Philosophy Faculty Reading List 2009-2010 PART II PAPER 02: PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

Material marked with an asterisk* is important and/or a good place to start.

SEARLE, J., The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1992) [Ch. 3]

FIRST PERSON THOUGHT Indexical Thoughts *PERRY, J., 'The Problem of the Essential Indexical.' Nous 13 (1979): 3-21. Repr. in Q. Cassam, ed., Self-Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), and in N. Salmon & S. Soames, eds., Propositions and Attitudes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988). BOR, S.E., and W. LYCAN. 'Who, Me?' Philosophical Review 89 (1980): 427-66. EVANS, G., 'Self-Identification', in Self-Knowledge, edited by Q. Cassam, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 184-209. [Essay 6] FREGE, G., 'The Thought', in his Collected Papers, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984), Repr. in P.F. Strawson, ed., Philosophical Logic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967). Also in P. Yourgrau, ed., Demonstratives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). KAPLAN, D., 'Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals', in Themes from Kaplan, edited by J. Almog, J. Perry and H. Wettstein, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). LEWIS, D., 'Attitudes "De Dicto" And "De Se".' Philosophical Review 88 (1979): 513-43. Repr. in his Philosophical Papers, Vol 1. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 133-59. MCGINN, C., The Subjective View (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983) [Chs. 4 & 5] MELLOR, D., 'I and Now', in his Matters of Metaphysics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), NAGEL, T., The View from Nowhere (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986) [ch. 4] REICHENBACH, H., Elements of Symbolic Logic (New York: Macmillan, 1948) [50] WITTGENSTEIN, L., The Blue and Brown Books (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958) [The Blue Book; especially ca pp. 60-70] First Person Authority *ALSTON, W., 'Varieties of Privileged Access.' American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (1971): 223-41. *CASSAM, Q., ed. Self-Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) [Introduction and essays by Ryle, Shoemaker (both), Chisholm, Armstrong and Evans]
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SYLLABUS Knowledge of other minds: the roles of analogy, of theory and of simulation. First person thought: indexical thoughts; first person authority. The nature of consciousness. Theories of intentionality and mental content: thought and language; object dependence. Mental causation and physicalism. Set text: Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations. KNOWLEDGE OF OTHER MINDS The Roles of Analogy, of Theory and of Simulation *CARRUTHERS, P., Introducing Persons (London: Croom Helm, 1986) *DAVIES, M., and T. STONE., Folk Psychology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995) [Introduction and essays] *HEAL, J., 'Understanding Other Minds from the Inside', in Current Issues in the Philosophy of Mind, edited by A. O'Hear, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 83-99. [Available on Camtools] AYER, A.J., 'One's Knowledge of Other Minds', in Philosophical Essays, (London: Macmillan, 1954). Repr. in D.E. Gustafson, ed., Essays on Philosophical Psychology (London: Macmillan, 1967). CARRUTHERS, P., and P. SMITH, eds., Theories of Theories of Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) [Essays by Gordon, Carruthers and Heal] CRANE, T., The Mechanical Mind (London: Penguin, 1995; 2nd ed. 2002) [Also available as an e-book] DAVIES, M., and T. STONE, eds., Folk Psychology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995) [Introduction and essays 1-3. Heal's essay is also in J. Butterfield, ed., Language, Mind and Logic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986)] MALCOLM, N., Problems of Mind: Descartes to Wittgenstein (London: Allen & Unwin, 1972) [Part I] MCGINN, C., 'What Is the Problem of Other Minds?' Aristotelian Society Suppl. Vol. 58 (1984): 119-37. PARGETTER, R., 'The Scientific Inference to Other Minds.' Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (1984): 158-63.
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BURGE, T., 'Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge.' Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (1996): 91-116. CHISHOLM, R., The First Person (Brighton: Harvester, 1981) HEAL, J., 'On 'First Person Authority'.' Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (2001-2): 1-19. MORAN, R., Authority and Estrangement (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001) WRIGHT, C., B. SMITH, and C. MACDONALD, eds., Knowing Our Own Minds (Oxford: Clarendon, 1998) [Essays by Wright, Fricker and Burge. Also available from www.oxfordscholarship.com]

