146738

FACTS: Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President. From the beginning of Eraps term, he was plagued by problems that slowly but surely eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power started on October 4, 2000. Singson, a longtime friend of the Estrada, went on air and accused the Estrada, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 19, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable. At1:20 p.m., the petitioner informed Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, had defected. January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately discharged the powers and duties of the Presidency. After his fall from the pedestal of power, the Eraps legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.

ISSUE: Whether or not Arroyo is a legitimate (de jure) president.

RULING: The SC holds that the resignation of Estrada cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacaang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country.

Estradas reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioners valedictory, his final act of farewell.

His presidency is now in the past tense. Even if Erap can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.

TITLE: Marcos vs. Manglapus CITATION: 177 SCRA 668 AND 178 SCRA 760

FACTS: Ferdinand E. Marcos who was deposed from his seat through the EDSA people power revolution was forced into exile in 1986. When Marcos was dying, he wished to return to the country along with his family. However, Pres. Aquino, the president under the revolutionary government, stood in his way and contended that Marcos cannot return to the country considering that his return would be a threat to the stability of the government and the countrys economy which was just beginning to rise and moving forward. The Marcoses assert that their right to return to the country is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution and that under the international law, the right of Marcos and his family to return to the Philippines is guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. ISSUE: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

RULING: Section 6 of the Bill of Rights state categorically that the liberty of abode and of changing the same with limits prescribed by law may be impaired only upon lawful order of the court. Not by an executive officer. Not even by the President. Sec 6 further provides that the right to travel, and this obviously includes to travel out of or back in to the Philippines, cannot be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.

It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to one's country, a totally distinct right under the international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International covenant on Civil and Political rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave a country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically

guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law and under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land. However, it is distinct and separate form the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant and Political Rights, i.e. against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof.

The resolution of the problem is made difficult because the persons who seek to return to the country are the deposed dictator and his family at whose door the travails of the country are laid and from whom billions of dollars believed to be illgotten wealth are sought to be recovered. The constitutional guarantees they invoke are neither absolute nor flexible. For the exercise of even the preferred freedoms of speech and of expression, although couched in absolute terms, admits of limits and must be adjusted to the requirements of equally important public interests.

The preservation of the State - the fruition of the people's sovereignty - is an obligation in the highest order. The President, sworn to preserve and defend the constitution and to see the faithful execution of the laws, cannot shirk from that responsibility. The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years after the Marcos regime.

The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant petition was DISMISSED.

TITLE: Biraogo, et. Al. vs. Philippine Truth Commission CITATION: G.R. No. 192935

FACTS:

After a month in office, President Benigno Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 1 (E.O. 1) on July 30, 2010 creating the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC). The PTC was tasked to conduct a thorough fact-finding investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption involving third level public officers during the administration of Aquino's predecessor Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and thereafter submit its findings and recommendations to the Office of the President, Congress, and the Ombudsman. Private citizen Louis Biraogo and a group of congressmen led by Lakas Kampi CMD chairman Rep. Edcel Lagman filed in the Supreme Court separate petitions for certiorari and prohibition assailing the constitutionality of E.O. 1 based on their belief that the creation of the PTC constitutes usurpation of the legislative power to create public office, threatens the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman, and violates the equal protection clause of the Philippine Constitution for specifically targeting certain officials of the Arroyo administration.

ISSUES: 1. Whether the president can create public office such as the PTC without usurping the powers of Congress; 2. Whether the PTC supplants the powers already vested on the Ombudsman and the Department of Justice (DOJ); and, 3. Whether the purpose of the PTC transgresses the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws.

RULING:

The president has the authority to create the Truth Commission Majority of the members of the Supreme Court rejected the justification of the Solicitor General (OSG) that the creation of the PTC finds basis on the presidents power of control over all executive offices. The Decision stressed that control is essentially the power to alter, modify, nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter. Clearly, the power of control is

entirely different from the power to create public offices. The majority also rejected the OSGs claim that that the E.O. finds basis under sec. 31 of the Administrative Code, which authorizes the president to restructure the Office of the President. Clearly, restructure under the said provision refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation or abolition of offices by reason of economy or redundancy. This presupposes an already existing office. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much less envisioned in said provision. Nonetheless, the ponencia agreed with the argument of the OSG that the presidents power to create the PTC may find justification under the presidents duty under sec. 17, Article VII of the Constitution to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. The Court held that while it is true that the authority of the president to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes, it does not necessarily mean that he does not have such authority. The president has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees (whether from past or present administrations) faithfully comply with the law. The purpose of ad hoc investigating bodies such as the PTC is to allow an inquiry into matters which the president is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. The PTC will not erode the powers or independence of the Ombudsman The Court also held that the investigative function of the commission will not supplant nor threaten the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. If at all, it will complement the functions of the Ombudsman and the Department of Justice. As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the function of the PTC is merely to recommend prosecution, which is just a consequence of its fact-finding investigation. The actual prosecution of suspected offenders, much less adjudication on the merits of the charges against them, is certainly not a function given to the PTC. The purpose of the PTC offends the equal protection clause While the Court was almost unanimous in holding that the president indeed had the authority to create the PTC and that it would not unduly duplicate the powers of the Ombudsman, nine (9) of the justices joined Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza in refusing to uphold the constitutionality of E.O. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in sec. 1, Art. III of the Constitution. Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio was joined by four (4) others in their strong dissent. Laying down a long line of precedents, the ponencia reiterated that equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike,

both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person against intentional and arbitrary discrimination. Applying this precept, the majority held that E.O. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The Decision stressed that the clear mandate of the PTC is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the questioned executive order. The Arroyo administration, according to the ponencia, is just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation gave the majority an impression that the PTC is just being used as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution and that E.O. 1 is only an adventure in partisan hostility. While the Court recognized that the creation of the PTC was inspired with noble intentions, the ponencia nonetheless reminded the government of the ethical principle that the end does not justify the means. It emphatically closed by stressing that the search for the truth must be within constitutional bounds, for ours is still a government of laws and not of men.

TITLE:

DENR VS. DENR EMPLOYEES

CITATION: G.R. NO. 149725. AUGUST 19, 2003

FACTS:

Respondents, employees of the DENR Region XII who are members of the employees association, COURAGE, represented by their Acting President, Baguindanai A. Karim, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato, a petition for nullity of orders with prayer for preliminary injunction. On December 8, 1999, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining petitioner from implementing the assailed Memorandum. The defendants DENR Secretary Antonio H. Cerilles and Regional Executive Director Israel C. Gaddi were ordered to cease and desist from doing the act complained of, namely, to stop the transfer of DENR [Region] 12 offices from Cotabato City to Korandal (Marbel), South Cotabato. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Dismiss, raising the following grounds: (1) The power to transfer the Regional Office of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) is executive in nature. (2) The decision to transfer the Regional Office is based on Executive Order No. 429, which reorganized Region XII. (3) The validity of EO 429 has been affirmed by the Honorable Supreme Court in the Case of Chiongbian vs. Orbos (1995) 245 SCRA 255. (4) Since the power to reorganize the Administrative Regions is Executive in Nature citing Chiongbian, the Honorable Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this petition. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order dated April 10, 2000. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was filed before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 58896. The petition was dismissed outright for: (1) failure to submit a written explanation why personal service was not done on the adverse party; (2) failure to attach affidavit of service; (3) failure to indicate the material dates when copies of the orders of the lower court were received; (4) failure to attach certified true copy of the order denying petitioners motion for reconsideration; (5) for improper verification, the same being based on petitioners knowledge and belief, and (6) wrong remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 to substitute a lost appeal. In essence, petitioner argues that the trial court erred in enjoining it from causing the transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices, considering that it was done pursuant to DENR Administrative Order 99-14.

ISSUE: Whether DAO-99-14 and the Memorandum implementing the same were valid?

Whether the DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR?

RULING: As head of the Executive Department, the President cannot be expected to exercise his control (and supervisory) powers personally all the time. He may delegate some of his powers to the Cabinet members except when he is required by the Constitution to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he acts personally Applying the doctrine of qualified political agency, the power of the President to reorganize the National Government may validly be delegated to his cabinet members exercising control over a particular executive department. Thus, in DOTC Secretary v. Mabalot,[21] we held that the President through his duly constituted political agent and alter ego, the DOTC Secretary may legally and validly decree the reorganization of the Department, particularly the establishment of DOTC-CAR as the LTFRB Regional Office at the Cordillera Administrative Region, with the concomitant transfer and performance of public functions and responsibilities appurtenant to a regional office of the LTFRB. Similarly, in the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by ordering the transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato. The exercise of this authority by the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego, is presumed to be the acts of the President for the latter had not expressly repudiated the same. In Chiongbian v. Orbos, this Court stressed the rule that the power of the President to reorganize the administrative regions carries with it the power to determine the regional centers. In identifying the regional centers, the President purposely intended the effective delivery of the field services of government agencies. The same intention can be gleaned from the preamble of the assailed DAO-99-14 which the DENR sought to achieve, that is, to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the DENR in delivering its services. It may be true that the transfer of the offices may not be timely considering that: (1) there are no buildings yet to house the regional offices in Koronadal, (2) the transfer falls on the month of Ramadan, (3) the children of the affected employees are already enrolled in schools in Cotabato City, (4) the Regional Development Council was not consulted, and (5) the Sangguniang Panglungsond, through a resolution, requested the DENR Secretary to reconsider the orders. However, these concern issues addressed to the wisdom of the transfer rather than to its legality. It is basic in our form of government that the judiciary cannot inquire into the

wisdom

or

expediency

of

the

acts

of

the

executive

or

the

legislative

department,[24] for each department is supreme and independent of the others, and each is devoid of authority not only to encroach upon the powers or field of action assigned to any of the other department, but also to inquire into or pass upon the advisability or wisdom of the acts performed, measures taken or decisions made by the other departments. The Supreme Court should not be thought of as having been tasked with the awesome responsibility of overseeing the entire bureaucracy. Unless there is a clear showing of constitutional infirmity or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the Courts exercise of the judicial power, pervasive and limitless it may seem to be, still must succumb to the paramount doctrine of separation of powers.[26] After a careful review of the records of the case, we find that this jurisprudential element of abuse of discretion has not been shown to exist. In view of the foregoing, the petition for review was granted. The resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 58896 dated May 31, 2000 and August 20, 2001, as well as the decision dated January 14, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City, Branch 15, in Civil Case No 389, were REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The permanent injunction, which enjoined the petitioner from enforcing the Memorandum Order of the DENR XII Regional Executive Director was lifted.

TITLE: Mondano vs. Silvosa CITATION: 97 Phil. 143

FACTS:

Mondano was the mayor of Mainit, Surigao. A complaint was filed against him for rape and concubinage. The information reached the Assistant Executive Secretary who ordered the governor to investigate the matter. Silvosa then summoned Mondano and the latter appeared before him. Thereafter Silvosa suspended Mondano. Mondano filed a petition for prohibition enjoining the governor from further proceeding. Silvosa invoked the RAC which provided that he, as part of the executive and by virtue o the order given by the Asst Exec Sec, is with direct control, direction, and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction . . . and to that end may order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office under his Department and in connection therewith may appoint a committee or designate an official or person who shall conduct such investigations.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Governor can exercise the power of control.

RULING: The executive departments of the Government created and organized before the approval of the Constitution continued to exist as authorized by law until the Congress shall provide otherwise. The Constitution provides: The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed. Under this constitutional provision the President has been invested with the power of control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, but not of all local governments over which he has been granted only the power of general supervision as may be provided by law. The Department head as agent of the President has direct control and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction as provided for in section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code, but he does not have the same control of local governments as that exercised by him over bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction. Likewise, his authority to order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office under his department is confined to bureaus or offices under his jurisdiction and does not extend to local governments over which, as already stated, the President exercises only general supervision as may be provided by law. If the provisions of section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code are to be construed as conferring upon the

corresponding department head direct control, direction, and supervision over all local governments and that for that reason he may order the investigation of an official of a local government for malfeasance in office, such interpretation would be contrary to the provisions of par 1, sec 10, Article 7, of the 1935 Constitution. If general supervision over all local governments is to be construed as the same power granted to the Department Head in sec 79 (c) of the RAC, then there would no longer be a distinction or difference between the power of control and that of supervision. In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. Such is the import of the provisions of sec 79 (c) of the RAC. The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision over municipal officials in the provincial governor who is authorized to receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude. And if the charges are serious, he shall submit written charges touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either personally or by registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge be one affecting the official integrity of the officer in question. Sec 86 of the Revised Administrative Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be exercised by the Department Head over the administration of municipalities. If it be construed that it does and such additional power is the same authority as that vested in the Department Head by sec 79 (c) of the RAC, then such additional power must be deemed to have been abrogated by sec10(1), Article 7, of the Constitution.

