The Unreality of Time

By John Ellis McTaggart

Published in Mind: A Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy 17 (190 !" #$%& #7'( )t doubtless seems highly *arado+ical to assert that Time is unreal, and that all statements -hich in.ol.e its reality are erroneous( /uch an assertion in.ol.es a far greater de*arture from the natural *osition of man0ind than is in.ol.ed in the assertion of the unreality of /*ace or of the unreality of Matter( /o decisi.e a breach -ith that natural *osition is not to be lightly acce*ted( 1nd yet in all ages the belief in the unreality of time has *ro.ed singularly attracti.e( )n the *hiloso*hy and religion of the East -e find that this doctrine is of cardinal im*ortance( 1nd in the 2est, -here *hiloso*hy and religion are less closely connected, -e find that the same doctrine continually recurs, both among *hiloso*hers and among theologians( Theology ne.er holds itself a*art from mysticism for any long *eriod, and almost all mysticism denies the reality of time( )n *hiloso*hy, again, time is treated as unreal by /*ino3a, by 4ant, by 5egel, and by /cho*enhauer( )n the *hiloso*hy of the *resent day the t-o most im*ortant mo.ements (e+cluding those -hich are as yet merely critical! are those -hich loo0 to 5egel and to Mr( Bradley( 1nd both of these schools deny the reality of time( /uch a concurrence of o*inion cannot be denied to be highly significant && and is not the less significant because the doctrine ta0es such different forms, and is su**orted by such different arguments( ) belie.e that time is unreal( But ) do so for reasons -hich are not, ) thin0, em*loyed by any of the *hiloso*hers -hom ) ha.e mentioned, and ) *ro*ose to e+*lain my reasons in this *a*er( Positions in time, as time a**ears to us prima facie, are distinguished in t-o -ays( Each *osition is Earlier than some, and 6ater than some, of the other *ositions( 1nd each *osition is either Past, Present, or 7uture( The distinctions of the former class are *ermanent, -hile those of the latter are not( )f M is e.er earlier than 8, it is al-ays earlier( But an e.ent, -hich is no- *resent, -as future and -ill be *ast( /ince distinctions of the first class are *ermanent, they might be held to be more ob9ecti.e, and to be more essential to the nature of time( ) belie.e, ho-e.er, that this -ould be a mista0e, and that the distinction of *ast, *resent and future is as essential to time as the distinction of earlier and later, -hile in a certain sense, as -e shall see, it may be regarded as more fundamental than the distinction of earlier and later( 1nd it is because the distinctions of *ast, *resent and future seem to me to be essential for time, that ) regard time as unreal( 7or the sa0e of bre.ity ) shall s*ea0 of the series of *ositions running from the far *ast through the near *ast to the *resent, and then from the *resent to the near future and the far future, as the 1 series( The series of *ositions -hich runs from earlier to later ) shall call the B series( The contents of a *osition in time are called e.ents( The contents of a single *osition are admitted to be *ro*erly called a *lurality of e.ents( () belie.e, 1

ho-e.er, that they can as truly, though not more truly, be called a single e.ent( This .ie- is not uni.ersally acce*ted, and it is not necessary for my argument(! 1 *osition in time is called a moment( The first :uestion -hich -e must consider is -hether it is essential to the reality of time that its e.ents should form an 1 series as -ell as a B series( 1nd it is clear, to begin -ith, that -e ne.er observe time e+ce*t as forming both these series( 2e *ercei.e e.ents in time as being *resent, and those are the only e.ents -hich -e *ercei.e directly( 1nd all other e.ents in time -hich, by memory or inference, -e belie.e to be real, are regarded as *ast or future && those earlier than the *resent being *ast, and those later than the *resent being future( Thus the e.ents of time, as obser.ed by us, form an 1 series as -ell as a B series( )t is *ossible, ho-e.er, that this is merely sub9ecti.e( )t may be the case that the distinction introduced among *ositions in time by the 1 series && the distinction of *ast, *resent and future && is sim*ly a constant illusion of our minds, and that the real nature of time only contains the distinction of the B series &&the distinction of earlier and later( )n that case -e could not perceive time as it really is, but -e might be able to think of it as it really is( This is not a .ery common .ie-, but it has found able su**orters( ) belie.e it to be untenable, because, as ) said abo.e, it seems to me that the 1 series is essential to the nature of time, and that any difficulty in the -ay of regarding the 1 series as real is e:ually a difficulty in the -ay of regarding time as real( )t -ould, ) su**ose, be uni.ersally admitted that time in.ol.es change( 1 *articular thing, indeed, may e+ist unchanged through any amount of time( But -hen -e as0 -hat -e mean by saying that there -ere different moments of time, or a certain duration of time, through -hich the thing -as the same, -e find that -e mean that it remained the same -hile other things -ere changing( 1 uni.erse in -hich nothing -hate.er changed (including the thoughts of the conscious beings in it! -ould be a timeless uni.erse( )f, then, a B series -ithout an 1 series can constitute time, change must be *ossible -ithout an 1 series( 6et us su**ose that the distinction of *ast, *resent and future does not a**ly to reality( ;an change a**ly to reality< 2hat is it that changes< ;ould -e say that, in a time -hich formed a B series but not an 1 series, the change consisted in the fact that an e.ent ceased to be an e.ent, -hile another e.ent began to be an e.ent< )f this -ere the case, -e should certainly ha.e got a change( But this is im*ossible( 1n e.ent can ne.er cease to be an e.ent( )t can ne.er get out of any time series in -hich it once is( )f 8 is e.er earlier than = and later than M, it -ill al-ays be, and has al-ays been, earlier than = and later than M, since the relations of earlier and later are *ermanent( 1nd as, by our *resent hy*othesis, time is constituted by a B series alone, 8 -ill al-ays ha.e a *osition in a time series, and has al-ays had one(1
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)t is e:ually true, though it does not concern us on the hy*othesis -hich -e are no- considering, that -hate.er is once in an 1 series is al-ays in one( )f one of the determinations *ast, *resent, and future can e.er be a**lied to 8, then one of them al-ays has been and al-ays -ill be a**licable, though of course not al-ays the same one(

