From the Desk of...

ANN M. FRIEDMAN
Director

Department of Libraries
2100 Clarendon Boulevard, Suite 402
Arlington, Virginia 22201
(703)228-3347 • FAX (703) 228-3354
10 LESSONS LEARNED DURING THE PENTAGON CRISIS

By Richard M. Bridges, APR

Assistant County Manager for Public Affairs, Arlington County,
Va.

I was sitting in class at the Federal Executive Institute

when one of the instructors came in and said, "Dick, you better
come here now." We had just heard the news and seen the CNN
reports about American Airlines Flight 11 and United Airlines
Flight 175 crashing into the World Trade Center, and my mind was
a blank as I followed her out into the lobby. I looked at my
watch. It was just before 10 a.m. "There is a report of a plane
having hit the Pentagon," she said.
As the Pentagon is in Arlington County (despite its
Washington, D.C. address), I knew the county would be mobilizing
and, after one phone call, I was on my way from Charlottesville
to Arlington. Arlington's Fire Department is the primary
responder to fires at the Pentagon by prior agreement with the
Defense Department, and every fire-fighting asset in the county
was on the scene.
The County's Emergency Operations Center had been activated
at 9:53 a.m. and was already up and running when I arrived at
the County building at Courthouse Plaza just after noon. County
Manager Ron Carlee had declared a state of emergency at 11:39
a.m., allowing the County to submit a request to the Federal
Emergency Management Agency through the state of Virginia
During the time that the Arlington County Fire Department
exercised on-site command (Sept. 11-21), the three-person public
affairs staff for the County was responsible for the official
release of information pertaining to the event. This
responsibility entailed an enormous amount of coordination with
federal, state and other local jurisdictions. What follows are
10 lessons learned during the course of the time Arlington was
"in charge."

LESSON #1 - Joint operations are key to operations in which

multiple agencies are involved — most of the time. Conventional
wisdom dictated that a Joint Information Center of some sort be
established, and this was something that I worked on for several
days before giving up. Although the Defense Department was
willing to send a liaison to any such joint center, it was
imperative for them to continue their operations in the Pentagon
to show the world that they had survived and were still capable
of defending the country.
Fortuitously, the Defense Department had allowed the media
to begin their stakeout at a Naval Base Exchange Citgo gas
station just outside the outer perimeter of the crash site. In
my attempts to find a spot for a Joint Information Center, I had
looked specifically at hotels around this area, as I knew the
media would likely not move very far, but just about every site
I explored would not have attracted them away from their
stakeout position. I quickly came to the conclusion that so
long as we knew where the media was and knew that they were not
likely to stir from the Citgo station and that they had
established a Joint Information Center themselves. All
Arlington had to do was to use the site as the central
information dissemination point.

LESSON #2 - No one tells the story better than those who

experienced it firsthand. Getting Fire Chief Ed Plaugher and
Police Chief Ed Flynn out in front of the media immediately was
key, and we had our first briefing in front of 60-plus .
television cameras the afternoon of Sept. llth. We did a
follow-up briefing the next morning, and we next set 10 a.m. and
3 p.m. as regular briefing times at the Citgo site so long as
Arlington County maintained site command at the Pentagon. Once
the media knew that they would be briefed on a regular basis,
they were quite cooperative, and the only problem after that
became keeping the information flowing.
Once the fire was under control (more than 24 hours after
the attack), information that had news value was clearly in the
realm of human interest. Luckily, we had a smorgasbord of
stories, and the media wanted everything we offered. Between
media requests and my own access to operational details of
everything that was going on, the task of finding items of
interest and interview subjects was easy. We featured Arlington
firefighters and police officers that had been first on the
scene at one highly successful briefing. We featured the
members of the Urban Search and Rescue Teams from Fairfax
County, Va., and Montgomery County, Md., at another, complete
with formal thank you from the senior military commander on the
scene, Maj. Gen. James T. Jackson, the commanding general of the
Military District of Washington, D.C. The teams from Tennessee
and Hampton Roads, Va., furnished representatives after their
last shifts on site. The Urban Search and Rescue Team from New
Mexico did a briefing upon arrival and departure. At one
briefing we featured a dog and his handler from the Montgomery
County group. We also featured grief counselors, both from
Arlington and the Red Cross, tapes of the police dispatcher and
the first police units arriving on scene, etc. And the more we
did, the more volunteers we got to come forward to tell their
stories. Other VIPs were attracted by our success at the Citgo
site, such as Virginia Gov. Jim Gilmore, Montgomery County Chief
Executive Doug Duncan, Congressional representatives including
Sen. Hillary Clinton, all of whom came to the Citgo site after
their visits to the crash site. ((Did they visit the site Yes)))