TITLE: Villena vs. Secretary of the Interior CITATION: 67 Phil. 451

FACTS: Villena was the then mayor of Makati. After investigation, the Secretary of Interior recommended the suspension of Villena with the Office of the president who

approved the same. The Secretary then suspended Villena. Villena averred claiming that the Secretary has no jurisdiction over the matter. The power or jurisdiction is lodged in the local government [the governor] pursuant to sec 2188 of the Administrative Code. Further, even if the respondent Secretary of the Interior has power of supervision over local governments, that power, according to the constitution, must be exercised in accordance with the provisions of law and the provisions of law governing trials of charges against elective municipal officials are those contained in sec 2188 of the Administrative Code as amended. In other words, the Secretary of the Interior must exercise his supervision over local governments, if he has that power under existing law, in accordance with sec 2188 of the Administrative Code, as amended, as the latter provisions govern the procedure to be followed in suspending and punishing elective local officials while sec 79 (C) of the Administrative Code is the genera law which must yield to the special law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Interior can suspend an LGU official under investigation.

RULING: There is no clear and express grant of power to the secretary to suspend a mayor of a municipality who is under investigation. On the contrary, the power appears lodged in the provincial governor by sec 2188 of the Administrative Code which provides that The provincial governor shall receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude. The fact, however, that the power of suspension is expressly granted by sec 2188 of the Administrative Code to the provincial governor does not mean that the grant is necessarily exclusive and precludes the Secretary of the Interior from exercising a similar power. For instance, counsel for the petitioner admitted in the oral argument that the President of the Philippines may himself suspend the petitioner from office in virtue of his greater power of removal (sec. 2191, as amended, Administrative Code) to be exercised conformably to law. Indeed, if the President could, in the manner prescribed by law, remove a municipal official; it would be a legal incongruity if he were to be devoid of the lesser power of suspension. And the incongruity would be

more patent if, possessed of the power both to suspend and to remove a provincial official (sec. 2078, Administrative Code), the President were to be without the power to suspend a municipal official. The power to suspend a municipal official is not exclusive. Preventive suspension may be issued to give way for an impartial investigation.

TITLE: Lacson-Magallanes Co. Inc. vs. Pano CITATION: 21 SCRA 895

FACTS: Magallanes was permitted to use and occupy a land used for pasture in Davao. The said land was a forest zone which was later declared as an agricultural zone.

Magallanes then ceded his rights to LMC of which he is a co-owner. Pao was a farmer who asserted his claim over the same piece of land. The Director of Lands denied Paos request. The Secretary of Agriculture likewise denied his petition hence it was elevated to the Office of the President. Exec Sec Pajo ruled in favor of Pao. LMC averred that the earlier decision of the Secretary is already conclusive hence beyond appeal. He also averred that the decision of the Executive Secretary is an undue delegation of power. The Constitution, LMC asserts, does not contain any provision whereby the presidential power of control may be delegated to the Executive Secretary. It is argued that it is the constitutional duty of the President to act personally upon the matter.

ISSUE: Whether or not the power of control may be delegated to the Exec Sec and may it be further delegated by the Executive Secretary.

RULING: The Presidents duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. is his control of all executive departments. So, too,

Thus it is, that department heads are

men of his confidence. His is the power to appoint them; his, too, is the privilege to dismiss them at pleasure. Naturally, he controls and directs their acts. Implicit then is his authority to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his department secretaries. In this context, it may not be said that the President cannot rule on the correctness of a decision of a department secretary. Parenthetically, it may be stated that the right to appeal to the President reposes upon the Presidents power of control over the executive departments. And control simply means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.

It is correct to say that constitutional powers there are which the President must exercise in person. Not as correct, however, is it to say that the Chief Reason is not wanting for this Executive may not delegate to his Executive Secretary acts which the Constitution does not command that he perform in person. view. The President is not expected to perform in person all the multifarious executive and administrative functions. The office of the Executive Secretary is an

auxiliary unit which assists the President. The rule which has thus gained recognition is that under our constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by authority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, including the Director of Lands, may issue.

TITLE: Ganzon vs Court of Appeals CITATION: 200 SCRA 271

FACTS: Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10 complaints were filed against him on grounds of misconduct and misfeasance of office. The Secretary of Local Government issued a 600 day suspension against Ganzon based on the merits of the complaints filed against him. Ganzon appealed the issue to the CA and the CA

affirmed the suspension order by the Secretary. Ganzon asserted that the 1987 Constitution does not authorize the President nor any of his alter ego to suspend and remove local officials; this is because the 1987 Constitution supports local autonomy and strengthens the same. What was given by the present Constitution was mere supervisory power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the Presidents alter ego, can suspend and or remove local officials.

RULING: Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally, supervision is not incompatible with disciplinary authority. The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision by the President over local government officials in contrast to the power of control given to him over executive officials of our government wherein it was emphasized that the two terms, control and supervision, are two different things which differ one from the other in meaning and extent. In administration law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. But from this pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the President over local government officials does not include the power of investigation when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires.

The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of the president, in suspending Ganzon is exercising a valid power. He however overstepped by imposing a 600 day suspension.

TITLE: DADOLE VS COMMISSION ON AUDIT CITATION: G.R. NO. 125350. DECEMBER 3, 2002

FACTS: In 1986, the RTC and MTC judges of Mandaue City started receiving monthly allowances of P1,260 each through the yearly appropriation ordinance enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the said city. In 1991, Mandaue City increased the amount to P1,500 for each judge. On March 15, 1994, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued the disputed Local Budget Circular No. 55 (LBC 55)

which provided that - In the light of the authority granted to the local government units under the Local Government Code to provide for additional allowances and other benefits to national government officials and employees assigned in their locality, such additional allowances in the form of honorarium at rates not exceeding P1,000.00 in provinces and cities and P700.00 in municipalities may be granted subject to the following conditions: a) That the grant is not mandatory on the part of the LGUs; b) That all contractual and statutory obligations of the LGU including the implementation of R.A. 6758 shall have been fully provided in the budget; c) That the budgetary requirements/limitations under Section 324 and 325 of R.A. 7160 should be satisfied and/or complied with; and d) That the LGU has fully implemented the devolution of functions/personnel in accordance with R.A. 7160. Acting on the DBM directive, the Mandaue City Auditor issued notices of disallowance to herein petitioners, namely, Honorable RTC Judges Mercedes G. Dadole, Ulric R. Caete, Agustin R. Vestil, Honorable MTC Judges Temistocles M. Boholst, Vicente C. Fanilag and Wilfredo A. Dagatan, in excess of the amount authorized by LBC 55. Beginning October, 1994, the additional monthly allowances of the petitioner judges were reduced to P1,000 each. 1994. The petitioner judges filed with the Office of the City Auditor a protest against the notices of disallowance. But the City Auditor treated the protest as a motion for reconsideration and indorsed the same to the COA Regional Office No. 7. In turn, the COA Regional Office referred the motion to the recommendation that the same be denied. On September 21, 1995, respondent COA rendered a decision denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. On November 27, 1995, Executive Judge Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, for and in behalf of the petitioner judges, filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the COA. In a resolution dated May 28, 1996, the COA denied the motion. head office with a They were also asked to reimburse the amount they received in excess of P1,000 from April to September,

ISSUE: Whether or not the administrative circular or guideline such as Local Budget Circular No. 55 render inoperative the power of the legislative body of a city by setting a limit To the extent of the exercise of such power?

RULING: According to respondent COA, even if LBC 55 were void, the ordinances enacted by Mandaue City granting additional allowances to the petitioner judges would still (be) bereft of legal basis for want of a lawful source of funds considering that the IRA cannot be used for such purposes. Respondent COA showed that Mandaue Citys funds consisted of locally generated revenues and the IRA. From 1989 to 1995, Mandaue Citys yearly expenditures exceeded its locally generated revenues, thus resulting in a deficit. During all those years, it was the IRA that enabled Mandaue City to incur a surplus. Respondent avers that Mandaue City used its IRA to pay for said additional allowances and this violated paragraph 2 of the Special Provisions, page 1060, of RA 7845 (The General Appropriations Act of 1995)1[12] and paragraph 3 of the Special Provision, page 1225, of RA 7663 (The General Appropriations Act of 1994)2[13] which specifically identified the objects of expenditure of the IRA. Nowhere in said provisions of the two budgetary laws does it say that the IRA can be used for additional allowances of judges. Respondent COA thus argues that the provisions in the ordinance providing for such disbursement are against the law, considering that the grant of the subject allowances is not within the specified use allowed by the aforesaid yearly appropriations acts. Respondent COA failed to prove that Mandaue City used the IRA to spend for the additional allowances of the judges. There was no evidence submitted by COA showing the breakdown of the expenses of the city government and the funds used for said expenses. All the COA presented were the amounts expended, the locally generated revenues, the deficit, the surplus and the IRA received each year. Aside from these items, no data or figures were presented to show that Mandaue City deducted the subject allowances from the IRA. In other words, just because Mandaue Citys locally generated revenues were not enough to cover its expenditures, this did not mean that the additional allowances of petitioner judges were taken from the IRA and not from the citys own revenues.

Moreover, the DBM neither conducted a formal review nor ordered a disapproval of Mandaue Citys appropriation ordinances, in accordance with the procedure outlined by Sections 326 and 327 of RA 7160 which provide that: Section 326. Review of Appropriation Ordinances of Provinces, Highly Urbanized Cities, Independent Component Cities, and Municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila Area. The Department of Budget and Management shall review ordinances authorizing the annual or supplemental appropriations of provinces, highlyurbanized cities, independent component cities, and municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila Area in accordance with the immediately succeeding Section. Section 327. Review of Appropriation Ordinances of Component Cities and Municipalities.The sangguniang panlalawigan shall review the ordinance authorizing annual or supplemental appropriations of component cities and municipalities in the same manner and within the same period prescribed for the review of other ordinances. If within ninety (90) days from receipt of copies of such ordinance, the sangguniang panlalawigan takes no action thereon, the same shall be deemed to have been reviewed in accordance with law and shall continue to be in full force and effect. Within 90 days from receipt of the copies of the appropriation ordinance, the DBM should have taken positive action. Otherwise, such ordinance was deemed to have been properly reviewed and deemed to have taken effect. Inasmuch as, in the instant case, the DBM did not follow the appropriate procedure for reviewing the subject ordinance of Mandaue City and allowed the 90-day period to lapse, it can no longer question the legality of the provisions in the said ordinance granting additional allowances to judges stationed in the said city. The petition was granted and the assailed decision and resolution, dated September 21, 1995 and May 28, 1996, respectively, of the Commission on Audit were set aside.

TITLE:

GPI VS. SPRINGER

CITATION: 50 PHIL 259. APRIL 1, 1927

FACTS:

Sometime in the 1900s, the National Coal Company (NCC) was created by the Philippine Congress. The law created it (Act No. 2822) provides that: The voting power shall be vested exclusively in a committee consisting of the GovernorGeneral, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. In November 1926, the Governor-General (Leonard Wood) issued E.O. No. 37 which divested the voting rights of the Senate President and House Speaker in the NCC. The EO emphasized that the voting right should be solely lodged in the Governor-General who is the head of the government (President at that time was considered the head of state but does not manage government affairs). A copy of the said EO was furnished to the Senate President and the House Speaker. However, in December 1926, NCC held its elections and the Senate President as well as the House Speaker, notwithstanding EO No. 37 and the objection of the Governor-General, still elected Milton Springer and four others as Board of Directors of NCC. Thereafter, a quo warranto proceeding in behalf of the government was filed against Springer et al questioning the validity of their election into the Board of NCC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Senate President as well as the House Speaker can validly elect the Board Members of NCC?