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That is, it -ill al-ays be, and has al-ays been, an e.ent, and cannot begin or cease to be an e.ent( =r shall -e say that one e.ent M merges itself into another e.ent 8, -hile *reser.ing a certain identity by means of an unchanged element, so that -e can say, not merely that M has ceased and 8 begun, but that it is M -hich has become 8< /till the same difficulty recurs( M and 8 may ha.e a common element, but they are not the same e.ent, or there -ould be no change( )f therefore M changes into 8 at a certain moment, then, at that moment, M has ceased to be M, and 8 has begun to be 8( But -e ha.e seen that no e.ent can cease to be, or begin to be, itself, since it ne.er ceases to ha.e a *lace as itself in the B series( Thus one e.ent cannot change into another( 8either can the change be loo0ed for in the numerically different moments of absolute time, su**osing such moments to e+ist( 7or the same arguments -ill a**ly here( Each such moment -ould ha.e its o-n *lace in the B series, since each -ould be earlier or later than each of the others( 1nd as the B series indicate *ermanent relations, no moment could e.er cease to be, nor could it become another moment( /ince, therefore, -hat occurs in time ne.er begins or ceases to be, or to be itself, and since, again, if there is to be change it must be change of -hat occurs in time (for the timeless ne.er changes!, ) submit that only one alternati.e remains( ;hanges must ha**en to the e.ents of such a nature that the occurrence of these changes does not hinder the e.ents from being e.ents( and the same e.ents, both before and after the change( 8o- -hat characteristics of an e.ent are there -hich can change and yet lea.e the e.ent the same e.ent< () use the -ord characteristic as a general term to include both the :ualities -hich the e.ent *ossesses, and the relations of -hich it is a term && or rather the fact that the e.ent is a term of these relations(! )t seems to me that there is only one class of such characteristics && namely, the determination of the e.ent in :uestion by the terms of the 1 series( Ta0e any e.ent && the death of ?ueen 1nne, for e+am*le && and consider -hat change can ta0e *lace in its characteristics( That it is a death, that it is the death of 1nne /tuart, that it has such causes, that it has such effects && e.ery characteristic of this sort ne.er changes( @Before the stars sa- one another *lain@ the e.ent in :uestion -as a death of an English ?ueen( 1t the last moment of time && if time has a last moment && the e.ent in :uestion -ill still be a death of an English ?ueen( 1nd in e.ery res*ect but one it is e:ually de.oid of change( But in one res*ect it does change( )t began by being a future e.ent( )t became e.ery moment an e.ent in the nearer future( 1t last it -as *resent( Then it became *ast, and -ill al-ays remain so, though e.ery moment it becomes further and further *ast( Thus -e seen forced to the conclusion that all change is only a change of the characteristics im*arted to e.ents by their *resence in the 1 series, -hether those characteristics are :ualities or relations( )f these characteristics are :ualities, then the e.ents, -e must admit, -ould not be al-ays the same, since an e.ent -hose :ualities alter is, of course, not com*letely the