LESSON #3 - The media are never satisfied. The media also

wanted access beyond the Citgo site. The FBI adamantly opposed
access inside the inner perimeter, and all I could arrange was a
photography pool to the edge of the inner perimeter for an hour
on the second day. We only did this once, but the pool system
worked fine, and the pictures expanded on the story as well as
gave the public an idea as to the dangers the Urban Search and
Rescue Teams were facing as they dug into the rubble. We also
arranged for visits into what was then called "Comfort City" in
the South Parking lot of the Pentagon where workers came for
meals and to relax between shifts. This was again a pool set
up, but one which we ran for several days. Getting inside the
inner perimeter was still something the media wanted, but as the
search went from rescue to recovery, the opportunities for media
access on site became slimmer and slimmer. The Department of
Defense went in with a Combat Camera Team to take video of the
interior of the Pentagon at the crash site, and we procured
copies for the media after it was distributed at the Pentagon.

LESSON #4 - Think about what is coming up tomorrow while the

media are busy with today. Anticipating the next steps in the
process was key to the success of the media operation. After
the fire was brought under control, it was important to define
what "under control" meant to the media, as we continued to
fight spot fires for days after it was declared under control.
Most spot fires were under control before they became visible,
and by preparing the media for such eventualities in advance, we
probably helped keep one rather large flare up in perspective.
I specifically asked our operations center to let me know
immediately when the "black boxes" from Flight #77 were found,
as it was clear that that would be the next focal point for the
media.
The next big event was when Arlington County would release
control of the site to the FBI as a crime scene.

LESSON #5 - Think way outside the box especially when expecting

the unexpected. Just when it appeared that we could transfer
site command to the FBI,(((what does this mean?))) we had
reports of a tornado moving toward the Pentagon. This was
compounded by the road-naming system in Arlington, as the media
were quite familiar with South Joyce Street where the Citgo gas
station was, and the initial report I got was that there was
storm damage along South Joyce Street between 17th and 21st
Streets South. In actuality, the storm damage in Arlington
County had occurred over a mile from the Pentagon. The tornado
that did touch down did so in College Park, Md., across the
Potomac River.
Most of the media had my cell phone and pager numbers by
this point, and I talked with a number of reporters to put the
facts in context. I did make a point to contact our 24-hours-a-
day news radio station, WTOP, and made sure they had the story.
Had I had more time and resources, a call to the Associated
Press would have been worth it as well.
On Friday, Sept. 21st, Arlington transferred the site
formally to the FBI. This did not, however, mark the end of the
crisis for the County. Saturday, Sept. 22nd was a regularly
scheduled Board meeting that had to go on, and the County's
efforts to reopen Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport
consumed County public affairs staff after the turnover date.
The end of Arlington's command on the scene was neither the end
of Arlington's participation in the incident (both the Fire and
Police Departments would maintain personnel on site during the
FBI's investigation) or the end of Arlington's own recovery
effort (which began after the site was turned over to the FBI).

LESSON #6 - You can't do it all yourself. Because of my absence

at the beginning of the crisis, Ann Friedman, director of our
Department of Libraries, filled in for me during the first few
hours. She stayed on to assist throughout the crisis, and, as
she owns the County's Web site and the County's cable channel,
Info31, her assistance was essential. Getting things posted on
the Web site both for media and residents was key to our
success, and being able to televise our twice-a-day news
conferences on InfoSl as well as other related items of interest
was enormously valuable. By the end of the 10 days, only CSPAN
was able to provide as much raw information as our Info 31 crew.
(Info 31 or InfoSl??)
Press releases were virtually impossible to prepare,
coordinate and issue on a timely basis. I initially relied
solely on getting the word out through the media by linking them
directly via interviews with those actually responsible for the
work on the scene. Ann came up with a better idea, however, and
exercised a contract option to provide transcripts of the daily
briefings that were posted on the Web site. This print record
was a valuable addition to our record keeping and our provision
of accurate information to the media.
 We eventually did ask for some additional staff from
Fairfax County. The addition of three more personnel helped some
of my staff, who, after a week, needed a break. In retrospect,
this is something I should have done sooner.