RULING: E.O. No 37 is valid. It is in accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers. The Supreme Court emphasized that the legislature creates the public office but it has nothing to do with designating the persons to fill the office. Appointing persons to a public office is essentially executive. The NCC is a government owned and controlled corporation. It was created by Congress. To extend the power of Congress into allowing it, through the Senate President and the House Speaker, to appoint members of the NCC is already an invasion of executive powers. The Supreme Court however notes that indeed there are exceptions to this rule where the legislature may appoint persons to fill public office. Such exception can be found in the appointment by the legislature of persons to fill offices within the legislative branch this exception is allowable because it does not weaken the executive branch.

Every other consideration to one side, this remains certainThe congress of the United States clearly intended that the Governor- Generals power should be commensurate with his responsibility. The Congress never intended that the Governor-General should be saddled with the responsibility of administering the government and of executing the laws but shorn of the power to do so. The interests of the Philippines will be best served by strict adherence to the basic principles of constitutional government. There was no hesitancy in concluding that so much of section 4 of Act No. 2705, as amended by section 2 of Act No. 2822, as purports to vest the voting power of the government-owned stock in the National Coal Company in the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, is unconstitutional and void. It results, therefore, in the demurrer being overruled, and as it would be impracticable for the defendants to answer, judgment shall be rendered ousting and excluding them from the offices of directors of the National Coal Company.

TITLE: Sarmiento v. Mison CITATION: 156 SCRA 549

FACTS: Petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the IBP and professors of Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin Salvador Mison from performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Guillermo Carague, as

Secretary of the Department of Budget, from effecting disbursements in payment of Misons salaries and emoluments, on the ground that Misons appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The respondents, on the other hand, maintain the constitutionality of Misons appointment without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. The Supreme Court held that the President has the authority to appoint Mison as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs without submitting his nomination to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation, and thus, the latter is entitled the full authority and functions of the office and receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto. Thus, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and the petition in intervention, without costs.

ISSUE: Whether the appointments of Mison et. al. is unconstitutional?

RULING:

No. Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution empowers the President to appoint 4 groups of officers: (1) the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; (2) all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; (3) those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and (4) officers lower in rank 4 whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. The first group is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President appoints. The second and third groups of officers can be made by the President without the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments, as can be determined through the recorded proceedings of Constitutional Commission. It is an accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated. In the case at bar, it would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the

consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. A constitutional provision must be presumed to have been framed and adopted in the light and understanding of prior and existing laws and with reference to them. Courts are bound to presume that the people adopting a constitution are familiar with the previous and existing laws upon the subjects to which its provisions relate, and upon which they express their judgment and opinion in its adoption. In the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential appointments required the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. Under the 1935 Constitution, the commission was frequently transformed into a venue of horse- trading and similar malpractices. On the other hand, the 1973 Constitution, consistent with the authoritarian pattern in which it was molded and remolded by successive amendments, placed the absolute power of appointment in the President with hardly any check on the part of the legislature. Given the above two in extremes, one, in the 1935 Constitution and the other, in the 1973 Constitution, it is not difficult for the Court to state that the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, struck a middle ground by requiring the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments for the first group of appointments and leaving to the President, without such confirmation, the appointment of other officers, i.e., those in the second and third groups as well as those in the fourth group, i.e., officers of lower rank. The proceedings in the 1986 Constitutional Commission support this conclusion. The word also could mean in addition; as well; besides, too besides in like manner which meanings could stress that the word also in said second sentence means that the President, in addition to nominating and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appointing the officers enumerated in the first sentence, can appoint (without such consent or confirmation) the officers mentioned in the second sentence, contrary to the interpretation that the President shall appoint the officers mentioned in said second sentence in the same manner as he appoints officers mentioned in the first sentence. Rather than limit the area of consideration to the possible meanings of the word also as used in the context of said second sentence, the Court has chosen to derive significance from the fact that the first sentence speaks of nomination by the President and appointment by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, whereas, the second sentence speaks only of appointment by the President. And, this use of different language in 2 sentences proximate to each other underscores a difference in message conveyed and perceptions established. Thus, words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition. The power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in character. Limitations on or qualifications of such power should be strictly construed. Such limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order

to be recognized. In the case at bar, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII clearly stated that appointments by the President to the positions therein enumerated require the consent of the Commission on Appointments. After a careful study of the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the Court found the use of the word alone after the word President in said third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII is, more than anything else, a slip or laps us in draftmanship. In the 1987 Constitution, the clear and expressed intent of its framers was to exclude presidential appointments from confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, except appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence. Consequently, there was no reason to use in the third sentence the word alone after the word President in providing that Congress may by law vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President alone, or in the courts, or in the heads of departments, because the power to appoint officers whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint is already vested in him, without need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, in the second sentence. The word alone in the third sentence, as a literal import from the last part of par. 3, section 10, Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, appears to be redundant in the light of the second sentence. This redundancy cannot prevail over the clear and positive intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that presidential appointments, except those mentioned in the first sentence, are not subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required. The 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the position of heads of bureaus from appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. Moreover, the President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (RA 1937, Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, Section 601, as amended by PD34 on 27 October 1972). RA 1937 and PD 34 were approved during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, under which the President may nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of bureaus, like the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. After the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, however, RA 1937 and PD 34 have to be read in harmony with Sec. 16, Art. VII, with the result that, while the appointment of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is one that devolves on the President, as an appointment he is authorized by law to make, such appointment, however, no longer needs the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.

TITLE: Concepcion-Bautista vs. Salonga CITATION: 172 SCRA 160

FACTS: On 27 Aug 1987, Cory designated Bautista as the Acting Chairwoman of CHR. In December of the same year, Cory made the designation of Bautista permanent. The CoA, ignoring the decision in the Mison case, averred that Bautista cannot take

her seat w/o their confirmation. Cory, through the Exec Sec, filed with the CoA communications about Bautistas appointment on 14 Jan 1989. Bautista refused to be placed under the CoAs review hence she filed a petition before the SC. On the other hand, Mallillin invoked EO 163-A stating that since CoA refused Bautistas appointment, Bautista should be removed. EO 163-A provides that the tenure of the Chairman and the Commissioners of the CHR should be at the pleasure of the President.

ISSUE: Whether or not Bautistas appointment is subject to Commission on Audit confirmation.

RULING: Since the position of Chairman of the CHR is not among the positions mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. 7 of the 1987 Constitution, appointments to which are to be made with the confirmation of the CoA it follows that the appointment by the President of the Chairman of the CHR is to be made without the review or participation of the CoA. To be more precise, the appointment of the Chairman and Members of the CHR is not specifically provided for in the Constitution itself, unlike the Chairmen and Members of the CSC, the CoE and the COA, whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution in the President with the consent of the CoA. The President appoints the Chairman and Members of the CHR pursuant to the second sentence in Sec 16, Art. 7, that is, without the confirmation of the CoA because they are among the officers of government whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint. And Sec 2(c), EO 163 authorizes the President to appoint the Chairman and Members of the CHR. Because of the fact that the president submitted to the CoA on 14 Jan 1989 the appointment of Bautista, the CoA argued that the president though she has the sole prerogative to make CHR appointments may from time to time ask confirmation with the CoA. This is untenable according to the SC. The Constitution has blocked off certain appointments for the President to make with the participation of the Commission on Appointments, so also has the Constitution mandated that the President can confer no power of participation in the Commission on Appointments over other appointments exclusively reserved for her by the Constitution. The

exercise of political options that finds no support in the Constitution cannot be sustained. Further, EVEN IF ON THE PRESIDENT MAY AN VOLUNTARILY SUBMIT TO THE THE

COMMISSION

APPOINTMENTS

APPOINTMENT

THAT

UNDER

CONSTITUTION SOLELY BELONGS TO HER, STILL, THERE WAS NO VACANCY TO WHICH AN APPOINTMENT COULD BE MADE ON 14 JANUARY 1989. There can be no ad interim appointments in the CHR for the appointment thereto is not subject to CoAs confirmation. Appointments to the CHR is always permanent in nature. The provisions of EO 163-A is unconstitutional and cannot be invoked by Mallillin. The Chairman and the Commissioners of the CHR cannot be removed at the pleasure of the president for it is constitutionally guaranteed that they must have a term of office.

TITLE: Rufino V. Endriga CITATION: G.R. No. 139554. July 21, 2006

FACTS: Article VII, Section 16

Presidential Decree No. 15 (PD 15) created the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP) for the primary purpose of propagating arts and culture in

the Philippines. PD 15 increased the members of CCP's Board from seven to nine trustees. Later, Executive Order No. 1058, increased further the trustees to 11.

Eventually, during the term of Ramos, the CCP Board included the Endriga Group Estrada appointed seven new trustees to the CCP Board for a term of four years to replace the Endriga group as well as two other incumbent trustees. The Rufino group took their oaths of office and assumed the performance of their duties.

the Endriga group filed a petition for quo warranto questioning Estrada's appointment of seven new members to the CCP Board. They claimed that it is only when the CCP Board is entirely vacant may the President of the Philippines fill such vacancies, acting in consultation with the ranking officers of the CCP. o The clear and categorical language of Section 6(b) of PD 15 states that vacancies in the CCP Board shall be filled by a majority vote of the remaining trustees. Should only one trustee survive, the vacancies shall be filled by the surviving trustee acting in consultation with the ranking officers of the CCP. Should the Board become entirely vacant, the vacancies shall be filled by the President of the Philippines acting in consultation with the same ranking officers of the CCP. Thus, the remaining trustees, whether one or more, elect their fellow trustees for a fixed four-year term. On the other hand, Section 6(c) of PD 15 does not allow trustees to reelect fellow trustees for more than two consecutive terms. o The Endriga group asserted that when former President Estrada appointed the Rufino group, only one seat was vacant due to the expiration of Maosa's term. The CCP Board then had 10 incumbent trustees. They maintained that under the CCP Charter, the trustees' fixed four-year term could only be terminated "by reason of resignation, incapacity, death, or other cause." Presidential action was neither necessary nor justified since the CCP Board then still had 10 incumbent trustees who had the statutory power to fill by election any vacancy in the Board. o The Endriga group refused to accept that the CCP was under the supervision and control of the President. The Endriga group cited Section 3 of PD 15, which states that the CCP "shall enjoy autonomy of policy and operation x x x."

Rufino Group: that the law could only delegate to the CCP Board the power to appoint officers lower in rank than the trustees of the Board. Section 6(b) of PD 15 authorizing the CCP trustees to elect their fellow trustees should be declared unconstitutional being repugnant to Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution allowing the appointment only of "officers lower in rank" than the appointing power.

CA: Endriga group entitled to the office.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 6(b) of PD 15 is unconstitutional considering that: 1. it is an invalid delegation of the President's appointing power under the Constitution; 2. it effectively deprives the President of his constitutional power of control and supervision over the CCP

RULING: UNCONSTITIONAL

POWER TO APPOINT

The source of the President's power to appoint, as well as the Legislature's authority to delegate the power to appoint, is found in Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which provides: the President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the

Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. (Emphasis supplied)

The power to appoint is the prerogative of the President, except in those instances when the Constitution provides otherwise. Usurpation of this fundamentally Executive power by the Legislative and Judicial branches violates the system of separation of powers that inheres in our democratic republican government.

Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President appoints three groups of officers. 1. heads of the Executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution. w/ the Commission of Appointments consent 2. those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. consent not required 3. all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law. consent not required appoints the third group of officers if the law is silent on who is the appointing power, or if the law authorizing the head of a department, agency, commission, or board to appoint is declared unconstitutional. Thus, if Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is found unconstitutional, the President shall appoint the trustees of the CCP Board because the trustees fall under the third group of officers. o * there is a fourth group of lower-ranked officers whose appointments Congress may by law vest in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.

The grant of the power to appoint to the heads of agencies, commissions, or boards is a matter of legislative grace. Congress has the discretion to grant to, or withhold from, the heads of agencies, commissions, or boards the power to appoint lower-ranked officers. If it so grants, Congress may impose certain conditions for the exercise of such legislative delegation, like requiring the recommendation of subordinate officers or the concurrence of the other members of the commission or board.

This is in contrast to the President's power to appoint which is a selfexecuting power vested by the Constitution itself and thus not subject to legislative limitations or conditions.28 The power to appoint conferred directly

by the

Constitution

on the

Supreme

Court

en banc29

and on the

Constitutional Commissions30 is also self-executing and not subject to legislative limitations or conditions.