THEORIES OF INTENTIONALITY AND MENTAL CONTENT Theories of Content *BLOCK, N., 'Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology', in Studies in the Philosophy of Mind, edited by P.A. French, Midwest Studies in Philosophy; 10. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), Repr. in S. Stich & T. Warfield, eds., Mental Representation (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994). *CRANE, T., The Mechanical Mind (London: Penguin, 1995; 2nd ed. 2002.) [Also available as an e-book.] *DAVIES, M., 'Intentionality', in Philosophy: A Guide through the Subject, edited by A.C. Grayling, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 275-300. *DENNETT, D., 'Intentional Systems.' Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971): 87-106. Repr. in his Brainstorms (Brighton: Harvester, 1981), pp. 3-22. *FIELD, H.H., 'Mental Representation.' Erkenntnis 13 (1978): 9-61. Repr. in N. Block, ed., Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 2 (London: Methuen, 1981), pp. 78-114. Also in S. Stich & T. Warfield, eds., Mental Representation (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994) *STELRELNY, K., The Representational Theory of Mind (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990) [ch. 6] *STICH, S., and T. WARFIELD, eds., Mental Representation: A Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994) [Introduction and papers by Block and Harman] DENNETT, D., Content and Consciousness. 2nd ed. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986) [ch. 2] DENNETT, D., The Intentional Stance (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987) [Especially essays 2 and *10] DRETSKE, F., Explaining Behaviour: Reasons in a World of Causes (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1988) [chs 3-5] FODOR, J., 'Psychosemantics', in Mind and Cognition, edited by W.G. Lycan, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990) [ch. 4. Includes a critique of his paper "Psychosemantics", pp. 104-6] FODOR, J., A Theory of Content and Other Essays (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990) [chs. 3 & 4] HARMAN, G., 'Conceptual Role Semantics.' Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23 (1982): 242-56. MILLIKAN, R.G., 'Biosemantics.' Journal of Philosophy 86 (1989): 281-97. Repr. in S. Stich & T. Warfield, eds., Mental Representation (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994). MILLIKAN, R.G., 'Thoughts without Laws: Cognitive Science with Content.' Philosophical Review 95 (1986): 47-80. Repr. in her White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993), pp. 51-82. STALNAKER, R., Inquiry (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1984) [chs. 1 & 2]

THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS *DENNETT, D., 'Quining Qualia', in Consciousness in Contemporary Science, edited by A.J. Marcel and E. Bisiach, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), Repr. in W.G. Lycan, ed., Mind and Cognition (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990). *NAGEL, T., 'What Is It Like to Be a Bat?' Philosophical Review 83 (1974): 435-50. Repr. in his Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp.165-80. Also in D. Rosenthal, ed., The Nature of Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 422-28. ARMSTRONG, D., 'What Is Consciousness?' in his The Nature of Mind, (Brighton: Harvester, 1981), pp. 55-67. DENNETT, D., 'Towards a Cognitive Theory of Consciousness', in his Brainstorms, (Brighton: Harvester, 1981), pp. 149-73. HARMAN, G., 'The Intrinsic Quality of Experience', in Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind edited by J.E. Tomberlin, Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 4 (Atascadero, CA.: Ridgeview, 1990), pp. 31-52. JACKSON, F., 'Epiphenomenal Qualia.' Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1982): 127-36. Repr. in W.G. Lycan, ed., Mind and Cognition (Oxford; Blackwell, 1990). LEWIS, D., 'What Experience Teaches', in Mind and Cognition, edited by W.G. Lycan, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), pp. 499-519. LUDLOW, P., ed., There's Something About Mary (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2004) MCGINN, C., The Problem of Consciousness (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991) [Especially chs. 1 & 4] SHOEMAKER, S., 'Qualia and Consciousness.' Mind 100 (1994): 507-24. Repr. in his The First Person Perspective and Other Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). TYE, M., Ten Problems of Consciousness (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995) [ch. 1]