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same( 1nd, e.en if the characteristics are relations, the e.ents -ould not be com*letely the same, if && as ) belie.e to be the case && the relation of A to B in.ol.es the e+istence in A of a :uality of relationshi* to B( > Then there -ould be t-o alternati.es before us( 2e might admit that e.ents did really change their nature, in res*ect of these charseteristics, though not in res*ect of any others( ) see no difficulty in admitting this( )t -ould *lace the determinations of the 1 series in a .ery uni:ue *osition among the characteristics of the e.ent, but on any theory they -ould be .ery uni:ue characteristics( )t is usual, for e+am*le, to say that a *ast e.ent ne.er changes, but ) do not see -hy -e should not say, instead of this, @a *ast e.ent changes only in one res*ect && that e.ery moment it is further from the *resent than it -as before@( But although ) see no intrinsic difficulty in this .ie-, it is not the alternati.e ) regard as ultimately true( 7or if, as ) belie.e, time is unreal, the admission that an e.ent in time -ould change in res*ect of its *osition in the 1 series -ould not in.ol.e that anything really did change( 2ithout the 1 series then, there -ould be no change, and conse:uently the B series by itself is not sufficient for time, since time in.ol.es change( The B series, ho-e.er, cannot e+ist e+ce*t as tem*oral, since earlier and later, -hich are the distinctions of -hich it consists, are clearly time&determinations( /o it follo-s that there can be no B series -here there is no 1 series, since -here there is no 1 series there is no time( But it does not follo- that, if -e subtract the determinations of the 1 series from time, -e shall ha.e no series left at all( There is a series && a series of the *ermanent relations to one another of those realities -hich in time are e.ents && and it is the combination of this series -ith the 1 determinations -hich gi.es time( But this other series && let us call it the ; series && is not tem*oral, for it in.ol.es no change, but only an order( E.ents ha.e an order( They are, let us say, in the order M, 8, =, P( 1nd they are therefore not in the order M, =, 8, P, or =, 8, M, P, or in any other *ossible order( But that they ha.e this order no more im*lies that there is any change than the order of the letters of the al*habet, or of the Peers on the Parliament Coll, im*lies any change( 1nd thus those realities -hich a**ear to us as e.ents might form such a series -ithout being entitled to the name of e.ents, since that name is only gi.en to realities -hich are in a time series( )t is only -hen change and time come in that the relations of this ; series become relations of earlier and later, and so it becomes a B series( More is -anted, ho-e.er, for the genesis of a B series and of time than sim*ly the ; series and the fact of change( 7or the change must be in a *articular direction( 1nd the ; series, -hile it determines the order, does not determine the direction( )f the ; series runs M, 8, =, P, then the B series from earlier to later cannot run M, =, 8, P, or M, P, =, 8, or in any -ay but t-o( But it can run either M, 8, =, P (so that M is earliest and P latest! or else P, =, 8, M (so that P is earliest and M latest!( 1nd there is nothing either in the ; series or in the fact of change to determine -hich it -ill be( 1 series -hich is not tem*oral has no direction of its o-n, though it has an order( )f -e 0ee* to the series of the natural numbers, -e cannot *ut 17 bet-een >1 and >%( But
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) am not asserting, as 6ot3e did, that a relation bet-een A and B consists of a :uality in A and a :uality in B && a .ie- -hich ) regard as :uite indefensible( ) assert that a relation D bet-een A and B involves the e+istence in A of the :uality @ha.ing the relation D to B@ so that a difference of relations al-ays in.ol.es a difference in :uality, and a change of relations al-ays in.ol.es a change of :uality(

-e 0ee* to the series, -hether -e go from 17, through >1, to >%, or -hether -e go from >%, through >1, to 17( The first direction seems the more natural to us, because this series has only one end, and it is generally more con.enient to ha.e that end as a beginning than as a termination( But -e e:ually 0ee* to the series in counting bac0-ard( 1gain, in the series of categories in 5egelEs dialectic, the series *re.ents us from *utting the 1bsolute )dea bet-een Being and ;ausality( But it *ermits us either to go from Being, through ;ausality, to the 1bsolute )dea, or from the 1bsolute )dea, through ;ausality, to Being( The first is, according to 5egel, the direction of *roof, and is thus generally the most con.enient order of enumeration( But if -e found it con.enient to enumerate in the re.erse direction, -e should still be obser.ing the series( 1 non&tem*oral series, then, has no direction in itself, though a *erson considering it may ta0e the terms in one direction or in the other, according to his o-n con.enience( 1nd in the same -ay a *erson -ho contem*lates a time&order may contem*late it in either direction( ) may trace the order of e.ents from the Freat ;harter to the Ceform Bill or from the Ceform Bill to the Freat ;harter( But in dealing -ith the time series -e ha.e not to do merely -ith a change in an e+ternal contem*lation of it, but -ith a change -hich belongs to the series itself( 1nd this change has a direction of its o-n( The Freat ;harter came before the Ceform Bill, and the Ceform Bill did not come before the Freat ;harter( Therefore, besides the ; series and the fact of change there must be gi.en && in order to get time && the fact that the change is in one direction and not in the other( 2e can no- see that the 1 series, together -ith the ; series, is sufficient to gi.e us time( 7or in order to get change, and change in a gi.en direction, it is sufficient that one *osition in the ; series should be Present, to the e+clusion of all others, and that this characteristic of *resentness should *ass along the series in such a -ay that all *ositions on the one side of the Present ha.e been *resent, and all *ositions on the other side of it -ill be *resent( That -hich has been *resent is Past, that -hich -ill be *resent is 7uture( ' Thus to our *re.ious conclusion that there can be no time unless the 1 series is true of reality, -e can add the further conclusion that no other elements are re:uired to constitute a time&series e+ce*t an 1 series and a ; series( 2e may sum u* the relations of the three series to time as follo-s" The 1 and B series are e:ually essential to time, -hich must be distinguished as *ast, *resent and future, and must li0e-ise be distinguished as earlier and later( But the t-o series are not e:ually fundamental( The distinctions of the 1 series are ultimate( 2e cannot e+*lain -hat is meant by *ast, *resent and future( 2e can, to some e+tent, describe them, but they cannot be defined( 2e can only sho- their meaning by e+am*les( @Bour brea0fast this morning,@ -e can say to an in:uirer, @is *astG this con.ersation is *resentG your dinner this e.ening is future(@ 2e can do no more( The B series, on the other hand, is not ultimate( 7or, gi.en a ; series of *ermanent relations of terms, -hich is not in itself tem*oral, and therefore is not a B series, and gi.en the further fact that the terms of this ; series also form an 1 series, and it results
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This account of the nature of the 1 series is not .alid, for it in.ol.es a .icious circle, since it uses @has been@ and @-ill be@ to e+*lain Past and 7uture( But, as ) shall endea.our to sho- later on, this .icious circle is ine.itable -hen -e deal -ith the 1 series, and forms the ground on -hich -e must re9ect it(