The framers of the 1987 Constitution clearly intended that Congress could by law vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. these inferior or lower in rank officers are the subordinates of the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards who are vested by law with the power to appoint. The express language of the Constitution and the clear intent of its framers point to only one conclusion the officers whom the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards may appoint must be of lower rank than those vested by law with the power to appoint.

Also, the power to appoint can only be vested in the HEADS of the named offices. The word "heads" refers to the chairpersons of the commissions or boards and NOT TO THEIR MEMBERS, for several reasons: o a plain reading of the last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution shows that the word "heads" refers to all the offices succeeding that term, namely, the departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. This plain reading is consistent with other related provisions of the Constitution. o agencies, like departments, have no collegial governing bodies but have only chief executives or heads of agencies. Thus, the word "heads" applies to agencies. Any other interpretation is untenable. o all commissions or boards have chief executives who are their heads. Since the Constitution speaks of "heads" of offices, and all commissions or boards have chief executives or heads, the word "heads" could only refer to the chief executives or heads of the commissions or boards. o the counterpart provisions of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions uniformly refer to "heads" of offices. The 1935 Constitution limited the grant of the appointment power only to "heads of departments."32 The 1973 Constitution expanded such grant to other officers, namely, "members of the Cabinet, x x x, courts, heads of agencies, commissions, and boards x x x."33 If the 1973 Constitution intended to extend the grant to members of commissions or boards, it could have followed the same language used for "members of the Cabinet" so as to state "members of commissions or boards." Alternatively, the 1973 Constitution could have placed the words commissions and boards after the word "courts"

so as to state "members of the Cabinet, x x x, courts, commissions and boards." Instead, the 1973 Constitution used "heads of agencies, commissions, and boards." o the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions make a clear distinction whenever granting the power to appoint lower-ranked officers to members of a collegial body or to the head of that collegial body. Thus, the 1935 Constitution speaks of vesting the power to appoint "in the courts, or in the heads of departments." Similarly, the 1973 Constitution speaks of "members of the Cabinet, courts, heads of agencies, commissions, and boards." o As an enumeration of offices, what applies to the first office in the enumeration also applies to the succeeding offices mentioned in the enumeration. other offices Since listed the in words the "in the heads of" refer to "departments," the same words "in the heads of" also refer to the enumeration, namely, "agencies, commissions, or boards."

Thus, the Chairman of the CCP Board is the "head" of the CCP who may be vested by law, under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, with the power to appoint lower-ranked officers of the CCP.

the CCP is a public corporation governed by a Board of Trustees. The CCP, being governed by a board, is not an agency but a board for purposes of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

** Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is thus irreconcilably inconsistent with Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 empowers the remaining trustees of the CCP Board to fill vacancies in the CCP Board, allowing them to elect their fellow trustees. On the other hand, Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution allows heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards to appoint only "officers lower in rank" than such "heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards." This excludes a situation where the appointing officer appoints an officer equal in rank as him. Thus, insofar as it authorizes the trustees of the CCP Board to elect their co-trustees, Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is unconstitutional because it violates Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. o It does not matter that Section 6(b) of PD 15 empowers the remaining trustees to "elect" and not "appoint" their fellow trustees for the effect is the same, which is to fill vacancies in the CCP Board. A statute cannot circumvent the constitutional limitations on the power to appoint by filling vacancies in a public office through election by the co-workers in that office. Such manner of filling vacancies in a public

office has no constitutional basis.

Further, Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 makes the CCP trustees the independent appointing power of their fellow trustees. The creation of an independent appointing power inherently conflicts with the President's power to appoint. This inherent conflict has spawned recurring controversies in the appointment of CCP trustees every time a new President assumes office.

POWER OF CONTROL OVER THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

The presidential power of control over the Executive branch of government extends to all executive employees from the Department Secretary to the lowliest clerk.35 This constitutional power of the President is self-executing and does not require any implementing law. Congress cannot limit or curtail the President's power of control over the Executive branch.36

The CCP falls under the Executive branch. Since the President exercises control over "all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices," the President necessarily exercises control over the CCP which is an office in the Executive branch. In mandating that the President "shall have control of all executive offices," Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not exempt any executive office one performing executive functions outside of the independent constitutional bodies from the President's power of control. There is no dispute that the CCP performs executive, and not legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial functions.

The Legislature cannot validly enact a law that puts a government office in the Executive branch outside the control of the President in the guise of insulating that office from politics or making it independent. If the office is part of the Executive branch, it must remain subject to the control of the President. Otherwise, the Legislature can deprive the President of his constitutional power of control over "all the executive x x x offices." If the Legislature can do this with the Executive branch, then the Legislature can also deal a similar blow to the Judicial branch by enacting a law putting decisions of certain lower courts beyond the review power of the Supreme Court. This will destroy the system of checks and balances finely structured in the 1987 Constitution among the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches.

Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15, which authorizes the trustees of the CCP Board to fill vacancies in the Board, runs afoul with the President's power of control under Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. The intent of Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is to insulate the CCP from political influence

and pressure, specifically from the President.44 Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 makes the CCP a self-perpetuating entity, virtually outside the control of the President. Such a public office or board cannot legally exist under the 1987 Constitution.

TITLE: Aytona vs. Castillo CITATION: 4 SCRA 1. January 19, 1962

FACTS: On December 29, 1961, Carlos P. Garcia, who was still President that time, made last minute appointments while the Commission on Appointments was not in

session. Said last minute appointment included Dominador R. Aytona, who was appointed as ad interim Governor of Central Bank. The latter took oath on the same day. At noon on December 30, 1961, President-elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed office. He issued Administrative Order No. 2 on December 31, 1961 recalling, withdrawing and canceling all ad interim appointments made by President Garcia after December 13, 1961, which was the date when Macapagal was proclaimed President by the Congress. He then appointed Andres V. Castillo as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank and the latter qualified immediately. On January 2, 1962, both exercised the powers of their office. However, Aytona was prevented from holding office the following day and thus instituted a quo warranto proceeding, challenging Castillos right to exercise the powers of the Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona claims that he was validly appointed and had qualified for the post, therefore making Castillos appointment void. Castillo then contended that Aytonas appointment had already been revoked by Administrative Order No. 2 issued by President Macapagal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the new president has the power to cancel all ad interim appointments made by the previous president after they have all qualified?

RULING: To quote We are informed, it is Malacaan's practice which we find to be logical to submit ad interim appointments only when the Commission on Appointments is in session. One good reason for the practice is that only those who have accepted the appointment and qualified are submitted for confirmation. Nevertheless, this time, Malacaan submitted its appointments on the same day they were issued; and the Commission was not then in session; obviously because it foresaw the possibility that the incoming President would refuse to submit later the appointees of his predecessor. As a result, as already adverted to, some persons whose names were submitted for confirmation had not qualified nor accepted their appointments.

Ad interim appointments are made when Congress is in recess and as such, the Commission on Appointments cannot convene and vote on the appointment. Even without the confirmation, however, the appointee gets to sit and perform the functions and powers of the position until rejected by the CA or until the next adjournment of Congress. An ad interim appointment is exercised by the president as hes special prerogative and is bound to be prudent to insure approval of his selection either previous consultation with the members of the Commission on Appointments or by thereafter explaining to them the reason such selection. It is expected that the President should exercise double care in extending such appointments. In the case at bar, it is hard to believe that in signing 350 appointments in one night, President Garcia exercised double care; and therefore, such appointments fall beyond the intent and spirit of the constitutional provision granting the Executive authority to issue ad interim appointments.

TITLE: Jorge vs. Mayor CITATION: 10 SCRA 33. FEBRUARY 28, 1964

FACTS: Petition for mandamus and quo warranto filed directly in this Court to have petitioner declared as the sole legally appointed and qualified Director of Lands, and

to require respondent to turn over said office to the petitioner as well as to desist from holding himself out as "Acting Director, Bureau of Lands". It is undisputed that petitioner, Nicanor G. Jorge, is a career official in the Bureau of Lands. He started working there as a Junior Computer in the course of 38 years service, from February 1, 1922 to October 31, 1960, and attained the position of Acting Director, through regular and successive promotions, in accordance with civil service rules. On June 17, 1961, he was designated Acting Director of the same Bureau, and on December 13, 1961 was appointed by President Carlos Garcia ad interim Director. He qualified by taking the oath of office on the 23rd December of 1961. His appointment was on December 26, 1961, transmitted to the Commission on Appointments, and on May 14, 1962, petitioner's ad interim appointment as Director of Lands was confirmed by the Commission. Petitioner discharged the duties as Director until on November 14, 1962 he received a letter from Benjamin Gozon, then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources of the Macapagal administration, informing him that pursuant to a letter from the Assistant Executive Secretary Bernal, served on petitioner on November 13, his appointment was among those revoked by Administrative Order No. 2 of President Diosdado Macapagal; that the position of Director of Lands was considered vacant; and that petitioner Jorge was designated Acting Director of Lands, effective November 13, 1962. Upon learning that respondent Mayor, an outsider, had been designate by the President to be Acting Director of Lands Jorge protested (in a letter of November 16, 1962) to the Secretary of Agriculture informing the latter that he would stand on his rights, and issued office circulars claiming to be the legally appointed Director of Lands. Finally, on September 2, 1963, he instituted the present proceedings. The answer of respondent pleads that the ad interim appointment of petitioner and its confirmation were invalid having been duly revoked by President Macapagal by Administrative Order No. 2 dated December 31, 1961; that petitioner voluntarily relinquished his position and accepted his designation as Acting Director, issuing press statements to said effect, and voluntarily accompanying and introducing respondent to meet officials of the Bureau as the new acting Director of Lands.

ISSUE: Whether or not Administrative Order No. 2 of President Macapagal operated as a valid revocation of petitioner's ad interim appointment?

RULING: In common with the Gillera appointment sustained by this Court less than a month ago, Jorge's appointment is featured by a recognition of his tenure by the Macapagal administration itself, since he was allowed to hold and discharge undisturbed his duties as de jure Director of Lands for nearly eleven months; it was only in mid-November of 1962 that the attempt was actually made to demote him and appoint a rank outsider in his place in the person of respondent Mayor. As to the alleged voluntary acquiescence and relinquishment by petitioner of his position as de jure Director of Lands, the evidence is that he did protect against his demotion in letters to the Secretary of Agriculture and in office circulars. That he did not immediately adopt a hostile attitude towards the authorities, and the respondent herein was merely evidence of that courtesy and "delicadeza" to be expected of a man in a high position who does not wish to obstruct the functions of the office, and is in no way incompatible with his determination to protect his right. It must also be remembered that the precedent' case of the former Chairman of the National Science Board, suspended indefinitely on charges that were subsequently found to be false, did not encourage precipitate action, and was a reminder of the unpleasant consequences of defying the administration. At any rate, "abandonment of an office by reason of acceptance of another, in order to be effective and binding, should spring from and be accompanied by deliberation and freedom of choice, either to keep the old office or renounce it for another" (Teves vs. Sindiong 81 Phil. 658), and the record is unconvincing that the alleged acts of acquiescence, mostly equivocal in character, were freely and voluntarily accomplished. The writs applied for were granted, the petitioner Nicanor G. Jorge is declared to be the duly appointed, confirmed, and qualified Director of Lands, the respondent, Jovencio Q. Mayor, was required to turn over said office to the petitioner and to desist from holding self out as "Acting Director of Lands" TITLE: De Castro vs. JBC CITATION: G.R. No. 1910002. March 17, 2010

FACTS:

This case is based on multiple cases field with dealt with the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory requirement of Chief Justice Puno on May

17, 2010 or seven days after the presidential election. On December 22, 2009, Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio member of the JBC, addressed a letter to the JBC, requesting that the process for nominations to the office of the Chief Justice be commenced immediately. In its January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, the JBC passed a resolution which stated that they have unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice to be vacated on May 17, 2010 upon the retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice. As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for application or recommendation, and published for that purpose its announcement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Philippine Star. In its meeting of February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next step of announcing the names of the following candidates to invite to the public to file their sworn complaint, written report, or opposition, if any, not later than February 22, 2010. Although it has already begun the process for the filling of the position of Chief Justice Puno in accordance with its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the President its list of nominees for the position due to the controversy in this case being unresolved. The compiled cases which led to this case and the petitions of intervenors called for either the prohibition of the JBC to pass the shortlist, mandamus for the JBC to pass the shortlist, or that the act of appointing the next Chief Justice by GMA is a midnight appointment. A precedent frequently cited by the parties is the In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the RTC of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively, shortly referred to here as the Valenzuela case, by which the Court held that Section 15, Article VII prohibited the exercise by the President of the power to appoint to judicial positions during the period therein fixed.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing? 2.Whether or not there is justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial determination? 3. Whether or not the incumbent President appoint the next Chief Justice? 4. Whether or not mandamus and prohibition will lie to compel the submission of the shortlist of nominees by the JBC?