LESSON #7 - Communication is a 24-hours-a-day business. The

media all had access to my cell phone and pager numbers. I had
put an extended absence message on my office phone offering the
numbers to anyone who called as well. Any member of the media
could reach me at any time, and they mercifully used the access
judiciously.
Staffing one number full-time with a person who could at
least take a message and make a determination as to whether I
should be disturbed at home was critical. We settled on public
affairs staffing from 8 a.m. until 8 p.m. daily, and the
overnight operations section would answer phones when a member
of my staff was not there.

LESSON #8 - Uniforms are more important than suits. Throughout

the 10 days, it was conveyed to me time and again that if you
wore a firefighter or police officer or deputy sheriff uniform,
you commanded more respect and had better access everywhere you
went. And for this crisis, that is how it should be. The men
and women on the scene of the incident were the ones with the
firsthand information and the personal experiences and thoughts
that could bring home to the American people the magnitude of
the tragedy and our ability to deal with it. What politicians or
public affairs people had to say was only interesting if it was
preliminary to putting the uniforms out in front. The only
exception I experienced was my announcement concerning the black
boxes.
Two of the three public affairs personnel from Fairfax
County wore the uniform, one each from the police and fire
departments. They were invaluable as escorts for out media
pools into South Parking and "Comfort City." Their uniforms
implied that we were OK to be where we were.
I also eventually succumbed and accepted the Sheriff's
offer of a full-time driver. With the security measures in
place, the only way one could get anywhere near the scene was
via police vehicle.

LESSON #9 - Pace yourself. On the first day of the crisis, I

worked about 12 hours, after which I went home. I split shifts
with my two personnel so that one would come in early and the
other would stay until 8 p.m. I normally came in by 7 a.m. to
get ready for the day and to get the 8 a.m. operational briefing
and guidance from the manager. Ann Friedman forced me into a
more liberal weekend schedule to allow staff a full day off.
When Chief Plaugher set a 10-day estimate on the length of time
we would be in charge of the site, I set 10 days as my goal as
well. Bottom line is that you can't be everywhere all the time,
and you need to hold something in reserve in case something else
happens.

LESSON #10 - Use the occasion of the crisis to teach and coach
your staff. The task of mentoring is not one that normally
comes to mind in a crisis, but it should. Involving members of
the public affairs staff insofar as possible, and according to
their current abilities, is key both to them feeling a true part
of the operation as well as preparing them for careers in public
affairs. Simple accuracy in taking phone messages and getting
relevant data from a media representative as part of the message
can save time for the public affairs chief and cause a junior
staff member to think on his/her feet.
Media escort duties are something else that puts
subordinates in a position to interact directly with the media
as well as deal with the inevitable snafus that plague even such
carefully pre-coordinated visits. Putting a subordinate out in
front of the microphone stand in front of 64 television cameras
to spell out the names of the primary briefers for the day gives
him or her a chance to experience what standing in front of a
media horde feels like without endangering them or your
operation. Allowing a subordinate to give a two-minute warning
to those media taking the briefing live also gives practice at
the microphone.
By the same token, this can be overdone. At one point we
were rotating Fire Department battalion chiefs through
briefings, and the information from one briefing to the next
started to unravel. Deadlines changed. Data was seemingly
contradicted. Sometimes you can have too many spokespersons.
As a last lesson, and certainly no less important than any
of the others, say thank you as often as possible to everyone
around you. They are all trying their absolute best, and they
all want to help. This includes the firefighters, police
officers, deputy sheriffs, human service workers, etc. It also
includes those who have maintained the regular County operations
and were never involved directly with the crisis. That the
organization's primary functions were maintained is of great
importance, and the difficulty involved in doing so when the
focus of many of the key staff is elsewhere shows how good the
stay-behind staff is.