STAMPE, D., 'Towards a Causal Theory of Linguistic Representation', in Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language, edited by P.A. French, Midwest Studies in Philosophy; 2 (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989), pp. 42-63. VAN GULICK, R., 'Functionalism, Information and Content', in Mind and Cognition, edited by W.G. Lycan, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), pp. 107-29. Thought and Language *DAVIDSON, D., 'Thought and Talk', in Mind and Language, edited by S. Guttenplan, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975). Repr. in his Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984). Also in D. Rosenthal, ed., Nature of Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) *MCGINN, C., The Character of Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982) [ch. 4] DAVIDSON, D., 'Rational Animals', in Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, edited by E. Lepore and B. McLaughlin, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988), DENNETT, D., 'Critical Notice: The Language of Thought by Jerry Fodor.' Mind 86 (1977): 265-80. Repr. as "A Cure for the Common Code?", in N. Block, ed., Readings in Philosophy of Psychology Vol. 2. (London: Methuen, 1981), pp. 64-77. Also in D. Dennett Brainstorms (Brighton: Harvester, 1981) FODOR, J., The Language of Thought (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976) [chs. 1 & 2] FODOR, J., 'Why There Still Has to a Language of Thought', in Mind and Cognition, edited by W.G. Lycan, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), pp. 282-300. Also in his Psychosemantics (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987) JEFFREY, R., 'Animal Interpretation', in Action and Events, edited by E. Lepore and B. McLaughlin, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988), pp. 481-487. MALCOLM, N., 'Thoughtless Brutes', in his Thought and Knowledge, (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 40-57. Object-Dependence *BLACKBURN, S., Spreading the Word (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984) [ch. 9] *FODOR, J., 'Methodological Solipsism', in his Representations, (Brighton: Harvester, 1981). Also in D. Rosenthal, ed. Nature of Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991). *PUTNAM, H., 'The Meaning of Meaning', in his Mind, Language and Reality, Philosophical Papers Vol. 2. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975) *STELRELNY, K., The Representational Theory of Mind (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990) [ch. 5] BURGE, T., 'Individualism and the Mental', in Studies in Metaphysics, edited by P.A. French, Midwest Studies in Philosophy; 6 (Minneapolis: University of
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Minnesota Press, 1979), pp. 73-121. Also in D. Rosenthal, ed., Nature of Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) BURGE, T., 'Other Bodies', in Thought and Object, edited by A. Woodfield, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982) BURGE, T., 'Two Thought Experiments Reviewed.' Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23 (1982): 284-93. [Available in the Faculty Library offprint collection] EVANS, G., The Varieties of Reference (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982) [ch. 6] KRIPKE, S., 'A Puzzle About Belief', in Propositions and Attitudes, edited by N. Salmon and S. Soames, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), Also in P. Ludlow, ed., Readings in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997). LEWIS, D., 'What Puzzling Pierre Does Not Believe.' Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59 (1981): 283-89. MCDOWELL, J., 'De Re Senses.' Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1984): 283-94. MCDOWELL, J., and P. PETTIT, 'Introduction', in their Subject, Thought and Context, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986) MCKINSEY, M., 'Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access.' Analysis 51 (1991): 916. NOONAN, H., 'Russellian Thoughts and Methodological Solipsism', in Language, Mind and Logic, edited by J. Butterfield, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986)