RULING: Petitioners have legal standing because such requirement for this case was waived by the Court. Legal standing is a peculiar concept in constitutional law because in some cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. But even if, strictly speaking, the petitioners are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised. There is a justiciable issue. We hold that the petitions set forth an actual case or controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. The reality is that the JBC already commenced the proceedings for the selection of the nominees to be included in a short list to be submitted to the President for consideration of which of them will succeed Chief Justice Puno as the next Chief Justice. Although the position is not yet vacant, the fact that the JBC began the process of nomination pursuant to its rules and practices, although it has yet to decide whether to submit the list of nominees to the incumbent outgoing President or to the next President, makes the situation ripe for judicial determination, because the next steps are the public interview of the candidates, the preparation of the short list of candidates, and the interview of constitutional experts, as may be needed. The resolution of the controversy will surely settle with finality the nagging questions that are preventing the JBC from moving on with the process that it

already began, or that are reasons persuading the JBC to desist from the rest of the process. PROHIBITION UNDER SECTION 15, ARTICLE VII DOES NOT APPLY TO APPOINTMENTS TO FILL A VACANCY IN THE SUPREME COURT OR TO OTHER APPOINTMENST TO THE JUDICIARY. Two constitutional provisions seemingly in conflict: The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof. Justification of the Supreme Court: First. The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the framers devoted time to meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the Constitution. Such meticulousness indicates that the organization and arrangement of the provisions of the Constitution were not arbitrarily or whimsically done by the framers, but purposely made to reflect their intention and manifest their vision of what the Constitution should contain. The Constitution consists of 18 Articles, three of which embody the allocation of the awesome powers of government among the three great departments, the Legislative (Article VI), the Executive (Article VII), and the Judicial Departments (Article VIII). The arrangement was a true recognition of the principle of separation of powers that underlies the political structure As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among

others, it lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The presidential power of appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. Although Valenzuela came to hold that the prohibition covered even judicial appointments, it cannot be disputed that the Valenzuela dictum did not firmly rest on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. Moreover, the usage in Section 4(1), Article VIII of the word shall an imperative, operating to impose a duty that may be enforced should not be disregarded. Thereby, Sections 4(1) imposes on the President the imperative duty to make an appointment of a Member of the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy. The failure by the President to do so will be a clear disobedience to the Constitution. The 90-day limitation fixed in Section 4(1), Article VIII for the President to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court was undoubtedly a special provision to establish a definite mandate for the President as the appointing power, and cannot be defeated by mere judicial interpretation in Valenzuela to the effect that Section 15, Article VII prevailed because it was couched in stronger negative language. Second. Section 15, Article VII does not apply as well to all other appointments in the Judiciary. There is no question that one of the reasons underlying the adoption of Section 15 as part of Article VII was to eliminate midnight appointments from being made by an outgoing Chief Executive. Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII, we have no doubt that the Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to appointments made in the Executive Department. The framers did not need to extend the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary, because their establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and screening of candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior

process of the JBC ensured that there would no longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary. Indeed, the creation of the JBC was precisely intended to de-politicize the Judiciary by doing away with the intervention of the Commission on Appointments. Third. As earlier stated, the non-applicability of Section 15, Article VII to appointments in the Judiciary was confirmed by then Senior Associate Justice Regalado to the JBC itself when it met on March 9, 1998 to discuss the question raised by some sectors about the constitutionality of xxx appointments to the Court of Appeals in light of the forthcoming presidential elections. He assured that on the basis of the (Constitutional) Commissions records, the election ban had no application to appointments to the Court of Appeals. This confirmation was accepted by the JBC, which then submitted to the President for consideration the nominations for the eight vacancies in the Court of Appeals.

Fourth. Of the 23 sections in Article VII, three (i.e., Section 14, Section15, and Section 16) concern the appointing powers of the President. Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. Fifth. To hold like the Court did in Valenzuela that Section 15 extends to appointments to the Judiciary further undermines the intent of the Constitution of ensuring the independence of the Judicial Department from the Executive and Legislative Departments. Such a holding will tie the Judiciary and the Supreme Court to the fortunes or misfortunes of political leaders vying for the Presidency in a presidential election. Consequently, the wisdom of having the new President, instead of the current incumbent President, appoint the next Chief Justice is itself suspect, and cannot ensure judicial independence, because the appointee can also become beholden to the appointing authority. In contrast, the appointment by the incumbent President does not run the same risk of compromising judicial independence, precisely because her term will end by June 30, 2010.

Sixth. The argument has been raised to the effect that there will be no need for the incumbent President to appoint during the prohibition period the successor of Chief Justice Puno within the context of Section 4 (1), Article VIII, because anyway there will still be about 45 days of the 90 days mandated in Section 4(1), Article VIII remaining. The argument is flawed, because it is focused only on the coming vacancy occurring from Chief Justice Punos retirement by May 17, 2010. It ignores the need to apply Section 4(1) to every situation of a vacancy in the Supreme Court. Section 4 (3), Article VII requires the regular elections to be held on the second Monday of May, letting the elections fall on May 8, at the earliest, or May 14, at the latest. If the regular presidential elections are held on May 8, the period of the prohibition is 115 days. If such elections are held on May 14, the period of the prohibition is 109 days. Either period of the prohibition is longer than the full mandatory 90-day period to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court. The result is that there are at least 19 occasions (i.e., the difference between the shortest possible period of the ban of 109 days and the 90-day mandatory period for appointments) in which the outgoing President would be in no position to comply with the constitutional duty to fill up a vacancy in the Supreme Court. It is safe to assume that the framers of the Constitution could not have intended such an absurdity. Seventh. As a matter of fact, in an extreme case, we can even raise a doubt on whether a JBC list is necessary at all for the President any President to appoint a Chief Justice if the appointee is to come from the ranks of the sitting justices of the Supreme Court. Sec. 9, Article VIII says: The Members of the Supreme Court xxx shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for any vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation. The provision clearly refers to an appointee coming into the Supreme Court from the outside, that is, a non-member of the Court aspiring to become one. It speaks of candidates for the Supreme Court, not of those who are already members or sitting justices of the Court, all of whom have previously been vetted by the JBC. WRIT OF MANDAMUS DOES NOT LIE AGAINST THE JBC

Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It is proper when the act against which it is directed is one addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or officer. Mandamus is not available to direct the exercise of a judgment or discretion in a particular way.

TITLE: Guevara vs. Inocentes CITATION: 16 SCRA 379. March 15, 1966

FACTS: The petitioner, Onofre Guevara was extended an ad interim appointment as Undersecretary of Labor by the former Executive on November 18, 1965. Took his

oath of office on November 25th same year. The incumbent Executive issued Memorandum Circular No. 8 dated January 23, 1966 declaring that all ad interim appointments made by the former Executive lapsed with the adjournment of the special session of Congress at about midnight of January 22, 1966. The respondent, Raoul Inocentes was extended an ad interim appointment for the same position by the incumbent Executive on January 23, 1966. Guevara filed before the court an instant petition for Quo Warranto seeking to be declared person legally entitled to the said Officer of the Undersecretary of Labor under Art. VII Sec. 10 (4) of the 1935 Constitution, which states that: The president shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress. Since there was no Commission on Appointments organized during the special session which commenced on January 17, 1966, the respondent contended that the petitioners ad interim appointment as well as other made under similar conditions must have lapsed when the Congress adjourned its last special session. But the petitioner stated that (1) the specific provision in the Constitution which states that: until the next adjournment of Congress means adjournment of a regular session of Congress and not by a special session and (2) only the Senate adjourned sine die at midnight of January 22, 1966 and the House of the Representative merely suspended its session and to be resumed on January 24, 1966 at 10:00 AM. The petitioner therefore concludes that Congress has been in continuous session without interruption since January 17.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not, the petitioners contention regarding the next adjournment of Congress specifically provides for regular session only. 2. Whether or not, the petitioners contention that Congress is still in continuous session?

RULING: 1. NO. The phrase until the next adjournment of Congress does not make any reference to specific session of Congress, whether regular or special. But a wellknow Latin maxim is statutory construction stated that when the law does not distinguish we should not distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere

debemus. It is safe to conclude that the authors of the 1935 Constitution used the word adjournment had in mind either regular or special and not simply the regular one as the petitioner contended. 2. NO. The mere fact that the Senate adjourned sine die at midnight of January 22, 1966, the House of the Representative is only a part of the Congress and not the Congress itself. So logically, the adjournment of one of its Houses is considered adjournment of the Congress as a whole. And the petitioners ad interim appointment must have been lapsed on January 22, 1966 upon adjournment of the Senate.

TITLE: Matigbag vs. Benipayo CITATION: G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002

FACTS:

On February 1999, petitioner Matibag was appointed Acting Director IV of the COMELECS EID by then COMELEC Chairperson Harriet Demetriou in a temporary capacity. On March 2001, respondent Benipayo was appointed COMELEC Chairman together withother commissioners in an ad interim appointment. While on such ad i nterim appointment, respondent Benipayo in his capacity as Chairman issued a Memorandum address transferring petitioner to the Law Department. Petitioner requested Benipayo to reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the LawDepartment. She cited Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 7 dated April 10, 2001, reminding heads of government offices that "transfer and detail of employees are prohibited during the election period. Benipayo denied her request for reconsideration on April 18, 2001, citing COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 dated November 6, 2000, exempting COMELEC from the coverage of the said Memo Circular. Petitioner appealed the denial of her request for reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc. She also filed an administrative and criminal complaint with the Law Department against Benipayo, alleging that her reassignment violated Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC Resolution No. 3258, Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 07, s. 001, and other pertinent administrative and civil service laws, rules and regulations. During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, petitioner filed the instant petition questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively. Petitioner claims that the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad interim appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.

RULING: We find petitioners argument without merit. An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter

its permanent character. The constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent by making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournments of Congress.

ARTICLE IX

Section 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit. Section 2. No member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any other office or employment. Neither shall he engage in the practice of any profession or in the active management or control of any business which, in any way, may be affected by the functions of his office, nor shall he be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or privilege granted by the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

TITLE: De Rama vs. Court of Appeals CITATION: G.R. No. 131136. February 28, 2001

FACTS:

Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, petitioner Conrado De Rama wrote a letter to the CSC seeking the recall of the appointments of 14 municipal employees. Petitioner justified his recall request on the allegation that the appointments of said employees were midnight appointments of the former mayor, done in violation of Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution. The CSC denied petitioners request for the recall of the appointments of the 14 employees for lack of merit. The CSC dismissed petitioners allegation that these were midnight appointments, pointing out that the constitutional provision relied upon by petitioner prohibits only those appointments made by an outgoing President and cannot be made to apply to local elective officials. The CSC opined that the appointing authority can validly issue appointments until his term has expired, as long as the appointee meets the qualification standards for the position.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appointments made by the outgoing Mayor are forbidden under Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution

RULING: The CSC correctly ruled that the constitutional prohibition on so-called midnight appointments, specifically those made within 2 months immediately prior to the next presidential elections, applies only to the President or Acting President. There is no law that prohibits local elective officials from making appointments during the last days of his or her tenure. ARTICLE VII Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. Rule V, Section 9 of the Omnibus Implementing Regulations of the Revised Administrative Code specifically provides that an appointment accepted by the appointee cannot be withdrawn or revoked by the appointing authority and shall remain in force and in effect until disapproved by the Commission. Thus, it is the CSC that is authorized to recall an appointment initially approved, but only when

such appointment and approval are proven to be in disregard of applicable provisions of the civil service law and regulations. Moreover, Section 10 of the same rule provides: Sec. 10. An appointment issued in accordance with pertinent laws and rules shall take effect immediately upon its issuance by the appointing authority, and if the appointee has assumed the duties of the position, he shall be entitled to receive his salary at once without awaiting the approval of his appointment by the Commission. The appointment shall remain effective until disapproved by the Commission. In no case shall an appointment take effect earlier than he date of its issuance. Section 20 of Rule VI also provides: Sec. 20. Notwithstanding the initial approval of an appointment, the same may be recalled on any of the following grounds: (a) Non-compliance with the procedures/criteria provided in the agencys Merit Promotion Plan; (b) Failure to pass through the agencys Selection/Promotion Board; (c) Violation of the existing collective agreement between management and employees relative to promotion; or (d) Violation of other existing civil service law, rules and regulations. Accordingly, the appointments of the private respondents may only be recalled on the above-cited grounds. And yet, the only reason advanced by the petitioner to justify the recall was that these were midnight appointments. The CSC correctly ruled, however, that the constitutional prohibition on so-called midnight appointments, specifically those made within two (2) months immediately prior to the next presidential elections, applies only to the President or Acting President. WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42896 affirming CSC Resolutions Nos. 96-2828 and 96-7527 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

TITLE: Llamas vs. Orbos CITATION: 202 SCRA 844

FACTS: Ocampo III was the governor of Tarlac Province. Llamas together with some other complainants filed an administrative case against Ocampo III for alleged acts constituting graft and corruption. Ocampo III was found guilty. He was suspended for office for 90 days hence his vice governor, Llamas, assumed office. In not less than 30 days however, Ocampo III returned with an AO showing that he was pardoned hence he can resume office without completing the 90 day suspension imposed upon him. The petitioner argues that President may grant executive clemency only in criminal cases. They say that the qualifying phrase after conviction by final judgment applies solely to criminal cases, and no other law allows the grant of executive clemency or pardon to anyone who has been convicted in an administrative case, allegedly because the word conviction refers only to criminal cases. ISSUE:

Whether or not the President of the Philippines has the power to grant executive clemency in administrative cases.