that the terms of the ; series become a B series, those -hich are *laced first, in the direction from *ast to future, being earlier than those -hose *laces are further in the direction of the future( The ; series, ho-e.er, is as ultimate as the 1 series( 2e cannot get it out of anything else( That the units of time do form a series, the relations of -hich are *ermanent, is as ultimate as the fact that each of them is *resent, *ast, or future( 1nd this ultimate fact is essential to time( 7or it is admitted that it is essential to time that each moment of it shall either be earlier or later than any other momentG and these relations are *ermanent( 1nd this && the B series && cannot be got out of the 1 series alone( )t is only -hen the 1 series, -hich gi.es change and direction, is combined -ith the ; series, -hich gi.es *ermanence, that the B series can arise( =nly *art of the conclusion -hich ) ha.e no- reached is re:uired for the general *ur*ose of this *a*er( ) am ende.ouring to base the unreality of time, not on the fact that the 1 series is more fundamental than the B series, but on the fact that it is as essential as the B series && that the distinctions of *ast, *resent and future are essential to time and that, if the distinctions are ne.er true of reality, then no reality is in time( This .ie-, -hether it is true or false, has nothing sur*rising in it( )t -as *ointed out abo.e that time, as -e *ercei.e it, al-ays *resents these distinctions( 1nd it has generally been held that this is a real characteristic of time, and not an illusion due to the -ay in -hich -e *ercei.e it( Most *hiloso*hers, -hether they did or did not belie.e time to be true of reality, ha.e regarded the distinctions of the 1 series as essential to time( 2hen the o**osite .ie- has been maintained, it has generally been, ) belie.e, because it -as held (rightly, as ) shall try to sho- later on! that the distinctions of *resent, *ast and future cannot be true of reality, and that conse:uently, if the reality of time is to be sa.ed, the distinction in :uestion must be sho-n to be unessential to time( The *resum*tion, it -as held, -as for the reality of time, and this -ould gi.e us a reason for re9ecting the 1 series as unessential to time( But of course this could only gi.e a *resum*tion( )f the analysis of the notion of time sho-ed that, by remo.ing the 1 series, time -as destroyed, this line of argument -ould be no longer o*en, and the unreality of the 1 series -ould in.ol.e the unreality of time( ) ha.e endea.oured to sho- that the remo.al of the 1 series does destroy time( But there are t-o ob9ections to this theory, -hich -e must no- consider( The first deals -ith those time&series -hich are not really e+istent, but -hich are falsely belie.ed to be e+istent, or -hich are imagined as e+istent( Ta0e, for e+am*le, the ad.entures of Hon ?ui+ote( This series, it is said, is not an 1 series( ) cannot at this moment 9udge it to be either *ast, *resent or future( )ndeed ) 0no- that it is none of the three( Bet, it is said, it is certainly a B series( The ad.enture of the galley&sla.es, for e+am*le, is later than the ad.enture of the -indmills( 1nd a B series in.ol.es time( The conclusion dra-n is that an 1 series is not essential to time( The ans-er to this ob9ection ) hold to be as follo-s( Time only belongs to the e+istent( )f any reality is in time, that in.ol.es that the reality in :uestion e+ists( This, ) imagine, -ould be uni.ersally admitted( )t may be :uestioned -hether all of -hat e+ists

is in time, or e.en -hether anything really e+istent is in time, but it -ould not be denied that, if anything is in time, it must e+ist( 8o- -hat is e+istent in the ad.entures of Hon ?ui+ote< 8othing( 7or the story is imaginary( The acts of ;er.antesE mind -hen he in.ented the story, the acts of my mind -hen ) thin0 of the story && these e+ist( But then these form *art of an 1 series( ;er.antesE in.ention of the story is in the *ast( My thought of the story is in the *ast, the *resent, and &&) trust && the future( But the ad.entures of Hon ?ui+ote may be belie.ed by a child to be historical( 1nd in reading them ) may by an effort of the imagination contem*late them as if they really ha**ened( )n this case, the ad.entures are belie.ed to be e+istent or imagined as e+istent( But then they are belie.ed to be in the 1 series, or imagined as in the 1 series( The child -ho belie.es them historical -ill belie.e that they ha**ened in the *ast( )f ) imagine them as e+istent, ) shall imagine them as ha**ening in the *ast( )n the same -ay, if any one belie.ed the e.ents recorded in MorrisEs News from Nowhere to e+ist, or imagined them as e+istent, he -ould belie.e them to e+ist in the future or imagine them as e+istent in the future( 2hether -e *lace the ob9ect of our belief or our imagination in the *resent, the *ast, or the future, -ill de*end u*on the characteristics of that ob9ect( But some-here in our 1 series it -ill be *laced( Thus the ans-er to the ob9ection is that, 9ust as a thing is in time, it is in the 1 series( )f it is really in time, it is really in the 1 series( )f it is belie.ed to be in time, it is belie.ed to be in the 1 series( )f it is imagined as in times it is imagined as in the 1 series( The second ob9ection is based on the *ossibility, discussed by Mr( Bradley, that there might be se.eral inde*endent time&series in reality( 7or Mr( Bradley, indeed, time is only a**earance( There is no real time at all, and therefore there are not se.eral real series of time( But the hy*othesis here is that there should be -ithin reality se.eral real and inde*endent time&series( The ob9ection, ) imagine, is that the time&series -ould be all real, -hile the distinction of *ast, *resent, and future -ould only ha.e meaning -ithin each series, and could not, therefore, be ta0en as ultimately real( There -ould be, for e+am*le, many *resents( 8o-, of course, many *oints of time can be *resent (each *oint in each time& series is a *resent once!, but they must be *resent successi.ely( 1nd the *resents of the different time&series -ould not be successi.e, since they are not in the same time( (8either -ould they be simultaneous, since that e:ually in.ol.es being in the same time( They -ould ha.e no time&relation -hate.er(! 1nd different *resents, unless they are successi.e, cannot be real( /o the different time&series, -hich are real, must be able to e+ist inde*endently of the distinction bet-een *ast, *resent, and future( ) cannot, ho-e.er, regard this ob9ection as .alid( 8o doubtt, in such a case, no *resent -ould be the *resent && it -ould onlt be the *resent of a certain as*ect of the uni.erse( But then no time -ined be the time && it -ould only be the time of a certain as*ect of the uni.erse( )t -ould, no doubt, be a real time&series, but ) do not see that the *resent -ould be )ess real than the time(