MENTAL CAUSATION AND PHYSICALISM *KIM, J., Mind in a Physical World (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998) *KIM, J., Physicalism, or Something near Enough (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005) *KIM, J., Supervenience and Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) [chs. 13,14,16 & 17] *YABLO, S., 'Mental Causation.' Philosophical Review 101 (1992): 245-80. BENNETT, K., 'Mental Causation.' Philosophy Compass 2, no. 2 (2007): 316-37. BENNETT, K., 'Why the Exclusion Problem Seems Intractable, and How, Just Maybe, to Tract It.' Nous 37 (2003): 471-87. CRANE, T., 'The Mental Causation Debate.' Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Suppl. Vol. 69 (1995): 211-36. FODOR, J., 'Special Sciences (Or: The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis).' Synthese 28 (1974): 77-115. HEIL, J., and A. MELE, Mental Causation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) [Especially essays by Baker, Burge, Davidson, Dretske. Also available as an e-book] LEPORE, E., and B. LOEWER. 'Mind Matters.' Journal of Philosophy 84 (1987): 630-42.
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SHOEMAKER, S., 'Realization and Mental Causation', in Physicalism and Its Discontents, edited by C. Gillett and B. Loewer. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001)

PITCHER, G., ed. Wittgenstein: The Philosphical Investigations (London: Macmillan, 1968) [Papers by Ayer, Rhees, Cook, Donagan & Kenny] WRIGHT, C., 'Does Philosophical Investigations I, 258-60 Suggest a Cogent Argument against Private Language?' in Subject, Thought and Context, edited by P. Pettit and J. McDowell, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), PI 302-428: Sensations and Their Owners

WITTGENSTEIN Set Text *WITTGENSTEIN, L., Philosophical Investigations. Translated by G.E.M. Anscombe. 3rd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1968) General *MCGINN, M., Wittgenstein and the Philosophical Investigations (London: Routledge, 1997) [Also available as an e-book] HACKER, P., Insight and Illusion. 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986) [chs. 9 & 10] HEAL, J., 'Wittgenstein, Ludwig Josef Johann'. In E. Craig, ed. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge: 1998; 2004. Retrieved 22 July 2009 from www.rep.routledge.com/article/DD072. [Gives a general overview of Wittgensteins views] PEARS, D., The False Prison Vol. 2. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987-88) [Also available from www.oxfordscholarship.com] STROUD, B., 'Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mind', in Contemporary Philosophy: A New Survey Vol. 4. edited by G. Flistad, (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1983), pp. 319-41. Rule Following *KRIPKE, S., Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982) [Also available as an e-book.] BOGHOSSIAN, P., 'The Rule-Following Considerations.' Mind 98 (1989): 507-49. PI 243-301: Private Language *JONES, O.R., ed. The Private Language Argument (London: Macmillan, 1971) CRAIG, E.J., 'Privacy and Rule-Following', in Language, Mind and Logic, edited by J. Butterfield, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) KENNY, A., 'Cartesian Privacy', in Wittgenstein: The Philosophical Investigations, edited by G. Pitcher, (London: Macmillan, 1968), pp. 352-70. KENNY, A., Wittgenstein (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973; rev. ed. 2006) [ch. 10] KRIPKE, S., Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Oxford: Blackwell,1982) [ch. 3. Also available as an e-book]
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KRIPKE, S., Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982) [Postscript. Also available as an e-book] WITTGENSTEIN, L., 'The Blue Book', in The Blue and Brown Books, (New York: Harper Perennial, 1965), pp. 60-74. WITTGENSTEIN, L., Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, edited by G.E.M. Anscombe. Vol. I (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980) [563-586, 903-922, 927-939] PI 429-465: Intentionality HACKER, P., Wittgenstein: Mind and Will (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996) [ch. 1] WITTGENSTEIN, L., 'The Blue Book', in The Blue and Brown Books, (New York: Harper Perennial, 1965), pp. 30-40. WITTGENSTEIN, L., Philosophical Grammar (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974), pp. 133158. PI, II, XI: Aspect Perception ANSCOMBE, G.E.M., 'The Intentionality of Sensation', in Analytical Philosophy (2nd Series), edited by R.J. Butler, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1965) DIAMOND, C., 'Secondary Sense', in The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy and the Mind, (Cambridge, Massachussetts: MIT Press, 1991), pp. 225-42. MULHALL, S., On Being in the World: Wittgenstein and Heidegger on Seeing Aspects (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1990) [chs. 1 & 2]