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Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)

This document provides an overview of Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA). It defines FMEA as a systematic approach to identifying potential failures, their causes and effects. FMEA generates a living document that delineates known failure modes and mitigation measures. The document then discusses how FMEA is applied to new product and process development, providing an example of applying FMEA to integrated circuit fabrication. It also outlines the key components of an FMEA, including potential failures, effects, causes, ratings for severity, occurrence, detection and risk priority numbers.

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100% found this document useful (1 vote)
317 views

Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)

This document provides an overview of Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA). It defines FMEA as a systematic approach to identifying potential failures, their causes and effects. FMEA generates a living document that delineates known failure modes and mitigation measures. The document then discusses how FMEA is applied to new product and process development, providing an example of applying FMEA to integrated circuit fabrication. It also outlines the key components of an FMEA, including potential failures, effects, causes, ratings for severity, occurrence, detection and risk priority numbers.

Uploaded by

recep1
Copyright
© Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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Prof.

RobLeachman IEOR130 Fall,2013


9/3/13 FMEA Rob Leachman

Definition:FMEAisasystematicapproachtothe managementofproductorprocess development.Itinvolves:


Identifyingallpotentialwaysaproductorprocess couldfail Identifyingtheeffectsorconsequencesofsuch failures Identifyingandimplementingmethodsormeasuresto eliminateorreducethechanceofsuchfailures occurring
9/3/13 FMEA Rob Leachman

FMEAgeneratesalivingdocumentforthe productorprocessdelineatingallknownfailure modes,theireffects,andthemitigation measuresimplementedtoprecludefailures. Formalapplicationsbeganintheaerospace industryinthemid1960s.Subsequently,FMEA wasadoptedbymanyotherindustries(e.g., automotive,semiconductors).


9/3/13 FMEA Rob Leachman

Developmentofanewprocessflowtofabricate integratedcircuitsisdividedintomodules correspondingtomajorprocesssteps(e.g.,a photolithographystepmodule,aplasmaetching stepmodule,andsoon). Typically,eachmoduleincludesoneormore measurementsperformedasthelastsubstep(s)of themodulethatprovethatnoneofthefailure modesarepresentbeforethesiliconwafersare passedtothenextmodule.
9/3/13 FMEA Rob Leachman

FMEAismosteffectivewhenperformedbeforea designisreleasedratherthanafterthefact
Thefocusshouldbeonfailurepreventionratherthan justfailuredetection

Assuch,FMEAisastandardengineering managementpracticeusedinthedevelopment ofnewproducts

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FMEA

Rob Leachman

DesignFMEA examinesthefunctionsofa component,subsystemormainsystem


Potentialfailuresfromincorrectmaterialchoiceor inappropriatespecifications Example:AirBag(excessiveairbaginflatorforce)

ProcessFMEA examinestheprocessesusedto makeacomponent,subsystemormainsystem


Potentialfailuresfromincorrectassemblyorexcess processvariationresultinginoutofspecproduct Example:AirBagassemblyprocess(carassemblyline operatormightnotinstallairbagproperlysuchthatit mightnotengageduringimpact)
9/3/13 FMEA Rob Leachman

BasicandSecondaryFunctions verbnoun descriptionsofwhatproduct(process)does.


BasicFunction:ingresstoandegressfromvehicle Secondaryfunctions protectoccupantfromnoise

FailureMode physicaldescriptionofafailure.
noiseentersatdoortoroofinterface

FailureEffects impactoffailureonpeople,equipment
driverdissatisfaction

FailureCause referstocauseofthefailure
insufficientdoorseal
9/3/13 FMEA Rob Leachman

Identifypotential failuremode Identifypotential effect(s)offailure mode Identifypotential cause(s)offailure mode Determine severity

Determine occurrence Determinerisk prioritynumber (RPN) Determine detectability Identifyactions leadingto improvement
Rob Leachman

Evaluatecurrent controlsordesign verification process


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Severityisaratingcorrespondingtotheseriousnessofaneffectofa
potentialfailuremode.(Scale:110.1:noeffectonoutput,5:moderate effect,8:seriouseffect,10:hazardouseffect)

Occurrenceisaratingcorrespondingtotherateatwhichafirstlevel
causeanditsresultantfailuremodewilloccuroverthedesignlifeofthe system,overthedesignlifeoftheproduct,orbeforeanyadditionalprocess controlsareapplied.(Scale:110.1:failureunlikely,5:occasionalfailure,8: high#offailureslikely,10:failurescertain)