RULING:

Yes. It is not specified in the constitution whether it may be considered under criminal or administrative cases. , if the law does not distinguish, so we must not distinguish. The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. By the same token, if executive clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution. Cases of impeachment are automatically excluded inasmuch as the same do not necessarily involve criminal offenses.

The do not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why the President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It is the courts considered view that if the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.

The court stressed, however, that when we say the President can grant executive clemency in administrative cases, we refer only to all administrative cases in the Executive branch, not in the Judicial or Legislative branches of the government. In criminal cases, the quantum of evidence required to convict an individual is proof beyond reasonable doubt. On the other hand, in administrative cases, the quantum of evidence required is mere substantial evidence to support a decision.

TITLE: TORRES v. GONZALES CITATION: 152 SCRA 272

FACTS: 1978, Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was pardoned by the president w/ the condition that he shall not violate any penal laws again. Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law. Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement. In 1982, Torres was charged with multiple crimes of estafa. In 1986, Gonzales petitioned for the cancellation of Torres pardon. Hence, the president cancelled the pardon. Torres appealed the issue before the SC averring that the Exec Dept erred in convicting him for violating the conditions of his pardon because the estafa charges against him were not yet final and executory as they were still on appeal. ISSUE:

Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before the petitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence.

RULING:

In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (1) Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny, or (2) Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code, a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon.

Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefore by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.

Under art. 159 of the RPC, parolee or convict who is regarded as having violated the provisions thereof must be charged, prosecuted and convicted by final judgment before he can be made to suffer the penalty prescribed. In the case at bar, President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under

Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the Presidents executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.

*Who determines if violated? The PRESIDENT. When the person was conditionally pardoned it was a generous exercise by the Chief Executive of his constitutional prerogative. The acceptance thereof by the convict or prisoner carried with it the authority or power of the Executive to determine whether a condition or conditions of the pardon has or have been violated. To no other department of the Government has such power been entrusted.

TITLE: Barrioquinto vs. Fernandez CITATION: 82 Phil 642 FACTS:

Petitioners Norberto Jimenez and Loreto Barrioquinto were charged with the crime of murder. As the latter had not yet been arrested the case proceeded against the former, and after trial Court of First Instance of Zamboanga sentenced Jimenez to life imprisonment. Before the period for perfecting an appeal had expired, the defendant Jimenez became aware of the Proclamation No. 8, dated September 7, 1946, which grants amnesty in favor of all persons who may be charged with an act penalized under the Revised Penal Code in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and committed during the period from December 8, 1941, to the date when particular area of the Philippines where the offense was actually committed was liberated from enemy control and occupation, and said Jimenez decided to submit his case to the Guerrilla Amnesty Commission presided by the respondents herein, and the other petitioner Loreto Barrioquinto, who had then been already apprehended, did the same. After a preliminary hearing had started, the Amnesty Commission, prescribed by the respondents, issued on January 9, 1947, an order returning the cases of the petitioners to the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga, without deciding whether or not they are entitled to the benefits of he said Amnesty Proclamation, on the ground that inasmuch as neither Barrioquinto nor Jimenez have admitted having committed the offense, because Barrioquinto alleged that it was Hipolito Tolentino who shot and killed the victim, they cannot invoke the benefits of amnesty.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the benefits of amnesty.

RULING:

In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation of September 7, 1946, it is not necessary that he should, as a condition precedent or sine qua non, admit having committed the criminal act or offense with which he is charged and allege the amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the evidence either of the complainant or the accused, shows that the offense committed comes within the terms of said Amnesty Proclamation. Amnesty is hereby granted to all active and former personnel of the AFP and PNP as well as their supporters who have or may have committed crimes punishable under the Revised Penal Code, the Articles of War or other laws in connection with, in relation or incident to the July 27, 2003 Oakwood Mutiny, the February 2006

Marines Stand-Off and the November 29, 2007 Manila Peninsula Incident who shall apply therefore; Provided that amnesty shall not cover rape, acts of torture, crimes against chastity and other crimes committed for personal ends.

TITLE:

Vera vs. People

CITATION: 7 SCRA 152

FACTS: Vera, Figueras, Ambas, Florido, Bayran and 92 others (97 in all) were charged with the complex crime of kidnapping with murder of Amadeo Lozanes. They invoked the benefits of the amnesty proclamation of the president and the case was referred to the 8th guerilla amnesty commission. none of the petitioners admitted having committed the crime. Vera was the only one who took the witness stand and denied having killed Lozanes. The commission said it could not take cognizance of the case because the benefits of amnesty could only be invoked by defendants in a criminal case who, admitting commission of the crime, plead that the said crime was committed in pursuance of the resistance movement and perpetrated against persons who aided the enemy during the Japanese occupation. When Vera appealed, the amnesty commission denied the appeal, adding that the facts of the case showed that the victim was a member of another guerilla group and that the murder seemed to have stemmed from a rivalry between the two groups. Vera brought the case to the Court of Appeals, asking the CA to also rule, one way or another, of the murder case. But the CA ruled that amnesty applies only to those who had admitted the fact but said they should not be punished for the crime done was in pursuance of resistance to the enemy. It also said it could not take cognizance of the murder case because that came from the amnesty commission, which had no jurisdiction over the murder case. The case was brought to the Court on appeal, which cited People vs Llanita, which said that it was inconsistent for an appellant to justify an act or seek forgiveness for something which he said he has not committed.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a distinction between pardon and amnesty?

RULING: Amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime, and when the accused maintains that he has not committed a crime, he cannot have any use for amnesty.

Where an amnesty proclamation imposes certain conditions, as in this case, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove the existence of such conditions. The invocation of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance, which means that the pleader admits the allegations against him but disclaims liability therefore on account of intervening facts which, if proved, would bring the crime charged within the scope of the amnesty proclamation. The term "amnesty" belongs to international law, and is applied to rebellions which by their magnitude are properly within international law, but has no technical meaning in the common law. It is a synonym of oblivion, which in the English law is the synonym of pardon. (Bouvier, "Amnesty.") In so far as the proclamation extends to the offenses of treason and sedition, it may be regarded as an amnesty. But as to those offenses which have arisen out of internal political feuds and dissensions among the Filipinos themselves, such as the ordinary crimes of murder, robbery, arson, etc., the proclamation must be regarded in the nature of a pardon. A pardon may be general, applying to all persons falling within a certain category, or it may be conceded to a single individual for an ordinary crime, in which latter case it is a special pardon, and is evidenced by a writing, the acceptance of which is necessary in order that it may become effectual. Where the pardoning power is vested in the legislature and is exercised by legislative grant, and is in the nature of a general amnesty for strictly political offenses, it has been considered in the nature of a public law, thus having the same effect on the case as if the general law punishing the offense had been repealed or annulled. (United States vs. Wilson, 7 Peters, 163.)

TITLE: Monsanto v. Factoran CITATION: G.R. No. 78239. February 9, 1989

FACTS: Monsanto was the Asst. Treasurer of Calbayug City. She was charged for the crime of Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents. She was found guilty and was sentenced to jail. She was however granted pardon by Marcos. She then wrote a letter to the Minister of Finance for her to be reinstated to her former position since it was still vacant. She was also requesting for back pays.

The Minister of Finance referred the issue to the Office of the President and Factoran denied Monsantos request averring that Monsanto must first seek appointment and that the pardon does not reinstate her former position. Also, Monsanto avers that by reason of the pardon, she should no longer be compelled to answer for the civil liabilities brought about by her acts.

ISSUE: Whether or not Monsanto should be reinstated to her former post.

RULING: Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated officially to the Court. A pardon is a deed, to the validity of which delivery is essential, and delivery is not complete without acceptance."Petitioner maintains that when she was issued absolute pardon, the Chief Executive declared her not guilty of the crime for which she was convicted. In the case of State v. Hazzard, we find this strong observation: "To assume that all or even a major number of pardons are issued because of innocence of the recipients is not only to indict our judicial system, but requires us to assume that which we all know to be untrue. A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered. Since the offense has been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been

rightfully done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required. This would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive back pay for lost earnings and benefits. On the other hand, civil liability arising from crime is governed by the RPC. It subsists not withstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioners civil liability may only be extinguished by the same causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor, compensation and novation.

TITLE:

TORRES VS. DIRECTOR OF BUREAU OF PRISONS

CITATION: G.R. NO. 122338. DECEMBER 29, 1995

FACTS:

The wife and children of convicted felon Wilfredo Sumulong Torres pray for his immediate release from prison on the ground that the exercise of the President's prerogative under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code to determine the occurrence, if any, of a breach of a condition of a pardon in violation of pardonee's right to due process and the constitutional presumption of innocence, constitutes a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Of two counts of estafa Torres was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila some time before 1979. These convictions were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The maximum sentence would expire on November 2, 2000. On April 18, 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to Torres by the President of the Philippines on condition that petitioner would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines. 5" Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement. 6 On May 21, 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to recommend to the President the cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to Torres because Torres had been charged with twenty counts of estafa before, and convicted of sedition by, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. On September 8, 1986, the President cancelled the conditional pardon of Torres. On October 10, 1986, then Minister of Justice Neptali A. Gonzales issued "by authority of the President" an Order of Arrest and Recommitment 7 against petitioner. The petitioner was accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence. Torres impugned the validity of the Order of Arrest and Recommitment in the aforecited case of Torres v. Gonzales 8. There we ruled thatSuccinctly put, in proceeding against a convict who has been conditional pardoned and who is alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the President's executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.

ISSUE: Whether or not the exercise of the President's prerogative under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code violates the pardonee's right to due process and the constitutional presumption of innocence,

constitutes a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction?

RULING: A conditional pardon is in the nature of a contract between the sovereign power or the Chief Executive and the convicted criminal to the effect that the former will release the latter subject to the condition that if he does not comply with the terms of the pardon, he will be recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of the sentence or an additional one. 10 By the pardonee's consent to the terms stipulated in this contract, the pardonee has thereby placed himself under the supervision of the Chief Executive or his delegate who is duty-bound to see to it that the pardonee complies with the terms and conditions of the pardon. Under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, the Chief Executive is authorized to order "the arrest and re-incarceration of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition, or conditions of his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence." It is now a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction that this exercise of presidential judgment is beyond judicial scrutiny. The determination of the violation of the conditional pardon rests exclusively in the sound judgment of the Chief Executive, and the pardonee, having consented to place his liberty on conditional pardon upon the judgment of the power that has granted it, cannot invoke the aid of the courts, however erroneous the findings may be upon which his recommitment was ordered. 11 It matters not that in the case of Torres, he has allegedly been acquitted in two of the three criminal cases filed against him subsequent to his conditional pardon, and that the third case remains pending for thirteen (13) years in apparent violation of his right to a speedy trial. Habeas corpus lies only where the restraint of a person's liberty has been judicially adjudged as illegal or unlawful. In the instant petition, the incarceration of Torres remains legal considering that, were it not for the grant of conditional pardon which had been revoked because of a breach thereof, the determination of which is beyond judicial scrutiny, he would have served his final sentence for his first conviction until November 2, 2000. Ultimately, solely vested in the Chief Executive, who in the first place was the exclusive author of the conditional pardon and of its revocation, is the corollary prerogative to reinstate the pardon if in his own judgment, the acquittal of the pardonee from the subsequent charges filed against him, warrants the same.