) am not, of course, asserting that there is no contradiction in the e+istence of se.eral distinct 1 series( My main thesis is that the e+istence of any 1 series in.ol.es a contradiction( 2hat ) assert here is merely that, su**osing that there could be any 1 series, ) see no e+tra difficulty in.ol.ed in there being se.eral such series inde*endent of one another, and that therefore there is no incom*atibility bet-een the essentiality of an 1 series for time and the e+istence of se.eral distinct times( Moreo.er, -e must remember that the theory of a *lurality of time series is a mere hy*othesis( 8o reason has e.er been gi.en -hy -e should belie.e in their e+istence( )t has only been said that there is no reason -hy -e should disbelie.e in their e+istence, and that therefore they may e+ist( But if their e+istence should be incom*atible -ith something else, for -hich there is *ositi.e e.idence, then there -ould be a reason -hy -e should disbelie.e in their e+istence( 8o- there is, as ) ha.e tried to sho-, *ositi.e e.idence for belie.ing that an 1 series is essential to time( /u**osing therefore that it -ere the case (-hich, for the reasons gi.en abo.e, ) deny! that the e+istence of a *lurality of time&series -as incom*atible -ith the essentiality for time of the 1 series, it -ould be the hy*othesis of a *lurality of times -hich should be re9ected, and not our conclusion as to the 1 series( ) no- *ass to the second *art of my tas0( 5a.ing, as it seems to me, succeeded in *ro.ing that there can be no time -ithout an 1 series, it remains to *ro.e that an 1 series cannot e+ist, and that therefore time cannot e+ist( This -ould in.ol.e that time is not real at all, since it is admitted that, the only -ay in -hich time can be real is by e+isting( The terms of the 1 series are characteristics of e.ents( 2e say of e.ents that they are either *ast, *resent, or future( )f moments of time are ta0en as se*arate realities, -e say of them also that they are *ast, *resent, or future( 1 characteristic may be either a relation or a :uality( 2hether -e ta0e the terms of the 1 series as relations of e.ents (-hich seems the more reasonable .ie-! or -hether -e ta0e them as :ualities of e.ents, it seems to me that they in.ol.e a contradiction( 6et us first e+amine the su**osition that they are relations( )n that case only one term of each relation can be an e.ent or a moment( The other term must be something outside the time&series(# 7or the relations of the 1 series are changing relations, and the relation of terms of the time&series to one another do not change( T-o e.ents are e+actly in the same *laces in the time&series, relati.ely to one another, a million years before they ta0e *lace, -hile each of them is ta0ing *lace, and -hen they are a million years in the *ast( The same is true of the relation of moments to each other( 1gain, if the moments of time are to be distinguished as se*arate realities from the e.ents -hich ha**en in them, the relation bet-een an e.ent and a moment is un.arying( Each e.ent is in the same moment in the future, in the *resent, and in the *ast( The relations -hich form the 1 series then must be relations of e.ents and moments to something not itself in the time&series( 2hat this something is might be difficult to say( But, -ai.ing this *oint, a more *ositi.e difficulty *resents itself(
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)t has been maintained that the *resent is -hate.er is simultaneous -ith the assertion of its *resentness, the future -hate.er is later than the assertion of its futurity, and the *ast -hate.er is earlier than the assertion of its *astness( But this theory in.ol.es that time e+ists inde*endently of the 1 series, and is incom*atible -ith the results -e ha.e already reached(