Detectionisaratingcorrespondingtothelikelihoodthatthedetection
methodsorcurrentcontrolswilldetectthepotentialfailuremodebeforethe productisreleasedforproductionfordesign,orforprocessbeforeitleaves theproductionfacility.(Scale:110.1:willdetectfailure,5:mightdetect failure,10:almostcertainnottodetectfailures)

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FMEA

Rob Leachman

TheRPNidentifiesthegreatestareasofconcern.It combinestheassessmentsofthe (1)Severityrating, (2)Occurrencerating,and (3)Detectionratingforapotentialfailuremode.


RPN=SeverityRatingxOccurrenceRatingxDetection Rating
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Theseverityis9or10(potentiallyhazardous failures),OR SeverityratingxOccurrenceratingishigh,OR RPN(severityxoccurrencexdetection)ishigh. NoabsoluterulesforwhatisahighRPNnumber. Rather,failuremodesoftenareviewedonarelative scale(i.e.,highestRPNisaddressedfirst).

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FMEA

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Companiesoftenidentifyspecialproduct characteristicswithanappropriatesymbolon theFMEAworksheet. Thesespecialcriticalcharacteristics(CCs)are typicallyitemswhichaffectregulatory compliance,suchasitemswhichrequirea warninggiventoconsumersorspecialprocess controls.


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AsfirststepstowardgeneratinganFMEA document,itisoftenusefulto
Performafunctionalanalysis,then GenerateFMEAcauseandeffectdiagrams.

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FMEA

Rob Leachman

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Identifythebasicandsecondaryfunction(s) of productsorprocessesusingverbnounrelationships. Basicfunctions:specificfunctionswhichaproductor processisdesignedtodo.


Mousetrapexample:basicfunctionistoKillMouseor CatchMouse.

Secondaryfunctions:allotherfunctionswhichare subordinatetothebasicfunction(e.g.,closetrap).
9/3/13 FMEA Rob Leachman

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Afailuremodeistypicallyjusttheinabilityto performafunctionidentifiedinthefunctional analysis. Example:Describefailuremodesforacardoor:


Basicfunction:ingress/egressvehicle
Failuremodes:doordoesnotopen,doorsticks,door doesnotopenwideenough

SecondaryFunction:protectoccupantfromnoise
FailureMode:doordoesnotseal,doorheaderleaks
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Methods

Note:failuremodemayhave multiplecausesand/or multipleeffects Failure Mode

Machinery Material People Downstream Process EndUser Operation Environment Customer Safety Causes
9/3/13 FMEA Rob Leachman

Effects
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Methods: Lackofproper warnings Machinery: Regulatornot functioning FailureMode Material: Bagmaterial tooabrasive People: Passenger toosmall Injurelightweight passenger

Environment: Passenger notwearing seatbelt


FMEA

Occupantunable toabsorbinflation force

Bruisepassenger incrash Killsmall children Effects

Causes
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PartorProcessName Design/Mfg Responsibility OtherAreasInvolved

AutomotivePassengerAirBagSystem

SuppliersandPlantsAffected ModelDate

EngineeringChangeLevel

Process Operation, ProductFunction orPurpose Inflateairbag

PotentialFailure Mode

Potential Effect(s)of Failure

S C E C V

PotentialCause(s) ofFailure O C C Sensorisnot functioning properly 2

CurrentControls EvaulationMethod D S R E * P T O N 6 16 96

RecommendedAction(s)

Bagdoesnot InjurePassenger 8 * openonimpact

Lighttonotifysystem ismalfucntioning

Addredundantsensorto monitorimpact

Restrain passenger

Occupantunable towithstand inflationforce

Injurelightweight Passengernot 8 * 4 passenger wearingseatbelt

None

10 32 320

1)Installswitchwhich deactivatesairbagsystem unlessseatbeltisworn 2)Consumereducationofair bagsystempotentialfailures

Bruisepassenger 3 incrash

Forceregulatornot Repeatabilitytestsin 2 3 working lab

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LastcolumnsofFMEAWorksheetareusedto identifyimprovementplan:
Recommendedactions Identifyresponsibilitytocompleteactions Identifytargetdatestocompleteactions ListactionstakenandreassessRPN

LikeotherQualityControlmethodologies,FMEA usesaMeasure Analyze Improve Control cycle.


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