Courts have no authority to interfere with the grant by the President of a pardon to a convicted criminal. It has been our fortified ruling that a final judicial pronouncement as to the guilt of a pardonee is not a requirement for the President to determine whether or not there has been a breach of the terms of a conditional pardon. There is likewise nil a basis for the courts to effectuate the reinstatement of a conditional pardon revoked by the President in the exercise of powers undisputedly solely and absolutely lodged in his office. The instant petition for habeas corpus was dismissed for lack of merit.

TITLE:

MACAGA-AN VS. PEOPLE

CITATION: 152 SCRA 430 G.R. NOS. 77317-50. JULY 29, 1987

FACTS: On 14 March 1986, petitioners moved "to close their cases and release [their] bond[s]" on the ground that they had been given amnesty by former President F. E. Marcos on 28 January 1986. The Sandiganbayan required them to submit originals or authenticated copies of their amnesty papers, which petitioners were unable to produce. Thereupon, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners' motion. In a motion for reconsideration, the accused sought to prove by secondary evidence their claim that they had been granted amnesty by former President Marcos. The Tanodbayan objected to allowing the accused to adduce secondary evidence of grant(s) of amnesty to the accused. In an extended resolution dated 27 January 1987, the respondent Sandiganbayan denied the motion for reconsideration.

The petitioners now seek certiorari to review and set aside the extended resolution of the Sandiganbayan, claiming that the respondent court committed reversible error, firstly, in holding that Presidential Decree No. 1082, the applicable amnesty statue according to petitioners, did not apply to them; and secondly, in not allowing them to present secondary evidence of the amnesty allegedly granted by the former President to the petitioners.

The petitioners state that they applied for amnesty through the 3rd and 11th Amnesty Commission (sic) of Lanao del Sur and Marawi City and that on 2 February 1985, they were granted conditional amnesty b , the said Commission, subject to the approval or final action of the President of the Philippines pursuant to P.D. No. 1082, dated 2 February 1977. The Amnesty Commission, the petitioners continue, endorsed the amnesty applications of the petitioners to the President, recommending approval thereof or grant of executive clemency to the petitioners. The petitioners' amnesty applications are said to have been submitted to the Office of the President by the then Presidential Assistant Victor Nituda. Former Governor Mohammed Ali Dimaporo, the petitioners further state, made written representations dated 27 January 1986 with former President Marcos concerning the petitioners' applications during a political rally of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan on 22 January 1986. Mr. Marcos apparently wrote on the upper righthand corner of former Governor Dimaporo's letter the following: "Approved" and signed the same with a partly illegible date. The petitioners state, finally, that the original copies of the amnesty papers were in the possession of then Presidential Adviser Joaquin

Venus and were lost or destroyed at Malacanang "during the February 1986 bloodless military revolution" and could not now be located.

The respondent Sandiganbayan declined to allow the petitioners to submit secondary evidence of the claimed applications for and grant of amnesty, upon the ground that even if the petitioners were to succeed in proving or authenticating the alleged amnesty papers through secondary evidence, petitioners would nonetheless not be entitled to discharge from the convictions rendered by that court. The respondent court held that the benefits of amnesty were never available to the petitioners under P.D. No. 1182.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can be granted on the applied amnesty.

RULING: No. P.D. No. 1182 as amended by P.D. No. 1429, dated 10 June 1978, provides, in relevant portion, as follows: SECTION 1. Proclamation of Amnesty. Amnesty is hereby decreed in favor of all persons who have been arrested and/or charged, or although not arrested and/or charged may have committed acts which make them liable for, violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 1700, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 885. and those who have been arrested for, and or charged or chargeable with crimes against public orderas defined and penalized under Revised Penal Code, including those crimes and offenses which may have been committed by said persons in furtherance thereof. SEC. 2. Persons Disqualified. The following persons are disqualified from amnesty under this Decree: (a) Those who have promoted, maintained or headed a rebellion or insurrection or who, while holding public office or employment took part therein, engaged in war against the forces of the Government, destroyed property or committed serious violence, exacted contributions or diverted public funds from the lawful purpose for which they had been appropriated; provided, that persons who have

been arrested and/or charged with having merely participated or executed the commands of others in a rebellion may be granted amnesty. (b) Those who have been arrested and/or charged with murder, homicide, serious physical injuries, crimes against chastity, robbery, piracy, arson, hijacking, violations of the Firearms and Explosives Law, and assault upon and resistance and disobedience to persons in authority and their agents, except if such crime or offense was committed in furtherance of subversion or crimes against public order as a mere participant/affiliate/member. SEC. 4. Conditions for the grant of amnesty. Any person applying for amnesty pursuant to this Decree must satisfy the following requirements: a. If under arrest or charged as of the date of this decree, he must submit his application not later than September 30, 1978 in the prescribed form hereto attached as Annex A; If not under arrest, he must submit such application within six months after his arrest or surrender; b. He must renew his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and swear or affirm to support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines; and c. He must surrender whatever unlicensed firearms and/or explosives and ammunition he may have in his possession." (Emphasis supplied) As pointed out by the Sandiganbayan, under the very legislation authorizing the amnesty, (a) The crimes to be amnestied must have been for violations of subversion laws or those defined and proscribed under crimes against public order under the Revised Penal Code; and (b) The applications for amnesty must have been filed not later than September 30, 1978 or six months after the arrest or surrender of the applicant for amnesty." The instant case therefore presents the issue of what effect, if any, may be given to supposed acts of the former President which were in conflict with or in violation of decrees issued by that same former President. So viewed, this Court has no

alternative save to declare that the supposed acts of the former President done in 1985 in clear conflict with the restrictions embodied in the very decrees promulgated by that same former President, cannot be given any legal effect. It may be supposed that the former President could have validly amended Presidential Decrees Nos. 1082 and 1182 so as to wipe away the restrictions and limitations in fact found in those decrees. But the former President did not so amend his own decrees and he must be held to the terms and conditions that he himself had promulgated in the exercise of legislative power. It may be we do not completely discount the possibility that the former President did in fact act in contravention of the decrees here involved by granting the amnesty claimed by petitioners, and that by such acts, he may indeed have aroused expectations (however unjustified under the terms of existing law) in the minds of the petitioners. If such be the case, then the appropriate recourse of the petitioners is not to this Court, nor to any other court, but rather to the Executive Department of the government. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Resolution dated 27 January 1987 of the respondent Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

TITLE: IBP vs. Zamora CITATION: G.R. No. 141284. August 15, 2000

FACTS: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional.

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the Presidents factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review (2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP

RULING: When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the Presidents action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification.

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and

suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the Court.

In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden, as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed forces. The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is militarized in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.

TITLE: Lacson Vs. Perez CITATION: 357 SCRA 756 G.R. No. 147780. May 10, 2001

FACTS: President Macapagal-Arroyo declared a State of Rebellion (Proclamation No. 38) on May 1, 2001 as well as General Order No. 1 ordering the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion in the NCR. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the rebellion were thereafter effected. Petitioner filed for prohibition, injunction, mandamus and habeas corpus with an application for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners assail the declaration of Proc. No. 38 and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof. Petitioners furthermore pray that the appropriate court, wherein the information against them were filed, would desist arraignment and trial until this instant petition is resolved. They also contend that they are allegedly faced with impending warrantless arrests and unlawful restraint being that hold departure orders were issued against them.

ISSUE: Whether or Not Proclamation No. 38 is valid, along with the warrantless arrests and hold departure orders allegedly effected by the same.

RULING: President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of Proc. No. 38 on May 6, 2006, accordingly the instant petition has been rendered moot and academic. Respondents have declared that the Justice Department and the police authorities intend to obtain regular warrants of arrests from the courts for all acts committed prior to and until May 1, 2001. Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion in suppressing the rebellion if the circumstances so warrant, thus the warrantless arrests are not based on Proc. No. 38. Petitioners prayer for mandamus and prohibition is improper at this time because an individual warrantlessly arrested has adequate remedies in law: Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, providing for preliminary investigation, Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, providing for the period in which a warrantlessly arrested person must be delivered to the proper judicial authorities, otherwise the officer responsible for such may be penalized for the

delay of the same. If the detention should have no legal ground, the arresting officer can be charged with arbitrary detention, not prejudicial to claim of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Petitioners were neither assailing the validity of the subject hold departure orders, nor were they expressing any intention to leave the country in the near future. To declare the hold departure orders null and void ab initio must be made in the proper proceedings initiated for that purpose. Petitioners prayer for relief regarding their alleged impending warrantless arrests is premature being that no complaints have been filed against them for any crime, furthermore, the writ of habeas corpus is uncalled for since its purpose is to relieve unlawful restraint which Petitioners are not subjected to. Petition is dismissed. Respondents, consistent and congruent with their undertaking earlier adverted to, together with their agents, representatives, and all persons acting in their behalf, are hereby enjoined from arresting Petitioners without the required judicial warrants for all acts committed in relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege of Malacaang.

TITLE: David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo CITATION: G.R. No. 171396. May 3, 2006

FACTS: In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate GMA she declared PP 1017 and is to be implemented by GO 5. The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring down the government. Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit, KMU head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest. Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5. In March, GMA issued PP 1021 w/c declared that the state of national emergency ceased to exist. David and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the president for such power is reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and that such is an over breadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an over breadth because it encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the presidents calling out power, take care power and take over power. ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.

RULING: The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned PP. It is still in fact operative because there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following way;

Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty. Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing on their faces statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily freedom of speech cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered harmful and constitutionally unprotected conduct. Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words and again, that overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct. Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation. Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC

considered the Presidents calling-out power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a sequence of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that whenever it becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. And such criterion has been met. Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine Pursuant to the 2ndsentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to the President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail the clause to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction. The SC noted that such provision is similar to the power that granted former President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6 categorically states that [t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify GMA[s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. The president can only take care of the carrying out of laws but cannot create or enact laws. Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as the Daily Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the constitution is not limited to natural calamities but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the president can declare the state of national emergency but her exercise of emergency powers does not come automatically after it for such exercise needs

authority from Congress. The authority from Congress must be based on the following: 1 There must be a war or other emergency. (2) The delegation must be for a limited period only. (3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe. (4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress. Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise of the calling out power of the president by the president.

TITLE: Ampatuan vs. Puno CITATION: G.R. No. 190259. June 7, 2011

FACTS: On November 24, 2009, the day after the gruesome massacre of 57 men and women, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946, placing the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of emergency. She directed the AFP and the PNP to undertake such measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in the named places. Under AO 273, she also delegated to the DILG the supervision of the ARMM. The petitioners claimed that the Presidents issuances encroached the ARMMs autonomy, that it constitutes an invalid exercise of emergency powers, and that the President had no factual basis for declaring a state of emergency, especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato, where no critical violent incidents occurred. They want Proc. 1946 and AO 273 be declared unconstitutional.

The respondents, however, said that its purpose was not to deprive the ARMM of its autonomy, but to restore peace and order in subject places. It is pursuant to her calling out power as Commander-in-Chief. The determination of the need to exercise this power rests solely on her wisdom.

The President merely delegated her supervisory powers over the ARMM to the DILG Secretary who was her alter ego any way. The delegation was necessary to facilitate the investigation of the mass killings

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called out the AFP and the PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City.

2.Whether or not there is factual basis on the calling out of the Armed Forces.

RULING:

1. NO. The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need a congressional authority to exercise the same.

2. Yes. The Presidents call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence springs from the power vested in her under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the Presidents exercise of the above power, unless it is shown that such determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion, the Court will accord respect to the Presidents judgment.