Past, *resent, and future are incom*atible determinations( E.ery e.ent must be one or the other, but no e.ent can be more than one( This is essential to the meaning of the terms( 1nd, if it -ere not so, the 1 series -ould be insuflicient to gi.e us, in combination -ith the ; series, the result of time( 7or time, as -e ha.e seen, in.ol.es change, and the only change -e can get is from future to *resent, and from *resent to *ast( The characteristics, therefore, are incom*atible( But e.ery e.ent has them all( )f M is *ast, it has been *resent and future( )f it is future, it -ill be *resent and *ast( )f it is *resent, it has been future and -ill be *ast( Thus all the three incom*atible terms are *redicable of each e.ent -hich is ob.iously inconsistent -ith their being incom*atible, and inconsistent -ith their *roducing change( )t may seem that this can easily be e+*lained( )ndeed it has been im*ossible to state the difficulty -ithout almost gi.ing the e+*lanation, since our language has .erb&forms for the *ast, *resent, and future, but no form that is common to all three( )t is ne.er true, the ans-er -ill run, that M is *resent, *ast and future( )t is *resent, will be *ast, and has been future( =r it is *ast, and has been future and *resent, or again is future and will be *resent and *ast( The characteristics are only incom*atible -hen they are simultaneous, and there is no contradiction to this in the fact that each term has all of them successi.ely( But this e+*lanation in.ol.es a .icious circle( 7or it assumes the e+istence of time in order to account for the -ay in -hich moments are *ast, *resent and future( Time then must be *re&su**osed to account for the 1 series( But -e ha.e already seen that the 1 series has to be assumed in order to account for time( 1ccordingly the 1 series has to be *re&su**osed in order to account for the 1 series( 1nd this is clearly a .icious circle( 2hat -e ha.e done is this && to meet the difficulty that my -riting of this article has the characteristics of *ast, *resent and future, -e say that it is *resent, has been future, and -ill be *ast( But @has been@ is only distinguished from @ is@ by being e+istence in the *ast and not in the *resent, and @ -ill be @ is only distinguished from both by being e+istence in the future( Thus our statement comes to this && that the e.ent in :uestion is *resent in the *resent, future in the *ast, *ast in the future( 1nd it is clear that there is a .icious circle if -e endea.our to assign the characteristics of *resent, future and *ast by the criterion of the characteristics of *resent, *ast and future( The difficulty may be *ut in another -ay, in -hich the fallacy -ill e+hibit itself rather as a .icious infinite series than as a .icious circle( )f -e a.oid the incom*atibility of the three characteristics by asserting that M is *resent, has been future, and -ill be *ast, -e are constructing a second 1 series, -ithin -hich the first falls, in the same -ay in -hich e.ents fall -ithin the first( )t may be doubted -hether any intelligible meaning can be gi.en to the assertion that time is in time( But, in any case, the second 1 series -ill suffer from the same difficulty as the first, -hich can only be remo.ed by *lacing it inside a third 1 series( The same *rinci*le -ill *lace the third inside a fourth, and so on -ithout end( Bou can ne.er get rid of the contradiction, for, by the act of remo.ing it from -hat is to be e+*lained, you *roduce it o.er again in the e+*lanation( 1nd so the e+*lanation is in.alid(

Thus a contradiction arises if the 1 series is asserted of reality -hen the 1 series is ta0en as a series of relations( ;ould it be ta0en as a series of :ualities, and -ould this gi.e us a better result< 1re there three :ualities && futurity, *resentness, and *astness, and are e.ents continually changing the first for the second, and the second for the third< )t seems to me that there is .ery little to be said for the .ie- that the changes of the 1 series are changes of :ualities( 8o doubt my antici*ation of an e+*erience M, the e+*erience itself, and the memory of the e+*erience are three states -hich ha.e different :ualities( But it is not the future M, the *resent M, and the *ast M, -hich ha.e these three different :ualities( The :ualities are *ossessed by three distinct e.ents && the antici*ation of M, the e+*erience M itself, and the memory of M, each of -hich is in turn future, *resent, and *ast( Thus this gi.es no su**ort to the .ie- that the changes of the 1 series are changes of :ualities( But -e need not go further into this :uestion( )f the characteristics of the 1 series -ere :ualities, the same difficulty -ould arise as if they -ere relations( 7or, as before, they are not com*atible, and, as before, e.ery e.ent has all of them( This can only be e+*lained, as before, by saying that each e.ent has them successi.ely( 1nd thus the same fallacy -ould ha.e been committed as in the *re.ious case($ 2e ha.e come then to the conclusion that the a**lication of the 1 series to reality in.ol.es a contradiction, and that conse:uently the 1 serles cannot be true of reality( 1nd, since time in.ol.es the 1 series, it follo-s that time cannot be true of reality( 2hene.er -e 9udge anything to e+ist in time, -e are in error( 1nd -hene.er -e *ercei.e anything as e+isting in time && -hich is the only -ay in -hich -e e.er do *ercei.e things && -e are *ercei.ing it more or less as it really is not( 2e must consider a *ossil!le ob9ection( =ur ground for re9ecting time, it may be said, is that time cannot be e+*lained -ithout assuming time( But may this not *ro.e && not that time is in.alid, but rather that time is ultimate< )t is im*ossible to e+*lain, for e+am*le, goodness or truth unless by bringing in the term to be e+*lained as *art of the e+*lanation, and -e therefore re9ect the e+*lanation as in.alid( But -e do not therefore re9ect the notion as erroneous, but acce*t it as something ultimate, -hich, -hile it does not admit of e+*lanation, does not re:uire it( But this does not a**ly here( 1n idea may be .alid of reality though it does not admit of a .alid e+*lanation( But it cannot be .alid of reality if its a**lication to reality in.ol.es a contradiction( 8o- -e began by *ointing out that there -as such a
$

)t is .ery usual to *resent Time under the meta*hor of a s*atial mo.ement( But is it to be a mo.ement from *ast to future, or from future to *ast< )f the 1 series is ta0en as one of :ualities, it -ill naturally be ta0en as a mo.ement from *ast to future, since the :uality of *resentness has belonged to the *ast states and -ill belong to the future states( )f the 1 series is ta0en as one of relations, it is *ossible to ta0e the mo.ement either -ay, since either of the t-o related terms can be ta0en as the one -hich mo.es( )f the e.ents are ta0en as mo.ing by a fi+ed *oint of *resentness, the mo.ement is from future to *ast, since the future e.ents are those -hich ha.e not yet *assed the *oint, and the *ast are those -hich ha.e( )f *resentness is ta0en as a mo.ing *oint successi.ely related to each of a series of e.ents, the mo.ement is from *ast to future( Thus -e say that e.ents come out of the future, but -e say that -e oursel.es mo.e to-ards the future( 7or each man identifies himself es*ecially -ith his *resent state, as against his future or his *ast, since the *resent is the only one of -hich he has direct e+*erience( 1nd thus the self, if it is *ictured as mo.ing at all, is *ictured as mo.ing -ith the *oint of *resentness along the stream of e.ents from *ast to future(

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contradiction in the case of time && that the charasteristics of the 1 series are mutually incom*atible and yet all true of e.ery term( Unless this contradiction is remo.ed, the idea of time must be re9ected as in.alid( )t -as to remo.e this contradiction that the e+*lanation -as suggested that the characteristics belong to the terms successi.ely( 2hen this e+*lanation failed as being circular, the contradiction remained unremo.ed, and the idea of time must be re9ected, not because it cannot be e+*lained, but because the contradiction cannot be remo.ed( 2hat has been said already, if .alid, is an ade:uate ground for re9ecting time( But -e may add another consideration( Time, as -e ha.e seen, stands and falls -ith the 1 series( 8o-, e.en if -e ignore the contradiction -hich -e ha.e 9ust disco.ered in the a**lication of the 1 series to reality, -as there e.er any *ositi.e reason -hy -e should su**ose that the 1 series -as .alid of reality< 2hy do -e belie.e that e.ents are to be distinguished as *ast, *resent and future< ) concei.e that the belief arises from distinctions in our o-n e+*erience( 1t any moment ) ha.e certain *erce*tions, ) ha.e also the memory of certain other *erce*tions, and the antici*ation of others again( The direct *erce*tion itself is a mental state :ualitati.ely different from the memory or the antici*ation of *erce*tions( =n this is based the belief that the *erce*tion itself has a certain characteristic -hen ) ha.e it, -hich is re*laced by other characteristics -hen ) ha.e the memory or the antici*ation of it && -hich characteristics are called *resentness, *astness, and futurity( 5a.ing got the idea of these characteristics -e a**ly them to other e.ents( E.erything simultaneous -ith the direct *erce*tion -hich ) ha.e no- is called *resent, and it is e.en held that there -ould be a *resent if no one had a direct *erce*tion at all( )n the same -ay acts simultaneous -ith remembered *erce*tions or antici*ated *erce*tions are held to be *ast or future, and this again is e+tended to e.ents to -hich none of the *erce*tions ) no- remember or antici*ate are simultaneous( But the origin of our belief in the -hole distinction lies in the distinction bet-een *erce*tions and antici*ations or memories of *erce*tions( 1 direct *erce*tion is *resent -hen ) ha.e it, and so is -hat is simultaneous -ith it( )n the first *lace this definition in.ol.es a circle, for the -ords @-hen ) ha.e it,@ can only mean @-hen it is *resent@( But if -e left out these -ords, the definition -ould be false, for ) ha.e many direct *resentations -hich are at different times, and -hich cannot, therefore, all be *resent, e+ce*t successi.ely( This, ho-e.er, is the fundamental contradiction of the 1 series, -hich has been already considered( The *oint ) -ish to consider here is different( The direct *erce*tions -hich ) no- ha.e are those -hich no- fall -ithin my @s*ecious *resent@( =f those -hich are beyond it, ) can only ha.e memory or antici*ation( 8o- the @s*ecious *resent @ .aries in length according to circumstances, and may be different for t-o *eo*le at the same *eriod( The e.ent M may be simultaneous both -ith AEs *erce*tion ? and BEs *erce*tion C( 1t a certain moment ? may ha.e ceased to be *art of AEs s*ecious *resent( M, therefore, -ill at that moment be *ast( But at the same moment C may still be *art of BEs s*ecious *resent( 1nd, therefore, M -ill be *resent, at the same moment at -hich it is *ast(