TITLE:

Nicolas vs. Romulo

CITATION: G.R. NO. 175888. February 11, 2009

FACTS: Herein respondent, Lance Corporal Daniel Smith, is a member of the United States Armed Forces. He was charged with the crime of rape committed against a Filipina, Suzette S. Nicolas. Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States, the United States, at its request, was granted custody of defendant Smith pending the proceedings. During the trial, the US Government faithfully complied with its undertaking to bring defendant Smith to the trial court every time his presence was required. Eventually, the Regional Trial Court rendered its Decision, finding defendant Smith guilty. He shall serve his sentence in the facilities that shall be agreed upon by appropriate Philippine and United States pursuant to the VFA. Pending agreement on such facilities, accused is hereby temporarily committed to the Makati City Jail. However, defendant was taken out of the Makati jail by a contingent of Philippine law enforcement agents, and brought to a facility for detention under the control of the United States government, provided for under new agreements between the Philippines and the United States, referred to as the Romulo-Kenney Agreement. This agreement provides that in accordance with the Visiting Forces Agreement signed, Smith, United States Marine Corps, be returned to United States military custody at the U.S. Embassy in Manila. Petitioners contend that the Philippines should have custody of Smith because if they would allow such transfer of custody of an accused to a foreign power is to provide for a different rule of procedure for that accused. The equal protection clause of the Constitution is also violated.

ISSUE: Whether or Not there is a violation of the equal protection clause?

RULING: The equal protection clause is not violated, because there is a substantial basis for a different treatment of a member of a foreign military armed forces allowed to enter our territory and all other accused.

The rule in international law is that a foreign armed forces allowed to enter ones territory is immune from local jurisdiction, except to the extent agreed upon. The Status of Forces Agreements involving foreign military units around the world vary in terms and conditions, according to the situation of the parties involved, and reflect their bargaining power. But the principle remains, i.e., the receiving State can exercise jurisdiction over the forces of the sending State only to the extent agreed upon by the parties. As a result, the situation involved is not one in which the power of this Court to adopt rules of procedure is curtailed or violated, but rather one in which, as is normally encountered around the world, the laws (including rules of procedure) of one State do not extend or apply except to the extent agreed upon to subjects of another State due to the recognition of extraterritorial immunity given to such bodies as visiting foreign armed forces. Applying, however, the provisions of VFA, the Court finds that there is a different treatment when it comes to detention as against custody. It is clear that the parties to the VFA recognized the difference between custody during the trial and detention after conviction, because they provided for a specific arrangement to cover detention. And this specific arrangement clearly states not only that the detention shall be carried out in facilities agreed on by authorities of both parties, but also that the detention shall be "by Philippine authorities." Therefore, the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19 and 22, 2006, which are agreements on the detention of the accused in the United States Embassy, are not in accord with the VFA itself because such detention is not "by Philippine authorities." Respondents should therefore comply with the VFA and negotiate with

representatives of the United States towards an agreement on detention facilities under Philippine authorities as mandated by Art. V, Sec. 10 of the VFA. The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States, was UPHELD as constitutional, but the Romulo-Kenney Agreements were DECLARED not in accordance with the VFA.

TITLE: Bayan v. Zamora CITATION: 342 SCRA 449

FACTS: The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an agreement called the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The agreement was treated as a treaty by the Philippine government and was ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada with the concurrence of 2/3 of the total membership of the Philippine Senate. The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits, and further defines the rights of the U.S. and the Philippine governments in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies. Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates 25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.

ISSUE: Was the VFA unconstitutional?

RULING: [The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions, held that the petitioners did not commit grave abuse of discretion, and sustained the constitutionality of the VFA.] NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional. Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and,

when so required by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state. There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution the provision in [in 25, Article XVIII] requiring ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum being unnecessary since Congress has not required it.

This Court is of the firm view that the phrase recognized as a treaty means that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the other contracting state, the United States of America in this case, to submit the VFA to the United States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase. Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. Its language should be understood in the sense they have in common use. Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under international law, the said agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty. The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard, has stated that the United States government has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For as long as the United States of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.

TITLE: Pimentel v. Executive Secretary Digest CITATION: G.R. No. 158088. July 6, 2005

FACTS: 1. The petitioners filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to the Senate of the Philippines for its concurrence pursuant to Sec. 21, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution.

2. The Rome Statute established the Int'l Criminal Court which will have jurisdiction over the most serious crimes as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes of aggression as defined by the Statute. The Philippines through the Chargie du Affairs in UN. The provisions of the Statute however require that it be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory state.

3. Petitioners contend that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic and international law, is a function of the Senate, hence it is the duty of the Executive Department to transmit the signed copy to the senate to allow it to exercise its discretion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Exec. Secretary and the DFA have the ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a member of the Philippine mission to the U.N. even without the signature of the President.

RULING: The Supreme Court held NO.

1. The President as the head of state is the sole organ and authorized in the external relations and he is also the country's sole representative with foreign nations. He is the mouthpiece with respect to the country's foreign affairs.

2. In treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states and enter into treaties but this power is limited by the Constitution with the 2/3 required vote of all the members of the Senate for the treaty to be valid. (Sec. 21, Art VII).

3. The legislative branch part is essential to provide a check on the executive in the field of foreign relations, to ensure the nation's pursuit of political maturity and growth.

TITLE: Go Tek vs. Deportation Board CITATION: 79 SCRA 17. September 9, 1977

FACTS: Go Tek was arrested by the National Bureau of Investigation after a search of an office in Sta. Cruz, Manila. He was alleged to have with him at the time of the arrest fake dollar checks in violation of Article 168 of the Revised Penal Court which rendered him an undesirable alien.- The Chief Prosecutor of the Deportation filed a complaint against Go Tek with a prayer that after the trial the Deportation Board recommend to the President of the Philippines Go Teks immediate deportation as his presence in this country having been, and will always be a menace to the peace. welfare, and security of the community.- Go Tek filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint was premature because there was a pending case against him and that the Board had no jurisdiction to try the case in view of the ruling in Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board 118 Phil. 868 that aliens may be deported only on the grounds specified in the law.The Board denied the motion. They reasoned that it was not necessary for an alien to be convicted before the State can exercise its right to deport said alien. Besides theBoard is only a fact finding body whose function is to report and recommend to the President in whom is lodged the exclusive power to deport an alien.- The CFI ruled in favor of Go Tek and issued a writ of prohibition against the Board.- Hence this appeal to the SC.

ISSUE: WON the Deportation Board can entertain a deportation proceeding based on a ground not specified in Section 37 of the Immigration Law and although the alien has not yet been convicted of the offense imputed to him.

RULING: Yes.- A thorough comprehension of the President's power to deport aliens may show the baselessness of the instant prohibition action of Go Tek. The President's

power to deport aliens and the investigation of aliens subject to deportation are provided for in the following provisions of the Revised Administrative Code:- SEC. 69. Deportation of subject of foreign power. A subject of a foreign power residing in the Philippine Islands shall not be deported expelled, or excluded from said Islands or repatriated to his own country by the Governor-General except upon prior investigator, conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent, of the ground upon which such action is contemplated. In such case the person concerned shall he informed of the charge or charges against him and he shall be allowed not less than three days for the preparation of his defense. He shall also have the right to be heard by himself or counsel, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to cross-examine the opposingwitnesses.- On the other hand, section 37 of the Immigration Law Provides that certain aliens may be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the Commissioner's warrant - "after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien."- So, under existing law; the deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected (1) by order of the President, after due investigation, pursuant to section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code and (2) by the Commissioner of Immigration upon recommendation of the Board of Commissioners under section 37 of the immigration Law (Qua CheeGan vs- Deportation Board, supra).- The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens (Chuoco Tiaco vs. Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 57 L. Ed. 960, 40 Phil. 1122, 1125). That power may be exercise by the Chief Executive "when he deems such action necessary for the peace and domestic tranquility of the nation. Disposition CFI decision is reversed and set aside

TITLE: Buscayno vs. Millitary Commission CITATION: G.R. No. L-58284. November 19, 1981

FACTS: Bernabe Buscayno alias Commander Dante and Jose Ma. Sison alias Amado Guerrero, alleged subversives classified as "PKP/HMB/CPP/MAMAO and Traditional Armed Group personalities", were wanted by the authorities since 1971. The habeas corpus case filed in behalf of Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., L-46909, was dismissed on the ground of abandonment in this Court's resolution of January 8, 1981. The habeas corpus case filed by Jose Luneta ang other defendants in the rebellion case, No. MC-1-92 or SMC-1-1 of Special Military Commission (Case No. MC-24-9) was dismissed in this Court's decision of January 16, 1981 (Luneta vs. Special Military Commission No. 1, L-49473, 102 SCRA 56). The habeas corpus case filed by Othoniel Jimenez, who was charged with subversion in Military Commission No. 34, was dismissed in this Court's decision of January 15, 1981 (G. R. No. 54577, January 15, 1981, 102 SCRA 39). The habeas corpus case filed by Saturnino Ocampo and four others against Military Commission No. 25 in connection with the subversion charge against them and Jose Ma. Sison, G. R. No. 50155, is still pending.

ISSUE: Whether or not Buscayno violated the military power.

RULING: Yes. Proclamation No. 2045 explicitly provides that persons, like petitioners who are under detention for rebellion and the capital offense of subversion, cannot enjoy the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Because the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended as to them, they are not entitled to bail.

Review of rulings of the military commission. Ordinarily, this Court cannot review the rulings and proceedings of the military commission. The National Security Code, Presidential Decree No. 1498, which was issued on June 11, 1978 (74 OG 11066), provides in its sections 86(f) and 87(e) that what this Court can review are the decisions of the Court of Military Appeals in cases appealed to it from the military commission. Generally, this Court does not exercise over military commissions the supervisory jurisdiction which it possesses over civil trial courts whose interlocutory rulings and decisions may be reviewed by this Court. Republic Act No. 1700 (quoted in full in People vs. Ferrer, L-32613-14, December 27, 1972, 48 SCRA 382), which took effect on June 20, 1957 and which outlaws the Communist Party and similar associations because their existence and activities constitute a clear, present and grave danger to national security, punishes the following acts: 1. By arresto mayor, anyone who knowingly, wilfully and by overt acts affiliates himself with, becomes or remains a member of the Communist Party or its successor or any subversive association as defined in the law. Prision correccional shall be imposed for a second conviction. Prision mayor shall be imposed for subsequent convictions. 2. By prision mayor to death, being an officer or a ranking leader of the Communist Party or of any subversive association as defined in the law. 3. By prision mayor to death, any member of the Communist Party or similar subversive association who takes up arms against the government. 4. By prision correccional to prision mayor, one who conspires with any other person to overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippines or the government of any of its political subdivisions by force, violence, deceit, subversion or other illegal means for the purpose of placing such Government or political subdivision under the control and donation of any alien power. 5. By prision correccional any person who knowingly furnishes false evidence in any action brought under the Anti-Subversion Law.

Section 1. Short Title This decree shall be known as the Revised Anti-Subversion Law. Sec. 2. Subversive Associations and Organizations - Any association, organization, political party, or group of persons organized for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines or for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof, with the open or covert assistance or support of a foreign power or the open or covert support from a foreign source of any association, group or person, whether public or private, by force, violence, terrorism, arson, petition, deceit or other illegal shall be considered and is hereby d a subversive organization. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 31, effective on June 6, 1979 and P.D. No. 1736, Sept. 12, 1980.). Sec. 3. Penalties (a) Members. Whoever knowingly, wilfully and by overt act affiliates with, becomes or remains a member of a subversive association or organization as defined in Section 2 hereof shall be punished by arresto mayor and shall be disqualified permanently from holding any public office, appointive or elective, and from exercising the right to vote; in case of a second conviction, the principal penalty shall be prision correccional and in all subsequent convictions the penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed. Officers or Ranking Leaders. If such member is an officer or a ranking leader of any subversive association or organization as defined in Section 2 hereof, or if such member takes up arms against the Government, he shall be punished by prision mayor to death with all the accessory penalties provided therefor in the Revised Penal Code. Sec. 4. False Testimony. Any person who knowingly furnishes false evidence in any action brought under this decree shall be punished by prision correccional. Sec. 5. Sufficiency of Evidence. Except as provided in Section 7 hereof, the twowitness rule heretofore provided in Republic Act Numbered Seventeen hundred is hereby obrogated and the accused may be convicted on the testimony of one witness if sufficient under the rules of evidence, or on his confession given in open court.