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This is im*ossible( )f, indeed, the 1 series -as something *urely sub9ecti.e, there -ould be no difficulty( 2e could say that M -as *ast for A and *resent for B, 9ust as -e could say that it -as *leasant for A and *ainful for B( But -e are considering attem*ts to ta0e time as real, as something -hich belongs to the reality itself, and not only to our beliefs about it, and this can only be so if the 1 series also a**lies to the reality itself( 1nd if it does this, then at any moment M must be *resent or *ast( )t cannot be both( The *resent through -hich e.ents really *ass, therefore, cannot be determined as simultaneous -ith the s*ecious *resent( )t must ha.e a duration fi+ed as an ultimate fact( This duration cannot be the same as the duration of all s*ecious *resents, since all s*ecious *resents ha.e not the same duration( 1nd thus an e.ent may be *ast -hen ) am e+*eriencing it as *resent, or *resent -hen ) am e+*eriencing it as *ast( The duration of the ob9ecti.e *resent may be the thousandth *art of a second( =r it may be a century, and the accessions of Feorge )I( and Ed-ard I))( may form *art of the same *resent( 2hat reason can -e ha.e to belie.e in the e+istence of such a *resent, -hich -e certainly do not obser.e to be a *resent, and -hich has no relation to -hat -e do obser.e to be a *resent< )f -e esca*e front these difficulties by ta0ing the .ie-, -hich has sometimes been held, that the *resent in the 1 series is not a finite duration, but a mere *oint, se*arating future from *ast, -e shall find other difficulties as serious( 7or then the ob9ecti.e time in -hich e.ents are -ill be something utterly different from the time in -hich -e *ercei.e them( The time in -hich -e *ercei.e them has a *resent of .arying finite duration, and, therefore, -ith the future and the *ast, is di.ided into three durations( The ob9ecti.e time has only t-o durations, se*arated by a *resent -hich has nothing but the name in common -ith the *resent of e+*erience, since it is not a duration but a *oint( 2hat is there in our e+*erience -hich gi.es us the least reason to belie.e in such a time as this< 1nd so it -ould seem that the denial of the reality of time is not so .ery *arado+ical after all( )t -as called *arado+ical because it seemed to contradict our e+*erience so .iolently && to com*el us to treat so much as illusion -hich a**ears prima facie to gi.e 0no-ledge of reality( But -e no- see that our e+*erience of time && centring as it does about the s*ecious *resent && -ould be no less illusory if there -ere a real time in -hich the realities -e e+*erience e+isted( The s*ecious *resent of our obser.ations && .arying as it does from you to me && cannot corres*ond to the *resent of the e.ents obser.ed( 1nd conse:uently the *ast and future of our obser.ations could not corres*ond to the *ast and future of the e.ents obser.ed( =n either hy*othesis && -hether -e ta0e time as real or as unreal && e.erything is obser.ed in a s*ecious *resent, but nothing, not e.en the obser.ations themsel.es, can e.er be in a s*ecious *resent( 1nd in that case ) do not see that -e treat e+*erience as much more illusory -hen -e say that nothing is e.er in a *resent at all, than -hen -e say that e.erything *asses through some entirely different *resent( =ur conclusion, then, is that neither time as a -hole, nor the 1 series and B series, really e+ist( But this lea.es it *ossible that the ; series does really e+ist( The 1 series -as re9ected for its inconsistency( 1nd its re9ection in.ol.ed the re9ection of the B series( But -e ha.e found no such contradiction in the ; series, and its in.alidity does not follo- from the in.alidity of the 1 series(

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)t is, therefore, *ossible that the realities -hich -e *ercei.e as e.ents in a time& series do really form a non&tem*oral series( )t is also *ossible, so far as -e ha.e yet gone, that they do not form such a series, and that they are in reality no more a series than they are tem*oral( But ) thin0 && though ) ha.e no room to go into the :uestion here && that the former .ie-, according to -hich they really do form a ; series, is the more *robable( /hould it be true, it -ill follo- that in our *erce*tion of these realities as e.ents in time, there -ill be some truth as -ell as some error( Through the dece*ti.e form of time, -e shall gras* some of their true relations( )f -e say that the e.ents M and 8 are simultaneous, -e say that they occu*y the same *osition in the time&series( 1nd there -ill be some truth in this, for the realities, -hich -e *ercei.e as the e.ents M and 8, do really occu*y the same *osition in a series, though it is not a tem*oral series( 1gain, if -e assert that the e.ents M, 8, =, are all at different times, and are in that order, -e assert that they occu*y different *ositions in the time&series, and that the *osition of 8 is bet-een the *ositions of M and =( 1nd it -ill be true that the realities -hich -e see as these e.ents -ill be in a series, though not in a tem*oral series, and that their *ositions in it -ill be different, and that the *osition of the reality -hich -e *ercei.e as the e.ent 8 -ill be bet-een the *ositions of the realities -hich -e *ercei.e as the e.ents M and =( )f this .ie- is ado*ted, the result -ill so far resemble those reached by 5egel rather than those of 4ant( 7or 5egel regarded the order of the time&series as a refle+ion, though a distorted refle+ion, of something in the real nature of the timeless reality, -hile 4ant does not seem to ha.e contem*lated the *ossibility that anything in the nature of the noumenon should corres*ond to the time order -hich a**ears in the *henomenon( But the :uestion -hether such an ob9ecti.e ; series does e+ist, must remain for future discussions( 1nd many other :uestions *ress u*on us -hich ine.itably arise if the reality of time is denied( )f there is such a ; series, are *ositions in it sim*ly ultimate facts, or are they determined by the .arying amounts, in the ob9ects -hich hold those *ositions, of some :uality -hich is common to all of them< 1nd, if so, -hat is that :uality, and is it a greater amount of it -hich determines things to a**ear as later, and a lesser amount -hich determines them to a**ear as earlier, or is the re.erse true< =n the solution of these :uestions it may be that our ho*es and tears for the uni.erse de*end for their confirmation or re9ection( 1nd, again, is the series of a**earances in time a series -hich is infinite or finite in length< 1nd ho- are -e to deal -ith the a**earance itself< )f -e reduce time and change to a**earance, must it not be to an a**earance -hich changes and -hich is in time, and is not time, then, sho-n to be real after all< This is doubtless a serious :uestion, but ) ho*e to sho- hereafter that it can be ans-ered in a satisfactory -ay(

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